

THE FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICS AND THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL
THOUGHTS IN THE EARLY OTTOMAN EMPIRE

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ABSTRACT

THE FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICS AND THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHTS IN THE EARLY OTTOMAN EMPIRE

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This thesis study analyzes the development of Ottoman social structure and the foundations of politics in Ottoman society in a time period from the 14th century to the beginning of the 16th century, and, based on this analysis, develops a research to reveal the historical meaning of political thoughts in Ottoman society. In the first part of the thesis, the structure of political thoughts, methodological approaches in the history of political thoughts, discussions on social formation types, the development of the Ottoman social formation, the structure of Ottoman society and the state problem are discussed in detail. In this context, the foundations of the Ottoman political structure are explained with reference to the concept of rentier mode of production, the development of the Ottoman state is revealed, and the structure of various classes and strata that make up the Ottoman society is analyzed. In the second part of the thesis, Ottoman political thought is analyzed based on primary historical sources. First of all, the rent and status-based struggles of various social segments with each other are analyzed, and the social struggles of which political thought examples were a part and the intellectual traditions they emerged from are included in this analysis as a whole. Secondly, law, justice, the image of the ruler, political tactics and genealogical constructions are evaluated as a part of the history of political thought, and the development of ideological formation, dominant identity and political discourse is analyzed within this framework.

Keywords: History of political thought, Ottoman political thought, rentier mode of production, social classes, political culture

ÖZ

ERKEN DÖNEM OSMANLI İMPARATORLUĞU'NDA SİYASETİN TEMELLERİ VE SİYASAL DÜŞÜNCELER TARİHİ

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Bu tez çalışması 14. yüzyıldan 16. yüzyılın başına kadar uzanan bir zaman aralığında Osmanlı toplumsal yapısının gelişimi ile Osmanlı toplumunda siyasal ilişkilerin temellerini analiz etmekte ve bu analizi temel alarak Osmanlı toplumunda siyasal düşüncelerin tarihsel anlamını ortaya çıkartmaya yönelik bir araştırma yürütmektedir. Tezin ilk bölümünde siyasal düşüncelerin yapısı, siyasal düşünceler tarihi alanında metodolojik yaklaşımlar, toplumsal formasyon tipolojisi tartışmaları, Osmanlı toplumsal formasyonunun gelişimi, Osmanlı toplumunun yapısı ve devlet problemi ayrıntılı olarak ele alınmaktadır. Bu çerçevede Osmanlı siyasal yapısının temelleri yeni bir yaklaşım olarak rantier üretim tarzı kavramına atıfla açıklanmakta, Osmanlı devletinin gelişimi serimlenmekte ve Osmanlı toplumunu oluşturan farklı sınıf ve tabakaların yapısı analiz edilmektedir. Tezin ikinci kısmında ise Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesi birincil tarihsel kaynaklara dayanılarak analiz edilmektedir. İlk olarak çeşitli toplumsal kesimlerin birbirleri ile rant ve statü merkezli mücadeleleri analiz edilmekte, siyasal düşünce örneklerinin parçası olduğu toplumsal mücadeleler ve içerisinden çıktıkları düşünsel gelenekler bir bütün olarak bu analize dahil edilmektedir. İkinci olarak hukuk, adalet, hükümdar imgesi, siyasal taktikler ve soykütük inşaları siyasal düşünceler tarihinin bir parçası olarak değerlendirilmekte, ideolojik formasyonun, egemen kimliğin ve siyasal söylemin gelişimi bu çerçevede analiz edilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyasal düşünceler tarihi, Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesi, rantier üretim tarzı, toplumsal sınıflar, siyasal kültür

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I am happy to be able to complete a preliminary study in this thesis that, in my opinion, should have been carried out at least thirty years ago. During the research and writing phases of the thesis, I struggled with pandemics, natural disasters and very harsh election periods. It was very difficult to access many sources and also, I had to develop new theoretical approaches, and this was often a complete struggle. In this process, I consider myself very lucky to be able to see further by standing on the shoulders of giants. For this reason, I know that young researchers who will come after me will be able to approach this complex field more easily, and I hope with all my heart that they will be able to carry their studies in this field much further than I did. What I can recommend to them is to be brave and not hesitate to build theories and develop large scale analysis, because many nuclei that can contribute the theory of history and politics in this field are waiting for new researchers, whose names have yet been unknown.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- Ahmed Cevdet: Ahmed Cevdet Paşa
Amâsî: Ahmed bin Hüsameddin Amâsî
AMP: Asiatic mode of production
Apzd: Âşıkpaşazâde/ Aşıkpaşaoğlu Tarihi
Bitlisî: İdrîs-i Bitlisî
Bursalı: Bursalı Mehmet Veliyyüddin Efendi
e.g. : For example
el-Mâverdî: Ebü'l-Hasen el-Mâverdî
EI: Encyclopedia Iranica
Esterâbâdî: Aziz B. Erdeşir-i Esterâbâdî
et al. : And others
etc. : And so forth
Fetihnâme: Mahrûse-i İstanbul Fetihnâmesi
ff. : Following pages
FMP: Feudal mode of production
Hacı Bektâş: Hünkar Hacı Bektâş/ Hacı Bektâş-ı Velî
Hayton: Hayton of Korkykos/ Korykoslu Hayton
İA: İslam Ansiklopedisi
i.e. : That is
Karamânî: Karamanlı Mehmet Paşa/ Karamânî Mehmet Paşa
Korkud: Prince Korkut/Şehzade Korkud
Oruç: Oruç Bin Âdil
RMP: Rentier mode of production
TDVİA: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi
TMP: Tributary mode of production
Tursun: Tursun Bey
TPEIPT: The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought
[]: Parts added to the original text by me
[tm]: Translation is mine

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HISTORICAL STRUCTURE

This PhD study examines the foundations of political relations in the region dominated by the Ottoman rule and the characteristics of political thoughts that developed within the framework of these relations, in a time period from the beginning of the 14th century to the first quarter of the 16th century. This historical survey is based on four founding theses. The main thesis is that Ottoman political organizations, widespread political relations and institutions were largely organized around a class-based pattern, and political thoughts emerged in relation to this basic antagonism. According to this thesis, class relations, visions and contradictions directly or indirectly assume a constitutive function in most of the cultural, economic and political conflict lines of Ottoman society. This function includes the defense of the general interests of the ruling classes, the organization of their political power, the protection of the particular interests of the various social segments, the determination of the rights and status of the social groups included in the ruling class, and the formulation of the political aims and positions of the resistance movements against the development of class domination in general. The second thesis of this study is that although Ottoman political thought has a complex and deep discursive structure that standing on its historical predecessors, it is not possible to simply reduce these premises to the concepts of belief, ethnicity, or tradition. The aforementioned reduction patterns are far from having a competent conceptual inclusiveness as they overlook a fundamental element that constitutes the essence of Ottoman political life and therefore political thought. It is possible to name this element, which is referred to in different political contexts and historical periods throughout this thesis, forming a common intersection point and establishing a relationship between various cultural codes, organizational structures and social institutions, as social class relations and phenomenon of stratification. In this respect, it is necessary to analyze class relations as well as the historical effects of the *Meşşâî* philosophy tradition, which can be considered as the original representative of Ancient Greek political thought, the mystical world view developed in *sûfi* circles, Islamic Law, Iranian poetry and advice tradition, and political and ideological structures that preceded the Ottoman Empire. The third thesis of this study is that the Ottoman

society did not form a homogeneous unison either in terms of organizational, cultural or mental structures or in terms of social stratification. In the context of this thesis, it can be argued that the Ottoman society and the components of the state organization as an extension of it do not form a homogeneous entity, on the contrary, they take place in a contradictory formation based on their different social origins, professions, economic interests and status demands. The elements of this contradictory unity unite around common political themes to protect their general class interests and status to the extent that they are part of the ruling classes, but they never abandon the idea of defending their particular interests and status. The fourth thesis of this study is that the course of development of the Ottoman state as a social organization, with its historical articulation relations and social contradictions, is one of the dominant mediums in the history of political thoughts. The development of the Ottoman state from an early-state form to an imperial form also constituted a reference/base/criticism element for a significant part of political relations and visions. Moreover, as an important extension of the indicated development, the main issues of the written political culture that develops within the bureaucracy, various social strata and the urban population and is nourished by patronage relations developed as the organization, dissemination and reproduction of state authority within 'legitimate limits'. The political vision and practices of the autonomist elements who were against this organizational pattern gained their historical meaning as the main antagonist of the institutionalization practice in question.

The four theses pointed out throughout this PhD study are included in the analysis under three basic research categories and information is produced in these categories with reference to these four theses. These three categories, which will be pointed out below, can be named as theoretical, sociological and historical categories. The first two of the chapters corresponding to these categories, as stated in the title of the thesis, were written in order to analyze the foundations of political relations in the early Ottoman Empire and to establish a new formulation about the formation of political sphere in it. In this context, the historical analysis, which constitutes the last part, analyzes the historical development of Ottoman political thought within the framework of the formulated foundations.

If the structure of this categorical analysis, which follows the main parts of the thesis, is briefly described, the theoretical analysis of the issue is made first in the introduction part of the thesis and in a series of chapters that follow. The main subjects of the theoretical analysis carried out are: (i) theoretical analysis of the phenomenon of

politics and the concept of political thought, determination of the methodological features of the field of the history of political thought, (ii) summarizing the social formation discussions and analysis of the Ottoman social structure. Secondly, a sociological analysis is carried out on the Ottoman social structure. This analysis has three main titles, and these titles can be listed as follows: (i) analyzing various social strata and segments with their political influence in Ottoman society, (ii) analyzing the development pattern and typology of the Ottoman state, (iii) analyzing the social position of writers and thinkers who influenced Ottoman political thought. In the last analysis, this last title, which is included in the sub-research field of the discipline of sociology of literature, is not dealt with as a separate section and is briefly analyzed in various parts of the thesis according to the structure of evaluated political arguments. The reason for this preference is that there is no sufficient information on the biographies of many writers in the early imperial period, and that writers, unlike modern ideologues, focused on striking a certain balance between the interests of more than one social group or class rather than being the spokesperson of a single social group or class, and were the subjects of family backgrounds and patronage relations at the same time. For this reason, instead of focusing directly on the identity of the authors, it would be more accurate to make a categorical analysis -at least for this period- about the written, verbal and visual mediums in which Ottoman political thought was formulated and shared. Such a categorical analysis is given at the end of the introduction section. Finally, historical analysis constitutes a significant part of this thesis. In this analysis category, the development of Ottoman political thought is analyzed in the frame of its historical establishment, development and interrelations. This analysis has several key themes. These themes can be listed as follows: (i) chronological analysis of Ottoman political thought within the framework of the development of Ottoman political organizations and institutions, (ii) comparative analysis of political thought examples with their contemporaries, (iii) comparative analysis of the themes of political thought prevailing in a particular historical period, (iv) exposition of the political thought traditions that preceded it in terms of their effects on the examples of Ottoman political thought, (v) interpretation of the examples of political thought with reference to the political tendencies and contradictions of their own periods. These titles are generally presented in a chronological framework by making partial retrospective and prospective comparisons and historical analysis.

Another issue that should be mentioned is the position that this thesis study locates itself in the academic literature and the issues that it claims to contribute to the literature. As a subject of academic interest, the field of the history of political thought in the Ottoman Empire was found less interesting than other fields of Ottoman history. Although studies in this field have increased in number and developed in quality in recent years, it can be argued that the increasing interest is supported by a series of approaches with obvious limitations. First of all, some of the approaches that support the interest in this field do not focus on a specific historical period and examine Ottoman political thought in an almost ahistorical integrity. In this style of analysis, Ottoman political thought is reconstructed as a monolithic moral, religious and political code that dominated the long years of the empire. A second approach focuses on a period in Ottoman history called the 'classical age' and analyzes this period and restores the elements of the history of political thought in a way that creates a kind of golden age image. In addition to these, it is possible to talk about the existence of another contemporary approach that compiles and partially interprets the basic texts of Ottoman political thought and presents them to both academic and popular use. A remarkable branch of this approach interprets Ottoman political thought by comparing it with the themes of ancient Mesopotamian and Iranian political culture. Although both of the last mentioned contemporary approaches have produced their first works trying to reach a wide-scale synthesis, it is difficult to claim that they have given the most competent examples of such studies yet. On the other hand, the dominant approach in this field, especially until the nineteen seventies, was the nationalist-developmental approach, which made the thesis that Ottoman society could not reach a similar economic and political level with contemporary Western societies as a basis for criticism. This approach takes as reference the reform literature that emerged especially after the 16th century and tries to reach a conclusion by examining the corruption patterns of institutions. It is quite surprising to encounter a similar approach in Marxist criticism, which started to give its first examples in the sixties and seventies. This approach also analyzes the social structure around the question of why capitalism could not develop in Ottoman society and critically analyzes examples of political thought in this context. Although the nationalist-developmental approach has been able to produce some formulations in this regard that have become widespread in popular use, it is noticed that the Marxist approach has not been able to produce a detailed study and interpretation in line with the above-mentioned approaches. Another remarkable point

is that the focal points of all of these approaches mentioned above were the 16th century and later, and they did not sufficiently deal with the early period of the empire - especially in terms of the discipline of the history of political thought. The main point that this thesis study claims to contribute to the literature is that it subjected the early Ottoman political thought to a detailed close-reading and carried out a comparative and critical analysis of it.

In general, conservative, nationalist or descriptive historiographic tendencies have succeeded in providing basic reference works since the second half of the nineteenth seventies. Although the Marxist approach completed such studies in Western European countries and the Balkans in the seventies, it cannot be considered to have completed its analysis on the Ottoman Empire. Although a number of remarkable studies were published in the early eighties, late nineties and recent period to complete such an analysis, their impact was limited. For this reason, one of the main purposes of this thesis is to complete such a study that should have been completed in the seventies and to pave the way for new approaches and researches. For this reason, in the theoretical part of the thesis, a broad summary of the approaches to Ottoman society will be given, and the contradictory conceptual structure and political background of the approaches made before the seventies -and which form the basis of some established opinions that are accepted without criticism today- will be shown. In this context, the second main feature that this thesis claims to contribute to the literature emerges: The making of a new and competent Marxist analysis of the Ottoman social structure and a detailed analysis of examples of political thought that has not been done before in this framework. When the theoretical part following the introductory part is examined, it will be seen that the modest contribution indicated conceptually includes the proposal of a new concept of mode of production (rentier mode of production) and a type of political regime (bureaucratic autarky).

Another point that should be mentioned about the relevance of this thesis in the literature is that it contains an effort to reverse a trend observed in the secondary literature in general. A general feature of the above-mentioned approaches, to be determined critically, is that they take repetitive concepts and themes in Ottoman political thought as patterns and reformulate them as a uniform political discourse. This general tendency seen in the secondary literature erodes the details of the concepts and interpretations of different authors in certain political conjunctures and treats them as the representative of a single thought in an abstract integrity. On the other hand, this

tendency is an anachronistic one. The political ideas formulated in the pre-modern period are not fabricated in the production line of the culture industry as in the modern period, and thus they are not standardized ideological discourses. For this reason, it is a more accurate method to analyze pre-modern examples of political thought not by filing the rich details they contain and generalizing their forms, but by revealing extraordinary details and subjecting them to a comparative criticism. In this respect, this thesis makes a close reading of examples of political thought and aims to reach general conclusions by comparing and interpreting their particular features, and aims to contribute to the literature in this way.

Finally, it would be appropriate to give brief information about the main reference sources used throughout this thesis study. First of all, it should be noted that there are serious differences between the forms of organization of political thoughts that emerged in different periods throughout history. For example, while a Law-centered political debate became dominant in the early phase of the modern period, topics such as history and economics in the 19th century and individual freedom, culture and ethics from the second half of the 20th century constituted the dominant discussion areas. In the pre-modern period, it is noticed that the political thoughts developed especially in the written culture are concentrated in the fields of religion, morality and military history. It is necessary not to accept such a categorization as absolutely correct without detailing it. In accordance with the social structure of the pre-modern period, the absence of a sharp differentiation between science, philosophy, historiography, religion and moral thought makes it possible—even the norm—to include examples of political thoughts belong more than one category in texts. In this respect, a certain type of work often includes sections, quotations, information or comments from other genres. Information about the basic categories in which Ottoman political thought was expressed is given at the end of the introduction section. For this reason, in this section, the concrete categories and works to which the examples of political thought used throughout the thesis belong will be briefly stated, and the analysis of this will be done in the indicated section. The texts analyzed throughout the thesis and accepted as the main reference point in terms of the history of political thoughts, roughly belong to fifteen basic categories. These categories can be listed as follows: (i) *siyâsetnâmes* and advice books, (ii) *menâkıbnâmes*, (iii) *sûfî* texts, (iv) studies on religious sciences, (v) *gazavâtnâmes*, (vi) travel books, (vii) historical narratives, (viii) literary works, (ix) scientific compilations, (x) epistolaries, (xi) memoirs, (xii) *fütüvvetnâmes*, (xiii)

customary law collections, (xiv) philosophical texts, (xvi) architectural monuments and inscriptions as well as coinage.

If a brief information is given about the works used in the said categories, first of all, it can be started from the classification of the works *siyâsetnâmes* and advice books. The number of works written in the type of *siyâsetnâme* and advice in the early Ottoman Empire is quite limited. This type of works was started to be written mostly towards the second half of the 16th century, and finally, *islâhatnâmes* were added to this genre in the 17th century. The *siyâsetnâmes* that constitute the main reference point in the period until the first half of the 16th century, which constitute the scope of our thesis, are as follows: *Mirâtu'l-Mülûk* (Ahmed bin Hüsameddin Amâsî), *Kenz'ül-Küberâ ve Mehek'ül-'ulemâ* and *Kitâb-ı Düstûr-ı Şâhî Fî-hikâyet-i Pâdişâhî* (Şeyhoğlu Mustafa), *Maârifnâme* (Sinan Paşa), *Kanûn-i Şâhenşâhî* and *Mirâtu'l-cemâl* (İdrîs-i Bitlisî), *Da'vetü'n-nefsi't-tâliha ile'l-a'mâli's-sâliha* (Şehzâde Korkud), and an anonymous *siyâsetnâme* presented to Bayezid II. In addition to these works, the advice letter sent by Murat I to Evrenos Beg and the texts named *Nasihâtü Sultan Murad*, whose originality is controversial, can be mentioned.¹ Secondly, it is necessary to briefly mention the secondary sources written in the *siyâsetnâme* form and used in order to present a comparative analysis of Ottoman political thought. The main ones of these works are: *Al-Ahkâm al-Sultâniyye wa'l-Wilâyât al-Dîniyye* ve *Dürerü's-Sülûk fî Siyâseti'l-Mülûk* (Al-Mawardî), *Kitâbü't-Tac fî ahlâki'l-mülûk* (Ebu Osman el-Cahîz), *el-Ikdü'l-ferid* (Ibn Abdîrabbih), *Mukaddime* (Ibn Haldun), *Seyfü'l Mülûk Ve'l-Hükkam*, *Seyfü'l-Kudat 'Ale'l-Buğat* (Muhyiddin el-Kâfiyeci), *Tuhfetü't-Türk* (Necmeddin et-Tarsûsî), *Siyâsetnâme* (Nizamü'l-Mülk), *Ahlâk-ı Nâsirî* (Nasîrüddîn-i Tûsî), *Mirsadü'l-ibad mine'l-mebde' ile'l-mead* (Necmeddîn-i Dâye), *Nasihâtü'l-mülûk*, *nasihatnâme*, *Takrirat-ı Selase* (Sa'dî-yi Şîrâzî), *Kitâbü't-tahâre ve tahâretü'n-nefs* (Ibn Miskawayh).

Secondly, it is possible to briefly talk about the works of written under the form of *menâkıbnâme*. Ottoman literature is very rich in terms of *menâkıbnâmes*, and such works sometimes contain examples of political thought in the form of sections, sometimes fragments, and sometimes anecdotes. The main examples of *menâkıbnâmes* used in this thesis study can be listed as follows: *Menâkıbü'l Tâcü'l-ârifîn* (Vâsî'tî), *Menâkıb-ı Eşrefzâde* (Bursalı Mehmet Veliyyüddin Efendi), *Menâkıb-ı Emir Sultan*

¹ Since these two texts were written in a later period and their originality are questionable, they were not used in the thesis. For the text of the advice that Murat I sent to Evrenos Beg, see Çabuk (1996, pp. 151-59). A critical analysis of the origin of *Nasihâtü Sultan Murad* will be made in the following sections.

(Hüsâmeddin Bursevî), *Vesîletü'l-Metâlib fî Cevâhiri'l-Menâkıb* (Halepli İbrahim Çelebi), *velayetnâme-i Pîri Baba*, *velayetnâme-i Kolu Açık Hacım Sultan*, *Menâkıb-ı Şeyh Bedreddin Sultan*, *Der-beyân-ı Menâkıb Âl-i Osman*, *Menâkıb-ı Şeyh Bedreddin* (Hâfız Halîl), *Hamzanâmes*, *Menâkıb-ı Hacı Bektâş-ı Velî*, *Menâkıb-ı Abdal Musa*, *Menâkıb-ı İlyâs İbn-i İsâ Akhisâri Saruhânî*, *Menâkıb-ı Şeyh Alâeddin Ali es-Semerkindî*, *Menâkıb-ı evliyâ (Buyruk)*, *Menâkıb-ı Bayramiye*, *velayetnâme-i Seyyid Ali Sultan*, *velayetnâme-i Otman Baba*. In addition, *Saltuknâme* (Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî), which contains common elements from both *menâkıbnâme* and *gazavâtnâme* forms, can be mentioned within this framework.

Under the third heading, there are works on *sûfîsm*. The works used within the framework of the thesis in this category can be listed as follows: *Envâru'l âşıkîn ve Dürr-i meknûn* (Ahmed Bican), *Yenbû-ı Hikmet* (Uşşâkî), *Tasvirü'l-Kulub* (Börklüce Mustafa), *Kitâb-ı Sırr-ı Kalbî* (Dervîş Külhenî), *Hikâyât-ı nây* (Akbiyık Sultan), *Vâridât* (Şeyh Bedreddin), *Menâkıb-ı evliyâ (Buyruk)*, *Maârifnâme ve Tazarru'-nâme* (Sinan Paşa), *Makalât* (Hacı Bektâş-ı Velî), *Risâletü'n-Nushiyye* (Yunus Emre), various works of Kaygusuz Abdal, poems of Abdurrahim-i Tirsî. In terms of comparison, İbnü'l-Arabî's various mystical works, Ghazali's *Elmaksadü'l esna şerh-u esmaillahil'husna*, and *Mirsadü'l-ibad mine'l-mebde' ile'l-mead* (Necmeddin-i Dâye) can also be mentioned in this context.

The fourth title, the works on religious sciences, are as follows: *Da'vetü'n-nefsi't-tâliha ile'l-a'mâli's-sâliha ve İşkâlî'l-Efkâr fî Hilli Emvali'l-Küffar* (Şehzâde Korkud), *Nesâyih* (Kemâlpaşazâde), Sheikh Bedreddin's works on Islamic Law, Shiite and Sunni caliphate theory and theology works, *Mirsadü'l-ibad mine'l-mebde' ile'l-mead* (Necmeddîn-i Dâye). The fifth title is about the category of works written in the *gazavâtnâme* genre. It is possible to list the main works in this category as follows: *Gazavât-ı mukaffa* and *Gazavât-ı umman* (Tursun Fakih), *Gazavât-ı Sultan Murad b. Mehmed Han*, *Gazânâme-i Rûm* (Kâşifi), *Gazavât-ı Mihaloğlu Ali Bey*, *Fetihnâme-i Sultan Mehmed* (Kıvâmî), *İskendernâme* and *Gazavâtnâme* (Ahmedî), *Saltuknâme* (Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî), *Selîmnâme* (Celâlzâde Mustafa), *Hamzanâme*, *Battalnâme*, *Müseyyebnâme*, *Gazavât-ı Ebu Müslim el-Horasanî*. Although the works in the genre of *seyahatnâme* were not directly part of Ottoman political thought, they were used as historical sources to make a comparative study. It is possible to list the authors who wrote this type of work and whose works were used in the thesis as follows: J. Barbaro,

J. P. Carpini, J. Schiltberger, Hayton of Corycus, Ibn Fadlan, Marco Polo, Ibn Battuta, Bertrandon de la Broquière, C. Zeno and A. Contarini.

The historical works in the seventh place constitute the category of written culture in which Ottoman political thought took place most intensely. The short tags of the works in this category are as follows: *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman* (Âşıkpaşazâde), *Tevârih* (Oruç Beg), *Dâstân-ı Tevârih-i Mülûk-i Âl-i Osmân ve Ahvâl-i Sultân Mehemmed* (Ahmedî), *Behcetü't-Tevârih* (Şükrullah), *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman* (Hacı Halil Konevî), *Câm-ı Cem-âyîn* (Bayatlı Mahmud b. Hasan), *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman* (Hadîdî), *Fetihnâme-i Sultan Mehmed* (Kıvâmî), *Tevârih* (Rûhî), *Heşt Behişt* and *Selîmnâme* (İdrîs-i Bitlisî), *Târîh-i Ebü'l-Feth* (Tursun Bey), *Târîh-i Âl-i Selçûk* (Yazıcızâde 'Ali), *Mahrûse-i İstanbul Fetihnâmesi* (Tâcîzâde Câfer Çelebi), *Tevârih* (Behiştî), *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman* and *Selîmnâme* (Kemalpaşazâde), *Selîmnâme* (İshâk b. İbrâhîm), *Selîmnâme* (Keşfi), *Gazânâme-i Rûm* (Kâşifi), *Tevârihu's-selâtîni'l-Osmâniyye* (Karamânî Mehmed Pasha), *Selâtinnâme* (Kemal), *Düstûrnâme-i Enverî* (Enverî), *Vâkiât-ı Sultân Cem* (Haydar Beg), *Kitâb-ı Cihannümâ* (Neşrî), anonymous chronicles (*Hikayet-i Zuhur-ı Âl-i Osman*, *Der-beyân-ı Menakıb Âl-i Osman*, Haniwaldanus, anonymous chronicles published by Öztürk, Giese, Köklü, Çimen, Çan, İğci, historical periodicals, etc.). It is necessary to add the following works to this list in order to make a comparative analysis: *Karamannâme* (Şikârî), *Ἀποδείξεις Ἱστοριῶν* (Chalkokondyles), *Ἐγγραφή Ἱστοριῶν* (Kritovulos), *Ἱστορία* (Doukas), *Chronica Byzantine Breviora*, *Bezm ü Rezm* (Esterâbâdî), *Selçuknâme* (Ahmed bin Mahmud), *Tâcü't-tevârih* (Hoca Sadettin Efendi), *Tarih-i Kızılbaşan*, *Ahsenü't Tevârih* (Hasan Bey Rumlu).

The literature category, similar to the historiography, is also very rich in various kind of works which are the mediums of political thought. In this category, there are works in genres such as poetry, jokes, folk tales, epics, fables, and chess books. To briefly introduce these works, they can be listed as follows: *Kitab-ı Daî-ü'l- Gumûm* (Deli Birader), *Letâif-i Lâmi'î* (Lâmi'î Çelebi), *İskendernâme* and *Dîvân* (Ahmedî), *Çengnâme* (Ahmed-i Dâî), *Kasayid-i Efsahî der Medh-i Sultan Bâyezîd* (Efsahî), *Harnâme* (Molla Lütîfî), *Harnâme* (Şeyhî), *Fakrnâme*, *Vasf-ı Hal*, *Hikâye*, *Kîmyâ*, *Garibnâme* (Âşık Paşa), *Halilnâme* (Abdülvasi Çelebi), *Vesîletü'n-Necât* (Suleyman Çelebi), *Hurşid ü Feraḥşad* (Şeyhoğlu Mustafa), *Süleymannâme-i Kebîr*, *Kutb-nâme*, *Şatranç-Nâme-i Kebîr*, *Münazara-i Seyf ü Kalem* (Firdevsî-i Rumî), *Saltuknâme* (Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî), *Dîvân-ı Avnî*, *Dîvân-ı Adlî*, *Dîvân-ı Harimî*.

The ninth title contains scientific works. Under this category, there are a series of works written on quite different subjects such as lapidary, medicine, accounting, and maritime. The main ones of these works can be listed as follows: *Miftâhu'l-hisâb-i kavâ'id-i defter* (Dervîş Bihîşt Şaruhanî), *Mecma'ü'l-Kavâ'id* (Muhyeddin Muhammed), *Er- Risâle Fi'l-Ulûmi's-Şer'iyye ve'l-Arabîyye* (Molla Lütfi), *Cevhernâme-i Sultan Muradî* (Mustafa B. Seydî), *Cevahirnâme* (Ahmed Bîcan), *Kitâb-ı Bahriyye* (Pîrî Reis), *el-İthâfu's-Süleymânî fi'l-ahdi'l-Ûrhânî* (Dâvûd Kayserî). Epistolaries, which are the subject of another title, can be listed as follows: *Epistola ad Mahomatem* (Pius II), letters of Manuel II Palaiologos, testament of Sultan Murad II, letter of Francesco Filelfo, letter of Orhan Beg. It is possible to add memoirs to these sources, and the following three memoirs have been used within the framework of this thesis study: Memoirs of Janissary Constantine, diary of N. Barbaro, and *Tractatus de moribus, conditionibus et nequicia Turcorum* by Georgius de Hungaria.

The thirteenth title is *fütüvvetnâmes*. Under this title, four *fütüvvetnâmes* were used and their names are as follows: *Fütüvvetnâme-i Dâî*, *Fütüvvetnâme-i Şeyh Seyyid Gaybî Oğlu Şeyh Seyyid Huseyn*, *Fütüvvetnâme-i Sultanî*, *Kitabu'l-Fütüvve* (el-Herevî). Another source type, customary law collections, has been excluded from the scope of this thesis because it requires a separate and detailed study to examine the development of Ottoman legal ideology, so only the text named *Kanunnâme-i Âl-i Osman* was used in discussions on state organization, status and discipline. The fourteenth title is devoted to works of philosophy and covers a series of works from antiquity to classical Islamic philosophy in order to determine the historical origins of Ottoman political thought and to analyze the changes comparatively. In general, these works came from the pen of a series of thinkers such as Aristotle, al-Kindî, al-Ghazali, Averroes, Avicenna, al-Farabi, Şehristani and Nasîrüddin Tûsî. Architectural monuments, inscriptions and coinage, which is the last title, constitute one of the main sources of the history of political thought, but they are excluded from the scope of this thesis. Only a few examples which are associated with political texts, architectural semiology and inscriptions become the subject of analysis.

In summary, this thesis study examines the history of political thought in Ottoman society on the basis of texts and the analysis of class relations. The foundations of this study are based on a detailed analysis of elements such as social formation, state, social classes and strata, social groups. Within the framework of these theoretical and sociologically analyzed elements, Ottoman political thought will be re-evaluated by

analyzing the historical sources mentioned above, and a new synthesis covering the early imperial period will be tried to be reached.

I.I. The Structure of Society, Politics and Political Thought

The main problem of research in the field of the history of political thought makes itself felt in the first step when the research object is defined. Whether it is the subject of historical research or part of a contemporary discourse analysis, it is not always easy to determine whether the fragment encountered by a researcher is an example of political thought. This problem is deeply rooted and multifaceted. The roots of the problem first appear in the answers to the question of what is political and what is not. In other words, the definition of the 'political' functions as a theoretical anchor that also binds the research object. Although such a definition has the power to provide a comprehensive framework for the nature and manifestations of the 'political', it is practically impossible to develop a competent theory of what kind of social phenomena the phenomena outside this framework are and why they cannot be considered political. Considering the modern history of research on the history of political thought, it is understood that the scope of the 'political' expands in parallel with every in-depth study and the development of current lines of political struggle. In this respect, every theoretical framework in which the 'political' is defined has the identity of a political choice in terms of the scope of the field it defines, and moreover, it falls short in the practice of life in a short time. For example, the 19th century Eurocentric approach, in which the scope of politics was defined around the political-society/civil-society distinction and integrating the political-sphere and the state or public law², expanded in scope with the Marxist approach integrating class-based politics and economics. Moreover, with the feminist movement in the 20th century, spheres defined as 'personal' according to public-law or thought to fall within the scope of language or morality have radically changed the scope and content of the concept of politics. A similar situation has emerged with the political debates and definitions organized around political theology, environmentalism, gender discussions, subaltern studies and cultural-politics approach. If we go one step further, changes in the theory of society have also caused the connection between the concepts of society and politics to be reconstructed. This relationship has been formulated in a wide range from definitions

² For example, Oakeshott's (2006, p. 7) view, which argues that politics is impossible without government, provides a late example of this approach.

of religion, macro-economics, cooperation, commons or morality-centered society definitions to approaches suggesting that society is an imaginary or lingual fiction. In this respect, whether the concept of politics is defined as consensus-centered or conflict-centered, it is constructed with reference to both a macro-scale argument about what society is and an actual content that aims to theoretically include -or negate- current political practices. In this respect, to make a final suggestion, the concept of politics has a 'political' part in its essence and never has the quality of an absolutely universal concept -if it is possible.

This situation reveals itself as a fundamental problem in defining what political thoughts are. The answer to the question of what politics is, is one of the main factors that define what political thoughts are, which is a special aspect of the phenomenon of politics in the final analysis. Although this factor can be considered a dominant factor, it does not completely eliminate a second theoretical problem. This problem centers around the question of what 'thought' or 'thinking' is. In this framework, the main problem, which is often left unanswered and glossed over in research on the history of political ideas, but is included in one or two aspects of the texts, the question of what the object of study is, hangs at the point of what 'politics' and 'thought' are in relation to social reality at the most general theoretical level. There are some other side-determinations of this question as well. For example, the specific role of 'thought' in political relations, the forms and modalities of political practice and forms of thought, the distinction between the thinking process and the product of thinking and the medium through which the thought is conveyed, the historical and sociological contexts of political thought, the dynamics of development and change of ideas, etc. In the final analysis, a sufficient clarification of these questions in general manner is essential to the development of research in the history of political thought.

First of all, it would be appropriate to start by explaining the concepts of society, politics and thought that will be used in this study. Throughout this study, the concept of society is used with two complementary meanings. First, the concept of society has a dynamic content that refers to the formation process of social reality. According to this, society is a process that takes place in the common area of three founding relationship forms that crystallize and merge on social phenomena, but theoretically have autonomy relative to each other. These three types of relations can be listed as culture, politics and economics. These three relations, within their unique possibilities and limitations, form the social reality by establishing essence/substance/appearance

relations with others and following the articulation/contradiction paths. This state of being has a dynamic nature as a destruction and creation process that is far from absolute harmony or balance. Culture as a process of *alethia* constantly constructs and destructs things, functions, desires and meanings, economy as a reproduction process organizes the material mechanism of production/accumulation/distribution, and politics, as a form of struggle based on rights, status and will, constitutes the three basic parts of this dynamic. In this dynamic process, the concrete manifestations of the three basic forms of social relationships sometimes participate in the process as inseparable phenomena, and sometimes as adversaries that eliminate each other in form and/or content. But the implication of the concept of society is not just the dynamic aspect of the construction of social reality. At the same time, society is a historical entity that has taken place around certain paths and has taken a certain form. In other words, society is the transformation of the infinite concrete potential of social relationships into objects, relationship schemes, situations, structures and even emotions, images and symbols for a finite and limited time and space. As such, the concept of society indicates a structural integrity in which the elements that make up the society are organized within the framework of certain power relations, and these gain a temporary continuity. This structural unity can be observed in broad historical examples, from communities in which face-to-face relationships predominate, to formal unities made between communities, and finally to modern social entities where anonymous relationships become isoformed. In this context, three basic social typologies or social formations emerge: Communitarian social formation, rentier social formation and capitalist social formation. Not all of these typologies can be considered 'society' in the full sense, because in a significant part of them, anonymizing and isoforming cultural/economic/political relations that transcend the local communities have not emerged. However, if they are examined within the framework of the dynamic approach, it is a fact that all these formations are more or less shaped by the three forms of founding relationships, which I call modes of social relationship. In this respect, the concept of socialization in its concrete and static sense has a common essence for both communities and societies and points to structural continuities depending on the mediation of community, rent or capital and their over-determination of these multiple relations. The multiplicity of living and non-living beings, which can be described as *plethos* in the absolute sense, 'homogenized' by establishing power relations, resisting

and reproducing them in the socialization process, and gains existence in various scales from primordial community form to modern society.

In the final analysis, the homogenization in question corresponds to a power relationship, no matter what form of social relationship it has emerged. To put it briefly, a power relationship, as used as a concept in this thesis, is a coordination relationship established between two or more actors and even between the conflicting tendencies of a person. The phenomenon of power, in its most basic and simple form, articulates more than one tendency, action and possibility within a common purpose, object or context. In this framework, while power relations establish a uniform interaction process between actors, this process can be organized symmetrically or asymmetrically. In a symmetrically organized power relationship, the coordination of actions does not require the existence of an authority over the parties -or, to mean the same thing, there is no subordination relationship. On the other hand, actions coordinated in an asymmetrically organized power relationship are organized as a subordination relationship, and in this context, it is necessary to talk about the possibility of authority and a structural situation that can reveal domination relationships. Considering the phenomenon of power through the modes of social relationship, in the intellectual or practical sense, cultural, economic and political relations established between the subjects exist as (i) symmetrical coordination relations or (ii) asymmetric subordination relations. Moreover, a subject, which is a part of power relations, is actually established within the framework of the same relations and potentially becomes the basis of the possibility of transforming these relations.

Political practices and examples of political thought cannot be excluded from this scheme of power relations. Political practices emerge to establish, reform or abolish a certain power relationship, and their existence constitute a power relationship itself. In this context, it would be appropriate to define more clearly what politics is. Politics is the name given to struggles for rights, status and will, and political struggles build or transform sociality in these three contexts. Political situations arise around social contradictions that focus on rights, status and will, and the search for reconciliation, resolution or management of these contradictions. The difference between this definition of politics is clear from the approaches that formulate the political sphere around public law and the state, tend to identify it with class struggle, or define politics as a mere negotiation process excluding conflict and violence. According to this definition made at a more general level, political relations as power relations cannot be

reduced to phenomena such as the state or class that ground the society as a whole, nor to complex communicative processes. On the contrary, politics is a basic form of social relationship that exists on many levels and on unlimited matter, from the individual level to the internal integrity of small groups, the relations and contradictions between social groups and segments, and global conflicts or possible intergalactic struggles. If the constituent elements of this form are to be analyzed, it is necessary to start with the category of right first. The concept of right, as included in the political formulation was used above, can be defined as a claim about the physical domination of the subject over things and relations -and this claim is supported by material means. The ability to possess, use, transfer, initiate a relationship, force, limit and destroy things or actors, and subjective statements and claims covering these titles form the basis of the struggle for rights.³ Considered at this level, the concept of right is primarily subjective and means a claim to power (which can be symmetrical or asymmetrical) over things, agents and relationships. The subject of this claim may be individuals or collectivities, and its method may vary from discourse to the use of force. Moreover, a particular claim can find an object, from personal appropriation to collective use or commons. Secondly, the fact that a right ceases to be a subjective claim and acquires an intersubjective and structural character depends on the construction of statuses. The concept of status is used to define the social basis of a certain right or category of right, to position the right holder according to this right, and to determine the relations between various right codifications. Statuses have a symbolic and relational reality and are based on social recognition. To the extent that a particular status is socially defined and accepted—whether that definition is affirmative or negative—it becomes valid. In this framework, statuses can be formally equal and asymmetrical, and they can take traditional/legal/rational/moral forms in terms of grounding. The social prestige of an ethnic group relative to other ethnic groups, the legal guarantee for learning and teaching a code of faith, the recognition of a particular class's right to organize, the position of a particular gender code in relation to others, the distinction between 'human' and 'non-human' species, the hierarchical distinction between certain social norms and their representatives can be evaluated under the category of status. To the extent that statuses are structured around certain rights and identities, they become structural factors that shape the actions of the subjects who are their carriers. Finally, it is necessary to consider the concept of will. Will, as a political phenomenon, is a vital

³ See: Duguit (2019, pp. 27-28)

quality crystallized in the act of resistance or initiative directed against the acts of other political subjects in order to establish, maintain or abolish a certain status or right. It is possible to define will as the practical claim of a collective or individual subject over his own actions. According to this perspective, the subject has the ability to structure his own acts in a certain way, to tend towards a certain thing, or not to apply the act envisaged by a certain power relationship. In such cases, conditioning the subject to initiate, maintain or resist a certain relationship reveals the phenomenon of volitionality in intersubjective relations. In the final analysis, although the concept of right has a practical nature and the idea of status is constructed in a symbolic context, the will is a synthesis of both practical and symbolic moments. Moreover, since it emerges within practical and symbolic power relations, the will needs both material (body, wealth, tools, organization, institutions, etc.) and symbolic (discourse, ideology, knowledge, identity, etc.) fulcrums. For example, as Clausewitz (2007, p. 13) argues, war can be defined as the continuation of politics by other means, an activity aimed at breaking the will of the enemy and making other sides will prevail. Accordingly, breaking the enemy's military and economic power, eliminating the social support behind a certain right claim or status or preventing the continuation of this claim also corresponds to a struggle of will. In this struggle, weapons, population, propaganda tools, official and civil organizations, ideological codes also become a part of the will. If the problem is to be considered in reverse, the codification of political ideas also has a critical importance for the construction of a will or its resolution.

The definition of the phenomenon of politics as a struggle for rights, status and will also presents an alternative path of analysis regarding the essence and appearance of political thoughts. Accordingly, political ideas can be defined as the codification of practical claims, status-indicating formulations, or will constructions—or discourses aimed at unraveling a particular will formation. While political ideas are defined in this way in terms of their political essence, they should also be analyzed in terms of their category, form and content. But before making a categorical analysis of political thoughts, it is necessary to briefly touch on the problem of what 'thinking' is.

Thinking is a specific form of the imaginary and/or symbolic relationship that living beings establish with their life world. This specific form takes place under the categories (i) affection, (ii) practical-imagination, (iii) operational thinking, (iv) speculation and (v) simulation. Affections can be evaluated as traces of interaction that existing things leave on each other when they come into contact with each other -

depending on the structure of each. In this state, the interaction, integration or dissolution of all material entities, regardless of animate or inanimate entities, expresses itself as an affection. This form of expression corresponds to a bodily effect called sensation in the case of living beings. Sensed effects constitute the most basic and imaginary element of what is called thought as a result of the interaction of living things with their own bodies or beings outside them. These images appear as sound-images, visual-images, physical contact sensations or chemical reactions of body, and the effects join the bodily being as a continuous flow. After this point, the intellectual existence of living beings and the state of inanimate beings -at least as far as we know- are separated from each other. Living beings, as self-moving beings, perform practical acts, and they develop a certain cognitive capacity in the areas where these acts are concentrated, depending on the structure and level of their capacity to sense and process it. Practical and repetitive activities create a *point de capiton* between cognition and practice, and this reference point formed at the imaginary level also makes it possible to think imaginatively. The point where imaginative thinking differs from affection is that some imaginative effects come to the forefront instead of the direct flow of images from the body of this type of thinking, and the subject has a detailed design and acquaintance with them. This design and acquaintance introduce the possibility of reversible mediation into the thinking process. According to this possibility, a subject can develop a practical or cognitive orientation, while doing this, one can cognitively 'search' for what will aim at. The situations of seeking and orienting correspond to a performative reflection in which images are mediated by processes such as emotion/habit/remembering, and experience turns into practice to mean the same thing. The transition from the direct affection to the mediation can be defined as a reflection process to the extent that the direct image flow is subject to an intention and depends on the selection and recognition of certain parts from this flow. The practical acts of living beings as individuals and the development of a cognitive context make it possible for both these acts and their images to be the subject of communicative action. Communicative relations between living things present a dual structure in terms of development lines. First of all, signs, which are the mediators of a certain communicative relationship, are formed from image-based signifiers, whereas every image-based signifier is also an undeveloped symbol. The continuity of communicative acts and the formation of their own patterns led to the development of a memory

formation organized around them and to the emergence of a derivative thinking based on remembering and repeating these image-based signs.

Regardless of whether there are imaginary or symbolic parts of the signs, it would be appropriate to argue that the way of thinking and thought that emerges at this level has ethical aspects. This way of thinking can be called practical-ethical (in another words non-contemplative) thinking in terms of both the commonality of practical purposes and the construction of a valid/correct/accepted way of understanding/adopting signifiers. At this point, imaginary signifiers gaining sign value as signifieds and the emergence of a language that develops around symbolic signifiers constitute the highest point of this process. Although mental activity built on a symbolic basis can also be seen in some animals, it has basically become the dominant form in the intellectual and communicative activity of the human species. The emergence of symbolic forms and their organization as a language depending on social practice have made it possible to compare and rearrange images and symbols through these forms, to design and record their position relative to each other with new symbols. The development of symbolic forms of thinking is the basis for the emergence of operational, speculative and simulative thought forms.

Operational thinking, as the name suggests, corresponds to mental acts such as inferences, reductions, conclusions, operation of functions, formulations, symbolic associations. What makes all these titles a process is that it works with qualitative or quantitative concepts without referring to a specific image and reaches results through the relations it establishes between them. To the extent that these results can also be applied to practical actions, the integrity of calculation and application is formed. For example, the implementation of a legal regulation, the calculation of the concrete to be poured in a construction, the establishment of cause-effect relationships in a problem of history or the calculation of perspective in an oil painting are realized within the framework of operational thinking. In this context, operational thinking is effective in areas such as logic, systematic sign construction, mathematics, accounting, reasoning and inference. Second, speculative thinking is conceptual thinking at the level of generalities. It can be said that the essence of speculative thinking is to grasp the general properties of the things comprehended, starting from the level of their particularity, by means of abstraction. If the origin of the word is examined, the Latin word *speculum* refers to reflection, or the word *speculari* refers to seeing with the help of a mirror (Heidegger & Fink, 2006, p. 89). In this respect, speculative thinking can be conceived

as projecting generalities, looking through the mirror of generalities, or projecting particularity into the mirror of generality. This reflection also makes it possible to reflect various particularities to each other and to find their common points in this way and to express them under general concepts at a higher level of abstraction. In this context, speculative thinking is the prerequisite for the emergence of general concepts. Thirdly, simulative thinking can be defined as a quasi-truth mechanism that creates a reality. According to Baudrillard's definition (2010, p. 1): "Today abstraction is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror, or the concept. Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal". Such a construction of reality includes and transcends the operational and speculative processes underlying simulative models, and constitutes a typology of simulative thinking in itself. In this way of thinking, thought breaks away from real images and is based on artificial images, and reformulates its operational systematics on artificial images and the concepts produced around them. In this case, the things that are the subject of thought become artificial particularities and designed generalities, and the reference of reality becomes fiction in itself.

After defining the general categories of thought in this way, it would be appropriate to examine the position of political thoughts within these categories. Considering the history of political thought, it is understood that there are three basic forms of political thought. These can be listed as (i) political philosophy, (ii) political theory and (iii) daily political discourses/discussions/communications. Political philosophy is the name given to the intellectual form that at least apparently investigates the universal qualities of the phenomenon of politics and tries to discover universal postulates that are common to all societies and to carry out the interpretation of political reality through these postulates. Premodern political philosophy generally dealt with the problem of the best society and the best form of government and realized this within a certain moral discussion and teleological perspective. In this respect, certain affinities have emerged between premodern political philosophy and political theology, especially in the political thoughts that emerged in Christian and Muslim cultures. In general, the idea that the direct image of political phenomena can be overcome, and universal truths can be reached through speculation lies on the basis of the universality claim of political philosophy. This idea rises on basic propositions such as the divine or secular universality of reason, the teleological existence of human beings or human societies based on reason, or the founding intellectual origin of the notion of society. In

this context, it is understood that the texts of political philosophy tend to construct certain symmetrical or asymmetrical right and status schemes, in which different social segments can live together, and deal with the issue of will more in an ethical context. This aspect of political philosophy texts, which is also subject to criticism in contemporary academic studies, concentrates on the correctness of the universality claim they put forward in this respect or the extent to which this claim is about a particular social reality. In this respect, the founding element of contemporary political theory is based on the denial of the universality claim of political philosophy in terms of historicity and/or social structure. According to this new orientation, the subject of political theory is not to find universal social or political truths, but to theoretically examine the political relations that are valid in certain social structures and political situations. In this case, theory becomes a tool used not for the determination of ideal forms, but for the examination of the existing phenomena in cause-effect relationships, placing them in their historical context or modeling rationally. In the same framework, political theory participates in the particular existence of social reality as an extension of certain political movements, administrative schemes and practices, certain state acts and legal structures, and models of international relations. In this respect, political theory both defines what kind of social phenomenon politics is, expresses or criticizes the meaning and values of a particular political struggle, and also makes propositions about political practice. In this context, it would not be wrong to claim that contemporary political theories are based on empirical observation and speculative analysis on the one hand, and can also include operational modeling and algorithms on the other. For example, the design of a particular election or decision-making mechanism requires both experiential knowledge, a future projection and a general discourse of legitimacy, and a kind of operational knowledge in which the political mechanism is established. Modern political theory, which develops around the multifaceted topics of interest and research from feminism to environmentalism, from individual rights to the problem of ethnicity, is a medium in which the legitimacy of claim of right is established, social statuses are formulated or tried to be transformed, and individual awareness and collective will are built as a part of contemporary politics. Finally, it is necessary to deal with the daily political discourse and debates. The basic mistake of a hierarchical distinction between these three forms of political thought is to completely ignore daily political thought and regard it as an example of vulgarized political philosophy or theory. Contrary to this proposition, daily political thoughts have

had the largest quantitative share among political thoughts for centuries, while qualitatively they have a great diversity, cultural continuity and political decisiveness. Daily political thoughts are examples of thoughts that are expressed/shared, invented or re-interpreted in people's daily life practices. While political philosophy and political theory appeal to more or less anonymous individuals and collectivities, the subjects of daily political thought are clear and specific. In this respect, daily political thought carries direct images and symbols of immediate power relations and is directly in contact with them. The context of daily life -and the everyday life in particular examples - is the context of individual power relations of living things –and human beings in particular. A discussion with friends in the coffee house about who will win in the election, dealing with a newspaper article, rituals or resistances to the reproduction of the authority of the manager in a company meeting, in terms of daily life, are the debates on the principle of action between the agents-subjects and are included in the individual aspect of power relations. In this respect, daily political thought is based on making sense of the political contexts (working life, gender, cultural groups and discrimination, local and regional power relations, state and law, etc.) that directly contact the individual in the concrete reality of the daily life of individual. This interpretation does not take place in the form of a one-way relationship (for example, the form of propaganda), on the contrary, the establishment and internalization of a certain political position, the discourse of resistance against it, and parodying contribute to the diversity of daily political thought. Moreover, daily political thought also has a performative feature. In this respect, claims of rights and social status depend on the performance as-is or the demand-to-exist (normative) way in concrete social relations, and it has the characteristics of a concrete statement or representation of a will. In this way, daily political thought uses imagination, speculation, and operational thinking in its daily context, moreover, it is possible to say that a simulative way of thinking has become a part of everyday thinking in the context of post-truth discussions.

Secondly, it is necessary to briefly touch on the form and content features of political thoughts. Political thoughts have three basic forms and three main content categories, and in the formulation of a particular political thought, these categories are articulated with specific ties. Starting from the three formal categories first, political ideas are expressed in (i) general, (ii) particular, and (iii) singular forms. The general form constitutes the framework for political propositions and arguments that collectively encompass all individuals of a particular social structure, often involving

more than one generation. The scope of such arguments is drawn by propositions about the general well-being, rights and status of a particular group of people, whether they are asserted as universal or time-space limited. The particular form of political ideas, on the other hand, is structured not by propositions claiming generality, but by relative and relational propositions, and deals with the rights and status of a particular social group, class or segment in relation to others. In such propositions, the social segments/groups about which discourse is produced or represented are either addressed in terms of certain characteristics or characterized within the framework of a certain right, interest or status claim. The third form of political thought is shaped by singular propositions. Such propositions establish, defend or discursively construct aspects of the individual that are not included in a particular conception of society or the community around concepts such as rights, freedoms, psychology, morality, ability to choose, will or consciousness.

If the categories of content of political thoughts are considered, it is possible to collect them under three basic epistemological titles: (i) empirical, (ii) *istorical*, (iii) theoretical. The content categories of political thoughts are analyzed with reference to the epistemological origin of the political facts and propositions that are the subject of the thought. The examples of political thought that fall within the scope of the first of these categories (ἐμπειρία) correspond to the direct empirical experiences of political subjects transformed into political discourse. In this form of discourse, the subjects' own rights, status and willpower in social struggles are transformed into political discourse from the perspective of personal experience. Secondly, political thoughts emerge in the *istorical* category. The term *istoria* (ιστορία), as an epistemological category, is used to refer to the information that the subject does not experience directly but obtains through communication from another subject who has a specific experience. In this framework, the political ideas formulated under the *istorical* category are shaped by the information and arguments conveyed by individuals, groups or various social segments through communication. These information and arguments contain statements about collective history, identity, experiences, rights and status. The third typology of political thought is under the category of *theoria* (θεωρία). What theoretical knowledge or propositions are categorically is a matter of serious debate. The question of what kind of phenomenon the term theory refers to can be answered under three basic approaches. The first of these is the idealist approach, which argues that theoretical knowledge is a knowledge of *a priori* ideas, and within the framework of this approach, the origin of theoretical knowledge or arguments is sought either in the idealist ontology of existence

or in the divine origin of knowledge. The second approach can be defined as objective rationalism and argues that both material existence and social structures and relations occur within the framework of logical relations and can be analyzed through reason. According to this approach, the theory is based on a rational analysis of the essence of natural or social existence. An alternative realist version of the second approach can be mentioned. According to this second version, especially in the capitalist social formation, social phenomena occur largely in accordance with the categories of economic rationality, and therefore rational analysis corresponds to the theoretical expression of the development pattern of social reality at a certain level of abstraction. The third approach has the view that the relationship between theoretical knowledge and propositions and reality is not a direct and ontological relationship, but a fictional one on the contrary. Centering this argument, three main approaches that develop specific analyzes can be mentioned: (i) descriptivism, (ii) constructivism, (iii) post-structuralism. Since it is not possible to discuss these three approaches in detail here, some specific arguments pointed out by all three approaches -and shared by the author of these lines- will be mentioned. First, descriptivism considers theoretical arguments as conceptual tools that describe phenomena in certain respects and thus serve to delineate events. Secondly, constructivism conceives of theoretical arguments as abstract connections between people's world experiences and pasts, in which a person constructs his/her worldview. Finally, the post-structuralist approach considers theory as a linguistic construct organized in the center of social power relations. According to the conceptual framework that I will use throughout this thesis, theory is a linguistic construction that presents a schema of social power relations. This construction can be constructed through the classification, abstraction, and association of empirical and *historical* data (thus it becomes a kind of abstract description), or it can be derived through rational analysis of a particular principle (reduction or ideological design). On the other hand, theoretical arguments have the possibility of conveying information about the general scheme of social relations as far as the generality of certain phenomenon patterns is possible, albeit limited by time and space. In this respect, political ideas presented in theoretical form can carry the abstract description of social reality, the general scheme of social phenomena, the legitimacy principle of a certain power relationship or a certain ideological codification. The inclusion of all four possibilities in the form of theoretical thought is a result of the epistemological origins of theoretical thought touching more than one point in social context. Accordingly,

theoretical thought either emerges through the abstract description or critical analysis of empirical and *istorical* information, or it is based on the application of a certain right/status/will principle to empirical and *istorical* data with a speculative method. In this case, it is possible to talk about two theory-building epistemologies based on inductive and deductive methods, and this distinction can explain the existence of factual descriptions and normative judgments included in theoretical thought.

Finally, it would be appropriate to briefly discuss the types and functions of political thought. It is possible to put forward the problem of concrete types and functions of political thought by examining both topics in detail. On the other hand, the type and function differentiations of political thoughts have an internal connection with each other, because the types of political ideas cannot be considered completely apart from their functions as mediums in which political ideas are formulated and disseminated. Examples of political thought are generally conveyed in three types of mediums. These are (i) verbal mediums, (ii) written mediums, and (iii) composite mediums. In these mediums, political thoughts are conveyed either directly or indirectly. The direct communication of a particular political thought is through the direct transmission of a claim, status determination or declaration of will to the other party. It is based on the indirect communication of a certain political thought and the transmission of rights, status or will elements by using analogies, metaphors, literary representation and narrative methods or by placing the political thought in the sub-text. Within this framework, it is possible to argue that political thoughts are formulated under five basic types. These types are: (i) aesthetic fictions and installations (literature, audio-visual images, architecture, oral works of art etc.), (ii) historical narratives (chronicles, historical compilations, fictional histories, hagiographies, family genealogies, etc.), (iii) argumentative constructions (works of political philosophy and theory, treatises of discussion or refutations, examples of rhetorical propaganda, oral arguments, etc.), (iv) legal and religious codifications (legislations, laws, provisions, religious law texts, traditions, etc.), (v) daily speech (and gesture).

Political thoughts, which are a unique category of political relations, aim to establish, reform or abolish a certain political position based on rights, status and will. In general, it is possible to determine that there are three basic political functions that these five types of political thought share in common. These functions in the abstract sense would be listed as such: (i) political formation, (ii) political reformation, (iii) political deformation. In the final analysis, these three functions correspond to the

general scheme of political struggle based on the establishment, transformation or abolition of a particular political position. When the concrete functions of political thoughts are analyzed, it is possible to encounter a very long list of functions. To give an example, some of these concrete functions can be listed as follows, persuasion, regulation, emotional pedagogy, adoption, criticism, agitation, legitimacy construction and reproduction of legitimacy, symbolic violence, authority building, threat, power modeling, strategic and tactical construction, political education, awareness, representation, etc. If the concrete political functions mentioned here are regrouped at another level of abstraction, it is seen that they can basically be reduced to two political functions: (i) political education, (ii) political criticism. The first of these principles includes the construction of a certain authority structure, informing the subjects within this framework, indoctrination, propaganda, dissemination of norms, and habituation of certain norms. Secondly, political criticism has titles such as dissolving and transforming a certain authority structure, restructuring the behavior patterns of the subjects, re-establishing the relations between facts and norms. In the final analysis, the socialization of both political education and political criticism takes place under three main headings that have an internal connection with the types of political thought: (i) emotional education and criticism, (ii) rational education and criticism, (iii) nomothetic education and criticism. Emotional education and criticism emerge within the framework of the aesthetic relationship established between images, opinions and emotions. Although historical or daily narratives based on aesthetic imagery are widely available, the type of political thought in which emotional education and criticism is of central importance is concentrated in works of art. Poetry, stories, epics, legends, myths, paintings, sculptures, theater plays and similar works of art have a structure in which certain patterns of power relations are associated with certain emotions and this emotional pedagogy formation is transmitted to the audience. Within this structure, power relations can be structured and reproduced, on the contrary, dominant power relations can be parodied and emotional pedagogy can be reversed. Secondly, it is necessary to briefly analyze rational education and criticism as the content element and functional principle of political thoughts. Rational education and criticism are based on rational justification, identification of cause-effect relationships, inferences and conceptual constructs based on linguistic forms. In the texts of political theory, political debate and especially political philosophy, an argumentative discourse is produced in accordance with the principles of rational reasoning and justification, and the orientation

and actions of a political subject are structured within this framework. The third type of political thought assumes the nomothetic function and fulfills this function within the framework of defining, disseminating or criticizing certain norms. The nomothetic function educates political subjects around the knowledge of laws, depending on whether laws arise by tradition, religion, force or compromise, or criticizes the basis and functioning of rules.

These three content and function typologies, in which examples of political thought emerge, constitute composite examples, especially within two mediums. These are historical narratives and daily conversations. Historical narratives undertake a certain emotional pedagogy and criticism function through analogies, offer a certain rational justification to the extent that they include diachronic cause-effect relationships, and place nomothetic elements in political discourses. Similarly, in daily conversations and discussions, all three elements take place to a certain extent.

I.II. Methodological Problems in the History of Political Thought

I.II.I. The Methodology of the History of Political Thought

There are some differences between the answer to the question of what political thoughts are as social phenomena and the meaning of a particular political idea in the context of the history of political thought. A certain political thought is a social phenomenon that categorically includes a declaration of right, status or will, has a certain form and content, and finally assumes a certain function. On the other hand, a certain political thought has a relational meaning within the political movements, structures and thoughts that are both contemporary and that will come before and after it. Just as the meaning of a lingual element in Saussurian linguistics emerges in its structural relationship with other elements in the language, the meaning of a particular political thought emerges in a particular social and historical context, whether that thought corresponds to an individual or collective political problem, and tends to have multiple layers of meaning in nature. In this respect, the main problem of the study of the history of political thought requires the analysis of more than one semantic level: (i) the identification of sources of political thought and its edition critique, (ii) the analysis of the structure of a particular thought as a social phenomenon, (iii) the comparative interpretation of a relational and contextual meaning of a particular political thought as a historical phenomenon.

In this framework, research on the history of political thought has five different research lines -if the research topics of political sociology are excluded. The first of these is the discovery and detection of political thoughts, as common in all kinds of historiography studies, and the publication of a reliable source by comparing oral sources, literal fragments, manuscripts and/or different editions. This approach does not completely exclude interpretive activities, on the contrary, it makes philological, graphological and stylistic studies while comparing different and contradictory sources, but interpretation tends to establish an authentic version of the text rather than the make a commentary on meaning of the text. Secondly, it is possible to talk about the approach in which a certain fragment of political thought or work is handled in its own specificity. This approach evaluates a certain text or piece of discourse as a whole of words and concepts that make up it and interprets the meaning of the text/discourse on a philological basis. Secondly, a particular variation of the same method focuses on the biography, psychology and political tendencies/preferences of its author in order to understand a particular political thought. Finally, while this approach analyzes the political thought of a particular author, it is seen that it developed a comparative-constructivist interpretation technique by examining other works of the author. Thus, the indicated approach evaluates political texts to an author-centered interpretation, which in the last analysis corresponds to a narrow-framed but contextual interpretation activity. This context is narrow-framed in terms of its psychological and biographical construction, but it differs from the historiographic approach, which is based solely on the determination of the text, in that it invites the activity of interpretation. In addition, it is possible to say that the esoteric interpretation approach based on close-reading of political thoughts has developed a text-centered interpretation, but this interpretation aims to reveal the directly invisible layers of the text.⁴ While the esoteric interpretation method reveals the hidden meaning layers of a certain text, it also performs a certain contextual interpretation. It is not theoretically possible to set a definite limit to this type of contextual interpretation, and it is possible to make inferences in a framework ranging from narrow-context to broad-context, but still the intention of the author is of central importance in the basis of this type of interpretation.⁵

Thirdly, the main methods that are effective in the study of the history of political thought come to the fore as historical and contextual interpretation approaches.

⁴ See: Strauss (1941).

⁵ See: Terence (2002, p. 13) and Dunn (1996, p. 23).

Both approaches analyze a particular example of political thought in relation to the historical relations, structures and political texts and conceptual lineages that surround that example and exist in a multidimensional relationship with it.⁶ The first of the research methods used within the framework of this approach can be called diachronic-intertextual analysis. According to this method, the intellectual origins of a particular example of political thought are researched in the history of political ideas and analyzed within the intellectual tradition in which this thought is embedded. This method, which can be called the archeology or genealogy of political ideas, while interpreting the meaning of a certain political thought form in the context of traditions of thoughts, it also offers the opportunity to conduct a comparative analysis with different traditions. Fourthly, it would be appropriate to mention about the method in which a particular example of political thought is compared with other contemporary examples of political thought in research on the history of political thought. This method can be called the synchronic-contextual method. In the analyzes based on this method, a particular example of political thought is interpreted in the historical and political context, including its contemporaries, and in this way, the propositions that a political thought has structured relationally in the political sphere become clear.⁷ A fifth method, which includes this method and widens the frame of reference, gives meaning to a certain political thought within its contemporary social structure. According to this method, which can be called historical synchronic-contextualism, a particular example of political thought is a part of the economic, political and cultural relations in the social context in which it emerges. In this respect, understanding a particular example of political thought requires comparing it with contemporary political, cultural and economic phenomena.⁸ Approaches using the synchronic and contextual interpretation method interpret the particular meaning of a particular example of political thought by comparing it with the general intellectual context created by its contemporaries and/or

⁶ For another approach in which this method is criticized as 'historicist', see: Strauss (1945, p. 99). Strauss evaluates the method of historical interpretation as legitimate one but bases it on the search for an investigation of how a particular text was understood by its author. According to this approach, political philosophy texts have universal themes that cannot be reduced to the history of political science or political ideas, and they can be understood from this point of view. See: Strauss (1989, pp. 30, 41).

⁷ See: Dunn (1996, p. 24) and Skinner (1969, pp. 35-36, 40-41).

⁸ See: Sabine (1960, p. v), Oakeshott (2006, pp. 14-15). In addition, within the framework of the *Begriffsgeschichte* approach, how certain concepts are understood by different social segments is evaluated in terms of historical context, cultural, economic and political dimensions (Richter, 1986, p. 619). See also: Koselleck (2004, pp. 80-81).

a particular form of discourse.⁹ One of the most basic propositions of this approach is that a certain piece of political thought is a linguistic act and should be dealt with from the linguistic context.¹⁰ However, approaches centered on the principle of synchronous historical interpretation suggest that a certain element of political thought is a part of the practical social context and is a reflection of certain social forces/political groups, and extends the context of the analysis to sociological foundations.¹¹

On the other hand, the general context in question does not only have to be established synchronously, but it is also possible to interpret with reference to a diachronic context which frames general themes. It is possible to talk about three different scales of this methodological preference. The first of these is based on interpreting a particular form of political thought within the general pattern of social change by comparing it with the forms of political thought before and after it. The second method is based on interpreting the dominant political thought forms from a certain period by comparing them with the political thought forms that emerged in other historical periods and contexts. Thirdly, how a particular example of political thought is interpreted and re-interpreted by different generations, thinkers and societies that come after it also constitutes an indirect field of research on the meaning of the text. This latest research method is also used in more than one form in conceptual history studies.

I.II. II. Sources of Political Thought in the Ottoman Empire

In the Ottoman Empire, the existence of all examples of political thought that can be detected in any premodern social formation can be observed. For example, it is possible to detect that politics were spoken in coffeehouses in Ottoman cities, mentioned in history books, war stories or satirical poems were read aloud. Similarly, in the Ottoman rural life, examples of folk tales, folk songs, religious legends and poems

⁹ See: Skinner (2002, pp. 125-26). In addition, it would be correct to mention examples in which a common context belonging to a certain historical period is established by comparing the works of certain thinkers. See: Peters (2013). In addition, it can be mentioned about an alternative approach that argues that certain thought forms are constructed in a sociological context and gain diachronic continuity as archetypes and exist as part of a fluid intellectual process. See: Collins (2002).

¹⁰ See: Pocock (2009, p. 26) and Skinner (2002, pp. 113-17).

¹¹ See: Sève (1968, p. 20), Wood (1978, p. 345; 2002, p. 115), Wood & Wood (1978, pp. 1, 8, 12), Goldmann (1980, pp. 112-15), Lukács (1981, pp. 37, 63-4, 68, 102), Lefebvre (1996, pp. 65-66), Althusser (2017, p. 165-68).

were shared in oral culture, and pro-state or rebel versions of religious discourse traveled between regions. Moreover, issues such as the formation of political power, the legitimacy of authority, the right to rule were sometimes mentioned in a hagiography text, sometimes in a *sûfi* poem, and sometimes in a discussion of Sharia codes. In Ottoman cities, the *Ahis* wrote their thoughts about both their own organizations and the order of the world, while discussions on the ethical and aesthetic problems of politics were carried out in the close circles of state officials, which included poets and historians. Similarly, the Ottoman palace was surrounded by poets, astrologers, historians, jurists, *sûfis* and philosophers. Rentier patronage networks extending from the palace to the members of the council, administrators, provincial commanders and landowners correspond to the centers where writers, thinkers and artistic performers gather. Each step of this hierarchical network also corresponds to a subject of political thought who needs to defend their own social status and rights, and these subjects are often the bearers of a collective status. In this respect, political thought in the Ottoman Empire emerged as multidimensional and multi-layered artifact and became a home to the worldview of more than one social class, stratum and status group that were articulated or conflicted with each other. It is possible to hypothetically list the social segments represented in the history of political thought as follows: (i) nomads, (ii) peasants, (iii) frontier warriors, (iv) *sûfi* circles, (v) ulama members, (vi) *timar* holders, (vii) landed aristocracy, (viii) state officers, (ix) members of the dynasty, (x) the monarch. The political thoughts of these social segments may vary according to their relations with the state, their ethnic and cultural backgrounds, their religious beliefs and affinity for a particular *tariqa*, and finally their position in a certain social conjuncture.

Considering the multitude of these social segments and groups, it is possible to collect the historical sources of political thoughts in the Ottoman Empire under certain titles. These titles can be listed as follows: (i) *siyâsetnâmes* and reform pamphlets, (ii) mystical works, (iii) religious works about Sharia, catechism, sects etc., (iv) *gazavatnâmes*, (v) travel books, (vi) historical works, (vii) literary works such as poetry, jokes, stories, epics, etc., (viii) scientific works such as accounting, logic, lapidary, medicine etc., (ix) letters, (x) memoirs, (xi) *fütüvvetnâmes*, (xii) customary law journals, (xiii) philosophical texts, (xiv) hagiographies and *menâkıbnâmes*, (xv) official reports, (xvi) architectural monuments and inscriptions. If the general structure of these works is examined, it will be understood that the text form in which the Ottoman political thought is mostly adopted were the historical works. Historical works contain

information about both political philosophy and forms of political practice, as well as information about the current politics of a certain period in terms of reflecting the attitudes of different social segments towards certain events. Historical narratives are primary sources of political thought because they contain direct observations (*emperia*) of the author, information learned from other historical works and people (*istoria*), theoretical formulations (*theoria*) and even literary fragments (*poetika*). Moreover, the fact that anonymous chronicles have clues about the worldviews of social groups at the lower levels of the social hierarchy or are fictionalized to make propaganda for those groups further diversify the content of historical texts. Secondly, political thoughts such as political philosophy and political theory are included in works such as *siyâsetnâmes* and *nasîhatnâmes*, but their number is quite limited. Political arguments produced at the level of philosophical abstraction can also take place in philosophical texts, scientific works and even literary works. The second largest group in which examples of political thought can be observed most commonly are literary works and works of *sûfis*. Literary works are divided into many sub-genres such as jokes, praise and satire poems, folk tales and songs, epics, and especially representations of the status of social groups are included in these genres. It is possible to evaluate *gazavatnâmes* as both a literary work and a historical work, and in such works, a discourse in which a certain ruler, a commander or a frontier lord is centered, and his social status is symbolically constructed by referring to the war tales and anecdotes is a dominant feature. In this respect, it is possible to think that there is a similarity between *gazavatnâmes* and *menâkibnâmes*. While *gazavatnâmes* focus on the extraordinary skills and social representation of warriors, *menâkibnâmes* construct the social status of *sûfi* leaders within religious and mystical discourse. It would be correct to assert that both sources of political thought have examples suitable to be read aloud in public places and can show a kind of propaganda text. In *sûfi* works, on the other hand, both political theory and representations of social status have a specific political content that aims to organize the lower classes around mystical discourse. Although this thesis has not been focused on intensively, legal texts should be counted among the sources of the history of political thought, as they are also the carrier of legal ideology and justifications. In this respect, the history of political thought in the Ottoman Empire includes both Sharia and customary law journals and discussions about their application of real cases. Finally, it is possible to come across data on Ottoman political thought in *fütüvvetnâmes*, letters, travel books, memoirs and official reports. Primary sources in this field are very limited,

since such documents are not very common in the early period, which is the subject of this thesis. The semiology of architectural monuments and the examination of epitaphs within the scope of political philology are excluded from the scope of this thesis, except for a few essential points, as they will constitute a special research topic.

If architectural monuments are accepted as an exception, all of these sources correspond to written works. On the other hand, written works do not have the ability to represent neither the multitude of daily political communication, nor the political thoughts of those who constitute the lowest layer of the social hierarchy, such as peasants and nomads. In this respect, writing a history of political ideas in the Ottoman Empire requires reconstructing a certain period with resources that are ninety percent incomplete in the final analysis, and in this respect, it is far from giving a complete sketch of political thoughts. But the lack of resources does not mean that it is completely impossible to hear their voices. Most of the texts of political thought both claim to represent a class with more than one social segment or different fractions, and contain a distorted image of the social status, rights and worldviews of the classes or social groups positioned against the social segments they center. Similarly, some political texts (for example, anonymous chronicles, *sûfi* texts, epics and poems read in front of the community) are shaped according to the social position of the audience and thus contain elements of the ethical and political worldviews of the lower classes. The point that draws attention in this context is that most examples of political thought, other than direct daily political thought, have multi-layered discursive mechanisms involving more than one social segment. In other words, it represents different social segments hierarchically, integrates their interests around certain centers and marks their rivals/enemies. In this respect, the analysis of a particular example of political thought requires analyzing by which social segment it is said, which social segments it represents, and what kind of arguments or images it is based on. As applied throughout this thesis, the best way to answer these questions is to compare a particular example of political thought: (i) with other examples of political thought in its own period and to identify differences in arguments, differences in expression and emphasis, (ii) to explain the reasons for the emergence of these differences with reference to the intellectual tradition (philosophical schools, *fiqh*, mysticism, ethnic traditions, etc.) and/or current social relations (economy, political conjuncture, cultural preferences). Secondly, it is important to compare the political discourse, concept, argument or discussion topics that emerged in a certain period with the periods that came before and after it, and to

determine their meaning in social change. Finally, it is a valid method to reveal the true social meaning of a certain form of political thought, by stripping it of its ideological cover that absolutizes or encase its meaning and making it possible to handle it in a new light with reference to the different examples in which it has emerged alternative historical contexts.

In the light of these methodological principles, it is possible to identify several historical contexts in which political thoughts in the Ottoman Empire could be discussed and the research techniques required to work in these contexts. In these contexts, the first is the early period when the political and military power organized around the Ottoman family developed in interaction with the society in which it was located, and the state was constructed within these relations. In the early phase of this period, examples of political thought were written directly by the Ottoman family members or people around it and that have survived to the present day are very few. Apart from a few poems, mystical treatises and the lost history book, it is necessary to determine the political thought of this period based on the sources written later. In this case, the handling of early Ottoman political thought requires the interpretation of sources written about half or a century later. The main reference point for this interpretive activity is secondary sources such as travelogues, inscriptions and chronicles, since the textual basis is limited. Secondly, a series of works of literature, history, political philosophy and theory written around the 15th century both contain some knowledge and opinions about the period before them, and also adopt a political attitude about their own period. The interpretation of these works necessitates the operation of more than one research method together due to their structure. In this framework, it is essential to compare the works written until the last quarter of the 15th century with their contemporaries, and thus to reveal the mentality, interests and status of the social group they represent, and their relationship styles. On the other hand, the inclusion of a theoretical section referring to political philosophy in the works of the same period necessitates research on the source and structure of this theoretical tradition. The presence of transitions between contemporary politics, political philosophy and religious moral formation in the works of the period requires the analysis of rhetorical, aesthetic and historical elements in these three titles. Thirdly, examples of political thought extending from the second half of the 15th century to the first quarter of the 16th century correspond to a period in which the political regime and the bases of this regime changed gradually, and new political struggle themes emerged. In this period, the *istoric* way of political

thinking becomes widespread, but a new religious codification and social struggle practice emerges. In this respect, while the practice of comparative interpretation focuses on historical narratives in the third period, the transformation of the social structure and the state becomes the main factor in making sense of political thought. Another distinctive aspect of this period is the increasing interest of political thought centered on the Ottoman state, both in the material world and in the Islamic heritage, and in parallel, both empirical-based and theological forms of discourse develop together. In this respect, the political thoughts written at the verge of the 16th century require contextual, historical and thematic interpretation as part of Islamic political theory one hand, and as a tool of the concrete needs of the imperial regime on the other.

In this thesis, the structure of political thought in the Ottoman Empire will be tried to be discussed comparatively. The subject of our thesis is limited in time and the period from the establishment of the Ottoman principality to the beginning of the 16th century will be discussed. The reason for this temporal limitation is the great expansion of the borders of the Ottoman Empire started with the second quarter of the 16th century, and as a result, the texts of political thought increased at an unprecedented rate in previous centuries. In this context, the 16th century has unique political problems and sophisticated texts that deserve to be studied as a case in itself, and even the cataloging of these texts, which were written in more than one language, has not yet come to an end. Despite this difficulty, Ottoman political thought that emerged in the 16th century and later has been the subject of more academic studies, but a comprehensive analysis of political thoughts in the early Ottoman Empire has not yet been made. For this reason, this thesis is aimed to fill a significant gap in the literature by focusing on this early period of the Empire. This thesis study consists of three main parts in general terms. The first of these is the theoretical analysis covering the period from the early period of the Ottoman state to it becoming an empire. In this analysis, the structure of Ottoman society as a social formation, its social elements, social class and status relations, and the framework of development of the state are analyzed theoretically. Secondly, the main themes of political thought in the pre-imperial early Ottoman society are discussed between the third and seventh titles of the thesis. Thirdly, the new issues and debates in the political thoughts in the Ottoman society, whose political regime was characterized as an empire from the middle of the 15th century to the beginning of the 16th century, will be analyzed in the seventh and eighth chapters of the thesis.

CHAPTER II

THE POLITICAL ORDER AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN THE OTTOMAN ERA

There are several basic approaches that deal with the structural features, institutions, actors of Ottoman society and modalities of their interrelationships. These approaches can be roughly divided into two. The first approach was developed within the Marxist political economy paradigm, and it deals with the Ottoman social structure under the concepts of feudalism, Asiatic mode of production or tributary mode of production. The second approach, on the other hand, developed partly under the influence of positivist historiography and particularism, and partly under the influence of orientalism, and focuses on a unique formulation of the term feudalism or the thesis that Ottoman history developed depending on some unique features. Although I mostly refer to the concepts of Marxist political economy in the theoretical framework used throughout my thesis, it does not address the Ottoman social structure with direct reference to the concepts of feudal mode of production (FMP)/Asiatic mode of production (AMP)/tributary mode of production (TMP), but I use a new concept that rentier mode of production (RMP) proposes to replace them. In this section, the discussions on the structure of Ottoman society will be summarized and the founding principles of the Ottoman social structure will be presented within the framework of the RMP. In the next subsection, the development and structure of the Ottoman state will be reviewed within the framework of this concept, and a series of arguments on how to analyze examples of political thought using the concept of RMP will complete the theoretical discussion.

II.I. Non-Marxist Approaches to Ottoman Social Structure

II.I.I. Feudalism Thesis and Ottoman Society

II.I.I.I. Development of the Concept of Feudalism

‘Feudalism’ -putting aside the excursive uses of the word- is a concept that was coined in the 17th century to describe a specific social structure that started after the end of the antiquity and entered a phase of complete change with the early modern period. The term, as it was first used, is specifically restricted to the European Middle

Ages and refers to a specific legal formation. The first emergence of the concept in the narrow sense was realized by César-Pierre Richelet's legal definition of the term *feudalism* around the term *fief* in *Dictionnaire françois* (Bloch, 2014, p. 23). However, it was later that the concept came to signify a certain form of civilization or type of society. In the first half of the 18th century, Count Boulainvilliers addressed and analyzed feudalism as a form of government in his work *Historie de l'ancien gouvernement de la France avec XIV Letters Historique sur les Parments ou Etats-Généraux* (Bloch, 2014, pp. 23-24). The general acceptance and spread of the term were realized with the works of Montesquieu and its meaning was expanded around Voltaire's views on the subject. The issue took its most developed form at the beginning of the 20th century, through the analyzes of M. Weber, which for a long time went largely unnoticed.

Montesquieu ([1748] 1989) in the 6th book of his *De l'esprit des lois* (Chapters 30 and 31) examined how the vassalage in the Germans evolved into fief agreements with the Charlemagne period and finally acquired a hereditary character in terms of legal history. According to his studies the scope of the feudal law mainly covers Western Europe and -by partial delays and specificities- Germany. Montesquieu's (1989, p. 619) definition of feudalism (as 'an event that occurred once in world history and will never occur again') points to the decisiveness of the said temporal and spatial boundary in the first emergence of the concept. On the other hand, Voltaire's alternative conceptualization of feudalism brings into being a second approach, which has survived to the present day, as to whether it can be used in the feudalism debate to characterize the structuring of different societies without being bound by the time and place peculiar to the Western Middle Ages. The effect of this approach can be seen in the discussions on the Ottoman social structure, although it is quite indirect. Voltaire (1879, p. 91) states that the social order built by the Mughal dynasty ruling in India is *feudalism*, no less than that seen in France, Germany and Spain, and that its origins are in the ruling style of the Scythian and Tatar conquerors, he underlines that it is a very old form of government that dominates three-quarters of the globe. Secondly, the issue Voltaire stressed is that feudalism coincided with an anarchic social situation in which public authority disappeared. This view, expressed by Voltaire from time to time in his *Dictionnaire philosophique* (1764), argues that the feudal world presents an anarchic

state in which certain privileges, uncertain borders, arbitrary laws, military and judicial powers far from central control are intertwined.¹²

The reconsideration, development and universal application of the legal and historical arguments formulated by Montesquieu and Voltaire were largely realized by the analyzes of M. Weber. While constructing the concept of feudalism, Weber identifies several typical forms of concrete social relations to which this concept refers. These typical features can be listed as follows (Weber, 2022, p. 48); (i) the existence of an armed social group that undertakes the functions of fighting and serving a higher authority during the war, (ii) the land ownership held by this group as the origin of social privileges, (iii) rental income and *corvée* provided from the unarmed population attached to the land. Weber argues that the concept of feudalism is admissible as a broad historical category, including examples from ancient Egypt, Babylonia, Sparta, and the Greek city-states, medieval Europe, Seljuk, and Ottoman Empires—albeit with some differences. The principle of emergence of such differences stems from differences between the forms of organization and financing of the warrior class, and within this framework, variants corresponding to the central state, manors or 'feudal cities' emerge (Weber, 2022, p. 48-9). Weber (1947, pp. 373-81) defines two basic forms (fief and beneficium), which he generally calls *Lehensfeudalismus* and *Pfrundantfeudalismus*, the first of which is largely decisive for Western European feudalism, while he uses the other to characterize examples in the history of the Middle East and Asia. While addressing the concept of feudalism, Weber especially refers to the economic context of this concept and draws attention to the rent relationship. In this respect, Weber (1978, p. 1072) focuses on pre-capitalist rent incomes and formulates three main and three intermediate typologies of feudalism. These typologies are listed as follows¹³:

(i) 'Liturgic' feudalism: soldiers provided with land, frontier guards, peasants with specific military duties (cleruchs, laeti, limitanei, Cossacks); (2) 'Patrimonial' feudalism, a) 'manorial': levies of coloni (for example, of the Roman nobility as late as the Civil War, and of the ancient Egyptian pharaoh); h) 'servile': slaves (ancient Babylonian and Egyptian annies, Arabian private froops in the Middle Ages, Mamelukes); c) gentile: hereditary clients as private soldiers {Roman nobility); (3) 'free' feudalism, a) 'vassalic': only by virtue of personal fealty without the grant of

¹² See: "Confiscation", "Donations", "Franchise", "Government", "Gregory VII", "Laws" articles, Voltaire (1843).

¹³ See also: Weber (1947, pp. 373-81).

manorial rights (most Japanese Samurai, the Merovingian *trustis*); b) ‘prebendal’: without personal fealty, only by virtue of granted manorial rights and tax revenues (Middle East, including the Turkish fiefs); c) ‘feudatory’ (*lehensmässig*): personal fealty and fief combined (Occident); d) ‘urban’ (*stadtherrschaflich*) ; by virtue of the communal association of warriors, based on manorial land allotted to the individual (the typical Hellenic polis of the Spartan type).

Contrary to Weber’s views, which were ignored for a long time, both Montesquieu’s approach and Voltaire’s approach, as prototypes, directly and indirectly influenced the arguments and discussions on feudalism in the 19th and 20th centuries. The first of the main currents of these debates considers feudalism as a unique social phenomenon that emerged in a certain time period in Western Europe, and similarly explains the foundations of the development of capitalism in Western Europe by referring to the uniqueness of the feudal social structure. As historical studies on Eastern Europe, Germany, and the Nordic countries have developed, academic consensus on at least the first part of the argument has relatively diminished. A closer examination of different parts of Europe, where the feudal social structure was never seen or had no uniform development, added new dimensions to the research on feudalism. While the first of these approaches results in the creation of an ideal type of feudalism centered on the Frankish states and the evaluation of other examples according to this model, the other accepts that feudalism may also emerge in non-European societies and expands the formal constraints of the concept of feudalism around the histories of different societies.

These approaches can briefly be named as narrow-model and broad-model, and it is undeniable that the irreconcilable theoretical dichotomies between the singular and general features of social phenomena have a methodical basis that is effective in the formation of both models referred to the concept of feudalism. If these two approaches are taken into consideration in the Ottoman studies, first, it is concluded that the Ottoman society did not have a feudal structure, based on the comparative studies made between the Ottoman social structure and Western European feudalism within the framework of the first approach. From this point of view, the Marxist followers of the first approach argue that AMP or TMP characterize the Ottoman society, or they argue that the Ottoman society has a unique structure. It is possible to detect in the relevant sections of this thesis that the discussions of AMP and TMP mostly started with the criticism of the theory of feudalism. The followers of the second approach argue that a

feudal social structure was dominant in Japan, China, Mongolia and Turkestan, Egypt, Iran and Ottoman lands, with specific differences being reserved, and they conduct their analyzes around this concept. In this subsection, it will be first briefly touch on the theory of feudalism and the historical characteristics of feudal societies, and then summarize the arguments of researchers who consider the Ottoman social structure as feudalism or FMP.

Feudalism is generally conceived as the disintegration of ancient society, either one of the specific aspects of this disintegration, or a new synthesis of the dissolved elements or a specific response to this dissolution (such as the development of dependency relations). The clearest examples of this approach, if taken as prototypes, can be seen in the analyzes of H. Pirenne, M. Bloch, and J. Le Goff. Although the mentioned historians do not share the same thoughts on some issues such as the historical reasons that were decisive in the formation of feudalism or the theoretical formulation of the land regime, they establish a similar line of thought between the dissolution of the ancient society and the establishment of feudalism. The works of K. Asakawa, Ch'u T'ung-tsu, H. Maspero and W. Eberhard, who contributed to the development of feudalism analysis simultaneously with these thinkers, are also worth mentioning. On the other hand, an alternative line of argument, rooted in the work of Marx and Engels and extended from German Social Democrats to Russian Marxists, Indian and Chinese Marxist theorists, has greatly contributed to the debate on feudalism in 20th century —this theoretical paradigm will be discussed in the next section.

Let's start with H. Pirenne first. Pirenne (1937, p. 8; 1959, pp. 242) draws the general framework of feudalism as the “return to rural civilization” and emphasizes that monetary wealth has lost its importance in social life and that social existence has been reorganized based on agriculture. According to Pirenne, the distinctive feature of feudalism is the disappearance of public authority, and this situation manifests itself especially on two elements: The state and the manor economy. In this context, the development of the feudal system corresponds to the evolution of a social structure in which the public authority is independently and hereditarily distributed in the hands of the feudal elements, as a situation where state sovereignty is actually eliminated (Pirenne, 1937, pp. 7-8).¹⁴ According to the author, the estates that constitute the

¹⁴ Even the historian W. A. Pelz (2018, pp. 19-22) who is an effective representative of the history-from-down approach and underlines the neglected importance of regional differences and the resistance of local people in medieval European societies, while describing feudalism, attributes a decisive importance to the absence of central political authority. Thus, shows how

economic center of this fragmentation of sovereignty are –perhaps not entirely, but largely– composed of units with no access to the market, organized in the form of a “closed estate economy” (Pirenne, 1937, p. 9). The organization of the labor required for agricultural production in these units is carried out within the framework of the serfdom institution. According to Pirenne (1937, p. 12), serfdom determines the status of the laborers engaged in agricultural production with its multifaceted structure as both an exploitation relationship, a protection relationship and a relationship of dependency. Pirenne’s approach, reminiscent of Voltaire, considers feudalism as a kind of institutional dissolution -anarchy- and interprets the coming together of the elements that make up feudalism -land, labor, domination- more or less around a legal dependency relationship.

Le Goff’s way of demarcating the feudal social order more or less repeats Pirenne. According to Le Goff (2019, p. 99), feudalism is shaped around the body of personal ties that bind the members of the dominant groups of society together in a certain hierarchy, and in the final analysis, feudalism can be reduced to homage and fief. This means that feudalism is based on land grant and service obligation, which is concretely tied to an homage between lord and vassal (Le Goff, 2019, p. 99). In this context, according to Le Goff (2019, p. 100), fiefs generally correspond to a piece of land, and this situation places the phenomenon of feudalism in the rural context and makes it necessary to define it as a kind of system based on land ownership and management. The secondary determining feature of the pointed organization is that the landlords (*seigneurs*) seize the right of jurisdiction at the expense of the decline of public authority (Le Goff, 2019, p. 323).

Feudal society, as depicted by Pelz (2018, pp. 19-20), is characterized by a plurality of laws and traditions, power and wealth are usurped by those with military power, widespread decentralization and tri-class (warriors, clergy and peasants) social stratification becomes the dominant feature. Although the origins of this schema (tripartite hierarchy, decentralization, military order) in general are based on the post-Enlightenment critique of medieval society, Duby’s (1978, 1982, 2006, etc.) detailed studies on medieval history and feudal society updated and improved this discussion. Duby (1978, p. 162) formulated feudalism as a new organization of the productive

effective and widespread this approach is. For a critique of frequently repeated concepts such as the absence of the state, the complexity of feudal law, and the feudal bond is a mixture of real and contractual law etc., see Gurvitch (1947, pp. 213-217).

forces and the social classes that dominate them, and he placed process of the dissolution of monarchical authority and the shift of authority to local princes at the heart of this new organization. In this respect, feudalization corresponds to the birth of a new society in which the public sphere is narrowed, the power is fragmented and privatized, and the private life replaces the public life (Duby, 2006, pp. 22-23). The new organization is characterized, in the last analysis, by the transition to a new mode of production in which the nature of social power changes, instead of the social structure of the ancient society based on war and slavery (Duby, 1982, p. 150). This new social structure was institutionalized with a triple change (Duby, 1982, pp. 153-55): (i) peasants were transformed from free property owners into tenants, from free individuals into serfs, (ii) the distinction between secular persons and clergy began to be sharply defined, (iii) a social distinction developed over the privilege of bearing arms (people versus potentates).

One of the distinctive aspects of Duby's work emphasized is the decisive importance of the church, in particular, in the organization of the feudal social system. Although the prominent position of the church in feudal society is clear, it is worth discussing whether this position is theoretically absolutely compatible with feudalism. For example, Poggi (2014, p. 53) refuses to evaluate the relationship between feudalism and the medieval Catholic church as a direct integrity, arguing that the centralized structure of the church is in conflict with feudal fragmentation. On the other hand, when the lands owned by the church and the familial ties between the church elite and the nobility are considered as indicated by Thomas (1962, p. 322), it is undeniable that there are concrete continuities that go beyond theoretical contradictions. Although it is a long-accepted interpretation that the church and Christianity are seen as integral parts of Western feudalism, it has been undertaken by Mann (2005) and Baschet (2009), following Duby, to put this reading into a theoretical formulation. Duby (1978, p. 165) analyzes the ideology of *three orders*, which had a decisive influence on the reproduction of the feudal system:

In this ideological model constructed by intellectuals, all members of the Church in those days, the specialists in prayer were obviously to be placed at the apex of the hierarchy of orders. Not only were they to be exempt from the many exactions to which powerful men could subject their dependencies through pillage or taxation, but they were also to be awarded a substantial share of all produce, this to be offered up to God through their intercession. People were thus induced to

give preference to economic activities relating to consecration and sacrifice. This penetration of the collective consciousness coincided with the moment when the flood of pious donations in favour of religious houses reached its highest point; never in the history of the Christian Church in the West were the laity's bequests so bountiful as during the five or six decades overlapping the year 1000.

Similarly, Mann (2005, pp. 379-90) draws attention to the decisive ideological power of Christianity and therefore the Catholic church in the formation of feudal institutions. Although he attributes similar importance to the problem of 'decentralized society' or 'dissolution of the state' to explain feudalism, a partially new theoretical approach has been developed by Michael Mann, which deals with the structural plurality of social power relations. Similar to Duby -but with a unique theoretical formulation, Mann (2005, p. 19) formulates feudalism as a quadruple pattern of power. Mann (2005, pp. 10-11) defines society as a complex structure in which organized power networks are articulated, and deals with the main typologies of organization of power under four headings: (i) economic, (ii) ideological, (iii) military and (iv) political. In this context, feudalism, as a term reflecting the dominant organization/institutionalization form of the four sources of social power in question, refers to a mode of production (economic instance) where the surplus is taken out from dependent peasant groups, a hierarchy rising from vassals to lords and monarchy (political instance), a the recruitment system (military instance) based on conscripting that ensures the gathering of feudal armies and Christianity (ideological instance), which is a distinctive ideological code spread throughout Europe (Mann, 2005, p. 19). In the aforementioned system, any kind of state with any financial or political determinant could be mentioned, and in the final analysis, any structure called 'feudal state' meant nothing more than the articulation of almost completely autonomous households (Mann, 2005, pp. 391-92). On the other hand, the founding principle of this society, which divided within the complex structure of households, church, peasants and vassal relations, is that power is not monopolized by anyone, all actors (lords, subjects, church, farmers) have enough control over resources to have their own partially autonomous regions (Mann, 2005, p. 397). Mann (2005, p. 397), who calls this structure a multiple network, draws attention to two significant situations brought about by the fact that the monopoly on power is not concentrated in the hands of any group: (i) the structure of multiple power possession makes social stagnation impossible, (ii)

each group, openly or implicitly, has its own private resources, thus private property which makes European feudalism more distinctive than other social structures (Mann, 2005, p. 399). Although Mann (2005, p. 399) claims that private property has become dominant in European feudalism since the 9th century, he also states in another part of his work that individuals cannot be considered as absolute property owners (Mann, 2005, p. 375).

A recent study highlighting the role of the Church in the development of feudalism through more detailed -and assertive- arguments is also worth mentioning. A recent extensive monograph by Jérôme Baschet, entitled *La civilisation féodale: De l'an mil à la colonisation de l'Amérique*, attributes the emergence of capitalism in the West to the historical exception of the feudal system and considers the church as the essence of the feudal system (Baschet, 2009, pp. 578-79). Baschet (2009, p. 583) argues that although the dominance in feudal society is entirely in the hands of the lords, social cohesion is primarily provided by the church. Moreover, some of Baschet's propositions completely reverse some of the generally accepted theoretical views on feudalism. For example, according to him (Baschet, 2009, pp. 581-83), feudalism cannot be defined as an anarchic situation because the conflict in the social system is very limited, commercial and urban growth is not contradictory with feudalism, on the contrary, it is compatible with it. Moreover, although the feudal mode of production corresponds to a total control between the dominating and the dominated, it brings a balanced and efficient social order, furthermore, feudal domination is practiced before and after production, not during production (Baschet, 2009, pp. 581-83).

On the other hand, Bloch's (2014) analyzes bring important corrections/new propositions in the classical feudalism theory that was mentioned above and lay the foundation for an alternative path. First, Bloch categorically opposes the tendency to analyze feudalism exclusively in Western Europe. Although Bloch's magnum opus *La société féodale* (1939) mostly deals with the historical development of feudalism in Western Europe, he argues that feudalism cannot be considered as a unique historical phenomenon -as Montesquieu proposed- (Bloch, 2014, p. 664). Thus, he categorically widens the framework of the concept. Bloch (2014, p. 25) expands the scope of the concept within the framework of a series of criticisms, arguing that feudalism is a highly complex form of social organization that cannot be reduced to a purely legal aspect.

First of all, Bloch (2014, p. 661) argues that medieval Europe cannot be considered as completely feudal, feudalism was not developed in cases such as

Scandinavia, Frisia and Ireland, besides, feudalization was incomplete in many places.¹⁵ For example, in most regions, the rural population has not been completely subject to personal and hereditary relations of dependency, large or small pieces of land in the status of *alleu* have survived, and the ‘free man’ and the state have not completely disappeared as long as the population that is directly dependent on the king or his representatives continues (Bloch, 2014, pp. 661-62). Secondly, Bloch considers that it is an inaccurate approach to define feudalism as a state of anarchy directly or to understand it through the absence of a power of central state. According to Bloch (2014, pp. 656-57), such a definition is loaded with value-based judgments because it accepts the sovereignty of the central state as an historical norm and misses the essence of the feudal system. Although it is an undeniable fact that the central authority was fragmented in the Western Middle Ages, the origins of this phenomenon should not be sought directly in feudalism, but in the seignorial regime, which is much older than the feudal regime and mixed with feudalism (Bloch, 2014, p. 657). Bloch (1931, pp. 247-52) argues that vassalage, fief, and seigniorship, cited as founding elements of feudalism, should be historically separated; He states that the term *fief* comes from the root of *fihu/fehu* (cattle), is a term referring to movable goods, that vassalage develops in the form of land assignment -as a payment- in return for military service, while seigniorship, as an economic model, should be sought in patriarchal land ownership which dates back to much older times. Finally, Bloch (2014, p. 125) opposes the identification of feudalism with the ‘closed economy’ model: According to him, the closed economy model does not apply even to small peasant holdings, and especially large seigniorships cannot be considered to be self-sufficient under any circumstances.

Braudel identifies the social formation in which feudalism became a form of civilization in the strict sense of the term, with Western Europe, but according to him the concept of feudalism was applicable in Japan under the Shogunate regime, Russia in the post-Kiev Principality period, partly Iran in the Middle Ages, China in the Warring States period, Gupta Empire period and Mughal India. In this context, Braudel, drawing attention to the antecedents of feudal relations in the seignorial land regime, states it is

¹⁵ Thomas (1962, p. 292) argues that feudalism, though local variants, was a phenomenon that had universal validity in medieval Europe. On the other hand, Thomas (1962, pp. 296-98) argues that the *nulle terre sans seigneur* argument is not valid due to *alleu* lands in Germany, *benefice* type lands were not known in Germany for a long time, despite the military aspect of French feudalism, Germany followed a different economic tradition, etc. He comes to conclusions quite close to Bloch.

possible that all elements of feudalism would not develop in different geographies and societies, and occasionally there could be a partial similarity exist. According to Braudel, feudalism has some universal features, and it can be said that it has some specific features when it reaches a developed form. Braudel (2017, p. 355) formulates the universally valid primary factor in the formation of feudalism as the sudden disintegration of a large political body. The indicated fragmentation is accepted as an equally decisive factor for both European feudalism and other examples of feudalism in the world by Braudel (2017, p. 355). Secondly, the general feature that can be mentioned—especially acceptable in terms of European feudalism but also unequivocally applicable to other examples—is that feudalism is a society based on relations between people, along a chain of dependencies; corresponds to an economy where services are not the only, but the most common means of payment (Braudel, 2017, p. 356). In addition, Braudel (2004a, p. 368) refers to a kind of closed economy system that is self-sufficient or tends to be so as another general feature that the term feudalism indicates. Braudel (2017, pp. 355, 357) states that feudalism, despite all its complexity and diversity, constitutes a homogeneous civilization for Europe in sense of moral, religious, cultural values; war/ love/life/death regulations; he argues that everywhere from one *fief* to the next, the same civilization was experienced.¹⁶

Beyond these general features, the specific development lines of the ‘feudalisms’ that emerged in different societies and regions differ from each other. For example, Braudel states that the social structure of the Gupta Empire in India and the Tokugawa period in Japan shows great similarities with Western feudalism (2017, pp. 199-200, 318-19, 323-24). On the other hand, it is understood that feudalism did not become the dominant social structure despite the appearance of serfdom and seigniorship in ancient Chinese and Tibetan societies (Braudel, 2017, pp. 195, 229). Braudel (2017, p. 577), who stated that an advanced feudal fragmentation emerged after the Tatar-Mongol invasions in the Russian lands, identifies the existence of structures similar to feudalism in South America during the colonization period (Braudel, 2004a, pp. 5, 346, 349, 369).

The debate about whether the feudal form of society is a universal phenomenon or not, which problem directly concerns the Ottoman example, necessitates a series of research on Chinese society and history in particular. Feudalism debates in China began

¹⁶ See also: Braudel (2004b, p. 415) summarizes how the feudal society consisted of plurality. In this later piece, Braudel seems to have partly moved away from the concept of feudalism, which he found loaded with Marxist holism.

intensely in the 1920s. The main reference point for these discussions is the *fengjian* system that was established during the early Zhou dynasty (13th century BC). This term would later be used to describe Chinese feudalism. As Dirlik (1996, pp. 229-30) states, the fact that this system was transformed into the *junxian* system with the establishment of the empire in the third century B.C. makes it questionable whether the *fengjian* system constituted a sufficient reference point in the analysis of Chinese social structure at the beginning of the 20th century. This system was accepted as an example characterizing the Chinese social structure for the first time -as far as is known- in *The Early Institutional Life of Japan* (1903) by a Japanese historian named Kan'ichi Asakawa. Asakawa bases his claim that some structural features similar to European feudalism are also valid for Chinese history by referring to this system (Dirlik, 1996, pp. 231-32). The independent works of Ch'u T'ung-tsu, H. Maspero and W. Eberhard also represent another important epoch in which the concept of feudalism is used in the field of modern Sinology. The most significant aspect of the non-Western (especially China-oriented) feudalism debate is that the two main arguments, such as decentralized social structure and the dissolution of clan ties, gradually lose their decisiveness for the definition of feudal social structure. Finally, Coulborn's (1956) compilation about debates on feudalism and theoretical reevaluation constitutes the best-known synthesis in this field.

To begin with K. Asakawa's analysis first, he considers feudalism as a form of social organization consisting of a certain land and taxation system and certain moral codes.¹⁷ According to Asakawa (1903, p. 4), feudalism in Japan emerged simultaneously with European feudalism, which had similar characteristics in terms of nature and principles, and the interaction with China after the 7th century was decisive in its development. Considering China in particular, Asakawa identifies a political conjuncture in which the central control was largely disintegrated around the 8th century BC, divided into semi-feudal states, thus he defines the system (*fang-kien*) applied during the Hsia (Xia), Yin (Shang) and Chow (Zhou) dynasties as feudalism (Asakawa, 1903, pp. 164, 190). During the Zhou dynasty, the division of the lands into many principalities aligned into five basic levels and the hereditary use of more than seventeen dynasties, and the more or less arbitrary enlargement of these levels as the central authority weakened are among the indicators of the feudal system (Asakawa, 1903, p. 164). The development and form of Japanese feudalism is also worth mentioning. The

¹⁷ For Asakawa's analysis of the moral character of feudalism, see Asakawa (1903, p. 3).

formation of the nobility class, which took a privileged position in the cultivation of the imperial lands, and a new military layer depending on this class, and the excessive use of taxation methods for their own interests, caused the existing centralist system to be shaken (Asakawa, 1903, p. 260). Following this situation, a new social system emerged, in which the imperial power lost its sole decisiveness but did not disappear completely, where the feudal lords gained power and used the authority to regulate on behalf of the emperor. Asakawa (1903, p. 329) argues that this system was organized as “the old emperor plus the new state”, which had no organic connection between them, and that the real power and control passed into the hands of the new military class. Parallel to the stated change in the balance of power, the central government was dispersed towards the management of the local parts, the nobility was organized in terms of “office and rank”, and the land ownership, tax burden and military service obligation were equally distributed (Asakawa, 1903, p. 264). After the said reform, the old taxation system took a new Sino-Japanese form, *so/cho/yo*, similar to the old *etachi/mitsugi/ta-chikara* division (Asakawa, 1903, p. 90). In addition, the social organization preserved its quasi-clan basis, and the principle of the authority of the elder of the clan, expressed in the form of *nji-no-choja*, continued to exist in an articulated form with the central government (Asakawa, 1903, p. 318). In this context, the clan leaders, who also led the new military class, eliminated the civil nobility that constituted the imperial bureaucracy around the 12th century, creating the final form of Japanese feudalism that would continue for the next seven centuries (Asakawa, 1903, pp. 329-30).

Secondly, it is necessary to deal with Tung-tsu Chu’s study of feudalism in Chinese history since the 1930s. The focus of Chu’s study of feudalism is ancient China during the Zhou dynasty, and his reference point is the writings of Confucius and Mencius. As it will be evaluated later, H. Maspero’s criticism of the use of these sources is also valid for Chu’s theses in this respect. Chu (2021, pp. 7, 16) defines the feudal system as a social structure in which a certain land regime is at the center and this determines the unequal rights and obligations that different social classes develop mutually. Chu frames feudalism in terms of its general characteristics as follows (Chu, 2021, pp. 210-15): (i) as a 'divide and rule' system, a system in which central authority is not strong and lands and subjects cannot be directly ruled by the king, (ii) an interclass submission system in which subordinates serve superiors, (iii) state administrators use military power directly, as well as administrative and judicial power, and serve as commanders, although they are not directly involved with fiefs and peasants.

Chu's (2021, p. 16) basic premise is that during the Zhou dynasty, the system of private ownership of land took place in two basic ways: (i) the state-owned land was divided into small pieces and distributed to peasants, (ii) for the purpose of administering large pieces of land in the name of the king they distributed as private property to the nobility at various levels. Chu (2021, p. 16) states that the principle followed in the distribution of land is based on the distribution of private property as a privilege belonging to the nobility, while the lands distributed to the peasants are cultivated in return for high taxes or service obligations to the landlords. The main thrust in the establishment of the said system is based on the fact that the king of Zhou state distributes the lands to the princes as fiefs in order to manage these lands and the population, and determines the tax burden and military service in accordance with the criteria such as the size of the lands subject to this distribution, their fertility and population (Chu, 2021, pp. 27-28). Chu (2021, p. 102) rejects the view that the distributed lands belong to the state in the final analysis, and states that the state's lands should be considered directly the land of the princes, since there is no clear distinction between the state and the princely possession of the land.

As for the class structure of feudal Chinese society, Chu (2021, p. 142) generally depicts a two-class social structure. While the first of these classes is nobles, the other is determined as commoners. The noble class is divided into five basic hierarchical grades (Chu, 2021, p. 47): (i) duke, (ii) marquis, (iii) count, (iv) viscount, (v) baron.¹⁸ On the other hand, it is seen that the 'commoners' class is also divided into five groups (Chu, 2021, p. 142); (i) scholar-commoners, (ii) farmers, (iii) craftsmen, (iv) businessmen. In general, he argues that farmers are bonded to the landed nobility through land and political control, and that this bond, defined under the headings of services/obligations, is considered the determining element of the feudal social structure (2021, p. 140). According to Chu (2021, p. 171), the fact that the farmers belong to the land and the land to the landlords means that the landowners indirectly own the farmers.

Henri Maspero's theses on Chinese feudalism differ from Chu in terms of both reference sources and a more flexible approach to the development lines of feudalism. The main theses that Maspero originally developed are as follows; (i) contrary to their importance in the study of Chu, the works of Confucius and Mencius do not constitute the main source in the study of Chinese feudalism, (ii) Chinese feudalism did not arise

¹⁸ As can be noticed, Chu used the terminology of the Western European nobility to distinguish these sections from each other.

as a result of the dissolution of the central state, its origins must be sought in the seignorial economy and clan structures, (iii) after the strengthening of the central state, feudal structures continued to resist locally. First of all, Maspero argues that both Confucius' and Mencius' testimonies in the feudalism debate cannot be regarded as directly valid, stating that they had only reached the end of the feudal period and that most of their thoughts were edited and written down by their students (Maspero, 2005, p. 5). In this respect, Maspero (2005, p. 10) mostly examines ancient Chinese inscriptions as the main sources. Based on these sources, Maspero (2005, pp. 10-11) states that private property has developed on land in China since the 9th century B.C., private property transfers were made with the permission of the king, and the landlords who benefited from this had some responsibilities towards the king. The fact that the private lands of the landowners were located in more than one place and the difficulty of managing the fragmented lands directly had resulted in the management of these lands by the stewards called *tsai* - a kind of absentee ownership- (Maspero, 2005, p. 11). This situation, which Maspero (2005, p. 19) calls simple land ownership, basically means that the landlord is the master of a certain area and the population living there, regulates the working relations in detail in the area he dominates, gets a share of the products, has a judicial authority. On the other hand, although there is dependence of the villagers on the land within this organization, their belonging to the landlord cannot be mentioned (Maspero, 2005, p. 19). Similarly, it is underlined that the landlord is not in an open feudal relationship, whether the donor of the land is king or not (Maspero, 2005, p. 19).

At this point, I will try to summarize W. Eberhard's theses formulated on the development and general characteristics of Chinese feudalism. Eberhard (1965, p. 27) defines feudal society as a rural social structure, which is generally divided into two sharp classes as ruler and ruled. In a specific sense, feudalism is defined as a network of rights and obligations in which the ruling aristocracy is subordinate to a central lord (Eberhard, 1965, p. 28). In this framework, the ruling class may have sub-branches, although it is not obligatory, but it is essentially hierarchically organized, the central figure of the hierarchy is -more or less- a ceremonial character, and the aristocracy, which acquires its position by birth, has accepted some contractual obligations to those in dominant positions, especially military service (Eberhard, 1965, p. 28). If the Eberhard's interpretation of Chinese history is mentioned, he divides Chinese history into three parts in general. The first of these is the history of ancient China, which is

largely a feudal society. The second form is the administration of a series of elites, from large landowners to civil servants, which he calls gentry society, which cannot be considered as feudalism. The third form is finally modern China and is beyond our discussion. Eberhard begins the formation of the first period with the Shang dynasty, which dominated China around 1450-1050 B.C. According to him, the introduction of horse and chariot technology into China led to the formation of a privileged landowner stratum and brought the state form closer to feudalism (Eberhard, 1995, p. 31). The rise of the Zhou dynasty, which followed the Shang dynasty and developed as a feudal lordship with special privileges during the Shang period, spread the feudal system (Eberhard, 1995, p. 33).

The Zhou dynasty distributed lands to members of the dynastic family and allied chieftains as a reward or concession (Eberhard, 1995, p. 34). Eberhard (1995, pp. 34, 40) argues that the kings of the Zhou dynasty did not have absolute power, lists the reasons for this under the following headings, which are synonymous with the reasons for the development of feudalism; (i) the garrisons spread throughout the country were under the rule of former tribal chiefs, (ii) the king was not own large estates to establish a central administration, (iii) the king was appointed by the overlords and was seen as an authority figure of a symbolic/religious context. In particular, as a result of the feudal lords' annexation of lands far from the cities, wars broke out between them and resulted in the dissolution of small-sized principalities. In this period, the role of the central ruler concentrated on the functions of preventing wars between feudal lords, establishing some alliances and formalizing new situations (Eberhard, 1995, p. 41). On the other hand, the long-lasting war of the feudal lords, along with the Warring-States period, accelerated the tendency to settle peasants in the newly conquered lands, and the enslaved peasants in the Zhou period were settled in these lands and the lands became a commodity that could be bought and sold (Eberhard, 1995, p. 53).

Finally, this section will be concluded by briefly discussing Coulborn's compilation published in 1956, in which the feudalism debate is ultimately exemplified throughout the universal history. In Coulborn's compilation, a discussion of feudalism is conducted in separate chapters on Western Europe, Japan, China, ancient Mesopotamia and Iran, ancient Egypt, India, the Byzantine Empire, and Russia. The significance of these discussions lies in the fact that, in general, all contributions have expressed a negative or positive opinion within the framework of a common theoretical

formulation. Strayer and Coulborn's (1956, pp. 4-5) article at the beginning of the review basically defines feudalism as follows:

Feudalism is primarily a method of government, not for economic or a social system, through it obviously modifies and is modified by the social and economic environment. It is a method of government in which the essential relation is not that between ruler and subject, nor state and citizen, but between lord and vassal. This means that the performance of political functions depends on personal agreements between a limited number of individuals, and that political authority is treated as a private possession.

Under this conceptualization, Coulborn identifies the formal and historical features of feudalism and formulates the necessary conditions for development. According to him, the phenomenon of feudalism presents more or less uniformity, and within this framework, the results of the feudalism debate in universal history agree in the presence of two examples that unequivocally demonstrate this structure: Western Europe and Japan (Coulborn, 1956, p. 185). On the other hand, the existence of structures that can be called feudalism is accepted by Coulborn (1956, p. 185) in China of the Zhou period and ancient Mesopotamia, although a definite opinion cannot be reached due to limited information. Egypt during the Libyan dynasty, the Rajput states of northern India, the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires and even the Russian Empire are not considered among the examples of feudalism, although there are opportunities for the development of feudalism in there. Briefly, if the main arguments of this reasoning are taken into consideration, it is seen that Coulborn identified a factor that can be considered as a *prima causa* in the emergence of feudalism, and two stages that follow each other gradually in its development. This factor can be formulated as the dissolution of a particular empire structure and the emergence of the need for security. In Coulborn's study, the stages of development of feudalism are discussed in terms of (i) proto-feudal and (ii) early-feudal. Coulborn (1956, p. 186) states that the phases in which a large empire is divided into several large states, followed by the restoration of the empire, are typical situations that can lead to feudalism. According to him, the dissolution of a great empire - although not necessarily resulting in feudalism - should be seen as the foundation that led to feudalism (Coulborn, 1956, p. 254). On the other hand, the approach in the classical theory of feudalism, which equates the development of feudalism with anarchy, is also rejected by Coulborn (1956, p. 190), and he insists that anarchy is a factor that will prevent the development of feudalism. Secondly, the first

of the developmental stages of feudalism, the proto-feudal stage, seems to be partly related to the anarchy debate. Coulborn (1956, p. 190) considers that some political reformers who came after the disintegration of the central state, spread personal vassalage relations in order to replace the official hierarchy during their efforts aimed at the restoration of the state, as the shaping factor of the proto-feudal universe. The formation of the Carolingian Empire in the history of Western Europe and the period of the Kamakura shogunate in the history of Japan are mentioned among the typical examples of proto-feudal phases (Coulborn, 1956, p. 204). The transitional phase from the proto-feudal phase to the early-feudal phase converges to anarchy as a transformation process in which disorder and violence increase, and these characteristics continue for a while, albeit decreasingly, in the early-feudal phase (Coulborn, 1956, p. 190). The indicated confusion brings along the search for security, and as a result of this, “strong fief” (the defining element of the early-feudal universe) emerges (Coulborn, 1956, p. 191). On the other hand, the difference seen in Byzantine, Mesopotamian, Persian and even Ottoman cases, where the possibility of transition to feudalism emerged but this potential was not fully realized, is that the central state never completely collapsed and therefore a social struggle for “strong-fief” did not intensify (Coulborn, 1956, pp. 337-38, 356).

This section can be concluded by briefly discussing the analyzes of feudalism carried out in accordance with Coulborn’s theoretical propositions. Reischauer (1956, p. 27) argues that the concept of feudalism in the history of Japan was valid between the 9th and 19th centuries, but it also had some exceptional elements. If the post-nineteenth century Japanese society is taken into account, three determining factors emerge that affect the development and original structure of feudalism (Reischauer, 1956, pp. 28-30): (i) the resilience of Japanese tribal (and/or clan) organizations that valued hereditary leadership and personal loyalty relationships, (ii) *sho* (manor) and *shiki* (tenures) as a system of land ownership and taxation that originated in China, (iii) hereditary and aristocratic faction of warriors based on ancient Japanese clan relations. In addition, prefeudal elements such as the central state, the imperial line, the palace aristocracy and the civil servant elite are exceptional examples that continued to exist in the feudal period (Reischauer, 1956, p. 27). This means that the maturation of feudalism is largely sought in the synthesis of elements of ancient Japanese society and the land regime of Chinese origin.

If the discussion made in Coulborn's compilation on the history of feudalism in China is summarized, it can be said that the most important point of this discussion is the exceptionality of feudalism. Bodde (1956, p. 49), based on Strayer and Coulborn's definition above, argues that feudalism cannot be considered a widespread and decisive phenomenon in Chinese history. The reason for this is centralized empire, civil bureaucracy etc. elements do not directly coincide with feudalism. On the other hand, Bodde (1956, p. 50) states that the period of the Zhou dynasty and the period of Period of Disunity can be considered as typical examples of feudalism in Chinese history. Bodde (1956, pp. 50-51) sees the concept called *feng-chien chih-tu* or feng-establishment system at the base of Chinese feudalism, which means growing crops/determining a border/ border of a fief/ to enfeoff. The development of this system was based on relations of dependency that found their origins in the Shang dynasty but reached their final form in the Zhou dynasty (Bodde, 1956, p. 52). During the Zhou dynasty, the society was basically divided into three sections (Bodde, 1956, pp. 55, 62); (i) *wang* (king, central monarchy), (ii) *chu hou* (vassals), (iii) subjects called *kung/hou/po/tzu/nan/min/chung jen*. This system is defined as feudalism, since the relationship between the Zhou king and the vassal-princes within this tripartite structure is also current between the large landowners and their subordinates (Bodde, 1956, p. 53). In this system, vassals are responsible for paying tribute to their superiors, performing military service and some special services (Bodde, 1956, p. 56). In contrast, vassal-princes constitute a practically autonomous domain of power in their feudal states (Bodde, 1956, p. 57): They can appoint their own officials, levy their own taxes, maintain personal armies, and maintain their own justice. Although the central kingdom has the official right to provide justice in the disputes of the noble vassals, it cannot always be considered to have such power (Bodde, 1956, p. 57). Bodde (1956, p. 54) states that due to some economic, social and political transformations of the Chinese society since the 6th century B.C., ruptures in the feudal order emerged and the emergence of the imperial regime, especially during the ruling period of the Ch'in dynasty, led to the disappearance of feudalism. An exception that can be described as feudal in this new phase of development is the period called Period of Disunity (221-589 B.C.). The weakening of the central authority in this period resulted in some of its administrative functions being undertaken by the local powerful landowners (Bodde, 1956, p. 85). Families and individuals (*k'o*/guests) who were weakened during this period came under the patronage of clans, thus gained support and assurance, and were

exempted from certain taxes and services imposed by the central government (Bodde, 1956, pp. 85-86). On the other hand, persons and groups called *k'o* also belonged to the landowners as subordinate part of the dependency relationship and were considered transferable to third parties, for example as a gift (Bodde, 1956, p. 86).

In Coulborn's compilation, it was seen that the concept of feudalism was applied in terms of Western Europe, Japan and partially sections of Chinese history. However, it is not always possible to make clear distinctions for some other parts of world history and societies. To mention a few of these secondary examples, which may be more controversial, it will suffice to briefly mention the examples of ancient Mesopotamia-Iran, Byzantine Empire and Russia. Brundage's (1956) analysis states that feudalism cannot be considered a determining factor in the ancient period of Mesopotamian-Iranian history, however, it is undeniable that some feudal elements emerged. The author, who first accepted the emergence of some feudal elements in ancient Babylon, nevertheless underlines the fact that the central state power has not disappeared (Brundage, 1956, p. 96).

On the other hand, feudal elements became more developed during the Kassite period (1595-1155 BC), who dominated the field after the collapse of the Babylonian state. Brundage (1956, p. 98) states that during the Kassite period, land-based agreements were made between the central government and local powers, certain rights of benefices that would become hereditary over time were accepted, and these rights included the collection of certain taxes/tributes, the organization of *corvée*, water and pasture rights, and military protection. The author, who found a second example in Iran of the Parthian period, argues that there is a mixed system here as well, stating that partly feudalism, partly tribal system and partly oriental despotism (Brundage, 1956, p. 112). In conclusion, if we focus on the history of the ancient world, Brundage emphasizes the possibility of eclectic social systems, including feudalism.

In addition, it will be necessary to summarize Kantorowicz's historical analysis of the Byzantine Empire. Similar to Brundage, Kantorowicz argues that a fully developed feudal social structure does not appear in the field he deals with, however, many feudal elements that make it necessary to be taken into account continue to take place in the field of social existence. These items are briefly military tenure, independent magnates, official privileges, personal armies and taxation, etc. (Kantorowicz, 1956, p. 152). Kantorowicz (1956, p. 153) stated that especially with the end of the Latin invasion, those who owned large estates became dominant in the society

and the management of the landed nobility had a feudal character, and in this context, the existence of some feudal characteristics in both the peasant militia system and the church system cannot be denied. For *themata*'s, which were centers of local militia organization (*limiterei milites*), balancing the power of landowners, he illustrates the contradictory relationship between the two by showing that the *strategoï* who ruled these regions began to emerge mostly from the children of landowner *dynatoi* class (Kantorowicz, 1956, p. 159). Trying to resolve this contradiction in favor of the landowners within the *pronoia* system should be interpreted as the basis of the quasi-feudal regime, according to Kantorowicz (1956, p. 159). While the lands in the status of *pronoia* were given to the aristocrats, who were members of the central bureaucracy, over time, they began to be seized by the military aristocracy or landowners in return for certain services (Kantorowicz, 1956, p. 161). If the Latin occupation is taken into the consideration, the author, who argues that the *pronoias* turned into *feodums* (Kantorowicz, 1956, p. 164), in any case he avoids the claim of a categoric Byzantine feudalism because the central state also maintains its authority.

Finally, Szeftel's discussion of feudalism in Russia should be summarized. Considering the history of Russia, Szeftel said that the existence of a complex and fully developed feudal society cannot be asserted, however, the existence of strong feudal tendencies and structures should also be taken into account. According to him, a completely dominant feudal phase has never emerged in the history of Russia, moreover, the lord-vassal relationship has developed with difficulty, although the institutional development of Russian society cannot be considered completely devoid of feudal elements (Szeftel, 1956, p. 181). In this context, he argues that the Russian social structure can be defined as "semi-feudalism", "quasi-feudalism", "para-feudalism" or "abortive-feudalism", the most appropriate of which would be the term "abortive-feudalism" for him (Szeftel, 1956, p. 181). There are certain historical relations behind this term. Szeftel's analysis basically centers on the post-12th century Russian society and focuses on the dual transformation of this society with the Tatar occupation. Along with the Tatar occupation, on the one hand, the rural population - especially the inhabitants of the Dnieper plain- systematically migrated towards central Russia, gathered around the church and landowners, and in this context, a relationship of dependency developed (Szeftel, 1956, p. 169). On the other hand, the intensity and actuality of migration make it difficult to keep the rural population tied to a certain piece of land (Szeftel, 1956, p. 169). In this case, political fragmentation, which provides a

favorable environment for the development of feudalism, accelerates, while land-based dependency relations do not lead to serfdom. In the final analysis, although the division of Russian territory into many principalities has taken place, political power still continues to be concentrated in the hands of Grand Prince Vladimir (Szeftel, 1956, p. 173). In this context, the central government began to distribute the non-hereditary benefice lands called *pomeste* in return for military service obligations (Szeftel, 1956, p. 175). These land assignments, which were not hereditary in the first place, became hereditary over time, so they began to integrate with *votchina* lands, and this process, which developed after the 16th century, progressed simultaneously with the development of serfdom in the land (Szeftel, 1956, p. 175). However, this development trend did not result in the disappearance of the central state and the determination of the entire social structure by feudal relations, on the contrary, the authority of the Tsar was able to continue and even the landowners became the public servant class (Szeftel, 1956, p. 176). The persistence of this dual structure clarifies why feudalism was 'abortive' in Russia.

II.I.I.II. Analysis of Ottoman Social Structure with the Concept of Feudalism

There are a series of studies that conceptualize Ottoman society as a feudal society throughout its history or in a limited part of its history and use the term feudalism in research on Ottoman political structure and/or political thought. D'Ohsson's *Tableau général de l'Empire Othoman, divisé en deux parties, dont l'une comprend la législation Mahométane; l'autre l'histoire de l'Empire othoman*, which was published in three volumes between 1787-1820, and Hammer-Purgstall's *Des osmanischen Reiches Staatsverfassung und Staatsverwaltung*, dated 1815, are the first examples of these studies. Many examples of this approach have emerged since the second half of the 19th century. It is seen that the works of A. Belin and P. A. Von Tischendorf also evaluated the Ottoman system as a feudal regime that developed from Islamic roots (Fisher, 1952, p. 4). On the other hand, the emergence of systematic studies on the subject started with the 20th century. In this context, A. Heidborn's *Manuel de Droit Public et Administratif de l'Empire Ottoman* (1908-1912) and C. Truhelka's *Die geschichtliche Grundlage der bosnischen Agrarfrage* (1911) are considered early and significant examples of the Ottoman studies. Another example of this literature, which later became a classic, is A. H. Lybyer's *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent* (1913).

Summarizing the ideas put forward in the early phase of the debates on Ottoman society can be a good point to start. The voluminous works published by Hammer-Purgstall since the second half of the 1820s greatly expanded the possibility of making theoretical evaluations on the subject. It is clear that the social structure of the pre-Hammer-Purgstall Ottoman Empire has not been sufficiently emphasized. For example, in the history of D. Kantemir, it is seen that a subject such as feudal relations or feudalism was not particularly emphasized. The problem that most of the evaluations made in the 18th century and before it placed the Ottoman Empire in a different nature compared to its Western European contemporaries due to its centralized structure, started to evolve into a comparative evaluation after these years. For example, in the article dated March 22, 1853, written by Marx and Engels for the New York Tribune - and it seems that the section on the Ottoman Empire was written by Engels - the timariot cavaliers are described as feudal lords who are at the lowest and most barbaric level of feudalism (Engels, 2008, p. 22).¹⁹ On the other hand, Marx (2011, pp. 142-43) in the first volume of *Das Kapital* (1856) still evaluated the Ottoman Empire as a kind of Asiatic despotism, rather than openly, and pointed out that the main state income of the in-kind ground rent was the reason for the survival of the Ottoman Empire -and emphasized the long-term stagnation of relations of production. At this point, it should be stated that the issue is far from being fully clarified for Marx and Engels as well as their contemporaries.

On the other hand, a series of studies published by M. Belin in the *Journal Asiatique* since the 1860s contain more in-depth analyzes in terms of seeking to reveal the similarities between Ottoman feudalism and Western European feudalism. Belin (1865, pp. 103-4) in his work *Essai sur l'histoire économique de la Turquie d'après les écrivains originaux* (1865), which is a compilation of articles published in 1863/64/65, pointed to the distribution of fiefs during the establishment phase of the Ottoman state and discussed feudal relations those placed in the center of the economic structure. Moreover, in *Du régime de fiefs militaires dans l'islamisme et principalement en Turquie* (1870), he develops the same argument and argues that fiefs were created to feed the feudal cavalry (Belin, 1870, p. 226). According to Belin (1870, p. 230-31), land ownership relations organized hierarchically from sultan to timariots, correspond to the hierarchy of military fiefs.

¹⁹ Also see: Marx & Engels (2008, p. 19, footnote 1).

Heidborn, who made one of the first and most detailed studies on the subject, focused his main theses on the *timar* system and its legal bases. Heidborn (1908, p. 142) argues that the general organization of municipal administration and feudal institutions in the Ottoman Empire formed a whole/integrity under the classical Ottoman order (ancient regime). The determining elements of this integrity can be listed as (i) land regime/fiefs, (ii) feudal hierarchy and (iii) laws (*kanuns*). Heidborn discusses the development of the land regime by focusing on several phases. According to him, first of all, most of the newly conquered lands are declared as the property of the ruler (*sultan*) and the form of ownership on these lands is defined under the *nue-propriété* (*rakabe*) status (Heidborn, 1908, pp. 142-43). These lands, which belong to the ruler and therefore under the control of the state, are given to the villagers residing on them within the framework of the right of disposition (*dominium utile*) (Heidborn, 1908, p. 143). In this dual structure, fief holders (timariots) are the determining elements of the feudal regime. Heidborn (1908, p. 145) claims that giving the state-owned lands to the feudals in the status of *fief/dirlik/timar* in the final analysis means giving the title of seigneur to the feudal lords and equips them with certain rights and powers. On the other hand, Heidborn (1908, p. 143) also underlines that this feudal structure has some unique characteristics, for example, he states that fief holders can be considered provincial agents of state in the final analysis, unlike Western feudalism, they do not contain hereditary privileges and their assignment has the characteristics of an employment. Considering both the hierarchy and the territorial division, Heidborn (1908, p. 144) states that this feudal system, although accepted within the Sharia, was carried out within the framework of its own specific Law (*kanun*) and these laws were structured under the influence of Seljuk and Byzantine administrations.

Continuing with yet another early study, the importance of Truhelka's (1911) study on the land regime of Bosnian is that it serves as a source for future studies on Ottoman domination in Eastern Europe and as a model for the origins and development of Ottoman feudalism. Truhelka ([1911] 1931, p. 59) argues that the Ottomans encountered feudal institutions in Bosnia for the first time and they preserved them. Truhelka's theses and their basis can be listed as follows:

- (i) After the Ottomans conquered Bosnia, they did not abolish local institutions but strengthened them. For example, they recognized the privileges of the landowners and accepted their inheritance (Truhelka, 1931, pp. 57-8),

- (ii) Former Bosnian families and Ottoman rulers established marriage bonds and were incorporated into the family name practice as a feudal institution (Truhelka, 1931, pp. 59-60),
- (iii) Although the lands in the status of *timar* were different from the lands given to individuals (*ad personem*, in medieval Western feudalism), the lands given in Bosnia followed the feudal structure and Islamized this practice (Truhelka, 1931, p. 62),
- (iv) Inheritance of land ownership is made possible by land in the *baština* category (Truhelka, 1931, p. 62)
- (v) Due to the hereditary transfer of lands in the status of *timar* and *zeâmet*, a ‘young military nobility’ arose in Bosnia alongside the old nobility (Truhelka, 1931, p. 64),
- (vi) In the land code of Suleiman I, the amount of tax that the villagers (*kmet*) should pay to the landlords was not determined and thus it was excluded from the state intervention (Truhelka, 1931, p. 67).

In the final analysis, Truhelka argues that the Ottoman state adopted and reproduced feudal institutions with the capture of Bosnia, and he grounds this proposition in terms of both land regime and social status relations.

Secondly, Lybyer’s theses are worth to consider in this context. Lybyer presented his analysis under several headings: The origins of Ottoman feudalism, its military organization, laws and taxation system. According to him, the Ottoman Empire had a complex financial and administrative system, part of which could be described as feudalism. He argues that in the origins of the Ottoman feudal system, there were some elements such as the land tax based on the cadaster that developed during the Sassanid period and the capitation tax applied to non-Muslims (Lybyer, 1913, p. 21). On the other hand, he underlines that the Ottomans were highly influenced by the Islamic states that dominated before them, the Sharia and, for example, the devshirme system of the Samanids (Lybyer, 1913, p. 23). Lybyer (1913, p. 24) evaluates the Byzantine Empire as the origin of many institutions in the Ottoman Empire, in short, he is convinced that the Ottoman feudal system was taken from the Byzantine state. At the base of the Ottoman feudal system, there is the army, which consists of central, feudal and irregular units and it is commanded by sultan who is the commander-in-chief (Lybyer, 1913, p. 109). The timariot *sipâhîs*, one of the basic units of this army, establish the feudal structure of the Ottoman state. Lybyer (1913, p. 100) states that the cavalry forces were

Muslims who were given fiefs by the ruler, and that most of the land outside the cities in the Asian and European areas of the empire was filled with these fiefs. In this context, fief holders constitute a social segment that collects revenues in their own lands and has the privilege to give jurisdiction “seigniorial jurisdiction” but is also supervised by the sultan’s servants (Lybyer, 1913, p. 100). Lybyer (1913, p. 101) states that *timar* and *zeâmet* holders, as provincial elites, constituted the basic middle class of the empire.

Another researcher who contributed to the feudalism debate is A. N. Poliak (Poliak)²⁰. Poliak’s article *La féodalité islamique*, published in 1936 in the *Revue des Études Islamiques*, is worth mentioning in this context. Poliak evaluates the development of military fiefs in general and serfdom in part as the basis of feudal relations in Islamic countries, despite some differences. According to Poliak (1941, p. 254), the relations between the feudal lords and the ruler are established in two different ways within the feudal model: (i) the collection of revenue between the ruler-state governor-local governor-small feudals, the relationship between tax farming and implementation of *ferme/sous-ferme* procedure, (ii) granting the right to benefit directly from the ruler by military fiefs. According to him, if a difference is to be sought between Western and Islamic feudalism, it is basically that feudal lords in the east reside in cities as absentee owners, while feudal lords in the west reside in castles at the head of their lands (Poliak, 1941, p. 251). Stating that this distinction is not absolute, he underlines that *mültezims* and *emirs* settled in their own properties in Egypt under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, and that the owners of military fiefs (*timar* and *zeâmet*) in the Ottoman period were obliged to reside in the places where their fiefs were located (Poliak, 1941, p. 253). The second important point Poliak draws attention to is the situation of direct producers against the feudal classes. The second important point Poliak draws attention to is the situation of direct producers in related to the feudal classes. Poliak (1941, p. 259), who stated that serfdom had historically developed in the lands dominated by Islam, for example, there was a very strict servage in Egypt, Syria and Palestine from the Mamluks to the 19th century, and this was most likely have been inherited from the Mongol Empire.

In this context, the works of F. Braudel are also worth to be mentioned. Braudel presented an analysis of the development and structure of the Ottoman Empire in his

²⁰ The author’s name, Polak, was printed as ‘Poliak’ in the Turkish translation. Although this difference, which may be caused by a printing error, is taken into account, the name of the author will be mentioned as it is in the translation (Poliak) in order not to be confused in the references.

three-volume work *La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, published in 1949 and revised several times. The shocking effect of the work on the historiography of the 20th century was directly perceivable for Ottoman historiography as well, and Braudel's effort to analyze and synthesize Ottoman feudalism as well as his historiography method drew attention. Braudel finds the basis of feudalism in the Ottoman Empire in the elements of the land regime and the nobility (land aristocracy).

Starting from the first element, Braudel (2019, p. 463) describes the development of the Ottoman Empire as the fact that feudalism in Anatolia opened the way to the Balkans as of the 14th century and settled in European lands and reproduced itself as a feudal system based on beneficium and fiefs. The author, who sees *timars* (or conditional fiefs) on the basis of this system, states that these fiefs correspond to a kind of salary, and the fief-owner is responsible for feeding the cavalry and participating in expeditions in proportion to the size of the fief (Braudel, 2019, p. 538). Due to the income-service relationship in the *timar*, Braudel (2019, p. 538) finds similarities between the lands in the *timar* status and the Carolingian beneficium. In his general evaluation, Braudel (2019, p. 535) states that the land regime in the Balkans, in particular, is not different from its Western contemporaries, that partially primitive states, similar to each other in a social structure with limited opportunities, give the same answers to the same problems and develop similarities in the final analysis. On the other hand, some differences and details that have emerged over time should be underlined. For example, Braudel (2019, pp. 538-39) underlines that the timariot *sipâhîs* constitute a very high number of nobles to be wealthy, whereas the owners of the *has* and *zeâmet* can be also the owners of foundations (*waqfs*) and property (*mülk*) by owning large lands.

Secondly, Braudel argues that the landed nobility existed in the Ottoman Empire and -far from being uniform- its characteristics changed over time which categorized by four different forms. This analysis of Braudel, in which he developed as four aristocracy typologies, is of great originality in terms of Ottoman feudalism studies. The four typologies that Braudel distinguishes chronologically and sociologically can be named as follows: (i) the aristocracy that settled in Anatolia until the end of the 14th century, (ii) the aristocracy that developed in Rumelia as of the 15th century, (iii) the aristocracy that emerged from the second half of the 16th century, (iv) landowners transformed with the emergence of the *çiftlik* farms. To briefly elaborate on these typologies, it can be said that the first typology emerged in Anatolia during the

establishment period of the Ottoman state, that this landed aristocracy showed both slave-owning and feudal characteristics, had seigniorial autonomy and exhibited free characteristics against the ruler (Braudel, 2019, p. 536). Braudel (2019, p. 536) states that in this period, lands could change owners without state intervention, there were *allodial* and foundation (*waqf*) lands, and because these last lands were hereditarily managed by family members, they were similar to *majorat*²¹ lands in the West. The second typology analyzed by Braudel (2019, p. 536-37) gained its distinctive form especially during the Balkan expansion of the Ottoman state. The defining characteristic of this type is that the people and lands are divided into fiefs/beneficium and distributed as *timars* in the new administrative units established on the old seigniorships, and the people who are freed from the old drudgery are subject to the obligation to pay in kind and/or in cash (Braudel, 2019, p. 537). Braudel (2019, p. 537) stated that the fiefs distributed at this stage, although they have the same qualities as the seigniorships in the West, cannot be considered ordinary, that they include villages, lands, uncultivated areas, rivers, tolls, even market rights but that their main purpose is to feed soldiers, in this context large fiefs were entrusted to the Christian nobility too. In addition, underlining that foundations and estates developed as a kind of ‘seigneur's reserve’ in this period, he argues that private property developed in favor of large *timar*-holders and undermined the foundations of the land aristocracy formed by all *timar* owners. The third typology that Braudel formulated emerges simultaneously with the development of large estates. According to him, the stagnation of the conquests led to the seigneurs of different sizes turning to the rural economy and exploiting the peasants to an increasing degree, and *timars* began to be given to the servants, palace people and viziers who were active around the palace (Braudel, 2019, pp. 540-41). In this period, the emergence of *timars*, which were given to more than one person or could be exploited by a single person under different names, caused changes in the structure of the aristocracy (Braudel, 2019, p. 541). For example, small seigniorships were swallowed by the big ones (Braudel, 2019, p. 541). Finally, this transformation has entered its final phase with the emergence of *çiftliks*, which are managed with strict seigniorial rights under the control of notables (*ayans*), but with high productivity and correspond to the modern form of ownership (Braudel, 2019, p. 541).

Compared to Braudel's general evaluations, S. N. Fisher's analysis focuses on the Balkan lands and deals with feudalism in the Ottoman Empire from the Balkan

²¹ The lands inherited by the eldest son of the family with the family title (Braudel, 2019, p. 536).

example. Let's start by looking at Fisher's definition of feudalism. The definition of Fisher (1952, p. 4) is as follows: "feudalism is marked by the territorial aspects of political, economic, and social relations and by the political, economic and social aspects of territorial relations". Within the framework of this definition, Fisher finds the feudal establishment of the Ottoman state in the military organization built on the land regime. Fisher (1952, p. 6) argues that the basis of Ottoman feudalism was the nurturing and maintenance of cavalry power, that all other economic/political/social aspects were secondary and developed mainly to support this military organization. At the core of this system, there are fiefs distributed by the ruler as *has*, *zeâmet* and *timar* (Fisher, 1952, p. 6). In general, he is of the opinion that the bilateral relations of the *sipâhîs* with the peasants on the one hand, and the provincial *begs* and the ruler on the other hand, give the most concise outline of Ottoman feudalism (Fisher, 1952, p. 15). Fiefs essentially constitutes a subsistence economy unit, which includes peasant farms and feudal *sipâhî* (Fisher, 1952, p. 13). The foundation of fiefs is the transfer of a certain income proportional to the size of the fief (*has/zemanet/timar*) to the fief owner (Fisher, 1952, p. 6). This income is obtained from peasant farms whose fragmentation is prevented, as well as registered by a *qadi*, whose transmission from generation to generation is guaranteed to the extent that certain tasks are fulfilled (Fisher, 1952, p. 13). The protection of these farms and the continuation of production -which is also the basis of the central state- are accepted as the responsibility of the fief owner *sipâhî* (Fisher, 1952, p. 13). Fisher (1952, p. 15) points out that the attachment of Muslim *sipâhîs* with the land in the Ottoman feudal system made them a dominant element in local government. On the other hand, the relationship between the ruler and local administrators (*sancakbeyis*) and *sipâhîs* in the distribution of fiefs constitutes another dimension that needs to be distinguished as stated by the author. This dimension is divided into two separate lines; The first of these corresponds to the formation of the privileged social group created by the fief endowment, the other to the problem of whose hand the control of the feudal system will be made -both of which are interconnected. Fisher (1952, p. 8) states that the right to receive fiefs was first regulated during the reign of Murat I and this right was limited only to cavalymen, children of *sipâhîs* and their horsemen. On the other hand, in the periods of Murat II and Mehmet II, the scope of the military class was expanded to include Janissaries, military slaves attached to the ruler, "occupants of learned posts at court" and women married to soldiers, so that the persons in the categories listed and their children joined the Ottoman feudal elite by

taking fiefs (Fisher, 1952, p. 8). He mentions the fact that the children of the palace bureaucracy began to be given *zeâmet*s above the traditional size as the corruption of Ottoman feudalism in this framework (Fisher, 1952, p. 9). The problem of who will control the feudal system also arises with this last implementation. Fisher (1952, p. 10) draws attention to the fact that the local administrators had control of the feudal system in the early periods of the Ottoman state, they were also fief owners, and they were hereditary governors. On the other hand, with the 1400s, the control of the feudal system passed to the army-commander-in-chiefs (Fisher, 1952, p. 10). If this development be examined in the region of Rumelia, Fisher (1952, p. 10) stated that the control of the feudal system in the Balkan provinces was still carried out by the local governors, and these governors had special officials who registered and controlled all the fiefs and inspected whether they fulfilled their obligations. The records kept by these officials, called “feudal secretaries” (*defterdars*) by Fisher (1952, p. 10), are of great function in terms of ensuring continuity in the fiefs, whose owners are constantly changed due to wars.

U. Heyd also uses the concept of feudalism in his study on the history of Ottoman law, which he continued throughout the 1960s -and according to the testimony of İnalçık (1969, p. 116)- the main structure of which was largely completed, but published after his death. Heyd uses the concept of feudalism both for fief organization and as a legal category, thus enhancing the work of Heidborn and Lybyer. It is necessary to touch on a few points about the analysis of feudalism scattered in Heyd’s posthumously published notes. Firstly, Heyd (1973, p. 43) states that the feudal system prevailed in the Ottoman lands in general, but there were exceptions such as Egypt. Heyd uses the concept of feudalism especially in the chapters where he examines the laws of Mehmet II period. For example, he defines the *cebelluyan* class in the *Kanunnâme* of Mehmet II as the armed followers of feudal lords (Heyd, 1973, p. 7), and conceptualizes one of the subsections of *Kanunnâme-i Âl-i Osmân* as “feudal and military law” (Heyd, 1973, p. 18). According to Heyd (1973, pp. 12-13), Mehmet II’s reforms reorganized the feudal system and eventually strengthened the feudal system by taking the privately owned lands under state ownership and distributing them as fiefs.

It is not surprising to see that the perspective developed by Coulborn and Kantorowicz is also used in research on Ottoman society. Dimitri Kitsikis, who wrote a monograph on the historical continuity between the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires, entitled *The Turkish-Greek Empire: An inquiry into Ottoman History through the Prism*

of the Intermediate Region uses this perspective competently. Kitsikis' interpretation of Ottoman history is generally based on the idea that the Ottomans left their tribal origins and became a largely feudal state and followed the Byzantine example in this process. According to Kitsikis (1996, p. 64), firstly, Osman Beg, as the head of a tribe, had the position of a military leader who ruled different tribal chiefs, and he had the status of *primus inter pares* compared to other tribal leaders. In this context, as a result of the conquests under the leadership of Osman Beg, each tribe collects taxes from the lands they own and sends one-fifth of the spoils of war to Osman Beg (Kitsikis, 1996, p. 65). He states that the form of these political relations changed in the 14th century and that a military force affiliated to the state was formed, which was centralized with the development of *timar* system, with the establishment of *yaya-müsellem* units instead of the Turkmen cavalry (Kitsikis, 1996, p. 75). In this context, the *timar* system constitutes a subject worth dwelling on. Kitsikis focuses on both the specific structure of the *timar* system and its historical origins, and calls the social segment organized around this system as 'feudal cavalry'. The development of the *timar* system is based on the appointment of the army commanders as the administrators of the seized lands and their obligation to feed and equip the soldiers in these lands (Kitsikis, 1996, p. 75). He states that the origin of this system is the lands in the status of *pronoia*, which is the Byzantine fief system, and that these lands can be considered as a continuation of the Seljuk *iqta* (Kitsikis, 1996, p. 76). According to Kitsikis (1996, p. 76), *timar* has the same characteristics as *pronoia* in essence, thus the former Byzantine feudal lords therefore accepted the Ottoman sovereignty and maintained their status. The main difference between *timar* and *pronoia* is that the *timars* are still under the domination of the central state/sultan, while the *pronoias* are more autonomous and organized under the private ownership due to the loss of power of the Byzantine central state and the Crusades (Kitsikis, 1996, p. 76). In general, Kitsikis (1996, pp. 77, 89) states that the Turkmen aristocracy and the Orthodox Christian aristocracy formed the feudal cavalry power by organizing around the *timar* system, and the inheritance of *timars* from father to son was seen from the early period, although the ruler continued to dominate over the *timars*. Moreover, Kitsikis (1996, p. 133) finds that with the expansion of the Ottoman state, it started to include the feudal societies in the Eastern Mediterranean region, and they preserved the feudal relations prevailing there without transforming them. Other topics that Kitsikis deals with are land division and taxation systematics. According to the author, in the Ottoman land system, peasant farms and lords farms were formed

separately from each other, *zeâmet* and *has*, which are large farms, were distributed in *beneficia* status like *timars* and operated by agricultural workers (Kitsikis, 1996, p. 110). On the other hand, peasant farms were organized according to the *zeugarion* scale of the Byzantine Empire and based on pairs corresponding to the size of a pair of oxen could plough, but the exploitation of feudal lords was prevented by state control (Kitsikis, 1996, p. 76). As a result, Kitsikis asserts an idea of continuity between the Ottoman and Byzantine Empires in terms of land distribution, formation of military forces and taxation, and highlights the organization of the feudal cavalry class on the land as the basis of this continuity.

II.I.II. Ottoman Social Structure in the Framework of the Particularist Paradigm²²

Another approach that developed as the structural counterpart of the works and approaches discussed above in general can be called the particularist paradigm. The basic thesis of this paradigm is based on the hypothesis that the Ottoman social structure was different from its contemporary Western examples. In this respect, the particularist paradigm or thesis is qualitatively different from the Marxist/neo-Marxist or orientalist approaches. While Marxist/neo-Marxist approaches evaluate exploitation as the underlying substance of social structures in class-based societies, representatives of the particularism see historical traditions, essential differences –and partly the contributions of individual genius– in the substance of social structures. If the approach in which personal genius is prioritized is left aside as an outdated analysis method, the biggest problem of the particularist approach is that the phenomenon identified as tradition or historical continuity tends to use reproduction mechanisms in a concrete social formation without associating them with concrete relations of power and exploitation. In this respect, the representatives of the particularist approach feel obliged to base their narratives on the particular tradition and the ‘sui-generic’ logic of historical continuity, no matter how much they use the tools of the discipline of political economy and historical primary sources in empiricist trend. The tradition in question may be Islamic/mystical, ethnic or geographical. Although this approach has mystifying, affirmative, apologetic or morally critical variants commenting the Ottoman state and its social structure, it is perceived that there is a common problematic at its base. To roughly frame the origin of this problematic, it can be summarized as how to take an attitude against the effect of Western modernization, how to respond to orientalist theses

²² On the problem of particularism, see: Aytekin (2017b, p. 15).

and how to reconstruct the official/dominant identity in line with modern necessities. Particularly at the end of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, particularist approaches that developed in this politico-cultural line encountered a different academic and political conjuncture from the middle of the 20th century, and developed new forms of discussion and analysis without completely losing their main lines. For example, the necessity of responding to the Marxist literature, the influence of the views of economists such as Weber, Sombart and Rüstow were the primary factors in the inclusion of new concept teams in the discussion. At this stage, when the basic development lines, arguments and conceptual framework of the particularist paradigm are examined closely, the relations of negate and/or justification with the theses (FMP, AMP, TMP etc.) that will be summarized later can be clearly seen. Finally, following the 1980s, the growth of a new generation of historians in the field of Ottoman historiography and the proliferation of academic debates shifted the focus of the particularist approach from a defensive position to a position of integration with the world. In the final analysis, considering the Turkish writers, the effect of the political choices made on the line of Westernization/modernization continues to exist as a subtext even in this third phase of particularist historiography. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the effects of particularist historiography began to be seen in some researches with Marxist tendencies, and analyzes that did not adhere to a predefined mode of production concept or prioritized political structures brought certain articulations between both approaches.

II.I.I.I. The Establishment Phase of the Particularist Paradigm

Specific references to the particularist paradigm generally appear as early Ottoman chronicles and archival documents, and for this reason, it is possible to think that this approach is partially fed by pre-modern historiography approaches. However, the political debates and orientations included in the historical process that started from the second half of the 19th century had a great impact on the approach in question to become an argumentative paradigm. As the distinctive works of this process, Ahmet Cevdet Pasha's work named *Târih-i Cevdet* (1854-1884), Namık Kemal's articles in *İbret* newspaper, *Renan Müdafaa-nâmesi* (1886) and *Osmanlı Târihi* (1877-1878), and finally, it is necessary to mention a series of works written by Ziya Gökalp at the beginning of the 20th century. The theses developed by these names against both the history studies of d'Ohsson and Hammer-Purgstall and the approaches of E. Renan and

similar orientalist also showed their effects in Ottoman historiography, which had a chance to develop fully at the beginning of the 20th century. This effect, in one way, directs the pens that tend towards universal historiography, as in the histories of Ataullah Efendi, Hayrullah Efendi, Ahmet Vefik Pasha and Ahmed Mithad Efendi, and makes it possible to build a certain common denominator between Ottoman history and world history. On the other hand, this influence is partly in the nationalist interpretations against the history theses of H. A. Gibbons and N. Iorga, and partly in the universalist responses to the nationalist interpretations of Balkan historiography, or at least in the responses to the ‘oriental despotism’ approach, which has become widespread since Montesquieu. In the final analysis, it would be appropriate to evaluate the historiography examples to be discussed at this stage as revisionist-particularist historiography examples. These examples both revise the Ottoman chronicles and develop defenses against Western views. The revision forms in question can be grouped under three headings as (i) legitimacy-based/Islamist revision, (ii) nationalism-based revision and finally nationalist-conservative revision.

It would be appropriate to briefly examine the above-mentioned origins of the main theses of the particularist approach. First of all, it is possible to start with the basic theses of Ahmet Cevdet Pasha’s *Târîh-i Cevdet*. In this work, Ahmed Cevdet Pasha focuses on the establishment of the Ottoman state and its historical meaning, and provides a comparative explanation of the decline of the state with the rise of Europe. In this respect, the history of Cevdet Pasha partly contains the core of the universal history narrative, and on the other hand, it builds the basis for particularist arguments as an extension of the conservative world view in which he is positioned on the political and cultural plane. Behind the author’s theoretical paradigm lies Ibn Khaldun’s distinction between *Bedevî* and *Hadarî* groups and his cyclical understanding of history. In this context, Ahmed Cevdet Pasha (1972, pp. 32, 36) considers the establishment of the Ottoman state as a phenomenon that took place after the caliphs lost their political power in the Abbasid state and after a phase similar to feudalism -and the further disintegration of the social structure after the Mongol invasion. This proposition contains two important judgments, the first of which is that the development of the Ottoman state has a centralized vision against feudal fragmentation, and the other is that the *mîrî* land regime and thus classical Islamic institutions are at the center of this vision. Interestingly, Ahmed Cevdet Pasha (1972, pp. 37) argues that the Ottoman state was founded by a small group of Turkmen who adhered to Islamic principles and did not

inherit property or civilization from their predecessors. At this point, Ahmed Cevdet Pasha shows the Turkish tribes as the founding -perhaps the dominant element- of the Ottoman state, but weakens this position with two very interesting separate arguments. Firstly, according to Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, although the Ottoman Empire was established as a Turkish state, it became a 'complex' state due to the large number of Muslims from Greeks and other tribes (1972, p. 46). Secondly, he states that the Greeks were in a much superior position to the Ottomans, who were a small tribe, in terms of their financial power and state knowledge (Ahmed Cevdet, 1972, p. 44). The possible subtext of these two theses put forward by Ahmed Cevdet Pasha is that the Muslim Greeks also contributed in the transition of the Ottomans from a tribal (*Bedevî*) social structure to a civilization (*Hadarî*) and that the Islamic institutions and traditions above the ethnic structure were the determining factor in the strengthening of this Ottoman state. The basis Ahmet Cevdet Pasha provided to the particularist approach is his understanding of the Ottoman state as a multi-ethnic Islamic structure in which the Turks were of central importance, and his prediction that the deterioration of the functioning based on religious principles in this structure would correspond to ethnic and administrative corruption. In this case, the originality of the Ottoman state lies in its application of religious rules and institutions in a way that can hold ethnic plurality together.²³ Another extension of Ahmed Cevdet Pasha's thesis is that it lays the ground for the prediction that Western writers will misjudge the Ottoman state and social structure, and moreover, may make unfair criticisms because they do not have sufficient knowledge about the Islamic administrative system and Islamic institutions.

The second fundamental view rising on this ground will belong to Namık Kemal. Namık Kemal is a versatile writer who had a serious impact on the 19th century intellectual world, if not directly on Ottoman historiography. Namık Kemal's theses are in line with Ahmed Cevdet Pasha's multi-ethnic Islamic empire framework and follow a similar line of moderate modernization. What made him an influential intellectual is his ability to engage in polemics with Western historians and thinkers while defending these theses, and to open a particularist discussion line that finds its origins in an Islamic culture. The basic view put forward by Namık Kemal in the article titled *Avrupa Şarkı*

²³ It is seen that Ahmed Cevdet Pasha applied these determinations to legal practice and directed the writing process of *Mecelle*, which claims to respond to modern needs and the requirements of a multi-ethnic structure. The fact that *Mecelle* could find a relatively long field of application in the lands that were subject to the Ottoman Empire before the First World War, also after the Empire, indicates the strengths of this thesis (see Şimşirgil & Ekinci, 2009, pp. 55-60).

Bilmez, dated June 22, 1872, written in the *İbret* newspaper, in *Renan Müdafaaamesi* and in his history of Ottoman Empire, is that Western writers do not have sufficient knowledge about the religious culture of Islamic countries in general, and the cultural and political structure of the Ottoman Empire in particular and they made deliberate distortions. It is noticed that the Western writers most exposed to Namık Kemal's criticism in this context are d'Ohsson, Hammer-Purgstall, Renan and partially Montesquieu. The most specific nomenclature that Namık Kemal puts while making these criticisms is that the people he claims to have no knowledge about Islam and the Ottoman Empire are the orientalist (*ulum-i şarkiyye*) circles. It is seen that these criticisms mostly focus on Islamic law, Islamic culture, ethnicity problem and Ottoman history. To give an example of the counter-propositions formulated by the author, Namık Kemal argues that Islamic law prevents the ruler from dominating people and goods in a way we can call 'eastern despotism' (Özün, 1938, p. 56). According to this opposing proposition, assumptions such as (i) the law of fratricide, which is alleged to have come into fore during the reign of Mehmet II, (ii) the Ottoman ruler's rule limited to his life –the absence of institutionalization, (iii) the arbitrary judgment of the ruler over the property and life of the civil servants, are completely wrong (Özün, 1938, p. 56). Second, let us consider the issues of Islamic culture and ethnicity. Namık Kemal generally claims that orientalist literature is full of material errors, exaggerations or misinterpretations about Islamic culture and tradition (Özün, 1938, pp. 54-55, 56-57, Namık Kemal, 1962, pp. 13-14). As it can be understood, some of these claims are about 'eastern despotism', 'savageness' and 'domination', while another part is the issue of ethnicity and nations, which has become the primary subject of 19th century Ottoman intellectuals. It is understood that both topics are not unrelated, on the contrary, they are the dominant parts of a wide debate about the integrity of the Ottoman state, which was on the verge of disintegrating into ethnic monarchies, and the legitimacy of its political order. First of all, Namık Kemal (1962, p. 26) opposes the thesis that the ethnic characteristics of various tribes are erased under the Islamic belief, which is one of the theses put forward by E. Renan in his speech titled *L'Islamisme et la science* in 1883. According to Namık Kemal (1962, p. 26), the religion of Islam does not destroy the ethnic characteristics of Berber, Sudanese, Circassian, Afghan, Malaysian and Egyptian tribes, but preserving them and placing it on them as a general identity. While describing the Ottoman political order, Namık Kemal develops the direct extensions of this argument to define the regime, and defines the elements that make up the Ottoman state

as legally equal, having common interests, people who hold official positions according to merit but differ from each other in terms of language/ethnicity/idea (Özün, 1938, p. 81). In this context, Namık Kemal's basic political proposition -if his own article titles are used- can be formulated as "ittihad-ı İslam" and "imtizac-ı akvam" (Özün, 1938, pp. 74, 81). In other words, Islamic solidarity and the unity of law, belief and culture that form the basis of this guarantee the coexistence of different ethnicities/religions/sects. Namık Kemal also applied this thesis to his interpretation of Ottoman history. According to the author, the Ottoman state has an unprecedented structure in terms of its establishment and structure (Namık Kemal, 1971, p. 60, 110; Özün, 1938, p. 58). The basis of this structure lies in accepting and applying Islamic principles morally, having unique rulers, and being largely different from the various Islamic states that preceded it due to its centralized power. To briefly mention the differences in question, Namık Kemal (1971, pp. 59, 64-65, 72, 110) states that Osman Beg was able to lay the foundations that would transform a tribe of four hundred and forty people into a world-scale state due to his extraordinary talents, he argues that unlike many previous or contemporary states, this state was not collapsed, was not divided between the family of the ruler and his children, established the first regular army, and created an unprecedented law of war. In the formation of this result, benefiting from members of many different nations -for example the Greeks, on the other hand, applying the rules of sharia and having an Islamic morality were decisive (Namık Kemal, 1971, p. 59). In this context, Namık Kemal (1971, pp. 64-65, 131), who considers the weakening of the central state and the violation of Islamic law as the beginning of corruption, indicates the examples of this process as the division of lands among relatives of the dynasty, giving or selling them as dowry/gifts. As Mardin (2000, pp. 286-87) points out, Namık Kemal's system of thought is based on the concepts of Islamic political philosophy. On the other hand, these concepts also correspond to a moderate modernization effort to keep the ethnic and religious minorities living under the roof of the Ottoman Empire together within a legal and ideological framework. In this respect, the thesis of the historical uniqueness of the Ottoman state became a kind of Islamic formative unity thesis, which was mostly put forward against the newly emerging nationalist movements, which was also the source of a revisionist history thesis, since the motto of this thesis was Ottomanism. However, as Mardin (2000, p. 286) states, this thesis will leave its place to its new successor, as Ziya Gökalp paved the way for nationalist interpretation of history.

Although Ziya Gökalp did not write an Ottoman history directly, he had a significant impact on the particularist paradigm as he was one of the founding references of the ideology of Turkish nationalism, was the teacher of M. Fuat Köprülü, and published influential works both in the late Ottoman period and the early republican period. Ziya Gökalp's main thesis is that the political, cultural and economic life of the Ottoman state was divided into two separate layers, which are original Turkish and cosmopolitan with international character. Gökalp divides these layers into two theoretical categories as culture (*hars*) and civilization (*medeniyet*). While the term 'hars' covers national social codes such as language, culture, belief, law and aesthetics, the term civilization corresponds to the sum of these social codes of more than one nation (Gökalp, 2015b, p. 46). Based on these concepts, Gökalp (2015a, pp. 17, 46; 2015b, pp. 46-59) states that the Ottoman Empire developed centered on the Byzantine civilization, so Turks were pushed to the second place in economic and political life and an alternative culture that was not related to the imperial center was developed. For this reason, Gökalp shifts the focus of his studies to the separation between Ottoman civilization and Turkish culture, to the history of pre-Ottoman Muslim Turkish states and finally to Central Asian Turkish culture. The differences that Gökalp (2015b, pp. 46-53) sees between Ottoman civilization and Turkish culture are gathered in the fields of language, music, literature, morality, wisdom/science and art/aesthetics. According to the author's basic thesis, the above-listed elements of the civilization adopted by the Ottoman Empire were largely inherited from the Byzantine society or the Eastern Islamic culture, of which the Byzantine society was the founder (Gökalp, 2015b, pp. 49-52). On the other hand, Gökalp (1981, pp. 67-68) is of the opinion that the historical factors that carried and settled the genuine Turkish culture in Anatolia should be sought not in the Ottoman Empire, but in the Seljuk, Khwarazmians, Qara Qoyunlu and Aq Qoyunlu periods. Another issue that Gökalp emphasizes is expressed under the concepts of Byzantium Empire (Eastern Roman Empire) and Eastern civilization. According to this, the Eastern civilization represented by Byzantium Empire constitutes the origin of the Islamic civilization, which showed its influence on the Ottoman Empire. Gökalp (2015b, pp. 59-60) argues that the Eastern Roman civilization influenced the Arabs and Iranians, and in this way it was transferred to the Ottoman Empire. The main features of this civilization are an imperial regime that is not based on democracy (Gökalp, 1981, p. 67), a cosmopolitan ruling class (Gökalp, 2015a, p. 39), and inertia that suppresses

economic development (Gökalp, 2014b, p. 77). It is clear that these theses are a nationalist variation of the concept of eastern despotism.

Gökalp's theses both trigger research on pre-Ottoman Muslim-Turkish states and open up a field of research for the identification of Turkish cultural elements within the Ottoman 'civilization' due to the criticism of the Ottoman state they contain. While Gökalp identified many elements of Turkish culture, especially in the establishment period of the Ottoman state, he is of the opinion that these elements lost their dominant position due to certain political and cultural reasons in the phase that would later be called the classical period.²⁴ An important analysis that needs to be emphasized at this point is the way Gökalp applied his analysis of the Eastern Roman influence to the Ottoman political regime. According to Gökalp, before entering the Eastern/Islamic civilization, Turks lived under social units based on consanguinity and democratic government forms that combined them. The most central and determinant of these forms of government took the name of Ilkhanate, and there is a democratic aspect that differs from the imperial regime since there was a congress even in this form (Gökalp, 1981, p. 66). On the other hand, the Turks' integration into the Eastern civilization, their transition to the Sultanate -or in other words, the imperial regime- took place. Gökalp (1981, p. 70) sees that the ruler's family is placed in a divine position that has the right to dominate all lands and people on the basis of this regime and the formation of the slave/*ghulam* army to support this. The author, who generally relates this regime to the displacement of Turkish tribes (raid and migration), also believes that this system is also related to the Iranian tradition, which he had previously associated with the Eastern Roman civilization circle. If the raid and migration pattern is taken into consideration, the author states that only the soldiers and chiefs of the Turks occupy a certain region in the first way, and therefore the captured places are turned into domains (*müstemleke*) and the dominant stratum earns their living by collecting taxes from the people (Gökalp, 1981, p. 68). Gökalp (1981, p. 67), who states that Turkish communities settled in a certain region with all members of the community and engaged in art, trade and agriculture in the migration pattern, calls this form colonization (*müstamere*). As we

²⁴ For the basis of a similar view, it is sufficient to look at T. Fikret's famous poem called *Sis*: "Ey köhne Bizans, ey koca fertut-ı müsahhir/ Ey bin kocadan arta kalan bive-i bakir". Tevfik Fikret wrote this poem to describe the tyranny of Abdulhamid II. In the imagination of the poem, it is indicated that the city of Istanbul has a similar atmosphere of oppression transferred from Byzantium to the Ottoman Empire. This connection symbolically evokes the dichotomy of Western liberalism versus Eastern despotism.

shall see in following parts, this theory had an important influence on the thesis of colonizing Turkish dervishes of Ö. L. Barkan. Gökalp (1981, p. 68) states that the sultanate/imperial regime emerged from the raid form, and that the political regime needed officials from different ethnicities in order to maintain this form. Historically, Gökalp (1981, p. 67-68) claims that Seljuk, Khwarazm, Qara Qoyunlu and Aq Qoyunlu settlements were formed in the form of migration and therefore, even if the Ottomans disappeared, these lands were not left by the Turks. On the other hand, he argues that regions such as Central Europe, North Africa, Abyssinia and Basra, which were ruled by the Ottoman Empire, were easily lost because they were exploited domains (Gökalp, 1981, p. 68). Another point that the author emphasizes is the historical and political background of the sultanate/imperial regime. According to Gökalp (1981, p. 70), the slave/*ghulam* army organization, which came from the Iranian tradition, became Islamized during the Abbasid caliph Mutasim period and passed on to the Samanids, Ghaznavids and Seljuks. The author's analysis is largely consistent with his critique of the multicultural structure and multi-ethnic administrative apparatus of the Ottoman Empire. Gökalp (1981, p. 70) defines this form of regime as a state based solely on military power and criticizes it for being away from democratic Turkish tribal traditions. Moreover, the army and bureaucracy formed from different ethnic groups constitute the Ottoman ruling class and are in great contrast with the Turkish mass ruled (Gökalp, 2015b, p. 53). If Gökalp's criticisms and suggestions are evaluated from a general point of view, it is seen that his main proposition guiding historiography lies in the distinction he makes between culture and civilization. While this distinction sees the political structure of the Ottoman Empire as belonging to an international civilization framework, it associates folk culture and belief with the Turkic tradition. In this context, post-Gökalp studies have largely focused on historical examples called the 'Turkish-Islamic' state, which took place before the Ottoman Empire, and tried to reinvent the ethnic tradition, which is thought to have preserved its own specificity in civilization. For this reason, the relevant distinction has continued to remain in effect, either openly or covertly, as an important pillar of particularist historiography.²⁵

As a result, Gökalp's determinations sit on a common theoretical ground with Ahmet Cevdet Pasha and Namık Kemal, but have a different political vision. All three names follow Ibn Khaldun's thesis of transition from nomadism to civilization, and - with the exception of Gökalp-, they take a cyclical understanding of history as the basis

²⁵ It is possible to see such effects in H. Kıvılcımlı, M. Akdağ, S. Divitçioğlu and B. Sezer.

for the analysis brought up to the last period of the Ottoman state. Ahmet Cevdet Pasha defends the cosmopolitan Islamic civilization, Namık Kemal states that the transition to civilization has created some problems of corruption and finds the solution in an Ottoman identity restructured under Islamic categories, while Gökâlp rejects the Islamist and Ottomanist problematics and radically rejects the structure he calls Ottoman/Islamic/Eastern Roman civilization. From these three positions, two dominant particularist approaches emerge: (i) The approach that comprehends and idealizes Ottoman Imperial culture and political institutions as the highest form of Islamic culture, (ii) the approach that sees the culture and institutions of the Ottoman Empire as structures alienated from Turkish society and idealizes their alternative, Turkic institutions. When the Ottoman historiography of the early republican period is considered, it becomes clear that there were individual examples of both approaches. On the other hand, the dominant approach will be the conciliatory approach, which argues that Ottoman institutions are a synthesis of Turkish and Islamic civilizations. The reason for this is that the Ottomanism versus Turkism debate in the early republican period ended against the former, and finally, the new variations of nationalist political tendencies that reconciled with conservative political tendencies gained strength over time. Finally, from the mid-70s, an Islamist revision of this historical narrative also emerged. This approach, which will be examined in the next section, rejects the thesis that Ottoman institutions may have ‘Western’ origins, and ascribes a historical specificity to these institutions, constructed in a Turkic and Islamic background. A similar search for peculiarity can be observed in the sub-text of some Marxist-oriented approaches.

The representatives of the particularist approach in the years after the 1920s were largely under the influence of this triple classification in terms of the general framework - either negatively or positively. On the other hand, especially the authors who wrote their works after the First World War had a higher academic level than their predecessors in terms of scientific method and reference sources. An important feature of the works written in this phase, whether it is a cyclical understanding of history or the importance given to the concepts of *asabiyyah/bedevî/hadarî*, has largely disappeared from the influence of Ibn Khaldun. It is seen that the progressive understanding of history has become dominant instead of Ibn Khaldun’s theoretical framework. In this context, professional historians such as Köprülü, Uzunçarşılı, Togan, and Yinanç carried out detailed studies in order to expand and contain the paradigm that

preceded them, and to bring it to an international academic level, until the mid-1940s, although they included various levels and differences in development. Among these names, Z. V. Togan and M. H. Yinanç emerged as the continuation of the Turkist approach. M. Fuad Köprülü, whose methodical meticulousness and richness of content in his works cannot be denied, studied in a field that can be formulated as the history of Turkish-Islamic civilization institutions and culture in general, and as of the end of the 1930s, he stepped into a more universalist understanding of history, especially with the influence of Russian orientalists. A similar situation can be said for İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, a dedicated student of Köprülü. Although Uzunçarşılı kept his research area narrower than Köprülü, he conducted detailed studies on the research topics he pointed out.

First of all, it would be appropriate to briefly mention the works of M. Fuad Köprülü. Köprülü started his academic career at a very young age with the support of Z. Gökalp and received great praise from Z. Gökalp after publishing his first major work, *Türk Edebiyatında İlk Mutasavvıflar* (1918). The general framework of the works written by Köprülü, especially until the end of the 1920s, accepts the distinctions put forward by Gökalp such as divan literature - folk literature, institutional Islam - folk Islam and focuses on Turkish history before the Ottoman state. To give an example, Gökalp's influence can be clearly noticed in the works titled *Türk Tarih-i Dinîsi* and *Anadolu'da İslâmiyet*, the monograph titled *Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, and the early articles collected in the volume titled *Edebiyat Araştırmaları* (Köprülü, 1980; 1999; 2005; 2012). On the other hand, it is seen that the works written by Köprülü in the 1930s gradually moved away from Gökalp's influence, and especially Gökalp's severe criticism of the Ottoman state fell from Köprülü's agenda. In particular, the detailed studies of Köprülü about the origin of the Ottoman dynasty and the state form in these years brought along a detailed denial of Gökalp's theses. By the end of the 1930s, it is understood that Köprülü abandoned the particularist understanding of history completely and developed a universal historiography project and planned to write a review centered on the concept of Turkish-Islamic feudalism. As will be shown below, the purpose of refuting the theses of H. A. Gibbons and N. Iorga, as well as the search for developing comprehensive theses developed by W. Barthold and V. Gordlevski on the Seljuk period, were influential in the formation of this draft. The fact that Köprülü did not publish his work on medieval Turkish-Islamic feudalism, which he declared to have written, prevented a wide synthesis in this area. Although Köprülü's views in this period were influential on İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, Ö. L. Barkan and O. Turan, the absence of

an effective work that deals with the subject in terms of universal history has brought Seljuk and Ottoman history studies back to a particularist line. The reason for this is that although the particularist historiography in general developed as a rival to the nationalist Balkan historiography and orientalism, it is not yet equipped enough against Marxist historiography. Since the idea of broad synthesis put forward by Köprülü is ultimately based on the development of Marxist historical studies, such a discussion seems to have been postponed until the emergence of Weberian schools in Ottoman historiography. On the other hand, it is clear that a Turkist historiography approach, which was directly or indirectly influenced by the lines of Z. Gökalp and F. Köprülü, emerged in the 1920s and 30s. The most prominent representatives of this approach can be listed as Z. V. Togan and M. H. Yinanç, whose intellectual origins are much more complex, but can be considered a founding figure. Apart from these names, A. İnan and S. M. Arsal can be mentioned among Turkist historians, but their contributions to Seljuk and Ottoman historiography are indirect and limited.

Let's start by taking Fuat Köprülü's theses to summarize the debates carried out in this period. In the first half of the 1930s, Köprülü published a series of studies on the Ottoman state's institutional structure, social bases, and ethnic and cultural pillars. The main ones that were influential on Ottoman historiography are the long article titled *Bizans Müesseselerinin Osmanlı Müesseselerine Tesiri* dated 1931 -which will be published later in book form- and the study entitled *Les Origines de L'Empire Ottoman* dated 1935. As can be understood from the names of these two works, they claim to analyze the connection between the ethnic/historical/social origins and institutions of the Ottoman Empire. In these two works, Köprülü makes two important methodological choices that have an impact on particularist historiography. The first of these is the criticism and rejection of Western sources written at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century (Köprülü, 2014, pp. 11-23), the second is the proposition that history researchers should not act with fixed doctrine/philosophical school/sociological model presuppositions -i.e., the principle of empirical orientation (Köprülü, 2018, p. 31). In this context, the main objectives of Köprülü are as follows; (i) to reject the argument that nomadic tribes were integrated into the institutional structure in the conquered areas, (ii) to erode the 'extreme' interpretations of the Turkist historiography paradigm about the Ottoman Empire, (iii) to come to a synthetic conclusion between Turkic and Islamic culture-history lines. Since the realization of these goals largely depends on discarding Z. Gökalp's nationalist/Turkist interpretation,

which explains -or criticizes-the Ottoman state structure and culture with reference to Byzantine institutions, Köprülü also builds a new framework for his analysis method and bases. According to this new framework, the historical origins of the Ottoman state are not based on the Byzantine Empire, but on the pre-Ottoman Turkish-Islamic states and the structure of Anatolian Turkish society. Köprülü argues that the political and economic institutions, ideological formation and symbols of dominance that gave the general character of the Ottoman Empire were largely created by the Seljuk state and its successors, and especially focuses on the social structure of 13th century Anatolia. Köprülü's (2018, pp. 60, 100-101, 106-7) analysis of 13th century Anatolian society shows that this social structure is not only composed of nomadic Turks, but also settled agricultural elements and urban dwellers among the Turkish masses who migrated to Anatolia, in this context, he states that there are more developed industrial and commercial centers than Western cities and villages with various forms of land ownership. The aforementioned developed city life provides trained human resources for the newly established state due to the existence of madrasahs and *qadis* in the final analysis (Köprülü, 2018, p. 60). This thesis has a strikingly particularistic orientation in that it contains the subtext that the Ottoman state will not accept any non-Islamic or non-Turkish institution. Köprülü (2014, pp. 49-72) applies this thesis to institutions and positions such positions as *beylerbeyis*, *qadiaskers*, *nişancis*, treasurer, captainpasha and *hadim* aga, and concludes that these positions were inherited from either Anatolian Principalities or post-Seljuk Muslim states. At this point, a remarkable anomaly emerges in Köprülü's discussions on the Ottoman tax system. Köprülü (2014, pp. 82-83) determined that the Ottoman tax system differed according to different regions, and that the practices in Central and Eastern Anatolia were the continuation of the practices of the pre-Ottoman Seljuk/Anatolian Principalities/Ilkhanate, on the other hand, he states that Byzantine influence can be mentioned for Western Anatolia and Rumelia. On this point, Köprülü (2014, p. 83) formulates his decisive methodological principle: When examining Ottoman institutions, Byzantine influence can only be found on items that are not included in the examples of Seljuk/Ilkhanate/Mamluks/Principalities. The problem of the origin of the tax system actually has an uncertainty that can create controversy in the fields of land system, army, administrative division and bureaucracy. Because the question of whether the *timars*, which form the basis of the tax system, consisted of the acquisition of *pronoia* lands common in the Byzantine Empire, needs to be answered. Köprülü (2014, pp. 88-99) argues that the *timar* system is not an

imitation of Byzantine *pronias*, on the contrary, the *iqtas* established during the Abbasid state were also adopted by the Seljuks and applied by the Atabegs, Ayyubids, Khwarazmshahs and Anatolian Seljuks with certain changes. Evaluating the origins of Ottoman *timars* in this context, Köprülü (2014, pp. 101-3) argues that *timars* were granted to their pre-Ottoman owners and that this practice existed during the reign of Osman Beg and was elaborated during the reign of Murat I. The problem of the origin of the *Kapıkulu*/Janissary army, which emerged as an alternative to the timariot cavalry soldiers in the Ottoman state, also emerges within this framework. In general, in the early periods of particularist historiography, the *devshirme* method and the formation of the Janissaries are shown as an example of Byzantine influence, as an element that was criticized on an ethnic basis. Köprülü (2014, pp. 114-16), who does not accept this thesis, finds that the regular infantry army organized around the ruler was also present in the Great Seljuk, Mamluk and Anatolian Seljuk states.

Finally, it is necessary to take a look at Köprülü's analysis of bureaucracy, administrative division and dominance in the Ottoman Empire. The issue of the origin of the state administrators, especially in the establishment periods of the Ottoman state, is important in terms of grounding Köprülü's approach. Köprülü (2014, pp. 141-43) states that the Ottoman state administrators were mostly Turkish and Muslim until the 15th century, and people who were raised in principalities such as Karamanids and Germiyanids or who were educated in madrasahs in the metropolises of the Islamic world assumed these duties. In this context, the early Ottoman state took the bureaucratic models and institutions of the Anatolian Seljuks, Mamluks and Ilkhanates as an example when establishing its administrative apparatus (Köprülü, 2014, pp. 141-43). Comparing the Byzantine and Ottoman institutions in general, Köprülü (2014, pp. 173-74) concluded that: The Byzantine state, which displayed a disorganized appearance similar to Western feudalism in the establishment phase of the Ottoman state and the imperial institutions were no longer determinant, was not in a position to have any effect on the centralist-absolutist Ottoman state, which had a very different structure from feudalism. As a result, Köprülü (2018, p. 163) does not see the Ottoman state as a new organization, a new ethnic and political establishment unrelated to the Seljuk Sultanate and Anatolian Principalities, but rather as a synthesis that emerged through the evolution of post-Seljuk Turkish organizational structures. This formulation is a definite indication that a progressive understanding of history has been substituted for Ibn Khaldun's cyclical understanding of history.

At the end of the 1930s, F. Köprülü tried to develop the ways of applying the progressive understanding of history discussed above to the history of ‘Turkish-Islamic’ civilization from a wider framework. He has stated several times that he is about to present his studies on this subject in detail within the framework of a book he named *Orta Zaman Türk-İslam Feodalizmi* but which he did not publish. Unfortunately, it is not possible to know the full content of the work because it has not been published, but it is possible to briefly interpret the transition of Köprülü to the understanding of universal history and its meaning in terms of approach to Ottoman history, based on a few works that are preliminary studies of the work. We learn from two main works that Köprülü worked on the phenomenon he called Turkish-Islamic feudalism. The first of these is Köprülü's introductory text to W. Barthold's work, which was translated into Turkish in 1940 with the title of *İslam Medeniyeti Tarihi*, and the second is the academic presentation titled *Orta Zaman Türk-İslam Feodalizmi* made by Köprülü a year later in Zürich. There is good reason to think that these two examples are related. It is known that W. Barthold has been interested in this subject since his early works, for example, he wrote an article titled *On the Problem of Feudalism in Iran* (Karakaya, 2013, p. 9). In the work dated in 1940, which Köprülü wrote introductory article and notes, Barthold accepts the suggestions that there is a different version of feudalism from the Western feudalism in Islamic countries. Accordingly, the land system in Islamic countries did not practice the form of serfdom that bond the producer to the land or embezzled a master, the peasants could leave the land, and the landowners could grant the land to the peasants in return for money (Barthold, 2013, p. 53). According to this thesis, Islamic feudalism, unlike the Western and Russian examples, was established according to the principle of providing land and income to feudal lords -not people/serfs- (Barthold, 2013, p. 53). Moreover, Barthold (2004, p. 206) considers the *timar* and *zeâmet* giving as a land grant method in the Emirate of Bukhara as a kind of feudal system in the lectures he gave at Istanbul University as he entered the second half of the 1920s. It is clear that these arguments of Barthold on Turkish and Islamic feudalism had a great impact on the discussion on the concept of feudalism in the above-mentioned presentation of Köprülü in 1941. It would even be appropriate to add to these influences the concept of Mongolian feudalism developed by B. Y. Vladimirtsov, P. Wittek's work called *La féodalité musulmane* (1936) and N. Poliakov's studies examining the Mamluk/Seljuk/Ottoman examples under the concept of feudalism.

Köprülü's introductory article written in 1940 constitutes the clearest and most effective objection to Gökalp's approach. In this article, Köprülü (1977, pp. xiii, xxiii) claims that the understanding of national history has completed its romantic period and should be abandoned, and that it is not possible to understand any national history without putting it into a general historical framework. The general historical framework put forward by the author argues, firstly, that the middle period of Turkish history should be evaluated within the history of Islam, and secondly, that Turkish states based on military aristocracy held the hegemony of the Islamic world until the 19th century - that is, it cannot be considered a degeneration. In his 1941 article, Köprülü felt the need to be included in the developing debate on Islamic feudalism, for example, he criticizes Poliak's approach that relates Mamluk feudalism to Mongolian feudalism, but did not put forward a criticism of the analysis of feudalism in the Seljuk state, which the author focused on more deeply. This is quite an interesting attitude because, in another work written in 1941, Gordlevski (1988, pp. 123-25) similarly tries to derive Ottoman and Seljuk feudalism from the Mongolian *incu* system. At this point, it is understood that Köprülü is trying to develop an alternative approach to the possibility that the feudalism debates of the Seljuk period are accepted with a term similar to Mongolian-Islamic feudalism in the international academic community, and he puts forward the concept of Turkish-Islamic feudalism. According to Köprülü (2005a, p. 45), the content of the concept of feudalism is unclear and it is possible to talk about Islamic, Turkish or Mongolian feudalities according to the structure of the concept. Köprülü (2005a, pp. 46-47) states that fiefs, which are the defining elements of Western feudalism, cannot directly define either Western or Eastern feudalism, and it is necessary to focus on legal and social hierarchy, economic relations, tax and state issues. An important point here is that Köprülü (2005a, pp. 47-48) states that both the centralization practices and the existence of tribal traditions coexisted in the Seljuks, that the tribes were directly subordinate to the ruler and that a certain feudalism view could be put forward by considering this personal relationship. Secondly, the point that should be emphasized is the problem of how Köprülü will establish the Ottoman-Seljuk continuity through this new conceptualization. Köprülü named his 1941 declaration as *Ortazaman Türk-İslam Feodalizmi* and this nomenclature refers both to a specific idea of periodization as medieval times and to a specific institutional structure. As was seen before, Köprülü adopts the improvement-oriented theses more openly in his works in the 1930s and sees the Ottoman state as a certain stage of development of Turkish-Islamic institutions. In

this phase, the central state emerges, and even before the Western examples, the absolutist monarchy becomes dominant (Köprülü, 2014, p. 174). In this case, it is clear that Köprülü can accept the Islamic middle age as an example of formal feudalism and accept the Ottoman state as a new form developed within feudalism, similar to the absolutist monarchies of the new age. It is possible to see this thesis in the early modern period analysis and even in the argument of the second empire, about sixty years after Köprülü. Köprülü did not work further on this issue because his early Ottoman-Seljuk cultural inheritance theses do not provide a consistent basis for such a transformation.

The fate of the universalist history proposal that F. Köprülü proposed but could not realize seems to have come to an end, due to the detailed study of a series of topics that he pointed out in an earlier period by his students. The view that there was a series of states (Anatolian Seljuks, Principalities, Mamluks, Ilkhanates, etc.) that emerged with the disintegration of the Great Seljuk state and adopted its institutional structure, on the basis of the Ottoman institutions, which is the main thesis of Köprülü, reached its most competent form in Uzunçarşılı's works.

İ. H. Uzunçarşılı (or Uzunçarşılıoğlu with his family name before the surname law) started his academic career as a thesis student of F. Köprülü and wrote his first works under the supervision of Köprülü. Considering the first works of the author, Köprülü's guidance and influence becomes evident. For example, the work called *Kitabeler*, written by Uzunçarşılı in 1929 and dedicated to F. Köprülü, both determines the pre-Ottoman Anatolian Seljuks, Principalities and Ilkhanate period inscriptions and establishes historical continuity with the Ottoman period works in these regions. Another work by Uzunçarşılı, in which he focuses on the same subject and studies the Anatolian Turkish states before the Ottoman state, is his large monograph titled *Anatolian Principalities and Akkoyunlu and Karakoyunlu States*, dated 1937. The basic theses of Uzunçarşılıoğlu²⁶ in the aforementioned work are as follows (1937, pp. 70-73): (i) Anatolian Principalities are of tribal origin and establish a state organization by imitating Seljuk institutions, (ii) the style of administration of the principalities is similar to the state organizations of the pre-Islamic Turks, (iii) the institutions of the principalities, especially the land regime, were also inherited and perfected by the Ottoman state. In general, it is seen that Uzunçarşılı made a detailed preliminary

²⁶ In the title of this work, the surname of the author is mentioned as Uzunçarşılıoğlu. I used it in the same way while talking about this work in order to avoid confusion in the references. The author changed his surname at a later date.

preparation to support Köprülü's theses in this work. This preliminary preparation took its definitive form in the author's extensive monograph titled *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatına Medhal*, published in 1941. This work is devoted entirely to supporting Köprülü's institutionalist historiography, which was constructed on the line of Seljuks-Principlities-Ilkhanate-Mamluks-Ottomans, with detailed examinations. As it can be understood from the title of the work, although the subjects examined completely cover the pre-Ottoman state, the way the subject is handled focuses on grounding the origins of the Ottoman state organization. Another link of the work with the Köprülü paradigm is that Uzunçarşılı needed to include the concept of feudalism, which he did not need to use in his previous works, in this work, which was written in 1941, albeit in a rather vague way. Let us briefly summarize Uzunçarşılı's analysis, to be the last to deal with the references to the concept of feudalism. Uzunçarşılı (1988a, p. 19) evaluates land distribution and administrative division in the Great Seljuk state as related to each other and identifies two basic practices: (i) all lands are considered the property of the monarch's family and dynasty members have large lands and mansions in different parts of the country, (ii) a portion of the land is given to tribal soldiers as *iqta* in return for military service.

In general terms, it is necessary to summarize Uzunçarşılı's discussion on the state structure, feudalism, the central army and the legal situation of the peasants in the Seljuk and post-Seljuk states. Uzunçarşılı (1988a, pp. 19, 59, 294, 444) defines a series of states briefly mentioned above as 'military administration' or 'military state'. The fact that this definition indicates is that the basic hierarchy principle emerges within the military organization in the administrative structures discussed, and the administrative layer emerges from among the commanders who manage the military units on a small or large scale. The situations that Uzunçarşılı refers to the concept of feudalism have a certain relationship with the term 'military state'. Uzunçarşılı (1988a, pp. 19, 52) names the administrative structures that emerged after the disintegration of the Great Seljuk state between dynastic members, frontier lords and commanders as 'Seljuk feudals'. Concrete historical examples to which this term refers can be listed as Anatolian Seljuks, Zengids, Ayyubids, Mamluks, Ottomans, Khwarazmshahs and 'partly' Mongols (Uzunçarşılı, 1988a, p. 19). The fact that the military leaders had a decisive influence in the establishment and development of these examples and that they created a kind of 'feudal disintegration' when they were partially or completely in military service relationship with the Great Seljuk state brought them to be defined with the

term. However, it would be a mistake to think that Uzunçarşılı refers to a feudal social structure suitable for Western European examples with these two terms (military state/administration and feudalism). Although Uzunçarşılı almost never explains the scope and content of the term feudalism, it would not be wrong to think that the way he used this concept gives a meaning close to the concept of *ortazaman Türk-İslam feodalizmi* used by F. Köprülü in the same years. In order to emphasize that the examples discussed in this framework are different from Western feudalism, the author emphasizes two basic features: (i) ghulam army, (ii) land registration and legal status of peasants. The ghulam army or the troops consisting of slave origin soldiers attached to the person of the ruler occupied an important place in the Great Seljuk state, the Mamluks and the Anatolian Seljuks (Uzunçarşılı, 1988a, pp. 53, 101-2, 414). The second issue deals with the registration method followed in land consignments and its legal consequences. Uzunçarşılı (1988a, pp. 117, 148-49, 243, 282, 406) reveals that almost all of the state examples he dealt with were land surveyed, the land to be granted as *iqta* and the amount of tax were determined, recorded and regulated. These regulations ensure the rights of the peasants working on the land as well as determining the land boundaries. Uzunçarşılı (1988a, pp. 58, 116, 238) states that the *iqta* granted in this context gave the people the right to complain and prevented the land captivity, and argues that it is different from the European example as it provides the protection of the peasants against the *sipâhîs* by the ruler. Another issue that arises in this context is the problem of the form of the relationship between the ruler and his subjects. Uzunçarşılı (1988a, p. 31) argues that in Turkish states traditionally the ruler had paternal custody (*pederane velayet*) over his subjects. This term refers to a wide range of meanings, including feasts, generosity, protection. Although this term is not widely used in Uzunçarşılı's works, it gives one of the first examples of the concept of patrimonialism that will be used in the next generation of Ottoman historiography, for example, by H. İnalcık.

As a result, Uzunçarşılı argues that the states that emerged after the disappearance of the Great Seljuk state and dominated the same region as the Seljuks are structurally the heirs of the Seljuk state. In this context, Uzunçarşılı, who based the institutional foundations of the Ottoman state on the 'Turkish-Islamic' states that came before him, analyzed the Ottoman state organization based on his extensive study of 1941, which was summarized above. A series of monographs he published sequentially starting from 1943 can be considered as a continuation of this work (İpşirli, 2012):

Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilâtından Kapukulu Ocakları (I-II), *Osmanlı Devleti'nin Saray Teşkilâtı* (1945), *Osmanlı Devleti'nin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilâtı* (1948), *Osmanlı Devleti'nin İlmiye Teşkilâtı* (1965). The dominant theoretical premise in all these works of Uzunçarşılı (1988a, p. x) is that the institutional structure of a particular state is determined by its historical background, the structures of the states that preceded it, and its 'racial, religious and social' characteristics. Uzunçarşılı (1988a, pp. ix-x) assumes that in this respect, states generally cannot take many elements from other states that differ in 'religion and race', and that the Ottoman state is a continuation of the 'Turkish-Islamic' states, not the Byzantine state. The author applied his view formulated in this way to Ottoman historical studies and saw the development of the Ottoman state as an advanced stage of the historical development of the 'Turkish-Islamic' states. Uzunçarşılı (1988b, pp. 124-25) in his large-scale work entitled Ottoman History, which he wrote within the framework of this approach, bases the development of the Ottoman state on the abandonment of tribal traditions and the emergence of the need for an administrative/military/judicial organization after the capture of Bursa. In this phase, the Ottoman state administrators followed the examples such as the Anatolian Seljuks and Ilkhanate state, and established the *Diwan* and the vizierate, the forms of administrative division, the judicial organization and the central army as the administrative apparatus, taking these examples into consideration (Uzunçarşılı, 1988b, pp. 126-27). Uzunçarşılı (1988b, pp. 502-3), who stated that the Ottoman state applied the state form that established before, stated that this form was developed with the 15th century, the number of viziers increased and the rank of *beylerbeyi* was increased to two, the sanjak beys organized the timariot *sipâhîs* and became the owners of the administrative division. He states that the *reâyâ* was developed and organized according to the status of the land (*dirlik, waqf, mülk*) and *qadi* offices were formed. This argument is a continuation of the historical development thesis accepted by Köprülü.

While concluding the evaluation of the early phase of the particularist approach to history, I will finally try to address the approaches that are partially outside of the Köprülü paradigm. The common feature of these approaches is that they emerged by following a more dominant nationalism path of the particularist interpretation of history. In this respect, the ideas of early nationalist thinkers such as Z. Gökalp and Y. Akçura, directly or indirectly, continue to have a more pronounced effect in this school.²⁷ To

²⁷ For a review of the different sociological backgrounds of Gökalp and Akçura's ideas, see: Georjeon (2016).

give an example, it is possible to come across Z. Gökalp's thesis in various nationalist historians that the Ottoman state, which established based on a Turkish tribe, completed its historical journey by adopting Byzantine institutions, that the ideology of Ottomanism and Islamism could not stop the disintegration of the Ottoman state, but also suppressed the political and cultural development of the Turkish ethnicity. In addition, Y. Akçura's thoughts had a certain impact on Z. V. Togan. Akçura evaluates Turkish and Islamic institutions in the origins of the Ottoman state in his study titled *Essai sur l'histoire des Institutions de l'Empire Ottomane*, which he wrote in 1903 (Temir, 1987, p. 30), on the other hand, he argues that the political, judicial and administrative institutions based on Islamic Sharia have become obsolete over time and have lost their function (Akçura, 1988, p. 8). Although I could not reach the work in question, it is understood that Akçura's criticism of Ottoman institutions was based on the idea that Ottoman state institutions lost their capacity to hold different ethnicities together (Georgeon, 1996, pp. 36-37). Similarly, in the views of Z. V. Togan and M. H. Yinanç, which will be discussed in this section, the ideas of institutional structure, ethnic essence, tradition and corruption of tradition have an important place.

First of all, it would be appropriate to start with Z. V. Togan. Following his arrival in Turkey in 1925, Togan started to teach general Turkish history courses at Istanbul University in 1927. Although he went abroad again between 1932-1939, he published the notes of these courses as a voluminous work in 1946 after his return. In the work in question, some ideas of Turkist thinkers such as Gökalp and Akçura are encountered, and the effects of Köprülü's discussion of the history of Ottoman institutions can be clearly seen. The main conflict of the last chapter devoted to the history of the Ottoman state in Togan's work titled *Umumî Türk Tarihi'ne Giriş* is that the state form left the tribal structure and attained an institutional identity and organization, and the Turkic tradition weakened, and the influence of Iran and Islam became decisive. Togan does not definitively reject the thesis of the acceptance of Byzantine institutions, which is an alternative version of this debate. First, let's start with Togan's treatment of the acceptance of Byzantine institutions thesis. While Togan accepted Köprülü's answer, he paid more attention to the ethnic problem that Köprülü had not given enough attention to. According to this approach, there was no great mixing or Turkification between the Anatolian Turks and the Christian population during the Anatolian Seljuk period -in this context, Turks, Byzantines, Greeks and Armenians did not form a common ethnicity (Togan, 1981, p. 207). The settlement

pattern that Togan (1981, p. 345) focuses on is that the *abdal* groups spread over the Bithynia region and Rumelia became the elements of colonization, and these colonisateurs were engaged in agriculture and crafts, and immigrant villages were formed around them. This proposition is inspired by Gökalp's theory of colonization and is the source of inspiration for Barkan's theory of colonisateurs dervishes. Another detail is that the Ottoman city population was predominantly Turkish and was connected to the Turkish-Islamic civilization (Togan, 1981, p. 370). Togan (1981, p. 207), who presupposes the existence of such a segregation in terms of ethnic groups living in Anatolia, argues that such a situation did not exist for the ruling part of the Seljuk state -on the contrary, fusion occurred due to marriage and residence. This is an interesting finding because Togan (1981, p. 207), who argues that the Byzantine Empire did not have a large-scale influence on the Anatolian Turks, attributes the abolition of the *ülüş* system and the tendency of centralization during the reign of Seljuk ruler Alâeddin Keykubat I to the close relationship of the ruler with the Byzantine aristocracy. Togan's proposition has a triple meaning, the first of which can be listed as the rejection of H. A. Gibbons' argument of 'racial mixture', the second as the critical positing of cultural difference between the popular masses and the ruling class, and the third as the indirect acceptance of the thesis of the influence of Byzantine institutions. I will try to summarize the analyzes corresponding to all three meanings in turn.

First of all, Togan identifies the effect of Turkish tradition in detail during the establishment period of the Ottoman state. These influences are as follows: (i) Kipchak influence - political terminology taken from the Oghuz-Kipchak dialect (Togan, 1981, p. 341), (ii) Uyghur writing tradition (Togan, 1981, p. 389), (iii) state tradition of Turkish communities, and (iv) Ilkhanate institutions. The alternative theory proposed by Togan (1981, p. 339) to explain the origin of the early Ottoman state highlights the traditional 'statism' (state organization) of Turkish communities rather than their Byzantine or Seljuk origin. The central element of this tradition is based on conquest and 'statism', and it has a 'simple and elastic' organization built within the framework of traditional laws called *türe* (Togan, 1981, p. 112). Togan argues that especially after the capture of Bursa, the Ottoman political tendencies began to change, its organizational development increased, and its resources diversified. For example, Orhan Beg divided the lands previously allocated to his comrades-in-arms among his children after their death, the power of the clan lords was broken by establishing timariot *sipâhîs* and pedestrian/*müsellem* forces, and he made some transfers from the

Seljuk/Mamluk institutions (Togan, 1981, p. 339). It is understood from the use of the title of pasha, which can be considered an original invention in Turkish culture, instead of the absence of a position such as the vizierate, which was authorized after the ruler, in which these transfers have not yet gained depth (Togan, 1981, pp. 339, 341). Togan (1981, p. 340) states that the state order prevailing in Orhan Beg's period was based on *türe*, *yasak* and *tamga*, and that there was no Sharia rule among the elements that constitute the basis of the state. Secondly, the issue that Togan focuses on is the influence of the Ilkhanate state on early Ottoman institutions.

In another plan, the author also identifies -critically- the effects of Iranian and Islamic administrative traditions on the Ottoman state, which cannot be traced back to Turkic origins. Togan (1981, p. 341), who states that the Seljuk-Islamic institutions evaluated in this context were brought to the Ottoman state by people of ulama origin such as Çandarlı Halil, argues that especially the ulama from Syria and Egypt tried to make Islamic traditions and Sharia dominant (Togan, 1981, p. 376). The historical phase in which the said effects became dominant is the period of Mehmet II and after. Togan (1981, p. 351) is of the opinion that the Ottoman state ceased to be a principality and turned into an empire during the reign of Mehmet II. This development had a significant impact on Ottoman culture and institutions. Togan (198, p. 378) states that this effect eroded the original aspects of Turkish culture and adaptation to the general Iranian and Islamic civilization emerged. An important moment of this process emerged in the field of literature and language, Turkish culture came under the influence of Iran and a similar process took place in the substitution of sharia instead of law (Togan, 1981, pp. 388-89).

Finally, the thoughts of another particularist, Mükrimin Halil (Yinanç), who partially published his works in the same period as Togan and possibly even wrote some theses in the early 1920s, were also influential on Togan. Mükrimin Halil is known for his studies on Turkish history and the Seljuk period. Mükrimin Halil published his first articles in *Anadolu Mecmuası*, which was published between 1924-1925, and this magazine differs from Z. Gökalp and Türkocağı circles, at least formally, with its ethnic and cultural interpretations that center a certain geographical part of Turkish history (Anatolia) (Çınar, 2013, p. 94). Mükrimin Halil (1934, p. 3) divides the history of Turkey into four great periods, and these periods are listed as follows: (i) Oghuz tribes settled in Anatolia (between the 11th and 14th centuries), (ii) the 'great feudalism' period in which principalities emerged (*tavaif-i mülûk*), (iii) the 'great empire' period

when the Anatolian union was established (Ottoman era after the 16th century) and (iv) the republican period.²⁸ Mükrimin Halil (1934, p. 3) states that he ordered these periods according to the political transformation and organizational differences of the Oghuz Turks, and therefore envisages a certain continuity. It is a conscious choice that Mükrimin Halil considers the long process in question as the history of the Oghuz Turks and does not characterize it with a specific dynasty name. The way Mükrimin Halil deals with Ottoman history based on this argument is remarkable. As an extension of this argument, Mükrimin Halil argues that regions such as Rumelia, North Africa, Egypt and Yemen, which were conquered during the Ottoman period, were also under the rule of 'Anatolian Turkishness' in the final analysis (Çınar, 2013, p. 82-83). Although *Anadolu Mecmuası* constitutes a local alternative to Gökalp's nationalist line in general, these theses of Mükrimin Halil directly overlap with Gökalp's theses of colonization of Anatolia and the formation of the 'homeland'. Mükrimin Halil evaluates the Seljuk period as the determining phase of Anatolia's becoming a Turkish homeland, cultural development and the formation of Anatolian-Turkish civilization (Çınar, 2013, p. 83, 99). This argument seems to be supported by minor arguments formulated in terms of administrative and ethnic history. According to Mükrimin Halil (1934, pp. 73-76), the Anatolian Seljuk sultanate was established as an imitation of the Great Seljuk state in civil/financial/military terms, allied and autonomous, but without a decisive centralization. Secondly, Mükrimin Halil focuses on the ethnic basis of the Turkish conquest of Anatolia. In this regard, Yinanç's views differ markedly in the 20s and 30s. In an article he wrote in *Anadolu Mecmuası* in 1924, Mükrimin Halil invalidated the thesis that Turks were settled in Anatolia during the Roman Empire and that the majority of the Anatolian population was composed of Turks during the Islamic conquests (Çınar, 2013, p. 83). On the contrary, it is surprising that he combined this thesis with pseudo-scientific craniometry constructs in his 1934 work titled *Türkiye Tarihi: Selçuklu Devri I*. According to the second version in question, the Hittite and Thracian tribes settled in Anatolia belong to the same 'race' as the Central Asian tribes, since they have a 'brachycephalic skull' (Mükrimin Halil, 1934, p. 81). Mükrimin Halil (1934, pp. 81-82) argues that the Anatolian people were harmed in the struggles between the Byzantine, Sassanid and Islamic states and took refuge in him with the

²⁸ In an article published in *Anadolu Magazine* dated 1924, Yinanç adds the period of Anatolian border principalities/governors during the Abbasid period to the beginning of these four periods (Çınar, 2013, p. 83).

arrival of the Turks - and he partially supports this thesis by referring to the 'racial relations'. Mükrimin Halil concisely expressed his thoughts on the period of the Ottoman Empire in two articles titled *Milli Tarihimizin Mevzuu* I and II, which he wrote in *Anadolu Mecmuası* in 1924. According to Mükrimin Halil, Anatolian Turks were removed from the administration following the development of the Ottoman state, and even Anatolia became a colony of palace and devshirme rulers (Çınar, 2013, pp. 98, 100). Mükrimin Halil argues that during the reign of Mehmet II, the Ottoman ruler, together with the Anatolian begs, turned from a chief/khan who ruled the state to an absolutist and tyrannical Roman Emperor (Çınar, 2013, p. 99). In addition, the finalization of the dominance of the palace circles and devshirmes following the reigns of Selim I and Suleyman I was a decisive factor in the emergence of Turkish revolts against the Ottoman rule in Anatolia (Çınar, 2013, p. 100). As a result, these last theses put forward by Mükrimin Halil carry the influence of Z. Gökalp to a large extent and they are the source of the thoughts that M. Akdağ will formulate after fifteen years.

II.I.II.II. Trends in Historiography in the 1940s and Beyond

The preparation and development phase of the particularist tendency in Ottoman historiography extends from the end of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th century. On the foundations laid in this phase, a series of historians, whose academic level is much higher and recognized in the international academic community, have emerged since the 1940s, and the works of these historians have largely preserved their influence until the last decade of the 20th century. It is possible to mention among these historians as Ö. L. Barkan, who started to publish his articles in the field of economic history from the end of the 1930s and became an influential historian with the 1940s, S. F. Ülgener, who published his doctorate titled *Yakın Şark Türk İslâm Dünyasının İktisat Ahlâkı ve Zihniyeti* in 1937 and reached a remarkable influence in the early 1950s with his work in the field, and H. İnalcık, who completed his doctoral thesis in 1942, gained international fame since the 1950s, and whose works continue to be influential even today. It is not a coincidence that these three names laid the foundations of academic particularism in the 20th century Ottoman historiography. All three names started to give their basic works during the Second World War, within this framework, they had the opportunity to take lessons from academics who fled from Germany, and they matured their academic paths in the 1944-1954 period, when the Turkism-Turanism movement was punished, and a moderate conservatism had some

opportunity in Turkish political sphere. From another point of view, this phase corresponds to a period when Marxist historiography and Ottoman history studies became widespread and began to gain prestige in the academic field. In this context, the particularist tendencies that developed after the 1940s have new interpretations and references in terms of both trying to create an alternative to Marxist historiography and keeping a distance from the romantic nationalist theses of the previous generation. The process that started in the 1940s, when new trends were developed in Ottoman historiography, gave its most important results after the 1960s. With the growing influence of Marxist approaches in the 1960s, it seems that new arguments emerged, partly to respond to them and partly to create a particular way against the attractiveness of the conceptual framework. It is possible to give examples of these new approaches to the works of names such as C. Tanyol, H. İnalçık, H. Cin, Ş. Mardin, M. Heper, M. A. Kılıçbay, Z. Kazıcı etc.

In this subsection, let's start by addressing Barkan's research first. Barkan first started to publish his works, which had a great impact on Ottoman historiography, at the end of the 1930s, and he wrote a series of remarkable studies, especially until the mid-1950s. The works in question mainly examine the land regime in the Ottoman Empire by using the primary sources competently and provide a material ground and clarity to the discussions on the land regime that did not exist before. On the other hand, the terminology that Barkan uses in his articles and his effort to keep the problem systematically out of certain conceptual frameworks have been a factor that feeds the particularist approach to history. In this context, to give a limited summary of Barkan's original contributions to Ottoman history and the land system around a few themes, it is possible to determine these themes as follows: (i) the importance of the land regime in terms of the structure of the Ottoman Empire, (ii) the birth conditions of the Ottoman Empire, (iii) the forms of land use in the Ottoman Empire, (iv) the political and social order of the Ottoman Empire, (v) the critique of Western/orientalist approaches on the Ottoman land regime and social order.

First of all, Barkan, unlike the researchers who came before him, deals with the structure and social order of the Ottoman Empire based on the arguments of the political economy school. It can be said that Barkan's fellowship with famous economists such as A. Rüstow, A. Neumark, W. Röpke has been influential in the development of such an approach. Interestingly, in the articles written by Barkan in the late 1930s, traces of a Marxist political economy whose concepts were not fully clarified can be seen, and

moreover, the liberalism/etatism/planned economy problems that were widely discussed in those years also found a place in Barkan's theses. In a series of articles published between 1937-38, Barkan puts forward the thesis that the Ottoman social structure and state type should be understood through the structures that dominate agricultural production and their organization. According to this thesis, Barkan (1980a, p. 281) focuses on the land regime in order to understand the characteristics of the social order in a historical structure in which all wealth emerges in relation to the land, and (i) to examine the forms of use to which the land is subject and (ii) the relations entailed by these forms of use. In this dual distinction, it is understood that Barkan considers the forms of land ownership, labor organization and political organization. The fact that he implicitly uses a distinction that touches on the Marxist categories of productive forces and relations of production in this form suggests that the influence he will have on Marxist historiography in the works he will write in the coming years may have some structural basis. The points that Barkan (1980c, pp. 125-26) emphasizes in the talk of the land regime correspond to the categories he calls 'land system' and 'organization of land work'. Taken as a whole, these include the categories of land and labor as productive forces, property/saving and state as relations of production. In this context, Barkan (1980c, pp. 125-26) argues that land relations constitute the 'base of the military and financial organization' of the state and reveal the 'state type'. Against all these conceptualizations that have an implicit affinity with Marxist political economy, it is clear that Barkan -as will be seen in his later articles- tries to indicate his distance from the Marxist form of analysis, and this constitutes the basis of the particularist orientation after the 1940s. In this respect, Barkan (1980b, p. 728) withdraws from such a claim at the first step, stating that the Marxist analysis centered on the class struggle could not evaluate the impact of the economic and political conditions of the time. In addition, it is seen that Barkan portrays the Ottoman state as an omnipotent will that establishes a unique order within the constraints of time and space, and while doing this, he uses the etatist politics of the 1930s as a model (1980b, pp. 725-26).

One of the most important points that Barkan contributed to the literature was the expansion of Köprülü's panorama of the emergence conditions of the Ottoman state. Barkan first criticizes various presuppositions that are accepted as valid regarding the establishment of the Ottoman state. These rejected presuppositions consist of the theses that the development of the state depends only on the history of the 'Turkish race', the extraordinary personality of the rulers or the grace of God, and the theses of the

formation of the ‘Ottoman nation’ and the influence of Byzantine institutions, advocated by H. A. Gibbons (Barkan, 2013, p. 47). These theses are a brief summary of the Turkist, Islamist, Ottomanist and Orientalist foundation theses. Barkan argues that the structures that dominated the establishment period of the Ottoman state were the Byzantine state structure, which was dissolving with the anarchic state of the Anatolian principalities.

The general premise of this thesis is that the pre-Ottoman political structures turned into feudalism and the Ottoman state rose against these structures. Barkan (1980a, p. 281) first describes the social situation that emerged during the period of *tavaif-i mülûk* as anarchy and evaluates the rise of the Ottoman state as the success of a ‘new state conception and order’ against the hereditary landed aristocracy. Another example of the social structure that was dominant in Anatolia during its establishment is expressed in the context of the Aq Qoyunlu, Memluk and Dulkadirid states. Barkan (1980b, p. 730; 1980c, pp. 133-34) states that in these examples, there is a feudal²⁹ relationship between landowners and farmers, that drudgery and servitude services, mansions and inherited *waqf*, obligation to present taxes in kind and present gifts to the begs. Secondly, referring to the structural features of the Byzantine Empire, Barkan (1980c, pp. 134-35) argues that Byzantine history was determined by the struggle between the Emperors and the landlords, and that in the last period of Byzantium, lands were largely passed to the church and landowners. For this reason, the Byzantine state order weakens considerably, oppresses the peasants under the heavy tax burden, and becomes open to the abuses of the landlords and the exploitation of the parasitic classes (Barkan, 1980b, p. 729).

Barkan (1980k, pp. 815-16) does not accept the existence of Byzantine influence in examples such as the *timar* system. At this point, he formulates an argument that may seem somewhat contradictory. Although Barkan evaluates the establishment of the Ottoman state as a central state building that developed against the feudal structure, he strongly accepts the influence of both feudal elements and *colon* organization in the historical heritage that the Ottoman state inherited. Barkan (1980e, p. 675), who saw the traces of feudalism and the ‘trends to a new feudal lordship’ in the establishment of the Ottoman state, does not consider these characteristics as a general

²⁹ Barkan sometimes uses the term *derebeylik* to mean feudalism and sometimes just domanial power. The author, who easily uses the term feudal for the Byzantine Empire, avoids using the term feudal for the ‘Turkish-Islamic’ states while approaching the problem of the historical origins of the Ottoman state. Therefore, he prefers to use the term *derebeylik* instead of feudalism in that cases.

feature of the Ottoman state. Barkan (1980e, p. 666) states that the *colon* system in the Roman Empire, which was based on placing prisoners of war on the ground, also existed during the birth of the Ottoman Empire and was based on similar economic and demographic conditions.³⁰ This contradiction arises as a result of Barkan's avoidance of contradicting the Köprülü paradigm on the one hand, and his attempt to analyze with the conceptual tools of the discipline of political economy, on the other hand - and, in the last analysis, trying to keep the concept of feudalism away from the study of Ottoman history with a particularist reflex. Barkan (1980e, p. 666) states that the organization called *ortakçı kullar*, as an example of a *colon* formation, shows the nature of pure servage and evaluates it as an important part of the Ottoman establishment period, but at the same time, he can consider the establishment and expansion of the Ottoman state as an action against feudalism.

The main topic that Barkan provides the most basic contribution to the establishment of the Ottoman state is the establishment process itself, which he deals with using the concepts of migration, settlement and colonization. Barkan (1980a, p. 288) is of the opinion that one of the most important factors in the process leading to the establishment of the Ottoman state was the great population change. The population change in question affects the establishment and formation of the Ottoman state in several plans. According to Barkan's (1980a, p. 288; 2013, p. 49) proposition, the ongoing Turkish invasions since the Seljuk period revealed the phenomenon of settlement and colonization, and the Ottoman state emerged at the last stage of this. An important part of this process is based on the placement of the newly arrived mass in certain places and the allocation of land. Barkan (1980d, pp. 151-52) states that the Ottoman rulers gave lands to great commanders, ahis and dervishes with wide exemptions during the establishment period. These lands were mostly in the status of tax-exempt freehold property and they have the freedom to establish *waqfs*, bequeath and be bought and sold (Barkan, 1980d, pp. 152-53). Secondly, Barkan (2013, p. 60) draws attention to the *zawiyas* given to *sûfî* circles and states that *sûfî* groups who open new villages, ensure the security of certain regions or settle in a certain region and were engaged in activities such as agriculture/milling/livestock were given the right to benefit from land incomes -or own property. The third issue that the author draws attention to is that the colonization movements in question are carried out under state control and

³⁰ The *colon* thesis will then be re-evaluated by T. Timur and M. A. Kılıçbay to draw a Marxist-oriented framework.

the use of the *mîrî* land regime to guarantee this. The *mîrî* land regime, in which the ruler claims rights over all lands, is a tool for the systematic realization of the resettlement and colonization policy, thus strengthening the central state, liberating the peasant masses from local and personal relations of domination, and making small peasant enterprises the dominant form (Barkan, 1980a, pp. 288-89). Barkan's views on settlement and colonization are very similar to those of Z. Gökalp and Z. V. Togan. As we have stated in the previous parts, these views consider the phenomenon of invasion and migration and colonization as separate concepts and see colonization as the acquisition of a region through productive activities, if some terminological differences are ignored. This way of understanding finally emerged as a direct extension of the nationalist border change plans of the 19th century and the population policies related to nation-state building. Since it is not possible to estimate exactly when Z. V. Togan's views on immigration and colonization emerged, due to the fifteen-year difference between his lectures and the systematization and publication of his lecture notes, it is not possible to make a definitive judgment on this matter. As can be understood from the views expressed above, Barkan is of the opinion that the resettlement and colonization process primarily took place on the lands with free property status, but the *mîrî* land regime and state control developed as another aspect of the same process and dominated the first process.

Another topic that we will consider while examining Barkan's views is the author's research on land use patterns in the Ottoman state and the Ottoman social order. When considered in general, most of Barkan's work is devoted to the land regime, the structure of land ownership and land ownership law. These studies cover a wide scale such as the land reforms in Eastern Europe, the effects of the Swiss civil law on the land regime, the land reform debates in Turkey and the changes in the land regime in the *Tanzimat* period. Since a significant part of such works will be out of the scope of this study, I will focus only on the author's articles on the pre-*Tanzimat* Ottoman land regime and its interpretation in terms of the Ottoman social order. Barkan deals with the land regime in the Ottoman Empire in a series of articles he published from the end of the 1930s to the end of the Second World War -and in a series of works published in the 1970s based on these studies. The basic land regime elements that Barkan emphasizes can be summarized under the headings of (i) lands in *mîrî* status, *timar* system and *çiftlik*s, (ii) lands in the status of *colon* and *ortakçı kullar*, (iii) lands in the status of *mâlikâne-dîvânî*, (iv) inheritable *waqfs*.

If we consider the content of the first title, Barkan places the *mîrî* land regime at the center of the Ottoman land regime and social order. According to Barkan's theses; (i) The Ottoman Empire took over the land tenure forms that were close to feudalism/feudalism, but gradually liquidated the feudal elements in these regimes or degrade their power, (ii) The Ottoman administration 'nationalized' the lands held by the local powers and reorganized to fulfill production needs (iii) a portion of the nationalized land was distributed in return for military or administrative service, (iv) farmers working on state-owned land are like owners of the land and are similar to 'officials' in terms of their social position. There are also contradictory points in these theses, and the terminology used by Barkan has partially changed during the more than thirty years when the article was published. Considering this situation, I will try to summarize Barkan's basic theses. Firstly, Barkan (1980d, pp. 152-53) asserts that in the early period of the Ottoman state, free properties had a certain weight, especially in Rumelia, however, pre-Ottoman land tenure forms continued under the status of *mâlikâne-dîvânî* in Anatolian lands. Despite this given situation, the development of the Ottoman state gradually restricts these land forms showing feudal features and tries to establish the *mîrî* land regime in which the land belongs to the state. According to Barkan (1980c, p. 127), the *mîrî* land regime is the state's superior ownership and control right over the lands, in other words, the appropriation of the lands to the 'nation' and *mîrî* category. Barkan (1980c, pp. 129-30), who states that this land regime developed from the early Ottoman period, states that it attained its most developed form with the Budin land code written by Ebüssuûd Efendi in the 16th century.

According to Barkan (1980c: 132), the development of the *mîrî* land regime broke the domination of the landlords and the land-rich in land use, and brought the land under the administration of a centralized and organized state. Barkan also put forward a series of theses on the historical background and social bases of the *mîrî* land regime. According to the first of these theses, the Islamic land regime, which is considered to be among the origins of the *mîrî* land regime, did not have a different form of ownership on the land before the Muslim conquest of Iran, and only after the conquest of Iran the method of transferring the right of disposition of state lands in return for a certain rent emerged (Barkan, 1980c, p. 139-40). However, Barkan (1980c, p. 140) points out that this method cannot be directly attributed to an Islamic basis, on the contrary, there were similar taxation and administration styles in ancient Egyptian and Mesopotamian cultures. In this respect, Barkan is of the opinion that the *mîrî* land regime is not Islamic

in origin, and its application by the Ottoman Empire cannot be considered a directly Islamic method of land distribution. On the contrary, Barkan (1980c, p. 146-47) accepts the implementation of this system in the Ottoman state as a result of a policy that changes according to concrete conditions, and even believes that this practice may have developed spontaneously without being bound by a tradition (Barkan, 1980c, p. 137). On the other hand, the proposition that this system, which brought the strengthening of the central state power against feudalism, developed contrary to the interests of the pre-Ottoman feudal landlords, makes it necessary to explain the social basis of this development. At this point, Barkan makes both the agents of the settlement and colonization movements and the villagers engaged in agricultural production the mainstay of this system. According to Barkan (1980a, p. 288), the resettlement and colonization policy of the Ottoman state freed the villagers from the authority of the local landlords and brought them closer to the state, and the central settlement policy was effective in the development of the *mîrî* land regime. For example, the abolition of the obligation of drudgery and special service on the peasants, and the fact that the *sipâhîs* were not given the right to own individual land except for a small piece of land (*hassa çiftlik/kılıç* or *hassa çayır*) were effective in the emergence of this result (Barkan, 1980c, p. 134). Moreover, the *mîrî* land regime brought the peasants to the status of permanent and hereditary tenants on the land, regardless of the nature of the land ownership, prevented the fragmentation of the land and eliminated speculation on the land (Barkan, 1980c, pp. 131-32). The element that the author puts at the center of the *mîrî* land regime is the division of land called '*çiftlik*' which is large enough for the villagers to work with a pair of oxen and allows for a certain taxation besides their means of subsistence (Barkan, 1980c, p. 128).³¹ Within the framework of this categorization, farmers have become "almost the real owner of the land [tm]" (Barkan, 1980c, p. 128). In the final analysis, Barkan (1980e, p. 684; 1980h, p. 789; 1980j, p. 718) argues that as a result of the *mîrî* land regime, the agricultural structures he called "small independent peasant enterprise [tm]" -that is, *çiftlik*- gained prevalence in favor of the peasants, and explains the development of this regime against the landowners by highlighting this basis. Another feature of the *mîrî* land regime is the right to use horsemen, who are called *sipâhî* in return for military service. The principle of the *timar*

³¹ Barkan lists four basic *çiftlik* types. These are called (i) reaya *çiftliks*, (ii) *hassa çiftliks*, (iii) military duty based *çiftliks*, and (iv) large agricultural property based *çiftlik-enterprises* (Barkan, 1980h, pp. 789-93).

system within the Ottoman Empire is as follows (Barkan, 1980k, p. 805): The state grants the privilege of collecting the land taxes of certain regions to the soldiers and civil servants in order to earn their living and to meet the expenses of certain services. The standard and most common form of *timar* lands were *sipâhî timars*, and within the framework of these *timars*, which constitute a large cavalry force attached to the state (Barkan, 1980k, pp. 806-7). In the final analysis, in the *mîrî* land regime, the land and the *reâyâ* are considered to belong to the ruler, the *sipâhî* has the right to collect taxes, not the property right, in the places given as *timar*, and the farm-centered land regime remains the same in all lands, regardless of whether it is used as *has/timar/waqf* (Barkan, 1980e, p. 684). Barkan argues that the Ottoman *timar* in its structure was completely different from the Western domanial system (1980e, p. 685).

Other forms of land tenure that Barkan emphasizes are lands in the status of *colon* and in the status of *mâlikâne-dîvânî*. Let us first consider the soils in *colon* status. Although Barkan does not directly give this name (*colonia*) to this soil form, the concrete situation of the producers working on this soil form makes it possible to give this name. Barkan states that apart from the common land regime in the Ottoman Empire, there was another special land regime, and examples of this were seen especially in the early periods. The main feature of this land form is that the peasants working on it, regardless of whether it is a *has/çiftlik/waqf*, are out of the status of *reâyâ* (Barkan, 1980e, p. 872). In contrast to the free peasants working in the status of *reâyâ*, the peasants working on this type of land are “captives placed in the land [tm]” and they are the parties of the legal and economic dependency relationship (Barkan, 1980e, p. 578). Barkan (1980e, p. 666) notes that these peasants, who are known by names such as *ortakçı/kesimci*, resembled the serfs in Western Europe, but in terms of the land they worked on, they lived in sultan’s estates/vizier estates and *waqfs/zawiyas*, not large farms. The conclusion that the author emphasizes with this argument is that there were dependent peasants in serf status in the Ottoman Empire, but their existence did not necessitate the existence of feudalism, on the contrary, this status was created by the state (Barkan, 1980e, pp. 675, 684).

Another topic of discussion is about the land category called *mâlikâne-dîvânî* in the Ottoman Empire. The lands in this category are formally similar to private properties with full ownership rights, but they also have important characteristics that differ from them. Barkan (1980d, p. 153) points out that the ownership of the land in the *mâlikâne-dîvânî* category belongs either to individuals or legal entities (for example,

waqfs), but that this right of ownership pertains to the bare property on land. This means that the lands in the *mâlikâne-dîvânî* category, unlike absolute *mülks*, give limited rights to bare property to the landlord, while the state also has some rights and authorities on the land (Barkan, 1980d, p. 153). The *mâlikâne* status, which is the first part of this dual right, includes the bare ownership of *waqf* or property land and, accordingly, the land rent received from the peasant (Barkan, 1980d, p. 154). However, unlike the *mâlikâne* status, the *dîvânî* status includes the right of the state to collect taxes on this piece of land and even to grant the privilege of collecting these taxes to third parties (for example, *sipâhîs*) (Barkan, 1980d, p. 154). Barkan (1980d, p. 175), evaluating the examples in question in general, concludes that the examples are concentrated in the regions where the Turkish-Islamic traditions maintain their strength. Moreover, the fact that some examples similar to this category of land are also seen in Rumelia shows that the state's intervention in free properties was the determining factor in the emergence of this category (Barkan, 1980d, p. 174). As a result, the origin of this form of ownership lies in the shaping of free properties in the status of *mâlikânes* by systematic state intervention and the restriction of rights on property to varying degrees.

Finally, I will summarize Barkan's thoughts on the political and social structure of the Ottoman Empire and take a brief look at the background of the author's conceptual choices. Barkan deals with the social structure in the Ottoman Empire by putting the state in the center and accepts the role of the state as a determining factor in the emergence of the social structure. The state form, which takes place as a strong presupposition in Barkan's works, represents a structure that has absolute determinant on the social structure and political field and is basically based on directly productive farmers/peasants. Barkan (1980b, p. 725) argues that the Ottoman state was an omnipotent organization that gave its dominant character to all social relations and created a social order of its own. Barkan (1980b, p. 726) states that the state type in question has a military organization like an army in a state of war, and claims that the organization of the state also shapes the social structure, assigns and organizes the social forces (Barkan, 213, p. 83). This organizational form, which Barkan (1980b, p. 768) called the 'Ottoman system', determines the land tenure and social classes. First of all, Barkan (1980b, p. 741) is of the opinion that the Ottoman state determined the "duty and status [tm]" of different social classes around the land regime and farm organization and that this constituted a kind of 'planned economy' policy. On the basis of the policy in question, there is the 'nationalization' of the land (Barkan, 1980c, p. 127). The claim

that the tasks of different classes are determined in these theses is a manifestation of the corporatist understanding of the 1930s, and terms such as nationalization of the land and etatism are directly an extension of the dominant debates of the 1930s. In this framework, Barkan (1980b, p. 775) describes the fact that the land organization in the Ottoman state prevented the peasants from leaving the land not as a kind of feudalism but as an application of the principle of ‘etatism’. Thus, Barkan categorizes both peasants engaged in agricultural production, *sipâhîs* and officials of devshirme origin as civil servants working for the state around the principle of etatism.³² This categorization contains a great contradiction in that Barkan evaluates farmers as both free peasants and civil servants, and such a state form needs to be explained in terms of its social underpinnings. Although the author generally analyzes the Ottoman society as a structure consisting of two classes (military and *reâyâ*) (Barkan, 1980b, p. 727), it both rejects class exploitation and remains unclear how the state gained its decisive power in this class scheme. Barkan’s general argument on this issue is that the Ottoman conquest and settlement movements developed against the feudal structures, liberated the peasant masses from feudal bonds, and the gaining power of the devshirme rulers broke the power of the local aristocracy (Barkan, 1980b, p. 764; 1980c, pp. 1364, 136; 1980f, p. 210; 1980i, p. 718). Barkan (1980f, p. 210), who states that in the final analysis, the ‘cosmopolitan’ imperial structure and recruited officials dominated the “local and national [tm]” landowners, states that the *gutsherrschaft* (big landowner) category has turned into a *grundherr* (income officer) (Barkan, 1980c, p. 134).

This analysis of Barkan had a great impact on several generations of academics who came after him. Some of the results arising from these effects are the source of approaches that emphasize the absolute power and unique political-economic organization of the Ottoman state, another part forms the basis of concepts such as the Ottoman mode of production, and finally, another part provides historical material for AMP discussions. Barkan also directly participated in some of these discussions. To give an example, he rejected the feudalism thesis, which was the dominant interpretation of Marxist Ottoman historiography until the 1960s, by pointing to the nationalist historiography in the Balkans (Barkan, 1980j, p. 873), and opposed the AMP thesis (Barkan, 1980j, p. 873; 1980k, p. 852) also supported the particularist interpretation,

³² For the argument that farmers are civil servants, see: Barkan (1980b, p. 739). For the thesis that *sipâhîs* are civil servants, see: Barkan (1980a, p.288). See: Barkan (1980f, p. 210) for the example in which devshirme-origin officials are expressed with the term ‘slave-officers’.

which emphasizes authentic aspects of Ottoman society against Marxist historiography (Barkan, 1980g, pp. 249-50). However, in these discussions, it is not generally discussed why Barkan used terms such as ‘liberal land ownership’, ‘nationalization’, ‘etatism’, ‘cosmopolitanism’ so easily in his analysis of Ottoman society.

In the first ten years of his academic career, Barkan especially focused on land reform issues and produced detailed studies on land reform in eastern European countries. Among the motivation sources of these studies, it is necessary to see the pre-acceptance and practices of etatist economics in the early republican period, and even the future vision. For example, a series of articles by Barkan, whose titles are given below, show more clearly that the author works on land ownership and its transformation in relation to both the possible reform process in Turkey and the former Ottoman lands in eastern Europe: *Harp Sonu Tarımsal Reform Hareketleri* (1935), *Balkan Memleketlerinin Zirai Reform Tecrübeleri ve Balkan Memleketlerinin Toprak Meseleleri Tarihine Bir Bakış* (1943), *Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu ve Türkiye’de Zirai Bir Reformun Ana Meseleleri* (1946), *İsviçre Medeni Kanunu’nun Çiftçiyi Alakadar Eden Maddelerindeki Tadiller ve Zirai Mülklerin Borçlarından Kurtarılması Hakkında 12 Aralık 1940 Tarihli Federal Kanun* (1946).³³ Along with these studies, Barkan was also interested in the land regime and types of land ownership in the Ottoman Empire, and he established some affinities between the reform activities that were thought to be carried out and the land regime that had been dominant in Anatolia for many centuries. In this context, Barkan’s discussion on the Ottoman state, its social structure, classes and land regime bears the stamp of the modern land reform and small producer debate. As a result, Barkan’s theses use anachronistic sets of concepts and adopt a particularist methodology to avoid articulation between his interpretations and Marxist historiography.

Sabri F. Ülgener is another name who started his academic career in similar years with Barkan and started to publish his basic works as of the end of 1940s. As an economist, Ülgener focuses on research quite different from his predecessors and is considered the founder of a field in Turkey that can be called mentality studies or

³³ *Agricultural Reform Movements at the End of the War* (1935), *A Look at the Agricultural Reform Experiences of the Balkan Countries and the History of the Land Issues of the Balkan Countries* (1943), *The Law on Providing Land to the Farmer and the Main Issues of an Agricultural Reform in Turkey* (1946), *Amendments to the Farmer Concerning Articles of the Swiss Civil Code and the Federal Law of 12 December 1940 on the Recovery of Agricultural Property from Depts* (1946).

economic mentality studies. The studies carried out by Ülgener (1991, p. 15) in the field of social mentality offer remarkable results in terms of being based on founding figures such as M. Weber and W. Sombart, who combined the fields of sociology and economics, and applying this framework to Ottoman history by making use of primary sources. Moreover, the views that Ülgener developed on the Ottoman social structure and the method he used while presenting them continued to be influential after him. The starting point of Ülgener's (1991, pp. 11-12) analyzes is that it will not be sufficient to examine only 'economic-technical' or 'legal-formal' issues in understanding a particular social structure, in addition to these, it is imperative to examine real human lives and thoughts, in other words, 'mentality'. While Ülgener's argument opposes the particularist-formalist historical analyzes of names such as Uzunçarşılı and Barkan, on the other hand, he legitimizes his position by basing it on F. Köprülü's studies on the history of Turkish literature (Ülgener, 1991, p. 17). Secondly, another of Ülgener's starting points is to cover the field of social phenomena that Marxist economic arguments cannot cover, and therefore seek to develop an alternative history thesis to Marxism. In this respect, Ülgener's starting points should not be excluded from the particularist debates of his age, but it would be useful to keep in mind that the arguments he put forward and the concepts he used do not always match the works written before him.

While summarizing Ülgener's thoughts, the topics that will be emphasized will be: (i) the nature of the research sources and method, (ii) the distinction between the concepts of morality and mentality, (iii) the structure, moral characteristics and dominant mentality of the Ottoman Empire. If the first title is briefly discussed, the main sources that Ülgener used for the history of mentality or his studies are rhetoric elements that have become folk sayings, poetry literature, political thought and advice literature, *fütüvvetnâmes* and chronicles. The feature of these sources is that they belong to the field of art, history and politics rather than being works related to the field of economics. Ülgener (1983, p. 24) especially focuses on works in the field of art and claims that they are of a (representative) nature as well as shaping the 'mental world'. The general category in which works in both art and other fields are evaluated is determined as the 'collective consciousness' category. Ülgener (1983, p. 26) states that although serious criticisms have been made about the concept of collective consciousness, this concept is still usable, and the concepts of 'objective idea' or 'world view' can be used in this context. Focusing on the content of these concepts, he concludes that the mentality

forms existing in a certain historical period rose on a ground formed as a result of the accumulation of intellectual products belonging to more than one generation in previous centuries, and concludes that this situation is also effective in the establishment of social relations (Ülgener, 1983, p. 26). Although these patterns are based on moral codifications in a way, Ülgener (1983, p. 23) states that moral forms and legal norms in a certain historical stage cannot characterize that period on their own, on the contrary, the 'real mentality' of a certain age often develops in the opposite direction of moral rules and law. Ülgener (1991, p. 13) formulates the two main aims of mentality history studies within this framework: (i) "to bring the economic morality and mentality into a picture [tm]" of a certain period and environment, (ii) determine the factors who have an impact on the emergence of a certain mentality. If we briefly discuss the methodological preferences on which Ülgener's (1984, p. 5; 1991, pp. 25-30) approach is based, he firstly accepts a kind of relational particularism based on the east-west distinction and rejects the Marxist method of analysis as it focuses solely on material reality. In this context, Ülgener's approach to social segments whose mentality structures he analyzed as certain ideal types and formulating his generalizations by following this method makes his affinity with M. Weber's social science method clear.

Ülgener makes a distinction between morality and mentality, which forms the basis of his research. According to this distinction, morality—or more specifically, economic ethics—is defined as "the wholesale expression of the norms and rules of action that must be followed [tm]" (Ülgener, 1991, p. 21). The concept of mentality -or more specifically, the economic mentality- is defined as "the sum of the values and beliefs that a person maintains in his real behavior [tm]" (Ülgener, 1991, p. 21). To the extent that the concept of the economic mentality is at the center of the discussion, Ülgener (1984, p. 20) defines two forms of its differentiation: (i) static or dynamic economic mentalities, (ii) economic mentalities based on tradition and custom or based on reason and logic. This distinction between mentality forms mostly refers to the characteristics of two different historical phases/structures, which are dominated by pre-modern/modern or pre-capitalist/capitalist relations, and which follow each other. For this reason, Ülgener's work is largely based on duality: The West, which has converted to capitalism, and the East/Ottoman, which has not been able to pass to capitalism - thus developing a unique mentality of dissolution period. The relationship between economic development and cultural structures, which is one of the main issues that Ülgener (2006, p. 299) draws attention in his various works, gains meaning in this

framework. Now, in this context, let us consider Ülgener's main arguments and the analysis he practiced.

Ülgener's most general argument is that in the pre-capitalist period, regardless of the east or west side of the world, there was a certain common economic morality, but this morality began to change with the end of the middle ages, with the effect of the change in mentality. While this change manifested itself in the west with a dynamic mentality underlying capitalism and rationalization, the same results did not occur in the East, on the contrary, more introversion and irrationalization occurred in the face of the development of the West. First, let us deal with the medieval analysis, which forms the basis for Ülgener's theses, by touching on its economic, political and mental characteristics. Ülgener believes that the characteristic features of the medieval period were partially seen in the early periods. However, in terms of its research topic, it deals with the different phases and variables of these features at the threshold of the pre-capitalist period. Accordingly, in the history of Western Europe, the middle age began to disappear around the 13th century, however, with the end of the rise of the Ottoman society, there was a return to the Middle Ages (Ülgener, 1991, p. 24). In terms of 'Turkish-Islamic' history, Ülgener (1991, p. 28) states that there was a 'liberal-individualist' period in the early period of Islam -similar to the rise of the Ottoman Empire-, however, the scholastic and conservative medieval phase became dominant in the later period. Ülgener (1991, pp. 23-24) states that wealth was tied to the land in the period called medieval, the same economy dominated and monetary relations remained in the background, simple production and trade in the cities and agricultural activities carried out in the countryside constituted the basic economic categories. In line with this economic structure, land-based organization of social hierarchy steps constitutes the political scheme of the Middle Ages, in which large land ownership and land-based dominance model dominate, power is decentralized and limited to the land (Ülgener, 1991, p. 24). Ülgener (1991, p. 66), who drew a certain medieval moral framework in connection with this scheme, states that this form of morality ideally adopts values other than 'material-economic life' and exhibits features such as introversion and dogmatism or denial of world. In general, frugality and adherence to tradition should be counted among the general characteristics of medieval morality (Ülgener, 1991, pp. 95-96). Finally, Ülgener (1991, p. 24), who formulated the prevailing mentality forms in this framework, notes the following titles: (i) the spirit of lordship and craftsmanship peculiar to landownership, (ii) the claim of origin and lineage, (iii) land-based immobile

understanding of wealth, (iv) guild ethics, (v) traditionalist understanding of craft and profession, (vi) religious and mystical atmosphere.

While Ülgener deals with the structural features of medieval life in eastern societies, he also touches on its social stratification form, the specific characteristics of these layers and groups, and the mentality forms. First of all, the author states that a typical middle eastern city has a clear common culture and mentality pattern, and takes the stratification form consisting of the *ümera/ ulama/ fukara* as a model to explain this structure (Ülgener, 1991, pp. 25, 30). *Ümera*, which is the first element of this triple stratification, is the political power group and consists of representatives of the central authority, local begs, notables, notables, *mutegallibe* and their servants, members of the army, administrators, *has* owners and officials (Ülgener, 1991, p. 31). The second group, the *ulama*, is referred to by Ülgener (1991, p. 31) with the term “spiritual class [tm]” and consists of clergy who have a privileged role in feudal land distribution. The last segment is evaluated under the category of middle and lower classes, and low-ranking administrative and military officials, civil servants, followers of the religious orders, artisans, craftsmen, traveling or settled merchants, and land workers engaged in agriculture near the city are included in this group (Ülgener, 1991, p. 31). While discussing the problem of economic ethics and mentality, Ülgener especially focuses on the third of these groups, because of the need to find an answer to the question of whether the group of merchants and craftsmen has a dynamism similar to that of Western capitalism. Ülgener divides merchants into long-distance merchants and small merchants. According to Ülgener (1991, pp. 31-32), the first of these, they are a part of the monetary economy, trade and financial networks that develop along transit roads and are gathered around limited cities. Ülgener (1991, pp. 31-32) argues that this segment presented the first and early examples of capitalism in a pre-capitalist world, but lost their importance with the decline of Eastern trade. The second group of merchants gathered together with the craftsmen in the cities and formed organized groups (Ülgener, 1991, p. 33). In particular, the organizations of urban craftsmen, called *Ahis*, made a certain form of morality dominate urban production, brought features such as a common work ethic and discipline, tradition, continuity of certain business lines, and seclusion (Ülgener, 1991, p. 34). To briefly evaluate the economic moral codes of the groups in question, Ülgener (1991, p. 54) states that the groups that make up the upper strata act with the pride of ‘lordship and being a master’, and that the motive of this stratum to acquire goods and wealth is not based on economic purposes, but is an

extension of the search for rank/reputation/majesty/title/nobility. Secondly, Ülgener (1991, p. 56) deals with the middle stratum and argues that the merchants and artisans in this stratum may act partly out of enthusiasm for adventure and exploration, partly in order to obtain booty. This proposition is also valid for the Western Middle Ages and refers to the moral motivations of the adventurer merchant type. On the other hand, the second component of this layer, the artisan group, namely the Ahis, is based on religious/social/political values rather than economic profitability, and they form a closed community similar to *sûfî* orders (Ülgener, 1991, pp. 56-57). Ülgener (1991, pp. 78-79) states that the artisan layer is not suitable for development due to its technical production level and financial structure, and therefore, as one of the most typical representatives of medieval morality, it is intertwined with mystical movements.

When considered in general terms -especially with the decline of long-distance trade- Ülgener who argues that these social groups have a certain common life understanding of the society as a whole, draws the sketch of this understanding under the concept of '*mesafe şuur*' (Ülgener, 1991, p. 66). According to this concept, in the Middle Ages, distance from the material world, a self-enclosed and calm lifestyle was adopted, and a spatial (limited to the close environment) and temporal (not worried about the future) understanding of distance was dominant (Ülgener, 1991, pp. 66-67). Another dimension of distance from the outside world is an intense concern for moderation. Ülgener (1991, pp. 76-77) underlines that there was a suspicious and even hostile view of commercial activities that allowed large agricultural enterprises and wealth accumulation in this period. When this understanding is considered in terms of its social consequences, Ülgener (1991, pp. 69-71), who argues that a stagnant lifestyle has become dominant in Eastern societies, states that items such as goods/wealth/work have become ideas that do not make sense on their own, that belief in destiny and attachment to a superior power have become the dominant belief form, and that society has closed itself in and limited economic activities to daily needs and livelihood.

As mentioned at the beginning, Ülgener stated that there may be contradictions between the prevailing moral codes and mentality styles in a certain period, and that this contradiction is a social phenomenon that should be interpreted in particular. In this framework, under the distinct moral code prevailing in the Middle Ages, various social strata's real mentality forms that sometimes contradicted or abused this code were formed. In general, in the mentality of the upper class, the elements of palace life, servant or disciple circles, enthusiasm for pretentious consumption and passion for

precious metals became evident (Ülgener, 1991, pp. 101-2). The worldly aristocracy holds the political authority, creates the ideological codification to legitimize its share of wealth, and instills the idea that the social order depends on the aristocracy's ownership (Ülgener, 1991, pp. 103-4). On the other hand, among the sects that represent religious authority, those who claim to be a saint or those who gather together with the 'saints' similarly claim social dominance and become secularized (Ülgener, 1991, p. 106). This situation is complemented by the fact that the members of the spiritual aristocracy also claim nobility of lineage and hope for land donations from the landlords (Ülgener, 1991, p. 113). Moreover, the fact that the middle and lower classes also claim nobility -for example, they emulate the status of beg and *efendi*, they are eager to be a manager and chief in the bureaucracy - show that the mentality of the upper classes also spread to the lower strata of the society. In the final analysis, the land-bound morality that strengthened the tendency of introversion and the hierarchical social structure was completed with the decline of Ottoman society against the West and the emergence of the above-mentioned mentality structures and prevented the development of capitalism. Ülgener believes that this situation constitutes a mentality specific to the dissolution period of the Empire.

According to the author, in the 15th and 16th centuries, when the Ottoman Empire lived at its height, there was no major change in the traditional mentality, and both the economic mentality and the social model remained attached to the feudal mentality (Ülgener, 1991, pp. 114-15).³⁴ Ülgener generally argues that the desire for profit is a universal human quality, but he thinks that there are different ways in Western and Eastern societies to satisfy this desire. As of his period, Ülgener (1991, pp. 130-31) states that the satisfaction of the desire for profit in Western Europe has been rationalized within the framework of trade and increasingly industrial activities, and the development of the state order and morality (Calvinism and Puritanism) has contributed to this process. On the other hand, Ülgener (1991, p. 131) argues that a kind of numbing morality and discipline of trifling became dominant in the Ottoman Empire due to the

³⁴ Ülgener frequently uses the terms 'feudal mentality' and 'feudal morality' throughout his works. This concept is used to reflect both a land-based economic ethics, a hierarchical social order and a static mentality. On the other hand, while Ülgener used this term directly in his early works, it is seen that some limitations were imposed on this term in his later texts. Ülgener (1983, p. 8) argues that this term does not refer to phenomena such as vassals/feudal obligations exist in the history of Western Europe and gathered around the castle/lord, and that it has nothing to do with the Marxist theory of feudalism – and therefore he prefers the term 'feudalistic'.

obstruction of eastern trade routes and internal markets, security problems and the closure of Turkish-Muslim trade life. In this period, the fail of rationalization of economic ethics resulted in the spread of economic relations and activities, which were referred to as irrational gains by Ülgener. To briefly list the irrational gains in question, the following picture emerges (Ülgener, 1991, pp. 159-60): Crude and hard gains (looting, road blocking, robbery, banditry activities) shared by those who hold the state authority and those who are far from it, earnings based on exploiting the farmer and the sources of rent, gains obtained by means of *esham/mukata'a/mansib* buying and selling/adulteration. Ülgener (1991, p. 160) underlines that these types of earnings become widespread as the rational/disciplined economic life declines.

As was mentioned at the beginning, Ülgener's work had a great impact on the next generation and it was popularized again by a newly developed academic group based on M. Weber's sociology after the 1980s. Although Ülgener's thesis bases its theoretical propositions on some universal (rationalization) and global (east-west) postulates, it can be considered that he developed a particularist explanation, since he accepted the dominance of the *sûfî* mentality as a determining factor for the region described as the 'East'. Because Ülgener, who at first glance does not foresee a difference between the 'Western and Eastern' societies in terms of pre-capitalist moral characteristics, does not seem to have the material basis to explain the differentiation that emerged in the 16th and 17th centuries. For this reason, Ülgener, who prefers to refer to a unique mentality carried by literary works and *sûfî* culture, does not examine the Western mystical or monastic works written in the same period, so his discussion remains incomplete. On the other hand, the paradigm that Ülgener used to explain the changes in the Ottoman social structure in the 17th century gives an example of a new interpretation style that can be called relational-particularism. According to this interpretation, the development of the West caused the commercial life to be blocked in the cities located on the Eastern trade route and its network, however, the medieval morality could not be renewed and the mentality structure was limited to feudal values (and magnificence, conspicuous consumption, frugality for the lower classes, etc.). In this interpretation, the unique characteristics of the mentality of the groups that were influential in the Ottoman society, such as the tradesmen/notables/*sûfî* circles/*mansib* holders, were combined with the effect of the new conditions created by the global economic change. The particularist potential of this model will reach its most developed

form in the pen of researchers such as M. Genç, A. G. Sayar, A. F. Bilkan and F. Ermiş, who will be further developed it after Ülgener.

Especially with the 1960s, it is seen that the number of works written within the particularist paradigm or making propositions close to it has increased considerably. Partly essentialist, partly apologist, partly nationalist or Islamist-constructivist approaches are effective in the structuring of these works. It is not possible to summarize the extensive repetitive academic literature in question and popular publications here. On the other hand, it would be appropriate to mention a series of authors and theses that were influential in the development of this literature and that are remarkable in terms of their academic qualities. In this context, it can be said that the works of researchers such as C. Tanyol, H. İnalçık, O. Turan, T. Gökbilgin, Ş. Mardin, K. Karpat, M. Heper have been influential in the development of this approach after the 60s. On the other hand, it would not be wrong to say that the evaluations of researchers such as H. Cin, T. Ateş, M. A. Kılıçbay, M. Özyüksel, A. Sayar, M. Genç on the subject constituted a secondary reference point in the 1980s. The common problem in both periods revolves around the need to prove that the Ottoman social structure was not an example of an FMP or AMP as predicted by popular Marxist approaches. Researches developing in this direction first try to draw an alternative theoretical framework to the concepts of FMP and AMP, but to the extent that this is not possible, they give an example of historiography that adheres to a descriptive historiography that is free from theoretical argumentation.

First of all, sociologist C. Tanyol argues that the Ottoman social structure was different in principle from the Western European example in his studies in the 1960s and especially in his discussions with B. Boran. Tanyol first supports this proposition with the argument that there are basically two different forms of belief and consciousness (divine oriented and human oriented) between Eastern and Western societies (Güllülü, 2010, p. 21). As a historical extension of this difference of belief and consciousness, Western civilization rises on a social system established on the basis of private property and incorporating relations of exploitation and class differentiation (Güllülü, 2010, p. 21). In Eastern societies, classes, class-based state and exploitation relations did not emerge, especially due to the absence of private property on land - a system of 'robbery' or 'plundering' emerged as mentioned by Tanyol (Güllülü, 2010, p. 22). Tanyol argues that the Turkish state tradition is founded on the principle of elite rule, that the rulers are not representatives of any class and that there is no noble class (Güllülü, 2010, p. 23). Tanyol continues this approach in his analysis of Ottoman

society, and argues that Ottoman society does not bear any similarity with Western societies, and that it cannot be considered under the concepts of FMP or AMP in terms of the social position of the people, land regime, property, social consciousness and the social bases of the state (Aksakal, 2018, p. 159). O. Turan and M. T. Gökbilgin elaborate this discussion in a similar framework. While Turan (2003, p. 239-40) states that the old Turkish states had a kind of feudal system, he argues that this system was tried to be overcome through the construction of a centralized state together with the Anatolian Seljuk State. According to this thesis, the land regime based on the *iqta* system of the Seljuk state led to the gradual disappearance of the feudal structure, and the *timar* system that emerged in the Ottoman state radically transformed the feudal structure by establishing a new and advanced social order (Turan, 2003, pp. 246-47). According to Turan (2003, p. 247), this new social order has validated a merit-based administration contrary to the unjust Western feudalism. Moreover, in the *mîrî* land regime, the ownership of the lands belonged to the state, and even the rulers did not have private property, and the rulers, including the ruler, became the officer of the state (Turan, 2003, pp. 247, 249). On the other hand, Gökbilgin (1977, p. 44) argues that there was a certain Turkish aristocracy in the Ottoman state, but it had no resemblance to the Western feudal class. As an extension of this thesis, Gökbilgin (1977, p. 45) states that the Balkan peoples got rid of feudal anarchy and lived under an imperial order thanks to the Ottoman conquests, and thus they passed to a higher social stage.

The ideas of H. İnalcık, who is indisputably a great authority in the field of Ottoman historiography, deserve to be mentioned in this context. It is not an easy matter to summarize İnalcık's work due to his long and productive academic life. For this reason, it would be correct to accept in principle that İnalcık's theoretical views and the concept sets he used changed gradually in his academic life, which lasted at least from the mid-50s to the millennium. This change has a two-step course. These phases can be divided into as such: (i) a phase in which the particularist tendencies of the first years of his academic life were eroded over time and partially Marxist influences could be seen in the 60s, and (ii) the post-70s period when Weberian influences became dominant. In general, İnalcık's historiography approach offers a comparative analysis of universal historical trends and traditional social characteristics, but some of the conceptualizations he puts forward form a basis for the particularist construction of

historiography.³⁵ In general, particularist approaches refer to the thesis that the land regime in the Ottoman Empire differed from its Western European contemporaries. In this respect, the analysis that İnalçık developed under the concept of the *çift-hâne* system constitutes an important basis for such approaches. İnalçık evaluates the structure of the Ottoman state as a social formation fed by Turkic and Islamic traditions and analyzes this formation as a part of the imperial tradition of Middle East region. There are two important categories of this analysis. The first of these corresponds to the organization of the tradition in question in the form of land regime, while the second is the problem of social stratification that forms a whole with the land regime. Starting with the first problem, İnalçık (2015, p. 15) states that the struggle over land tenure in Islamic Empires -and the Ottoman Empire- in general is a fundamental area of conflict between the state and individuals. The basic appearance of this contradiction in the Ottoman Empire is the *timar* system - and the *çift-hâne* system at its core. İnalçık (2018a, p. 112) states that although the *timar* system is superficially similar to feudal land assignment, it is essentially a very different system and is a distinctive feature of the Ottoman regime. The implementation of the *timar* system depends on the state's absolute control over the land by suppressing private property forms and making the peasants tenant producers (İnalçık, 2018a, p. 113). According to İnalçık (2015, p. 16), the reaya cultivates the state-owned land with an unending lease agreement, and within this framework, actually owns the land. In this framework, the state prevents the land from becoming private property and protects the peasants from becoming serfs or workers (İnalçık, 2015, p. 16). According to the author, the basis of such a land regime is equipping a peasant family with a piece of land (*çiflik*) that will enable them to earn their living and pay taxes at a certain rate (İnalçık, 2015, p. 16). Secondly, the stratification pattern of this social system needs to be analyzed. Although İnalçık generally describes the stratification pattern prevailing in Ottoman society as a two-class society structure, his views on the formation of these classes have changed over time. İnalçık (2018b, p. 82) states that the taxation systematic in Asian Empires constitutes the basis of social stratification and status relations. First, these two classes are divided into military and reaya, but the principle of these class relations is explained within the framework of Weberian theory. In this context, the elements of social honor, status and prestige in the Ottoman society are determined by an absolute sovereign ruler

³⁵ For example, see İnalçık (1968, p. 51). İnalçık mentions about a politico-cultural continuity from *Kutadgu Bilig* to the *Tanzimat* edict in this text.

and give this society its patrimonial character (İnalçık, 2019i, p. 9). According to İnalçık (1992a, p. 52-53), medieval societies were politically stratified in two ways, based on status and estate; While a class-based patrimonialism based on fiefs developed in Western societies, a patrimonialism based on *timar* and status groups existed in the Ottoman example. İnalçık (2018b, p. 85) states that both raider and volunteer warriors and people of slave origin can receive *timars*, and in this way they share the privileges of the patrimonial lord.

Secondly, it is necessary to summarize the remarks of K. Karpat on the Ottoman state and society. Karpat considers the Ottoman Empire as a patrimonial state characterized by a social stratification system and a strong state. Karpat (2006b, pp. 223-24) argues that structuring the Ottoman society into four strata was the basic imperial policy, and he lists these strata as (i) clerks, (ii) soldiers, (ii) traders and artisans, (iv) farmers and livestock breeders.³⁶ Maintaining the order and harmony between the said strata constitutes the essence of the authority of the ruler and the basic political function of the administrative apparatus (Karpat, 2006a, p. 109). According to Karpat (2001, p. 85), this hierarchical stratification is arranged according to the principle of professional affiliation, not lineage or wealth. None of the said strata could find the opportunity to establish control over another stratum or strata because power/property could not be concentrated in the hands of any strata (Karpat, 2001, p. 85). The main reason for the emergence of this situation is that the ruler/state has absolute property right on the land, and therefore the power is concentrated on this point (Karpat, 2001, p. 85). The structuring of power relations in this way is integrated with the principle that administrative and military officials also exercise their authority on behalf of the ruler and that they do not have private property (Karpat, 2001, p. 85). Thus, the property relations under the control of the state and the ruler secured the stratification system, the authority representing the state was concentrated on the ruler and ensured the continuation of the order (Karpat, 2001, p. 85). Karpat (2001, p. 84) is of the opinion that the practical and theoretical foundations of this social order, which he calls patrimonialism, attained a developed form during the reign of Mehmet II. In this framework, Karpat (2006a, p. 72) asserts that the elite groups in charge of the state administration also form a bureaucratic class that aims to continue the existing social system without being linked to any social class or ethnicity.

³⁶ Also see Karpat (2019, p. 23).

From the second half of the seventies, a secondary literature emerged in which the debates on the Ottoman social order were reevaluated in the light of the views summarized above. Comprehensive studies on primary sources, especially by historians such as Uzunçarşılı, Barkan and İnalçık, constituted the mainstay of the secondary literature in question. In this context, it would not be wrong to say that liberal, conservative and Marxist interpretations of the cited sources emerged and they developed approaches to the interpretation of the Ottoman social order. In this respect, it is possible to evaluate the liberal-oriented interpretations of Ş. Mardin, M. Heper and M. Çizakça, the conservative-oriented interpretations of H. Cin, G. Akyılmaz, A. Tabakoğlu, Z. Kazıcı and V. Sırım, and the Marxist-oriented interpretations of T. Timur, M. A. Kılıçbay and M. Özyüksel within this framework.

The main feature of liberal-oriented historical interpretations is that they define the Ottoman state as a political structure that suppresses the development of private property and establishes an oppressive dominance over society. First of all, it is necessary to briefly discuss Ş. Mardin's thoughts on the political order in Ottoman society. Mardin (1990c, p. 178-79) categorizes the Ottoman Empire as a patrimonial bureaucracy and states that the authority of the ruler is not based on an autonomous feudal class as exist in Western societies, but on the contrary, on a patrimonial bureaucratic class. In this framework, the society is divided into two opposing strata, the first of which is state officials with high status, while the second is the local power centers located opposite the center in socio-political manners (Mardin, 1990a, p. 33-34). According to Mardin (1990b, p. 74), the administration of the state was undertaken by an organization made up of people of servant origin, and the society consists of two basic groups, the rulers and the ruled. In this social structure, the members of the bureaucratic center try to control the society and the economy, set limits on land ownership and trade, and keep the state authority above the social strata (Mardin, 1990a, pp. 35-36). In particular, the determination of land tenure by the central authority is considered as a part of the central authority's strategy to destroy its local rivals (Mardin, 1990b, p. 73). The weakness of the administrative apparatus in the Ottoman Empire and its positioning against autonomous social forces characterize it as "an eastern despotism that came very close to the optimum balance [tm]" (Mardin, 1990b, p. 74). According to Mardin (1990a, p. 38), especially during the decline of the Empire, state officials constituted plundering powers over their own society through heavy taxes, and the 'eastern despotism' character of the regime became more evident.

Secondly, it would be meaningful to briefly summarize M. Heper's views. Heper (1976, p. 508) evaluates the basic motif of Ottoman history within a line of development dominated by bureaucracy. The most important element of this development line is the state bureaucracy as a "ruling institution" organized around the military apparatus, and this organization makes it possible to concentrate power in the hands of the ruler (Heper, 2000, p. 65). The functioning of the ruling institution in the Ottoman Empire was integrated with the palace-centered education system and the *devshirme* policy, thus cutting the connection between the ruling elite and other social groups (Heper, 1976, p. 509). In addition, the ruling institution through the *timar* system attracts economic resources, thus preventing the emergence of local aristocracies as an autonomous power (Heper, 1976, p. 509). Heper (1985, p. 99) names the social structure, whose general lines are briefly drawn in this way, as patrimonialism. The author, who first accepts the personal administrative authority of the Ottoman ruler effective in the development of this social structure, claims that this structure turned into a traditional patrimonialism in the following centuries -that is, the whole country turned into a great *oikos* and the political sphere into a sultanic manor (Heper, 1985, pp. 99-100). To explain the meaning of this conceptualization, according to Heper (1985, p. 100), the center constructs political norms and the will of the ruler determines social status (2000, p. 65). In this respect, dominant political norms emerge as the central power maintaining justice, keeping all social segments in the position reserved for them, and protecting the subordinate segments (Heper, 1985, p. 100). In the final analysis, the role of the ruler and the state is very central in the social system that Heper depicts. In this context, Heper (1985, p. 100) argues that local forces are quite weak against the state, that the power of these social segments depends on the weakening of the center, and that they can never transform their economic power into a political power.

Finally, M. Çizakça (2016, p. 313) explains the political development of the Ottoman state with reference to the abolition of feudal institutions in the Balkans and argues that the original Ottoman order was established instead of the dissolving feudal ties. According to this thesis, Ottoman administrators aimed to maintain harmony between various social segments in line with the needs of the regime (Çizakça, 2016, pp. 328-29). In this framework, the Ottomans developed a system that would finance expansionist wars, social balance and reproduce itself (Çizakça, 2016, p. 343). Çizakça states that this system is not based on class conflict and therefore calls it "proto-pseudo-socialism". The main feature of this system is that the right to property can be violated

by the state in line with the needs of the regime -and for example, the pressures directed to the merchant class suppressed and destroyed its development (Çizakça, 2016, pp. 329, 343). On the other hand, the state, which systematically suppressed the capital accumulation of the merchants, allowed the elites of the military bureaucracy to accumulate capital, albeit limited, and this meant that, in the final analysis, the economy was shaped not by the producers and merchants, but by the interests of the military class (Çizakça, 2016, pp. 338- 39).

To make a brief assessment of conservative-oriented interpretations of history, these interpretations concentrate on a few basic arguments. These arguments are: (i) Ottoman social order is quite different from Western examples and concepts formulated by Western-centered theories, (ii) Ottoman social order not based on social classes and exploitative relations, (iii) social order organized around the principle of justice, or justice is one of the founding qualities of the order. Starting with the analysis of H. Cin, the author argues that the Ottoman social order has no resemblance to the FMP and AMP. According to this thesis, the bare ownership of lands in the Ottoman land regime belonged to the state, but the actual use of the land by the *reâyâ* gives them a kind of property right, and this constitutes a structure suitable for evolving into the right of private property (Cin, 1985, p. 66). In this framework, the rights of the *sipâhîs* on the land differ from the rights of the feudal lords in terms of ownership of land and labor, drudgery, judicial and administrative powers and taxes (Cin, 1985, p. 66). Cin (1985, pp. 66-67) states that there were no social classes in Ottoman society, and that the state suppressed the development of feudal property and the bourgeoisie and supported the *reâyâ* against injustice and oppression. In this respect, *sipâhîs* are considered as civil servants under the control of the central authority (Cin & Akyılmaz, 2000, p. 383). If we examine another issue, Cin (1985, p. 69) argues that AMP was not seen in Ottoman society because the lands where production belonged to the state, not the village communities, the villagers were independent from the village communities and partially owned private property. Moreover, according to Cin (1985, p. 69), Ottoman villages were not completely closed economic structures, and the Ottoman society did not show the characteristics of an economically stagnant society. In the final analysis, Cin (1985, p. 70) and Cin & Akyılmaz (2000, p. 389) stated that the Ottoman social order was formed within the Turkish-Islamic philosophy and understanding of the state, based on social justice, protecting the weak against the strong, and providing everyone with the opportunity to provide the income they need. Secondly, Tabakoğlu (2021, p. 229)

argues that there was no Western-style class differentiation in Ottoman society because the principles of Islamic society and property were applied. According to this thesis, social stratification has emerged based on administrative hierarchy, and there is a relationship of responsibility, not domination, between the ruler and the ruled social segments (Tabakoğlu, 2021, p. 229). In addition, according to Tabakoğlu, the ideal of Islamic unity prevented the emergence of antagonistic contradictions and classes in Western societies. In this situation, the state ownership of the land, the prevention of the accumulation of capital in certain individuals made it impossible for forces such as tribal nobles, land-based nobles or large capital owners to emerge (Tabakoğlu, 2021, p. 229). In this framework, the timariot *sipâhîs* also served as officials, and both this group and the devshirme-origin bureaucrats were prevented from becoming a privileged social class (Tabakoğlu, 2021, p. 234). Thirdly, according to Z. Kazıcı (2017, p. 74), the main factor determining the early development of the Ottoman state was the replacement of feudal relations, serfdom and land nobility with the *timar* system. The development of the *timar* system means that the serf-status peasant turns into a tenant with real rights, thus preventing the development of social class differences (Kazıcı, 2017, p. 74). Kazıcı (2017, pp. 75, 77) draws attention to the fact that there was no hereditary nobility in Ottoman society, that a privileged social class was not formed, and that there was a merit-based system and mobility opportunity to reach administrative levels. In the final analysis, Kazıcı (2017, pp.74, 77) states that the structure of Ottoman society has a feature that cannot be compared with other societies, and that the basis of this feature is the doctrine of justice, property and rights based on Islam. Similarly, Sirim (2017, p. 176) argues that Islamic belief and moral codes are at the core of the Ottoman social order, and that although there is a distinction between the ruler and the ruled in society, this does not correspond to the class differentiation found in Western European societies.

Finally, it is necessary to briefly evaluate the main approaches that interpret some of the arguments and data of the particularist approach within a Marxist or Marxist-oriented framework. The main feature of such approaches is that they refrain from evaluating the Ottoman social order directly under the Marxist categories of their own period, but instead of proposing a new Marxist political economy category, they show an open or hidden tendency to the concept of patrimonialism. In this respect, although these approaches object to the direct application of the concepts of FMP and AMP to Ottoman society, it is difficult to ignore the fact that there is a certain interest

in the content of the concept of AMP, especially in the early works of T. Timur. If we start with Timur's theses, the basic theses of the author are that the Ottoman social structure cannot be evaluated under the concept of FMP and that the state structure was not directly built on a social class basis. Timur (1979, p. 176-77) is of the opinion that the dominant status of direct producers in Ottoman society was neither free peasantry nor serfdom, but rather communal peasantry, bound to their communities by patriarchal ties. Timur (1979, pp. 206-7) states that communal relations were dominant both in Byzantine villages and Slavic communities, and among Turkmen tribes who settled down, and points out that the *çiftlik*s and the *colons* working on them are part of this structure. On the other hand, according to Timur (1979, p. 211), feudal relations in Ottoman society also developed under the status of *timar*, but the fact that the peasants were not in the status of serfs makes founding conditions different from those in Western Europe. In this social structure, there was no vassal bond between the *timar* and *zeâmet* holders and the palace aristocracy, and the status of the peasants was determined by the state, not by the feudal elements (Timur, 1979, p. 213). Timur (1979, p. 192) drew attention to the dual character of the *timar* system: (i) fiefs are built on the feudal line of development, but (ii) central power through *timar* grants hinders the development of feudalism. The historical possibility of the *timar* system largely depends on the existence of the *mîrî* land regime. Timur (1979, pp. 199-200) states that the *mîrî* land regime is ideologically formulated and does not fully correspond to historical reality, but underlines that through this ideological element, the despotic state tries to prevent class warfare and freeze development of social class. At this point, the problem of the nature of the Ottoman state comes to the fore. Timur (1979, p. 224) states that although there were social classes in Ottoman society and the state did not act completely impartially towards them, it did not become a class-state in the full sense, and sought a balance between various classes like the Bonapartist state. In this framework, the upper classes avoid becoming remarkably rich, the bureaucracy threatens all wealth with confiscation and protects the people against the wealthy classes (Timur, 1979, pp. 224-25). In the final analysis, Timur establishes a connection between the patriarchal-communal character of the peasants and the despotic structure of the state, and depicts a social order that is similar to the AMP but cannot be fully reducible to it. A similar analysis also takes place in the conceptual framework of M. A. Kılıçbay. Kılıçbay (2010, pp. 263, 273) evaluates the development process of the Ottoman state as a historical process that took place between the feudal elements and the central state,

showing a tendency towards feudalism within this framework, but suppressing and controlling these tendencies. The basis of this process is the *mîrî* land regime and *timar* system, which developed against feudal forms of land ownership. First of all, the Ottoman state established the *timar* system, which limited the rights of *sipâhîs*, made it possible for the state to collect some land revenues as taxes, and was able to exercise its right to dominate over the *reâyâ* and *sipâhî* (Kılıçbay, 2010, p. 292). Secondly, in the regions where the feudalization tendency is high, the lands in the status of *mâlikâne-dîvânî* and the state became a shareholder of a part of the ground rent, and in time, the *mülk* lands were converted into *timar* status (Kılıçbay, 2010, p. 289). In this framework, the social status of direct producers emerges not as feudal serfs, but as *colon* within a pre-feudal structure (Kılıçbay, 2010, p. 311). In the final analysis, Kılıçbay (2010, pp. 273, 324) finds it wrong to include the Ottoman social order in a certain mode of production such as FMP or AMP, and argues that it is possible to talk about an Ottoman Mode of Production, especially due to the structure of the economic institutions that formed its foundations. Finally, it would be appropriate to summarize M. Özyüksel's analysis. Özyüksel (1997, p. 128) argues that there are deep differences between the feudal society structure and the Ottoman society, and lists these differences under the following headings: (i) property relations, (ii) nature of the state, (iii) characteristics of social classes. If these titles are to be evaluated, according to Özyüksel (1997, p. 128), the ownership right on land (as opposed to feudal private property) was in the hands of the state, society is not organized around a dual class distinction between serfs and lords (it has a more complex structure that includes *ulama*, *reâyâ*, *sipâhî* and *devshirme* groups, etc.), the privileges of the ruling classes over land were limited to their terms of office. Moreover, while the feudal society had a fragmented power structure, there was a strong central state in the Ottoman society and prevented the seigneur and the bourgeoisie from finding autonomous social spheres (Özyüksel, 1997, p. 128). In this context, Özyüksel (1997, p. 165) states that feudal and centralist powers potentially coexist and struggle in pre-capitalist societies, and states that the development of the Seljuk and Ottoman states suppressed feudalism - however, an absolutely centralized state could not be established. In the final analysis, Özyüksel (1997, pp. 167-68) names the Ottoman state as the continuation of the eastern societies, the central-bureaucratic state, and states that this typology is superior to feudalism.

II.II. Ottoman Social Structure in the Framework of the Marxist Paradigm

II.II.I. Content of the Concept of Mode of Production

The proposition that the institutional character of a particular mode of production lies at the root of the Ottoman social order is primarily expressed by Marxist and Marxism-inspired approaches. According to this approach, the production function, organized as a social relationship in order to meet individual and social needs, is the primary basis of social organization (Marx, 1904, p. 11; Lenin, 1990, pp. 21-22; Korsch, 2000, pp. 171-72). Although this thesis developed within modern political economy thought, it has roots that can be traced back to ancient philosophy -and the Mesopotamian myths behind it. This view is partly based on examples of myths in ancient Sumerian-Babylonian mythology that try to answer how societies were established after the Great Flood, and their reconsidered forms in Hesiod's thought. In these examples, the emergence of post-flood societies is treated as a gradual evolution based on the emergence of crafts, division of labor, and cities. Plato, who developed this view, argues that because people are weak in the face of nature and do not have fur and claws like wild animals, they invent the division of labor to meet their needs, therefore, crafts and different social segments emerged, and they established cities in order to achieve general well-being (welfare, security, virtue). Aristotle, who developed this scheme, accepts private property (family property) as well as the division of labor as the founding element of the social order, and states that this element is decisive in many titles from the master-slave distinction to the economic order of the city. The approach, which sees the division of labor and thus economic-based social differentiation and specialization as the basis of the foundation of society, dominated modern economic theory with the influence of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and in this way formed the basis of the social theory of Marx and Engels. While modern economic theory accepts this scheme, they also introduce serious innovations on it. For example, while Adam Smith (2016, pp. 14-17) saw the division of labor as a fundamental factor in the production of material wealth and thus in ensuring welfare, he rejected the Aristotelian logocentrism as its basis and argued that the tendency for division of labor is an instinct in living things, thus turning the division of labor into a kind of 'natural' tendency to trade. Moreover, Smith argues that the tendency to trade, which he finds useful for obtaining individual needs and demands, ultimately arises from individual self-interest and that this is a natural reason underlying the division of labor (Smith, 2006, p. 69). In this framework, Smith grounds the commercial capitalism

of his age as a universal form of civilization and states that the division of labor is the basis of social progress and therefore civilization (Smith, 2006, p. 68). In his work *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, Smith formulates four basic steps that make up the different stages of social development that include and develop each other until modern commercial capitalism, and he calls them the 'mode of subsistence'. After the development of societies, these modes of subsistence do not disappear completely, but are contained and surpassed by a more developed form (Smith, 2006, p. 49). According to him, these four forms of subsistence, consisting of hunting, shepherding, agriculture and trade, determine other institutional structures in the communities they dominate and shape moral conventions (Smith, 2006, p. 49). The most significant among these institutions is, as an artificial convention, the property relationship that emerges in "specific circumstances" and undertakes certain social functions (Smith, 2006, p. 51). The model that Marx used while developing the concept of mode of production is largely the 'mode of subsistence' scheme formulated by Smith. Considering that the thought of Adam Smith in general combines the philosophy of political economy, morality and law (Long, 2006, p. 291), it is easier to understand how much this influenced Marx's holistic analysis. With the help of this scheme, Smith makes a historical synthesis of the economic activities of human societies for their subsistence and the moral and institutional codes that develop depending on them. Similarly, Marx states that the subsistence of human societies is ultimately dependent on a process of the social production and this production process consists of the categories (i) productive forces and (ii) relations of production, thus mode of production. The Marxist concept of the mode of production is defined as follows: "the mode of acquiring the means of existence, material goods indispensable for the satisfaction of social needs. It is a set of productive forces and relations of production, expressing a state of society at every stage of social evolution [tm]" (Bouver-Ajam et al., 1977, p. 577). While the concept of productive forces consists of sub-categories of labor and means of production, the concept of relations of production has sub-categories of ownership of the means of production, the place of production of various social groups, and the distribution of goods produced (Bouver-Ajam et al., 1977, pp. 493, 575). In this framework, it is generally an accepted approach among Marxists to consider the history of societies as the sequential history of modes of production, in general terms, of the social formation consisting of at least three basic levels (economic base, legal and political superstructures, forms of social consciousness) (Balibar, 2007, p. 502). On the

other hand, there is a crucial difference between the concepts of mode of production and social formation. As Suret-Canale (1985, p. 37) states, the concept of mode of production reveals the most general level of relations found in concrete human societies at a certain level of abstraction, while the concept of economic and social formation reveals the concrete historical characteristics of a particular society by referring to the dominant mode of production.

In this framework, Marx first states that people organize their production activities socially in order to meet their material needs, and he calls the primary form of this organization cooperation. According to Marx, cooperation is prominently prevalent in the early stages of the labor process, hunting societies, Indian agricultural communities, etc., and it is differed from modern forms of cooperation by the common ownership of the means of production because of the fact that individual's relation with the tribe/community has not yet been separated (Marx, 2011, p. 325). On the other hand, the division of labor develops according to the characteristics of both the kind of the work and the social relations organized between the subjects, and finally the organization of the work instruments. For example, differences of production between clans and families due to the natural environment are transformed into differences in exchange and thus social division of labor structures after the encounter of these communities, the differentiation of town and country produces an advanced form of division of labor mediated by commodity exchange, while the development of manufacture gives rise to the independent organization of a particular line of sector and creates a new form of division of labor -thus contributes to the development of a social division of labor (Marx, 2011, pp. 341-42). In the final analysis, the development of the division of labor affects social development as part of the development of relations of production and the development of articulation between different societies/communities. In addition, the organization of social labor relations under the forms of cooperation and division of labor affects the establishment and change of the social structure under many titles from labor productivity to accumulation and distribution relations. As he stated in his letter to J. Weydemer of March 5, Marx (1852) argues that the existence of classes also depends within this framework on the specific historical stage of the development of the mode of production (*historische Entwicklungsphasen der Production*).

In their work titled *Die deutsche Ideologie*, Marx and Engels considered the division of labor to create a fundamental division between body and mental labor as one

of the milestones of a duality that would continue throughout the history of civilization, bringing the division of society into two separate classes. According to Marx and Engels (2013, p. 56), the distinction between physical and mental labor has crossed a distinctive threshold with the development of the urban and rural differentiation, the emergence of cities has necessitated the administrative apparatus, police, taxes and politics, and the population has been divided into two social classes. Marx and Engels (2013, p. 68) consider this line of development as a change in the mode of production and state that the change between the two situations corresponds to a change in the mode of production: (i) under the dominance of the natural means of production, where individuals are bound by family/tribal/territorial ties, physical and mental activity are not separated from each other, the property or possession relationship is based directly on personal relationships and the division of labor between individuals does not develop, (ii) widespread trade, separation of mind and body labor, artificial means of production, exchange ties rather than family/tribe/land ties, power relations emerges through the mediation of money. In this respect, it is understood that changes in productive forces and relations of production create differentiation in social formation to the extent that they correspond to a change in the mode of production, and its analysis is necessary to understand the typologies of different societies. In Marx's various works, the typologies of different societies are analyzed based on different modes of production. Although the debate about their number has not been concluded, it is generally accepted that Marx suggested the existence of primitive-communal, ancient-slavery, Asiatic/oriental, feudal and capitalist modes of production and spoke of socialist-communist modes of production as a possibility (Marx, 1904, p. 13; Mandel, 1999, pp. 193-95). Considering Marx's analyzes on pre-capitalist modes of production in the *Grundrisse*, it is seen that he also places the pastoral or nomadic mode of production at the root of primitive forms of society (Marx, 1973, p. 472). Hobsbawm (1985, p. 58) states that these communities, which made their living by hunting, fishing, animal husbandry and primitive agriculture, have been in the works of Marx since *Die deutsche Ideologie* and coincided with the *communautaire* stage of human history. Suret-Canale (1985, pp. 41-42) states that the first of these basic modes of production analyzed by Marx corresponds to primitive-classless society forms (including collectivist Asiatic, Ancient and Germanic forms), whereas Asiatic, slave-owning, feudal and capitalist modes of production are related to the class-based-societies.

At this point, it is an interesting debate whether Marx attaches fundamental importance to the concept of the Asiatic mode of production. The absence of the discussion of the AMP in Engel's *Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staats* has placed the concept –for a long time– on an insignificant place in Marxist literature. In his notes on Kovalevskij [1879], Marx writes: “The lousy ‘Orientalists’ etc., have recourse in vain to the passages in the Koran where it is said of the earth that it belongs ‘to the property of God’” (as cited in Banaji, 2010, p. 20). Banaji (2010, p. 20) interprets the silent end of the discussion of AMP in Marx with this passage as a serious change of perspective on the subject.³⁷ Maybe this change should be commented as an *argumentum ex silentio*. What deepens this opinion is that although the notes of Morgan, Maine, Phear, Kovalevskij, which Marx used while developing his theses on the state, are used by Engels in his *Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staats*, a discussion on the AMP is not included in the work (Claessen & Skalnik, 1993, p. 12).³⁸ What Marx noticed—for us—is nothing but the discrepancies that often arise between theology and reality, *de facto* and *de jure* forms of property as well as their contradiction with the ideological discourse.

The fact that Lenin and Plekhanov's discussions about the concept did not come to a positive conclusion, as Melekechvili (1970, p. 275) states, Lenin did not include the concept of Asiatic mode of production in his work called *State and Revolution*. Finally, the short history of the CPSU, published in 1938, manifested a five-point (primitive communal, slave-owning, feudal, capitalist, socialist) classification by not taking into account the AMP, then the discussion was covered. Stalin's ([1938]1975, p. 29) formulation of a linear understanding of history that corresponds to the modes of production and the five phases of social evolution (Primitive, Slavery-based, Feudal, Capitalist, Socialist) within this framework, and thus creating a doctrine of historical evolution, caused the discussion to fall off the agenda completely.³⁹ A similar situation

³⁷ Bloch (2002, p. 53) suggest that the analysis made on the Inca empire in the Conquest of Peru published by Prescott in 1847 was influential in Marx's development of this concept, which states that “a great empire ruled without the aid of writing, only with the help of brutal military power and religion [tm]”.

³⁸ Erdost (1984, p. 14) argues that, unlike Banaji, Engels does not include the concept, but keeps the emphasis on the collective production of Indian village communities, which constitutes the content of the concept.

³⁹ I think that the approach of Lenin and Stalin shares a common background with Marx in part because Marx's thoughts on mode of production, social formation and their succession are based on ancient philosophy and A. Smith's thoughts as well as 19th century archeology's categorization of prehistoric times. Briefly, if we need to follow these traces, it would be

seems to have occurred with the application of the five phase scheme for Chinese history in the *Zhongguo tongshi jianpian* (A Concise General History of China, 1947), which reflects the official view of the CCP, and ignoring other theoretical interpretations (Dirlik, 1996, pp. 244-45). The fact that the AMP was also formulated as ‘eastern despotism’, that it included state ownership, that a pejorative similarity was established between this mode of production and the political and economic organization of the Soviet Union, and that they were more or less similar to Trotskyist criticisms, were effective in falling the theory off the agenda -or in the formation of the *anti-Aziatchiki* position. In addition, due to the linear/developmental understanding of history prevailing in the Soviet Union, the fact that socialism is necessarily considered to belong to a social formation that is ahead of the previous modes of production, and the application of AMP to societies that ‘resemble’ the Soviet Union has made it politically objectionable. The concept was reintroduced into academic and political debates in the 1960s with the effect of the CPSU-CCP conflict (Sawer, 1977, p. 100). The debate on whether China lived through the phases of feudalism and capitalism and whether it could directly transition to socialism resulted in the early Maoist forces developing rural struggle despite the CPSU line. With the 1960s, the CCP accused the Soviet Union of revisionism and attempted to gather the leadership of the world revolutionary movement under its own leadership. In this context, whether Maoist China can carry out such a leadership, the possibility of transition to socialism without the need for the completion of the stage of capitalism (that is, the productive forces and production relations reaching a certain stage of development), etc., the debate over the issues made AMP

appropriate to mention Thomsen's and de Mortillet's categorizations on prehistoric times. C. J. Thomsen divides the archaeological findings, previously called Celtic, Belgian, Druid culture, into three as stone/bronze/iron age. In the second half of the 19th century, following Thomsen's categorization, Gabriel de Mortillet divided the stone age into six successive subcategories (Chelles, le Moustier, Solutre, etc.) named after the local culture (Childe, 2019, pp. 31-33). De Mortillet's subsequent distinction between the bronze and iron ages and his definition of these subdivisions as the evolutionary stages that all societies must pass through has created a trend that has influenced material culture studies for a long time (Childe, 2019, p. 34). This categorization tendency was not similar to the medieval, early modern, and modern-day etc. historical distinctions made after the Enlightenment, but corresponded to the use of tools and production processes that determined the cultural and social development of certain human groups. Perhaps this is why Mortillet's approach functioned as the dominant paradigm in research on the prehistoric period in the USSR until the 1950s (Childe, 2019, pp. 34-5). In this context, Marx's study on Slavic, Germanic, Ancient and Asiatic mode of production typologies and finally organizing them under six basic forms refers to a similar evolutionary link established between local cultures and universal human history, and basically does not fall far from the Mortillet paradigm - even adapting it to historical epochs.

theory popular again.⁴⁰ On the other hand, Wittfogel's discussion of 'eastern despotism'/ 'hydraulic societies' and the concept of the Asiatic mode of production reintroduced the concept of the AMP, including the criticism of the Soviet Union. Factors such as the de-Stalinization period and the emergence of Eurocommunism with intense democratic emphasis have also increased the interest in alternative paths of historical development. For example, S. M. Dubrovskii, a proponent of the Stalinist scheme of the 1930s, in his latest works which coincided with the second half of the 1960s, divided the social systems corresponding to the modes of production into six pre-capitalist basic forms, including the distinctions of patriarchal society, petty-producer, serfdom and feudalism (Dunn, 2011, p. 24). New Marxist approaches that emerged after the 1960s and focused on the possibilities of multilineal historical evolution increased mode of production typologies; in order to exemplify those; the 'tributary mode of production' which has its origins in the work of Jiro Hayakawa, Ian Banu, Henri H. Stahl and is detailed by Samir Amin and John Haldon; Coquery-Vidrovitch's 'African mode of production', J. Banaji's 'colonial mode of production', Leonid Vasilyev's 'state mode of production', Yuri Semenov's 'politarian mode of production', Nikolay Kradin's 'exopolitarian mode of production', Chris Wickham's/Eric R. Wolf's and Laura da Graca's 'peasant mode of production', Kılıçbay's 'Ottoman mode of production' etc. In fact, the fact that Marx made insufficiently developed distinctions between Germanic and Slavic modes of production has placed the necessity of considering and separating many concrete social formations from each other while determining the general typologies of the modes of production. In this framework, it is seen that the Marxist debate on the modes of production has gradually evolved into a particularistic form, because it is seen that the different relations of production and relations of productive forces that emerged locally in different periods of world history have many alternative forms, especially in the pre-capitalist period. In this case, as Althusser points out, the coexistence of more than one mode of production in a particular social formation makes it increasingly difficult to

⁴⁰ For the official view formulated by Soviet writers that China cannot lead the world revolution due to its 'economic backwardness', see: Konstantinov et al. (1975, pp. 212 ff.). One side of this debate is based on the fact that the Soviet Union actually put into practice the principle of peaceful coexistence as its foreign policy doctrine. Contrary to this is the contradiction between Communist China's reliance on a much more active foreign policy in Far Asia against Taiwan, Japan, and Franco-American imperialism. This new international conjuncture has made Communist China both a model and the biggest supporter for various revolutionary struggles in Far Asia, thus placing it at the forefront of the leadership of the world revolution.

analyze a particular historical stage and society in terms of a single mode of production conceptualization, especially in the case of pre-capitalist societies.⁴¹

II.II.II. Feudalism and the Concept of the Feudal Mode of Production

II.II.II.I. Emergence and Framework of the Concept

II.II.II.II. Marxist Theory and Analysis of the Feudal Mode of Production

This chapter will summarize the arguments of a series of writers who contributed to the concept of the feudal mode of production, starting with the works of Marx and Engels. When the concept of feudal mode of production and the development history of feudalism analysis are considered, it is seen that they are structured in several basic phases. The first of these phases is the early period when Marx and Engels created their theoretical formulations and these were interpreted by Bogdanoff, Kautsky, Lenin, Bukharin and Luxemburg and evaluated in practical political struggle. The second stage is the period in which the general theory of feudalism was adapted to specific cases after it reached a certain clarity, and analyzes were developed especially on China (Stalin, Trotsky, Radek, Mao, Tao Xisheng), Mongolia (Vladimirtsov) or small-scale production (Chayanov). Thirdly, it is necessary to mention a phase in which the theory of feudalism was reconsidered within the debates on the transition to the capitalist mode of production -and therefore in the context of the development economics. At this stage, the works of researchers such as Dobb, Sweezy, Takahashi, Hilton will be briefly discussed. In the fourth phase, in which the concept of the feudal mode of production was re-evaluated in terms of universal historiography and adapted to many specific cases, the influence of Soviet historiography is particularly evident. Diakov, Kovalev, Kerov, Agibalova, Donskoy, Semenov, Kula and Kolesnitsy can be mentioned as the leading figures of this period. In the same context, the work of a series of neo-Marxist Western writers deals with the problem of feudalism. We can mention the names of these authors as Moore, Anderson, Croix, Harman, Wood, Faulkner. Finally, it is possible to talk about another school of historiography in which the theory of feudalism is adapted to the history of India. In this context, the works of Kosambi, Sharma, Yadava and Nandi will be briefly mentioned.

First, as can be seen in the early works of Marx and Engels, the analysis of FMP mainly bears traces of the arguments of Adam Smith, Montesquieu and Voltaire -if its

⁴¹ For researchers who carry this debate to the present, see (ed.) Grace & Zingarelli (2015); Babinskas (2009 and 2018).

further development is examined, it can be argued that Morgan's influence also becomes visible. Marx and Engels' analyzes of feudalism generally consider it as a mode of production, and in particular as a mode of ownership, a relationship of dependency, and a form of state and Law. Marx and Engels' first argument about feudalism was formulated by examining medieval forms of land ownership. This formulation treats feudalism as both a social system and a form of land ownership. According to this formulation, the prototype of the property form of the Middle Ages is tribal ownership, and the origins of this property form go back to the war practices of the Romans and the cattle breeding practices of the German tribes (Marx & Engels, 2013, p. 65). Both prototypes have transformed into feudal landed property and corporate movable property in their historical development (Marx & Engels, 2013, p. 65). While the historical basis of this change is the conquest of Roman lands by the Germanic invaders, its theoretical expression can be framed as the fusion of the social formation of the invading groups and the productive forces in the invaded lands. According to Marx and Engels (2013, p. 67), although this fusion took place with the conquest of the Roman Empire by the barbarians, the coverage of the production relations of the conquest determines the dominant aspect of the phenomenon and can take place under the following headings: (i) the social formation of invading groups becomes equal to the level of productive forces they have conquered, (ii) in the absence of such conformity, the social formation of the invading groups is changed in accordance with the present productive forces. For example, the Germanic groups that conquered the old Roman provinces establish a fief system intertwined with the old tribal system and give each individual a piece of land as a reward (Marx & Engels, 2013, p. 336). Secondly, it is seen that feudalism is defined in a series of passages by Marx as a complex of relations of dependency and these relations are defined as a factor that also determines the 'social relations of material production'. While touching on the structure of medieval society, Marx and Engels (1948, p. 9) consider feudal lords, vassals, guild masters, journeymen, apprentices, serfs and their lower grades as layers of the class structure. According to Marx (1973, p. 163; 2011, p. 87) relationships of personal dependency dominate in medieval Europe -serfs and lords, vassals and lords, seculars and clergy, etc.- and these relations constitute the given basis of society.⁴² This means

⁴² Although Marx (1973, p. 165) states that the 'personal' appearance of dependency relations can be partially considered as an illusion, he underlines that in the final analysis it is not possible for these relations to be considered completely impersonal due to their origins and primitive structures in military subordination relations.

that people's labor and labor products are organized and divided in a way that cannot be considered separate from their personal reality and personal relations (Marx, 2011, p. 87). Labor and labor products thus participate in the social functioning as services in kind and payments in kind (Marx, 2011, p. 87).

Thus, feudal relations of exploitation are realized as an extension of feudal dependency relations and are characterized by the direct producers being subjected to forced labor on the fields of feudal landowners within certain days. In this framework, the class dominance of the feudal lords develops depending on the multitude of people they make bonded and subordinate to them. According to Marx (2011, p. 690), power of feudal lord is determined not by the number of their possessions, but by the size of their subjects. Although a significant part of the subjects is in serf status, the social origins of serfdom and the social position of serfs are not entirely determined by feudal dependency relations. In Engels' letter to Marx of December 22, both thinkers seem to agree that serfdom is not an absolute form of medieval feudalism, and that it can appear in many parts of the world, in the final analysis, in the form of the relationship between invaders and direct producers who cultivate the land (Engels, 1882).

On the other hand, the fact that these subjects were not completely dispossessed masses like the slaves in the ancient society or the modern proletariat, on the contrary, were common owners of the land around their home and common lands, gives the feudal system its unique character (Marx, 2011, p. 690, footnote 217). The existence of common lands indicates that, in the final analysis, the feudal social formation contained an important remnant of the communal character of tribal property. Engels (2018, p. 172) finds the social organization of the Germans at the stage of 'upper barbarism' at the origin of these common lands. According to Engels (2018, pp. 172-73), the Germans were able to overcome the contradiction between landownership and slaves, which was the reason for the collapse of Roman society, and develop a new social order, due to their understanding of 'personal value' based on the egalitarian foundations of the gentile organization, their freedom tendencies and their "democratic instincts [tm]". In this new order, after the collapse of the Germanic states, a form of feudal dependency based on benefice and commendation relations developed against Norman and Arab invaders (Engels, 2018, p. 172). In the new feudal organization, the mark partnerships, one of the dominant elements of the gentile organization of the Germans, were also preserved in the feudal state form, and even for the exploited peasants, a means of association and resistance that the ancient slavery and modern proletariat did not have

could survive (Engels, 2003, pp. 172-73). In this context, Engels (2018, p. 193) determines that the feudal state both developed as the organ of the nobility to keep serfs and *corvée* peasants under their yoke, and that this organ necessarily took a part from the egalitarian structure of the productive forces - in the final analysis, it points to one of the original contradictions of the feudal social formation. In general, although it is clear that Engels adhered to the approach that defines the state as an instrument of organized oppression of the ruling classes, he did not conduct a detailed analysis of the material framework (organs, legal structure, sources of authority and legitimacy, personnel regime, administrative division, etc.) of the feudal state structure. When the Marx and Engels' analysis of the transition from feudalism to capitalism is examined in general, it is seen that the usurpation of the common lands by the ruling classes and their enclosure, as in the case of England, led to the dissolution of feudal property relations, leading to peasant revolts and finally the formation of the urban proletariat.

The analyzes of Marx and Engels on the feudal mode of production were developed especially by the Russian Social Democrats and applied to Ottoman society by academic circles in the Soviet Union. For this reason, it is also substantial to follow the development of the Marxist analysis of feudalism through the works of Russian/Soviet socialists and their companions -particularly German socialists. In this context, firstly it will be examined how this theory developed among the Social Democrats through the relevant works of Bogdanoff, Kautsky, Lenin, Luxemburg and Bukharin.⁴³

Let's start with the general economic history book written by Bogdanoff. Bogdanoff's ([1897] 1923/1925) work, which has been translated into English under the title *Short Course of Economic Science*, has had a theoretical impact on the Russian Marxist movement in general. We understand this the fact that in an 1898 book review article written by Lenin in the 4th issue of *Mir Bozhy* magazine, he praised Bogdanoff's

⁴³ In addition, it is necessary to mention the evaluations of A. Gramsci on the feudal mode of production, which is partially scattered in the prison notebooks. According to Gramsci in general, feudalism is organized around agricultural production, military aristocracy and clergy constitute the two main landed classes, exploitation is carried out by non-economic means (political-military coercion and religious ideology), central state structure has minimal effect, particularism and universalism (local landowners and the church) coexist in this social formation in which there is a dialectical tension between them (Douet, 2020, pp. 340-341). Since Gramsci's definition and analysis did not make a remarkable distinction in feudalism discussions, I did not see the need for further discussion.

work in general, although he brought partial criticism⁴⁴. Similarly, the fact that some of the theoretical details in Bogdanoff's work are included in the later works of Lenin and Bukharin shows that this effect cannot be considered short-lived at all. Moreover, the fact that Bogdanoff's aforementioned work was translated into Chinese and caused some debates for and against it (Dirlik, 1989, p. 103) shows that this effect is not only related to Soviet Marxism. The points that Bogdanoff (1925, p. 63) formulated as the general theory of feudalism are as follows: (i) the base formed by a small and self-sufficient agricultural community that is technically weak, not industrially developed, (ii) the administration of the feudal lord who takes part in the organization of production and distribution, (iii) subordination between strong and weak feudal lords for the purpose of security and military cooperation, (vi) primitive exchange relationship between neighboring communities. To these points, it is possible to add the church's participation in the structure of the feudal system as a landowner and ideology production center. If we go into the details of the feudal society formulated by Bogdanoff, it is seen that he first identified two main themes for the establishment of feudalism. The first of these paths is the evolutionary transition from the communal society to the feudal society, and the second is the development of feudalism as an extension of the military organization of the warrior societies in the long-lasting invasion movements (Bogdanoff, 1925, pp. 46-48, 53). Bogdanoff analyzes the specific character of ideology and the institutional structure of ideology production in feudal society. According to him, feudalism has a unique ideological structure, and at the center of this ideological structure is an authoritarian motif that sees the "finger of God" in everything (Bogdanoff, 1925, p. 65). This ideological formulation constructs a hierarchical image of the world with the God at the top, and ultimately this construction reflects the material hierarchy of the feudal society organized based on authority and subordination relations (Bogdanoff, 1925, p. 64).⁴⁵

Secondly, Kautsky's analysis of feudalism will be summarized, as it was developed in his work *Die Agrarfrage: Eine Uebersicht über die Tendenzen der*

⁴⁴ See: Lenin (1898).

⁴⁵ Interestingly, Bogdanoff (1925, p. 65) also refers to ancient Greek society as a kind of "early feudalism". We will see this proposition later in Bukharin. Although he did not develop a detailed explanation, it can be thought that Bogdanoff talked about the Achaean invasion period. It is possible to see the traces of a kind of manor organization that is not based on feudal chivalry ethos and serfdom in the Homeric epic, where characters such as Agamemnon, Aeias, Odysseus are also depicted as landowners. It can be thought that Bogdanoff's theses were inspired by the later frequently criticized works of Eduard Meyer.

modernen Landwirtschaft und die Agrarpolitik der Sozialdemokratie (1899), which deals with the development of commodity production in agriculture and the socialist reorganization of modern agricultural structures. It is known that this work of Kautsky had a great impact on Russian Marxists, even in a book review Lenin wrote for the *Nachalo* magazine in 1899, he praised the work.⁴⁶ In this work, Kautsky especially focuses on the problem of how the feudal economic units were reorganized on the basis of commodity exchange. For this reason, the analysis carried out by Kautsky mostly focuses on the economic characteristics of agricultural structures organized under the feudal mode of production and does not go into the analysis of political organization, except for partial references. Kautsky (1988, p. 32) defines the typological features of feudalism, which he also refers to as the “medieval mode of production”, as follows: (i) egalitarian communities are found to produce for their own consumption in a way that they share a common level of prosperity, (ii) the fields are based on summer, winter and fallow rotation with the dominance of communal farming practices. Finally, it is possible to mention self-sufficiency as another economic organizing principle of medieval agricultural communities; In line with this principle, the products produced in the community were still consumed within the community, their removal or sale outside the community was strictly prohibited -or subject to the permission of the village community members (Kautsky, 1988, p. 22). According to him, the three-field system developed by the Germanic tribes underlies the economic organization based on communal practices. According to this regime, the land is divided as the common property of the village community, while the peasant families form a self-sufficient domestic cooperative, each village forms a self-contained cooperative economy called *Mark* (Kautsky, 1988, p. 20).⁴⁷ In the indicated system, the private areas used by families and the areas processed under the common ownership of the village community form a complementary whole, so that areas with location and productivity differences can be processed alternately (Kautsky, 1988, p. 20).

Thirdly, I will briefly consider the ideas formulated by V.I. Lenin and R. Luxemburg on the feudal social formation. First of all, Lenin (1977, pp. 191-92) defines the essence of the feudal economic system by emphasizing the relations of production and the form of exploitation:

⁴⁶ See: Lenin (1899).

⁴⁷ For another emphasis on feudal corporations, see Bookchin (2012, p. 49).

The essence of the economic system of those days was that the entire land of a given unit of agrarian economy, i.e., of a given estate, was divided into the lord's and the peasants' land; the latter was distributed in allotments among the peasants, who (receiving other means of production in addition, as for example, timber, sometimes cattle, etc.) cultivated it with their own labour and their own implements, and obtained their livelihood from it. The product of this peasants' labour constituted the necessary product, to employ the terminology of theoretical political economy; necessary—for the peasants in providing them with means of subsistence, and for the landlord in providing him with hands; in exactly the same way as the product which replaces the variable part of the value of capital is a necessary product in capitalist society. The peasants' surplus labour, on the other hand, consisted in their cultivation, with the same implements, of the landlord's land; the product of that labour went to the landlord. Hence, the surplus labour was separated then in space from the necessary labour: for the landlord they cultivated his land, for themselves their allotments; for the landlord they worked some days of the week and for themselves others. The peasant's allotment in this economy served, as it were, as wages in kind (to express oneself in modern terms), or as a means of providing the landlord with hands. The peasants' "own" farming of their allotments was a condition of the land-lord economy, and its purpose was to "provide" not the peasant with means of livelihood but the landlord with hands.

Lenin (1977, pp. 192-93) summarizes the main characteristics of the feudal social formation on four points: (i) a self-sufficient natural economy prevails in feudal society and the feudal estate has a very weak relationship with the outside world, (ii) as an extension of such an economic structure, direct producers generally have direct access to the means of production and partly to the land, so the dominance of the landlords is based on the attachment of the producers to the land, (iii) the condition of existence of the feudal economy is dependent on the personal bondage of the direct producers to the landlords, and therefore non-economic pressure is the constituent element of the system, (iv) lastly, the distinctive characteristic of the feudal economic system is the very low level of technical development, the degraded agricultural production due to poverty, personal dependence and ignorance. It seems that Lenin's formulation is based on a fairly general description of the economic model and relations of political dependence. In addition, since Lenin's focus was on the study of the pre-capitalist land regime in

Russia, it would not be wrong to think that he made an abstraction by centered on Russian serfdom. Luxemburg, on the other hand, defines feudalism, partially following Kautsky, by focusing on its economic characteristics and the transition process to commodity economy. According to him, feudalism is characterized by serfdom in the rural areas and the guild system in the cities (Luxemburg, 2003, p. 348). Luxemburg emphasizes that the capitalist mode of production necessarily spread by dissolving non-capitalist economic and social structures in its historical development, and within this framework, she evaluates the feudal economy as a natural economy system. According to Luxemburg (2003, p. 349), the defining characteristics of natural economy systems are: (i) they are developed according to the domestic demand of the community and therefore there is little or no demand for foreign goods, (ii) there is either no surplus production or there is no urgent necessity to use/dispose the surplus production. In this respect, all natural forms of economy, including feudalism, are characterized by a clear dependence between the means of production and labor, and in this respect there is no great difference between the formation of the village commune and the structure of feudalism (Luxemburg, 2003, p. 349); “The communist peasant community no less than the feudal corvée form, and similar institutions maintain their economic organization by subjecting the labor power, and the most important means of production, the land, the rule of law, and custom”. In conclusion, Luxemburg finds the defining element of feudal relations in the countryside in the arrangement of the egalitarian village community within serfdom, and underlines that both forms are, in the final analysis, self-sufficient natural forms of economy.⁴⁸

It is possible to follow Bukharin’s views primarily from a series of works he wrote in the 1920s and finally from his long text, *Philosophical Arabesques*, which he wrote while he was in prison in 1937. First of all, Bukharin defines the structure of feudal economy in this late text in a very similar way to Lenin. According to Bukharin (2005, p. 257), feudalism is a natural economic order with low development rates, a stagnant technological level, and as an extension of these, a hardened mentality under

⁴⁸ While it is impossible to claim that Luxemburg made an advanced analysis of the political structure of feudalism, there are some propositions scattered among her various works. For example, Luxemburg (1977, p. 83) uses both the terms natural economy and feudal-anarchy for the feudal period in her doctoral dissertation (1898), an early text on the industrialization process in Poland.

the domination of theological-dogmatism.⁴⁹ In this social order, the dominant organizational model of the economy, political relations and ideology is the unchanging hierarchy of social positions (Bucharin, 1983, p. 287). Bukharin's particular emphasis is on the problem of analyzing religious dogmatism as the ideological superstructure of feudalism. Bukharin, who argues that the official religion in general reflects the thoughts of the ruling classes, specifically argues that the theological way of thinking is a result of feudalism, that is, religious dogmatism is an extension of the material organization of social relations (Bucharin, 1983, p. 214; Bukharin, 2005, p. 258). The material basis of this relationship is further deepened in the close relationship between the church and the feudal state of the landowners (Bukharin & Preobrazhensky, 1922, p. 249). Finally, Bukharin (2005, p. 232) argues that feudalism is a universal social form and underlines that all its examples have a common character in essence. On the other hand, he emphasizes that the "nomadic feudalism" seen in the Mongols or the Russian feudalism has some unique characteristics when compared with the Western examples (Bukharin, 2005, p. 232). Furthermore, similar to Bogdanoff, the author, who claims that a kind of feudalism was seen in the ancient Greek society, mentions that feudalism in ancient Egypt gave an advanced example (Bucharin, 1983, pp. 218, 268).

This debate has come to the fore as an extension of the discussions within the CPSU about the conditions for the Chinese revolution to mature since 1927 and what strategy to follow for the future of the revolutionary movement. In the discussion, some of which was published in Pravda and put forward with a series of polemics, the group led by Stalin and Bukharin argues that the dominant mode of production in China is the feudal mode of production and that the Chinese revolution must first develop as a national democratic revolution. Due to this thesis, it is argued that the conditions for the direct transition to socialism under the leadership of the working class in China -unlike Tsarist Russia- did not occur. On the other hand, L. Trotsky and his circle, who oppose the views of Stalin and Bukharin, are of the opinion that the bourgeois revolution has taken place in China, that the socialist revolution can solve the land problem, and that the feudal ties are either absent or not as strong as exaggerated. Also noteworthy is

⁴⁹ But Bukharin, unlike Lenin, states that no economic model can be completely natural (Bukharin, 2005, p. 257) and he defines feudalism as a semi-natural economic model (Bucharin, 1983, p. 220).

Radek's ([1926] 2021, pp. 215-16, 219-220) view that modern China's social structure cannot be explained in terms of the feudal mode of production alone.⁵⁰

Another important figure who participated in the feudal mode of production debate within Marxist theory is Mao Tse-tung. In a series of reviews and reports written by Mao, he touches upon the characteristics of the feudal mode of production in Chinese history and formulates its original elements. Mao Tse-tung (1994a, pp. 303-4), on the other hand, describes the landowning class in China as feudal, but states that this class is an extension of the international bourgeoisie together with China's comprador bourgeoisie, and that its main bases lie in the imperialist powers. This description points to a commodity economy that develops depending on the capitalist mode of production rather than the feudal mode of production, and thus to the typology of powerful landowners rather than feudal lords. For example, in Mao's (Tse-tung, 1994c, p. 448) *Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan*, he mentions the means of struggle used by the peasant struggle against feudal landlords as blocking the grain transportation out of the region and increasing grain prices, and also stating that the landlords are engaged in usury- shows that this 'feudal class' should be evaluated within the commodity economy. On the other hand, Mao uses the term "patriarchal-feudal class" when talking about the feudal class in his 1927 reports. If Mao's reports on Hunan province are examined, an uncertainty about the theoretical content of the term feudalism would be revealed -it is because of the arguments that the dominance of the feudal class was established thousands of years ago (Tse-tung, 1994b, p. 426; 1994c, p.431; 1994d, p. 473) and that the feudal class continued the "old feudal order" (1994c, p. 433).⁵¹ However, the fact that local landowners created a semi-autonomous dominance area defined as "local monarchies" (monopoly over military, financial and judicial organization) in *du* and *tuan*, which are rural administrative units in China, strengthens Mao's emphasis on feudal character (Tse-tung, 1994c, p. 449). If Mao's analysis of the authority structure in Chinese society examined in general frame, it is seen that -with some important differences- he put forward a quaternary structure similar to Western feudalism. According to Mao, an ordinary man in China is controlled by an authority

⁵⁰ For texts where the development of the debate can be examined, see: Stalin (1977) and Trotsky (2014). For a summary of this discussion, see Dirlik (1989, pp. 69-94; 2005, pp. 49-51).

⁵¹ In fact, a similar ambiguity is found in the Kuomintang Marxists' interpretation of history. See Dirlik (1989, p. 96) for the thesis that the feudal system in China has disappeared since at least the period (end) of the Zhou (13th-8th centuries BC), but the feudal powers continued to exist in the political superstructure until the 20th century.

complex consisting of three rings and a woman of four. This complex (Tse-tung, 1994c, pp. 452-53): (i) system of state authority (political authority) extending from towns to regions and provinces, (ii) clan authority system extending from the central ancestral temple to the head of the household, (iii) King of Hell' from the lower world to the village and town gods, and the celestial world from the Heavenly Emperor to various gods and spirits, that is, the religious authority systematic. For women, in addition to these, authority based on male dominance. Mao argues that all this constitutes the patriarchal-feudal ideological system and that the basic basis of all is the political authority of the landlords (Tse-tung, 1994c, p. 453). In a later text translated under the title *How to Analyze Classes* (1933), Mao described the characteristics of the feudal landlord class as follows (Tse-tung, 1997e, pp. 546-47):

A landlord is a person who owns land (no matter how much), does not engage in labor himself, or does so only to a very small extent, and lives entirely by exploitation. The collection of land rent (including the collection of rent from school land) is his main mode of exploitation of the peasants; in addition, he may also lend money, hire labor, or engage in industry or commerce. But his exaction of land rent from the peasants is his principal form of exploitation. The administration of ancestral temples is also a type of exploitation through land rent. (...) Warlords, bureaucrats, local bullies, and bad gentry are the political representatives of the landlord class and are particularly ferocious elements among the landlords. (...) Those who rely solely or in large part on exploitation by usury for their livelihood are called usurers. Although these people are not landlords, usury is feudal exploitation.

Mao's way of describing the feudal landlords shows that this class is mainly based on land rent and the exploitation of peasant labor, but with the development of commodity economy, the surplus obtained from land rent can also be channeled into financial instruments, wage labor, industrial production or trade. This theoretical position is in line with the theories of other communist writers such as Zhu Qihua (Zhu Peiwo) and Li Lisan, who generally explain Chinese society in accordance with the concept of feudalism characterized by non-economic exploitation relations but emphasize the difference of Chinese social structure from European feudalism in general (Dirlik, 2005, p. 56). For example, while Zhu Peiwo analyzes the feudal character of Chinese society, he places drudgery, tribute obligations, the use of force by landlords on peasants, and social status distinctions (Dirlik, 2005, p. 59).

The work of another Chinese Marxist, Tao Xisheng, also offers a model of feudalism worth mentioning. Xisheng (1930, p. 49) gives the following general definition of feudalism in his work named *Getning lilunde jichu zhishi* (Basic Knowledge of Revolutionary Theory) (cited in Dirlik, 1996, p. 237):

The feudal system is founded upon agriculture and handicrafts conducted within the boundaries of the local community [difang gongtongtil]. A single village or a number of villages constituted the local community which possessed in common forest and pasture land, water resources, and arable land. In this local community, the common land and the fields which were distributed among the peasant households provided the necessities of life; for instance, the fields, hunting and fishing, and domestic animals (provided the necessities for consumption) while materials such as timber and sheep wool provided the raw materials for household industries. This kind of local community was ordinarily a self-sufficient economic organism and had little economic interchange with the outside world. The local lord nurtured within the community awe for his powers. The king was only an elevated lord and did not have the power to subject other lords to his will; hence the feudal state had an extremely loose organization.

Xisheng's formulation of feudalism directly references medieval European feudalism and therefore argues that Chinese feudalism largely disintegrated around the 5th century B.C. -the natural economic structure deteriorated and commodity economy emerged (Dirlik, 1996, pp. 237-38). According to Xisheng, the emergence of the central empire structure in China resulted in the concentration of political power in the hands of the central state and therefore bureaucrats, unlike feudalism, although the economic power remained in the hands of local landowners and merchants (Dirlik, 1996, p. 238).

The actual debate over the Chinese revolution is, as it concerns, on the one hand, the future of the Chinese communist movement - as well as the future of the power struggle between the Stalinist and Trotskyist camps in the Soviet Union is in the another. On the other hand, this discussion reveals new themes - and academic research topics- in terms of the stages of the transition to socialism and the formulation of the social formations of non-Western societies. The fact that the AMP debate has come to the fore again, especially since the mid-20s, in order to examine the history of the societies of China, Egypt, Iran and the Middle East, is the first result of this discussion. The AMP debate that developed within this framework will not be mentioned again as it will be discussed in the next section. But there is a part of this discussion that concerns

feudalism. The thesis of the *Aziatchiki* group led by J. Varga that there is no FMP exist in China was completely rejected at the ECCI (Executive Committee of the Communist International) meetings in Tbilisi, Baku and Leningrad (1930-1931) - and ECCI decided that despite the other alternatives kind of an Asiatic variation of feudalism is a basis of social formation of China (Mommen, 2011, p. 93). In the final analysis, the decision taken by ECCI imposes that there are different variations of feudalism on a world scale, and one of them should be defined as “peculiar feudalism in the Orient” as seen in the example of China (Mommen, 2011, pp. 93-4). As a result of this decision, at the end of the 1930s, the Soviet official ideology would be shaped around the Stalinist five-phase theory, many third world countries would be characterized as feudal, and semi-feudal or primitive/pre-feudal, central-feudal, etc. concepts will be introduced more. Ottoman historiography is not exempt from such conceptualizations. Before moving on to the official Soviet theory of the feudal mode of production and its sub-interpretations, it is necessary to mention two important contributions to the theory of feudalism in the 1920s. While the first of these contributions was made by A. V. Chayanov, who conducted theoretical research on peasant economy and developed quantitative models, the second belongs to B. Y. Vladimirtsov, who is famous for her studies on Mongolian history and the sociological structure of steppe communities.⁵²

First of all, to start with Chayanov, it is seen that Chayanov’s works are particularly focused on the organization of the peasant economy and the model of cooperatives. On the other hand, his 1924 text, *Zur Frage einer Theorie der nichtkapitalistischen Wirtschaftssysteme*, in which he makes some suggestions about the structure of the feudal mode of production, provides enough examples to understand Chayanov’s arguments on the subject. It should be noted that although Chayanov uses Marxist concepts and terms, he cannot be considered a Marxist directly, and he was criticized by his contemporaries as using the Austrian marginalist school’s economic analysis method instead of Marxist methodology (Kerblay, 1966, p. lxix). In particular, the aforementioned critique on Chayanov seems to have categorized the author as a

⁵² In fact, a third contribution was made by S. I. Kovalyov (Kovalev). In Kovalyov's work *Курс всеобщей истории* (1925), it was described as a feudal social structure dominated by noble landowners for a period until the rise of the city-state of Athens in ancient Greece (Nalçacı & Çalış, 2020, p. 45). However, since we could not reach either the original study or a translation of it, it is not possible for us to deal with these early theses of Kovalyov. In their later works, Diakov & Kovalev (2017, p. 78) openly reject the theories of ‘ancient Greek feudalism’ or ‘ancient oriental feudalism’ put forward by historians such as E. Meyer, J. H. Breasted, L. Delaportes, E. Drioton and J. Vandier.

neopopulist, not a Marxist (Harrison, 1976, p. 390 et al.). On the other hand, it should be pointed out that this criticism directed at Chayanov has controversial aspects. Chayanov touches on anomalies of both the neoclassical and Marxist approaches (Durrenberger, 1980, p. 133). There is also a reasonable view that Chayanov's thought—consciously or not—is located within the Marxist tradition that followed Engels' historical analysis (Banaji, 1976, p. 1595). The main contribution of Chayanov is that the feudal economy, in the last analysis, frequently emerged as a universal form on a world scale, and he explained this economic form by centered on the articulation of a two-step network of economic relations. Chayanov's basic premise proposes that feudalism is a kind of symbiosis of two economic models; While the first of these models is 'peasant economy', the second is formulated as 'landlord economy'. The first of these economic levels is the natural economy organized by families, and it is possible to talk about exploitation in the form of self-exploitation (Chayanov, 1966, p. 6) within this economic model. On the other hand, the articulation of family production, which is the dominant form of natural economy, with the fief system -that is, with the political and economic relations network dominated by the rentier ruling class- reveals the feudal mode of production and makes it possible to realize feudal exploitation (Chayanov, 1966, p. 21). In this context, the payment of rent by peasant families to feudal lords in the form of tribute - in the form of economic rent or serf rent - and the realization of this rent as commodities in distant markets constitute the essence of the feudal system (Chayanov, 1966, p. 21). This new approach bears some resemblance to Bogdanoff's division of economic history into natural and commodity economics, or rather, it combines these two forms, treating feudalism as a kind of transitional form with specific limitations. Such a conceptualization offers an important starting point for the establishment and development of feudal structures in non-European regions. According to Thorner's (1966, p. xxii) interpretation, Chayanov's theory of feudalism explains the different variants of feudalism, systematically distinguishing between the model of the Russian peasant who worked on his own land and paid tribute to the feudal lord, and the European peasant who paid the necessary payments through drudgery by working directly on the lord's land. In addition, Chayanov's emphasis on the feudal ruling class marketing the products they seized through rent has the power to explain the economic mechanism that enabled landlords in China and *timar* holders in the Ottoman Empire to maintain their dominant social positions.

Secondly, I will summarize the arguments formulated by B. Y. Vladimirtsov on Mongolian social structure and nomadic feudalism. The author developed his main propositions primarily in the Genghis Khan monograph published in 1922, but he revised them in another study titled as *Общественный строй монголов. Монгольский кочевой феодализм* (*Le régime social des Mongols : Le féodalisme nomade*) which published in 1934 (Inan, 1995, p. VIII). For this reason, the theory of nomadic feudalism will be briefly discussed by centering this work, which was published after his death. Vladimirtsov's conceptualization of nomadic/steppe feudalism is based on four basic features; (i) development of private property, (ii) existence of steppe aristocracy, (iii) establishment of seignorial rights and dependency, (iv) existence of seignorial taxation and economic privileges. Vladimirtsov (1995, pp. 60, 71, 73-4, 92, 132) states that the Mongolian tribes first consisted of communities organized within the framework of natural economy, on the other hand, integrated communities organized around rich herd owners and social differentiation emerged from the 11th century and finally, he argues that this feudalization process reached its most developed stage with the 14th century. In this framework, steppe aristocracy was formed in Mongolian society, and these militarily skilled and wealthy people were gaining dominance by force (Vladimirtsov, 1995, p. 114-15). Thus, the Mongolian tribe (*obox*) structure was divided into various classes and layers and developed as follows (Vladimirtsov, 1995, p. 108); The tribes are divided into three strata as the ruling lineage, the invariable vassals (*unagan bogol*) and the servants (*ötüle bogol*), and these strata are divided into two classes as *noyad* (dominant lineage and wealthy vassals) and *xaracu* (small vassals and servants). The *ulus*, that is, the owned-people, which is subject to a leader called Haan, *raya*, *taysi*, *baatur* etc. and considered his property, is distributed by the leader as *beneficium* to his family and helpful men or warriors (Vladimirtsov, 1995, p. 147-49). This division consisted primarily of the members of the dominant lineage/dynasty, then the members of the steppe aristocracy, and then the *nökers* and the *Noyans*. In this framework, the *nökers* also receive kind of *timar* and hunting ground in return for their military services, and they are held responsible for recruiting a soldier of the size of their *Len* (*ayil/timar*) and serving their lords (Vladimirtsov, 1995, pp. 155-56). The size of these properties is determined according to the amount of *ayil* and *cerig* (herd/house/*oba* and soldier) (Vladimirtsov, 1995, p. 154). As a result, a feudal hierarchy is formed around the obligation to recruit soldiers and *ayil* ownership from the emperor to an ordinary captain, and it is schematized as follows (Vladimirtsov, 1995, p. 158): *Xagan* (emperor)-

köbegün (shehzades/princes)-*noyan* (*mukataa*/ulus-owner, division chief, major, captain etc.). Between the XV. and XVII. Century, feudalism developed among the Mongols and leap into a new phase. In this phase, it is seen that feudal relations deepened and became widespread and revealed the feudal fragmentation. Vladimirtsov (1995, p. 182) states that after the death of Genghis Khan, the empire was divided into several unequal parts –feudal unions– and even in China, the Genghis dynasty princes established semi-independent small kingdoms. According to him, the Mongols had turned into a “typical feudal state” -as an union of feudal lords- already in the second half of the 12th century, and the period of feudal wars had begun (Vladimirtsov, 1995, pp. 183, 191).

Following the alternative feudalism theories developed in the Marxist literature in the 1920s, it is also necessary to consider the propositions of the Soviet ideology on feudalism, which became the official view in the 1930s and were schematized in this way. In addition, it is necessary to mention the feudal mode of production debate, which was formulated in the framework of the studies on the transition from feudalism to capitalism. First of all, I will deal with M. Dobb’s monograph published in 1946, which studies the development of capitalism -and hence the dissolution of feudalism-, and the debates on this monograph. In this context, the discussion on feudalism will be briefly summarized, which was published in a different series of journals from 1950 to 1962 and in which a number of Marxist historians and economists such as P. Sweezy, K. Takahashi, R. Hilton participated. Secondly, in the 1960s, studies detailing the Soviet official view and partially transferring it to popular literature became widespread. In this framework, firstly, V. Kerov’s theses as expressed in a kind of pedagogical handbook about pre-capitalist societies, and secondly, Agibalova and Donskoy’s analysis of feudalism, which was written for Soviet schools and constitutes an example of the official historical narrative will be summarized. Thirdly, the analyzes of W. Kula, who carried out an in-depth study on the theoretical modeling of Soviet feudalism theory, and finally, the comments of B. Moore Jr. and P. Anderson, who reconsidered Soviet theses within the neo-Marxist approach and came to a similar conclusion with partial criticisms. In addition to these, we will briefly touch upon the views of Semenov, Kolesnitky and Fan Wen-lan, who, while agreeing with the official Soviet view on the theory of feudalism, claim to provide partial answers to some of the problems they encountered in the concrete analysis phase.

According to Dobb (1946, p. 35), feudalism is a social system based on serfdom, which imposes obligations that can take the form of services or taxes directly to producers in order to meet the economic demands of the overlord. According to him, although this social system generally produces to meet the direct needs of the households or village community, serfdom and natural economy are not elements that can be directly integrated (Dobb, 1946, p. 37). According to Dobb (1946, p. 37), the 'classical' form of feudalism, or the zenith of its development -although not necessarily limited to this element- the establishment of the demesne-farming and the organization of forced labor of the serfs on the landlord's land. The dependent-labor status of direct producers that characterizes feudalism is complemented by the political decentralization of the political system. The lands are conditionally handed over to the feudal lords in the form of service-tenure, and the feudal lords assume judicial or quasi-judicial functions on the dependent people (Dobb, 1946, p. 37). Dobb points out that feudalism should take place directly in the relationship between the producer and the lord. For this reason (for example, in his reply to Sweezy's criticisms at a later date) he reemphasizes that the coercive relationship in the direct appropriation of surplus labor by the ruling class, which he sees as the founding principle of feudalism, is conditioned by a certain level of development of the productive forces (Dobb, [1950] 1984, p. 61).

Sweezy radically opposes the evaluation of serfdom as the founding element of feudalism. According to Sweezy ([1950] 1984, p. 32), it is completely incorrect to use serfdom as a synonym for feudalism as it can occur in social systems other than feudalism and even in different economic organizations. For this reason, Dobb's definition of serfdom is too general to be applied to concrete conditions and refers to a set of social systems based only on serfdom (Sweezy, 1984, p. 33). Moreover, Dobb's focus on the example of Western Europe while developing his own analysis greatly invalidates the applicability of this example for different parts of the world, and even requires the correction of his term "classical form" to apply only to Western Europe (Sweezy, 1984, p. 34). Sweezy's critique of the servage-centered interpretation is followed by the author's own alternative reading, which he claims to more or less replace the labor-centered interpretation with the circulation-centered interpretation. According to Sweezy (1984, p. 34), although feudalism is framed by serfdom and a land system organized around the manor of the feudal lord, the main distinguishing feature that defines it is the production made 'for use'. This situation does not require feudalism

to be a kind of natural economy and does not justify denying the existence of monetary circulation completely (Sweezy, 1984, p. 34).

On the other hand, Takahashi argues that focusing on the social position of serfs is an indispensable determinant for defining the feudal mode of production. According to him, the positioning of peasants as serfs deprived of freedom constitutes the original mode of existence of the workforce, which determines the feudal mode of production (Takahashi, [1954] 1984, p. 74). Although the quality of serfdom varies according to the characteristics of the region where the feudal mode of production is dominant or the stages of feudal economic development, serfdom maintains its categorical importance. In this context, Takahashi (1984, p. 77) evaluates the historical relationships intertwined between the land belonging to the family (*Hufe/virgate/manse*), the village community (*communitate rurale*) and the seigneurie (*Grundherrschaft*) in the basis of the feudal system. Takahashi (1984, p. 78, footnote 15) states that the elements necessary for the livelihood of the person and his family consist of a piece of land (*Hof*) with a house built on *Hufe*, a main arable parcel (*Flur*) and a share of common land (*Allmende*). In this sense, the fact that the general form of *Hufe* is subject to collective-communal regulations creates a pressure element in the continuation of the labor process (Takahashi, 1984, p. 78, footnote 15). On the other hand, *Hufe*'s suitability for private property and the development of productivity arising from private property led to dominance over people and land, and thus the private property of the feudal lord on land developed (Takahashi, 1984, p. 78, footnote 15). In the final analysis, as the dominance of the feudal lord takes over the village community and *Hufe*, the manor rules operate within these two, and the mutual relations of these three become feudal relations in particular (Takahashi, 1984, p. 78, footnote 15). Just as *Hufe* became a peasant farm (*Besitz, tenure*) under feudal land ownership, traditional communal arrangements became means of realizing feudal rent and securing labor (bonding the peasant to the land) (Takahashi, 1984, p. 78, footnote 15). In this case, the peasant's labor process was integrated with the rent formation process, both of which constituted the feudal production process (Takahashi, 1984, p. 78, footnote 15). In this context, it is seen that Takahashi attributes the emergence of the feudal mode of production to the development of structural features inherent in the communal society. In formulating the concept of the feudal mode of production, Hilton focuses on the tendencies of historical subjects in general and classes in particular, rather than structural features. According to Hilton ([1953] 1984, p. 123), the essence of the feudal mode of production is that the owners

of the means of production, the landlords, constantly try to appropriate for their own use all the surplus product produced by the direct producers. In this framework, the social status of direct producers and the character of exploitation may vary in accordance with the developmental stages of feudalism (Hilton, 1984, p. 123). These qualities can be seen in the first of the variants in the establishment of feudalism in England by the military aristocracy. According to the author, the military aristocracy, which still remained semi-tribal in England before the invasion of the Danes, struggled to convert the tax paid by the peasants to the tribal king into feudal rent and to colonize the uncultivated areas by slaves or semi-free people (Hilton, 1984, p. 123). In addition, it is seen that some big peasant families -as Takahashi emphasizes- became stronger after tribal communities collapsed and they structured nobility based on rent (Hilton, 1984, p. 123). The second form that Hilton (1984, p. 123-24) emphasizes is suitable for Italy and Western and Southern Gaul, and it is about the gradual transformation of slave-working *latifundia* into serf-working mansions by the Roman nobility residing in these regions. This second form was also adopted by the Germanic communities such as the Burgundians and the Visigoths, who gradually fused with the Roman nobility, and in the final analysis, servage and rent relations emerged in this manner.

The schematic nature of the feudal mode of production debate reached its peak in the 1960s, in parallel with the emergence of the AMP debate. The reorganization of the works of V. N. Diakov and S. I. Kovalev in the 1920s within the framework of official Marxism and their publication in French (*Histoire de l'antiquité*, 1959) can be considered as one of the first steps in this process. V. Kerov's analysis of feudal society in *Aperçu d'histoire et d'économie (Tome 1. La communauté primitive, la société esclavagiste, la société féodale)* (1960) was a detailed exposition of the Soviet official view applied to the scale of world history. For this reason, it has been accepted as a textbook in different parts of the world and has become one of the reference texts of socialist political struggles. Another textbook written by Y. Agibalova and G. Donskoy, published in 1978 and which won the State Prize in the Soviet Union, largely repeats V. Kerov's arguments in this regard, showing the long-term power of the official analysis of feudalism. For this reason, I will summarize the analyzes of Kerov, Diakov & Kovalev and Agibalova & Donskoy comparatively. In his analysis, Kerov gives the essence of FMP and social formation within the framework of a short definition that does not have very sharp lines, and applies it to regions such as Western Europe, Arabia, Japan, India, China, Russia and Africa based on this definition. Similarly, Agibalova

and Donskoy apply the concept of FMP from Western Europe to the Ottoman Empire, from Slavic communities to the Middle East and North African societies, and to the examples of the Byzantine Empire, China and India.

Kerov's model is generally based on the thesis that feudalism has stages of birth, development and dissolution. Kerov argues that the 'birth phase' coincides with the dissolution of the slave-owning social formation for some societies and the dissolution phase coincides with the development of capitalism, but he also accepts the possibility of a direct transition from the primitive communal society. He states that religious structures such as church/monastery etc. constitute the main ideological basis of feudalism and deals with the structure of the FMP based on appropriation of rent. It is understood that Agibalova and Donskoy also accepted the same birth-development-dissolving scheme and completed this scheme with the land regime and ideological institutions. However, it is possible to say that these two researchers elaborated more on the forms of transition to feudal society. This modeling is generally included in the feudalism theory that developed by Bogdanoff/Lenin/Bukharin/Stalin, but it expands towards new analysis objects such as Africa, India and Arabia.⁵³ According to Kerov (1989, p. 146), the defining feature of the FMP is determined as (i) the monopoly of the feudal lords over the primary means of production, land and tools, (ii) the direct producers (peasants) are subject to the lords in personal dependence relations, and (iii) through this extra-economic pressure, a lord can compel the peasants to work for his own interests. For this reason, feudal loyalty develops as a dependence on the legal and administrative power of the lord and makes non-economic forms of oppression the characteristic feature of the FMP (Kerov, 1989, p. 136). Kerov (1989, p. 134) states that the need to pay rent to lords is the objective reason for production in FMP, and this need is limited to the personal and family needs of the lord and the needs of the servants. In addition, meeting the vital needs of the villagers and craftsmen was a necessity for the continuation of production (Kerov, 1989, p. 134). In this framework, the surplus product appropriated by the lords constitutes the feudal rent and is a function of the monopoly of the feudal lords on land ownership (Kerov, 1989, p. 134). The division of society between peasant and artisanal producers and feudal landowners constitutes the antagonistic conflict of the feudal social formation (Kerov, 1989, p. 138). The emergence of this conflict over land rent can take the form of drudgery, rent-in-kind and money-rent (Kerov, 1989, p. 135). The product produced within the feudal enterprise is

⁵³ Also in this context, see: Manfred (1974) and Yeliseyeva (2014).

divided into three parts: (i) the product appropriated as rent by the lord, (ii) used for the subsistence of the peasant family, and (iii) surplus from the subsistence minimum, the first part constitutes surplus-product and the last two parts are the necessary-products (Kerov, 1989, p. 134). In this case, the labor of the peasant is divided into two as necessary-labor and surplus-labor, and the ratio of surplus-labor to necessary-labor gives the exploitation rate (Kerov, 1989, p. 134). Finally, according to Kerov, the domination structure of feudalism is legitimized by religious ideology. While the Catholic Church was the carrier of religious ideology in the European example, Islam in the Middle East and Buddhism in the Far East developed to justify social inequalities (Kerov, 1989, pp. 181-83).⁵⁴ Agibalova and Donskoy's theory of feudalism is formulated around emphasizing the difference between the FMP and the slave-owning mode of production. They state that there are two basic ways of transition to feudalism, first of that the Germans, Slavs and Arabs passed through the primitive communal society into the feudal system as a result of the economic differentiation of the nobles, secondly, that there was an example of transition from slavery exist in the lands dominated by the Roman Empire (Agibalova & Donskoy, 1988, pp. 72-73). In this context, the general characteristics of the FMP in the development phase are those: (i) a two-class structure consisting of feudal lords and dependent peasants, (ii) the peasants have partial control over their own products -unlike slaves, (iii) the dominant class do not have a complete political dominance over the peasants due to the structure of the peasant communities (Agibalova & Donskoy, 1988, p. 73). In addition, they argue that early-feudal states emerged as organizations that helped the nobility acquire land and convert the peasant masses into serfs (Agibalova & Donskoy, 1988, p. 74). In this respect, they accept that three state variants can exist in the feudal social formation: Both the early feudal state, the feudal fragmentation and the absolutist feudal state.⁵⁵ In addition, it would be meaningful to summarize the theses of Semenov and Kolesnitsky. Semenov (1985, p. 171) states that the mode of economic and social articulation in which small independent producers are exploited by the state is one of the early forms

⁵⁴ For a Marxist debate around whether Buddhism is an egalitarian response to social inequalities, see Sankrityayan (1998), Chattopadhyaya (1998), Balaramamoorthy (1998) and Sharma (1998).

⁵⁵ On the other hand, Diakov and Kovalev (2017, pp. 211, 228, 288, 290) focused on the effect of the slave-owning mode of production in the transition to the FMP, and in this context, they underlined the traces of the slave-owning mode of production in the history of the feudal relations developed in Western and Central Europe, China and India.

of feudalism. First of all, Semenov (1985, pp. 174-75) states that in the foundation of ancient Eastern societies—for example, Sumerian and Mycenaean societies—there were slaves, free farmers, and various intermediate forms between them, working both on state-owned lands and on private estates, and generally they could be defined dependent-producers. According to Semenov (1985, pp. 171-72) the power that held the position of ‘primitive feudal lord’ in the old East was usually the state, and they could maintain this relationship by transferring the right to collect taxes to a third party - and usually to the leading figures of the state. In this framework, in primitive feudalism, the surplus product produced by small producers was transferred to the state under the control of the state’s coercive apparatus, and for this reason, the state was not only the protector of the existing relations of production, but also an instrument of exploitation of the workers (Semenov, 1985, p. 172).⁵⁶

In this framework, the direct attachment of the mass of producers to the state through a systematic exploitative relationship is formulated with the concept of prefeudal social formation (Kolesnitski, 1985, p. 183). According to him, the lack of personal freedom of the peasant under feudalism was not absolute. On the contrary, the dependence of the peasant on the feudal lord could be limited by the conversion of taxes into money, and dependency to the seignorial courts in land and tax cases (Kolesnitski, 1985, p. 185). Kolesnitsky (1985, p. 186) defines the main features and possible variants of the feudal social formation as follows:

The main pillars of the feudal regime, namely that the land and the labor of the direct producers were the property of the exploiting classes, remained unchanged, only the owners changed; in some cases the proprietor was the state and the ruling class of exploiters who stood behind it, in other cases individuals who were bound among themselves by relations of dependency and subordination. Political relations and the forms of organization of the state were changing in according to this relations; Political fragmentation took place when the people were

⁵⁶ It is possible to see a similar interpretation in the Marxist interpretation of Chinese history. In the book titled *Zhongguo tongshi jianpian* (A Concise General History of China) (1947), edited by Fan Wen-lan, it is stated that in accordance with the centralization policy of the Qin dynasty, the Chinese social formation evolved from a decentralized feudalism to a centralized feudalism (Dirlik, 1996, p. 245). In this case, defining feudalism as a ‘decentralized’ structure as in the European example ceases to be a necessity, and the concept of ‘central feudalism’ is at least used to characterize feudal superstructures.

completely dependent on the feudal landlord, and the central political power was consolidated when exploited by the state.

Before moving on to the discussion of feudalism that developed within Marxism in the 1970s and afterwards, it is necessary to briefly mention another work, Witold Kula's *An Economic Theory of the Feudal System* (1962), which can be considered neither a complete repetition of the official feudalism theory nor an open critique of it. In this work, Kula did not break away from the main arguments of official Marxism, but examined the feudal economic unit as a kind of feudal enterprise, and the influence of neoclassicism, which is partly seen in Chayanov's studies, can be noticed in his analysis.⁵⁷ Kula (1976, p. 15-16) generally considers feudalism as a social system based on land ownership and personal dependency relations between direct producers and landlords. Moreover, he generally evaluates the feudal structure as a kind of natural economy based on small production units, in which exchange does not develop (Kula, 1976, p. 17). Kula put forward parallel arguments with the previously formulated theories of feudalism. But the point where he generally differs from other writers is quite critical (Kula, 1976, p. 17): In practice, the feudal society has a dynamic integrity that tries to increase its income, get a larger share from the distribution, and adapt to long-short circuit differences -and this integrity must be modeled in related to market mechanisms. Within this general structure, the special features that give the feudal economy its dominant character are discussed under the headings of (i) the size of the economic surplus and the laws governing its use, and (ii) the short- and long-term development form/model of the economic system (Kula, 1976, pp. 16-17).⁵⁸

From the second half of the nineteen-sixties, it is seen that neo-Marxist approaches have started to show interest in the feudalism debate. In this context, the evaluations of the authors -such as B. Moore Jr., P. Anderson, G. E. M. De Ste. Croix, C. Harman, E. M. Wood, N. Faulkner, etc.- on this subject are worth to be mentioned. These writers were explicitly or implicitly opposed to the acceptance of feudalism as a universal mode of production, as generalized by official Marxism, and its application to

⁵⁷ See especially footnote 56 (Kula, 1976, p. 62) and footnote 66 (Kula, 1976, p. 72).

⁵⁸ Specifically, the necessity of summarizing Kula's quantitative and qualitative modeling here is debatable, since our main purpose was to analyze the Ottoman social order, and we do not have the kind of feudal estate records in the Ottoman context that Kula was able to reach for Poland. Therefore, presenting Kula's basic propositions under headings should be considered sufficient for our thesis.

all parts of the world. On the other hand, it is seen that they do not openly accept the concept of AMP or Asiatic despotism. In this respect, it would not be irrelevant to claim that these writers -carefully- sought an original interpretation. On the other hand, in the same years, it is seen that another group of historians from Southeast Asia deepened their research within the framework of orthodox Marxist theses. Similarly, a series of theoretical studies published in 1975 and 1977 by B. Hindess and P. O. Hirst on pre-capitalist modes of production is noteworthy and it is possible to detect that they developed and defended the orthodox Marxist position.

B. Moore Jr.'s propositions on feudalism generally do not include an explicit critique of the official Marxist approach, but are situated outside it. While he evaluates Western European feudalism in a classical framework, he is very cautious about using the concepts of feudal mode of production and feudal society about the non-Western world. Moore Jr. ([1966] 1974, p. 8) lists the common characteristics seen everywhere feudalism developed around the world as follows: (i) the existence of private property in the land and (ii) the many types and numbers of obligations undertaken. Specifically, the feudal system that developed in Western Europe emerges as a system in which the feudal mastermind is cultivated by the peasants and the lord provides protection and justice to the peasants (Moore Jr., 1974, p. 419). In general, the lands are divided into three as demesne, commons and lands cultivated by the peasants on their own account, and the peasants cultivating these lands are tied to the land in accordance with the interests of the feudal lord (Moore Jr., 1974, p. 419). In this socio-economic structure, although people are able to meet their own needs locally, the market phenomenon - contrary to what is believed- has an important role from early times (Moore Jr., 1974, p. 419). Although it is highly doubtful to come across this system in the history of Russia and China, which is quite common in Western European history, he states that a very similar structure developed in Japan, and local similarities can be found in India very much (1974, p. 419). Moore Jr. also drew attention to the existence of alternatives in which feudal organization did not necessarily arise. Showing that in general autocratic/despotic regimes have developed as alternatives to feudalism, Moore Jr. theorized the development of these social systems as follows (1974, pp. 416-17):

Traditional despotisms may arise where a central authority is able to perform a variety of tasks or supervise activities essential to the working of the whole society. (...) On the other hand, there also seems to be a rather wider range of choice than was once supposed in the political level at which a society organizes the division of labor and the

maintenance of social cohesion. The peasant village, the feudal fief, or even a crude territorial bureaucracy may constitute the decisive level under generally similar agrarian technologies.

P. Anderson's two-volume work, first published in 1974, examining the transition from ancient society to feudalism and the rise of absolute monarchies in feudal society, is an significant reference work in terms of the way it handles the debate and brings new approach to the subject.⁵⁹ Anderson briefly defines feudalism as follows (1974, p. 19): Feudalism as a mode of production was originally defined by an organic unity of economy and polity, paradoxically distributed in a chain of parcellized sovereignties throughout the social formation. The institution of serfdom as a mechanism of surplus extraction fused economic exploitation and political legal coercion at the molecular level of the village. The land in his turn typically owed liege-loyalty and knight-service to seigneurial overlord, who claimed the land as his ultimate domain.

In another work of Anderson, in which he defines the feudal mode of production more broadly, he offers a more detailed model. According to this second model, which can be considered as the broader version of the above definition, the main characteristics of the feudal mode of production are as follows (Anderson, 2017, pp. 167-68); (i) the dominance of a natural form of economy in which labor or products of labor do not become commodities, (ii) the relationship of social dependence between the direct producer and the means of production (bondage or serfdom), (iii) land is not the property of the direct producers and controlled by the feudal class who appropriate the surplus by extra-economic coercion, (iv) exploitation is realized through drudgery, rent in kind, or taxes, (v) lord has the privilege of judgment, (vi) lord's dominance over land is not absolute (chain of vassalage relationships from small lords to king) (vii) political

⁵⁹ In fact, in the context of neo-Marxist pursuits, it would be appropriate to mention a series of studies written by E. Laclau in the late 1960s and early 70's before Anderson. Laclau put forward his first examination of the subject in his work *Feudalismo y capitalismo como categorías de análisis histórico : notas introductorias para un estudio histórico de la marginalidad en América Latina* (1968). Unfortunately, I could not find a copy of this work. On the other hand, the definition of feudalism is given very limitedly in the article of the same author named *Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America* published in *New Left Review* (no. 67) in 1971. Laclau (1977, p. 35) defines feudalism as a mode of production and lays it out under three main headings; (i) the labor has the obligation to work under economic coercion as the basis of the economic surplus, (ii) the economic surplus becomes the private property of someone else instead of the direct producer, (iii) the property which is the means of production remains directly in the hands of the producer. Since this definition is quite narrow, I did not need to give a section dedicated to Laclau's arguments.

sovereignty is not concentrated in a single center and sovereignty is parceled out within a hierarchy. Secondly, to establish a general model, Anderson argues that the characteristic development pattern of the feudal mode of production in Europe emerged in three different ways, depending on the internal structure of the Roman-Germanic synthesis. Following the theory of the Soviet historians A. D. Liublinskaya, E. V. Gutnova and Z. V. Udalcova on Western feudalism, Anderson (2017, pp. 176-77) discusses the tripartite formation as follows; (i) Northern France and adjoining areas as the core region of feudalism where the Romano-Germanic synthesis developed 'balanced', (ii) In Provence, Italy and Spain, the synthesis took place under the dominance of the ancient mode of production, (iii) In Germany, Scandinavia and England, since the influence of the Roman administration was very limited, the barbarian heritage was dominant and the transition to feudalism took place more slowly. Anderson's analysis indirectly suggests that classical feudal structures could not develop in lands outside the historical center where the Roman-Germanic synthesis developed in a balanced way. Anderson (2017, p. 300) frequently uses this argument when examining different historical cases, for example he asserted that the Byzantine-Slavic relationship did not reveal feudalism, the social structure in Eastern Europe, Ottoman and Russia did not directly overlap with classical feudalism, etc. On the other hand, Anderson argues that pre-capitalist Japanese society emerged as a feudal society that had some specifics but was essentially similar to Western European feudalism.

De Ste. Croix ([1981] 2014, pp. 341-42) argues that there are fundamental problems with the formulation and use of the term feudalism. The first of these problems is that the term feudalism is treated only as a 'system of administration' and its depth as an economic-social system is ignored (De Ste. Croix, 2014, pp. 341-42). On the other hand, he claims that the generality of the term FMP in the Marxist literature is insufficient to meet the specific variants of the phenomenon around the world. In this framework, De Ste. Croix (2014, p. 343) proposes the use of a more time-space-limited term such as 'Medieval Western European mode of production' instead of the term feudalism as a mode of production from which Western capitalism emerged. Secondly, Croix makes some criticisms about the content of the term feudalism. According to him, when the term feudalism is used, two basic phenomena are referred to, the first of which is the existence of a military-fief or similar relationship, and the second is the large-scale existence of serfdom (De Ste. Croix, 2017, pp. 341-42). He states that the first reference is partially acceptable, but states that serfdom cannot be accepted as a

universal phenomenon sufficient to define feudalism (De Ste. Croix, 2014, p. 341).⁶⁰ According to De Ste. Croix (2014, p. 342) serfdom existed in many other societies that were not similar to medieval Western societies. For example, although forms of serfdom emerged in the Hellenistic world, fief-like *katoikiai* lands (military-colonies, etc.) neither formed the dominant form of landed property nor did serfdom as a necessary bondage. Interestingly, although he seriously avoided proposing a new definition of feudalism, Croix also objected to limiting the phenomenon of feudalism to the history of Western Europe alone. The author, who deliberately avoids using the term feudalism in terms of ancient Western European history, acknowledges that there may be examples on the border of feudalism due to the central army organization of the Hittite society, which existed around the second millennium B.C., and the fact that the social differentiation was based on land assignment due to military service obligation (De Ste. Croix, 2014, p. 343).

It is surprising to see that C. Harman is quite reticent in using the term feudalism for societies that lived in different places and periods of world history. When Harman uses the term feudalism to denote a particular social structure, he is careful to limit it to the European Middle Ages. Although Harman (2017, pp. 62-63, 65-67) finds traces of ‘feudalism-like’ structures or ‘feudalization of society’ in his analysis of the 6th century Indian social structure and 11th century Chinese territory, he avoids using the concept of feudal mode of production directly. On the other hand, Harman (2017, pp. 158-59) claims that with the development of commodity economy in feudalism, an intermediate form called ‘market feudalism’ has emerged.⁶¹ In this context, the increase in the demand of feudal lords for city-origin goods led to the need for cash, so feudal production began to articulate with the market. Harman (2017, pp. 160-61) points out that this development transformed feudalism in two ways: (i) feudal lords multiply the surplus product they obtained by multiplying the obligations of the serfs, or (ii) they lease their properties to large peasant families in return for fixed rents and they allow them to exploit other landless peasants in return for rent. It is claimed that especially the

⁶⁰ Actually, this view is not new, and its origins have been discussed extensively by J. Banaji (Banaji, 2010, pp. 181-214). Going further back, it should not be overlooked that W. Barthold drew a feudalism scheme in which serfdom did not exist in his studies of the Islamic land regime (see: Barthold, 2013, pp. 52-53). For the passage in which Barthold considers the distribution of *timars* and *zeâmet*s in the Emirate of Bukhara as a kind of feudal system, see: Barthold (2004, p. 206).

⁶¹ To compare the concept of “commodity-feudalism”, see Banaji (2010, p. 82).

second option is effective in the transition towards capitalism for the lands located on the peripheries of the cities (Harman, 2017, p. 161).

Although E. M. Wood's approach to the phenomenon of feudalism does not go beyond the general framework as had summarized above, it includes two specific emphases. While Marxist approaches in general revert the origins of Western feudalism to the Roman-Germanic synthesis, Wood firmly rejects the partially ambiguous and eclectic meaning of the concept of 'synthesis'. According to Wood (2008, p. 165), the origins of the phenomenon of feudalism should not be sought in a synthesis and therefore in a historical break, but in the constantly changing Roman property forms. Wood (2008, p. 164) strongly argues that feudalism is not a phenomenon that came to Europe from outside, but cannot be based on a break with ancient societies based solely on a 'barbarian effect', and that this claim will ultimately lead to the Roman heritage being overlooked. The basis of this difference in Wood's approach lies in the fact that the reflections of European feudalism in the field of political thought were not created with reference to Germanic sources, on the contrary, there were systematic references to ancient Greek and Roman thought. Secondly, Wood emphasizes that in defining feudalism it is necessary to refer to the specific relationship of landlords and peasants. Wood (2008, pp. 167-68) argues that to define feudalism, it is not sufficient to refer only to a contractual relationship or merely to a rent-based form of agricultural exploitation. According to her, whether or not there is a vassal relationship, forms of taxation/exploitation/rent based on "parceled sovereignty" constitute the essence of feudalism (Wood, 2008, p. 168). In this framework, lords, who assume the functions and powers that the central state used to have, combine the exploitation of direct producers with public functions such as administration/judgment/sanctions (Wood, 2008, p. 168). In this framework, although the free person-slave distinction in the ancient world is disappearing, even free landowners are subject to seignorial domination and the master-slave relationship is replaced by a series of dependency relationships determined by the lords (Wood, 2008, p. 171-72).

In this context, I will summarize N. Faulkner's analysis of feudalism. Faulkner sees feudalism as a dynamic social system, and also partially combines some characteristic features of feudalism and the structure of tributary relations. According to Faulkner (2016, p. 124), feudalism differs from its counterparts because it is organized as a competitive military accumulation system. According to him, feudalism established a tight bond between the state and the ruling class by linking land ownership

and military service, and also secured the production base, since the maintenance of the status of the ruling class depended on the management of agricultural properties (Faulkner, 2016, p. 120). Moreover, within this framework, the feudal system is considered by Faulkner as a dynamic and unstable form of social organization rather than static one. Contrary to the general acceptance, serfdom has never become a universal element in the feudal system, for example, in medieval England, although peasants were still bound by feudal obligations, semi-dominion or free farming did not disappear (Faulkner, 2016, p. 124). Faulkner used the concept of feudalism for both European history and the Far East, but the detail that gives his analysis its unique character is the consideration of the transitions and articulations between feudalism and the tributary state. According to his analysis, two forms of tribute collection and land donation in return for military service coexist in the foundation of early ancient and medieval western societies (Faulkner, 2016, p. 119). In other words, an army that is attached to a central administrative structure and whose expenses are covered by tribute/taxes and a second army consisting of citizen militias or knight servitors and whose expenses are covered by land assignment coexist (Faulkner, 2016, p. 119). In this case, the balance between both military organizations could be critical in determining the consistency and stability of the administrative structure (Faulkner, 2016, p. 119). While the author does not make a clear distinction between tax/tribute/rent in theory, he rejects feudalism and tributary mode of production as two stereotypes separated by precise historical lines, and draws attention to the concrete historical relations and articulations between them.

The studies carried out by Hindess and Hirst since the mid-1970s and especially the theoretical discussion they conducted around the concept of feudal mode of production are worth mentioning. Hindess and Hirst formulate the concept of feudalism as a mode of production based on the specific relationship between the relations of production and productive forces, in which rent is appropriated through exploitation, which has various historical variants and conditions a certain state form. First, they argue that the founding principle of the FMP is that the relations of production have dominance over the productive forces, this dominance established in the non-economic sphere which determines the political and ideological relations, and finally that the production process is surrounded by a structure that cannot be separated from the appropriation of the surplus product (Hindess & Hirst, 1975, pp. 233-34). This dominance of the relations of production is directly related to the specific form of feudal

landed property and the use of force. If feudal landed property is considered first, this concept refers to (i) the existence of a certain class that owns the land (feudal landlord class), (ii) that class has a monopoly on the land, armed with political powers and titles and be equipped with an effective right of possession, (iii) advanced forms of appropriation of surplus-labor -such as forms of payment of the rent (Hindess & Hirst, 1975, pp. 234-35). The development of feudal landed property –in agricultural production where there is no generalized commodity production– brought about the ability of the landowner to exclude direct producers from the use of the land, and in this way compel direct producers to pay a rent for the cultivation of the land (Hindess & Hirst, 1975, pp. 235-36). When feudal relations of production are focused, the control of the landlords over the means of production and the rate of surplus production is determined by the class struggle between the direct producers, and within this framework, the rate and form of feudal rent is determined (Hindess & Hirst, 1975, p. 243). Hindess and Hirst (1975, pp. 223, 239-40) recognize three basic forms of feudal rent in terms of labor/product/money and that it can be shaped by the size of the amount of land controlled, re-tenancy, control of the means of production, and taxation. At this point, a debate arises about the status of direct producers and the categorical status of rent. Specifically, the position of serfdom in the feudal mode of production and the determination of the category of tax/tribute income constitute the central problem of this discussion. The dominant elements in the discussions of AMP and TMP, which will be discussed in the next section, can be identified as the central or dissolved position of the state in these modes of production and the fact that direct producers differ from the status of servage (free producers, slaves or village communes, etc.). In this framework, Hindess and Hirst specifically examine whether the distinctions between feudal rent and tax-rent forms have a direct impact on the mode of production debate. Hindess and Hirst (1975, p. 224) argue that the political context and status are decisive in the difference between feudal-rent and tax-rent – and therefore between AMP and FMP. This differentiation reveals in detail such as: The state is more organized in securing rights over the land compared to the feudal confederation, the relationship of the ruling class with the state organization (whether the state is made up of landlords or the landlords are representatives of state power), the fact that the direct producers are dependent on the landowner by personal relations or being dependent on the state, etc. (Hindess & Hirst, 1975, pp. 223-24). As can be understood from this general formulation, the situations in which the state is in a decisive position in the rent relationship are called

AMP, but Hindess and Hirst (1975, p. 224) state that there is no difference between tax-rent and feudal-rent in terms of category of exploitation when the rent relationship is taken into account. In accordance with this context (Hindess & Hirst, 1975, p. 224): “In both cases the subject faces a politically enforced deduction from his total product, a deduction which goes to an exploiter who pays no part as an agent in the process of production”. As a result, they state that the phenomenon under the concept of AMP is not essentially different from feudalism and they express it under the concept of “tax feudalism” - this system, which is based on the allocation of the revenues of a particular region to state officials, can also turn into feudal land ownership and vice versa (Hindess & Hirst, 1975, p. 225). On the other hand, Hindess and Hirst (1975, p. 225, 232) argue that the existence of feudal-rent in general does not directly require the existence of FMP, that the necessary condition for the existence of FMP is that the exploitative relationship takes place at the economic level as a constitutive element. Another notable extension of this thesis is about serfdom. Hindess and Hirst (1975, pp. 236-38) state that the relation of serfdom does not directly hinder the producer’s effective possession of the means of production, therefore serfdom does not belong to the economic level of the FMP and does not constitute an obligation to define the FMP. On the other hand, forms of tenancy based on communal control over the means of production are not considered within the FMP (Hindess & Hirst, 1975, pp. 243-44).

Finally, I will summarize the discussions on the existence and development of FMP in Indian history. The discussion of colonialism, feudalism and the transition from FMP to capitalism, carried out by Marxist or non-Marxist researchers in India, began to be acknowledged by Western academic circles in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In this context, a series of articles and criticism published in the *Economic and Political Weekly* magazine ensured the recognition of the debate. Researchers such as A. Rudra, A. Majid, B. D. Talib, R. S. Rao, U. Patnaik, P. Chattopadhyay, A. G. Frank, R. Sau, J. Banaji, H. Alavi, G. Omvedt, M. M. Mukhopadhyaya and P. H. Prashad have contributed to the development of this debate.⁶² In this discussion, the emphasis on the semi-feudal structure of the pre-capitalist Indian society gained importance despite the claims and criticisms to the contrary, and the function of the concept of “colonial mode of production” in explaining the existing complex relations in the analysis of the transition to capitalism was emphasized. On the other hand, the relative weakness of the historical details contained in this discussion on pre-capitalist Indian society is noticeable. In this

⁶² See: Patnaik (1990).

context, the fact that Indian historiography, which developed with the 1980s, began to have much more detailed information about the pre-capitalist Indian society, made it possible to reveal much more detailed analyzes on the development of feudal society in India. A series of studies in *Feudal Social Formation in Early India* (1987), compiled by D. N. Jha, succeeded in drawing a panorama that could form the basis for arguments developed on Indian society. First of all, the relationship between the establishment of feudalism in India and the Islamic conquests, which is included in classical Marxist analyzes, is largely denied in new studies. For example, Kosambi (1987, pp. 130, 143) identifies that feudalism began to emerge in Kashmir, which can be considered a backward region of India, long before the Islamic conquests, and on the basis of this, the effort to increase commodity production and finally the development of the nobility, which seized the surplus under coercion. Kosambi's approach partly echoes the idea of the co-development of commodity economy and exploitation based on personal relations in the late Roman Empire. A similar idea is also be found in the analyzes of Sharma and Yadava, although from a different position. Sharma (1987a, pp. 58-60) explains the emergence of feudalism in India as follows: (i) the Maurya-type bureaucracy became more difficult to finance due to difficulties in tax collection during the late third and fourth centuries, (ii) a dissolution that caused the population to migrate from the cities to the countryside, (iii) land endowments increased, and slave employment began to cease. The theme of the development of feudalism due to the disintegration in the central state/urban life/slave-owning mode of production and the development of land appropriation by the nobility more or less converges to the theoretical model of Western feudalism. In this analytical framework, the first phase of Indian feudalism is called the *sāmanta* system. Yadava (1987b, p. 199) states that the *sāmanta* system was institutionalized as a kind of "feudal complex" during the 6th and 7th centuries and developed through various transformations (for example, between the 10th and 11th centuries and after the 12th century). Yadava (1987b, p. 199) summarizes the main feature of this system as the prevalence of land assignments, the dissolution of the central authority, the development of the administrative structure based on actual domination and control over the land, and the development of lord-vassal relationship under various forms. Similarly, Nandi (1987, p. 240) attributes the development of feudalism, especially in the peninsula of India, to the emergence of warriors as landowners around the 6th and 7th centuries, and the development of fief relations through service tenants. Second, I will try to summarize Sharma and Yadava's analysis

of the structure of feudalism and the specifics of feudal society in Indian history. Sharma (1987b, pp. 166-67) states that feudalism should be seen as a unique “mode of distribution of the means of production” and a form of appropriation of the surplus product, and that although this general/universal framework remains constant, historical development with some local features. In this framework, the main features of feudalism are listed as (i) landowners’ appropriation of the surplus in some “extra-economic” ways, (ii) lord-peasant relationship essentially based on exploitation, and (iii) an agricultural economy based on class distinction (Sharma, 1987b, p. 167). Within this general framework, what makes the Indian FMP variant distinctive can be sought from the structure of the ruling class and direct producers. Sharma (1987b, pp. 167-68) states that landlords can be listed as monasteries, tribal chiefs or administrative officials who live on land taxes, and argues that although this looks partly different from the Western example, the landlord-peasant relationship preserves its feudal essence. Similarly, Yadava reveals a two-layered class structure with internal differentiation. According to Yadava (1987b, p. 199), the class structure of Indian feudalism consists of “the landed intermediaries” including the ruling landowner hierarchy and largely dependent peasants. On closer analysis, the ruling class consists of the feudal elite, priests, preachers, and monks, and by the 11th and 12th century landowners and “merchant princes” began to merge (Yadava, 1987b, p. 200). In terms of subordinated classes, some specificities of Indian feudalism can be mentioned. Sharma (1987b, pp. 168-69) argues that serfdom was not one of the founding elements of feudalism, and that servile relations were similarly common when peasants were crushed by heavy rents.

II.II.II.III. Analysis of Ottoman Social Structure under the Concept of Feudalism

In the Marxist literature, there were series of interpretations –especially written in the Soviet Union– emerged on the Ottoman social structure during the 1920s and 30s. It is seen that these sources are also evaluated in Turkey and some of them are reflected in the arguments of Şefik Hüsnü Değmer. The re-emergence of the concept of feudalism in the ‘land reform’ debates of the 1930s Turkey resulted in the term ‘feudalism’ attracting a wide range of attention from daily discussions to political texts and academic/semi-academic debates. Written in this context, I.H. Tökin’s *Türkiye Köy İktisadiyatı* (1934), H.A. Şanda’s works named *Reaya ve Köylü* (1941) should be mentioned. The discussion conducted by B. Boran about the feudal structure in Ottoman society was expanded with the comments of researchers such as K. Fişek, M. Kıray and

İ. Beşikçi. The extensions of the Ottoman social structure and feudalism debates seem to have emerged in the broadest sense in the 1970s. The fact that researchers such as M. Sencer, T. Timur, M. İ. Erdost and O. Oyan brought the subject to the academic agenda and the translations made from Soviet writers became decisive in shaping of theoretical framework. The publication of E. Werner's famous study as *Die Geburt einer Grossmacht – die Osmanen* in 1963, which was translated into Turkish albeit with a ten-year delay, can be counted as one of the factors that enriched the discussion. Although the interest in the subject could be considered to have faded partially during the 80s and 90s, the fact that H. Berktay had a very bright discussion on the subject shows that the feudalism debate was not completely left aside. The works of N. E. Keskin, B. Tezcan, S. Arslan, and A. Aytekin in the 2000s can be cited as prominent examples pointing to the current aspects of the debate. As far as I have tried to show above, the approach of the Ottoman social structure under the concepts of feudalism/feudal mode of production basically took place in three periods. The first period can be defined as the early period and lasts until the end of the 1950s. The second circuit opens in the 1960s and continues until the end of the 70s. The third period can be placed in the process that started after 1980 and continued till today.

Let's start by summarizing the arguments written in the first phase, which dates back to the 1950s. Ottoman social structure and feudalism debates were revived after the WWI with the spread of Marxist thought. First of all, Şefik Hüsnü's perspective in a series of articles he wrote in *Aydınlık* magazine during the 1920s also affected the theoretical attitudes in the following period. Şefik Hüsnü argues that the Ottoman state, and therefore its contemporary remnant, had a feudal character. For example, in the article he wrote in the 5th issue of *Aydınlık* magazine, dated November 1921, he claims that modern Turkey is in a period of "primitive capitalism mixed with feudal lordship [tm]" (Şefik Hüsnü, 1975, p. 63), in another article he wrote in 15th issue of *Aydınlık* in May 1923 while analyzing the counter-revolutionary powers, he states that their loyalty on the feudal traditions and the Ottoman dynasty (Şefik Hüsnü, 1975, p. 156). The term 'derebeylik' used by Şefik Hüsnü here can be considered ambiguous. This term can refer, on the one hand, to the concept of seigneurie, and on the other hand, to the concept of feudal lordship. If we refer to another article by Şefik Hüsnü (1975, p. 307) in order to clear this ambiguity, the author in his article dated December 1924 (*Aydınlık*, issue 28) states that the "ağalar, beyler, şeyhler" (seigneurs, lords and sheiks), who were defined as *derebeys*, led the "life of medieval rulers [tm]" and had their own subjects

(*tebaa*). In this respect, although the theoretical meaning of the term remains unclear, reference to the Middle Ages indicates the existence of an empirical content similar to that of Western feudalism. If it is accepted that Şefik Hüsnü speaks within the Marxist tradition, it is possible to think that this term is used synonymously with feudalism in the final analysis. This impression is strengthened by the fact that the term is more clearly introduced in the work of a series of writers following Şefik Hüsnü.

In the early 1930s, the analysis carried out by two former members of the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) and thus from the circle of Şefik Hüsnü is worth mentioning. The first comprehensive article on the subject in *Kadro* magazine was written by Şevket Süreyya [Aydemir] in June 1932 (*Kadro*, issue 6) and this article was followed by İsmail Hüsrev's [Tökin] dated July 1932 (*Kadro*, issue 7) article. Although these articles are generally included in the common cluster of land reform, industrialization and Turkification discussions in Turkey (Derin, 2016, pp. 34-43), they also contain arguments about the analysis of the Ottoman social structure. These arguments, unlike the concurrently developing land reform debates (Solak, 2013, pp. 198-230), need to lean on a Marxist analysis, albeit implicitly. Şevket Süreyya (1978, p. 42) used the term feudalism in his article titled *Derebeyi ve Dersim* in referred to the material institutions of a backward society (i.e. feudal land ownership) and the spiritual forces defending the legitimacy of these institutions (i.e. influence of sheikhs and tekkes). This definition is largely in line with Plekhanov's definition of feudalism. In addition to this conceptualization, he states that "land slavery" (servage) has a prevalence in feudalism, there are autonomous areas which people can be bought and sold together with the land and there is no state intervention exist in this manner (Şevket Süreyya, 1978, p. 42). This conceptualization of the author in general also supports his argument that there are some forms of 'Kurdish feudalism' or 'tribal feudalism' in the eastern provinces of Turkey. Aydemir's definition of feudalism as a matter of land and ideology, as well as his use of the "sheikh and tekke influence [tm]" argument, is similar to Şefik Hüsnü's approach. Secondly, in the article titled "*Türkiye'de Derebeylik Rejimi*" (Derebeylik Regime in Turkey) published in the same journal with the signature of İsmail Hüsrev (1978, p. 16), it is seen that the discussion has been expanded and systematized. İsmail Hüsrev, by taking the theses of this article into the center and developing it, published his work named *Türkiye Köy İktisadiyatı* (Turkish Village Economy) in 1934. Tökin (1990, p. 158) states that there are three types of feudal regimes in the Ottoman case, and divides them into three main categories: (i) *sipâhî*

feodalism, (ii) spiritual feodalism, (iii) especial/private (*hususî*) feodalism. If we briefly mention these titles, the term ‘*sipâhî* feodalism’ corresponds to a class-based social relationship standing on the land regime of *timars* and *zeâmet*s (Tökin, 1990, p. 158). The basic characteristics of this social relationship develop, in essence, based on the social relations of production between the peasant and the *sipâhî*. According to Tokin (1990, pp. 159-63); (i) the peasants work independently and pay taxes, but are not free, but subject to the "*sahib-i arz*" (*sipâhî*), (ii) the *sipâhî*s seize the product as tax and in return serves the state during the war, (iii) there are characteristic feudal taxes exist that *sipâhî*s can levy them separately from the *öşür*. Tokin secondly uses the term ‘spiritual feodalism’. This term, as was seen before in Şefik Hüsnü and Şevket Süreyya, can be defined as “the feudal lordship of religious institutions [tm]” and includes the allocation of large lands to religious institutions (for example, Bektashi and Mevlevî orders) (Tökin, 1990, p. 163). Finally, if we consider the term especial/private feodalism, this structure is seen in places “directly assigned by the sultan as a private estate or farm [tm]” or in some places where the old classes were left in place after the conquest (Tökin, 1990, p. 165). The term is understood to be used for the social form in which feudal lords have full and unconditional ownership of the land. Tökin (1990, p. 166) argues that this type of feudal lordships has no difference with European feudalism, for example, servage exist and the overlords extract both crops and peasants.

Şanda enriched Tökin’s theses conceptually and contextually, examined some topics in detail, brought new discussion topics, and finally dared to make a clear comparison between Ottoman society and European feudalism. Firstly, Şanda (1975, pp. 18-19) defines feudalism by considering the following points: (i) it is a social and economic system situated between slave-ownership and capitalism, (ii) social relations between producers and exploiters are established through surplus product, (iii)) the lands as the main means of production are owned by the feudal lords and the producer class is the peasants who do not own the land, (iv) the peasant is obliged to work on the land of the feudal lord and give some of his product to the lord, (v) products are produced for personal consumption, not for exchange, therefore production is organized in the framework of natural economy. Taking this general framework into account, Şanda (1975, p. 31) argues that the Ottoman Empire had all the general features of feudalism. According to him, the existence of feudalism in the Ottoman Empire becomes unbearable when the following examples are evaluated: the division of lands according to political power, the relations of the nobility (*ocak zades*) and *raiyyah*, the

dominance of the natural economy, the simplicity of the means of production, the fact that the *reâyâ* is bonded to the land such as *has/timar/zeâmet* etc. (Şanda, 1975, p. 31).⁶³ It is seen that Şanda draws the framework of feudalism in the Ottoman Empire, similar to Tökin, based on three basic categories: Feudalism organized around *timars*, feudalism as spiritual seignory and feudalism organized around independent estates. First of all, Şanda (1975, p. 36) accepts the divisions of land such as *zeâmet* and *has* as elements within the feudal land distribution system, but states that timariot lords developed the most common and the most extensive feudal relations articulated with the direct producers. For this reason, ‘*sipâhî* feudalism’ gives the characteristic of Ottoman feudalism (Şanda, 1975, p. 36). According to him, “the greatest property owner [tm]” is the sultan, and the lands are divided in order of rank between the grand vizier, the viziers, the *umeras*, the *beylerbeyis*, the *sancakbeyis* and the *sipâhîs*, in accordance with the hierarchy of land-income (Şanda, 1975, p. 35). The *sipâhî*, who was entrusted with land by the Sultan, gives *tapu* (deed) to the *reâyâ* with the title of ‘*sahib-i arz*’ (owner of the land), makes those who work on the land the same status as the serfs in the Western feudalism (Şanda, 1975, p. 36). On the other hand, the *sipâhî* class, who was considered to be the owner of a fief, was obliged to feed armed soldiers and serve in the military, therefore, according to him, there was no difference between the “fief” in the Ottoman and European examples (Şanda, 1975, p. 38). Since Şanda evaluates feudalism as a form that developed between the slave-owning mode of production and capitalism in accordance with the Marxist approach, he also identifies some remnants of the slave-owning mode of production in the Ottoman Empire. These are (Şanda, 1975, pp. 43-44); (i) free trading of slaves as a commodity; and (ii) peasants with the status of “*ortakçı kullar*”. Secondly, Şanda (1975, p. 46) argues that the Ottoman subjects were a kind of serf and constituted a “social type” stuck between slavery and free peasantry, and that this group was not the property of its owner like a serf, but still considered a prisoner because of its bond to the land.

With the 1940s, the arguments of Soviet researchers such as Tveritiova, Gorldevski and Filipovic evaluating Ottoman society under the concept of FMP achieved remarkable success. Tveritiova’s study named *Vosstanie Kara Yazıdji-Deli Hasan*, completed in 1941 and published by the Soviet Union Academy of Sciences-Institute of Oriental Studies in 1946, provides one of the important examples of detailed

⁶³ For another article in which the term “Ocak zade” is used to signify the lineage-based Ottoman aristocracy (*sipâhîs*) see: Mehmet Ali Şevki (1968b, pp. 118-119).

and systematic studies carried out before the 1960s.⁶⁴ Tveritina (2006, p. 39) first draws attention to the fact that Ottoman military-feudalism was formed at the end of the 13th century and draws attention to the fact that its general structure was regulated by the laws enacted in the periods of Murat I, Mehmet II and Suleyman I.⁶⁵ According to her, the land regime lies on the basis of Ottoman feudalism, and the territorial division of this regime includes three main categories (Tveritina, 2006, p. 40): (i) private properties, (ii) *waqf* lands, (iii) lands which belongs to the state. Tveritina (2006, p. 40) is of the opinion that the first category lands were relatively insignificant in the early Ottoman period, but increased their social influence especially after the 16th century, when *timars* became a part of private property. Stating that the clergy who benefited from the second land category became big feudal lords over time, she explains the power of this social class in the state administration based on this (Tveritina, 2006, p. 191). The lands in the third and last category are state-owned lands and this land is basically used in three parts (Tveritina, 2006, p. 41); (i) the part devoted to the sustenance of the monarch and the dynastic family, (ii) the part directly under the management of the state treasury and whose income is transferred to the treasury, (iii) the part devoted to the livelihood of the palace officials and military-feudalism. According to her, the third chapter is given for the purpose of fulfilling the services of the vizier, *beylerbeyi*, *sanjakbeyi*, palace officials, on the other hand, *timar* and *zeâmet* were the lands given in return for military-services and constituted the military-feudal *iqta* system (Tveritina, 2006, p. 41). Underlining two details within this system, Tveritina focuses on the distribution of authority and the status of peasants in the Ottoman feudal society. According to her, while the sultan is considered the sole owner and administrator of the lands and subjects in legal terms, the appearance of the legal structure and real social relations do not overlap, in the real situation, the great state officials/vizier (feudal notables) and the nobles and elites around the state rule the state

⁶⁴ In addition, the works of N. Filipovic in the 1950s are also noteworthy. The main thesis of Filipovic (1955, pp. 163, 188) is that the Ottoman Empire developed in a feudal structure, while the core of this feudal structure was *mîrî* land regime in the early period, the establishment of *çiftlik*s and the emergence of *mültezims* in the 17th century did not change the feudal essence but reshaped it.

⁶⁵ V. Gordlevski also defends a similar thesis. In Gordlevski's work titled *Gosudortsvo seldžhukidov maloj azii*, published in 1941, there is the thesis that the fief system developed as an extension of Mongolian feudalism, that feudal hierarchy began to emerge with the dissolution of *zeâmet*s during the reign of Murat I, and reached the widest scope during the reign of Suleiman I (Gordlevski, 1988, pp. 123, 129-30).

and make it suitable for the interests of the high seigneurs. (Tveritina, 2006, p. 39). Secondly, the social status of peasants includes relations of dependency far beyond free producers. It is possible to see the signs showing dependency relations in the extreme and complex taxation categories (Tveritina, 2006, p. 49), in the multitude of feudal liability categories consisting of extra-economic coercion (Tveritina, 2006, p. 52), and finally in the laws that prevent the farmers from leaving the land and punish otherwise (Tveritina, 2006, p. 50).

Another detailed study published on the feudal social structure in the Ottoman Empire was written by D. Angelov. Angelov deals with feudalism in the Ottoman Empire by referring to the development of productive forces, the dissolution of the old tribal structure, the formation of the land aristocracy, the situation of direct producers and the course of historical development. According to him, although Asia Minor was a region dominated by feudal social relations before the Turkish invasions, the establishment of new Turkish emirates meant the dominance of a new feudal class (Angelov, 1956, p. 228). On the other hand, the military-clan structure of the newly arrived nomadic groups does not guarantee the establishment of a competent dominance over the mass dominated by the emirs, and prevents the new ruling class from establishing its dominance (Angelov, 1956, p. 299). In this context, Angelov (1956, p. 229) states that the invaders who wanted to dominate the Christian peasants developed feudal relations, thus the first Turkish states were established in Anatolia and the Ottoman state could be considered a typical example of those. Angelov (1956, p. 229), who states that the core of the feudal class among the Ottomans in the first phase was the military leaders of the clans, the royal family and his entourage, underlines that this group became landowners during the conquests. According to him, this group dominated large areas by force and/or gift, slaves, towns and cities, and became great lords with large property (Angelov, 1956, p. 229). Angelov (1956, pp. 229-230) argues that since the end of the 13th century, this group constituted a landed aristocracy among the Ottomans, especially military leaders and dynasty members were given property and gifts. Secondly, the author, who draws attention to the fact that a second feudal class emerged under the ruling class consisting of military and civilian feudal elements, argues that this class consists of people under the rulers, who are given medium and small land and are responsible for military service (Angelov, 1956, p. 230). Stating that the military fiefs given to the administration of this second group became the basis of the Ottoman political and social regime, he is of the opinion that the status of the labor

working these lands was also regulated in accordance with the administrative form (Angelov, 1956, p. 231). Angelov (1956, p. 232) claims that the welfare of the ruling class is built through the obligations and taxes imposed on the peasants, and that the producers are bonded to the land and exploited. Underlining that this general framework is also valid for the Balkans, Angelov (1956, p. 275) states that the Ottoman advance did not fundamentally change the feudal relations in the Balkans.

In the 1960s, a series of brilliant works were written that examined the Ottoman social structure, the nature of the state and its development lines by focusing on the concept of feudalism. At the forefront of these works are the books and articles of V. P. Moutafchieva, who synthesized the data of historians (such as A. S. Tveritnova, Br. Djurdjev, G. Gulubov, V. D. Smirnov and A. D. Novichev), reevaluated them with field studies and systematized them. Secondly, it is necessary to mention the voluminous review of E. Werner, followed by the works of B.A. Cvetkova and N. Todorov. Contributions have also been made to this debate from Turkish academic and political circles. While contributions from Turkey in the 1960s were mostly made by names such as B. Boran, M. Belli, İ. Beşikçi within the framework of texts with stronger political argumentation, starting from the end of the 1960s and throughout the 1970s the feudalism debate has gained academic depth within the framework of the analyzes of names such as M. Kiray, K. Fişek, M. Sencer, M. Erdost, O. Oyan, A. Z. Manfred, V. N. Yeliseyeva, Ye. Agibalova & G. Donskoy.

Let us first consider Moutafchieva's analysis with its main headings. Moutafchieva comprehends the Ottoman Empire as a social structure dominated by the FMP and examines it under the titles of land regime, class structure, function of the state, structure of the exploited population and explains its historical development. Moutafchieva (1988 [1962], p. vi) states that feudalism is a socio-economic formation organized within the framework of certain relations of production, and it is basically shaped by the principles of "incomplete" ownership of the means of production by the direct producers and the appropriation of the surplus product by non-economic means, and in this way, she argues that it is a universal form through which all societies pass. Besides this general definition, Moutafchieva (1988, p. vi) -as will be seen in Werner and Cvetkova- under the influence of AMP theory, emphasizes the existence of a strong central state as the distinguishing feature of feudalism in the Eastern regions of the world. Stating that the Ottoman Empire cannot be considered as an exception to this principle, he draws attention to the fact that the strong central state was used to obtain

land revenues (Moutafchieva, 1988, p. vi). Although Moutafchieva (2003, p. 8) defines this structure as “military-feudal” based on the relationship between the territorial system and the formation of military units in the early stages of her academic career, in her later articles she defines the Ottoman Empire as “simply feudal” without abandoning the concept of feudalism.⁶⁶ According to her, feudal landownership forms develop from the relations and contradictions of three basic variables. These can be listed as follows (Moutafchieva, 1988, p. 3): (i) the level of development of the existing productive forces, (ii) the formation of the Ottoman feudal class, (iii) the interests and interventions of the central state. She states that before the Ottoman domination, feudal land ownership forms generally existed in official (conditional) and unofficial (unconditional) land ownership forms in Anatolia and Central Asia, while in the Anatolian Turkish Principalities *mülk/waqf/mâlikâne-dîvânî* type land ownership forms were dominant -on the other hand *timar* form that was effective in the establishment of the Ottoman state and it is indirectly separated from other examples (Moutafchieva, 1988, p. 1). Secondly, it is necessary to consider the nature of the lands in the status of fief. If it is examined in the general plan, the lands distributed as *timars* originally have the status of *mîrî* land according to Moutafchieva (1988, p. 6) and *mîrî* lands form the backbone of the “feudal-agrarian” system. The importance of the *mîrî* lands under the control of the state is related to the fact that they constitute the largest land reserve in quantity, as well as the substance of the dominant feudal relations (Moutafchieva, 1988, p. 6).

Moutafchieva (1988, p. 136) argues that the development of feudalism in Ottoman society emerged depending on the basic forms of land ownership (*mülk, waqf, timar*). According to her, the formation of feudal rent in the Ottoman Empire should be sought in the relationship between *mülk, waqf* or *timar* owners and dependent peasants (Moutafchieva, 1988, p. 139). In this relationship, rent is obtained as money/ product in-kind /drudgery, and in terms of the way the rent is collected, the *rûsûm-i raiyyet* that goes to the feudal lord and the *tekâlif-i dîvâniye* imposed by the treasury constitute two basic forms of the rent (Moutafchieva, 1988, p. 169). Finally, it should be considered how Mustachieva lays out the relations between the state, feudal structure and the exploited population in the Ottoman Empire. First, Moutafchieva (1988, p. 7) argues

⁶⁶ In the works of researchers such as A. D. Novichev, who preceded Moutafchieva, the *timar* system in the Ottoman state is called "*voneeno-lennaya systema*" (military-mansion system), and the similarity of this system with Western feudalism is emphasized (Abak, 2020, p. 103).

that the Ottoman state in general was an apparatus of the feudal landed class and acted in accordance with the interests of a certain stratum of it. Specifically, which stratum of the feudal class will be represented by the state depends on the real power relations. Moutafchieva focuses on two historical phases that will categorize these relations. The first of these coincides with the early development phase of Ottoman feudalism, while the second corresponds to the post-classical period. Moutafchieva (1988, p. 3) reveals the first form of relationship by stating that, in the early period, the central state limited the expansion of the power of the feudal lords with larger lands by being articulated with the lower-level feudal lords (timariot *sipâhîs*). The second form emerges in the model where the state becomes the apparatus of the big landowners and restricts the privileges of lower stratum feudal lords (Moutafchieva, 1988, p. 48).

Secondly, let's try to summarize how E. Werner dealt with Ottoman history within the framework of the feudal mode of production. In his work *Die Geburt einer Grossmacht -die Osmanen (1300-1481): Ein Beitrag zur Genesis des türkischen Feudalismus*, published in 1963, E. Werner makes a broad reading of the early period of the Ottoman Empire around the concept of feudalism. It is understood that Werner (2019b, p. 17) was first interested in the concept of AMP when he started to work on Ottoman society, but he preferred to rely on the concept he referred to as 'Asian feudalism' or 'Eastern feudalism' as a result of the widening of the scope of the AMP concept, which lost its explanatory power.⁶⁷ Werner (2019b, pp. 16-17) argues that the concept of AMP does not refer to an original social formation *per se*, but to a concrete feature of another particular mode of production (feudalism); He argues that Asian/Eastern feudalism has some concrete features such as (i) the existence of a state monopoly on land, (ii) overlapping between the tax and rent, and (iii) the subordination of the ruling class to the central authority without a feudal pyramid. On the other hand, Werner (2019b, p. 17) is of the opinion that the Ottoman social formation, which he called Eastern feudalism, basically shared common features with European feudalism. These common features are; (i) domination of rural structure over cities, (ii) dominance of agriculture over crafts, (iii) domination of a minority group's monopoly on land over the "majority of small peasants engaged in independent production [tm]", (iv) "small production under the dominance of large landed property [tm]", (v) the existence of persistent class struggle, (vi) the spread of the ruling class through the 'service

⁶⁷ Similarly, the Soviet historian Ivanov (2013, p. 27) discusses the Ottoman state and the Mamluks under the concept of 'Eastern feudalism'.

aristocracy' (*sipâhîs*) (Werner, 2019b, p. 17). All these common features are based on the fact that the Ottoman social structure is generally considered under the concept of feudalism. Werner explains the origins of Ottoman feudalism by referring to the development of stratification among Turkish tribes, the emergence of feudal dependency relations by overcoming the military democracy phase, and finally the making of feudal reforms with the Seljuk state -the creation of *mülk* and *waqf* lands. First of all, Werner (2019a, pp. 40-41) claims that in the light of the studies conducted by S. G. Agadzanov and S. E. Tolybekov on the Oghuz tribes, since the 10th century, the communal property relations were dissolved and the property was usurped by the tribal aristocracy, and the common pastures were used to obtain rent -which constitutes a form of exploitation. Based on the studies of V. F. Sachmatov, Werner (2019a, p. 41) sees that the center of feudalization is not the domination of pastures by the feudal aristocracy, but the transfer of herds to the private ownership of the aristocracy, thereby dissolving the independent economies of families and subordinating the labor force of the poor members to the aristocracy. Werner (2019a, p. 46) is of the opinion that a certain analogy can be established between the Asian steppes and Germania in terms of the transition phase from military democracy to feudal class domination. The expansionist movement of farmers in Germania and nomads in the steppes led to class domination in both cases (Werner, 2019a, p. 46). The developed form of this process - and in this way the origins of the Ottoman social structure and state- is found in the Seljuk example (Werner, 2019a, p. 29). Although the expansionist tendency of nomadic groups was decisive in the spread of the Seljuk Empire, according to Werner (2019a, p. 46), the Seljuk aristocracy made the ulama and bureaucracy the main pillar in order to place feudal domination against nomadism. On the other hand, he states that the Anatolian principalities, which replaced the Seljuk domination, entered a certain stagnation after reaching their geographical or political borders, and that they could not leaped to an upper stage, stuck between military democracy and primitive tribal feudalism (Werner, 2019a, p. 124).

Werner is of the opinion that the principal example that can transcend this framework is the Ottoman principality, and he explains this phenomenon on the basis of land ownership and military organization. The details presented under both headings also constitute the basic elements of the feudal structure of the Ottoman state. Based on B. Djurdjev's research, Werner (2019a, p. 219) states that there are two separate fief systems, which are (i) a servant aristocracy consisting of slave origins and (ii) army

commanders with property owner status. The fact that both systems were tried to be taken under the control of the state by Bayezid I and balancing the two against each other was effective in taking the definitive form of Ottoman feudalism (Werner, 2019a, p. 219). Werner (2019a, p. 420) argues that Ottoman lands were divided into three as *waqfs*, *mülks* and *mîrî* land (*has* and *timar*), but these three categories tended to develop in the direction of property ownership. A fundamental dimension of Ottoman feudalization is the development of the *timar* system, and there are other features of this system that need to be addressed apart from the military organization aspect. Werner (2019a, p. 219) underlines that the Ottoman army was mostly composed of timariot *sipâhîs*, and that the spread of this system should be evaluated in the same context as the feudalization of the state and the increase in central power. Werner (2019a, p. 364) argues that *sipâhîs*, as feudal lords, are part of the empire's monopoly on landed property and an element of the same rent mechanism as an exist in the European feudalism. According to Werner (2019a, p. 421), feudal exploitation is not realized in a collective character, but individual in the form of the lord's exploitation of the peasants. Werner (2019a, p. 420) draws attention to the fact that when the mode of production and relations of production are centered, there is no difference between *waqf*, *mülk* and *has* lands, but unlike the Western feudalism there is no serfdom in *mîrî* lands. In addition to the *timar* owners, the influence of the ulama, the development of *waqf* and *mülk* lands should also be evaluated within the framework of Ottoman feudalism. Werner (2019a, p. 360) defines the Ottoman Empire's employment of ulama cadres, or more precisely, the influence of ulama cadres in the administration, as a 'systematic feudalization'.

Before moving on to the discussion of Turkish researchers on Ottoman feudalism, it would be appropriate to briefly discuss B. A. Cvetkova's work, *Les Institutions Ottomanes en Europe*, published in 1968, which has become one of the main reference texts in the international literature on Ottoman history. The main focus of Cvetkova is the conquests of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and the social relations that these conquests reorganized. Cvetkova argues that the Ottoman conquests and socio-economic configuration in general showed the characteristics of a transition to feudalism by leaving its tribal-origin and the articulation established with Balkan feudalism in this process was decisive. She argues that feudalism developed with the *timar* system and finally reached its final form with the domination of stronger landlords to the detriment of small *timar*-holders. Cvetkova (1978 [1968], p. 2) first states that the advance of the Ottomans in the Balkans took place within the framework of a primitive

social organization, accompanied by an “infancy” feudalism and a simple state organization, although the tribal origins are evident. On the other hand, the gradual settlement of the Yuruk and Tatar groups and the decrease in the need for their military contributions occur simultaneously with the replacement of tribal traditions by the feudal state organization (Cvetkova, 1978, p. 41). According to her, the social group with the decisive power of this period was the Turkish aristocracy, and this group was influential in the conquered areas, with large land ownership, political decentralization and privileges on the land (Cvetkova, 1978, p. 2). According to Cvetkova (1978, p. 289), *timar* was the main feudal “form of possession” in the lands of South-East and central Europe under Ottoman rule. Another fundamental element of this structure, which should be considered together with the *timar* system, is the land registration (*census/tahrir*). According to Cvetkova (1978, p. 45), the population brought into serf status gains a legal status with censuses and becomes a part of the “feudal domain”. In this way, the masses who gain legal status assume the obligations of the land in favor of their masters, thus the feudal lord is formed as *sahib-i ra’iyyet* and *sahib-i ‘arz*. In addition, it should not be overlooked that *waqfs* played an important role in feudal development. Cvetkova (1978, p. 26) states that *waqfs* are institutions used for Islamic-religious propaganda, financed directly by the taxes of producers, and ultimately aiming to strengthen the social prestige of the Ottoman feudal class. Cvetkova (1978, p. 28) argues that Ottoman feudalism was relatively primitive until the 16th century, but after this century, *mülks* and *waqfs* began to expand and became the dominant form of land ownership. If this thesis is examined at the general plan, the characteristic elements of the Ottoman feudal system prevailing in the 15th and 16th centuries are listed as follows (Cvetkova, 1978, p. 78); (i) strong central state imposing the fief system, (ii) dominance of military fiefs, (iii) more or less limited power of fief holders, (iv) absence of subinfeudation, (v) division of power between state and feudal lords (retaining revenues from land and *reâyâ* in military fiefs), (vi) a truly divided ownership structure in *mülk* lands, (vii) development of city life, trade and monetarization.

It is seen that the findings of Moutafchieva, Werner and Cvetkova are also shared by N. Todorov. Todorov’s *History of Bulgaria*, written with Moutafchieva and published in 1969, frames the Ottoman administration with the concept of feudalism and states that the Ottoman feudal administration suppressed the historical development in the Balkans (Moutafchieva & Todorov, 1969, p. 81). In the same work, in the Medieval period and Ottoman domination section written by Moutafchieva, it is

emphasized that the Bulgarian people were first taken under bondage as a ruling and purely consumer class under the domination of the Turks (Moutafchieva & Todorov, 1969, p. 68). Todorov (1979, p. 45) states that the Ottoman administration was essentially a strong central feudal system, and the land was divided within the framework of the relationship between the state, producers and members of the ruling class. According to him, the real owner of the land appears as the state, the peasants are reduced to the status of simple laborers depending on the state, and the land incomes - although some of them are allocated to the state budget- are extracted by the *sipâhîs* who constitute the military power (Todorov, 1979, p. 45). In this framework, he describes the ruling class that constitutes the Ottoman feudalism in a dual structure, which are listed as (i) *timars*-holders/ *sipâhîs*, (ii) high-level administrators/officers/soldiers (Todorov, 1979, p. 45).

The second part of the discussion of feudalism in Ottoman society, which continued throughout the 1960s, was continued by Marxist academic circles and socialist political practitioners in Turkey, although their theses generally did not find resonance in the international academic community. In this subsection, we will briefly discuss the contributions of B. Boran, M. Belli, K. Fişek, İ. Beşikçi and M. Kıray to the debates in the 1960s. The specific importance of these debates is that they were the source of a series of contributions to be made in the 1970s and largely shaped the theoretical-political lines of the debates. Among these names, B. Boran is the most decisive writer in terms of both his undisputed academic career and his earliest polemical writings on feudalism. Boran, in general, can be considered as an advocate of orthodox Marxist analysis. If Boran's thesis is briefly reviewed, it can be summarized that the Ottoman Empire had a feudal formation that could not be considered completely different from Western feudalism -although it had some specificities, and Ottoman society divided into social classes that serfdom found a place in this social formation. On the other hand, the fact that Boran broke with the Kemalist feudalism thesis, which can be formulated as the continuation of feudalism in the eastern provinces Turkey - and which has been dominating since the 1930s - can be considered as a distinctive feature of his position.⁶⁸ Boran (2018b, p. 48) states that feudalism is one of the three

⁶⁸ Boran (2018a, p. 30) argues that although landlords are 'feudal residuals' in contemporary Turkey, they cannot be considered feudal lords and are members of the bourgeois class. In this regard, Belli (2019 [1966/71], p. 225) argues that contemporary feudal elements are inherited from Ottoman history. The point that Belli emphasizes in his analysis of feudalism is the autonomy of feudal powers against the central state. Beşikçi (2019, pp. 109-112), on the other

modes of production shaped basically according to the social position of labor, and they differ from each other in terms of being based on slave-labor, serf-labor which bonded to land and waged-labor. Similarly, Fişek (1967, p. 176) considers feudalism as a stage of social evolution and accepts the ownership on labor, land and means of production as the determinant feature of feudalism. Land ownership and the development of the political-administrative structure also have a decisive effect on the development of the social position of labor. For this reason, Boran (2018b, pp. 48-49) analyzes these two elements and proposes the following three propositions regarding the first element: (i) the right of 'absolute property' in the land cannot be monopolized by any class, (ii) the gradual division of landed property between serf and lord class within a hierarchy of rights, (iii) at the top of the hierarchy is the king/suzerain, who legally owns the land.

Boran (2018a, p. 28) formulates feudalism as “a form of political domination established directly over people and the emergence of this domination in the form of a hierarchy of personal relations [tm]”. Fişek (1967, p. 176), on the other hand, conceives these relations as property relations directly, and states that feudalism is the order of property consisting of (i) land, (ii) direct producers, (iii) means of production to the aristocracy (to the landlords), in which both the producers and the classes controlling the surplus product are dependent on the land. On the other hand, Kıray (1982 [1969], p. 119) defines feudalism with reference to the relations between classes and the production process and lists the following elements: (i) mainly plough-based agriculture, (ii) large mass of peasants who directly produce agricultural products, (iii) a small upper-class that appropriates the surplus product and controls its distribution, (iv) a group of merchants and artisans settled outside of agricultural production. Kıray (1982, p. 119) also states that the existence of the political organization (state) completes the feudal system as a necessary element in control of peasant labor. Boran (2018b, p. 50) states that *reâyâ* cannot be considered a free peasant because (i) the hereditary status of it, (ii) the peasant who left his land is forcibly brought back and punished financially, (iii) the *reâyâ* cannot have a *timar*, and (iii) an escaped *reâyâ* is sent back even if caught in a long period of time like ten years. Fişek (1967, p. 190) states that with the interregnum period, the feudal elements gained power against the *mîrî* land regime, and the *reâyâ* turned into serfdom. In this context, Fişek (1967, pp. 192-93) evaluating the manors that became widespread during the reign of Suleiman I,

hand, is of the opinion that the domination of a village and its people, including property, still exists in contemporary Turkey, which means the dominance of feudalism.

argues that both landed nobility and serfdom developed in this period, feudalism reached a high stage and the state imposed heavy penalties for the people to leave the land. Kıray (1982, p. 119) argues that while the servage relationship was established in Western feudalism in order to keep labor in agriculture, the same purpose was achieved with the prohibition of leaving the field, settling in the cities, joining the craft guilds and the actual impossibility of making a living outside of agriculture in the Ottoman Empire.

Boran (2018a, p. 29) states that the lands from the Ottoman Empire were distributed to benefit from their income in return for military functions, and that the “local feudal orders [tm]” in the newly conquered places were connected to the center. In this context, Boran (2018b, p. 51), who states that land is distributed to viziers/*vükela/sanjakbeys/ sipâhîs* in return for administrative-military duties, argues that these people are state officials and cannot be considered landowners like the seigneurs in the West. Boran (2018b, p. 51) claims that the difference she underlined in terms of ownership does not prevent the said segments from benefiting from the products of the land and the labor of the producers like property owners. Belli (2019, p. 226) is of the opinion that the determining feature of feudal relations cannot be derived from purely landed property. Belli (2019, p. 226) states that the *aghâs* (local seigneurs), whom he defines as local feudal elements, established dominance over the pastures belonging to village communities, formed an alternative government based on their personal armed forces and received “tribute from the citizen who benefits from state lands [tm]”. Beşikçi accepts property relations as the main reference in the analysis of feudalism. Beşikçi (2019 [1968], p. 109) defines the domination of “a person, a family or a lineage” to a certain village and house/land/people in a village as feudal relations. Fişek (1967, p. 195), on the other hand, argues that *dirliks* are examples of a closed village economy and that *dirlik* owners hold all their raw material resources.

Third, let’s summarize Boran’s analysis of class structure. Boran (2018a, p. 29) states that administrative differentiation and economic differentiation directly correspond to each other in terms of class structure in feudalism. Despite this, Boran (2018a, p. 29), who states that the state mechanism in the Ottoman Empire partially differs, is of the opinion that this situation - the existence of specialized state cadres - does not contradict the feudal structure of the Ottoman example. Boran (2019, p. 186) asserts that the ruling group in the Ottoman Empire was a part of the ruling class on its own and served the sultan depending on its own hierarchies in accordance with its own

interests. Kıray (1982, p. 119) develops the proposition that “an Ottoman lord is a bureaucrat lord [tm]” by stating that the lords as the ruling class in European feudalism came to a class position as a hereditary, whereas in the Ottoman example, the dominance was achieved by appointment. Fişek (1967, p. 200), on the other hand, is of the opinion that merchants, landlords and tax farmers were also included in the Ottoman ruling class, since the military-feudal property form that was dominant in the classical period was transformed after the 16th century.

Boran (2018b, p. 49) argues that the three characteristics as was summarized above are common to both Western feudalism and Ottoman feudalism. Accordingly, when the property concepts of Ottoman and European feudalism are compared, it is seen that there is no ‘absolute difference’ (Boran, 2018a, p. 28). On the other hand, she underlines that the only difference is that feudalism developed in a ‘local’ form in the West and a ‘central’ form in the Ottoman Empire (Boran, 2018b, p. 49). Fişek evaluates the course of feudal relations within a developmental line from Anatolian Principalities to Ottomans. According to him, in the period of Anatolian Principalities, *reâyâ* who had small property and possessions gradually turned into agricultural workers subject to the obligation of drudgery, and in the period from Mongolian domination to Ottoman domination, the definitive dominance of feudal elements was established in Anatolia (Fişek, 1967, p. 188). A notable differentiation in this process is that the Ottoman state, while applying the “*mîrî* land regime peculiar to Asian societies [tm]”, changed the superstructure without changing the production relations and spread centralism through the distribution of *dirliks* (Fişek, 1967, p. 188). Another researcher who evaluated the concept of Asiatic mode of production and the theory of feudalism together is O. Sencer. According to Sencer (1969, pp. 18-19), the social order of Turkish nomads in the period up to the development of the Great Seljuk state shows characteristics close to the Asian model. For this reason, AMP effects manifest themselves in the central state’s ownership of all lands and the social formation that emerges accordingly (Sencer, 1969, pp. 25, 27). On the other hand, the development of the *iqta/timar* system both in the Seljuk state and the Ottoman state brings with it the development of FMP (Sencer, 1969, p. 26). As a result, the effects of both modes of production show themselves in the original structure of Ottoman society (Sencer, 1969, pp. 26, 32). Similar to Boran and Fişek, Kıray (1982 [1974], p. 22) also states that if the Ottoman social system is evaluated on the basis of “labor-agricultural production-technology-social institutions-customs [tm]”, there are not great differences exist compared to the states that preceded

it, such as the Roman and Byzantine Empires. Kiray (1982 [1969], pp. 119-120) considers it necessary to highlight the “similarities of functions and relationship patterns [tm]”, not ‘forms’, when comparing Ottoman society with other societies, she states that there is no difference between Ottoman and Western feudalism in terms of ‘basic class relations’.

The discussion of feudalism in Ottoman society developed and became detailed during the 1970s. In this context, the works of M. Sencer, M. Erdost, O. Oyan, A. Z. Manfred, N. V. Yeliseyeva, Ye. Agibalova and G. Donskoy are worth mentioning. The works of M. Sencer, the first of these studies, can be evaluated within the historicist paradigm, and the analysis of feudalism partially parallels the Kemalist feudalism criticism. On the other hand, the studies of M. Erdost and O. Oyan are effective studies in terms of adapting the Marxist theory to the Ottoman specialty and recognizing some originalities, and their main arguments are largely devoted to the discussion with the AMP thesis.

The passages that Agibalova and Donskoy devoted to the discussion of feudalism in the Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, contain the official Marxism of the Soviet Union and partially Slavist tendencies, yet present a coherent panorama. M. Sencer analyzed the land regime, financial and legal structure of the Ottoman Empire in a series of studies published in the early 1970s. The basic theses of Sencer (1997, pp. 140-41) are as follows: (i) Although the legal formation in the Ottoman Empire was presented as a religious structure, it essentially had a customary character, (ii) the basis of this structure is the feudal land regime (relations of production). While Sencer focuses on the land regime while discussing feudalism in Ottoman society, his definition of feudalism focuses more on political relations. According to him, the founding characteristic of feudal sovereignty in Ottoman society emerges as seigneur groups providing their economic privileges by collecting taxes and enslaving the people (Sencer, 1971b, p. 98). When evaluated within this framework, Sencer identifies similarities between European feudalism and Ottoman feudalism. These similarities are seen in the composition of the ruling classes, the law and the social status of the peasants. One of the founding elements of Sencer’s analysis on the Ottoman land regime is the *timar* system. According to him, the *mîrî* land system, in which the land was considered the personal property of the ruler, played a major role in the development of the *timar* system and *sipâhîs* (Sencer, 1971b, p. 52). While he considers the *mîrî* land regime a part of the ‘Asian tradition’, he states that this regime is not represents the

whole reality for the Ottoman society, and that the lands with the status of *mülk/has/zeâmet* cannot be reconciled with the concept of AMP (Sencer, 1971b, p. 248). In addition, the existence of immovable properties owned under the status of *waqfs* in cities shows that the *mîrî* system is not inclusive (Sencer, 1971b, p. 233). On the other hand, Sencer (1971b, p. 64) argues that the *sipâhîs* emerged as a feudal element from the period of Murat I, when the *timar* system was put into practice. While enumerating the elements of Ottoman feudalism, Sencer draws attention to the lands and *waqfs* used by the state officials. The first of these, the officials, can be listed as *beylerbeyis*, *sanjakbeys*, viziers, *qadiaskers*, *nişancıs*, treasurer and Janissary *aghas*. According to Sencer (1971b, p. 75), persons in the status of *beylerbeyi* were bound to the sultan by feudal ties, while the *sanjakbeys* and their vassals as a whole became the sub-vassals of the sultan. Sencer states that the principles of taxation of the people working on the land in the Ottoman Empire were of a feudal nature, and for example, the group called *mjeropşitina* in the Balkans had serf status (1971b, pp. 91, 286). In this context, he embodies all three aspects of feudal social relations (seigneur, servage, appropriation of surplus product) in the Ottoman Empire. The feudal structure that Sencer emphasizes as the fourth aspect is the social relations developed around *waqfs* and *waqf* status lands. He generally considers *waqfs* as the institutional structures of ‘religious feudal relations’, and in this context, he makes a sub-division of ‘heirship *waqfs*’ and ‘social *waqfs*’ (Sencer, 1971b, p. 211). In general, *waqf* officials constitute a consumer segment that can be considered as the ‘seigneurs’ of the Ottoman Empire, as the segment that make a living based on land income and immovable property rent (Sencer, 1971b, p. 228).

Another researcher who dealt with the Ottoman social structure under the concept of feudalism in the 1970s is M. Erdost. The concept of feudalism, as used by Erdost, corresponds to a mode of production based on land-based rents, based on small production, where the direct producer and ownership of the means of production are separated (1989, pp. 110, 167). According to Erdost (1989, pp. 161-62), although the Ottoman Empire passed through the FMP phase in the evolutionary scheme of societies, it differs from the features seen in the last phase of European feudalism, therefore it has a ‘central-feudal’ character. Erdost (1989, p. 163) evaluates the Oghuz tribes, who were primitive-communal communities at the origins of Ottoman feudalism, coming to Anatolia and encountering the remnants of the slave-owning mode of production. In general, Erdost (1989, p. 167) states that feudalism in Ottoman society was a “retarded

feudalism [tm]” compared to the European example, and that its military characteristics did not turn into economic ones and eventually evolved into a “deteriorated [tm]” form of feudalism. In this context, he argues that Ottoman feudalism did not reach full development in accordance with the form seen in Europe and still reflects some features of the transition from primitive-communal society to feudalism (Erdost, 1971, p. 12). Erdost underlines the forms of land ownership at the center of the feudalism debate in the Ottoman Empire, and specifically their appropriation under *timar/waqf/mülk/yurtluk/ocaklık* status. He states that the *mülk/mîri/waqf* categories and their sub-forms are examples of feudal land ownership and that the social position of the direct producers emerges under three types such as bonded-to-land/feudal taxpayer/serf (Erdost, 1989, pp. 170-71).

Firstly, Erdost (1989, p. 126) states that the *timar* system is the military organization of the feudal state on the land. With this form, the lands in the status of *timar* constitute the dominant form of ownership in the Ottoman Empire (Erdost, 1989, p. 27). The basis of the *timar* system is the transfer of the income from the land, such as of rent and taxes, to individuals or organizations in return for official service (Erdost, 1989, p. 27). A second point of distinction is the difference in administrative autonomy between the different forms of *timar*. Erdost (1989, pp. 42-43) is of the opinion that free *timars* are more autonomous feudal units than *sipâhî timars*, and *yurtluks* are more autonomous than *Ocaklık timars*. While examining Ottoman feudalism, Erdost focuses on two types of landforms: These are (i) manors (*mâlikâne*) and (ii) lands of the *mâlikâne-dîvânî* status. Manor lands, also called ‘free estates’, may have been inherited from Anatolian Principalities and assigned to soldiers, high administrators or members of the dynasty by the ruler after the conquests (Erdost, 1989, p. 35). These lands were managed by their owners as exempt from religious or customary taxes, free from military obligations, away from inspection and control, and autonomous in administrative and financial terms (Erdost, 1989, pp. 35-36). In the *mülk* lands under the status of *mâlikâne-dîvânî*, the ownership rights (right to sell, transfer, donate) belong to the landlord, and the *sipâhî* appointed by the central state also has some rights on taxes (Erdost, 1989, p. 37). Secondly, Erdost (1971, p. 10) states that the landowners transferred their lands to *waqf* status in order to gain a certain assurance against the gradual strengthening of the central state in the Ottoman Empire. It is seen that the lands in this status, in addition to the assurance they provide to the property owners, also undertake a direct function in the reproduction of feudal relations. Erdost (1989, p. 86)

argues that the monetary wealth accumulated in *waqfs* is not only allocated for personal consumption by members of certain families, but also allocated to madrasah/zawiya/mosque teachers, muezzins and students, whom he calls ‘religious feudals’.

It is necessary to consider the social situation of the Ottoman peasants as the basis of the feudal relations mentioned above. Erdost (1989, p. 49) is of the opinion that the Ottoman rural producers were surrounded by a feudal dependency relationship in terms of their relationship with the land, its taxation and control over it. This relationship is established between two basic social classes called the *askerî* and the *reâyâ* (Erdost, 1989, p. 45). First of all, he states that the *reâyâ* shows the characteristics of a “peasant tied to the land [tm]”, that is, a serf, and that his bond with the land is not an ownership but a possession relationship (Erdost, 1989, p. 30). In this framework, *reâyâ* is formed as a social class that is responsible for “cultivating the land, paying rent and taxes [tm]”, and is not recognized as a right to leave the land or leave it empty this class (Erdost, 1989, pp. 30-31). Secondly, *reâyâ* - regardless of whether pays in product, labor or money, is under the obligation of drudgery (Erdost, 1989, p. 43). In the sections where he deals with the taxation forms of the *reâyâ* in general, Erdost concludes that these forms are feudal payments in essence.

At the end of the 1970s, another researcher who examined the Ottoman social formation within the framework of the concept of feudalism emerged as O. Oyan. Oyan’s doctoral thesis titled *Le Développement du capitalisme dans l’agriculture de Turquie*, which he completed in 1977, is worth mentioning in this regard. Oyan (2016, pp. 171-72) states that although it is a close variant of feudalism seen in the Byzantine example, the Ottoman social structure cannot be seen as a direct extension of the heritage inherited from the Seljuk and Byzantine examples, thus it is a feudal synthesis that develops original characteristics in many points. The basic feature of this synthesis, especially in terms of its structure between 1350 and 1550, can be defined as an agricultural regime with feudal characteristics, the central state and the integrity of property forms with various exceptions (Oyan, 2016, p. 124). In this context, Oyan underlines that Ottoman feudalism acquired distinctive features. These features can be listed as follows; The tendency of centralization that prevented the development of a vassalage system similar to the European feudal model (Oyan, 2016, p. 88), the liberation of the peasants from drudgery and arbitrary obligations especially in the Balkans (Oyan, 2016, p. 94), the formation of the Janissaries of slave-origin, which

constitute a layer of the dominant class (Oyan, 2016, p. 100). In this context, it is necessary to briefly discuss Oyan's analysis of the land regime, the situation of direct producers and the class structure in the Ottoman Empire. Oyan formulates the basic elements of the Ottoman social formation as follows (2016, p. 126): (i) the hierarchy of ruling classes determined by the extent of their land holdings, (ii) the existence of private landholdings and the almost complete autonomy of some *dirlik-timar*-holding groups, (iii) the effective economic and social roles of the small fief holders (*sipâhîs*), who form the lower stratum of the ruling classes, and their share of autonomy that cannot be neglected.

The land regime has a special significance in the configuration of these items. First of all, the lands in the status of "*hass-ı hümayun*" directly owned by the ruler are administered by the local agents called *naibs*/voivodes, and the revenues of these lands were sent directly to the palace or to the state treasury (Oyan, 2016, p. 46). Secondly, at the base of the Ottoman land regime, there are lands in the status of *timar*, which are in two different categories as free (*serbest*) and ordinary/*adî*. In general, *timar* holders own all the agricultural surplus in the lands under their administration, in addition, they receive some irregular taxes, income from animals and pastures, fees and penalties as income (Oyan, 2016, pp. 49-50). On the other hand, *sipâhîs* are subject to a heavier set of obligations than free timariots, and they are obliged to feed and equip a number of soldiers that require serious expenses compared to their income (Oyan, 2016, pp. 50-51). Apart from *timars*, free properties, which were given to commanders, *Ahis* and dervish groups with absolute property rights and similar to the '*allodial*' properties in Western feudalism, were also a part of the land regime (Oyan, 2016, p. 113). Another form belongs to the status of land, which is called *mâlikâne-dîvânî* and whose administration is divided between the landowner -who has the right of bare-ownership- and the state (Oyan, 2016, p. 114). Oyan evaluates this last form as an example of feudal property rights and the simultaneous clarification of possession rights under the same landed property form (2016, p. 115). In addition, *waqfs* emerge as structures whose incomes are extracted by the privileged stratum formed by the heirs of the property owner and the *waqf* managers, except for the shares allocated to charitable works (Oyan, 2016, pp. 117-119). In this context, Oyan (2016, pp. 120-21) states that *waqfs* are a way of protecting land ownership from the state, that the change in the status of the land does not make any difference in terms of the situation of the villagers who cultivate it, and

certain taxes exemptions can be given by the state, thus the feudal principles at the core of these structures remain unchanged.

Another factor to be considered while discussing the land regime in the Ottoman Empire is the social status of the direct producers who can be considered as part of the land regime. Oyan (2016, p. 53) argues that the *reâyâ* has the right to save, not the ownership of the land, and within this framework, they constitute the exploited class as direct producers. Oyan (2016, pp. 64-65), who examines the social position of the *reâyâ* in legal terms, argues that this social group does not have real freedom, is subject to a relationship of personal dependence, albeit flexible, and therefore, similar to the serf category seen in Western feudalism, it is tied to the land. Finally, let us briefly consider Oyan's way of analyzing the class structure in Ottoman society. Oyan (2016, pp. 126-27) stated that the class structure in Ottoman society was divided into two main poles, the first of which was the ruling hierarchy (small/middle/large *dirlik* holders, *mülk* and *mâlikâne-dîvânî* owners, civil/military/religious high administrative layer), and the second is composed of *reâyâ*, which are direct producers attached to the land. Oyan highlights the complexity of the relations between the ruling classes by underlining the existence of an intra-class struggle for the ownership of agricultural surplus between landowners, representatives of the central state and *sipâhîs* (2016, pp. 48-49). In this context, Oyan (2016, pp. 100-101) argues that a second field of struggle shaped between the *sipâhîs* and the people of slave origin, and states that the Janissaries figured as a new layer of ruling class that dominated the Ottoman countryside. Above the Janissary group, there is the ruler, who is "the most important member of the ruling class [tm]" (Oyan, 2016, p. 46).

Although there was no significant progress in the evaluation of Ottoman history within the framework of the FMP concept in Soviet historiography from the 70s to the beginning of the 80s, it is seen that the critical tone increased in historical studies, especially with the influence of Balkan historiography. In these evaluations, the Ottoman Empire is considered under the concept of feudalism and the dominance of the ruling class of the Empire is evaluated together with heavy feudal exploitation mechanisms. In this context, it is necessary to briefly consider the views expressed by A. Z. Manfred, Ye. Agibalova & G. Donskoy, N. V. Yeliseyeva, S. F. Oreshkova and M. S. Meyer.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ In addition, the theses of Igor Diakonoff, the author of the review titled *Puti Istorii: Ot drevneishego chelovek do nashikh dnei*, published in 1994, are also worth mentioning briefly.

Agibalova & Donskoy (1988, p. 146) consider the Ottoman state as a feudal establishment uniting the tribes in the Seljuk lands and explain the territorial expansion with the advances of the feudal lords. According to the authors, one of the main pillars of the ruler is the feudal cavalry, and these feudal lords oblige the villagers to pay eighty different taxes and force them to do drudgery (Agibalova & Donskoy, 1988, pp. 150-51). Manfred's (1974, p. 348) main argument, on the other hand, considers *timar*-holders as "fief-holders" and is based on the idea that *sipâhîs* formed a feudal hierarchy. In addition, it is striking that he considers civil officers as separate from the military/feudal hierarchy. Yeliseyeva (2014, pp. 264-66) similarly defines the Ottoman Empire as an area of feudal domination and states that the big landowners in the Ottoman-dominated areas -especially Bulgaria- were "feudal lords". It is understood that the research on Ottoman history carried out in the Soviet academy in the 1980s did not show any significant theoretical difference. Although the works of S. F. Oreshkova and M. S. Meyer contributed to Ottoman historiography, it is not possible to talk about a theoretical innovation. Oreshkova's work deals with the characteristics of Ottoman feudalism within the historicity of the transition from nomadism to feudalism. According to Oreshkova, the development of Ottoman domination depended on the breaking of the nomadic character in Anatolian principalities, the increase in class stratification and the development of feudalism (Abak, 2020, p. 103). In this context,

Diakonoff makes significant criticisms about both the slave-owning mode of production and the inclusiveness of the concepts of feudalism in the FMP. He states that feudalism was shaped especially during the Carolingian dynasty, which ruled from the 8th to the 10th centuries, and that it was not a widespread and decisive system outside of Western European societies (Diakonoff, 1999, pp. 3, 85). Although Diakonoff uses the term feudalism in a very narrow sense in this context, he draws attention to the fact that the content of this term can be found in a series of historical facts. To give an example, he states that the Japanese society between the 12th and 16th centuries was very similar to the Western feudalism, and he observes similar characteristics in the Byzantine Empire and the Ilkhanate state after the 11th century (Diakonoff, 1999, pp. 68, 89, 105). Diakonoff (1999, p. 110) states that the Turkish advance in the 11th century and later, which would establish the Ottoman state, did not eliminate the social segments settled in the geography they came from, but only liquidated the ruling layer of the society and replaced them by the invaders themselves. Although he does not make a definite argument about the transition process, he is of the opinion that the Ottoman social structure was determined within a certain historical continuity. This continuity has two meanings when compared to Western feudalism. The first meaning indicates that the Ottoman Empire was centralized as a "military and bureaucratic machine", especially in the 17th century, and within this framework, there were insurmountable differences between it and Western Feudalism (Diakonoff, 1999, p. 114). On the other hand, he deals with the local government systematic in the Ottoman state and mentions its feudal-like structure. In this context, Diakonoff (1999, p. 115) uses the term 'military-feudal system' to describe the Ottoman social structure.

the formation of infantry soldiers and the distribution of *timars* were called internal feudalization by Oreshkova (Abak, 2020, p. 103). While Oreshkova reveals the difference of the *timar* system in the Ottoman state from the Seljuk *iqta* and Byzantine *pronoia*, she emphasizes the dominant character of state control, inheritance prohibition and life-time limit in Ottoman *timars* (Abak, 2020, p. 105). While Oreshkova explains the development of the Ottoman principality as representing an advanced stage compared to the social context from which it emerged, M. S. Meyer accepts the opposite interpretation. According to Meyer, the founders of the Ottoman principality adapted to the Balkan/Caucasian/Arab cultures that were higher than themselves, since they represented a lower stage according to the social context in which they developed, and reformed the order before them in the region where they ruled (Abak, 2020, p. 106). Oreshkova and Meyer's analysis of the 'period of stagnation' is also noteworthy. Oreshkova argues that the Ottoman social order was transformed during the 16th and 17th centuries, and that with the deterioration of the *timar* system and the emergence of the notables, it evolved into the classical form of feudalism encountered in the Western Middle Ages (Abak, 2020, p. 110). On the other hand, Meyer sees the establishment of tax farming (*iltizam*) system in the relevant period as a progress that strengthens the tendency of private property and counts the increase in agricultural production, trade and urbanization among the basic characteristics of this period.

Researches on Ottoman history and social structure in the 1980s diversified around new focuses, perspectives and theoretical arguments. On the other hand, the concept of FMP, as it applied to the history of Ottoman society and its contemporary, of the Ottoman social structure, and especially the examples in which this concept is analyzed based on the Marxist interpretation, have greatly decreased. It is possible to think that both the emergence of new methodologies and topics in the field of historiography and the decrease in interest in Marxism after the dissolution of the Soviet Union contributed to the emergence of this situation. The works written by Berktaş (1983a), Ertürk-Keskin (1999), Arslan (2013a, 2013b) and Aytekin (2021) use orthodox Marxist arguments to analyze Ottoman society by enriching it with some new data and interpretations. On the other hand, although the references of his theses are partly belonged to the Marxist approach, the traces of Weberian categories are evident in the arguments of Tezcan (2010), who tries to draw a new perspective.

The first of the studies to be discussed is Halil Berktaş's comprehensive work, published in 1983 and titled *Kabileden Feodalizme*. If Berktaş's analysis is summarized

on a few basic points, it is seen that he focuses on (i) land ownership and forms of possessions, (ii) classes, (iii) forms of exploitation and (iv) structural elements in Ottoman social formation. Firstly, while Berktaý examines the categories of land use in the Ottoman Empire, he focuses on the *mîrî* land regime, fief distribution and manor system. According to him, the form of *mîrî* property, which indicates the absolute property right of the state or the ruler on the land, is a characteristic element of the land regime of the Ottoman period, but this does not mean pure state ownership (Berktaý, 1983a, p. 337). He states that there are no great differences in terms of land codes between the examples of Western European feudalism and the Ottoman example, and that the land is a resource that is shared under two basic forms and organized around ownership/possession/usufruct rights (Berktaý, 1983a, p. 335). The basic forms of organization on land are in two forms (Berktaý, 1983a, p. 336): (i) *mîrî* property right (domaines royal, *rakabe*) gathered in the person of the monarch, representing the political organization of the military aristocracy, (ii) the possession rights of the members of the military aristocracy over *mîrî* land under the category of fief or *dirlik*. Berktaý (1983a, p. 336) defines that the first one is not dominant and decisive in the relationship between these two forms, on the contrary, if the ruler imposes the absolute right of property, since the alliance within the ruling class will disappear. Therefore, both forms of this relationship can become dominant over the other. In this respect, he believes that there is no essential difference between the examples of Western feudalism and Ottoman feudalism. The existence of other feudal examples in the historical background of the Ottoman state shows itself especially on the material dimension of the land regime. Berktaý (1983a, pp. 369-70) states that as an extension of the economy, communication and transportation facilities, and financing problems of the central bureaucracy and the army, the administration on the land is carried out by distributing fiefs. According to him, fiefs appear in the form of *pronoia* in the Byzantine state, *kat'ia* in the Arab/Islamic tradition, *iqta* in the Iranian tradition and the Anatolian Seljuks, *timar/zeâmet/has* in the Ottomans, and *beneficium/feodum/allodium* in the European example (Berktaý, 1983a, p. 370). The main feature of these structures is that producer and ruling classes are defined with different privileges and obligations. According to Berktaý (1983a, p. 318); (i) Ottoman *dirliks* cover part of a village, entire village or several villages, likewise European manors form sub-units of fiefs, (ii) a particular manor is made up of two parts called *hassa* farm (demesne, domaine, réserve seigneuriale) and peasant farms (manse, tenure, strip tenancy, serf holding), (iii)

dependent peasants give some of their crops to the seigneur as rent-in-kind and performs drudgery in the seigneur's demesne. He states that drudgery did not have a similar importance in the Ottoman land organization as in Western Europe, but he is of the opinion that the form of drudgery turned into other forms of rent.

Another topic that Berktaý deals with is feudal exploitation relations that are shaped depending on the forms of ownership/possession on the land. Berktaý identifies three basic types of exploitation that are valid, although there are partial differences in both Ottoman society and Western European feudalism. These are listed as (i) labor-rent, (ii) product-rent, and (iii) money-rent. According to him, the labor-rent form, which is based on the *corvée* work of direct producers on the landlords' lands, is not an original feature of the FMP, but rather a remnant of the slave-owning mode of production (Berktaý, 1983a, p. 341). The second form of feudal exploitation is based on the landowners' appropriation of the labor products of direct producers in the form of product-rent. On the basis of this form, a part of the products produced by the dependent villagers on the lands under their possession is transferred to the landlord class in kind (Berktaý, 1983a, p. 341). He states that the product-rent form is the founding feature of feudalism and that it differs from the labor-rent/money-rent forms that can also be observed in slave-owning or capitalist social formations (Berktaý, 1983a, p. 343). The third type of feudal exploitation, the money-rent type, is based on the return of a fixed amount of money to the landowners by the direct producers for the right to engage in production activities (Berktaý, 1983a, p. 342). Berktaý (1983a, p. 343) argues that the form of labor-rent was much less common in Ottoman society than in Western European examples, whereas the form of product-rent existed for long periods as the dominant form of feudal exploitation. He is of the opinion that the labor-rent form did not become a widespread and decisive feudal exploitation element due to the absence of a distinct slave-owning stage in the history of the Ottoman-Turkish community (Berktaý, 1983a, p. 343). Secondly, Berktaý (1983a, p. 356) argues that the prevalence of tax-rent practice, which is an extension of product-rent and money-rent, in Ottoman society cannot be evaluated outside the concept of FMP. Another important issue that Berktaý dealt with is the structural features of the FMP that were dominant in Ottoman society. In summary, it is seen that these features correspond to titles such as class structure, state, law and ideology. Starting with the first element, Berktaý (1983a, pp. 368-69) states that the dominant class structure in medieval societies consisted of two main parts, the first of which was the secular military class that had a state apparatus, and the clergy

-Berktaý, in particular, stated that the Ottoman ruling class was a military organization organized in the form of a state and an army that it consists of the ruling aristocracy. The fact that religious professionals are members of the dominant class also brings about the dominant ideology being religious ideology (Berktaý, 1983a, pp. 367-68). In this framework, the state emerges as a structure in which the dominant aristocracy is organized within itself, each fief holder becomes a state official or representative at the same time, and the ruling class acquires a bureaucratic appearance (Berktaý, 1983a, p. 367). In this context, Berktaý conceptualizes the Ottoman state as a central state and grounds the 'central-feudal' structure in the historical process.

The second study, the main theses of which will be summarized, belongs to N. Ertürk-Keskin and is a general monograph on the organization of the state on land in Turkey, which includes a detailed section on the land regime and social classes in the Ottoman state. The backbone of Ertürk-Keskin's analysis is based on the argument that Ottoman society was organized within the framework of the FMP. Ertürk-Keskin (2009, p. 47) states that there are two basic classes in Ottoman society, namely the *askerî* and the *reâyâ*, and the first of these, which corresponds to the ruling class, is composed of officials/administrators, soldiers and ulama. The second group, under the category of *reâyâ*, composed of peasants and citizens who are engaged in activities such as industry or commerce (Ertürk-Keskin, 2009, p. 47). Ertürk-Keskin (2009, pp. 59-60) states that the social segment, which is under the second category and includes the merchants, is included in the dominant classes, although they are not included in the military class. According to her, the prerequisites of being a member of the ruling class in Ottoman society are listed as being a state official, religious expert or being wealthy, and she argues that all three groups are basically composed of feudal elements that extract the surplus product produced by the *reâyâ* (Ertürk-Keskin, 2009, p. 53). Ertürk-Keskin (2009, p. 77) states that there are four basic land ownership types prevalently observed in the Ottoman social structure and lists them as (i) *mîrî*, (ii) *mülk*, (iii) *waqf* and (iv) lands possessed by tribes. Considering the early period of the Ottoman state, Ertürk-Keskin (2009, pp. 75, 83-84) argues that the seized lands were first divided among the feudal aristocracy and organized as small administrative units, and she is of the opinion that the central authority on the lands became widespread with the expand of the *timar/dirlik* system. She states that the land is a field of struggle between both the central state - or the central feudal to mean the same thing - and local powers, that *mîrî* lands from time to time became the subject of *mülk* and *waqf* status and became the subject

of private property, and that these rights were abolished during the periods when the central state became stronger (Ertürk-Keskin, 2009, p. 82).

Another work I will discuss is S. Arslan's two-volume book published in 2013, which analyzes the Ottoman social structure under the concept of FMP. The starting point of this work of Arslan is the thesis that the Ottoman Empire cannot be evaluated under the concept of AMP, and based on this thesis, he deals with (i) the historical origins of feudalism in Ottoman society, (ii) its characteristics and (iii) the effect of the FMP on the formation of the central state structure.

Arslan grounds the emergence of the dominant mode of production in the Ottoman society with reference to the relations between the civilizations settled in Iran and Anatolia with the Turkish tribes, who passed through the feudal phase or carried the characteristics of this phase as a core open to development. First of all, Arslan (2013b, pp. 19-20) argues that Turkish communities did not experience the slave-owning phase after the primitive communal phase, but leaped to feudalism, and that they went through the 'military democracy' phase for a long time with the dissolution of the communal formations. The point that Arslan (2013b, p. 21) especially emphasizes is this: Before the Turkish communities settled in Anatolia, the FMP dominated while the Ottoman state was established, due to the beginning of class differentiation, the realization of wealth accumulation and the permanence of the nomadic aristocracy. According to this point of view, the Turkish tribes, which came to the stage of feudalization, leap into feudalism with the influence of the civilizations they encountered in Iran and Anatolia and create a kind of 'Turkish-Islamic feudalism' (Arslan, 2013b, p. 25). Another issue that Arslan emphasizes is that feudalism in the Ottoman Empire developed the central state structure along with it. The classical feudalism theory predicts the existence of dispersed production and management units, which necessitates the analysis of the central state phenomenon for those who resist this conceptualization. Arslan considers the formation of the central state as a historical phenomenon belonging to the late phase of feudalism and explains the organization of the Ottoman state as a central power by linking it to historical, geographical and partly class origins. Arslan (2013b, p. 146) is that during the development period of the Ottoman state, commercial relations, settled agriculture and city life already existed and centralization was built on this basis. Another presumption is that the Crusades, Mongolian invasion, popular revolts and Turkish tribes continued their influence during the establishment of the Ottoman state, and therefore the Ottoman aristocracy tended to

build a centralized state (Arslan, 2013b, p. 151). It was with the help of a few organizational pillars that the Ottoman ruling class was able to achieve centralized state-building. In this sense, the Ottoman state kept the feudal relations of production under control with the help of the *timar* system, the *sipâhî* class was organized directly under the ruler, the emergence of subin-vassalage was prevented, and the lands were distributed based on certain obligations without hereditary succession rights (Arslan, 2013b, p. 151). On the other hand, the organization of the Ottoman state as a central power was not only possible as a result of a certain historical process, but also specific class struggles developed around this process. According to the periodization of Arslan (2013b, p. 152), the feudalization process began at the end of the 13th century and the beginning of the 14th century, it tended to institutionalize during the reign of Murat I, was interrupted by the Battle of Ankara (1402) and reached its final form by attaining the central-feudal structure during the reign of Mehmet II. In this framework, the centralization process also includes the organization of a central army consisting of *Kapıkulu* troops of Sultan's household. The contradictions between the local Turkmen lords and feudal lords and the slave-based Ottoman ruling class increase within this framework.

The last work I will discuss in this section is the short review in A. Aytekin's collected articles published in 2021. In the center of this review, there is a series of criticisms about the acceptance of the AMP concept as the dominant mode of production in the Ottoman Empire, and it is argued that the concept of FMP would be more appropriate, especially with reference to the *timar* system. First of all, Aytekin (2021, p. 219) states that the *timar* system was not a land regime specific to the history of the Ottoman Empire and clearly separated from Western feudalism, on the contrary, it developed as a continuation of the Byzantine *pronoia* system. Aytekin (2021, p. 234) emphasizes the concrete transition between *pronoia* and *timar* to support this thesis, and gives the following titles as an example of this relationship: (i) The Ottoman state transferred and protected some *pronoia* owners in Bithynia, Thrace and Macedonia, (ii) the Byzantine Empire, which recaptured some lands after the Battle of Ankara (1402), continued the Ottoman taxation system, (iii) the terms *timar* and *pronoia* were used interchangeably -and refer to *feodum*. The second point that Aytekin emphasizes and is related to the *timar* system is the social status of direct producers. Aytekin (2021, p. 236) states that the Ottoman villagers did not have the characteristics of free peasants, they were limited economically and legally, and they were practically tied to the land

with penal sanctions. Aytekin (2021, p. 236) argues in this context that the *reâyâ-sipâhî* relationship is a concrete, interpersonal relationship, and when the drudgery obligations are taken into account, this relationship also includes dominance over the *reâyâ*. As a result, the position of direct producers in Ottoman society does not confirm an interpretation that the Ottoman social formation did not include feudal relations of production (Aytekin, 2021, p. 236). In general, Aytekin (2021, p. 244) states that certain political-legal forms emerged in all feudal societies and these were also seen in the Ottoman example, and lists them as follows: (i) a distinct legal division between classes that pay taxes and have the privilege to bear arms, (ii) a permanent division based on land possession between the two main classes, (iii) a persistent tension between central and local elements of the ruling class. According to him, timariot *sipâhîs* in the Ottoman Empire constitute a “hereditary ruling class [tm]” that has the privilege of carrying weapons and has the right to transmit their *dirlîks* to their children (Aytekin, 2021, pp. 226-27). In this context, it is possible to think that the *sipâhî* class cannot be considered civil servants, that the existence of the state’s authority over the *sipâhîs* does not exclude the concept of FMP, and that the *sipâhîs* does not fully occupy a subordinate position in this relationship (Aytekin, 2021, p. 227). In the final analysis, he claims that *sipâhîs* are landed nobles who have a certain autonomy in their relations with the central state, have rights over land and peasants, have a function in extracting the surplus product by the ruling class, and have personal military power (Aytekin, 2021, p. 228).

The last example which will be discussed is about the arguments developed by B. Tezcan on the Ottoman social structure with his work titled *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World*. In this work, Tezcan argues that the structure of Ottoman society should be examined under two separate theoretical forms, and he analyzes the economic and legal structure of the transformation between these two forms historically. Tezcan’s main thesis is that the structure of the Ottoman Empire began to change from the second half of the 15th century, and that it gained a new political and economic framework, especially from the second half of the 16th century. If the content of this thesis is analyzed, Tezcan argues that the feudal relations that drew the social framework of the Ottoman Empire in the early period and the political-legal structure that developed as an extension of it were dissolved due to the development of the monetary economy and finally the patrimonial empire form became dominant. When Tezcan’s thesis is formulated in this way, it is seen that the Marxist concept of FMP and the Weberian concept of patrimonialism are

used for two separate historical phases, and in this respect, the thesis presents a new theme for research on Ottoman social structure. Firstly, Tezcan (2010, p. 20) defines the concept of feudalism as a specific mode of production in accordance with the Marxist theory and states that this mode of production was dominant in the late medieval period of the Ottoman Empire. The concept of feudalism, as used by Tezcan (2010, p. 82), indicates a phenomenon in which surplus is appropriated by extra-economic methods, economy and politics are intertwined in this framework, and fief owners take the form of lordship over peasants. In this mode of production, the possibility of exploitation by those who hold the land under certain conditions, rather than the form of ownership of the land, is more decisive in the constitution of this social formation (Tezcan, 2010, p. 82). In this context, Tezcan analyzes the development and structure of the “formative period”, which covers the history of the Ottoman Empire between 1300-1453 and is shaped according to the FMP. On the other hand, the so-called formative period has its own internal contradictions that create the next period. According to Tezcan (2010, pp. 86-90), in accordance with the nature of feudalism, there were two dominant political tensions in the Ottoman state, the first of which corresponds to the necessity of constantly conquering the land in order to keep the vassals of the Ottoman dynasty, and the second of the ruler’s necessity of observing the balance of power against the danger thus the vassals getting stronger and breaking from the Ottoman rule. The intersection point of these two political tendencies is feudal laws (*kanun*), which, according to Tezcan (2010, pp. 27, 35), constitutes the dominant law tradition in the early Ottoman period. Tezcan (2010, p. 90) argues that at the end of the formative period, with the economic expansion brought by the conquests, the development of the monetary economy and the emergence of a certain monetary zone (*akçe* zone), feudal relations were dissolved and replaced by patrimonial power relations - and the feudal law have been replaced by religious law (Sharia). The aforementioned economic integration, the developing market economy and the political integration process that developed along with it, in the last analysis, have also been the main factor of social transformation (Tezcan, 2010, p. 89). During the reign of Mehmet II, land taxes began to be paid in cash, and with the expansion of the financial resources of the state, appointments were made to the administrative positions -in which Anatolian and Balkan aristocracy settled before- within the servants of the ruler (Tezcan, 2010, p. 91). According to him, with these appointments, feudal relations have been replaced by a kind of “political slavery” based on real or fictional ties, and the establishment of the

patrimonial administration apparatus emerges depending on this development (Tezcan, 2010, p. 90). Secondly, the Ottoman land registrations gradually decreased, and the jurists' law replaced the feudal law, and in this context, one of the main pillars of the dynasty's authority was changing (Tezcan, 2010, pp. 23-24). At the end of this process, *timar* lands cease to be a part of the feudal economy and become a part of the market economy and become an investment opportunity (Tezcan, 2010, p 23). As a result, Tezcan interprets the critical change process, especially starting at the end of the 15th century and extending to the 16th century, as the transformation of the Ottoman Empire from feudal landed property, exploitation and administration relations to a market-centered and patrimonial empire regime.

II.II.III. The Concept of Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP)

II.II.III.I. The Development of the Concept of the Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP)

The concept of the Asiatic mode of production has formed to characterize a particular social formation that has arisen in egalitarian communities based on the continuous emergence of a surplus and the consequent development of division of labor and social stratification. This concept has gained worldwide attention, gained new historical contexts, and the debate on it has deepened, especially in the 60s, with the contributions of French researchers.⁷⁰ The emergence of the concept is largely based on Marx's early treatises. Marx's first systematic studies of the structure of Eastern societies were included in a series of articles he wrote for the *Daily Tribune* in the 1850s (Krader, 1975, p. 80). Marx's work, based on Mark Wilks' *Historical Sketches of The South of India* (1810) and *Report No. 5* of The Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Affairs of the East India Company (Fifth Report, 1812), focuses in particular on the state of productive forces, land ownership and the structure of the state. Determining that Indian village communities are largely similar to self-sufficient 'republics', Marx states that the central state emerged as the sole sovereign and was based on rural communities (Krader, 1975, p. 86). Inspiring from the François Bernier's travel notes he written around the 1670s, who claimed that there was no private property on land in Turkey/Ottoman Empire, Iran and India, Marx developed the idea

⁷⁰ It is surprising to see that for a short time the concept was considered a standard concept of Marxist sociology. See: Lapassade & Lourau (1974, pp. 72-74).

that this situation might be a result of climatic features (Krader, 1975, pp. 86-87).⁷¹ For example, Marx, in his *New York Daily Tribune* article titled *British Sovereignty in India* (1853), stated that the sustainability of agriculture in certain parts of the world, especially in the Sahara, Arabia, Iran, India and Tatarstan, depends on the construction of artificial irrigation systems, and that the necessity of using water sparingly and jointly is the responsibility of oriental governments, he states that it reveals its centralizing intervention by providing public works services (Varga, 1985, p. 137). The point that Marx emphasizes is the decisive importance of self-sufficient community structures in Eastern societies, which have communal characteristics because there is no individual land ownership, and where there is no commodity production and primitive commercial relations. In addition to these, the fact that a state has complete dominance over either the land or the agricultural surplus -by tax or rent, which means the same thing- is the distinguishing feature of this social structure (Sawer, 1977, p. 44). Krader states that Marx's analyzes on the Asiatic mode of production (AMP) and especially focusing on Indian farming communities, in general terms -with some modifications- presented under ten main titles in *Capital/* Volume I. These titles can be listed as follows (Krader, 1975, pp. 122-23); (i) communal ownership or possession of the land, (ii) direct unity between agricultural production and handicrafts at the village level, (iii) a fixed form of division of labor, (iv) division of labor according to the traditional plan is shown by the mechanism of the community, that is, in case the need for handicrafts increases, even if the activities in this production area increase, the production stages are not divided into sub-branches (no extra specialization in organization and technique of production), (v) the production process is shaped by the immediate needs of the community, (vi) there is no or not developed commodity exchange within the village, (vii) production in village communities is independent of the division of labor in Indian society, (viii) surplus products are transformed into commodities, (ix) part of the surplus converted into commodities is owned by the state, (x) state collects taxes in the form of rent and/or in kind of labor/drudgery. While deepening these points, Marx mentions the following details (Krader, 1975, pp. 123-24); (i) In the village, part of the division of labor may correspond to domestic house-industry (spinning, weaving) and partly to activities such as out-of-home blacksmithing and carpentry, (ii) commodity exchange throughout

⁷¹ Bernier's travel notes was also used by A. Smith and Montesquieu in terms of grounding the argument of the stagnation of despotic Asian regimes and the their weakness in terms of the development potential (Parthasarathi, 2019, pp. 57-58).

Indian society is completely separate from commodity exchange in villages, (iii) there is no economic unity between the cities and the countryside, (iv) commodities transferred to the state treasury are based on the flow of commodity exchange between villages, (v) the state collects the rent income and it cannot be separated from the tax form, (vi) monetary relations in the economy have a very low effect, and even the commodities produced in the village never transform into monetary form. Marxist analyzes conducted after Marx's death expanded the scale of historical societies to which the concept of AMP could be applied. In this framework, Hoffmann (1985, p. 94) argues that the Asiatic mode of production emerged in Mesopotamia, Egypt, Sindh and Punjab, Jericho and even Çatalhöyük between the second half of the fourth millennium B.C. and the beginning of the third millennium BC.⁷² Olmeda (1985) and Bartra (1985) state that Aztec, Maya and Teotihuacan societies can also be studied within the framework of AMP. Jiro Hayakawa, on the other hand, in his studies on Japanese society, stated that there is a mode of production that emerged after the collapse of the tribal society and took the form of feudalism or slave-owning, a different kind of 'collective tax/tribute payment' and that it could be called AMP (Hilav, 1970, p. 11). Lewin (1985, p. 103) also states that the concept of AMP was applicable to Chinese society from 1600-1100 to 400 B.C., but there was no necessity to establish large artificial irrigation systems in China at that time.⁷³

Dunn (2011, p. 110) states that the concept of AMP is basically formulated in three different ways. The first of these is a universal intermediate form of transition from preclass or classless societies to class societies, the second is a mode of production developed only by specific societies that need large irrigation facilities depending on natural conditions, and the third is a specific mode of production dominated by a form of exploitation that develops due to debt-slavery. Godelier (1993, pp. 54-55) suggests that AMP can arise in two different forms: The first is large irrigation projects, etc. and the other by establishing dominance over communities engaged in animal husbandry activities. The common point of both forms can be formulated as "a minority's mediated exploitation of communities without directly interfering with the conditions of production but by providing a surplus of product or labor for their own benefit [tm]"

⁷² However, as Varga (1985, pp. 150-51) states, a final decision could not be reached even by experts on the subject, such as V. Struve, about whether the mode of production in ancient Egyptian was Asiatic or slave-owning.

⁷³ The lack of remarkable interest in AMP theory among Chinese researchers (Dirlik, 1996, p. 243), is a paradox worthy of further investigation.

(Godelier, 1993, p. 54). On the other hand, Lewin (1985, pp. 103-4) states that AMP can be established by forming military units to provide security against nomadic invasions. According to Lewin (1985, p. 104), the emergence of the central state in China is due to the strong military organizations created by the need for protection against the invasions of nomadic tribes. Lewin's approach replaces large irrigation projects with military defense organization, but formally adheres to the second interpretation of Dunn's categorization. Varga (1985, p. 137) argues that sinologists try to formulate the concept of AMP based on the local conditions of China, but this concept can only be used for regions where rainfall is insufficient. In this respect, it can be thought that the criticisms directed at Lewin are also valid for F. Tökei's arguments (1966), and therefore, it should be taken into account in terms of the use of the concept of AMP in the Ottoman context. In this context, it is seen that the concept of AMP is used both for ancient kingdoms that established irrigation systems and for ancient and medieval states with monarchical regimes. The reason for this is the application of the AMP concept to ancient civilizations (India, Egypt, Mesopotamia) and contemporary Eastern countries (Ottoman Empire, Iran, China, Russia) by European researchers, about which they are often not well informed, and reproduce orientalist themes (such as 'the stagnation of the East for millennia', 'continuous backwardness', 'lack of development', 'despotism' etc.).

In this social formation, both the existence of an exploiting class and the execution of public works for the common good of the society develop together under the organization of the state. Struve (1985, p. 191) underlines that this process occurs when the tribal chief gains power and can carry his authority to a despotic character as a result of trying to control the rivers by clan and family communities, as in the example of Southern Mesopotamia. As Godelier (1993, pp. 18-19) states, in the Asiatic mode of production, class differentiation is not the result of the exploitation of a particular individual by other individuals, but the fact that a particular individual or community undertakes and organizes general social functions and therefore gains the position of the dominant class through the state organization. The determining factor in this process is the execution of large irrigation projects under the leadership that unites and coordinates communities, which are necessary for cultivating fertile lands and which cannot be carried out by small communities alone. Particularly, the emergence of slave groups in the AMP reinforced the position of the central leadership, since these groups were both employed in public projects and given to the common property of the state/cities/sacred

places/temples to serve them (Struve, 1985, pp. 191-92). Thus, the central state (or ruler) builds and legitimizes its own political existence by basing it on both the necessity of public projects and the forced acquisition and control of slaves to work in them. This approach combines the concept of AMP with forms of slavery—for example, debt slavery—but the recognition of the state as the organizer of public projects obscures the clarity of its class position.

It is also necessary to examine the ownership forms included in the AMP concept. Researchers such as L. A. Sedov and V. V. Krylov, who were called as *neo-Aziatchiki* in the 1960s, associated the social order in which relatively independent agricultural communities at the local level were exploited by taxation by a bureaucratic and despotic regime (but there was no clear form of private ownership on the means of production) with the concept of AMP (Dunn, 2011, p. 83). Organization of the social leadership in the form of a state leads to the development of relations of production in which the state seizes the land ownership and the real producers who cultivate the land lose their ownership of the land and only have the right of possession on the land (Godelier, 1993, pp. 19-20). In summary, Godelier (1993, pp. 51-52) states that the special advantages enjoyed by a certain minority in return for the services rendered to the communities, over time, become an obligation, that is, a relationship of exploitation. Another important point in this scheme is that small kinship communities and local unions who cultivated the land before the central state came into existence collectively occupied the land after the emergence of the state. That is to say, we can speak of a dual collectivity: The collective unity of the direct producers and the collective unity of the ruling classes under the despot and state which appropriates the surplus product. In this scheme, although there was no private or collective ownership of the productive communities on the land, the land was regarded as the property of either the state or the elites (Hobsbawm, 1985, p. 62; Godelier, 1993, p. 52). Somer (1985, pp. 11-12) argues that in AMP the state develops on the basis of collective property and classes, whereas in Western-type class societies classes develop on private property and the state develops on classes. For this reason, although social classes in Western-type class societies have ideologies that will reflect their specific economic interests, it is thought that the dominant ideology emerges as a kind of ‘state ideology’ in societies where AMP is dominant (Somer, 1985, p. 12). Suret-Canale (1985, p. 37) draws attention to the fact that since the authority is used through a centralized despotism, the legitimacy of the administration is provided by economic projects that concern the whole society

(irrigation), or by structures that symbolically serve to glorify the unity of the society (such as palace, temple, tomb, etc.). Even if the proposals of Somer and Suret-Canale are accepted, it is not clear enough whether the political and ideological picture it reveals is a general phenomenon, or whether it reflects only a partial picture of social reality that has survived to the present day. Because Briant's (1985, p. 228) study on the Achaemenid Empire provides important data that the lands opened for agriculture through irrigation canals for the first time were considered the property of the king and only the right of possession was granted to direct producers on these lands. But the new lands that the king brought into his possession did not necessarily cover all the lands. In this case, it is necessary to accept that state property may also have specific historical origins, and therefore, there may be different lands belonging to both the state and family property in an area dominated by the state. For this reason, although the traces of ideologues clustered around the central state have survived to the present day, the political views of those who are influential at the local level and who are likely to have family or clan property are kept secret - so the existence of different ideologies is often overlooked.

One of the crucial points of the issue is whether the state has a supra-class position in AMP or whether classes have developed in AMP. As Dunn (2011, p. 110) points out, the thesis that class relations may not have developed definitively in societies dominated by AMP is a decisive part of the discussion. In the early phase of the AMP debate, S. I. Kovalev rejected the arguments that the state had a 'supra-class' position in the AMP, and stated that an exploitative class based on the ground rent which emerged with the state as a privileged group of civil servants, warriors, priests and they collectively hold means of production as their property (Dunn, 2011, p. 22). In this context, Varga (1985, p. 148) places the centrality of the state's role in AMP on two main pillars: (i) the primary and sole owner of the surplus product is the state, which appropriates it as ground rent, and (ii) all the exploiting strata get their income through the state. In this framework, while local communities can continue the egalitarian and cooperative production process, the central state is placed under the rule of a deified despot. One of the most prominent themes of the AMP discussions is thus formulated as the contradiction between lands in the collective possession of local communities and a despotic ruler/king/aristocracy free from their control. But Hobsbawm (1985, p. 63) argues that the society to which AMP refers either is not a class society in structure or has the most primitive form of class relations. A similar view is expressed by Lewin

(1985, p. 103) and he argues that the necessity of establishing a state organization before the division of society into antagonistic classes is the defining characteristic of AMP.

II.II.III.II. Analysis of Ottoman Social Structure under the Concept of AMP

One of the main concepts used to explain the historical development of the Ottoman social structure and state, the specific characteristics of the central power structure and its social bases is the concept of the Asiatic mode of production. The main researchers who gave this concept a central place in the analyzes of Ottoman society can be listed as Selahattin Hilav, Sencer Divitçiođlu, Baykan Sezer, Muzaffer Sencer, Stefanos Yerasimos, Çađlar Keyder, Huricihan İslamođlu and novelist Kemal Tahir. These researchers, especially in their early works, attach special importance to the concept of AMP and apply this concept to examine the Ottoman social structure. Although these researchers comment on the concept of AMP at different points, draw attention to controversial or irreconcilable points or (sometimes, instead of using the concept, they adopt alternative conceptualizations such as Asiatic despotism / TMP / patrimonialism, etc.), it is seen that they adhere to the general framework of the concept of AMP for a long time. In addition, the effects of the concept of AMP are indirectly observed in the works of Hikmet Kıvılcımlı and Niyazi Berkes. It would be meaningful to think that Kıvılcımlı's discussions constitute an exception that should be considered separately in terms of bringing an early projection about AMP.

The emergence of the AMP debate was influenced by the socialism/imperialism/underdevelopment debates in the second half of the 1960s. At this stage, the recognition of the AMP debate by Turkish intellectual circles first started with S. Hilav's article titled *Asya Tipi Üretim Biçimi*, published in *Eylem* journal in 1965 (Özcan, 2018a, p. 425). F. Naci's compilation of 1965 titled *Az gelişmiş Ülkeler ve Sosyalizm* and the translation of Maurice Godelier's book titled *La notion de mode de production asiatique et les schémas marxistes d'évolution des sociétés* into Turkish in 1966 expanded the scale of the discussion. In addition, the inclusion of AMP theory in H el ene Carr ere d'Encausse and Stuart Schram's book, which was translated into Turkish in 1966 with the title of *Asya'da Marksizm ve Milliyet ilik (Le Marxisme et l'Asie)*, was another source supporting the discussion. Furthermore, a series of translations and introductory articles by S. Hilav and K. Somer in 1966 increased the

interest in the subject.⁷⁴ A series of articles by N. Berkes, titled *Az gelişmişliğin Tarihsel Nedenleri*, published in *Yön* Journal in 1966, also contributed to the extension of the discussion to different fields such as religion, westernization and history of economics. It can be thought that Küçükömer was influenced by the AMP thesis in a relatively different way in 1960's.⁷⁵ On the other hand, Divitçioğlu (1971, p. 43, footnote 69) counts Küçükömer among the authors who tacitly or formally use the AMP theory. In addition, the section of K. Marx's *Grundrisse* (known as *Formen*) containing the concept of AMP was translated by Mihri Belli in 1967 and published under the name of *Kapitalizm Öncesi Ekonom Şekilleri*. On the other hand, a series of works published by H. Kıvılcımlı between 1965-70 contain various analyzes and arguments that he tried to reach a synthesis by combining his long-term studies on Ottoman history and the newly developing AMP debate. In this context, the works titled *Tarih Devrim Sosyalizm* published in 1965 and *Toplum Biçimlerinin Gelişimi* published in 1970 can be mentioned. It would be claimed that Kıvılcımlı's earlier studies had a profound effect on the novelist Kemal Tahir, who is considered an influential figure within the framework of the AMP debate.

Akkurt (2017, p. 91) argues that both Hilav and Divitçioğlu belong to the circle of K. Tahir and that their interest in the subject emerged largely with the influence of him.⁷⁶ The presence of theses on the originality of the Ottoman society and why it could not be an example of FMP in K. Tahir's novels, *Yorgun Savaşçı* and *Devlet Ana*, which can be considered as the *magnum opus* of the famous novelist and published in 1967, raised the interest on the subject, and a number of thinkers and researchers around K. Tahir were also involved in the discussion (Özcan, 2018a, p. 429). M. Sencer's work titled *Devrim Stratejisi Açısından Osmanlı Toplum Yapısı*, published in 1969, deepened the historical foundations of the AMP debate and brought it to the center of discussions

⁷⁴ See: Hilav, S., "Asya- tipi üretim nedir?", *Yön*, No. 150-151; "Sovyet bilim adamları Aysa tipi üretim biçimini tartışıyor", *Dönüşüm Dergisi*, 15 Kasım 1966; Varga, O., "Asya tipi üretim biçimi", Tr: Somer, K., *Sosyal Adalet*, no. 20. Also see: Hilav (1970, pp. 18-19, footnote 2).

⁷⁵ See: Belge (2017), *Küçükömer* (1969, 2009).

⁷⁶ On the other hand, H. Kıvılcımlı, who was a prison friend of K. Tahir in the arrests of the TKP case, reached conclusions close to the AMP theses in the 1930s in his studies on Ottoman history and implied that K. Tahir was also influenced by him in this framework (Kıvılcımlı, 1974, p. 240; Özcan, 2018a, pp. 428-29). If we look at the notebooks of K. Tahir published after his death, it is seen that he examined many academic sources on the subject, from Gordon Childe to Wittfogel, and took notes on many works that are reference sources about Ottoman history. Among these notes, there is an unnamed work of H. Kıvılcımlı, but it does not have a remarkable place among the notes (Tahir, 1992, p. 255).

about Ottoman social formation. In the two-volume work of N. Berkes, titled *100 Soruda Türkiye İktisat Tarihi* published in 1969 and 1970, there are comments that the Ottoman economy was neither feudal nor capitalist (but Asian/Oriental in nature and its political system was despotic) which show that he has become the indirect advocate of the AMP theses.⁷⁷ However, Berkes' analysis constitutes a politics-centered study that examines Ottoman social formation around the concept of Eastern despotism rather than the concept of mode of production. In addition, in Gülten Kazgan's book titled *İktisadi Düşünce veya Politik İktisadın Evrimi*, which was first published in 1969, the AMP thesis was presented as a Marxist theory of underdeveloped countries, and it was underlined that it could be an effective model for explaining structure of Turkish society (1981, pp. 431-32).

In the first half of the 1960s, the pre-capitalist mode of production and AMP discussions around *La Pensée* magazine and CERM (*Centre d'etudes recherches marxistes*) in France were translated into Turkish in the 1970s and made available to researchers. In this context, the compilation titled *Asya Tipi Üretim Tarzı* (Chesneaux & Varga & Lichteim et al., 1970) published in 1970 greatly influenced both the historical background and the theoretical framework of the discussions. In addition, B. Sezer's work titled *Asya Tarihinde Su Boyu Ovaları ve Bozkır Uygarlıkları*, which he completed in 1969 and presented as his PhD Thesis in 1971, made an important contribution to the subject by associating the historical background of AMP discussions with archaic history of Turkish tribes (Eğribel & Özcan, 2011, p. 6).⁷⁸

In this context, it is necessary to mention the doctoral thesis titled *Turquie: Le processus d'un sous-développement*, completed in 1973 and the first volume of which was translated into Turkish and published in 1974, by S. Yerasimos, who applied the AMP thesis to his analysis of Ottoman history with various commentaries and extensions. Although it has not received the attention it deserves in the academic community, it cannot be ignored that it makes an advanced contribution to the debate. The publication of H. İslamoğlu and Ç. Keyder's article titled *Osmanlı Tarihi Nasıl Yazılmalı?* in 1977, shows that although the AMP discussions have lost their impact in general, they are still on the agenda in the academic community. Also the articles of A. Savaş Akat, İ. Küçükömer, and S. Akşin published in the journal of *Toplum ve Bilim* in

⁷⁷ See: Berkes (1969, pp. 26-27).

⁷⁸ The title of the doctoral thesis version of the same study is *Doğu'da Yerleşik ve Göçebe Toplumların Sosyolojik Özellikleri Üzerine Bir Deneme*.

1977, show that this interest continues in the late 70's.⁷⁹ It is possible to understand that AMP debate continued in the 1980s -even though its actuality gradually decreased- from the publications such as S. Nişanyan's translation of *Grundrisse* in 1980, and from H. Berktaş's indirect response to the AMP debate in his 1983 work, *Kabileden Feodalizme*, and the translation of the second book of the CERM circle into Turkish in 1985, titled *İlk Sınıflı Toplumlar: Asyagil Üretim Tarzı ve Doğu Despotizmi* (Suret-Canale, J. & Hobsbawm, E. & Hoffmann, E. Et all., 1985).

The examples in which the AMP debate showed its effect under the concept of tributary mode of production and the original aspects of the Ottoman-Turkish social structure compared to the European example were examined within the framework of democratization discussions emerged with the 80s. S. Gürsel's doctoral thesis accepted in 1979 and titled *La transition d'une formation tributaire à une formation périphérique : l'exemple de l'empire ottoman*, R. Ege's doctoral thesis of the same date in the name of *La signification du thème de stagnation caractérisant le Mode de Production Asiatique dans la conception marxiste de l'histoire*⁸⁰, A. İnel's PhD study (dated 1982) *La Turquie entre l'ordre et le développement Éléments d'analyse sur le rôle de l'état dans le processus de développement*, Ş. Pamuk's book titled *Ottoman-Turkish Economic History in One Hundred Questions (1500-1914)* which published in 1988 and Ç. Keyder's book titled as *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*, published in 1989, can be evaluated within this framework. Although the concept of AMP has been largely abandoned in these recent studies, the concrete content of the concept and its predictions about the pre-capitalist history of non-Western societies have been articulated with new forms of analysis. Another approach, which gives a more central role to the concepts of Marxist political economy than İnel and Keyder, and which carries out a reading of Ottoman history around the concept of tributary mode of production, is F. Başkaya's work titled *Bir Devlet Geleneğinin Anatomisi: Yediyüz* which published in 1999. Among the rare works that reconsider the AMP debate in the 2000s are the following: S. Arslan's *Osmanlı/Türkiye Tarihi ve Toplumunu Değerlendirmesi* -published in 2013- which aims to conduct an indirect political critique of the above works, in which Ottoman society is evaluated with AMP theses, R. Ege's

⁷⁹ Since Akşin's later works refer to contradictory concepts about Ottoman social structure, I leave his theory out of consideration. For example, Akşin (1987, p. 10) argues that in the 'classical period' of the Ottoman state was organized as 'central feudalism or Asian mode of Production' and evolved into 'decentralized feudalism' with the development of tax farming etc.

⁸⁰ Since I could not reach this PhD thesis, it is excluded from the scope of this thesis.

article titled *Pertinence et limites du concept de 'mode de production asiatique' appliqué à l'espace ottoman* (2014) and A. Aytekin's book chapter published in 2022 entitled *Eskimeyen Bir Tartışma: 'Asya Tipi Üretim Tarzı' ve Osmanlı Toplumsal Formasyonu*.

As stated above, the first text that directly influenced the emergence of the AMP debate in Turkey is S. Hilav's article published in 1965. In this article, Hilav (1965, pp. 71-72) summarizes the views of Marx and Engels on AMP and gives information about the general framework of the concept, using the articles of Ferenc Tökei, Charles Parrain and Jean Chesneaux, who participated in the AMP debate in the 1960s. Hilav's (1965) assessment, in general terms, includes the relations of ownership, state organization, class schema and ideological formation thesis developed in the frame of the AMP concept, on the other hand, he does not make a clear statement as to whether the using the concept of AMP is suitable for Ottoman society. According to Hilav, the characteristics of the Asiatic mode of production can be listed as follows: (i) lands and means of production are jointly owned, and the state emerges as the protector/maintainer of this form of ownership (1965, pp. 76-81), (ii) because the state represents the common interests of the community, it appropriates the surplus product without the aid of extra-economic relations (1965, pp. 76, 79), (iii) donation of lands to civil servants does not change the autonomous organization of production by local communities, feudal form of *fief* does not emerge (1965, p. 82), (iv) cities do not play a significant role in economic life and are an appendage to the countryside (1965, p. 83), (v) The dominant ideology in the Asiatic social formation is the belief in the immutability of the world and the individual has no role/value in this belief system (1965, p. 84). Hilav (1965, pp. 81-82) counts China, Vietnam, India, Ancient Iran, Aztec, Maya, ancient Crete and Mycenaean civilizations and Egypt among the societies dominated by the Asiatic mode of production, He states that there is a need for an examination of the ancient Mesopotamian and Anatolian civilizations and early Byzantine state in this respect. With his reference to Byzantine society and Anatolian civilizations, Hilav also provides a clue to the reader that he has a tendency to extend the subject to the Ottoman Empire. In another article about AMP, which Hilav later wrote in a Turkish translation with CERM discussions, this trend becomes more evident (Chesneaux et al, 1970, pp. 10-22). In this article, Hilav (1970, pp. 12-20) criticizes the adherence to the Western model or Stalinist templates in the study of Ottoman/Turkish society, thus he argues that the interest in the concept of AMP stems from the

practical/political and theoretical needs brought about by the direct relationship between Turkish society and the socialist struggle, and that the concept of AMP is a useful assumption in this respect.

S. Divitçioğlu is another thinker who examines Ottoman history around the concept of AMP and has the widest effects on the subject. Divitçioğlu's studies are central to the AMP debate and continue to be the main source of reference from the second half of the 1960s to the present. The framework drawn by Divitçioğlu generally constitutes the main topics of the AMP debate in Ottoman society. For this reason, below, both Divitçioğlu's theses will be summarized and the theses of other researchers examining the AMP topic will be tried to be presented by comparing them with Divitçioğlu's theses.

Divitçioğlu (1971, pp. 28-32) considers AMP to be one of the six basic modes of production detailed in the works of Marx and Engels and therefore has a remarkable theoretical significance. Divitçioğlu (1981, p. 54) argues that it is not possible to analyze the Ottoman social formation by taking the Western feudalism scheme as a model, and that the feudalism model cannot even be accepted as a hypothesis in the study of Ottoman history. Similarly, criticism of using the example of Western feudalism can be seen in Akat (1977, p. 34). Divitçioğlu (1981, p. 134) bases this thesis on the proposition that Ottoman social structure differs from European feudalism in terms of land ownership, social class structure and class relations, and social contradictions in general, and claims that this may be based on AMP. According to Sencer (1973, p. 10), considering the concrete historical relations, each society has different appearances from each other, but they also show the characteristics of general social types as well as the characteristics acquired by societies depending on time and place. Sencer (1973, pp. 16, 90-91) argues that the structure of Ottoman society differed from the type of nomadic society, and that it had neither a classless society nor a specific structure that could be described as feudalism. Similarly, Sezer states that Ottoman society cannot be considered under the concept of feudalism or under the nomadic-steppe-empire model (Vergili, 2000, p. 15). On the other hand, Sezer opposes the application of the concept of AMP to all Eastern societies and states that when AMP is used specifically in the Ottoman society, the evaluations that take the Ottoman social formation back from the current stage of development, similar to the slave-owning mode of production, are incorrect (Aksakal, 2018, p. 178). In this respect, it should be underlined that Sezer uses the concept of AMP with certain annotations and rather tries to make an original

analysis of concrete reality.⁸¹ On the other hand, K. Tahir has developed a more complex and contradictory view on the subject, which is sometimes directed towards idealist constructions. The author, stating that the Ottomans were against feudalism (Tahir, 1992, pp. 55, 226)⁸², argues that it should be examined with the AMP hypothesis in terms of Ottoman land law and social stratification structure (Tahir, 1992, p. 257).⁸³ Küçükömer (1977, pp. 8-12) argues that AMP has two main origins, hydraulic and nomadic, and that the Ottoman social structure can be examined within the concept of AMP, based on its nomadic past. Yerasimos (1977, p. 350) states that the Ottoman state owned eighty eight percent of the existing lands and that the dominant mode of production in Ottoman society came close to AMP due to the existence of a ruling class that seized the land rent in the form of taxes. Yerasimos' (1977, p. 351) critical comment on this issue is that the function of organizing large public works was not a decisive feature for the Ottoman state.

Sencer (1973, p. 281) argues that Ottoman society can be evaluated within the framework of the AMP model in terms of the relationship between labor and means of production, which is the most decisive factor in the evolution of society types. Sencer (1973, p. 37), argues that historians such as Ö. Lütfü Barkan, Fuat Köprülü, Halil İnalcık and Mustafa Akdağ realized that the Ottoman social structure could not be understood within the framework of feudalism, but they could not reach a clear proposition about

⁸¹ When it comes to the 90s, it is seen that Sezer changed his views on the AMP thesis somewhat and gave a meaning to the concept of AMP within the framework of orientalism. According to Sezer (1991, p. 44), the concept of AMP, as a Western-centered concept, is the reflection of an approach that finds the only problem of Eastern societies in "not being Western" and ignores the specific problems of Eastern societies.

⁸² However, Tahir states that there were Balkan and Eastern provinces where feudal relations were seen in Ottoman society (1992, p. 42), on the other hand, he also referred to 'feudal lords' as civil servants (1992, p. 108). It is understood that the author depends on the argument that the development of feudalism in the Ottoman Empire was prevented in the final analysis.

⁸³ On the other hand, Kemal Tahir also evaluates the Ottoman social order and state with the following alternative concepts; 'plunder economy' (1992, pp. 55-56), 'Asian type of feudalism' (1992, p. 113), 'degenerated AMP' (1992, p. 254), 'non-Western despotism' or 'non-Western mode of production' etc. Some of these concepts are direct reflections of current debates in the 1960s, for example, the definition of the central feudal social formation within the concept of 'Asian feudalism' bears clear traces of Behice Boran's theses. It is possible to come across the concept of 'degenerated AMP' in Divitçioğlu's studies. The concept of 'non-Western despotism' or 'non-Western mode of production' is simply an inversion of the term 'Eastern despotism'. In addition, Tahir criticized the analysis of the 'plunder economy' in the following years and accepted that an empire could not survive only on plunder (1992, p. 312), he also re-evaluated the concept of despotism and claimed that the Ottoman ruler was not a despot (1992, p. 226).

which type of society it was. Considering the subject like this, according to Sencer (1973, p. 270), the Ottoman society should be analyzed within the framework of the concept of AMP, since the preconditions for the transition from feudalism to capitalism were not formed in the Ottoman society and their formation was not possible due to the social structure. K. Tahir has a similar view and argues that since the development of feudalism in Ottoman society was prevented, it was not possible to develop private property and to create conditions for capital accumulation, and therefore, it was not possible to switch to the capitalist mode of production. Secondly, it is necessary to deal with the formation of classes in Ottoman society. Divitçioğlu deals with the class structure of Ottoman society and supports the AMP thesis based on this analysis. Divitçioğlu's analysis on this issue is quite clear. According to the author (Divitçioğlu, 1981, p. 68), Ottoman society was a class-based society and was divided into two basic classes: The state, which owned the land, which was the primary means of production, and the *reâyâ*, which was deprived of land ownership. In this context, Divitçioğlu (1981, p. 60) argues that the state is not a social class *per se* and that it is 'represented' by the social segments benefiting from the rent of the lands owned by the state, and divides these segments into three categories as palace/*sultan*, military/*seyfiye* and scholars/*ilmiye*. On the other hand, Divitçioğlu (1981, pp. 62-63) states that this ruling class does not have aristocratic privileges. K. Tahir (1992, p. 31, 116-17) also supports the idea that there was no aristocratic group in Ottoman society, and also argues that some social differentiations depending on wealth do not mean a class distinction. In this context, K. Tahir differs from other researchers using the concept of AMP in that he argues that the Ottoman social structure was divided into two as civil servants-administrators and *reâyâ*, but this structure did not correspond to a class relationship. K. Tahir (1992, pp. 152-53) states that stratification was prevented in the Ottoman society, that civil servants could not be considered a class subject (1992, p. 221), and therefore the 'class-based-state' did not emerge. According to Yerasimos, the Ottoman society was a class-based society and the presence of slave-origin civil servants, cavalrymen, Islamic scholars and merchants provides sufficient data to identify these classes. According to the author (Yerasimos, 1977, p. 153), slave-origin civil servants, whose origins are in the Seljuk *ghulams* and used in the Byzantine state, are the most suitable state officials for 'Asian type' societies and were widely used in the Ottomans as well. Secondly, Yerasimos (1977, p. 293) argues that *sipâhîs* constitute a privileged and exploitative class, but states that this class cannot be considered a ruling class, since

it is ultimately under the supervision of the state and excluded from the central bureaucracy. According to Divitçioğlu (1981, p. 120), the surplus-product (rent) or surplus-labor created by the village communities (*reâyâ*) is transferred to the state in the form of taxes, tribute and generalized drudgery, and the rent that is not directly transferred to the state is transferred to the *sipâhî*, who is an official of the state. Küçükömer (1977, pp. 12, 14) states that the Ottoman ruling class emerged as a praetorian ruling class that did not interfere with production, and they constituted a separate society above the direct producers. In this context, while the ruling class protects itself as a warrior caste, with the influence of its nomadic origin, it establishes its relationship with production in the form of external control (the realization of tax or tribute) (Küçükömer, 1977, p. 23). Sencer (1973, pp. 268-69) argues that the military class benefits from the land rent captured by the state, is exempt from taxation, and states that this class -including the *ulama*- is the 'fighting and ruling' class. K. Tahir, on the other hand, put forward a more contradictory series of views on the social position of the Ottoman *reâyâ*. According to him this social segment resembles the institution of slavery, but elsewhere he states that there was no serfdom in the Ottoman Empire and that free peasantry was a dominant form in agriculture (Tahir, 1992, pp. 96, 199). Küçükömer (1977, p. 24) similarly underlined that the *timar* holders could not directly intervene in the lands cultivated by the peasants, and that the peasant families worked freely within the 'closed field system'.

Divitçioğlu argues that the land rent created by the *reâyâ* is transferred to the state through taxes and that this model is similar to the AMP model pointed out by Marx. Therefore, in this model, there is no exploitation based on personal relations, and the exploitative relationship takes place between a class representing the state and direct producers (Divitçioğlu, 1981, p. 92). Sezer, on the other hand, argues that the share taken from production by the central authority does not always correspond to a relationship of exploitation, and that the ruling class is not the owner of the surplus product, but a group that saves it in the name of God (Sezer, 1979, pp. 46, 53; Vergili, 2000, p. 18). Sezer's approach -in general- does not foresee the development of exploitative relations in AMP because he argues that the state form that fits the AMP model emerges not from class conflict but from the balance between social groups (Sezer, 1979, p. 60; Vergili, 2000, p. 19). Similarly, K. Tahir states that the Ottoman Empire developed as an 'Oriental state' without experiencing class contradictions within itself (1992, p. 311) and that forms of exploitation based on slave labor, serfdom

or wage labor did not emerge as seen in Western societies (1992, p. 304). K. Tahir tends to analyze guilds, artisans and workers as state officials (Tahir, 1992, p. 209). Sezer's approach, on the other hand, differs from Divitçioğlu by having an *étatist* emphasis and resembles K. Tahir. In his novel *Yorgun Savaşçı* (1969), K. Tahir argues that the Ottoman state has been '*étatist*' since Orhan Beg, and that shipyards, gunpowder workshops, mines, *mîrî* lands, public works, madrasahs, judicial institutions and guilds were controlled by the state (Kırbaş, 1987, p. 24). According to Sezer, in the AMP model, the state is a determining factor in the development of the industry in cities, and even turns industrial producers into a kind of state-officer or '*kapikulu*' (Sezer, 1979, p. 72; Vergili, 2000, p. 19).

According to Divitçioğlu (1981, p. 87), the source of legitimacy of the Ottoman state emerges in the same way as the source of legitimacy of the state in the social formation dominated by the AMP: The organization of public affairs and services. In this framework, a part of the surplus product is "necessarily allocated to public works and services [tm]" (Divitçioğlu, 1981, p. 93). Sencer (1973, p. 267) similarly states that a part of the surplus product appropriated within the framework of the *timar* system is used to cover public services for war purposes, the expenses of public officials who perform these services, and the equipment and transportation costs necessary during wartime. According to Sezer, the defining feature of AMP is the organization of artificial irrigation systems by the state as a public service within the framework of the need to organize production and defense service against plunderer communities (Sezer, 1979, p. 39; Vergili, 2000, p. 17). These two organizations constitute the basis of political union because the conditions of existence of production also depend on the collective organization of war and irrigation services (Sezer, 1979, p. 39; Vergili, 2000, p. 18). Although K. Tahir (1992, pp. 237, 247) states that the '*benevolent/gracious state*' (*kerim devlet/hayırlı devlet*) similarly organizes public services through bureaucracy and military staff, he admits the fact that the Ottoman state was not based on a hydraulic basis due to geographical conditions. It should also be noted that Yerasimos (1977, p. 351) found it irrelevant to evaluate the Ottoman society within the framework of public investments/irrigation systems regarding affiliate it with the frame of AMP.

Third, let's see how the Ottoman land system (*mîrî* land regime) was evaluated around the concept of AMP and in terms of various social segments. According to Divitçioğlu, with the exception of free estates and *waqfs*, land ownership in Ottoman society belonged to the state and the *reâyâ* possessed the land individually (1981, p.

119). In this model, villagers make agricultural production for use value in a way to form a closed village economy, and their in-kind exchange within the village or in local markets does not change the subsistence character of production (Divitçioğlu, 1981, pp. 74-76). On the other hand, Sezer differs from Divitçioğlu by stating that the thesis that the village economy is self-sufficient should be considered invalid if the public services undertaken by the central government -especially artificial irrigation- are taken into account (Sezer, 1979, p. 57; Vergili, 2000, p. 18). K. Tahir (1992, p. 125), on the other hand, is of the opinion that the village unit constitutes an autarkic structure in Ottoman society.

Divitçioğlu (1981, pp. 70-73) argues that the general status of the *reâyâ* is free peasantry, since the *sipâhîs* are not the heirs of the property of *reâyâ*, they are not under the category of serfs, and they are not exploited under the obligation of drudgery. According to this approach, direct producers—individually holding their status of *freedom*—are not generally considered free social segments. A similar view is also found in Sezer. According to Sezer, direct producers have the status of free peasants, but there is ‘general slavery’ exist (Sezer, 1979, p. 60; Vergili, 2000, p. 19). On the other hand, the *sipâhîs* -who possessed the *timar* lands- do not have a right or ownership on the land (Divitçioğlu, 1981, p. 52), they do not have the right of administrative and economic dominance (1981, p. 138), and for this reason, the social status of the *sipâhî* is determined as officer-soldier rather than feudal lords (Divitçioğlu, 1981, pp. 52-53). Sencer reaches a similar conclusion. According to Sencer (1973, pp. 233-34), the determining principle of property relations in the Ottoman state was the ‘communal land regime’ (*mîrî*), and in this regime, with the central authority controlling the productive forces, the individual property on the land was eliminated and communal ownership was expanded. Sezer also states that in the AMP model, land ownership belongs to the state, but the producers have private property rights over the means of production such as a plow etc. (Sezer, 1979, p. 46; Vergili, 2000, p. 19). Küçükömer (1977, p. 27) argues that the distribution of lands by the central state is necessary for the reproduction of the state, the redistribution of lands is a prerequisite for reproduction, and the prevention of private property in land is a way to prevent the redistribution of domination.

However, unlike Divitçioğlu, Sencer stated that trade in Ottoman society was so developed that it could not be included in the scope of AMP (1973, p. 275), that some drudgery continued even if they were converted into money (1973, p. 262), that the *reâyâ* did not have the freedom to leave the land (1973, p. 259) and that he states that

there are examples (such as free *timars*/property *timars*/ autonomous government's lands/ manors and tribal lands etc.) that placed outside of the *mîrî* land regime (1973, p. 262-67). Yerasimos, on the other hand, puts forward a somewhat different view. According to him, the *timar* system and therefore the existence of *sipâhîs* do not directly necessitate the evaluation of AMP as the dominant mode of production. On the contrary, the *timar* system bears the traces of the tribal structure and has an evolutionary tendency towards feudalism (Yerasimos, 1977, p. 201). This situation can also be observed in regions where the *mîrî* land regime could not show a great development, for example in the *yurtluks* given to the tribal leaders (Yerasimos, 1977, p. 250).

As stated at the beginning of the chapter, the theses that H. Kıvılcımlı started to formulate in the mid-1930s turned into a series of works in an advanced form in the 1960s, when the discussions on Ottoman history and mode of production were intense, and were presented to the attention of researchers through these works.⁸⁴ In this section, I will try to briefly present Kıvılcımlı's theses. In H. Kıvılcımlı's studies on Ottoman history, an alternative argument has been developed that, in particular, the early Ottoman history is different from Western examples, and that collective land ownership is dominant and this constitutes a unique historical synthesis that bears traces of the 'barbaric phase' of history of humanity. Although this argument cannot be directly evaluated within the AMP thesis, it is seen that Kıvılcımlı partially reached conclusions close to the AMP thesis in his own interpretation of history. Kıvılcımlı's theses were formulated partly inspired by Morgan's schema, which deals with the stages of historical development, before the publication of the *Grundrisse* and especially before the AMP debates that matured in France in the 1960s. Although these theses cannot be handled directly within the framework of the concept of AMP, they can be evaluated as an alternative way of explaining societies based on collective ownership that matured before feudalism and slave-owning mode of production. In this context, the social formation that Kıvılcımlı named '*dirlik düzeni*' (order of *dirlik*) can be accepted as one of the AMP variations. For example, his analyzes on the Ottoman land regime and the

⁸⁴ Özcan (2018b, p. 104) argues that Kıvılcımlı started his studies on history in 1925, based on unpublished manuscripts. Since there is no clear thesis on Ottoman history in these manuscripts, it would be more accurate to accept the formulation of the outlines of Kıvılcımlı's theses on history as the 1930s. The fact that the first announcement about the publication of Kıvılcımlı's work titled *Osmanlı Tarihinin Maddesi* was made on the back cover of his work named *Gündelikçi İş ve Sermaye*, published in 1935, can be considered as evidence for this thesis (Özcan, 2018b, p. 169).

structure of social classes in his work titled *Fetih ve Medeniyet*, published in 1953, precedes the AMP discussions of the 1960s.

Kıvılcımlı's historical analysis is based on the idea that human communities characterized by the common property ownership in historical moments of savagery and barbarism, while the development of civilization reveals private property and social class differences. In this context, he especially interprets pre-capitalist historical transformations around the cycles of establishment and institutionalization of civilizations and their destruction or reformation with egalitarian barbarian raids. According to Kıvılcımlı (1970, p. 30), hunting activity constitutes the basis of the lower moment of the barbaric age, the shepherd activity constitutes the middle moment, and a 'mobile' land ownership emerges with this moment. According to Kıvılcımlı (1970, p. 37), the emergence of settled communities dealing with agricultural activities with the Neolithic revolution did not abolish communal property, on the contrary, it led to the emergence of a social order in which the land is the common property of the society, and the relationship of individuals with the land is not personally, but through the commune. In this framework, Kıvılcımlı (1970, pp. 39-40) states that the social order based on common production and common ownership, which started in Mesopotamia, is not the only example, and that the different types of primitive society identified by Marx have a common essence determined on the basis of common ownership. These society types are listed by Kıvılcımlı as Asian-type, Slavic-type, Germanic-type, Ancient-type and ancient Roman-type and are reduced to four archetypes such as Asiatic, Ancient, Slavic and Germanic (Kıvılcımlı, 1970, p. 40). Based on *Grundrisse*, Kıvılcımlı (1970, p. 43) states that the development lines of these four archetypes refer to common origins and draws attention to some common features of the urban common ownership form that founded the early Roman society and the Eastern common ownership form. According to him, the advanced form of Eastern common ownership emerged in the subtropical riverside cities, which are also referred to in the AMP discussion, and the God figure as the 'imaginary tribal entity' sanctified as the leader of the society in these cities continued to exist in Greek and Roman cities as well (Kıvılcımlı, 1970, p. 45). According to him, the founding principle of the Eastern common property system can be formulated as "excessive labor" being given to the upper community, in other words, individuals and communes present the surplus product from their own livelihoods to the union of communes and tribes (Kıvılcımlı, 1970, p. 57). In this case, these communities gain the character of a person as a

representation of unity and embody in the figure of despot or temple/God representing common property. Kıvılcımlı (2007, p. 122) is of the opinion that one of the distinctive roots of the Muslim-Turks, the dominant group that founded the Ottoman state, is the Turkish groups that carry the traditions of the moment of barbarism and are subject to the “primitive socialist Oghuz tradition [tm]”. For this reason, one of the sources of power that renews the ‘degenerate’ Roman-Byzantine and Islamic civilizations on an egalitarian basis is traced back to the social structure of these Turkmen groups, which Kıvılcımlı attributed purity. In this context, Kıvılcımlı uses the concept set of his analysis on the line of barbarism-civilization on the common property system, its origins, development and dissolution in his analyzes on Ottoman society and state. He has drawn a similarity between the destruction of the ‘degenerate’ Roman civilization by the Germanic invasions and the destruction of the ‘degenerate’ Byzantine state by the Turkish-Islamic raids. In this framework, Kıvılcımlı suggested that both lines of development be interpreted within a line of struggle between the communist barbarians and the Roman/Byzantine civilization. According to Kıvılcımlı (1970, p. 55), as the Byzantine Empire became the target of barbarian raids throughout history, significant changes occurred in the form of land ownership, and the direct producers’ ownership of the land brought the land regime closer to the Asian form rather than private property.⁸⁵

Kıvılcımlı establishes an ideal historical relationship between the establishment of the Ottoman Empire, the collapse of the ‘degenerate’ Byzantium, and the Islamic renaissance. According to Kıvılcımlı (1953, p. 15), who argues that a corruption process similar to that of the Roman Empire was also valid for the Byzantine state, Byzantium

⁸⁵ On the other hand, Kıvılcımlı adopted a more agnostic interpretation in his work titled *Osmanlı Tarihinin Maddesi*. According to him, the Ottoman state structure dating back to Mehmet I is a ‘hybrid’ intermediate form like the medieval feudal states, and neither ‘Asian type production’ nor ‘Absolutely tyrannical Eastern rule’ is not seen in these transition states (Kıvılcımlı, 2007, p. 157). This thesis points to a great contradiction in terms of Kıvılcımlı’s history thesis because the author both sees the transition from barbarism to civilization in the origin of AMP, and avoids making a similar argument for the Ottoman society, which he states that he went through the same process. Because Kıvılcımlı, who associates AMP (1970, 2012) with the collectivist barbarism tradition in some of the works discussed above, sees the Asiatic form as the “antique empire form in which the last vestiges of primitive nomadism were wiped out [tm]” in his *Osmanlı Tarihinin Maddesi* (2007, p. 165). While he evaluates Asian-type land relations as a model of the equitable distribution of land on the one hand, on the other hand, the process after the 16th century, when private property and social classes formed on the land with the start of *mukata’a*, is “perpetuation of the Asian status quo of Ottoman society [tm]” (2007, p. 523). It is clear that there are contradictions between these interpretations. In this framework, Berktaş (1983a, p. p. 292, footnote 19) sees Kıvılcımlı as the defender of the AMP thesis.

began to feudalize with the 11th century, village lands were taken over by local landowners, and local powers dominated both direct producers and Byzantine state. According to him, the Ottoman advance eliminated the Byzantine lords (*tekfurs*), but did not directly replace the *tekfurs*, but took the path of changing the social order (Kıvılcımlı, 2012, p. 273). Kıvılcımlı (2012, p. 373) sees the reason for this situation as the Ottomans' conversion to Islam and their adoption of "pure human democracy and Land-Property-Social Justice principles peculiar to the first days of Islam [tm]", and therefore, according to Kıvılcımlı Ottomans have propagated the principles of "mîrî land regime established in the era of Rashidun Caliphs [tm]" in the lands they captured. The meaning of this situation can be interpreted as the Ottomans creating a 'Renaissance' in Islamic civilization as barbarians who "have not lost their pure nomadic spirit [tm]" (Kıvılcımlı, 1953, p. 19). Kıvılcımlı (2012, p. 274) states that the *mîrî* land regime emerged in the years when Islam was born and that it can be traced back to the times when primitive socialist societies had just entered civilization, and that it could be seen in the lands dedicated to God in the first cities.⁸⁶

Kıvılcımlı, who placed the land regime on the basis of the 'renaissance' created by the Ottomans, analyzes this regime by using the concept of *dirlik*-order (*dirlik düzeni*). According to him, the *dirlik* system has the nature of an egalitarian social order in which the property of land is the common property of all Muslims, the right to dispose of the land is entrusted directly to the producers, and the timariot *sipâhîs*, who were called *dirlikçi* in this sense, do not own the land, but only consist of soldiers who control the production and protect the producers. Kıvılcımlı (1970, p. 55), who states that the lands are divided into farms and distributed to the producers in this way, claims that in this method, the people collectively own the lands called *mîrî*, and they have the right to dispose of the land belonging to them, and this scheme corresponds to the concept of AMP stated by Marx. Kıvılcımlı (2007, p. 282) evaluates 'barbarian socialism' in

⁸⁶ The basis of this view can partly be traced back to the thoughts of Ebulula Zeynelabidin and Faik Bercavi. Ebulula's article titled *Hukuku tasarruflıyei arazi hülasaları*, which he wrote in *Sırat-ı Müstakim* in 1912, basically expresses the thesis that the Islamic land regime prevented the emergence of Western feudalism (Şanda, 1975, p. 26). It is understood from the interview published in 1992 that Faik Bercavi had close relations with Nazım Hikmet and the TKP circle in the 1930s (Bercavi, 1992). Bercavi's thesis, which he formulated and discussed in the 1930s and published in the mid-1940s, suggests that Islam and socialism can be integrated. The arguments he used while grounding this thesis (state ownership in the land, beyt'ül-mal, Islamic ideal of equality) largely overlap with the theses of Kıvılcımlı, see: Garaudy & Bercavi (2012, pp. 131-36).

general and ‘Islamic socialism’ in particular as the basis of *mîrî* land regime.⁸⁷ This actually points to a social formation in which the state owns the lands and is directly called the Asian type (Kıvılcımlı, 2007, p. 466).

In this context, Kıvılcımlı (2007, p. 465), who compares the early Ottoman period and the post-16th century, when the *dirlik* order degenerated, argues that social classes that did not exist in the *mîrî* land regime but emerged in the *mukata'a* regime - thus the caste society turned into a class society. Kıvılcımlı (2007, p. 181), who claims that four "state classes" or castes were dominant in the Ottoman classical period, specifically states that these groups were degenerated and transformed with the 16th century. According to him, this change can also be observed through the Islamization of culture, and while the traces of the "classless Central Asian Turkish society" are gradually being erased, the effect of the "Middle Eastern civilization society with social class" becomes evident (Kıvılcımlı, 2007, p. 183). In the classical era, the Ottoman society consisted of two separate layers called the ‘state population’ (*devlet nüfusu*) and the state classes (*devlet sınıfları/kapı halkı*). Stating that the state classes are made up of four castes called (i) *ilmiye*, (ii) *seyfiye*, (iii) *mülkiye* and (iv) *kalemiye*, he asserts that the first two of them originate from the primitive socialist traditions of “*kam*”s and “*ilb*”s, the last two were formed as a result of the denial of a classless society (Kıvılcımlı, 2007, p. 181). In the early period, the state assumes the role of ‘Great Judge’ between the social segments and transforms all of those as a part of state, such as upper classes, who may have a small amount of private property, and the large lower classes, which are considered to be an effective element of the land economy because they do not have private property (Kıvılcımlı, 2007, p. 85). On the other hand, as class relations developed, state classes became *dirlikçi*, *mukataacı*, *sarraf*, usurer and so on, the state turns into a hierarchy composed of exploiting and ruling classes (Kıvılcımlı, 2007, p. 518). It is possible to list Kıvılcımlı’s main arguments as follows; (i) The Ottoman state is based on common ownership as in the examples of ancient Greece, Rome and Islam, (ii) the pattern of the destruction of degenerating civilizations by barbarian raids is also valid for the establishment of the Ottoman state, (iii) the emergence of the Ottomans on the stage of history also constitutes a renaissance for the degenerating Islamic

⁸⁷ It is possible to note the existence of a similar debate in another area. For the reflection of the Asian type of socialism debate on Chinese history (*Wang-Mang* government), see: Eberhard (1995, pp. 102-103).

civilization, (iv) The Ottoman state was founded on the *dirlik* system, and with its deterioration, it degenerated from its egalitarian origin.

Finally, it would be appropriate to consider the theses of İslamoğlu and Keyder (1977). In two successive articles by Keyder (1976) and İslamoğlu & Keyder (1977), the Ottoman state was considered as an example of AMP and the structure of the Ottoman society and state was tried to be analyzed based on this concept. İslamoğlu and Keyder (1977) are included in the group of researchers discussed above, arguing that the dominant mode of production in the Ottoman social formation is AMP. On the other hand, since İslamoğlu and Keyder's evaluations deal with the concept of AMP with a greater emphasis on tributary relations, they enable a historical-intellectual articulation with the concept of TMP, which I will examine in the next subsection. In this respect, the propositions of İslamoğlu and Keyder can be considered as a kind of intermediate form between AMP and TMP. These two researchers will abandon the AMP thesis in the later stages of their careers and will gradually adopt the concept of tributary mode of production (TMP). To summarize İslamoğlu and Keyder's (1977, p. 56) analysis, firstly, they argue that in AMP, the state extracts the surplus product produced by the free peasantry under the form of tax, the ruling class is organized as state officials, and the scope of political authority encompasses the framework of reproduction. In this regard, the central authority's appropriation of the surplus and its dominance over the production processes constitute the prerequisite for the social formation to be reproduced within the framework of AMP (İslamoğlu & Keyder, 1977, p. 56). On the other hand, the independent production of peasants has its own specific limits. For example, the freedom of the peasants does not constitute a sufficient reason for them to form autonomous units, and the tax bond of the peasants with the state also necessitates their commitment to the ideological-legal apparatus by which the state politically secures the division of labor (İslamoğlu & Keyder, 1977, p. 56). İslamoğlu and Keyder (1977, pp. 57-58) argue that the Ottoman state was an element that cut the economic, political and ideological levels in common and integrating the system, controlled tax revenues – and therefore the production of agricultural surplus – through the administrative apparatus, and integrated urban crafts and commerce into the social formation, thus, the state determined “the economic division of labor which ensures that the surplus arrives at the place of use as a desired product”. In this context, it is seen that the Ottoman state assumed a role in the economic plan, both in agriculture, in crafts and trade, within the scope of AMP. The essence of this role consists in appropriating

agricultural surplus at the end of the production process and industrial production in the circulation process. This mediation was carried out by the *timar*-holders, who were considered to be the “representatives of the central government/state officials” and had administrative powers in the villages until the 16th century, and after the 16th century, the tax farming system replaced the *timar* system (İslamoğlu & Keyder, 1977, pp. 57-58). On the other hand, the *sipâhîs* were under the influence of a dual control within the administrative apparatus: Both the right to collect taxes was given by the central state only for a certain period of time, and the kadîs, who were directly responsible to the central government, supervised the practices of the *sipâhîs* (*timar*-holders) (İslamoğlu & Keyder, 1977, p. 57). İslamoğlu and Keyder also mentioned the specific characteristics of the social contradictions brought by AMP and analyzed them in terms of Ottoman social structure. The authors state that AMP is associated with two basic types of social contradictions (İslamoğlu & Keyder, 1977, p. 64): (i) contradictions that arise due to the structure of AMP itself, and (ii) contradictions that arise as a result of the articulation of AMP to the social formation. İslamoğlu and Keyder (1977, p. 64) argue that the determining relationship of the first level of contradiction emerges through an inter-class conflict between the social segments that seize the surplus. For this reason, the basic social contradiction is now developing between the state officials, that is, the groups such as *timar* owners, *muhtesibs*, *mültezims*, *ulama*, *qadis*, bureaucrats and Janissaries. The second social contradiction arises especially from the contradictory nature of the articulation between the state and commercial capital. According to İslamoğlu and Keyder (1977, p. 66), the reproduction of the Ottoman social formation within the framework of the AMP necessarily requires the control of the division of labor by political means, and therefore suppresses the development of commodity production and commercial capital.

II.II.IV. The Concept of Tributary Mode of Production (TMP)

The concept of AMP, which was discussed at the end of the 1960s, and the way it was applied to the Ottoman society were outlined above. Apart from the researchers mentioned above, it should also be noted that a number of researchers who were influenced by the AMP conceptualization or who used some innovations brought by this concept but placed alternative conceptualization forms at the center of their analysis discussed the Ottoman social structure. Among these researchers, the analyzes of Seyfettin Gürsel, Çağlar Keyder, Huricihan İslamoğlu, Şevket Pamuk, Fikret Başkaya

and Ateş Uslu are especially worth mentioning. In this section, the ideas of the mentioned researchers will be briefly presented. First of all, let's start by explaining the concept of tributary mode of production (TMP) that these authors generally use.

II.II.IV.I. The Development of The Concept of Tributary Mode of Production (TMP)

The first emergence of this concept in academic writing was due to the researches carried out by Jiro Hayakawa and Ion Banu on Japanese and Chinese societies. Jiro Hayakawa, in his research on Japanese history, argues that there is a mode of production that emerged after the dissolution of tribal communities and had a kind of collective tax/tribute payment characteristic, different from feudalism or slave-owning mode of production (Hilav, 1970, p. 11; Chesneaux, 1970, p. 39). Ion Banu (1985, pp. 198-99) argues that the phenomenon of TMP corresponds to a certain stage of development of primitive forms of society, that it is based on village communes, but that it belongs to a stage in which social contradiction and the state emerged, unlike communities made up of only village communes. According to Banu (1985, p. 199), TMP, which is the final stage of development of the primitive commune, can turn into a slave-owning mode of production and thus private property can emerge. Banu (1970, pp. 321-27) also stated that Eastern societies with TMP could develop an ideological formation suitable for this form of society, for example, the use of the body metaphor to signify social unity, or the political symbology established between the ruler and welfare/abundance should be understood within this framework. Thus, Banu concludes that the concept of TMP and the forms of political ideology and morality seen in a series of societies from Mesopotamia to ancient China form a coherent integrity.

Another researcher who was a significant figure in the development of the concepts of tributary mode of production and tributary social formation is Romanian sociologist Henri H. Stahl. Stahl states that the tributary social formation is a variation of Asiatic despotism, but the former has a lower density than the latter in terms of sophistication of state control of direct producers (Babinskas, 2009, p. 75). Stahl argues that a phenomenon called tributer mode of production does not actually exist (in fact, the phenomenon mentioned is 'communal mode of production'), but the phenomenon of "tributer mode of exploitation" can be mentioned (Babinskas, 2009, p. 74).

Stahl (1980, p. 134) formulated the content of the concept of tribute as "any service or tithes demanded by the state", and especially in his studies on pre-16th

century Wallachia, social order of village communes was exposed to fiscal exploitation by a state founded under the leadership of the Boyars who did not yet have feudal privileges, interpreted based on this framework. According to Stahl (1972, pp. 43-44), one of the ways in which the nomads seize the surplus product produced by the settled villagers is to be content with annual taxes without eliminating the production conditions, and in return, it is possible to give the villagers a guarantee against other raider groups. As a result of the development of this relationship, two social groups separate from each other, and nomads form a class that does not participate in production but constantly gets a share from the surplus product. If concrete historical examples are to be examined, Stahl (1980, pp. 133-34) argues that the Boyars who would become feudal landowners at the end of the 16th century emerged as rulers of free peasants on the basis of their “local chieftain” qualities and held the ownership of the land under their rule -and this although they did not have the feudal privileges attached to them, they gained the right to collect tribute from the peasants. He claims that this system, which he calls “fiscal exploitation”, was inherited from the nomads due to the Cuman and Tatar occupations (Stahl, 1980, p. 136).

The fact that the concept of TMP entered the agenda of international academic and political discussions -in a way, became popular- was realized with the contribution of Samir Amin to the development of this concept in a series of his works. Amin (1976, p. 15) formulates the distinctive feature of the TMP as the division of society between a peasantry organized into communities and a ruling class that monopolizes the political organization and collects tribute from rural communities—clearly not in commodity form. According to him, this mode of production always tends to turn into feudalism within its own line of development (Amin, 1976, p. 15). On the other hand, sequential position of TMP which follows the communal mode of production creates its dominant contradiction: The existence of rural communities and negation by the state (Amin, 1976, p. 15). For this reason, Amin (1976, p. 16) states that the relations of production in TMP cannot be directly reduced to *de jure* property relations. Amin suggests that tributary social formation consists of three subtypes. These subtypes and examples are as follows (Amin, 1976, p. 20): (i) long-lived “rich tribute-paying formations” that appropriated a high level of internal surplus product, such as the Egyptian and Chinese civilizations, (ii) “poor tribute-paying formations” that could appropriate a limited internal surplus product, such as ancient civilizations and medieval societies (iii) tribute-paying and trading formations that dominate trade routes, such as ancient Greek society,

the Arab world at its apex, and the African savannah. Amin (1977, p. 74) argues that in general all pre-capitalist social formations are based on the direct acquisition of use value without the need for any exchange value mediation. In this respect, the basis of production in TMP is determined as the direct needs of the producing masses. Thus, the surplus product seized by the ruling classes in the form of tribute also becomes a part of the product produced for use value and the existence of commercial relations is not accepted as the main basis of social formation (Amin, 1980, p. 51). Another interesting contribution Amin makes to the TMP debate is that he does not necessarily accept the statement that the state owns the land in the AMP debate as true. According to Amin (1976, p. 23), the ruling classes (state-class) that dominate the state in the TMP do not own the land, the land directly belongs to the community. Amin (1980, p. 49) argues that the development of the productive forces necessitates the development of the state at this level, which leads to the dissolution of the ties of blood, and states that in this framework, the state/dominant class also has the chance to control access to lands. According to Amin (1980, p. 49; 2011, p. 13), extracting the tribute directly from the producer is possible with the ideological influence embodied in a certain state-religion. In this context, Amin (1980, p. 52) states that the ideological superstructure in TMP that can enable a certain social reconciliation takes on forms such as Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism or Confucianism. Although there are class struggles in this social formation, the opposition of the subaltern classes, depending on the production based on use value, cannot take a revolutionary form aiming at the elimination of exploitation, on the contrary, it exhibits a resistance demanding that exploitation be carried out at 'reasonable' levels (Amin, 1980, p. 53).

Another researcher contributing to the TMP debate is John Haldon. Haldon's theses, who wrote a monograph on TMP, are partly a continuation of the discussion on pre-capitalist societies that developed along a certain line from Marx to Amin. Haldon (1993, p. 66) bases his critical thesis on that both Marxist studies and non-Marxist approaches generally adhere to the Eurocentric historiographic language, and therefore the term feudalism necessarily refers to particular historical societies. On the other hand, according to Haldon, neither the Byzantine society nor the Ottomans have a social formation that can be directly explained by the concept of FMP in the 'classical' sense. Although this difference is partially explained within the framework of the concept of AMP, according to Haldon (1993, p. 159), the concept of AMP was dissolved into the concept of TMP with the analyzes of S. Amin.

Haldon (1993, p. 105) evaluates the struggle for agricultural surplus between direct producers and exploiter classes as the determining element of the tributary relations of production, which is the main component of the TMP concept, and argues that this struggle is expressed as the institutional expression of the mode of surplus appropriation. Haldon states that in some of the societies in which TMP is seen, there is a central state structure, and this generally assumes some functions necessary for the class power to reproduce itself. Examples of these central state organizations are the Ottoman and Mongolian Empires, where the state developed an effective control over local representatives (Haldon, 1993, p. 84). These functions can be grouped under two main headings: (i) the domination over the direct producer classes, but also (ii) the direct producers to have enough surplus products to reproduce themselves -or the prevention of over-exploitation (Haldon, 1993, p. 146). Haldon (1993, p. 146) argues that the universal way for this institutional structure to develop is that the state elites/aristocracy transfer certain privileges in the collection of land revenues to their local allies, for example “revenue assignments, fiefs, or other forms of allocation and distribution”. On the other hand, it is indisputable that these allocation and distribution relations also have an effect on the tributary state form, which restricts the possible autonomy of the state. According to Haldon (1993, p. 146), it is possible to talk about a field of social struggle between the members of the ruling class (the ruler, the bureaucratic elite, the dominant aristocracy) represented by the interests of the state and the other members of the ruling class, which develops over the appropriation of the surplus product and its distribution.

According to Haldon (1993, p. 158-59), although the Ottoman state is seen as one of the clearest examples of AMP, it is doubtful that this argument fully meets the truth as the concept of AMP melted into the concept of TMP after Amin’s studies. On the other hand, when the relations of production in Ottoman society, the appropriation of surplus, the Ottoman state and its social formation are examined, Haldon argues that this example falls under the concept of TMP without any problems (1993, p. 159). For Haldon (1993, p. 171), the Ottoman state is based on basic structural principles that are valid in all other tributary social formations:

(...) an intermediate class represents the state to the producers, consuming a large portion of the surplus it extracts in the name of a central political authority and an appropriate legitimating political ideology, and it contains the same structural contradictions in respect of control over the distribution of surpluses.

According to Haldon (1993, p. 162), the Ottoman state was basically based on a two-class social system, the first of which was the economically dominant class and its dependents, while the second class consisted of direct producers, hereditary and constantly working and exploited peasants in agricultural production. Within this class structure, the founding privilege of the ruling class can be formulated as follows (Haldon, 1993, p. 162): “a military class with monopoly of the right to bear arms and receive revenues and allocations of lands”. Secondly, Haldon (1993, pp. 164-65) partially criticized the thesis that there was no hereditary aristocracy in the Ottoman society, and for example, *frontier begs* had their own armies, had an effective control over their own lands, had a kind of clan domination over the lands they had acquired as a fief or partly property –that they can be considered as “Turkish nobles”. The *timar*-holder *sipâhîs* constitute a part of this elite group, and the *sipâhîs* are similar to the Byzantine *pronoia* owners and the Mongol *mansibdars* as the owners of land incomes –not lands (Haldon, 1993, p. 170). According to Haldon (1993, p. 170), it is clearly a “legal fiction” to see the *sipâhîs* as a mere state official, regardless of his relationship with other *timar* holders, who prevent the collection of land revenues in private hands. In this framework, it is stated by Haldon (1993, p. 171) that *timar* holders should also be evaluated within the ruling class and they are not merely a state official—precisely for this reason, an important administrative function that affects the construction of the ideological image of the ruler is to prevent the over-exploitation of direct producers by the *timar*-holders based on customary law, that is, to protect the peasants against the middle strata by the state.

Finally, it would be appropriate to mention the contributions of Chris Wickham, Eric R. Wolf, and Berhanu Abegaz to the concept of the tributary mode of production. Wickham begins his analysis of the concept of the tributary mode of production by pointing out the difficulty of analyzing the structures of ancient societies directly under the concepts of slave-owning or feudal mode of production.

According to Wickham, especially in the late Roman Empire (3rd century and later), the organization of the relations of production has a rather heterogeneous appearance, for example, while some tenants were shaped in accordance with the FMP, slavery was still encountered or free tenancies emerged (Wickham, 1984, pp. 8-9). On the other hand, in the late Roman Empire it cannot be said that the FMP dominates the society, on the contrary, the dominant form of appropriation of agricultural surplus is not as rent but as tax (Wickham, 1984, p. 9). In this context, he states that taxation

dominates the entire late Roman economy and that it has become the main pillar of the state, and argues that no part of the economy - not even long distance commerce - can escape from the relationship with the state (Wickham, 1984, p. 13). Similarly, the author, stating that the Byzantine state was formed in a tax-dependent centralized structure, underlines that this morphology was also seen in the Arabian Empires, Sassanids, Ottomans and Safavids as a kind of “Eastern pattern” (Wickham, 1984, p. 35). Wickham (1984, p. 35) formulates the founding contradiction of all these states as follows: “Those states (...) had the problem of balancing tax-raising with landownership, but often over very wide areas and without the institutional mediation of cities”. The author, who argues that the AMP concept will be completely inadequate in the analysis of the states mentioned in this context, especially the Eastern examples, and that the concept of TMP as developed by Samir Amin can both explain these examples and that the chronologically older examples considered under the concept of ancient mode of production will also be used by the TMP (Wickham, 1984, pp. 35-36).

Eric R. Wolf takes the concept of TMP as a central concept that explains the structure of a significant part of societies observed in history, and details the content of this concept to include various concrete variants. Wolf (2010, p. 76) formulates three main modes of production, which can be listed as (i) kin-ordered mode of production, (ii) tributary mode of production, and (iii) capitalist mode of production. The defining characteristic of the tributary mode of production lies in the appropriation of the surplus product through political or military means, in the form of tribute, in a society where direct producers have direct access to the means of production, whether they are farmers or shepherds (Wolf, 2010, pp. 79-80). Within this social system, the ruling elites take place in “the apex of the power system” and occupy two important strategic positions (Wolf, 2010, p. 80): (i) organization of facilities such as waterways etc. as “strategic elements in the process of production” and (ii) the organization of the means of coercion, which requires a standing army and a superior military power. This position of the ruling classes now privileges them to appropriate the surplus product and enables them to develop unique strategies in competition with the lower ‘parasitic classes’. One of the striking aspects of Wolf’s framework lies in his formulation of the founding axis of social struggle in the TMP around the endless contradiction between the center and the periphery. According to Wolf (2010, pp. 81-82), societies dominated by TMP oscillate between centralization and fragmentation because strategic elements of production and the means of coercion are sometimes concentrated in the hands of local

powers, sometimes in the hands of the central state - and thus the extraction of the surplus product passes to the privilege of one of the poles. In the final analysis, according to Wolf (2010, p. 181), the examples of AMP and FMP, which are observed as centralist or fragmented social structuring, emerge as a result of the struggles of non-productive ruling classes among themselves, and it is possible to evaluate both under the concept of TMP.

Finally, it is necessary to address the proposals of Berhanu Abegaz, who dealt with the TMP and the state structures that developed in relation to it. Abegaz (2018, p. 33) argues that when the articulation/fusion of political and economic power in pre-industrial societies with a class structure is considered, there are four basic methods of realizing this: (i) control over land, (ii) control over labor, (iii) control over long-distance trade, and (iv) control over the meager economic surplus of the smallholder, the craftspeople, the pastoralist, or all three. In this framework, Abegaz (2018, p. 33) is of the opinion that there are three main types of pre-industrial political systems that apply these four basic methods with their variants. The first of these systems is called the European model and is based on dominance over land, water, scarce labor resources, and trade between towns and ports (Abegaz, 2018, p. 33). The development of the European model took place in parallel with feudalism (Abegaz, 2018, p. 34). The second type of political order can be named as the hydraulic-Asiatic model and is based on the control of the lands in the river valleys and the use of the existing labor surplus in the construction of irrigation systems (Abegaz, 2018, p. 33). The last type of political system is called the Afroasian model and is based on a regular and measured flow of surplus products from autonomous producers settled on highly dispersed lands (Abegaz, 2018, p. 33). For example, while Abegaz (2018, p. 35) argues that feudalism, that is, the European model, has a territorial state, the Eurasian, Asian and Afroasian models have developed a tributary state form. While the tributary model is primarily based on the exploitation of independent producers who have rights over the land, the territorial model is based on the exploitation of landless serfs and, therefore, territorial control over direct producers (Abegaz, 2018, p. 35). According to Abegaz (2018, p. 36), tributary formation is defined as a “pre-industrial land-based or trade-based” social institution, and therefore, established with the mediation of the extra-economic relations between the titled overlords and the property-owner direct producers. In this social formation, landed free peasants and long-distance traders had to pay the ruler undefined tributes (taxes, income rights, gifts and militia service), and this flow of goods and

services was not necessarily reciprocal. Thus, the status of taxes and services collected in the tributary system is structured differently from the tax-service reciprocity, which forms the basis of the modern state, and gives this tributary social formation its unique character. Secondly, in the tributary social formation, those appointed by the ruler seize incomes similar to feudal vassals, but unlike feudalism, they do not have the right or power to arbitrarily deprive peasants and merchants of their means of production (Abegaz, 2018, p. 36). Abegaz also makes a distinction between external and internal tributary relations and formulates the first of these concepts as a relationship between the monarch and local kings, and the second as a relationship between the ruling class and the productive class (2018, p. 36). Finally, Abegaz lists the other distinguishing features of the tributary social formation as follows (2018, p. 36):

This goes a long way toward explaining why political authority tended to be over “people” rather than over land; offices were more appointive than hereditary; estates in land were less important for funding large organizations than estates in offices; and infantry dominated over very expensive cavalry as a means of conquest, destruction, or booty.

Abegaz (2018, p. 40-41) evaluates the Ottoman state, together with the Safavid state and the Delhi Sultanate, within the Afroasiatic state typology, but argues that the advanced bureaucratic organization in the Ottoman state is a variant of the Eurasian Slave-owning Empire typology. According to him, the ruling elites of all three states act with the motivation of “redistributive wealth accumulation” and realize these goals through *jizye*, agricultural taxes or commercial taxes (Abegaz, 2018, p. 40).

II.II.IV.I.I. Analysis of Ottoman Social Structure under the Concept of TMP

In this subsection, the concept of TMP in the analyzes of Seyfettin Gürsel, Ahmet İnel, Şevket Pamuk, Çağlar Keyder, Fikret Başkaya and Ateş Uslu and its application to Ottoman history will be discussed. The works of Huricihan İslamoğlu can be partially added to this list, but with the 90s, she completely abandoned the concept of TMP, even though she emphasized the importance of tributary relations in her works. In the articles published by the academicians working on the Ottoman social formation since the second half of the 1970s, it is seen that they were aware of the works of Samir Amin and the concept of TMP. On the other hand, as can be seen in the article by İslamoğlu and Keyder (1977), the tendency to use the concept of AMP instead of this

concept, due to the newly developing recognition of the TMP concept, continues until the end of the 70s.

The first change in this trend was broken by Seyfettin Gürsel's doctoral thesis, which was accepted in 1979, entitled *La transition d'une formation tributaire à une formation périphérique: l'exemple de l'empire ottoman*. Although it is not possible for us to make a definitive analysis since I could not reach this text, it is understood that as Kaya stated (2019, p. 361), Gürsel evaluated the dominant principle of the Ottoman social formation under the concept of TMP and defended the argument that this structure was transformed with the development of the capitalist world-system. In an article dated 1983, in which Gürsel also refers to his doctoral thesis, the Ottoman social structure is described as a central-bureaucratic structure that is characteristically different from feudalism, which can be examined under the concepts of AMP or TMP. According to Gürsel (1983, p. 20), the specific structure of societies such as China, Iran, Thailand and the Ottoman Empire, which could not transform into the capitalism but were not fully colonized and destroyed, contain some features that prevent the development of capitalism. According to Gürsel (1983, p. 20), feudal societies and central-bureaucratic societies have significant differences in the titles of (i) land ownership, (ii) class structure, and (iii) state form -and while these differences result in the development of capitalism in feudal societies, on the other hand in the central-bureaucratic societies a partial stagnation exists. To summarize the differences gathered under the aforementioned titles, in a feudal society, the feudal lord has an absolute property right on the land he owns and can directly and fully seize the ground rent based on this, while in central-bureaucratic societies, private ownership of the land is negated, land-possession rights are limited, and property usually belongs to the state, and the central authority decides on the usage and distribution of the ground rent (Gürsel, 1983, p. 20). Secondly, the class structure in feudal society is divided into two basic categories as feudal lords and peasants -the artisans and the commercial bourgeoisie can be added to these-, in central bureaucratic societies the class structure is divided into peasants and bureaucracy, and the artisans and merchants can receive a share from the land as long as they are in the service of the state (Gürsel, 1983, p. 20). In this context, Gürsel tries to explain the failure of capitalism in Ottoman society by analyzing the characteristic features of the Ottoman social order in terms of land ownership, guild system and labor organization. To make a general assessment, it is seen that Gürsel's (1983) analysis uses the general theoretical framework of the concepts of AMP and TMP, however, he bases

his problematic largely on the existence of the central bureaucratic state and broadens his conceptual choices towards a Weberian framework.⁸⁸

The effects of Gürsel's doctoral thesis, and the analysis method developed towards Weberian concepts could be seen in Ahmet Insel's doctoral study titled *La Turquie entre l'ordre et le développement Éléments d'analyse sur le rôle de l'état dans le processus de développement*. Insel (1996, pp. 14, 43) begins his analysis by arguing that in Ottoman society, the state is more like AMP than FMP because of its dominance of property, and therefore the Ottoman state can be formally explained with the concept of patrimonialism. Throughout his analysis, Insel prefers to use the concept of TMP instead of the concept of AMP, and he also uses the concept of patrimonialism in a broader sense, not as a 'form of sovereignty' as Weber uses, but as a form of social organization in which the state dominates lands and people (1996, p. 43, p. footnote 5). Insel (1996, p. 64) argues that the field of power relations in Ottoman society was shaped by tax relations, and even the basis of Ottoman power was based on tribute (Insel, 1996, p. 84). The main features of this tributary order can be listed as follows (Insel, 1996, p. 64): (i) it is established by the state occupying a certain area and establishing the right to collect tribute from it, (ii) the state can allocate the right to collect tribute from certain lands in return for service or income, but it does not limit the monopoly of domination over the state's territory or turn tax collectors into political rivals of the monarch, (iii) nobility does not exist as private property is not secured within the empire, so wealth and prestige are intertwined with the state—belonging to state authorities, not individuals/families. In this context, Insel argues that the Ottoman social structure has a tributary-patrimonial character in terms of land regime and economic relations, state organization and the formation of social classes.

If these titles are briefly explained, first of all, the way the power is organized on land is quite different from feudalism. The owner of the *timar* is not a noble but a state official and is in charge of collecting the tribute. Even though the administration of the autonomous remote provinces or Kurdish regions has internal autonomy, this situation can still be maintained in return for paying a large amount of tribute (Insel, 1996, p. 62). Although a dual ownership system emerged in the lands with the status of

⁸⁸ Likewise, Feroz Ahmad (1993, p. 21) describes the Ottomans as a community with a strong state that can be defined as "patrimonial", "oriental-despotic" and/or "tributary". Since Ahmad did not develop these theses, we will not dwell on them in our doctoral thesis, but we will content ourselves with pointing out the way the thesis is presented, as it directly sets an example for the articulation of Weberian concepts and the AMP thesis.

mâlikâne-dîvânî, in fact, the legal owner of the property and the state could confiscate the surplus as rent and tax (İnsel, 1996, p. 62). On the other hand, the *timar* holders cannot directly determine the obligations of the producers, the relations between the *timar* holders and the villagers are established through the state, and the *qadis* are obliged to listen to the complaints of both parties (İnsel, 1996, p. 71). The direct results of this relationship were the state's protection of the peasants from the exploitation and oppression of the overlords, and also that it could prevent the "peasant from facing difficulties peculiar to small production [tm]" (İnsel, 1996, p. 71). Similar to the rural structure, the effects of TMP reveal themselves in the relations between the Ottoman state and urban producers. İnsel (1996, p. 75) states that the state was the biggest consumer of the country, that some goods were distributed according to the needs of the Ottoman capital instead of being sent to the demanding places, that some craftsman groups only produced for the palace, and therefore, trade was organized as a duty to meet the needs of the state and the ruling classes. İnsel (1996, p. 75) states that traders can partially escape from controlled trade relations, but for this reason, they encounter hostile attitudes from official administrators and guilds and are tried to be controlled through price controls. Finally, it is necessary to deal with İnsel's propositions on the class structure and social struggles in the Ottoman Empire. İnsel seeks the first of the defining characteristics of the Ottoman class structure in the shaping of social classes according to tributary relations. İnsel (1996, p. 77) states that there are two basic classes in the understanding of Ottoman politics, the first of which is formulated with the term *reâyâ*, which includes working and tribute-paying segments, and the second denoting the ruling class is formulated with the term *Ottomans*, who are independent of tribute-paying obligation and do not have any social ties apart from their relations with the state. According to İnsel (1996, p. 78), the ruling class consists of (i) *timar* holders, (ii) servants and (iii) *ulama*, while the ruler is above the ruling class and represents the state in absolute terms. In this class structure, the state is shaped as protecting the 'society' and thus the order, and is to correct the 'deviations' that may arise as a result of the ruling class acting in line with its specific interests, because such a 'deviation' would also mean competing with the state on the right to tribute (İnsel, 1996, p. 98). The second determining factor is the absence of nobility in the Ottoman Empire -the kind that existed in Western feudalism. In the construction of this structure, the state's partial independence from local power centers regarding the army, and even the control of the city militias by the *qadi* were decisive (İnsel, 1996, p. 86). The second determining

factor is the absence of nobility in the Ottoman Empire -the kind that existed in Western feudalism. In the construction of this structure, the state's partial independence from local power centers regarding the army, and even the control of the city militias by the qadi were decisive (İnsel, 1996, p. 86). According to him, the titles of property and 'nobility' were not secured in the Ottoman Empire, and even high-ranking officials could be executed -without trial- by the order of the ruler (İnsel, 1996, p. 67). Moreover, the properties of the Ottoman officials can be confiscated, or their movable and immovable properties can be transferred to the sultan after his death; in the final analysis: "the wealth obtained by the state's income is transferred to the state again and again [tm]" (İnsel, 1996, p. 66).

The third researcher to contribute to the TMP debate is Ş. Pamuk. Pamuk's prominent study, *100 Soruda Osmanlı-Türkiye İktisadi Tarihi 1500-1914*, which was first published in 1988 and deals with the Ottoman-Turkish economic history with its main lines, discusses the Ottoman social structure under the concept of TMP. Pamuk's main argument asserts that neither the FMP nor the AMP were dominant in the Ottoman social formation, and he states that the use of the TMP concept would be more appropriate for the Ottoman society when evaluated under the titles of property relations, the state, and the way of appropriation of surplus. Pamuk (1999, p. 19) places AMP in front of FMP and states that AMP corresponds to a social structure based on the same productive forces but different production relations with feudalism. The defining features of AMP are (Pamuk, 1999, p. 19): (i) agricultural surplus is taken directly from the producers, not by the seigneurs, but through a "strong central state", (ii) landed property belongs directly to the state or the monarch who represents the state, (iii) the state collects the land rent directly from the producers as taxes, (iv) the ruling class are the state officials and extract the surplus on behalf of the state, (v) the class distinction is shaped around the contradiction between the state officials and agricultural producers. In addition to these titles, Pamuk (1999, p. 20) states that the dominant contradiction contained in AMP is shaped between the state and local lords, and the survival of AMP depends on the dominance of the power of the central state over local power centers. Pamuk (1999, p. 20) adds that the result of the struggle between these two centers in favor of the local lords, as seen in feudalism, results in the disintegration of the sovereignty among the local lords. On the other hand, Pamuk, referring to some gaps and contradictions in the concept of AMP, proposes the use of the concept of TMP, which has a broader historical scope. Pamuk (1999, p. 20) draws attention that the

limitation of the concept of AMP to the existence of independent village communities and irrigation projects undertaken by the state is not valid historically, and irrigation projects cannot be shown as the sole origin of state ownership on land, some features such as the absence of commodity production and the very limited class differentiation do not coincide with the real development levels of the societies in which the state dominates the land.

According to him, this new concept abstracts the concept of AMP from some specific details and limits it to the titles of “state ownership in land, tax-rent, developed cities and a social structure suitable for the development of commodity production [tm]”, and thus the new content of the concept is transferred from the Ottoman Empire to the Near East, Indian and Chinese civilizations to include the social characteristics of further historical examples (Pamuk, 1999, p. 21). In this framework, Pamuk (1999, pp. 22-23) divides the Ottoman history into four main phases and identifies the main characteristics of these phases according to the dominant mode of production; (i) the period until the end of the 15th century, i.e. the period characterized by the struggle of the FMP and the TMP, (ii) the period until the end of the 16th century, that is, the dominance of the TMP, (iii) the period until the beginning of the 19th century, that is, the weakening of the TMP but the inability of a new mode of production to dominate, (iv) the opening of the TMP to world capitalism in the 19th century and later. It would be appropriate to briefly touch upon Pamuk’s analysis to indicate the period between the 14th and 16th centuries, which is within the scope of our thesis.

According to Pamuk (1999, p. 78), the plural existence of different and contradictory modes of production in Ottoman society was largely broken by the 15th century and TMP became dominant. In this context, the land order and the development of urban production and trade relations can be interpreted within the framework of TMP. Firstly, I will summarize the propositions of Pamuk on the development of relations of ownership, distribution and exploitation over land. In this period, state ownership of the lands develops, and the ruling class seizes the surplus produced by the direct producers through taxation. Pamuk (1999, p. 78) lists the basic features of the land regime as follows: (i) the peasant household constitutes the smallest but most basic unit of agriculture and the economy, (ii) differentiation between agricultural producers remains limited, (iii) as long as state ownership of the land continues, it is not possible for the peasants to be expelled from their lands and become dispossessed, (iv) as long as the political power of the state persists, the formation of a landed aristocracy is prevented.

Two factors can be mentioned that determine the land regime in the Ottoman social formation. The first of these is the domination of the state over the land, and the second is the regulation and control of the intermediate social strata that ensure the reproduction of this domination. According to Pamuk, the Ottoman state intervened in the forms of ownership on the land, prevented the expansion of large agricultural enterprises/farms and strengthened small production (1999, p. 37). Secondly, the situation of cities and commerce should be considered under TMP. First of all, Pamuk (1999, p. 38) states that as of the 16th century, Ottoman villages were not self-contained and self-sufficient units, contrary to what AMP theory predicted, that ties were established between the village and the city economy and that the villages around the city were integrated with the city. In this framework, the villagers have to bring a part of the product they produce to the market and thus obtain a part of the taxes given to the state in the form of money (Pamuk, 1999, p. 38). This situation ensures the development of the division of labor between villages and cities, improves the relations of the villagers with the market, expands commodity production and supports domestic and foreign trade (Pamuk, 1999, p. 78). The dominance of the TMP is a necessity for the state to have control over the city guilds and trade, and in this way to meet the needs of the armies and the supply of the cities where the ruling classes live (Pamuk, 1999, p. 78). Ultimately, in this system, class segregation takes place between those who pay taxes and those who seize surplus through taxes (Pamuk, 1999, p. 32), and the ruling class presents a tripartite structure consisting of the devshirme-origin-servants used in civil or military services and the ulama class (Pamuk, 1999, pp. 33-35).

Another researcher who adapted the concept of TMP to the Ottoman social structure is Ç. Keyder. In his studies on Ottoman history, Keyder underlined the appearances of the TMP in the Ottoman land regime, economic division of labor, social change dynamics and ideological formation. Keyder, who generally abandoned the concept of AMP, which he used in his previous studies, re-evaluated the historical elements of the concept of AMP under the concept of TMP, however, the weight of the concept of mode of production has relatively lost its central importance in his analysis. Keyder bases his analysis on the thesis that the Ottoman social formation was different from its Western contemporaries.

According to the author, the social structure of the Ottoman Empire was structured in a completely different way from European feudalism, and the determining factor of this difference was in the character of the state, which showed its effect under

a series of titles ranging from class structure to its role in the reproduction of the social order, as well as in the class structure as reflected in Law and relations of production (Keyder, 2011, p. 15). In this context, the Ottoman social structure, which showed a significant continuity with the Byzantine social formation, reversed the feudalization trend seen in the late Byzantine period and was able to establish its own unique structure by preventing the emergence of a European-type aristocracy (Keyder, 2011, p. 20).

According to Keyder (2011, p. 37), class relations are shaped by the connection with bureaucratic positions and therefore with the state. In this framework, while the founding principle of the class consisting of civil servants is to seize the surplus through taxation in the economic field, it is determined as the “political and ideological reproduction of the social system” in terms of its relations with the state (Keyder, 2011, p. 37). These state officials occupy a wide scale from tax officers to vizier, from qadi to Janissaries as personnel of administrative, military, judicial and religious institutions. The division of civil servants into different hierarchies and fractions causes intra-class conflicts at the center of the distribution of surplus and alternative organization of the social system (Keyder, 2011, p. 38). On the other hand, when it comes to the class position of all these segments against the direct producers, there is a certain integrity in terms of ideological perspective and political attitude (Keyder, 2011, p. 38). Finally, the bureaucratic class, which seizes the economic surplus, spends a very small part of the surplus in order to provide the conditions for economic reproduction such as road network and irrigation projects, and allocates the remaining part to luxury consumption (Keyder, 2011, p. 37).

According to Keyder, the origins of the Ottoman land regime are based on the Byzantine model of domination over the land. The continuation of the small peasantry in the Byzantine Empire - slavery and serfdom did not dominate - and the rise of the palace on a bureaucratic structure that taxed the independent peasantry constitute the first dimension of this parallelism (Keyder, 2011, pp. 15-16). Secondly, the Byzantine Empire’s control over long-distance trade routes and the control of commercial activities by taxation and the transfer of taxes to the center ensure the reproduction of the social formation (Keyder, 2011, pp. 15-16). According to Keyder (2011, pp. 20-21) the centralization moves of the Ottoman state restored the deteriorations in the land regime in the late Byzantine Empire and brought it closer to the ideal situation in the Byzantine Land Code by “re-establishing the classical agricultural structure of Byzantium”. In this context, firstly, the Ottoman state took all lands under state

ownership in order to establish an independent peasantry base, abolished drudgery and combined the old tax/liability forms in a single standard tax form (Keyder, 2011, p. 21). The reason for the arrangement of the land regime in this way can be formulated as establishing a free peasantry that holds similarly sized lands and pays taxes to the officials appointed from the center, and thus to establish the class structure under the control of the central state. Secondly, the Ottoman state also developed a certain control over urban crafts and commercial activities. According to Keyder (2011, p. 22), the control mechanism over trade and craft can be read as an attempt to create a state-centered division of labor that aims to connect the urban and rural economy. The fact that foreign trade relations are more subject to state control enables the state to effectively shape the division of labor within the country, and the control of foreign trade constitutes an important part of political control of the economy within closed borders (Keyder, 2011, p. 22).

Another researcher who applied the concept of TMP to the analysis of Ottoman society is F. Başkaya. The starting point of Başkaya is based on the criticism of Stalin's five-stage schema, in which the development of social formations is explained. Başkaya (2014, p. 33) states that the Eurocentric narration of history reduces the development of human societies to two main lines, Western and non-Western, and to five stages that refer to the capitalist development in the West (primitive communism-slave owning-feudalism-capitalism-socialism), whereas historical facts does not confirm with this conceptualization. According to him, the transition to capitalism is not a process that is monopolized by the West, and the five-stage evolution model is only an exception, not a rule (Başkaya, 2014, p. 33). In this framework, Başkaya (2014, p. 33) criticizes the Eurocentric writing of the evolution of social formations and states that an alternative history should be written to challenge this view, and realizes this suggestion partially in his analysis of Ottoman society. According to Başkaya (2014, p. 33), the general and dominant line in the evolution of social formations is not the Western model that mentions the transition from primitive communism to the slave-owning mode of production obligatory phase, but the transition to the tribute-based mode of production which is the "first widespread version of the class society [tm]". In this context, Başkaya (2014, p. 69) argues that the FMP is also a version of the TMP, and that even the Eastern societies, which are considered under the concept of AMP, actually belong to the TMP. Following the arguments of S. Amin, he believes that it would be more appropriate to use the concept of TMP, which has a more general scope, instead of the concept of AMP

(Başkaya, 2014, p. 69). Başkaya (2014, p. 70) summarizes the general characteristics of societies dominated by TMP under the following five headings:

- (i) “There is no private property in the land”. The land is under the control of the ruler and his close circle. This possession can be called the collective possession of the dynasty.
- (ii) “The ruling class is also the political class”. The state is alienated from the direct producers and it is possible to reproduce its existence through tribute. For this reason, it has gained political, not economic, decisiveness, and the way to acquire wealth is to hold political power.
- (iii) The dominant ideology is codified on the basis of religion and preaches the immutability of the world.
- (iv) The continuity of sovereignty, and thus the state, depends on the “centralization of the surplus”, so the existence of centrifugal forces, the struggle between the center and the periphery is a structural element of the social system.
- (v) The centralization of the surplus product makes it difficult for the emergence of “new and different” social classes to transform the existing structure.

In this respect, Başkaya uses the concept of TMP in his analysis under the titles of property relations, class structure, forms of appropriation of surplus value, social change, ideology and state structure in Ottoman society. The first of these specific characteristics that gave the Ottoman social structure its concrete historical character is the regime of land ownership. Başkaya (2014, pp. 99-101) states that the *timar* system became the dominant land regime in parallel with the development of the Ottoman central state, and although the *timars* had a “property-like [tm]” character in the establishment period when the central authority was not yet established, on the other hand, from the end of the 14th century state’s monopoly on landed property became the dominant form of land regime. The state's dominance of land ownership is also a requirement of the centralization of the surplus and determines social class relations. Başkaya (2014, p. 63) states that in the social formations dominated by the TMP, the political factor is more important than the other instances, and this means the existence of a ‘state-class’ that is alienated from the productive peasant class and reproduces itself based on taxation. According to Başkaya (2014, p. 64): “The ruling class and the political class are intertwined and mixed with each other in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, there is no political class separate from the ruling class or a ruling class

separate from the political class [tm]”. For this reason, Başkaya (2014, p. 113), following H. Kıvılcımlı, argues that the ruling class can be called ‘state-classes’ (*devlet sınıfları*), while the segments outside the ruling bloc constitute the ‘state population’ (*devlet nüfusu*). To briefly address both groups, firstly Başkaya (2014, p. 110) states that the dominant class alliance had a tripartite structure in the Ottoman Empire and these could be listed as the Sultan, the Janissaries and the Ulama. In general, the ruling classes, which have this triple structure, are divided into subcategories according to various status and seniority.

Placing these categories under the ruler, Başkaya (2014, p. 112) first considers the members of the dynasty consisting of the sultan’s daughters, grooms, and children of dynasty members as a group, in the second group mentions the viziers, high-ranking officials and commanders, thirdly the raiding officers and their children, and finally the he considers Anatolian begs, palace officials, sheikhs and dervishes -to whom the state gives responsibilities- as a part of the ruling class. In particular, the author, who examines the *sipâhîs*, states that this social group is in the status of an official in charge of collecting taxes from the producers and maintaining social order, and that their status is deliberately kept insecure due to the small size of the *dirliks* and the rotations they undergo (Başkaya, 2014, p. 113).

Secondly, Başkaya deals with the subject classes, which he calls ‘state population’, and categorizes them as peasants, artisans and merchants in general. According to him, the villagers (*reâyâ*) use the *mîrî* and which’s bare ownership belongs to the state, and in return they give their surplus product in the form of tribute to the state (Başkaya, 2014, p. 113). The position of this social segment was quite different from the feudal serf, and its relationship with the *sipâhî* was regulated by laws and was protected by the state against the exploitation carried out by the *sipâhî* (Başkaya, 2014, pp. 114-15). Secondly, Başkaya (2014, p. 113) draws attention to the necessity of the existence of a certain stratum of craftsmen (*esnaf*) producing in order for the subsistence-based agriculture economy to function and for the war-conquest activities to continue. This segment does not belong to the ruling class and, unlike the Western bourgeoisie, continues to operate largely under state surveillance. Başkaya (2014, p. 119) states that the Ottoman Empire was a closed agricultural economy, trade did not develop because the limited industrial production was sold by the *esnaf* and the villagers lived in subsistence-based economic conditions, adding that internal trade could not be considered a defining economic activity. On the other hand, long-distance trade gained

more importance and tended to meet the luxury consumption needs of the ruling classes (Başkaya, 2014, p. 119). Stating that the Ottoman ruling class considered domestic trade and merchants dangerous and suppressed commercial gains, the author draws attention to the fact that the merchant class was not considered prestigious by the central authority (Başkaya, 2014, p. 120).

Another writer who uses the concept of TMP in the study of the history of political thought and in the categorization of the Ottoman social formation is A. Uslu. Uslu uses the concept of TMP for a series of social structures that took place on the stage of history in the pre-modern period, from China to Western Europe. In order to cover this historical and geographical extent, the author makes both narrow and broad definitions of the concept. According to the first of these definitions (Uslu, 2021a, p. 27): TMP refers to the forms of production that are mostly based on agricultural production but also include urban economies, in which the ruling class seizes its surplus by using violence and ideological devices. The second definition, based on this core definition, deals with the different concrete forms of TMP in different social formations and presents them under three basic categories. The first of these is the central TMP, and it is called the social system where “an integrated ruling-dominant class dominates [tm]” (Uslu, 2021a, p. 27). The latter is called the *iqta*-based TMP and corresponds to a social system where “the ruling class entrusts the task of collecting tribute and recruiting at the local level [tm]” (Uslu, 2021a, p. 27). The third one is called feudalism and corresponds to a social system where “the ruling class is divided into hierarchical layers, each of which has separate political-economic power [tm]” (Uslu, 2021a, p. 27). While Uslu generally accepts that there may be many concrete forms of TMP, he accepts these three forms as basic forms and states that they can transform into each other. According to Uslu, TMP also has a certain ideological formation. Summarizing the basic structure of this ideological formation in various parts of his work, Uslu’s views can be presented as follows (2021a, p. 64; 2021b, p. 73); The prevailing ideological formation of TMP (i) involves the identification, glorification or deification of the ruler with supernatural powers, (ii) produces discourse on the economic duties of the ruler, (iii) aims at the consent of the productive mass to the domination of the ruling class.

In this context, it is possible to summarize Uslu’s partial analysis of the Ottoman social formation. Uslu (2021b, p. 157) evaluates Ottoman society as one of the typical examples dominated by the TMP, along with its contemporaries as Safavids and Mughals. First of all, Uslu (2021b, p. 48) underlines that the dominant mode of

production in Anatolia during the establishment of the Ottoman state was dominated by the ‘agricultural-tributary mode of production’, and that the ‘nomadic mode of production’, which was widely observed, also existed in this region. According to him, alliances were formed, supported by the *ghaza* ideology of the dynasties and nomadic nobles who were in the dominant position of both modes of production (Uslu, 2021b, p. 48). The Ottoman state, which developed and partially centralized in this framework, would be dissolved with the Timurid invasion and re-established in the first half of the 15th century. With its second establishment, the Ottoman state will gain a new face, as seen in the Byzantine, Seljuk and Mamluk examples, where the rulers allocate land and centralize the military and administrative organization in this way (Uslu, 2021b, p. 61). The development of the *timar* system, especially during the reign of Murat II, led to the development of a social form in which the elements of production, administration and army were managed centrally and Uslu (2021b, p. 61) generally referred to as *iqta*-based TMP. The manifestation of the *iqta*-based TMP, which lived its ‘classical age’ with the formulation of Uslu (2021b, p. 61), in Ottoman society created a ‘hegemonic bloc’ established between the dynasty, bureaucrats and local ruling classes and strengthened the central power. In addition, within this framework, the official ideology of the central state is moving away from the pre-Islamic nomadic Turkish and Mongolian traditions or the notion of *ghaza*, and examples of political thought reflecting the “sedentary-territorial state tradition [tm]” are starting to be taken as a discourse model (Uslu, 2021b, pp. 61-63).

II.II.V. The Concept of Rentier Mode of Production and Its Application to Ottoman Society

The concept of the rentier mode of production is the abstract expression of the structure of societies (or communities) based on the organization of social relations of production and distribution, and the political and ideological relations on which they are based, primarily around ground rent. As discussed in the sections above, the Marxist mode of production debate has developed five basic models, namely primitive-communal, ancient/slave-owning, Asiatic, tributary and feudal, in order to explain the structure of pre-capitalist societies, and discussed social change on the basis of transitions between these models. On the other hand, as can be understood from the general discussions above - and especially the contradictory arguments centered on the Ottoman social formation - the power of these concepts to explain a given historical

case or other similar social structures is quite limited, except for the norm-example they centered on. The concept of feudalism, which is explanatory when this norm is in medieval Western societies, loses its power to a large extent when it comes to ancient Chinese society, and even falls short of explaining examples such as the 7th century Byzantine state or the 16th century Safavid state. In order to solve such problems, the tendency to consider intermediate social forms primarily under palliative concepts such as semi-feudal, central-feudal, Asiatic-feudal etc. does not offer a solution that penetrates deeply into the core of the problem. In addition, in this framework, the concept of AMP and its application to the Ottoman society lead to major theoretical problems in terms of consistency with historical facts, and the concept of TMP, on the other hand, does not take into account the production process itself enough, despite the broadness of its general descriptive level, its concrete explanatory power remains limited.

To identify the underlying causes of this problem, first of all, concepts such as feudalism/Asiatic despotism/slave-owning mode of production etc. were produced in a relatively hypothetical –and relatively biased– manner, without relying on adequate empirical work, even at the stages of their creation. For this reason, the inclusiveness of such concepts diminishes as monographs which detailing specific historical examples are published, and as the critical study of several generations crystallizes on them. Secondly, the core of these concepts, which are hypothetically put forward in cases where there are not enough field studies, has largely been shaped under the determination of concrete examples that have more knowledge as of the period they were created. To speak more clearly, the concept of the ancient/slave-owning mode of production was produced with reference to ancient Greek or Roman societies, while the concept of the FMP was developed by taking the feudal lands on the Western Europe into the focus. However, the decisive role of these concrete examples in the center of the concept raises questions about the accuracy of the concept's level of abstraction. In addition, these concepts have an inherent inadequacy in terms of both being under the influence of historical context they were developed, such as social progressivism -or gradualism- paradigm and Occidentalism-based universalism. The weakness and geographical/historical monotony of the concrete contents of the concepts and the universality or inclusiveness of their political claims do not easily match with each other. As a result, it is far from being considered as a question that can be solved

directly, whether the social formation that these concepts refer to is a concrete structure or whether it should be interpreted as a universalist abstraction.

In this context, the solution that I will bring with the concept of rentier mode of production consists of separating the problem of modes of production into three basic universal forms and organizing societies in certain typologies under this concept based on their internal contradictions based on the distribution of rent. While doing this, the fact that social structures called ‘ancient/slave-owning’ and ‘primitive-communal’ can be evaluated under this concept offers a structuralist alternative that can be considered outside the gradualist paradigm. In this respect, in order to explain the concept of the rentier mode of production, our basic theses about (i) the general categories of the mode of production, (ii) the forms of rent, (iii) concrete examples of the rentier mode of production will be summarized and the Ottoman social structure will be explained within the framework of these theses.

II.II.V.I. The Concept of Mode of Production and Typologies of Social Formations

The concept of mode of production -as stated at the beginning of this chapter- was developed to denote the structural unity of productive forces and relations of production that shapes a given society. In this respect, this concept expresses a wide chain of social phenomena ranging from means of production to ownership/possession relations on them, from political patterns to ideological codes or cultural relations. In this respect, although the use of the concept of mode of production seems to claim to explain the origin, function and internal relationship of all social phenomena in a particular society, this situation creates uncertainty about the concrete extent of the concept. In this respect, my proposition is to take the concept of mode of production as an abstract expression of a systematic of relations, which is necessary for the reproduction of a certain social structure, and which directly or indirectly affects most of the social phenomena. By this definition, the emergence of certain social structures does not occur independently of the relations abstracted by the concept of mode of production, however, the framework of the mode of production does not naturally and necessarily include all social phenomena, neither actual nor potential. If this perspective is explained, a certain mode of production necessarily articulates political/economic/cultural relations and renders them isomorphic/cofunctional, on the other hand, in societies where a certain mode of production is dominant, the emergence of alternative political/cultural/economic relations independent of that mode of

production does not necessarily suppressed by it. If this multi-level structure is to be schematized, the social relations that arise in a particular society are constantly reproduced, whereas the subjects of a particular mode of production integrate some of these relations into the mode of production, suppress some of them, and introduce/develop/reproduce many new social phenomena appropriate to the given mode of production. If a negative photograph of this scheme is taken, similarly, subjects resisting the determinism of the given mode of production in a particular society both develop social relations *per contra* what the mode of production dictates and try to articulate certain social relations that develop independently from the mode of production with resistance movements. As a result, this tripartite structure (the potential of social relations to derive independently from the mode of production, the social relations organized around the mode of production, the social relations organized against the given mode of production) presents a certain schema, though not completely inclusive, in terms of modeling the reproduction or change of the social structure.

If the categorical scheme of modes of production is considered in general, it is possible to talk about three main categories due to the relational limitations of social structures. These are listed as (i) communitarian mode of production, (ii) rentier mode of production and (iii) capitalist mode of production. The communitarian mode of production, which is the first of these, is divided into two basic sub-categories. The first of these sub-categories is the primitive-communitarian mode of production, while the second is called modern communitarianism (or socialism/communism). Throughout this review, particular attention will be paid to the first and second pre-capitalist typologies. Therefore, briefly touching on the second category, modern communitarianism corresponds to a mode of production based on the egalitarian organization of social production and distribution relations, either directly or as a representative, under the political will of the community of producers. Modern socialism, which is the early form of this mode of production, aims to establish a planned and egalitarian social formation without private property on means of production by operating in coordination with the direct will of the producers' community and the state as a representative organ. On the other hand, in alternative examples such as communism, anarcho-communism and eco-communism, an alternative social structure is advocated in which directly egalitarian communities fulfill their production/distribution/management functions freely, in which the decisiveness of representative organs, economic scarcity and state authority are eliminated.

The first category, the primitive-communitarian mode of production, corresponds to a situation in which groups of people are organized as face-to-face communities (*gemeinschaft*) directly related to the practice of living together, where social stratification and class differentiation are not observed, and the society shaped as a direct organic unity. In this mode of production, the production process is carried out to meet the direct needs, their control does not have a certain effect on the production process because the means of production are either not developed at all or are very limited, the production relations are either very weak or crystallized on symbolic forms based on directly reproducing the community identity. Two typical sub-forms of the primitive-communitarian mode of production can be mentioned. The first of these is the egalitarian form, in which the community -at least hypothetically- continues to exist as a coexistence of independent individuals, and the second is the quasi-egalitarian form, in which a concrete or symbolic authority representing the community begins to form and the possibility of stratification emerges.⁸⁹ In the egalitarian form, a particular social production function is not necessarily defined, nor is access to the means of production necessarily community mediated. As Clastres (1992, p. 135) points out, it is seen that there is no structural element that can be called 'economy' in such communities. In the quasi-egalitarian form, however, production becomes socialized, and access to the means of production passes through the political and/or cultural mediation of the community. In both sub-forms, individuals within the community are accepted as natural members of the community, their position is culturally secured (kinship, myths, etc.) and the development of the state form is not observed. In this respect, the internal power relations of the community are mostly shaped as an *ad hoc* form, and methods such as voting/drawing/temporary authority can be used as well as traditions and personal relations.⁹⁰ Since there is no specialization and stratification, it is analogically reasonable to say that the community in these structures is culturally

⁸⁹ Suret-Canale (1970, pp. 151-55, 158 ff.) characterizes these two forms of community as communal and tribal/patriarchal-tribal. In addition, it is possible to think that pre-lingual communities are at the origin of egalitarian communities and these communities are pre-communal communities because there is no cultural medium that can reproduce the commune form in these communities. The communities we focus on are especially post-lingual communities that leave certain cultural products behind or that can be observed in their natural state. In some of these communities, egalitarian relations are dominant. For the concept of preliterate communities or 'organic society' as a similar category, see Bookchin (2015, p. 73).

⁹⁰ It should also be taken into account that the formal form of unity founded on kinship and collective rituals correspond to a certain form of power, in cases where several ethnies unite and large tribal 'societies' are formed. On this subject, see: Godelier (2022, pp. 107-8, 113-14).

composed of a single organ.⁹¹ On the other hand, the emergence of political and cultural forms of sexual coercion in the quasi-egalitarian sub-form of the communitarian mode of production, sexuality becoming the subject of community mediation from the immediacy of desire, and the development of subordination relations, especially on the female body, cause a transition to a new phase. With the female body becoming a means of production, phenomena such as the development of collective dominance over this 'tool', the prohibition of incest and the exchange of young women between tribes lead to the emergence of forms of institutional subordination. After these forms of power become to condition a certain family dominance over women/animals/lands, rent forms also develop. This development also gives the key to the evolution of simple forms of occupancy on the means of production into complex forms of ownership.⁹² The development of the form of ownership, though in this form of collective ownership, has developed a certain form of egalitarianism brought about by the export of natural resources to meet the needs of different communities, to the struggle - the war- between different communities for the protection of a particular territory in order to preserve their autonomy.⁹³ In this context, Clastres (2017, pp. 21, 48-49) explains the emergence of war in primitive communities not from the scarcity of material resources, but from the search for autonomy of primitive communities stemming from their own internal structures. In this respect, while the phenomenon of war is an extension of the internal structure of the community, it also constitutes the internal contradiction of the communitarian mode of production in terms of the development of power relations between -and within- the communities.⁹⁴

In the second form mentioned, it is possible that inter-communal tribute/rent relations develop under the form of asymmetric gift giving, some differentiations and specializations occur within the community (healer, animist/shaman, warrior, etc.), and

⁹¹ For a discussion on the unity of 'primitive' communities, see Clastres (2017, pp. 31-33).

⁹² For the relation of occupation and property, see: Proudhon (2011, p. 84).

⁹³ The term 'armed-conflict' may also be used here instead of 'war'. The conflict-level use of force by communitarian communities differs in class relations from systematic warfare organized by the state.

⁹⁴ Malešević (2018, pp. 349, 355) evaluates the organization of war and violence as one of the most prominent patterns of the social stratification process, and states that the stratification structure deepens as the right to use violence becomes monopolized and military roles become professional. In addition, it should not be ignored that modern communitarian forms tend to be stratified with the development of military-bureaucratic organization. Suret-Canale (1970, p. 160) also draws attention to the personal wealth differentiation and tribal chiefs pyramid that emerged through war in the Kissi community (Guinea) and Agni and Baules (Ivory Coast).

finally, privileged individuals emerge within the community. In this context, the formation of primitive coordination structures, the development of war/defense/migration patterns with the merging/articulation of various communities creates the possibility of transition to the rentier mode of production. At the specified stage, the organic unity of the community on which the communitarian mode of production is based is disintegrating, and instead the organic unity form in which the community is represented around a certain status differentiation and/or the formal unity between communities/status/strata becomes dominant. As the differentiation of duties/interests/status among the members of the community increases, the organization that includes these differences and its contradictory integrity can be formally combined. The experience of equality will turn into a kind of primitive ideological construct that leaves its place to the construction of hierarchy and mythical past. In general, the typical structure of communitarian mode of production is the dominance of concrete community structure in terms of production/distribution relations, political structures and cultural codes, and the construction of relations in these areas subject to the direct or indirect approval of the community. It is very difficult to determine whether there is a dominant ideological form in this structure. Theoretically, kinship relations, solidarism or animist traditions constitute distinctive reference systems of communitarian communities, but it is unclear to what extent they play a role as symbolic systems that reproduce power relations. It can be argued that such systems of thinking take on more ideological roles, especially in communities that have become quasi-egalitarian, and the dominant ideology is shaped, especially with the development of patriarchal power. If this thesis is accepted, it can be said that the community-centered understanding, which is typical of the communitarian mode of production, leaves its place to the representation of the community and the symbolic relations between the statuses/positions that cut the community in common, and ideological structures are developing. In the final analysis, every cultural/economic/political differentiation of organic unity in a community organized within the framework of communitarian mode of production reveals a certain form of mediation and accordingly forms of alienation. Even with different historical forms (invasion, increase in production, articulation of different communities, etc.), the concentration of rent, status and the authority to apply violence in the hands of certain individuals or communities results in the dissolution of

the communitarian mode of production and the emergence of a different social formation.⁹⁵

The concept of the rentier mode of production, which corresponds to the second of the mode of production categories, refers to a social form in which social contradictions and thus structures/relationships/struggles are organized around asymmetric rent income. The main feature of this social form is that the pursuit of rent is dominant over a series of social phenomena, from political violence to status and authority relations, from certain cultural presuppositions to land use patterns. In a more general form, if the dominant cultural/political/economic relations (subordination/domination/resistance structures) in a particular society are part of the search for rent as a whole, for or against, this society should be evaluated under the concept of rentier mode of production. The determining feature of the rentier mode of production is a possible form of social organization based on direct/indirect/open/closed forms of coercion that builds the rent relation.

Under this form of organization (in a wide framework from egalitarian communities to tribes that have begun to stratify, from settled farmers to dependent states) social patterns based on rent relations are encountered in titles ranging from lands, pastures, water usage rights, and mines etc. It is seen that the rentier mode of production was dominant and developed many variants in different parts of the world - together with the communitarian mode of production- for long millennia before the capitalist mode of production became dominant. The common features that can be observed in many examples, from the Aztec tribes to the ancient Greek site, from the Ottoman Empire to the Togukawa period Japan, reveal the universality of this form. In this respect, the wideness of the sample makes it necessary to first reveal the categorical scheme of the rentier mode of production and to return to the examples again through this scheme -in terms of the method of analysis. Rentier mode of production can be considered under several headings categorically. These titles can be listed as (i) the

⁹⁵ An interesting detail at this point is the possibility of class differentiation after symbolic/ideological differentiation in communitarian social formations. The development of cults of worship, the emergence of collective temples that attract different communities, may ideologically lead to the emergence of a transcendent symbolic authority from individual individuals and communities. In this case, the emergence of professional religious officials, settled agriculture and formal relations between different communities becomes a historical possibility. Göbeklitepe may be an example of this transition. On the hierarchical relations (and related exploitation) that developed before the emergence of classes and the state structure and their status/prestige-based arrangement, see: Bookchin (2015, pp. 75, 152).

definition of rent as a socio-economic category, (ii) the exposition of the historical categories of the rentier social formation forms, (iii) the description of the typical state and ideology forms in the rentier mode of production. The discussion under these headings will be carried out in the next subsection.

Finally, it is necessary to review the general features of the capitalist mode of production. If it is necessary to make a narrow formulation of the capitalist mode of production, it will suffice to mention a specific structure in which the dominant elements and social relations constituting the social formation are necessarily mediated by capital. In this structure, production is organized as commodity production, labor becomes waged in the form of labor-power, exploitation relations take place within the production process, and the means of production and direct producers are completely separated from each other. Since it is not necessary to elaborate the discussion of the capitalist mode of production in terms of the subject I have discussed, no further explanation will be given on this issue.

II.II.V.II. Rentier Mode of Production: A Concept and a Social Formation

II.II.V.II.I. Definition of Rent as a Socio-Economic Category: Various Approaches to the Concept of Rent

First of all, it is necessary to discuss the content of the concept of rent. The concept of rent was developed in the classical political economy paradigm (A. Smith, D. Ricardo, R. Malthus), elaborated in the Marxist economic approach and tried to be placed on new foundations within the neo-classical economics approach.⁹⁶ The history of the discussion of the concept of rent in the field of macroeconomics can be traced back to the physiocrats (Lackman, 1976, p. 287; Negishi, 1989, pp. 11-12; Marx, 1998, p. 45). However, the construction of the theory of rent and the beginning of the discussions on it are based on the theses of A. Smith. A. Smith (2016, pp. 160-61) defines rent as the value or price paid to the landowner to benefit from the land. This price is determined by the reproduction of the tenant's production goods and the demand by the landowner for all the products other than the standard profits common in the region of production (Smith, 2016, p. 160). According to Smith (2016, p. 203), rent payments can be paid in kind (grain, cattle, poultry, etc.) as well as in cash, which in time this second form became dominant. In this framework, Smith (2016, p. 161) states

⁹⁶ Discussions by J. B. Say, J. C. L. Sismondi, F. List, J. K. Rodbertus, and J. S. Mill can also be mentioned. Only the basic approaches will be covered here.

that the rent income is determined not depending on the amount of investment made by the landowner for the improvement of the land, but according to the highest price that the tenant can pay, thus he argues that the rent value emerges as a monopolistic price. This proposition of Smith will be criticized both by Ricardo and Marx with the differential rent theory, and the correlation between the rate of investment in land and the rate of rent will be re-examined by A. Marshall. Finally, A. Smith makes a triple distinction when describing the sources of rent, according to which (i) agricultural products always provide some rent, (ii) resources that sometimes bring rent and sometimes do not, and (iii) sources which's the amount of rent realized relatively when compared to both their own kind and industrial products. First of all, the land usually yields more products than can feed the labor required for production and replace the stock (animals, seeds, vehicles, etc.), therefore it provides rent to the landowner (Smith, 2016, p. 163). Smith (2016, pp. 177-80), who states that especially the land where the products that people eat directly, bring some rent, is of the opinion that this rent income indicates the minimum level of the rent of other cultivated lands. Smith (2016, pp. 163-64) also draws attention to pastures as the subject of this form of rent, and to lands closer to the city -and to the market- in terms of bringing more rent. Secondly, Smith states that rent income can sometimes be obtained from lands other than lands where crops are grown for direct human consumption, but this cannot be generalized. To give an example, the lands where the raw materials used in the production of clothing (such as hunting animal fur, etc.), the sources of sheltering needs (wood, stone, etc.) and coal mines are evaluated in this category, and he states that precious metals and stones do not yield any rent (Smith, 2016, pp. 181-83, 185, 190-94). The third category is determined by the relation of the first and second rent categories to each other. According to this thesis, the value of the conditional rent sources always changes according to the rent value of the rent-providing lands -and increases over time (Smith, 2016, p. 196).

Secondly, it is necessary to briefly discuss T. Malthus' theory of rent. Malthus (1836, p. 136) defines ground rent in general with the formula for the landowner's share of the total production after deducting all the expenses spent on using the land in agricultural production and the profit on the capital employed. Malthus identifies three basic situations for the emergence of ground rent. These situations can be classified as follows (Malthus, 1836, p. 140); (i) due to the different productivity of different pieces of land, some lands produce more products than the vital needs of the peasants working

on the land, (ii) after the consumption of the product necessary for life -due to the increase in population- it produces its own demand and this demand tends to increase, (iii) the presence of fertile lands in a natural or artificially limited state. This last item will then be reinterpreted both in an examination of the problem of capital investment in land -and artificial productivity- in the Marxist theory of differential rent, as well as in marginalist approaches. Finally, Malthus (1836, p. 142) states that, unlike A. Smith, other resources on a certain land - clothing, woodcutting, nutritional raw materials, etc. - can also be a source of rent without being separated from the soil.

Another economist who made a great contribution to the theory of rent is D. Ricardo. Ricardo (2020, p. 43) defines rent as the share paid to the landowner in exchange for using the authentic and indestructible powers of the land. Although this definition is similar to that of A. Smith, it allows a different analysis to be carried out both in the forms of rent and in some areas with rent yields. Firstly, Ricardo (2020, p. 45) states that in the early periods of history, when the human population was low and fertile land was abundant, ground rent did not arise because the needs could be met by cultivating a small portion of the fertile land that was not yet owned – and therefore no one would pay for the use of this land. On the other hand, Ricardo (2020, p. 46) argues that fertile lands begin to bring rent income, with the increase in population and the opening of less fertile lands to production as well as fertile lands. In this framework, when the lands with secondary productivity are opened for agriculture, the primary ones start to yield rents, as the lands with the tertiary fertile are opened for agriculture, and both the primary and the secondary ones start to provide rent (Ricardo, 2020, p. 46). The rent rate in question varies according to the productivity differences of the lands with each other. Ricardo also adapts this scheme to mine rents. Accordingly, contrary to what A. Smith puts forward, Ricardo argues that the usage fee paid for the mines or quarries is the price of the products to be extracted from these quarries -thus it cannot be directly considered as a rent (2020, p. 44). On the other hand, as the source of the rent obtained from the mines, Ricardo (2020, p. 59) shows the existence of different types of quarries that yield more or less products in exchange for equal amounts of labor. In this context, the return of the least productive mine, which does not provide any rent, determines the rent income obtained from the more efficient quarries and provides rent to the quarry owners (Ricardo, 2020, pp. 59-60).

K. Marx's theory of rent is based on a partial critique and development of the rent categories of classical political economy. Marx is of the opinion that the basis of

rent is private property on land and the social relations that develop accordingly. According to this thesis, rent emerges as a result of the dissolution of the ‘organic social order’, the monopolization of the use of land in certain hands under the form of ownership (Marx, 1999, pp. 31-32; 2020, pp. 614-15). Ownership of the land provides the landowner with a certain amount of rental income -as a surplus value or surplus product- in return for the use of this land by others (Marx, 2020, pp. 621, 632).⁹⁷ Marx categorizes two basic and six sub-forms of rent. The first of these basic forms is differential rent, which results from the difference between the private production price of the capital invested in the soil in a particular production region and the general production price in the same production region (Marx, 2020, p. 644). There are two main sub-forms of this difference.⁹⁸ The first of these is the difference in the products created by the equal amount of capital invested in two pieces of land of a certain size in terms of (i) productivity and/or (ii) position of these pieces of land (Marx, 2020, p. 647). Marx (2020, p. 656) suggests that this difference is not necessarily based on the increase in the rent value of the more fertile ones as the less fertile lands are put into production, as Ricardo and Malthus states, and that it may arise with the fertile lands becoming unproductive over time and the infertile lands becoming fertile over time. This differentiation can occur depending on the amount of capital invested in a particular piece of land, as can be seen in Malthus’s emphasis on artificial productivity. Accordingly, more than one -repeated-capital investment in a certain land will increase the amount of rent obtained from the land, as it will make the land more productive compared to its previous state (Marx, 1999, p. 85; 2020, p. 735). As the second of the main forms of rent, Marx examines the form of absolute rent. Marx (2020, pp. 757-58) states that the same amount of capital can produce different amounts of surplus value in different sectors based on the same amount of exploitation rate, this surplus value is added to the average profit in industrial production and equalized, but in agriculture some of the surplus value is returned to the landowner as a rent. This share constitutes the absolute rent form.

⁹⁷ On the other hand, Marx (1999, p. 33) argues that if all the lands in a country are of the same quality - regardless of the existence of private property - rent cannot arise. An important criticism will be brought to this thesis by C. Menger later on.

⁹⁸ In general, it is necessary to refer to the theses of J. Anderson for the first formulation of the differential rent theory before Malthus and Ricardo (Jevons, 1965, p. 210; Marx, 1999, p. 137). In addition, H. F. Storch argues that differential rent arises depending on whether the most fertile soil satisfies the demand and as the demand cannot be satisfied by fertile soils, less fertile soils will begin to yield rent (Barnett, 2019, p. 52).

While Marx's approach generally focuses on the forms of rent under the capitalist mode of production, it is seen that the absolute rent form applies to historical examples and presents results under three subcategories. These subcategories defined by Marx in terms of labor, product (payment-in-kind) and money are generally accepted as pre-capitalist forms of rent (Hoell, 1975, p. 21; Bouvier-Ajam et al, 1977, pp. 434-35). First, the labor-rent form emerges as the simplest form of ground-rent, when the direct producer works on the landlord's land for certain days without remuneration, and thus, surplus labor passes to the landlord in the form of rent (Marx, 2020, p. 775). Marx (2020, p. 777) states that the form of labor-rent is the first form of surplus value, that there is no difference other than forced labor when the labor of the direct producer is spent for himself and the landlord, and therefore it presents a concrete integrity. Marx is of the opinion that the lack of freedom of labor in the form of labor-rent is a necessary characteristic of this relationship. According to him, it is a general phenomenon that the producer is not free in a series of rent relations ranging from serfdom with drudgery to the obligation to pay tribute (Marx, 2020, p. 776). Marx (2020, p. 780) calls the second rent form he analyzes as product-rent and states that it emerges at a higher level of social development than the labor-rent form exists. The landlord's appropriation of rent as a product is based on the producer's giving a portion of his labor-time to the landlord in product and free of charge, but at the same time having a certain control over his own production process (Marx, 2020, p. 780-81). In order for this form of rent to dominate, the integrity of agriculture and rural household industry and the existence of natural economic conditions are necessary (Marx, 2020, p. 781). Finally, the money-rent form corresponds to a transformed form of the product-rent form, unlike the capitalist rent form (Marx, 2020, p. 782). Direct producers pay the landlords the price of that product instead of the product in the form of this rent, so a part of the product is produced in the form of commodities in order to be converted into money (Marx, 2020, p. 782). Giving ground rent in the form of money reveals a social situation in which direct producers become capitalist tenants or landlords over time, while capitalists are attracted to agricultural production and the capitalist enterprises become widespread (Marx, 2020, p. 784-85).

Marx (2020, pp. 776, 784) points out that the change of the form of rent from the form of labor-rent to money-rent is also the basis for the change of political ties between the landlord and the direct producer from a relationship of coercion/dependence to a legal relationship based on custom and contract. In addition,

the author, who draws attention to the fact that the forms of rent coincide with the forms of taxation, evaluates some examples in the Asian continent where the land belongs to the state. According to this evaluation, in cases where the state is the highest landowner and private land ownership is not observed, ground rent directly corresponds to tax (Marx, 2020, p. 777).⁹⁹ In the discussions conducted in the 20th century, some other forms or Marxist theories of rent have been discussed besides the ones introduced in this chapter. For example, rents paid to real estate owners, payments made to own a certain property with long-term periodic payments called mortgages, and payments to government bonds are referred to as forms of rent (Bouvier-Ajam et al, 1977, pp. 434-35).¹⁰⁰ Recently, Henri Regnault has developed the concept of negative differential rent within the categories of Marxist political economy, which is not yet generally accepted (Amin, 2018, p. 79).¹⁰¹ David Harvey (2006, p. 349; 2019, p. 145), on the other hand, after defining the rent categories as monopoly, absolute and differential, argued that the power of private property owners to monopolize a certain area or property/goods lies at the basis of all rent forms.

Finally, let us briefly examine how the theory of rent was developed in the neo-classical economics literature. The early representatives of the neo-classical economic paradigm developed multiple approaches to ground rent. J. Mill and W. S. Jevons generally accept D. Ricardo's theory of rent and discuss the development of rent in relation to the use of capital on land. According to this theory, capital investment made in two different soils with different degrees of productivity -or made repeatedly in the same soil- have different returns from each other (Jevons, 1965, p. 214). In this framework, the lowest return from the land compensates for the entire investment, while the difference between the lowest and highest returns based on the returns on the invested capital shares constitutes a rent (Jevons, 1965, pp. 214-15). On the other hand, C. Menger criticizes D. Ricardo's theory of rent and tries to put the theory of ground rent on a different basis. According to Menger (2007, p. 167) the value of land or ground rent (*services of land*) is not directly reducible to its relation to labor or capital. In this respect, Menger (2007, p. 168) accepts that the differences in yield and location between the soils affect the rent, but claims that rent income can arise even in the same

⁹⁹ Also, see: Marx (1999, p. 86) for the argument that landlords can obtain leasing-rent income in unproductive lands where economic rent does not arise.

¹⁰⁰ Marx (1999, p. 25) also mentions water rent and house rent in Lombardy and Asian countries as forms of rent that develop depending on monopoly conditions.

¹⁰¹ This concept has similarities with the under-rent concept in the marginalist approach.

productivity and location. The basis of this view is the argument of Menger (2007, p. 116) that economic relations emerge depending on value when the value is perceived as a quality that people attribute to goods within the framework of their needs and the quantity of goods remains below the need -not a quality inherent in the goods themselves. Since land in a given country exists in quantities that cannot be easily increased and in quite different qualities, the value of it or its use becomes the subject of an economic relationship (Menger, 2007, p. 169). Similarly, the limitedness of goods and the difference in the subjective weights of their values reveal the exchange relationship (Menger, 2007, p. 122). In this framework, land and ground rent become a “value appraisal object” in order to meet the needs, and the land generates a certain rent income in terms of (i) the products it can produce in the future and (ii) the complementary value of the products it produces (Menger, 2007, p. 169).

It is seen that L. Walras and W. Pareto were also critical of D. Ricardo’s theory of rent. Walras (1965, pp. 214, 216) defines land as a form of capital (*natural capital*) and defines the income arising from its use with the concept of rent. According to Walras (1965, p. 216), soil –although there are some examples to the contrary– generally has a quality that cannot be artificially produced and destroyed, and its value is extraordinarily high because it is scarce with “advanced” societies. In this framework, as the effective demand exceeds the effective supply, the land use price increases and this is called rent (Walras, 1965, p. 223). Walras (1965, pp. 408-16) also criticizes Ricardo’s theory of diminishing returns in agricultural production, emphasizing that not only the quality of labor and the cost of capital-services but also the quantity of wages, interest and leased land should be taken into account in determining rent. Pareto sees the principle of “marginal utility of the services of the capital” at the root of rent (Foldvary, 2008, p. 111). Pareto –contrary to Ricardo– argues that rent is part of the cost of production, and that rent will arise on any land where productivity is greater than or equal to the margins of production (Foldvary, 2008, p. 111). A. Marshall (2013, p. 523) deals with the phenomenon of rent as an extension of the supply and demand relationship within the general economic theory. According to Marshall’s (2013, p. 130) general theory, rent depends on factors such as (i) the value of land determined by nature, (ii) human-made improvements, and (iii) population growth that resulting the development of roads and railways. In this framework, Marshall (2013, pp. 136-37) criticizes D. Ricardo’s theory of diminishing returns and states that it is not valid theoretically and historically (due to new raw material needs, free trade, developing

organizational capacity, etc.). Secondly, Marshall (2013, p. 351) is of the opinion that there is no fundamental difference between differential rent and scarcity rent. Accordingly, every increase in productivity due to capital and labor invested in the land is also a 'quasi-rent' return (Marshall, 2013, p. 524). The concept of 'quasi-rent' is used as a new approach that Marshall added to the discussion of rent, in the sense that man-made tools and equipment affect the production process and income for a certain period of time (Marshall, 2013, pp. 63, 354). Another issue Marshall focuses on is the problem of directly associating state-owned lands, the forms of land ownership in the East or the forms of medieval economics with rent income. This issue was also addressed before Marshall. The opening of new discussion topics in the neo-classical theory of rent arises especially within the framework of the question of leasing the lands controlled by the state and the nature of the rent in this rental relationship. Firstly, trying to answer this question, F. F. Wieser argues that even in a communist state, rent can arise, but in this example, the rent is not owned by the property owners, but by the state, and therefore by the whole society (Foldvary, 2008, p. 93).¹⁰² According to Marshall (2013, p. 531), in cases where the land is controlled by the monarch, the state or a similar group, the taxes or payments given by the tenants are "fixed sum", not ground rent. This share is a fixed amount determined by tradition or law, the landowner does not invest in land and tools, the producer is protected by tradition, etc. The rent obtained by the landlord for reasons and its share in the payments is uncertain -in cases where the payments are received in monetary terms, the value of the rent and the monetary payment are different from each other (Marshall, 2013, pp. 531-33). The broadest criticism against the classical and neo-classical rent thesis was put forward by F. Fetter (2007, pp. 350-52, 358, 371). Based on Fetter's theses, Rothbard (2009, pp. 418-19) defines the concept of rent as the purchase of unit of services of any good, and in this respect, he evaluates the sale of labor services under this concept. Rothbard (2009, p. 476) criticizes Marshall's theory of quasi-rent and argues that capital goods -such as land- earn gross rent, and that all rentals and purchases earn rent either directly over their unit of value or over the value they will contribute to production in the future. In addition, Rothbard (2009, p. 477) states that the wage corresponds to the rent price/cost defined for the unit of service of labor, and that in the case of slavery, buying and selling people for a future income is the absolute capitalization of labor.

¹⁰² As a late example, it is possible to add the thesis of Chayanov, who was influenced by neo-classical economics, that rent arises in family businesses, within this framework.

In summary, when the specific meanings of the concept of rent are taken into account, it is seen that three basic meanings come to the fore. The first of these -as Fetter (2007, p. 319) points out- corresponds directly to the income obtained from the soil or soil products -and its different variations. Secondly, the concept of rent is considered as the basic category of the unequal distribution of labor products in pre-capitalist social formations. Thirdly, rent constitutes the form of marginal return on capital in capitalist mode of production -specific in some approaches and general in others. The fact that the concept of rent, as developed by Rothbard, is presented as the general relation that creates the price, and that the concept of *marginal utility* is presented as the universal determination, constitutes the extreme point of this last framework.

Since the focus of this thesis is the Ottoman social structure, I will focus on the second of these definitions and try to show how the theory of rent can be applied to the Ottoman social formation and mode of production discussions. In my opinion, the essence of the concept of rent in pre-capitalist societies lies in the phenomenon of *over-production* based on political coercion. The common feature of pre-capitalist societies -regardless of ancient, 'medieval' or early modern period, and region- is that production and exchange for immediate needs is the dominant trend. In the emergence of this tendency, the traces of the effect of communitarian social formation in cultural relations as a residual and the organization of the producer communities in production units that are far from each other -which makes them difficult to be controlled, are definitive factors.

In this context, political coercion, similar to the economic coercion that emerges in the capitalist mode of production, destroys the communitarian structure of the productive communities (fragmentation of tribes, policies of forced-resettlement, appointment of administrators, triggering the process of vertical mobilization in tribal structure, enslavement, etc.) and adapts them to the rent relationship or makes them suitable for paying taxes/tribute/rent in order to coerce them for the surplus production.¹⁰³

Thus, direct producers, in addition to appease their own immediate needs and reproduce the conditions for their satisfaction (seeds, animals, tools, etc.), they are also forced to reproduce the needs of the rentier class, which is their exploiter, and the conditions to satisfy their needs (professional soldiers, administrators, clergy, war and

¹⁰³ As a historical example, on the appointment of tribal chiefs during the Seljuk Empire, see: Peacock (2020, pp. 76-77).

defense equipment, ostentatious buildings and tombs as status symbols, etc.). To formulate it abstractly, the arbitrary occupation of the land by free producers is prevented by political coercion, thus creating the phenomenon of rent -as a social relation- by the absolute or conditional ownership forms that emerge. To reiterate this point, pre-capitalist rent is not a form of appropriation of the surplus product, but a result of the political coercion that brought about the surplus product. In this respect, while discussing pre-capitalist forms of rent, the coercive relations underlying the rent should be taken into account. Concrete forms of the relationship of coercion in rentier societies have many variants. These include enslavement, serfdom, indebtedness—and debt bondage, conditionalization of property based on the threat of invasion, coercive contracts, conditional land allotments, seed confiscation and seed distribution—as well as tenancy relations developed over the means and animals used in production. This relationship -if its historical origins are left out of discussion- can occur in two ways, directly and indirectly. While the direct form of coercion (i) emerges as coercion on labor, the indirect form of coercion is divided into two basic forms: (ii) *de facto* conditionalization of property and/or (iii) *de jure* conditionalization of property. In both forms, over-production is performed directly or indirectly depending on the military, political or ideological/culturally organized power of coercion.

The form of direct coercion is based on the forcible bonding of labor used in production on a particular property to the landlord or the land in order to obtain rent. The bonding of labor to the landlord takes place through the acquisition of property with the laborer and is called slavery. It is possible to detect the bonding of labor to the land in the examples of Roman colonies and serfdom. When pre-capitalist social formations are examined, it is seen that slave ownership is a common but not decisive phenomenon. Although agricultural units producing with slave power were common in ancient Greek and Roman societies, it could not be thought that slave labor was always the dominant form of labor in these units, nor could it be claimed that the units producing with slave labor were the only and decisive element of the ancient economic system. On the contrary, there are many examples where slaves work with the landlord's family members in the same way as the assistants/steward who run the affairs of a particular household, and quantitatively less than family members - as seen later in China, Mongolia and even in Islamic countries. Moreover, in these examples, which are thought to show the slave-owning mode of production, there are also some points of distinction, such as production activity for the market - the capitalist form, which will

later be seen in the plantations in the American colonies- and the use of capital. Secondly, the existence of small family holdings, limited wage labor, tenancy and sharecropping forms besides the economic units producing by slave labor –and often even a larger percentage in quantitative terms– is also a fact that needs to be taken into account. It is possible to find the clearest example of this situation in Cato's *De Agricultura*.¹⁰⁴ In this work, Cato (2022, pp. 26-27) states that on a 60-hectare (240 *iugera*) farm, besides the housekeeper and his wife, 5 workers, 3 farmers, 3 shepherds and 6 slaves should work. Similarly, in a vineyard of 25 hectares (100 *iugera*), a total of 16 people and 6 slaves are required to work, including 10 workers, a farmer, shepherd and helpers, in addition to a guard and a servant (Cato, 2022, p. 28). In this census, the ratio between slaves and free people would be half at worst. Moreover, the fact that Cato (2022, p. 33) also mentions the amount of wage labor required for the establishment of the mill shows that this sector of labor cannot be ignored, although it is not decisive. In the final analysis, the fact that a part of the production is carried out by slave power does not change the fact that the ground rent is appropriated by the ruling class or strata. Here, the appropriator can become private individuals, families or the state itself, as in the Sparta/Roman/Ottoman examples (*helots/ slaves of ager publicus /ortakçı kullar*) - even in the case of the Mamluk state, the slaves become rentiers who reproduce slavery over time. In this case, examples that are generally evaluated under the concept of slave-owning or ancient mode of production should be accepted as a specific variant of the rentier mode of production.

Secondly, let us look at the emergence of the phenomenon of rent under the form of indirect coercion. The indirect form of coercion is divided into two basic forms: making the status of property conditional as (i) *de facto*, and (ii) *de jure*. The difference between these two forms is that, in the first form, no distinction is made between the *jus in re* and *jus ad rem* forms of disposition. In the second form, the distinction between *jus in re* and *jus ad rem* is made on the legal context, so the rent relationship becomes the subject of legal-institutional forms.

The *de facto* transformation of property into conditional form is based on the forcible conversion of the right to use it into conditional form by a foreign power, whatever the legal codification of the producers on the means of production in general

¹⁰⁴ It also shows that in the example of ancient Egypt, despite the existence of slaves, they were not the determining factor in production. It is seen that wage workers, who are paid in kind or assigned land compared to the slaves, play an important role in the production for the kingdom or the nobility (Childe, 1994, pp. 98-99).

and the land in particular (ownership, possession or simple occupation). This situation may occur as a result of invasion or conquest movements. Accordingly, in order to maintain the right to use a certain land, it is necessary to pay a certain amount to the power holding the monopoly of coercion. A relationship of rent arises regardless of whether this payment is made in the form of tax, tribute or obligation. Similarly, the shares paid (or given under the form of a gift) to have the right to use a certain part of the earth (water edges, grasslands, fields, mines) by guarantee are also included in the rent relationship.¹⁰⁵

It is surprising that under this form there can be quite different variations of the form of labor. Examples such as the egalitarian *mark* lands of the Germans, the *zadrugas* of Eastern Europe, the *feddan/musha'a/kibbutz* systems in the Arabian and Jewish communities, or the Russian village communes (*mir*) - along with their examples in the Middle East and East Asia - are worth mentioning.¹⁰⁶ Although the process of production in these lands will gradually dissolve, it is organized according to the egalitarian structure of the communitarian mode of production, while direct producers pay rent to a superior power. In another alternative, rentier institutions determined by tradition that emerged in the history of Western Europe, China and early Japan, where free producer communities were not dominant, can be evaluated under this category. In addition, some examples of unpaid family labor in small landholding based on family production can be considered examples of this category due to special circumstances such as domestic coercion and the father's power to deprive children of inheritance.

Bringing property into conditional form as *de jure* reveals another rent relationship that is frequently seen in the history of pre-capitalist social formations. On

¹⁰⁵ It is possible to add to this the revenues obtained by the security organizations through tax or tribute in the regions under the threat of invasion. Moreover, the situation of tributary states also sets an example for the transfer of rent in this status. As an archetype of this relationship, it is possible to mention the Zhou dynasty's forced settlement of nomadic tribes and collecting tribute from them (see Otkan, 2018, p. 61).

¹⁰⁶ On the subject, see: Ascher (2020, p. 77), Barnett (2022, pp. 58-59), Wolf (2000, pp. 70, 130), Thomson (2021b, pp. 506-7), Anderson (2015, p. 168), Bloch (2014, pp. 218-19), Patai (1949, pp. 436-38). An interesting detail at this point is the re-emergence of the open-field system after the Viking and Hungarian raids. It is noteworthy that human societies, which do not have the characteristics of communitarian formation in origin, can sometimes reinvent communitarian forms due to the needs of distribution of inheritance and security needs (see: Davis, 2020, pp. 204-5). Another interesting example emerges within the framework of the Mazdakism movement. The common property claim of Mazdakism seems to have been supported by the Sassanid ruler, at least for a while, in order to break the power of the local aristocracy (Rubin, 2008, p. 135).

the basis of this form, the right to produce on a certain piece of land is legally limited by a superior power. In this framework, a distinction emerges between the forms of property *jus in re* and *jus ad rem*. First of all, the ownership category of both direct producers and first-level rentiers who have a possession relationship on the rent source is defined as *jus in re* (*de facto* right on the object). On the other hand, the property right on the land that the superior power, which forces the direct producer for over-production and organizes the rentiers at the first level, often does not directly seize the rent income, has the status of *jus ad rem* (the right to be owned relative to the object). In this form, which is also called the prebendal form of ownership, the owner entrusts the right to use the land to third parties for a certain tax/service or free of charge, and these third parties acquire the right to collect taxes/incomes/tributes etc. on the specified piece of land. On the basis of this relationship, the people who have the right of possession on the prebend do not own it but benefit from the rent income. An advanced form of this practice can be observed in the lands with the status of *timar* in the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, *sipâhîs* emerge as a class-segment that does not have private property rights over *timars* but has the privilege of obtaining rent income from agricultural production. In addition, some rent rights of the state and/or dynasty still remain on the direct producer in the *timar* land. The significant point here is that the rent-taking stratum is appointed by a superior power conditionally, and at the same time, the rights of the direct producers on the land are made conditional by the same power. In this way, the power that assigns land can organize the element of pressure to obtain rent, however, it cannot directly seize all of the rent. Similarly, in ancient Mesopotamian civilizations, the lands that were in the hands of the priest class and left as *prebends* directly to producers or administrators in return for taxes can be considered under this category (see: Childe, 199, pp. 105-6). Another example of this category can be found in the lands entrusted to officials in return for administrative and judicial duties -for example, lands left to faqîhs, qadis and members of the ulama in the early Ottoman state. In this last example, some of the lands have the status of *waqf*, and precisely for this reason, there is a conditional ownership –the reason for the endowment and its control. The use of slave, wage worker or sharecropper labor in such lands does not change the essence of the rent relationship.

To sum up, it is possible to argue for the universal validity of a few basic structures in which the rent relation emerges as the founding element in the rentier mode of production. These are (i) patriarchal family production and household slavery, (ii)

farms using slave labor, (iii) land under the status of *allodium*, *fief*, *prebend* etc., (iii) state-owned farms, (iv) situations where free producers (farmers, tribes, etc.) are subject to tax/tribute.¹⁰⁷ The main category in which all these structures operate is the absolute rent form, as defined by Marx. On the other hand, it should be accepted that in the above-mentioned examples, differential rent may have arisen at varying rates depending on the location of the soil, its productivity and whether capital has been invested on it. To briefly touch on this issue, when it comes to the distribution of lands among the young men of the family in the form of patriarchal family production, it is likely that a differential rent difference will arise in terms of the fertility of these lands and their distance from the market. Secondly, as determined by Cato (2022, p. 20) in his book titled *De Agricultura*, even when the factors such as the productivity of the soil and the distance to the market remain the same, the condition of the tools used, the buildings and animals -that is, the capital invested- affects the ground rent.¹⁰⁸ On the other hand, in prebendal land assignments, it is clear that the private lands of the persons who have the right to obtain prebend incomes are located in more fertile and better position than other lands -if these incomes are paid in kind- it will leave a certain differential rent income to the related parties. An important issue at this point is whether differential rent has become a common form of rent. As it will be examined in the following sections, the emergence of differential rent, its monetization and its articulation with market relations will have a significant impact on the mode of organization of the state in rentier social formations.

Finally, it is necessary to briefly touch on the material forms of rent income. As Marx pointed out, rent can be directly converted into (i) unpaid labor (labor-rent) (ii) a certain share of the product (product-rent) or (iii) money (money-rent) income. Although there is a certain limitation of the first form, the other two forms can re-emerge directly under the categories of exploitation, taxation or tribute. Although the most developed of these three forms is the money-rent form, it is seen that all three forms are interchangeable until the establishment of capitalism in agricultural production. In this respect, the concrete form of rent does not have a direct effect on the emergence of rent,

¹⁰⁷ The first three of these forms can be intertwined in a variety ranging from *oikos* to *manor*.

¹⁰⁸ Bryson's *Oikonomikos Logos* can be cited as another work that establishes a direct relationship between land ownership and commercial agriculture in ancient times. It is an interesting parallel that this work was also translated into Arabic and found readers in medieval Islamic society. For Bryson's theses on how capital should be used in agricultural production, see: Swain (2022, p. 26).

on the contrary, the political, cultural and economic structures after the emergence of the rent relationship determine the arrangement of the rent form. When the historical variants of rentier relations are examined, it is seen that the use of force is structured in several different forms of social relations. For example, in Buddhist or Christian monasteries and on lands belonging to certain *sûfi* circles, rent can develop under the influence of cultural-political (symbolic) forms of coercion, military achievements are rewarded with land ownership (or prebend), and a rentier relationship can arise from this, people who hold administrative positions can be rewarded with land or in case of retirement or have been settled in the prebendal farms. If these relationship examples are placed in a general scheme, it is noticed that the use of coercion is an important factor in the establishment of the rent relationship, but the monopoly of violence, authority and social status relationships based on administrative and religious functions have an impact on the distribution of rent. In this respect, rent distribution is also observed as a struggle for social priority and status, and in this way, it leaves a trace in the history of political thought. For example, Morgan (1998, p. 352) stated that the emergence of titles and social positions such as *archon/pylo-basileus/basileus* in ancient Greek society and the emergence of *princeps/rex* duties in ancient Rome revealed a certain aristocracy consciousness, thus these new institutions -although they cannot completely eliminate the traditional understanding of egalitarianism- are rooted in property ownership and public duties. Morgan's assessment provides a pattern of the historical impact of social status relations on the transition from communitarian to rentier mode of production. It is possible to understand from the transitions between status-administrative authority-land ownership that this pattern is effective not only in the transition from kinship relations to rentier relations, but also especially in cosmopolitan imperial structures. Identifying such a relationship in a similar way in societies that developed in a different time and place is important in terms of understanding the generality of this relationship form. In considering the societies of ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, Childe finds that there are several different ways of building kingdoms. Accordingly, magical-religious prestige as well as military and economic achievements can be a source of the right to rule and access to agricultural products (Childe, 2011, p. 99). It is possible to observe a similar situation in the relations of the ruling classes in ancient Indian societies. In the *Upanishads*, there is both a contradiction and a certain unity between the *Brahmin* clergy class and the warrior class called *Kshatra* (Kaya, 2016, pp. 53-54). In the development of the ancient Greek city,

the lands called *témenos*, reserved for the use of priest-king-clan chiefs, became private property over time and corresponding to the most fertile lands can be evaluated within the same framework (Wycherley, 2011, p. 24; Thomson, 2021a, pp. 46-47, 70). In the early periods of Mongolian tribes, the tribal chief's status as a *beki* (priest, *pontif maximus*) and commander gives the example of integration of both statuses (Vladimirtsov, 1995, p. 80).

II.II.V.II.II. Historical Typologies of the Rentier Mode of Production and the Problem of Ideological Formation

Social formations that can be considered under the concept of RMP have some structural features and they form real historical structures according to their configuration. First of all, it should be taken into account that the RMP is mostly effective on communities that have communitarian social formations or that have emerged with the dissolution of this mode of production. In this case, first of all, the degree of influence of the communitarian social formation or some of its historical remnants, how they are included in the rent relations or what kind of social contradictions dominate, also determines the variants of the rentier social formations. These variants emerge around power relations that cut more than one social contradiction in common, such as how the tribe or commune form is adapted to rent relations, the formation of political cadres and commercial relations. Since this last form emerges in social structures where the RMP is transformed around market relations, it would be appropriate to mention the development of commercial relations and capitalist exchange as another factor determining social formation variants in the RMP.

Within this framework, it is possible to identify several basic variants. First, the social structure in which quasi-egalitarian communities rising above certain egalitarian/quasi-egalitarian/non-egalitarian communities (families, tribes, etc.), and appropriated rent to the detriment of the first can be mentioned. As a prototype of this form, it is necessary to take into account the military-political unions formed by nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes among themselves, and subordinates are bound to superiors by service/tribute/gift etc. obligations. Examples of this social formation can be found in the Spartan state, the early Aztec federation, the Germans, and the early Turkic and Mongolian tribes. The Aztec federation was founded on a dual class structure, and the Aztec tribes maintained a semi-egalitarian order among themselves,

while obtaining tribute from the surrounding tribes.¹⁰⁹ It presents an interesting example of structure in terms of the pattern of emergence of these rentier relationships. Aztec tribes developed a society that did not know money or money-based exchange, engaged in irrigated agriculture and weaving, and accepted the form of common ownership on land (Morgan, 1994, pp. 288-89). Aztecs, whose administrative system was probably a kind of primitive democracy, established a confederation between three great tribes, which received tribute in kind from dependent villages and tribes such as *Xochimilca* and *Cahlcán*, which were not members of the confederation (Morgan, 1994, pp. 290, 293-4, 296). While there are many details about the egalitarian structure of the Germanic tribes in Tacitus's work *De origine et situ germanorum*, there are observations that point to the rent relationship between the enslaved people and members of Germanic tribes have. Tacitus (2006, p. 59; 2022, pp. 87-88) states that in Germanic tribes the slaves lived in their own houses and ruled that house, whereas the slave owners demanded a certain amount of grain, cattle and clothing from them. In Mongolian tribes, groups called *unagan-bogol*, which were subordinate to the ruling tribe or family, especially in the pre-11th century, were obliged to pay tribute even though they were personally free and own their private property (Vladimirtsov, 1995, p. 100). The Spartan example is a transitional variation similar to the Aztecs. The ancient Spartan state was based on a rentier social formation where the Doric tribes turned into a closed ruling class and exploited the direct producers called *helots* on the basis of the principle of communal ownership and family possession of the land (Thomson, 2021a, pp. 68-69).¹¹⁰ Another interesting example is the Kingdom of Nkore; in which an upper class dealing with livestock and a lower class dealing with agriculture were united under the rule of a king called *mugabe* and the king collected tribute from the farmers (Itandala, 1986, pp. 32-33). Suret-Canale (1970, p. 162) points to the pattern in which the patriarchal family dominated their slaves and villages and formed a

¹⁰⁹ It is possible to come across a similar model in the Incas. The Inca tribes confederation had dominance over the village communes called *ayllu* located around it, and imposed both tribute/rent and drudgery on the village communities (see: Godelier, 1978, pp. 63-64). Another example can be found in early Rome, where several tribes or clans combined to form a ruling class. Patrician families, as the name suggests, are descendants of - or thought to be descendants of- clan rulers (patriarchs). For the tribal origins of consuls in early Rome, see Bradley (2020, p. 246). For the clan names of the Patrician families, see: Forsythe (2005, p. 158).

¹¹⁰ It can also be mentioned that there was a Sparta-like social formation in the ancient Carthaginian society, see: Thomson (2021c, pp. 164-65). However, the decisiveness of commercial relations should not be overlooked in this example.

privileged class in terms of the development of class relations in African communities. We place such examples, which he considers under the concept of AMP, under the category of RMP discussed above.

Secondly, it can be mentioned that there is a variant where an aristocratic class organized in the cities dominates the agricultural activities around the city and extracts rent income. This variant shows itself, albeit with some differences, both in ancient Mesopotamian cities and in Vedic India, ancient Greek and Roman examples.¹¹¹ First of all, it can be mentioned about the form in which the landowner class, organized in a particular city, obtains rent income both from their own lands and from the lands of family/clan property or individual property status in the vicinity of the city. In the second form of the RMP, which developed at the urban scale, it should be pointed out that the land aristocracies partially preserved their social position, but besides them, the families with small and medium-sized land also benefited from the rent income. Sumerian cities, which are typical examples in both forms, constitute the dominant economic center in the social formation and receive tribute from the surrounding fields, villages and towns (Childe, 2001, p. 121; Mumford, 2000, p. 60; Oates, 2015, p. 24). The lands around the city are cultivated by tenant farmers, clans, slaves, sharecroppers etc. These lands could belong entirely to private individuals, families ect., or could be regarded as the property of the temple or the king, and could even be reserved for public works, being the common property of the city community. It is possible to come across examples in the records of the city of Lagash, where the lands belonging to the city were distributed to the people for certain periods and obligations, similar to which can be found in the Solonian reforms, Greek tyrannies or the Republic of Rome. The determining factor in the Lagash example is that the land given to the ordinary people between 3.5 and 11 units is given to the ruling class by around 150 units (Oates, 2015, p. 114). Moreover, in this framework, it is seen that the city administrators (*ishakku*) took the largest share from the common lands and appropriated the product through taxes/gifts coming from these lands (Oates, 2015, p. 117). In the kingdom of Meroë, which ruled in West Africa, the early state, organized by a certain urban aristocracy, received annual tribute from the villages clustered around it and from nomads in return for the use of pastures (Shillington, 2020, p. 92).¹¹² In another example, Childe (2007, p. 175) draws attention to the similarity of the power of the Shang dynasty ruling in

¹¹¹ For a detailed review of the aristocratic republics in the Vedic period, see: Sharma (1968).

¹¹² For a later example, Hausa city-states, see Shillington (2020, pp. 286-87).

ancient China, organized around the city of Anyang, with the city-states of early Egypt, Sumer, and India. It can be mentioned that an agriculture developed under the rule of aristocratic families (both free peasants, land-granted producers, and farms using prisoners of war) in Hittite cities during the early kingdom period (Macqueen, 1986, pp. 75-76, Bryce, 2003, p. 93). The situation in ancient Greek cities is not different from these examples in essence. In its early period, Greek cities emerged mostly as castles where property differentiation took place under the partial or absolute authority of a king. The contradiction between the lands belonging to the king, the city community and the kinship groups was partially resolved over time by the division of the lands between certain aristocratic groups and on the basis of family ownership. In this respect, although the social contradictions between small landowners, debt slaves and sharecroppers and big landowners occasionally led to the redistribution of land, they did not radically change the rent-appropriation privileges of the urban landowners. Ultimately, the emergence of democratic city-states is based on a relatively equitable distribution of rentier privileges among city stakeholders/citizens. Similar to the ancient Mesopotamian cities, it is seen that some lands were granted to temples in ancient Greece and these lands were cultivated by tenant farmers (Weber, 2022, p. 227). In the Roman example, it is possible to determine that the patrician clans living in the city held most of the lands.¹¹³ Class division in Texcoco, one of the late Aztec cities, and the service obligations of the surrounding towns to the city (Hodge, 198, pp. 25-26) give an example of a similar rentier relationship.¹¹⁴

Thirdly, the units of production that are organized as independent small producer units and supply partly asymmetric domestic labor and partly external labor power (slave, docking, sharecropper, etc.) constitute small and closed rent units. There are many different types of examples of this form in world history. An example of this in nomadic groups is the person (or families) who own a kind of land, go to war individually and can own slaves (for example, Otkan, 2018, pp. 58-9, 68), that benefited both the rent from individual small-holdings and common pastures. The fact that each

¹¹³ This framework is largely valid for the kingdom and republican periods of Rome. On the other hand, some of the small landowner plebs must be counted in the rentier class— especially since the 2nd century B.C., the political struggle of the plebs tends to guarantee such a position. On the social position of senatorial families in the imperial period, see: Arnheim (1972, pp. 143-54).

¹¹⁴ For the thesis that the development of cities in the Spring and Autumn Period in ancient China was similar to the oligarchic Greek city, see: Seland (2022, p. 69).

family has its own property in the Mongolian tribes, that the pasture is under common property, the herd and tools are privately owned, and that slave labor (and in certain cases waged labor paid in kind) is encountered in the utilization of this property points to a similar situation (for example, Vladimirtsov, 1995, pp. 85-92). Moreover, examples of small landholdings in Greek and Roman society can also be evaluated in this group. While Hesiod (2020, pp. 57-58, 71, 72), who gives one of the earliest examples of this type of land ownership, sees the countryside and agricultural production as the place of a healthy and prosperous life, he finds cities and kings largely unreliable, and prioritizes agriculture with the help of a steward and servant, and the exchange by sea at a certain time of the year above other economic activities.¹¹⁵ Furthermore, Xenophon (2020, pp. 23-24) sees it as a virtuous effort to engage in agriculture personally and states that this profession will bring wealth. The existence of free peasants and uncontrolled villages outside the manor organization, as Pirenne (1937, p. 58) pointed out, constitute alternative examples of the RMP in the history of medieval Europe.¹¹⁶ Chayanov (1966, p. 6) states that in general, in this type of family business -even if there are no slaves or wage workers- a form of self-exploitation may emerge due to the relationship between the direct demand of the family and drudgery. In particular, it is difficult to negate that forms of domestic coercion can create the phenomenon of over-production and that it is possible to collect this surplus product in the hands of 'family leaders'/'masters'. According to this formulation, when slaves and wage-laborers are added, it must be admitted that small producers can generate a certain amount of rent under the form of patriarchal community. One of the best examples of this relationship can be found in Tacitus. Tacitus (2006, p. 45; 2022, p. 82) states that among the Germans, warrior men do not participate in any production activities other than war and hunting, and they leave the field and housework to women, old men and the weak people of the house (*infirmissimo*). In the dissolution periods of cities, feudal relations or empires, it is seen

¹¹⁵ In the same context, an agricultural text found in Sumerian tablets about a thousand years before Hesiod makes similar suggestions. In this text, production is carried out by household members and labor considered to be rented, see: Kramer (1990, p. 55).

¹¹⁶ Le Goff (2018, p. 254) argues that such independent peasants cannot be regarded as completely independent because they are under the jurisdiction of the ruling and taxation right of the lord in a particular area and pay tribute directly or indirectly. Although this thesis is correct, the focus in this topic is the formation of the rent factor in family businesses based on small land ownership. If over-production and rent relations arise due to the fact that these units are subject to seigniorial power, it is necessary to evaluate the relevant example in another category -or in both categories.

that the lands that used to be the subject of conditional ownership passed into the status of small peasant property or were disposed of completely independently or in return for taxation. For example, after the 7th century, as a result of the dissolution of large estates belonging to the Byzantine aristocracy, small peasant estates became widespread and it is possible to see that slave labor was used in some of these estates (Ostrogorsky, 2019, pp. 125-27). These estates derive both the rent based on the use of family members and slaves, and the rent that such communities were collectively obliged to pay to the Byzantine Empire. The idea and phenomenon of direct linking of small family businesses to the state through a rent relationship also constitutes a remarkable transitional variant. The emergence of the state or persons (*seigneurs*) who take a share of the rent obtained by the direct producers in the units of production based on private or collective property will not eliminate the rent relationship within the *oikos* in the first place, but also opens a new channel of rent creation and transmission. The idea and phenomenon of direct linking of small family businesses to the state through a rent relationship also constitutes a remarkable transition variant. The emergence of the state or persons (*seigneurs*) who take a share of the rent obtained by the direct producers in the production units based on private or collective property will not eliminate the rent relationship within the *oikos* in the first place, but also opens a new channel of rent creation and transmission. One of the most striking of such plans was created by Mencius, and according to this, the land should be divided into nine units, a family should save each of these eight units as private properties, and the product produced in the ninth unit should be sent to the king/state (Yu-Lan, 2009, p. 103). Over time, this bill would bring about the transformation of eight units of land into prebends subject to taxation and the appointment of an administrator/soldier to a unit considered to belong to the king/state, and most likely a share of the administrator from the income of the eight-unit re-taxed areas etc. In this respect, this is one of the possible variants of the prebendal property form and the transition to the imperial regime, which it will be discussed later.

Fourth, the social structure that is organized around seignorial units or manors and that creates a hierarchical political formation (feudalism) as a result of the articulation of these units among the rulers/*seigneurs* can be given as an example. The most basic feature of the feudal model of formal unity is that the hierarchy of rights/obligations/status based on the extraction of ground rent is mode of articulated as interpersonal relations (systems of personal trust, kinship, war comradeship,

homage/oath forms, etc.), whereas the nature of the status of direct producers stands impersonal/general. The fact that the mode of appropriation of the ground rent has not yet been monetized -or the monetary relations are not in a dominant position- brings with it the establishment of a two-dimensional relationship between the source of rent and the rentier class. The first of these dimensions is based on the personal military strength and combat skills of the rentier class, while the second is the patronage of a lord with greater military strength and war skills. This patronage position also means that the autonomous existence of the rentier class in *oikos* type properties and the right of family ownership are limited to certain conditions. Contrary to the general opinion, even in Western feudalism, the development of private property in absolute sense developed quite late, and the manor owners were in the last analysis the tenants -or subordinates- of another lord (Huberman, 2009, pp. 18-19). In addition, as La Patourel (1984, p. 32) points out, the practice of confiscation, which is used as a compelling/pressure mechanism in the solution of political problems in feudal political formation, shows again and again that private property is not the dominant form as it is thought.¹¹⁷ For example, in classical Western feudalism, the ceremonial procedure of vassals gifting their *allodium* lands to the overlords and then overlords' 'donating' these lands back to them as fiefs includes the symbolic expression of such conditional ownership. Similarly, land ownership pattern in Tokugawa period of Japan has become more conditional compared to the previous period, and the confiscation of lands of *daimyos* has made land ownership more insecure than before (Allen, 2022, p. 120), thus it become conditional in principle.¹¹⁸ The distinctive feature of Japanese feudalism is that all lands were officially considered the property of the ruler, whereas with the Tokugawa period, the absolute political power of the ruler was abolished in *de facto* and the land consignment was determined by the Shogun family and his personal relations. Therefore, although the Japanese example can be formally likened to empires with prebendal land allocation, it actually corresponds to a social structure dominated

¹¹⁷ The same situation is more or less valid for other examples of rentier social formations. For example, the properties of Ibn Suleyha, who surrendered the Cebele Castle with guarantee from Emir Tugtekin, confiscated by Sultan Berkyaruk the ruler of the Syrian Seljuks without any justification (Ibn Kalânisi, 2015, pp. 8-9).

¹¹⁸ After the Tokugawa period, the Japanese lands were divided into different parts according to the rent income of the rice-growing lands, the daimyos brought to the management of these lands seized the rent in kind and gave it to their entourage as a salary. See: Suzuki (2021, p. 19).

by feudal relations.¹¹⁹ Another example of the development of feudal relations is the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem and the feudal allies around it, which was formed after the Crusades. In this example, it is possible to determine that advanced feudal relations have not yet emerged, the kings of Jerusalem needed their vassals due to the critical military and economic situation, and therefore the lord-vassal relations developed in a personal framework, free from legal and financial control mechanisms (Berber, 2021, pp. 11-12). Moreover, in this example the newly developing kingdom manages both its tribute-paying subjects and the rent-paying colonialists -called *burgensis*- within the same framework of rentier relations (Barber, 2021, pp. 147-49).

A notable problem here culminates in whether lands are subject to conditional ownership again and again. In the RMP typology where feudal relations are common, the lands subject to conditional ownership can be re-divided by the subordinated subject of this ownership. For example, in Western feudalism and ancient China, although landlords use their lands conditionally under the supervision of the overlord, they can also conditionally grant them to their sub-lords.¹²⁰ In another subtype of the RMP which prebendal relations are common, on the other hand, since the lands are largely divided into small peasant holdings, their re-assignment can only occur under the monopoly of the central government, which keeps and controls the land records.

Another issue arises around the term ‘central feudalism’ and the historical problem it points to. Although feudal relations generally correspond to scattered and local rent relations, it is also possible for feudal hierarchies that dominate a certain region (Western Europe, North India, Southern China, etc.) to arise there. While the prevailing political phenomenon in this case could be termed ‘central feudalism’, the term does not have the capacity to directly encompass bureaucratic autarkies/empires. Since the feudal chain of hierarchy corresponds to a formal unity based on personal relations, it does not necessitate the centralization of powers such as jurisdiction, taxation and lustration. For this reason, it is necessary to carefully distinguish between

¹¹⁹ Monetization and the development of bureaucratic organization that took place until the Meiji period should not be ignored. This process develops with details such as the administration of certain lands by officials directly affiliated with the Shogun family and the control of the central authority over local units (see: Moore, Jr., 1974, pp. 231-32).

¹²⁰ For the subinfeudalization process in India, see: Sharma (1987b, p. 172) and Nandi (1987, p. 240). For a partial evaluation that such relations may have emerged in the late Byzantine empire, see: Mango (2008, pp. 61-62). On the contrary, Bartusis (1992, p. 183) argues that subinfeudalization did not occur in Byzantine *pronia*, and therefore *pronoia* should be carefully distinguished from fiefs granted in Western Europe.

the phenomenon referred to by the term ‘central feudalism’ and the rentier empires. However, there are situations where both social formations are intertwined. For example, *feodus* agreements between Byzantine Emperors and Gothic communities recognize the administrative autonomy and tax exemption of these communities, while giving them the status of ‘ally’, giving them an obligation to help in case of war (Ostrogorsky, 2019, p. 48). In this example, the rentier Byzantine Empire tries to secure its western border by making feudal alliance agreements. In another case, the governorships/satrapies that emerged in the old kingdom period of Egypt, the Assyrian state, the late Hittite state, Iran during the Achaemenid period, and India during the Maurya period have both political phenomena that can be considered under the concept of ‘central feudal’. On the other hand, the development of prebendalist relations can be detected in these examples too, thus the bureaucratic autarky form was developed simultaneously. In this case, it is clear that the term in question (central feudal etc.) can correspond to both a historical possibility and a stage of development.¹²¹ One of the most interesting examples of this process is the Great Seljuk Empire. Although the Seljuks had a stage of development in which the advanced Abbasid political institutions were liquidated, they were able to construct an army consisting of both a regular central army and state militia (*asker* and *jund*) based on prebendal ownership -especially with the Nizam’ül-Mülk period- exemplifies reconstruction/restoration of the empire-structure.¹²² The empire building process in the Great Seljuk State was never completed due to nomadic pressures, especially the possibility of subinfeudalization (see Senaullah, 2020, p. 29), the problematic relationship of the nomads with the central

¹²¹ It is a phenomenon frequently seen in societies dominated by the RMP that independent kingdoms become subject to tribute and are ruled by satraps appointed from the center after a while. At the core of this phenomenon is the search for reducing the mediation of the rentier relationship and for more effective control of rent income. Several variants of the phenomenon in question can be mentioned. The first of these is the administration of the regions (principality) allocated to the dynasty by the satraps, the second is the appointment of satraps to the independent kingdoms as mentioned, the third is the unification of a region dominated by clans and local landowners under the centrally appointed rulers. All three forms may have feudal or prebendalist tendencies according to the concrete social relations they involve.

¹²² See: Senaullah (2020, pp. 29, 38, 41, 51). On the other hand, it is striking that the dominant structure during the establishment period of the Great Seljuk State was the union of tribes and even the ‘central feudal’ form could develop after a certain period of time (See; Köymen, 2000, pp. 363-66, Aganacov, 2002, p. 303). Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the feudal elements of Ghazna and the people of cities such as Nishapur (Agacanov, 2002, p. 300) were also articulated to this structure and that the settled elements were effective in the stability of the state.

authority and the distribution of lands among the dynasty members, the feudal structure did not completely disappear. On the other hand, when the taxation of nomadic groups for pasture use and the appointment of administrators on tribes (Özgüdenli, 2020a, p. 54) are considered together with the prebendal land distribution, the search for centralization can be seen more easily. In this respect, it constitutes a good example of structures called ‘central feudal’. A similar process can be observed in the development of the Mongol state. With the Ögeday reforms, bureaucracy and taxation procedures have been systematized considerably compared to the previous period. The taxes that Ögeday imposed on human groups dealing with agriculture and animal husbandry (see Spuler, 1957, p. 334) supported the centralization process, but the emerging political form could not go beyond being a kind of ‘central feudalism’. Although it is observed that Hulagu Khan developed this system, the centralization process reached its highest potential during the Ilkhanate period -but it is impossible to talk about a homogeneous development in all the regions dominated by the Ilkhanate state.

Considering both the ancient examples and the transitional social formations in the early-modern period, it is seen that the feudal organization in general either transformed the central imperial structure or was divided or dissolved between rentier regions and commercial cities. If we focus on the first possibility, it will be noticed that the development of commercial relations has a great impact on the centralization process. Commercial relations enable the development of commodity production, increase the urban population, finance the central army and bureaucracy, and reveal the possibility of obtaining differential rent from the land. In the Hellenistic states, on the shores of the Mediterranean at the end of the 1st century B.C., when the Roman Republic turned into an Empire, in Chinese society during and after the Warring States, the level of development of commercial relations has reached the level where it can monetize the rent income of the capital invested in the land -due to the market mediation.¹²³ It is probably on the basis of this factor that the development of central bureaucracies and the construction of imperial regimes became possible.¹²⁴ In this

¹²³ An interesting transitional form that came into existence in late antiquity is the Kingdom of Aksum. This kingdom was divided into sub-kingdoms (*negus*) that had their own properties and were responsible for paying tribute to the Aksum king, but in its lands subject to long-distance trade, commercial capital had the opportunity to develop in addition to rent relations (Kobishanov, 1995, pp. 383-4, 386).

¹²⁴ For monetization, development of bureaucracy, Law and centralization in the Eastern Roman Empire, see: Ostrogorsky (2019, p. 30). For the relationship between the military system, central bureaucracy and monetization, see: Oikonomidés (1996, pp. 34-40).

context, it is not a coincidence that a series of works that evaluate the categories of commerce, agriculture, land rent (and household or state administration) have emerged. Among these, Cato's *De Agricultura*, Varro's *Res Rusticae*, Bryson's *Oikonomikos Logos* can be mentioned. In these works, capital investment and business proposals are written on how the landowners can operate the agricultural activities, which are also the subject of trade, more productive so that their lands can bring better income/rent. It is clear that similar searches exist in the literature of ancient Chinese literature.¹²⁵ In this literature, issues such as increasing production, efficiency, taxation and development of trade are included. The presence of criticisms in Japanese economic thought about the monetization of the *Samurai*'s rent income and their becoming urban rentier classes reveals that this process is also developing in early-modern Japanese society (see: Suzuki, 2021, pp. 31-32). The case of Japan provides a critical picture of the development of trade, a similar situation that occasionally arises in ancient Chinese economic writing. For example, in the work called *Lu-shih Ch'un-Ch'iu*, written in the 3rd century B.C., it is possible to see that agriculturalists and traders are compared and the former is favored over the latter (Yu-Lan, 2009, p. 24). However, it should be noted that this book belongs to the disintegration phase before the Qin Empire was established. Therefore, this phase, in which trade, small and large land ownership and monetary accumulation take place, includes the establishment of the imperial regime as a historical possibility.

Fifth, the rentier social structure can be identified, in which the lands in a particular region are largely considered the property of the monarch and divided in tenure and/or prebend status and entrusted to the military and administrative elites.¹²⁶ This structure can be seen especially in the states established in the Hellenistic period, partially in ancient Egypt, Hittite, Byzantine, Chinese and Persian societies. Among these structures, the ruler, as the highest landlord, renounces the right to directly receive rent from agricultural production -partially or completely-, on the other hand, he does not transfer the absolute property right on the land, fixing the rights of the rentier intermediate classes on the land to the conditional status. In other words; (a) people on the land, (b) land revenues in the form of taxes/tributes/rents, or (c) the right to cultivate the land are entrusted upon a member of the ruling class- not the right of ownership on

¹²⁵ See: Jing (2021, pp. 103-5), Shichang (2021, pp. 143-46, 151), Renwu (2021, pp. 159, 176), Xueyi (2021, pp. 196, 199).

¹²⁶ For the concept of prebendal property, see Wolf (2000, pp. 88-89). Also, for Weber's concept of 'liturgical state', see: Weber (2022, p. 93).

the land. This relationship established between the prebend entruster and the recipient is a form of mediation similar to tax farming and endowment in the sharing of rent incomes. This relationship can be organized top-down or bottom-up following the path of political articulation. For example, Great Armenia Kingdom, Ani Kingdom, various Armenian principalities and castles were forcibly turned into the property of the Byzantine Empire in return for imperial offices and titles, and coercion was used for *de facto* annexation (Charanis, 2021, pp. 73-75).¹²⁷ On the other hand, with the establishment of *themata* system after the Heraclius reforms, Byzantine military units were placed in the land in return for certain obligations (Baskıcı, 2016, pp. 118-19). *Themas* are on the one hand lands given to the soldiers-peasants for subsistence, on the other hand, they are formed as the prebendal lands of the *thema* commanders. This type of land distribution is also encountered in ancient China, and it is seen that especially in the early Qin state, with the Shang Yang reforms, the peasants who joined the army were given the right to cultivate a certain land, but this right was also limited by taxes and obligations (Lewis, 2007, p. 30). In this system, in which peasant groups consist of five families control each other, administrators are appointed to local units to collect taxes and oversee the fulfillment of drudgery obligations. This policy, called the *Xian* system, is based on a perfect combination of peasant tenures, prebendal income assignment, and bureaucratic organization (Rosenstein, 2009, p. 26). In the same framework, it can be mentioned about the policy of granting the Byzantine state lands to private individuals with the obligation to pay taxes (*adiectio sterilium* system) (Ostrogorsky, 2019, pp. 37-38). The fact that the lands given as *iqta*, *has* or *timar* in the Anatolian Seljuk State can also be taken back by the ruler in the final analysis, and the fact that some of them were assigned with full property right until the death of the person, the fact that the right of inheritance was not recognized makes it understandable how the rentier relationship was established in conditional status.¹²⁸ Another variant of

¹²⁷ The confiscation of the property of Maleinos, one of the wealthy families of Cappadocia, after they hosted the emperor at the end of the 10th century (Baskıcı, 2016, p. 136), is an important example in terms of showing how insecure the property was. In addition, the fact that concepts such as absolute property, right of use and collective responsibility in the Byzantine Empire were intertwined to a certain extent (Khazdan, 1993, p. 88) should be considered as a phenomenon related to the conditionalization of property and therefore the prevalence of prebendalism. In this context, the development of imperial regimes as bureaucratic autocracy creates fields of struggle where both certain conditions and certain guarantees on property and usage rights develop together.

¹²⁸ See: Gordlevski (1988, pp. 130-34), Koca (2011, p. 465).

this form can be seen in the lands with the status of *mâlikâne-divânî* in the Ottoman Empire. The status of these lands is based, on the one hand, on the sovereign's recognition of the right of private land ownership of local the rentier classes, and on the other hand, his conditional dominance over property by levying taxes from these lands and making them subject to administrative regulations. In the development of these lands, especially in the examples of Rumelia and the Balkans, the former landowners' willingness to subject their lands to the imperial rule in the face of the Ottoman advance had a great impact. In fact, conditional landed property or right of possession is not entirely separated in essence from the 'feudal' political form. It is possible to mention about a conditional property right, not an absolute property right, in the tradition of re-donating the land to the vassal in return for the vassal's accepting to the service of a lord, which was observed in the feudalism of Western Europa. On the other hand, the *de facto* possibility of vassals to change lords also exists in central empires. The main problem here is that the level of dominance relationship between lord and vassal in Western feudalism is so low that it cannot be compared with the military/financial/bureaucratic/ideological abilities of control that emerged within the framework of the central empire. The phenomenon of centralization renders the power relationship between the vassal and the emperor quite asymmetrical and thus causes the possibility of an absolute regulation on the conditional property form. In particular, the registration of direct producers by the central government and the legal assurance of their status are effective in the development of this process. The central imperial structure, on the one hand, could finance an army directly subordinate to the ruler, on the other hand, it could keep the provincial armies under control through territorial arrangements. Unlike the lords who can choose their own vassals and develop free alliances/dependency relations in the feudal political formation, the lowest level military units in bureaucratic autarky are under imperial control. In this framework, the dominant political form becomes legalized in a way that goes beyond the relations of personal dependency that is dominant in feudalism, and becomes the subject of bureaucratic regulation - to mean the same thing, a war of position waged over bureaucratic authorities. While large families, who have achieved strong positions within the central state, are able to loosen the imperial control over the lands, acquire new lands and develop absolute ownership over them, those who cannot reach these positions gradually lose their social position and their control over rent incomes wear out. One of the main results of this war is that the conditional ownership of the land -at

least as an opportunity- develops in favor of the central state and paves the way for the transfer of ground rent to the center (under different forms such as income, power, subordination, etc.). In this framework, the contradictory coexistence of the absolute power of the emperor and the existence of the legal system points to the founding contradiction of the prebendal system.¹²⁹ The development and monetization of the tax farming system, from ancient empires to early modern states, constitutes one of the most obvious examples of this path. The development of tax farming, as the basic form of extracting the ground rent, necessitates the monetization of this relationship, its depersonalization and taking a legal form to the extent that it is monetized, and the replacement of personal relationships by general and legal categories, contrary to the feudal form. In particular, the creation of widespread and continuously audited land records was effective in the emergence of the prebendal system. After the Warring States period in China, the registration of the lands, the determination of tax rates and the execution of the administrative power by the governors appointed by the center led to the development of this structure. In ancient Mesopotamia, the rise of the Babylonian state paralleled the building of the prebendal empire. The giving of military fiefs, satrapy and central taxation in the status of conditional property in the Hammurabi period can be evaluated within this framework (see: Köroğlu, 2018, p. 114; Herodotus, 2020, p. 103; Weber, 2022, pp. 107-11).¹³⁰ The same trend can be observed in the Persian state and the Hellenistic states. Persian kings rent their lands for long-term, donate them as private estates and collect taxes by officials (Weber, 2022, pp. 272-73). In the Hellenistic states established in the Near East region, which was integrated with the conquests of Alexander on the road and trade network developed by the Persians, the lands were considered directly owned by the king, except for the temples, the king's assistants and soldiers, half of the production was given to the king and tax collection was carried out by tax farmers (Childe, 2007, pp. 245-47). On the other hand, Hellenistic rulers distribute military lands to which they provide various degrees of autonomy and privileges (Weber, 2022, p. 271). An important detail here is that as conditional

¹²⁹ On the coexistence of the central bureaucracy and the arbitrary will of the ruler in Hellenistic states, see Anderson (2017, pp. 58-59). For the contradiction between the fact that the emperor was both the absolute legislator and the obligation to obey the laws in the Byzantine Empire, see: Ostrogorsky (2019, p. 229).

¹³⁰ The Akkadian kingdom also began to transform into a tax-collecting state form over time. The first core of this process must probably have emerged during the Sargon period. See: Childe (2020, p. 159).

ownership of land develops, these conditions tend to expand towards the extent of occupied land, the social status of direct producers, and jurisdiction. For example, as of the indicated period, the status of direct producers ceased to belong to the landowner in China, and the policies in 13th century France (in the period of Philip Augustus and later) to prevent to impose taxes and use of judicial powers without the permission and officials of the center point to this tendency- those examples can also be directly applied to the development of the Ottoman state in essence.¹³¹ Moreover, the Diocletian-Constantinos reforms, which the Roman Empire put into practice by taking the Hellenistic states as a model, also contributed to the institutionalization of the central bureaucracy and imperial authority (Vasiliev, 1958, pp. 60-64), thus making the prebendal land distribution in the 7th century possible. On the other hand, where prebendal land-sharing extends to the broad masses of the population (*thema* farms and partially *pronoias*), central control of local forces requires an indispensable lever of leverage—the central paid army.

The spread of prebendalism turns into a weapon of the imperial regime itself after a critical threshold, as it will cause a decrease in tax revenues. The successive periods in the history of the Byzantine Empire such as (i) dissolution and disappearance of *thema*-lands and small peasant lands in favor of big landowners and *pronoias*, (ii) their re-establishment and the (iii) expansion of central paid army summarizes this relationship.¹³² On the other hand, when the centralization, prebendal land distribution and the organization of the central *ghulam*/slave army are considered as a whole in the history of the Great Seljuk State, it shows that there may be variants of a similar contradiction between the nomadic tribes and the central state.¹³³ As Peacock (2020, p. 112) points out, the emergence of professional armies of *ghulam*/slave origin in Middle

¹³¹ See: Chu (2021, pp. 253-55), Maspero (2005, p. 19), Eberhard (1965, pp. 22-23), Strayer (2020, pp. 62-68). It should also be taken into account that in India around the 6th century, land was defined as the property of the state, the amount of tax was determined in advance, and the land was divided into two as private estates and prebendal lands (Agibalova & Donskoy, 1988, pp. 171-72). For an unsuccessful attempt, the example of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem can be examined. For the establishment of the chancellery in the Kingdom of Jerusalem and the efforts to draft legal regulations from the center, see (Barber, 2021, pp. 161-62).

¹³² For Basileo II period and after, see: Ostrogorsky (2019, pp. 284-85, 296-97, 299) and Mango (2008, pp. 65-66).

¹³³ For the complex structure of military organization in the Seljuk states, see: Köymen (1970, pp. 9-37), Kafesoğlu (1973, pp. 147-155), Sevim & Merçil (1995, pp. 512-13). For the contradictions between the tribal traditions and the central imperial structure in the Great Seljuk State, see Kafesoğlu (1972, pp. 114-15, 123-125).

Eastern states, almost as a structural feature, serves as an important means for balancing the power of nomadic tribes on the one hand, and controlling the prebendal land grants on the other. To the extent that such central armies are supported by the bureaucratic administrative and financial structure and supported by monetary taxation, they become one of the main institutional pillars of the emergence of the empire structure.¹³⁴ Although this process was not completed in the Great Seljuk State, it seems to have advanced considerably in the Anatolian Seljuks, due to the commercial revival in the 13th century, the inheritance of the institutional framework of the Byzantine land system, and the large amount of *jizya* taxes that supported the central treasury.¹³⁵ The Anatolian Seljuk state was quite successful in developing the bureaucratic autarky form, however, it could not complete this process due to the Crusades, Mongol invasion and the spread of nomads to the borders.¹³⁶ If an exception is to be made, the beginning of granting *iqtas* to the soldiers during the Ghazan Khan period and the prohibition of these lands from gift and sale transactions constitute an important milestone in the development of the imperial regime (Spuler, 1957, pp. 444-45). In the Ghazan Khan reforms, leasing of *iqtas* was not prohibited, moreover, it was decided to give seeds and agricultural means to *iqta* owners. In this case, the status of *iqta* lands is approximating the prebendal form as they are open to be regulated by *iqta* owners so that they can

¹³⁴ Establishment of record keeping (registers) and financial control mechanisms for central taxation and their control is of decisive importance. For the *Diwans* and officials dealing with financial affairs in the Seljuks, see: Kurpalidis (2020, pp. 92-98), Merçil (2021, pp. 106-120).

¹³⁵ See: Turan (1969, pp. 284-86), Cahen (2012, p. 124). For the signs of the development of differential rent in the Anatolian Seljuks, see: Turan (1969, p. 297). Perhaps for this reason, the issue of taxation on commercial activities has been a constant subject of contention between local governments and the central government. In this regard, the work of Merçil (2021) on taxation in the Seljuk states provides extensive information. As it can be understood from this work, nearly ten titles of taxation have emerged on commercial activities, and most of them have been tried to be abolished by the central government to the detriment of local administrators.

¹³⁶ The Battle of Köseadağ (1243) and the Mongolian occupation that developed after it largely eliminated the central Seljuk army and the *iqta* system (Turan, 1969, p. 229). Cahen's study provides very interesting information about the dual power situation that emerged in this period. According to him, the Mongol domination and the Seljuk state system did not form an institutional whole, but rather corresponded to two separate power structures that developed a symbiotic relationship with each other (Cahen, 2012, p. 321). In this period, the dissolution of the Seljuk *iqta*'s gradually turning into private estates, however, led to the replacement of the Seljuk army by Mongolian troops whose soldiers were financed with cash revenues such as *jizye* (Cahen, 2012, p. 323). Both developments are ultimately related to each other. Referring to an example given by Turan (1958, pp. 2-3), it can be said that during the reign of Vizier Ahmed Lakuşi, the taxes collected were not sufficient for the Mongol princes and commanders, and *miri* lands began to be sold and became private property.

appropriate their incomes.¹³⁷ In addition, the conditional distribution of lands as seen in the *soyugal* and *tiyul* systems in the post-Mongolian period, when centralized states re-emerged (Diakonoff, 1999, p. 109), indicates that the prebendalist historical basis has not been completely destroyed. The fact that the relationship between the central army and the control of the local prebendal lands became unsustainable, thus had a great impact on the emergence of this situation.¹³⁸

An example in which the prebendal appropriation process reverses –but continues to point to the general category– can be found in the integration of the prebendal lands (*pomeste*) with the *votchina* status lands in Russia over time, as well as in the re-servitude of free peasants (Szeftel, 1956, p. 175).¹³⁹ Another remarkable distinction at this point is the organization of the land in the form of large enterprises, as in the example of the second serfdom in Eastern Europe, and the situations in which direct producers recourse to dependent status. Such situations cannot be considered directly as the re-feudalization of social formation. On the contrary, they constitute a late and violent example of the capitalist mode of production entering the agricultural production.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, the existence of ‘intermediate’ periods in the history of Western Europe, when the central state began to strengthen and transferred resources to the local area, while the barons became stronger again, should not be interpreted as the strengthening of feudalism, but on the contrary, as the contradictory reflections of the

¹³⁷ It is possible to come across examples in Ottoman *timars*, where the owner of the *iqta* owned the means and animals necessary for cultivating the land, and gave them to the use of the peasants –who worked on their land and had the status of sharecropper– in return for which half of the product was appropriated. See Beldiceanu (1985, p. 57).

¹³⁸ See: Cahen (2012, pp. 136-46), Gordlevksi (1988, pp. 139-42).

¹³⁹ For a similar process that took place in India, see: Yadava (1987a, pp. 73-75). In the Byzantine Empire, bureaucratization and the increase in the power of the central state and the transformation of the status of villagers as colons seem to have occurred together, at least for the early period (Ostrogorsky, 2019, p. 36). There are two important results shown by the Byzantine example: monetization and central accumulation of wealth can result in both making the peasants dependent and increasing the political authority of the central state/emperor. But it is impossible for these two vectors to point in the same direction forever. In this context, Byzantine history passed through multiple phases in which both the status of the peasants were reorganized and the power of the local landowners formed a counterweight to the center, and this contradiction could not be finally resolved. The reason for this is the increase in the tax burden as the expenditures of the central government increase, the overproduction capacity's inability to meet the taxes and reproduction needs at the same time, and the bankruptcy of the small peasantry due to borrowing as a result. In this case, the tenant or small landed peasantry falls under the yoke of the state, the emperor or the big landowners.

¹⁴⁰ On this subject, see: Stoianovich (1994, pp. 203-5).

influence of the central state in the dissolution of feudalism. Such examples, which can be called ‘false feudalism’ (see Strayer, 2020, p.77), can be identified with different aspects during the rise of the local notables (*ayans*) in the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴¹ In any case, such examples are laden with the contradictions of the transition to the capitalist mode of production in general and function as gravediggers of the rentier imperial form, whether due to state-centered-demand or the opening up of independent agricultural holdings to the world market.

Finally, in the colonies that emerged in the early-modern period, based on slave labor and producing for the market, ground rent is also encountered. But since the founding principle of these communities is not pre-capitalist ground-rent, but the capitalist mode of production largely integrated into the world market, they will be excluded from this analysis.

It should be noted that these variants of the rentier social formation are also typical examples of certain forms of political articulation. First, there is the inter-tribal subordination relationship. As an extension of this relationship, the establishment of castle-towns and the organization of communities as kingdoms or aristocratic assemblies lead to the formation of the first rentier political forms. Secondly, the form of city-states emerges. It is possible to deal with the development of the city of Mexico under the Aztecs, the ancient Greek polis, the structure of the cities of Rome and Indus. Even if it is a kingdom in the form of city-states, it is necessary to determine the existence of an aristocratic assembly embedded in the political system. This assembly can exist in the form of a bicameral assembly structure in the Mesopotamian city-states, *gana* in Vedic India, the Hittite *pankus*, the Greek *boule* or the Roman *senate*.¹⁴² As it can be determined especially in the Hittite and Roman examples, the loss of political power of these assemblies constitutes an important pillar for the construction of the imperial regime. In general, the formation of alliance units by the city administrations

¹⁴¹ On the other hand, it can be said that a system of feudal alliances based on the land aristocracy had a decisive influence in the administration of the Paleologos dynasty in the late Byzantine period and the pruning of the powers of the central state both *de jure* and *de facto*. The fact that the local military organization (*pronoia*) is decisive in the distribution of ground rent and that the struggle over ground rent at the macro level reaches a faster conclusion under such a system of alliances -as can be observed from the enthronings of several emperors- are effective in the emergence of this situation.

¹⁴² See: Sharma (1968, pp. 102-3), Kramer (1990, p. 25), Oates (2015, pp. 26-28), Macqueen (1986, p. 76), Glassman (2017, pp. 309-9), Doğan (2008, p. 95). Also, for examples of notable councils in ancient southern Arabian monarchies, see: Lewis (2019, p. 5-6).

is not directly enough for a different political form to emerge. For example, when it comes to Sumerian cities, as Oates (2015, p. 24) states, such unions do not last long. Benevolo (1995, p. 21-22) argues that the Roman Empire consisted of a series of autonomous urban units and united them across the Mediterranean – but this is an incomplete interpretation. In the final analysis, the existence of commercial relations and a common military power that will limit or articulate the local interests of the urban landed class constitutes the basis of a political form that transcends the urban scale. It is possible to encounter such relations in the Babylonian Empire, the late Hittites, the Persian Empire, and China during the Qin and Han dynasties etc. It is possible to find examples of the third form scattered in the local ancient cultures that preceded the emergence of cities, in border areas far from central political structures (for example, in the Chinese countryside), in periods of political fragmentation, and even scattered in Western European region around the 8th and 9th century. The main feature of this form is the existence of small producers or associations of small producers free from political domination relations. Fourthly, a political form called feudal state and dominated by personal loyalty relations can be identified. In this political form, although the land ownership takes place on a wide scale with conditional and unconditional examples, the political articulation takes place between the warriors organized as military groups. The hierarchy among warriors also corresponds to the military hierarchy, the territorial and status hierarchy, and the patronage relations.¹⁴³ In the fifth example, an example of a more developed imperial form is identified. The increase in population and class differentiation within city-states, the monetization of military and bureaucratic organization, and the undeniable importance of commercial relations in terms of social organization were effective in the development of this form. In this framework, rentier relations were monetized, differential rent forms gained importance especially for the upper strata of the ruling class; Landless masses, small landowners, debtors, urban plebs, who were the carriers of social opposition, were tried to be integrated into the system through military service. City and countryside were brought under the control of state organization through imperial administration—and varying degrees of local participation. Another aspect of the issue is that the army, organized by the state, places local ethnicities in different regions and thus disintegrates local solidarity networks

¹⁴³ In this text, the concept of feudalism is considered as an early state form, not as a mode of production. In this respect, feudal relations belong to the political structure that defines a certain mode of formal unity in the rentier mode of production.

while taking them under bureaucratic control.¹⁴⁴ Another issue is that empires dissolve both tribal, urban, and senatorial assembly structures and centralize their power to govern.¹⁴⁵ In this framework, the appearance of the political authority becomes an autocracy to a large extent, while a certain legal system prevails in the imperial lands. The development of the legal system is significant in terms of making the transfer of rent income in cash to the center sustainable in return for certain patronage relations and property guarantees. For example, after the Byzantine Empire made the city of Aleppo a vassal, the non-Christian population was taxed in return for their safety, or the non-Muslim population in the Ottoman Empire was charged the poll tax (*jizye*) for the same reason, as examples of such mechanisms.¹⁴⁶

One of the main contradictions of the rentier empire form in terms of its political structure is this Law-autocracy conflict. While the structure of the empire contains the legal formation and the bureaucratic organization based on it, it also needs the existence of an emperor with absolute powers in this legal system. The reason for this is that the emperor assumed the role of both the leader and representative of the ruling classes and the ‘father’ of the lower classes -thus claiming to rein in class conflicts under his personal authority. In this context, it is appropriate to name the dominant character of the rentier empire form as ‘bureaucratic-autocracy’. As the rent relations, which are the carriers of the imperial form, and the bureaucratic structure that regulates them strengthen, in other words, as the military/religious/judicial bureaucracy develops, its influence of the appointment of ruler and his administrative position increases. For example, in the late Roman and subsequent Byzantine Empires, the emperor is appointed by the military organization and landowners rather than the hereditary monarchy principles, and even intra-church theo-political debates are influential in this process -the debates between Arianism, Antioch and Alexandria theologies, the

¹⁴⁴ It is possible to observe examples of this process in Roman and Ottoman history. Trying to settle thirty thousand Armenian families in Thrace by giving land with the edict of Emperor Maurikios during the Eastern Roman Empire and changing the local ethnic structure within the framework of the *thema* system is an example of this process (see: Charanis, 2021, pp. 26-27). Similarly, the Ottoman Empire settled the Turkmen tribes in Rumelia and tried to control them by including them in the *timar* system.

¹⁴⁵ A clear example of this is the loss of the power of the senate in the Eastern Roman Empire and its replacement by the *sacrum consistorium*, which can be considered a kind of council and advises the emperor (Grant, 2000, p. 9; Baskici, 2016, p. 85). With the reforms of Emperor Diocletian, the relative autonomy of municipal administration system was replaced by domination of the Byzantine bureaucracy (Ostrogorsky, 2019, p. 279).

¹⁴⁶ See: Ostrogorsky (2019, p. 270), Runciman (1961, pp. 97-98), Erkal (1993), İnalçık (1993c).

iconoclasm movement, etc. It is clear that a similar political structure was also valid for the Ottoman Empire. Especially with the 15th century, it is observed that the decisions of the Janissary army and military elites were influential on both the regime and the enthronement of a certain ruler, and the ulama fraction joined these two groups within a century.

It is theoretically possible to divide all of the political forms as have analyzed above into two main typologies in principle. The first typology corresponds to the early-state form, which includes tribal relations, city-states and feudal articulation, while the second typology corresponds to the mature/advanced state form consisting of centralized kingdoms and bureaucratic autarky (empire). Some merchant colonies (eg. Phoenician colonies), trade/market towns (Ugarit, Palmyra, Hecra, Mina, Mecca etc.)¹⁴⁷ and the administrations of military garrison towns established to collect tribute (eg. Syrian garrisons during the Sargon period) can also be considered as early state forms - but not included in the rentier mode of production. In addition, under the advanced state form, it is necessary to place the early-modern monarchy form, absolute monarchy and partially constitutional monarchy forms, as well as mercantile city-states such as Venice/Genoese/Florence, whether the rentier mode of production is dominant or not. As it can be easily noticed, the absolute rent form and the prevalence of the first and second types of coercion are striking in the rentier social formation organized under the early state structure. Since both state forms are determined by the boundaries of the rentier social formation, they correspond to a politically and culturally established network of formal unity between the units of production. In the mature state form, the examples in which differential rent emerges and property becomes *de jure* conditional with the commercial relations reaching a certain level of development are more dominant -and this property structure will evolve from conditional to absolute status in the history of social struggles.

Whether there is a dominant ideological code in the rentier mode of production is also an important question to be asked. We pointed out in the previous section that the basic ideological code in the communitarian mode of production refers to the collective identity, symbols and collective decision-making power of the community as a whole. The historical crystallization of this code -apart from the examples of modern

¹⁴⁷ For some cities that developed along the caravan trade route, see: Mackintosh-Smith (2022, pp. 90-91). For the structure of the city of Mecca, see: Lewis (2019, pp. 15-16). The examples of Sevahili for early modern trading cities are also worth mentioning (see: Gilbert & Reynolds, 2019, pp. 200-206).

communitarianism- is largely based on symbols of kinship relations, vicinage, and tribe-membership. When the traces of a similar ideological code in the rentier mode of production is searched, it would be appropriate to look for the core of this code in the patterns of the transition from communitarian social formation to rentier one. Especially with the emergence of patriarchal power relations and administrators who claim to represent communities, the transition process to the rentier mode of production has gained concrete reality. Millet (2000, p. 25) accepts patriarchy as an administrative institution and presents a hierarchy scheme in which women, who make up half of the population, are ruled by men and young men are governed by older men.¹⁴⁸ The misogynistic discourse, which repeats itself from ancient works to Ottoman political thought and continues as an undercurrent of political thought, contains clear examples of this schema. For example, in Hesiod's (2020, pp. 63, 75, 77) work titled *Ἔργα καὶ Ἡμέραι*, the arguments that women are equated with thieves and should be subject to men, Confucius's (2021, p. 123) undervaluation of women's social status, Xenophon's passages about the regulation of the duties of men and women in *Oikonomikos* (2020, p. 33), Aristotle's (2002, p. 18) formulation of household management based on women, children and slaves under the rule of the father, Avicenna's statement that women are inferior in nature and belonging to a man (Özturan, 2020, pp. 469-70) indicate a continuous structure from the ancient period to the Islamic middle ages. Misogynistic narratives in the early Ottoman sources, such as *Halilnâme* (Gültaş, 1996, pp. 300-1), İdrîs-i Bitlisî's (Koçarslan, 2019, p. 161) and Kemalpaşazâde's (Uğur, 1997, pp. 16-17) historical narrative women did not take place in administrative positions, thus offers a panorama of how the issue is reproduced in a broad historical framework. To give a simple example, Prince Korkud (2022, p. 273) argues that women's reason and religion are lacking, which makes a general judgment for keeping women out of religious hierarchy as well as administrative duties.

While this scheme is largely valid in the social structures which were dealt with, our particular emphasis is on the ideological variations at the center of this scheme's rentier mode of production which reconstructing the male ruler figure in

¹⁴⁸ It is undeniable that men seized the monopoly of using weapons and women (and children) were the first to be disarmed in the emergence of this discourse. It is possible to make sense of the fact that women are either not included in traditional war narratives or that they are often considered as 'war spoils' (see: Sjoberg, 2016, pp. 50-53, 57). On the other hand, in communities where women have not been disarmed yet (Amazons, Turkic tribes, etc.), women are also encountered in war narratives.

military/administrative/religious etc. contexts. In these variations, women are excluded from class privileges due to the social stratification patterns that develop depending on the rentier mode of production. For example, they are excluded from administrative authorities because they are supposed to be deficient in reasoning, they are excluded from the possibility of being a religious authority because they are supposed to be lacking in religion, and they are excluded from military organizations because they are supposed to be physically weak. While this scheme primarily grounds the dominance of men over women, it also grounds the dominance of the rentier classes over society. In accordance with this scheme, knowledge of military success, religious or mystical authority, or administrative practices among the men's community –and even supporting these with genetic constructions– completes the pattern of class differentiation. In this context, the status of members of military organizations, ulama and sheikh, and civil servants belonging to the state bureaucracy is drawn as privileged compared to other layers of society. These three groups originally represent the dominant forms of masculinity, and therefore, they are privileged to access rent incomes as they are accepted as patriarchs with the right to set norms on society.

The concept of patriarchy is originally derived from the word *patriarck*, which means chief of a tribe (Byrson, 2019, p. 275). In this context, the concrete core of the ideological code that dominates the rentier mode of production is also found in the patriarch figure, which has begun to gain social privileges in this process. The figure of the patriarch is largely a product of the formal unity formed by small kinship communities. The male figure, who represents his own family, lineage, clan, tribe or the unity of tribes as a whole in the male publicity formed by the formal unity, is in a position whose social position is overdetermined by the level of intercommunal relations, not primarily in terms of the structure from which he emerged. This determination develops depending on some social functions such as taking part in the war collective, undertaking *ad hoc* administrative duties, or rising to the position of spokesperson in primitive democracy. On the other hand, the institutionalization of such social positions and their overlap with property and/or administrative institutionalization results in the transformation of the representative position into a 'patriarch' with the privilege of command.¹⁴⁹ For example, the fact that war chiefs have

¹⁴⁹ For example, in Aztec tribes, which maintained their more or less egalitarian characteristics, the priority of men in the eating order gives an idea about the development of patriarchy. In the Aztecs, men first sit down to eat, and after they finish, women and children can sit down to eat

the right to polygamy as a kind of privilege in semi-egalitarian societies where a commanding power or administrative institution has not yet emerged (see Clastres, 2007, pp. 35-36) bears the traces of such a patriarchal transformation. Lerner (1987, p. 216) describes how patriarchy develops within more complex social structures with the following typical example:

The archaic state in the Ancient Near East emerged in the second millennium B.C. from the twin roots of men's sexual dominance over women and the exploitation by some men of others. From its inception, the archaic state was organized in such a way that the dependence of male family heads on the king or the state bureaucracy was compensated for by their dominance over their families. Male family heads allocated the resources of society to their families the way the state allocated the resources of society to them. The control of male family heads over their female kin and minor sons was as important to the existence of the state as was the control of the king over his soldiers. This is reflected in the various compilations of Mesopotamian laws, especially in the large number of laws dealing with the regulation of female sexuality.

It is possible to follow the development of the patriarch figure through several historical typologies in Lerner's example. The first of these typologies is the *pater familias* figure who is the landowner and dominates the family.¹⁵⁰ The concept of *familia* is a very broad concept that includes not only family members but also movable and immovable properties (Mauss, 2013, pp. 342-43). In this respect, the concept of *pater familias* indicates a man who has dominance over everything that exists within the framework of the household, albeit to varying degrees. There are a number of different variants of this figure, ranging from the dominance model over the *oikos* to urban and imperial scales.¹⁵¹ The scale of power of the *pater familias* figure in Roman

(Morgan, 1994, p. 289). On the diets in which men are privileged in patriarchal power relations, see: Adams (2010, pp. 49-50).

¹⁵⁰ For approaches that only use the concept of patriarchy to characterize the institution of family, see: Bryson (2019, p. 276). For patriarchal family structure in Mongolian tribes, see: Vladimirtsov (1995, pp. 77-80). For the father's position in the Oghuz nomads, see: Dede Korkut (2019, p. 4). The discourse produced in Ottoman political thought that the father is dominant over women, children and slaves/servants is nothing but a repetition of this framework with Islamic references (see: Korkud, 2022, pp. 216-17).

¹⁵¹ For the 'father' figure, who was the household manager in ancient Mesopotamian cities, to become the temple and palace manager, see: Ur (2017, p. 143).

society corresponds to an absolute right of disposition on lands and slaves, and with some exceptions, over family members, similar to the ancient Greek society which is its archetype. Freedom and responsibilities of family members are determined within the power of the ‘father’, and in the case of patricide, those responsible are sentenced to the heaviest torture and punishment.¹⁵² The dominance of the ‘father’ figure in ancient Greek society is also mystified by linking its genetic origins to certain Greek gods or demigod heroes.¹⁵³ It is possible to encounter a similar scale of power in Chinese society. The cult of ancestors¹⁵⁴, which has been accepted in the Chinese society - likewise in the Japanese society- since ancient times, and the Confucian thought, which developed the classical moral formation on this cult, built a privileged ideological position on the ‘father’ figure.¹⁵⁵ The representations that developed in ancient Egyptian¹⁵⁶, Babylonian¹⁵⁷ and Iranian¹⁵⁸ societies and in which the father figure had absolute or equal status with the mother figure in some places dominance -as a remnant

¹⁵² On the practice of the father’s right to life and death (*vitae necisque potes*) on his heirs in Rome, see (Saller, 1997, pp. 115-17). The father also has a right to the profits of all family members and slaves as the owner of their *peculium* (see Swain, 2022, pp. 200-201). Ortaylı (2012, p. 126) draws attention to the fact that although the father figure is dominant in Ottoman society, it does not have the same legal powers as it is compared to the Roman *patria potestas*.

¹⁵³ In the ancient Greek mythological narrative, the father's sovereignty over the land and his privileged position in the family are protected by Zeus (see: Hesiod, 2020, p. 60-61). In many other cultures, it is possible to come across examples in which the ruler is imagined as a godly father. For such examples, see: Roux (2020, pp. 117-19).

¹⁵⁴ Ancestral temples called *zong miao* are established within certain rules. During the Zhou dynasty, the ruler had the right to establish seven temples, the princes or lords five, the senior administrators-officers three, and the sages one (see: Yu-Lan, 2009, pp. 26-7; Giles, 2017, pp. 29-30; Confucius, 2021, p. XXV). These temples are monuments that articulate cultural-religious practices and political authority, and historicize and spread patriarchal ideology within religious practices. In ancient Egypt, the right to build a mausoleum belongs to the royal family and the civil servant aristocracy (Childe, 2007, pp. 136-37).

¹⁵⁵ In Confucian thought, an ethical-political relationship is established between the social roles of the ruler, civil servant, father and son, and the order of society in general. For examples of this relationship, see Confucius (2021, pp. 80, 101).

¹⁵⁶ For the relationship established between the inheritance of the kingdom from father to son and the divine inheritance between Osiris-Horus in ancient Egyptian mythology, see: Pinch (2002, pp. 86-87). For an alternative approach to the continuation of the matrilineal tradition in Ancient Egypt, see Diop (1989, p. 53). Childe (1994, p. 97) states that the imperial god was always male, and the pharaohs had the privilege of polygamy.

¹⁵⁷ For the relationship between father/ruler/God figures in ancient Babylonian thought, see: Charpin (2013, pp. 75-78).

¹⁵⁸ For the dominance of the father figure over the household and its use in divine analogies in Avesta texts, see: Adsay & Bingöl (2012, pp. 123, 250-51, 257). Similarly, in the Vedas, the father figure is frequently used in analogies to divine beings.

of matriarchy and / or matrilineal traditions- came under the dominance of the father figure with the spread of Semitic religions in the history of the Middle East. It can be said that partly the deification of the ancient Egyptian rulers and partly the effect of late Zoroastrianism in the emergence of this situation. In Semitic religions, the father figure and the king/sovereign figure are intertwined, and the peak of this is reached in the Christian thought. Christian thought transformed the ancient *oikos* design into a universe design under the rule of God, who was portrayed as the divine father. Moreover, the development of church organization within this framework brought along a system in which both transcendent religious figures, church administrators and doctrinal founders (church fathers/ Εκκλησιαστικοί Πατέρες) were represented under the figure of 'father'. A similar understanding is found in the conception of Islamic society. In Orthodox interpretations of Islam, the figure of the 'father' finds use to include the prophet, state administrators, mosque imams and household managers. On the other hand, in *sūfi* circles and in heterodox interpretations, the figure of 'father' (*baba*) has been used to describe both wandering dervishes and the leading positions in *sūfi* hierarchies.

Considering the examples in which the rentier mode of production is dominant, it is striking that the father figure is widely used both in the management of the household, in the patronage relations that develop depending on the administrative authorities, and in legitimizing the authority of the ruler. Ownership of land, tax and military obligations, and the right of inheritance in household management largely belong to men. Administrative offices are characterized by patriarchal social relations that develop around them, whether they correspond to small and medium-sized principalities based on large landholdings or imperial bureaucracy subordinated to a higher authority.¹⁵⁹ The ideological representation of these relations is -in essence- based on the presentation of the just, generous, forgiving and punishing aspects of the ruler as a father as a whole. The same frame is also used for the representation of ruler figures loaded with cosmic and religious attributes. In this second representation, the principle of enthronement of the ruler directly or indirectly acquires a divine meaning (chosen ancestry, divine assignment, being the son of God, showing divine characteristics, being a God himself or his incarnation, etc.). The ideal qualities of the

¹⁵⁹ For a review of how the development of 'feudal' landed property in England developed within the framework of patron-client relations and male-dominated inheritance relations, see: Murray (1995, pp. 57-58). The connection between the institutionalization of patriarchy and the development of rent relations can be clearly seen in Murray's analysis.

father are attributed to the ruler who becomes the God or the representative of the Gods and the qualities of the father are presented as divine qualities. It is clear that such political discourses and representations can be interpreted as the reproduction of the father figure in different contexts (administrative, political, etc.) and reconstructing it in accordance with different political needs. In the final analysis, in the rentier mode of production, in accordance with the military/administrative/status-based ways of reaching land rent, the figure of the 'father' is constructed as a privileged man (or group of men) who has the roles of violence/justice/religious intermediary and has the authority to command. For this reason, it is seen that imaginary or real genealogies are circulated as an authority-constitutive discourse, father-son symbology is used in many areas from political patronage relations to *sûfi* hierarchies and guild organizations, and even *sûfi* lineages have become a symbolic genealogies (the term of son of the *sûfi* way *-yol evladi-* gives a clear example). For example, the ruler is drawn as an authority figure (father) who is in charge of administering the people under his command, while in doing so, he combines the responsibility of protecting and punishing them in his own person. While these powers and responsibilities are given to the ruler at the state level, at the family level, they are given to the man who is appointed as the master, to the women in the education of the children of the master, and to the servants/slaves in protecting and watching over the master's property.¹⁶⁰ As a result, the political discourse form of the late period kinship relations, in which asymmetrical power relations developed, is included in the forms of non-vicinal political and cultural articulation as a residual, and a politico-ideological function is assumed within the framework of the rentier mode of production.

Another issue that needs to be addressed at this point is how this ideological formation is adapted into the particular structure of political struggles. The importance of this question lies in the problem of how proto-rentier/rentier communities, based on a similar ideological core and endowed with essentially the same class privileges -or aiming to obtain them- can construct ideologies for their particular interests. When concrete examples are examined, it is noticed that in the same region, both the ruler, the local military unit commanders, the clergy and the trustees of the *waqf* have produced ideology to secure their own privileges. When the problem is considered in general, it is seen that there are three typical adaptation forms of patriarchal ideology. The first of

¹⁶⁰ This scheme is found in many works of Islamic political thought and ethics. For a brief sample, see: Korkud (2022, pp. 216-17).

these is based on the development of the charisma of the person in the position of the patriarch and the mystification of his personal position. However, this form constitutes a very weak typology in terms of institutional continuity. Secondly, examples can be cited in which patriarchal ideology is built out of individual mystification and built at the level of community/communities and society. The relationship between individual 'charisma' and community ideology is highly permeable but not directly reducible to each other.

Secondly, it is necessary to examine the structure of patriarchal-rentier ideologies, which are constructed on the scale of community and society. The first of these can be called in-group-ideology/group-ideology (*gemeinschaftliche-ideologie*), which is dominant in concrete group formations and determined by face-to-face relations. When it comes to the rentier mode of production, at the center of this ideology is the family/household structure, concrete social relations bundles organized like a family (personal entourage, small military units, *sûfi* circles, patronage networks, master-apprentice relations, etc.). In this type of relationship, the 'father' figure is a distinguished, privileged figure, but is conceived as a material entity whose position can be filled by someone else. On the other hand, the power of this figure lies in its structure, which cannot be reduced to its own person, on the contrary, identifies it with the dominant identity, origin and historical continuity of the community. The second form is shaped on the level of abstract and general social relations beyond face-to-face relations. This second form, which can be called *Gesellschaftliche-ideologie*, constructs an abstract, general and transcendent metaphor of the patriarchal model involved in face-to-face relations, and symbolically establishes formal unity among concrete human communities by referring to the transcendent identity (especially religious ecumenical-identity) that this metaphor refers to. The development of the *Gesellschaftliche-ideologie* form has to both articulate with the *gemeinschaftliche-ideologie* forms and integrate the common elements of the identity and cultural structure of concrete communities in symbolic universality. The second form mentioned above assumes broad political unity to the extent that it contains anonymizing, alternative history and identity-building characteristics beyond face-to-face relations and creates the possibility of symbolic articulation and construction. It is possible to observe the best examples of this in the spread of Christianity and Islam to large regions by being articulated with the imperial structures, in Buddhism, and in the development of Confucianism as interpreted by Mencius.

Another issue that needs to be addressed at this point is whether this two-scale ideological structure has a certain anti/opposite ideology. Considering both levels individually, it is hypothetically possible to place (i) ideologies that do not recognize male elitism or egalitarianist discourses, (ii) vulgar materialist ideologies that preach concrete locality rather than symbolic universality, in such a position. For example, the ancient Greek Cynic philosophy, fragments from the Stoic Zeno's *Politeia*, the philosophical movement called *Carvaka-darshana* that emerged in India (Hiriyanna, 2011, pp. 164, 169), the ascetic thought of Yan Chu in ancient China (Yu-Lan, 2011, pp. 85-7). Historically, it is possible to identify concrete examples of such ideologies in matriarchal-egalitarian residues, ancient materialism examples, and hedonist/solipsist individualism movements, but it is an important question whether they are completely opposed to rentier relations. For this reason, it is easier to give an abstract and general definition of the 'anti-ideology' of patriarchal-rentier ideological codes than to embody it on a concrete example. If it is necessary to formulate such a definition, it would be appropriate to refer to it as antinomian *kommunitaristisch-ideologie*. This definition refers both to a certain communal life form and its underlying egalitarianism, as well as the disappearance of sexual prohibitions that refer to patriarchal norms and the purpose of reproduction of community. It is possible to observe such an ideological argument within 5th century Mazdakism. But the view of women and children as objects of communal property in Mazdakism (Crone, 2012, pp. 439-40) reveals that the idealized structure in the final analysis is at best a quasi-egalitarian community—and as such it is not necessarily anti-rentier and anti-patriarchal. On the other hand, traces of such an ideology can be found in the legends of antinomian communities that entered the Ottoman political thought. In Ottoman sources, nude groups in which composed of both men and women, did not engage in any production activities, group consisting of only women and managed by women, and naked ascetics are met with an expression of great amazement (see: Ahmedî, 2018, pp. 248, 628-29, 636-37). In el-Kâfiyeci's work called *Seyf'ül-mülük*, a more advanced presentation is found compared to Ahmedî. In an anecdote quoted in this work, Dhul-Qarnayn met with a group that did not have rulers, did not own property, did not eat animal meat and only fed grass, wanted to give land and vizierate to one of them, but was rejected (el-Kâfiyeci, 2018, pp. 70-72). Such groups, generally reminiscent of wandering *sûfi* circles or regarded as 'savages', are not fully regarded as ideal subjects of the political system, although they sometimes arouse a similar respect to *sûfis* in political thought. To the extent that the antinomian

characteristics of such groups intensify, they become the absolute opposite of the political system and thus the dominant ideological code and play an important role in the construction of a series of political discourses, from local resistance ideologies to general uprising ideologies.

II.II.V.II.III. Analysis of Ottoman Social Structure under the Concept of Rentier Mode of Production

The structure and historical development of the Ottoman society took place within the framework of rentier mode of production in terms of the socio-economic formation, the political forms, the discursive mechanisms and the ideological formation. In this respect, Ottoman society constitutes a concrete example of the rentier social formation. When the Ottoman social structure is examined closely, firstly the position of the land regime and the social classes organized on land rent, secondly, the structure of political institutions from the early-state form to the imperial regime, and finally the discourses produced by different social segments as a part of the political-ideological struggle can be interpreted around this concept. The conditional land ownership/possession system is the basis of the Ottoman land regime. Leaving aside the monarch's properties, which belong to the ruler and a significant part of its production is recorded directly as income in his treasury, the lands allocated to the military and civil officials in the status of *timar/zeâmet/has*, lands in the status of *mâlikâne-dîvânî* which cannot be considered completely exempt from tax although they are private property, lands belonging to autonomous kingdoms which are subjected to tribute, *waqf* lands, pastures allocated to nomadic tribes and other groups dealing with animal husbandry constitute a part of the conditional land ownership system as a whole. It should be noted that the lands in this system have three basic features: (i) these land ownership categories exist mostly in the Byzantine, Abbasid, Seljuk states and principalities that were dominant in Anatolia before the Ottoman Empire, albeit with partial differences¹⁶¹, (ii) these land ownership categories are based directly on the

¹⁶¹ There is a well-developed literature in which Ottoman social structure is discussed based on the concepts of 'tradition', 'historical continuity' or 'structural continuity'. I have included a part of this literature above while referring to the studies carried out around the concepts of feudalism and AMP. For evaluations on this matter, see also: Bartusis (1992, p. 184), Aytekin (2021, p. 219), Oyan (2016, pp. 170-71), Gökalp (2015a, p. 39; 2015b, pp. 46-53, 59-60; 1981, pp. 67-8), Köprülü (2014, pp. 44-6, 88-99; 2018, p. 163), Uzunçarşılıoğlu (1937, pp. 70-73), Uzunçarşılı (1988a, pp. 17-19, 52-53, 141; 1988b, pp. 502-5), Togan (1981, pp. 339-41, 351-89), Çınar (2013, pp. 98-100), Pamuk (1999, p. 21), Barkan (1980c, p. 132), İnalçık (2021b, pp. 184, 187),

distribution of rent revenues -monarch, military and administrative officers, tribes, autonomous governments, and direct producers- (iii) relations between different rentier classes and strata are regulated by the monarch and through the conditionalization of land use.

First, the Ottoman social formation is generally a continuation of the concrete rentier social formations that preceded it. But it is impossible to attribute this continuity to an absolute synthesis of 'Turkish-Islam', to articulation with Byzantium, or to a definite ancient Mesopotamian-Iranian-Hellenistic origin etc.¹⁶² The reason for this is that the forms of rent appropriation and conditional property are necessarily determined by the conflict of concrete social forces, in other words, they cannot be attributed to a particular ethnic/religious/historical tradition. The development and relations of these forces vary according to the population structure and size, community formations, the level of development of commercial relations, military technology, personal loyalty relations, durability and / or dissolution of kinship relations, and soil fertility etc. In this case, certain spatial and temporal combinations of the factors in question result in the emergence of social relations that are completely different from each other in terms of appearance, affected by partial differences of time and space in terms of substance, and largely the same in terms of essence. In this respect, the Ottoman social formation is similar in essence to other societies that preceded it, and even contemporaneously, in terms of the prevalence and decisiveness of rentier social relations. On the other hand, as will be mentioned later, it is noticed that both phenomenal and substantive common points have emerged in areas such as prebendal land forms, central professional army formation, ideological codifications, land registrations, judicial and penalizing practices.

In this context, it would be appropriate to focus on the Ottoman land order. The lands allocated to agricultural production and animal husbandry are divided among different segments of the society under various statuses, and within this framework, rent is given to (i) peasant and nomadic families, (ii) *timar*-holders, (iii) high military and administrative officers, (iv) professionals who assume religious functions (ulama and

Ortaylı (2020a, pp. 25-29, 41, 57-67, 104), Tabakoğlu (2020, pp. 31, 143, 150), Başkaya (2014, p. 44).

¹⁶² On the other hand, it is known that there are also lands in the status of *timar* directly taken over by the Ottoman state. Among these, the *timars* of the Anatolian Seljuk state in the Teke region, the *timars* of the Karamanid, Aydın, Menteşe, Germiyan, Saruhan Principalities, and the Aq Qoyunlu and Dülkadirid *timars* can be counted, see Beldiceanu (1985, pp. 19-23).

sûfi circles), (v) the ruling classes of the allied states, (vi) the remnants of the ruling classes of the previous period (Balkan and Anatolian aristocratic families) and the Ottoman royal family. In addition, a part of the monetized ground rent is reappropriated by the military and religious circles through the state, while the other part participates in the profits of the commercial and urban small production circles. Especially after the 16th century, with the development of the tax farming system, serious changes occur in the structure of the social segments that take a share from the land rent, in parallel with the development of differential rent, the share of the rent income belongs to the merchants and the families of the capital-owning money-changers/usurers increases systematically and presents a premature example of capitalist rent. In general, the development of rentier relations in Ottoman society took place around the *çiftlik* organization (*çift-hâne* system).¹⁶³ The farms, whose borders were determined and registered by the Ottoman state, and which largely consisted of lands large enough to be plowed by a pair of oxen, functioned as the basic unit of rent. Farm units are granted to the villagers on the condition of producing and paying taxes, whereas a land with more than one farm is left to the timoriot *sipâhîs* in return for this land to collect the rent income determined as tax beforehand.¹⁶⁴ Having the right to cultivate a fertile piece of land (*kılıç/hassa/hassa-i sipâhîyan*) in a certain region personally and leave it to their children, the *sipâhî* who obtained the privilege of obtaining a rent in the form of taxes from other farms in the same region, in return, the obligation to bring soldiers to the war – their quantity was proportional to the size of the fief. However, when examining the practice of *timar* in the broad sense, it would be unwarranted to claim that it only pays for military services -therefore it is not possible to equate the prebendal *timar* with the military *fief* in absolute terms. Beldiceanu's (1985, pp. 34-42) analysis on the subject states that some of the *timars* are reserved for professions that do not include military service, such as aqueduct, fortress, bridge repair and maintenance, horse and camel

¹⁶³ For the *çift-hâne* system, see: Barkan (1980e, p. 684), İnalçık (2015, p. 16; 2021b, pp. 184-89), Pamuk (1999, p. 78).

¹⁶⁴ The fact that the farmers could use slave labor in these production units and that this was relatively common before the 17th century indicates that there are two sides to the rent income. On the one hand, rent based on family-production arises and is accumulated by the exploitation of slave labor, on the other hand, a part of this rent is shared with the rentier social classes. In this regard, the impressions of a 15th century witness can be indicated. According to Georgius de Hungaria, it was believed that those who have slaves or servants in 15th century Anatolia would not be poor, this category of labor is widely operated among Turkish and Muslim families (Stevenson, 2016, p. 22).

breeding, caravanserai management, treasury, falconry, prince tutoring; It reveals that religious or civil professional groups such as city officials (*assesbaşı*), *muhtesibs*, *qadis*, *imams/hatips/muezzins* can also benefit from *timars*. In these lands, which are divided into three as *timar*, *zeâmet* and has according to their size, rent incomes are received mostly in kind and in cash; In addition, the obligation to work on the landlord's land still exists even though it takes different forms (annual drudgery, monetary equivalent of drudgery, the landlord's obligation to carry his goods to the market, etc.).¹⁶⁵ The existence of prebendal property does not necessarily mean that the central state should waive all rent income. As McGowan (1981, pp. 105-10) shows, the central state's keeping the record of direct producers and holding the right to tax them in principle enabled the emergence and even institutionalization of irregular taxes. Through such taxes, which can be called tax-rent, a certain amount of rent income could be transferred to the center under a tax form. Although the dominant form of prebendal land ownership in the Ottoman Empire changed from *timar* to manor (*mâlikâne/çiftlik*), it can be argued that neither the *timar* status nor the manorial status completely disappeared until the 19th century.

In addition to the prebendal land concessions in the *timar* status, there are also lands directly owned by the ruler and cultivated by slaves (*ortakçı kullar*), and the rent obtained from these lands is recorded as income in the treasury.¹⁶⁶ Moreover, in the examples of such lands opened to large markets, as in rice farming, state-owned lands are operated in *mukata'a* status and the rent is appropriated by the state (Faroqhi, 2018a, p. 24; 2018b, p. 67).¹⁶⁷ It should also be noted that large lands were also cultivated, albeit in small numbers, by slave labor, sharecropping, and wage labor. Similar

¹⁶⁵ In addition, examples such as *öşr-i bostan* taken from vegetable gardens, *bidat-ı hanazır* and *resm-i ağman* taken from pig and sheep herders, incomes obtained from officials who established a monopoly on olive oil presses can be given as examples of rent income from commercial commodity production. On the subject, see: Faroqhi (2018b, pp. 70, 73, 87). See Beldiceanu (1985, p. 30) for another type of *timar*, which includes the right to seize the rental income of immovables located in city centers.

¹⁶⁶ Also see: Barkan (1980e, pp. 578, 612, 634, 658, 666) for the groups named “kesimciler” and “koyun kafirleri”, which have similar status with “ortakçılar”. These groups of captive origins can work not only in the *has* but also in the *waqfs*, estates and *zawiyas* of the viziers and pashas. It is also seen that after the lands in the status of *mevat* were opened to production, some powerful state officials operated them with slave and *ortakçı* labor (see İnalçık, 2015, p. 18).

¹⁶⁷ In addition, the rents of lands with irrigation infrastructure and high productivity can be shared between the state and the *sipâhîs*. See Faroqhi (2018b, p. 89) for an example where half of the income of some well-watered lands were seized by the state, and the remaining lands were held by *sipâhîs* which demand a tithe (*öşür*).

categories of labor can be found in private properties with the status of *mâlikâne* or *mâlikâne-dîvânî*. Granting lands in the status of *timar* to members of the *ulama* class and *sûfî* circles in the early Ottoman period shows a rentier tendency, which was effective in the development of this social segments.¹⁶⁸ In addition, as Barkan (1994, pp. 30-32) states, some *Ahi* sheikhs were given land, *waqfs* and farms were entrusted. It is also necessary to mention the lands given to certain tribes as *yurtluk* and *ocaklık*. Tribal leaders, who are autonomously ruling these lands, get more rent income in terms of taxes and gifts separately from other lands and can have some administrative and judicial powers. Moreover, the livestock activities carried out by certain nomadic tribes were also subject to rent, and the right to benefit from the pastures was paid in return for the rent in kind over livestock such as horses and sheep etc. On the other hand, capitatum (head tax) is collected from non-Muslim communities that are subject to the Ottoman state, and in this way, a separate item of rent income is created (see: Nedkoff, 1944, pp. 621-27). It is seen that *waqfs* who own a certain land similarly receive a share from the agricultural production around them and use their rent income by spending it sometimes for various public services and sometimes for the living of their trustees.¹⁶⁹ Finally, the right to operate the mines is granted according to the tax farming procedure, and accordingly, a rent income is demanded from the mine keepers, which cannot be fully separated from the profit. The development of tax farming system in the 16th century means that the tax-rent in a certain region is collected for a limited time by the officials appointed by the center. These officials are expected to deliver a significant portion of the tax revenues of the envisaged region to the state as a prepayment, and in return, they are expected to compensate this prepayment with the taxes they collect in kind or in cash at the time of tax collection. Finally, to find a significant part of the total tax amount requires borrowing, converting the collected goods in kind into cash requires commercial activity, and since obtaining the power of tax farming requires convincing high officials with bribes, the whole process has been monetized and revealed the

¹⁶⁸ For the first commentary which was made by J. Deny on the subject, see: Beldiceanu (1985, pp. 33-4). For examples on this subject, see: Barkan (1994, pp. 32-39), Vatin (2019, p. 53), Şahin (2022c, pp. 136-44). Beldiceanu (1985, pp. 36-39), who developed a categorical analysis on the subject, shows that *qadis*, *imams*, preachers and *muezzins*, who undertake military duties or not, as well as Orthodox clergy who are included in the church hierarchy, can benefit from lands in the status of *timar*.

¹⁶⁹ The rent income obtained by *waqfs* is not necessarily realized on the land. For an example where half of the fish caught from a particular fishing catch is given to a *waqf*, see: Faroqhi (2018b, p. 74).

capital-intensive distribution of the rent income.¹⁷⁰ It is clear that the *mâlikâne* system, which developed with the tax farming practice in the same period, also aimed to restructure the rent distribution.¹⁷¹ In the *mâlikâne* system, the right to collect the annual tax revenues of certain regions was entrusted to various state officials for life, whereas the candidates had to enter the auction and pay a price called *muacelle* in order to obtain the right to collect the relevant revenues. In this system, especially the places with high differential rent income are in high demand, therefore it becomes a reasonable choice to invest in this type of land in order to be able to subtract the annual tax income paid.¹⁷² When examined systematically, this method guaranteed the revenues of the central treasury, encouraged investment in land, and granted long-term possession rights of the *mâlikâne* owners.¹⁷³ However, in practice, it turns out that the investment in land is not at the expected level, and moreover, a new rentier stratum has begun to be effective in city life as an *absentee owner* (actually *absentee possessor*) (see, Genç, 2014c, p. 107). It is also necessary to take into account the emergence of capitalist relations in large farms, especially with the development of commercial agriculture and the development of wage labor and forms of sharecropping that require a certain capital investment.

In general terms, it can be seen that the development of the Ottoman social formation passed through several different phases. There is not enough reliable information available about the tribe/tribal order, which is probably the first of these

¹⁷⁰ For the relationship between the emergence of large farms and the development of usurer's capital, see: Cezar (1965, pp. 62-4), Akyıldız (2009), Tveritinova (2006, p. 70), Koyuncu (2014, pp. 305-12), Yaycıoğlu (2019, pp. 383-85).

¹⁷¹ The legalization of the *mâlikâne* system in 1695 and the existence of hesitant phases in which it was abolished and re-established in the next twenty years are important indicators of this search for restructuring. While it is certain that the *mâlikâne* system is related to the commercialization of agriculture, it is doubtful that it is only reducible to this (see Faroqhi, 2011, p. 193). On the other hand, it is surprising that the spread of *mâlikânes* paradoxically resulted in an increase in the control of the central state within a century and a half (Faroqhi, 2011, p. 207). It is an important detail to see the signs of innovation in the *fiqh* discussions on rent distributions in the 17th century and later. On the subject, see: Johansen (1988, pp. 98-121).

¹⁷² This situation is clearer especially in the cases where the lands in the status of *mevat* were transformed into commercial farms (see İnalçık, 2015, pp. 18-19; 2015, p. 29). Faroqhi (2000, p. 320) in his study examining the purchase and sale of lands around Kayseri and Ankara in the 17th and 18th centuries states that the value of commercial agricultural products grown in the lands around Kayseri also affects the value of the land and much higher values were determined compared to the Ankara region. In this framework, it is possible to determine more clearly that land has become a form of investment and is associated with commerce.

¹⁷³ However, the existence of farms obtained in *mukata'a* status necessitates the evaluation of such rentier units in the form of conditional ownership. In this regard, see: Veinstein (2015, p. 38).

phases. For this reason, interpretations about the origin of the Ottoman dynasty are largely doomed to remain hypothetical.¹⁷⁴ However, it does not seem possible to completely reject the tribal-origin thesis. As Beldiceanu (2019, pp. 30-31) draws attention, it is seen that the Ottoman family participated in the wars as a whole even during the reign of Orhan Beg and solved the problems related to the division of property by coming together. To give an example, Osman Beg's brothers Gündüz, Saru Yatu, his uncle Dündar, his nephews Bay Hoca, Aydogdu and Ak Timur can be counted among these names (Altuğ, 2020, p. 77). But another remarkable feature is that family members died quite early in various conflicts, which constitutes an important starting point for state building. Although such features are being dissolved or restructured, they indicate that certain level of kinship relations have not yet completely disappeared. Considering the information on this subject in the early Ottoman and Byzantine sources, a group of Turkish origin tribe members or warriors gathered around Ertugrul and Osman Beg, whose internal structure we do not know, were primarily subordinate to the Anatolian Seljuks, Çobanids and/or Ilkhanates to a certain region that they settled down and engaged in military service in case of war. The fact that they periodically present 'gifts' to the *Tekfur* of Bilecik suggests that they pay a certain annual tribute for the lands they use as summer pastures and winter quarters. In the following period, it is possible to extract from the Ilkhanate tax registers at least Orhan Beg was obliged to pay a certain tax to the Ilkhanate governor. It is not possible to talk about a specifically such an advance social formation at this early stage. It would be equally correct to speak of a hypothetically quasi-egalitarian tribe, a tribal aristocracy organized around the Ertugrul household, or some premature feudal relations. It is possible to date the second phase of the development of the Ottoman rule, especially to the old age of Osman Beg and the period of Orhan Beg, when the Seljuk/Ilkhanate domination lost its influence.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁴ The lack of sufficient documentation, combined with the current political tendencies that attach importance to the establishment problem, becomes an inextricable "spiral" in the problem. For a detailed critical study on this subject, see Demirhan (2019).

¹⁷⁵ For a similar comment, see Tezcan (2010, pp. 82-90). Tezcan evaluates the period of 1300-1453, which he calls "formative period", under the concept of feudal mode of production. My interpretation, on the other hand, is primarily based on the category of the RMP rather than the FMP, and considers the transition from the feudal political formation to the imperial regime as an uneven and combined process. Feudal relations and bureaucratic autarky developed together in a suspended contradiction, but uneven development ended with the liquidation of the former by the latter. Pamuk (1999, p. 78) emphasized the contradictory coexistence of TMP and FMP in Ottoman society before the 15th century and pointed out that this situation was overcome in favor of the former. Although this is a reasonable interpretation, its main problem is that it does

In this period, a kind of feudal articulation was dominant, as can be seen by looking at examples such as Samsa Çavuş and Evrenos Beg.¹⁷⁶ In this period, the fact that the managers of the families that were articulated with the Ottoman dynasty were given the title of 'beg' rather than 'pasha' (Vatin, 2019, p. 46) and that they had absolute property rights provide signs that support the theory of feudal articulation. The newly conquered lands are given to the warrior groups/families or their leaders organized under the Ottoman dynasty or the chieftain, either with property or right of use, and in return, military obligations secured by personal relations are entrusted. Although it is not possible to talk about a mature state structure for this period, the first cores of a systematic organization in money, taxation, paid army and land registration, especially in the period of Orhan Beg, give the signs of the change of the feudal early-state form. From the time of Orhan Beg, the Ottoman state had a dual identity, and while the organizational forms of the feudal early-state were being developed, on the other hand, the elements of the central state form continued to develop. The mentioned two-dimensional development process was able to suppress its internal contradictions for a long time due to rapid territorial expansion, the need for resistance against well-organized Balkan infantry forces and unified armies, high loot revenues and city/fortress siege opportunities. On the other hand, as of the reign of Bayezid I, the central state structure became significantly stronger in proportion to the feudal alliance forms, and the centralization of the palace, army and judicial organizations created a new historical ground where the said contradiction could be resolved against the feudal relations. Although this ground suffered a great shock after the Timurid invasion and the Battle of Ankara, the interregnum period caused a transition to a phase that preceded the state-restoration, especially as a result of the reorganization of the central authority of the *Kapıkulus*, the ulama and the large landowners in the Balkans. In this new phase, the ties between feudal relations and the developed state organization became manageable through the active stance of the *Diwan* organization -or, as I will discuss later, the

not take into account ground rent that has not become the object of tribute. If the continuity of the *timar* system is taken into account, the existence of a rentier class at the local scale requires that the mode of production category be defined as "rentier" in the general plan.

¹⁷⁶ Barkan (1939d, pp. 152-53) states that the lands given to the commander, ahi and dervishes during the Ottoman establishment period had the status of absolute property right, tax-free, endowable, seizureable and transferable to/by third parties. Although the holding of these properties may be more or less subject to personal relations and therefore conditional, in the final analysis they point to the existence of a pre-prebendalistic phase. See also: Cezar (1965, pp. 57-58) and Faroqhi (2000, p. 323).

'administration of the pashas'. Moreover, the development of the *timar* system in the distribution of land rents made it possible to include and overcome feudal relations in favor of a future imperial regime. The main relationship that gives its general characteristic to the long 15th century under Ottoman rule is the distribution pattern of ground rent among soldiers, ulama and *sûfi* circles. In general terms, this pattern *timar* holders directly appropriate the agricultural surplus of the producer to the extent determined by the central state, the *zeâmet* and *has* holders also have the status of *absentee owner*, although they establish rentier relationship on a larger scale, subfeudalization is still practically possible, but gradually becomes dependent on the approval of the center, points to a framework in which the lands owned by religious institutions are subject to conditional ownership to a large extent. Compared to the early period, it is observed that the soldiers and *sûfi* circles had much less absolute property rights, the *timar* was less preferred to be given to the *faqih*s and *imams*, and the influence of the waged sections of the state officials increased in number. On the other hand, in this century, when the big cities in Anatolia and the Balkans were captured -or subordinated- and repopulated together with its surroundings, commercial relations started to get complicated with the reconstruction of Constantinople as the capital, and a common monetary-zone (*akçe-zone*) established (Tezcan, 2010, p. 89), thus a suitable environment has been created for the emergence of differential rent forms. In particular, the allocation of the most fertile areas of the land to the holders of *timar/zeâmet/has*, the privilege of benefiting from the pastures, mills and canals in their lands supports the development of differential rent.

Beldiceanu (1985, pp. 52-53, 57, 65) states that lands in the size of one or two *çiftlik*s, called *hassa/kılıç yeri*, offered to the personal use of *timar* holders, can also include places such as orchards/vineyards/olive groves/vegetable gardens/meadows/paddy fields; moreover, it shows that they can have production or trade units such as mill/olive oil press/straw workshop/fish barn and fairground with the status of *hassa* income - and they can establish tax farming there. Also, at the beginning of the 16th century, *timar* holders were able to collect the highest quality part of the peasants' products as taxes, as Prince Korkut (2022, p. 268) pointed. Since the middle of the 15th century, when ground rent began to be paid in money, the rent income of lands close to cities and/or markets has increased, and the rate of increase in income accrues as the population settled on the land multiplies and less fertile lands are opened to production. In this respect, it is not a coincidence that the expression of military

obligation decreased in the *timar* records from the middle of the 15th century and that it was even less common at the beginning of the 16th century.¹⁷⁷ As Tezcan (2010, p. 23) states, from the end of the 15th century, *timar* lands became a part of the market economy and began to be seen as an investment opportunity – the development of the tax farming system is based on the economic and political articulation of this tendency with the imperial center. In this period, the influence of the center in the financial, bureaucratic, judicial and military organization of the state and the political and ideological position of Mehmet II being unrivaled provided decisive foundations for the construction of the imperial regime. For this reason, from the second half of the 15th century, the imperial regime -bureaucratic autocracy- was institutionalized, and continued to develop throughout the 16th century. In the final analysis, with the development of the imperial regime, land ownership was riveted to the conditional status subject to the absolute control of the state, the dominant form of ownership became prebendal, and in this context, it became necessary to be articulated with the central state bureaucracy and/or to have a status recognized by the imperial administration in order to seize the land rent. But this form of development never seems to be reducible neither to the concept of AMP nor FMP.

In this case, generalizations such as ‘property belongs to God’, derived from religious decrees, or that the ruler is the owner of all property / the ruler of all servants, will be far from encompassing the developing and conflicting concrete social relations and lines of struggle.¹⁷⁸ Weber (2014, p. 376) considers the doctrine that ‘land cannot be regarded as the product of human labor like any other commodity and therefore cannot be appropriated’ as part of natural Law ideology, and finds traces of the class reaction of the poor peasants against the landowner group. While this proposition is theoretically correct, it should be noted that in particular instances this discourse is not directly part of the struggle of the subordinated class. For example, one of the poet of this period, Ahmedî, frequently uses the argument ‘property belongs to God’, but this statement, besides its rhetorical effect, is an example of claiming that the *sûfi* circles

¹⁷⁷ In addition, from the second half of the 16th century, *mîrî* lands began to change hands in exchange for money. The decrease in military obligation (Beldiceanu, 1985, pp. 6-7, 10) and the fact that lands are subject to speculation and exchange (Faroqhi, 2000, pp. 299-300) indicate that lands close to cities and markets have become the subject of differential rent income.

¹⁷⁸ For example, the difference between *justitiction laïque* and *jurisdiction ecclésiastique* in the Abbasid era reveals that although advanced schools of *fiqh* and different jurisdiction approaches emerged, the theoretical relevance of the practice often did not exist in land regime (Köprülü, 2005c, p. 23).

have knowledge of a truth that transcends the social reality/determination of the sultanate.¹⁷⁹ The poems in *İskendernâme* do not contain any radical criticism that might be expected about the acquisition and operation of private property. In this context, what is in question is an ideological fiction in which the conditionalization of land use rights within the framework of the current political regime is legitimized in the eyes of the direct producers. Boran (2018b, 51-52) underlines that the actual situation is more important in this discussion: “(...) it shows that the condition of ‘not having property’ remains theoretical in most cases and times, that they benefit from the land and the products of the land workers as if they were property owners [tm]”. Köprülü (2005, p. 41) similarly states that the studies of feudalism in the Islamic world are weak and the information on this subject is insufficient, and attributes this to the fact that focusing on land ownership and the legal and political forms it results from, creates erroneous opinions about the social structure.¹⁸⁰

All these examples show that the Ottoman Empire had a structure based on the rentier mode of production. The development of the imperial structure enabled the state to transfer resources to the center from the rent revenues of prebendal lands and even private properties through taxes, *mukata’ a* and *iltizâm/mâlikâne* systems. On the other hand, it is seen that civil servants or civilian persons/groups, who are the executives of such systematics, also receive a significant share of the rent income, and they also affect the policies of the center within this framework. In this context, if the class relations in the Ottoman Empire are re-evaluated, it becomes clear that the ruling class of the empire is the rentier class that rises over the direct producers. This class consists of several different layers and fractions. First of all, the Ottoman dynasty -especially the ruler- is above the other groups in appropriating and distributing the rent income and constitutes the dominant group. Later, the military and civilian hierarchy members who appropriate their rent incomes in cash take place in the class scheme. The military section of this section is divided into two as the *Kapıkulus* and the provincial soldiers, and the second group consisting of the *ulama*, the scribal service and the *qadis* completes this first

¹⁷⁹ See: Ahmedî (2018, p. 79).

¹⁸⁰ In this framework such an idealist misinterpretation had made by Sakin. Sakin (2011, p. 13) argues that there were no class barriers between the ruler and the ruled in the Ottoman country, that there were no privileged sections, including the dynasty, and that even the notables who emerged in the 18th century did not constitute an exception to this scheme because they did not have hereditary privileges.

group.¹⁸¹ Within these two groups, there are interlayers on a wide scale, from *timar*-holder *sipâhî* to *zeâmet*-holders and members of the *Diwan*. The manner in which these strata appropriation of rent varies over time, ranging from purely cash incomes to a combination of salary and prebendal land incomes, or just right of land possession instead of salary, as seen in some of the *mâlikânes*. Thirdly, it is understood that the *sûfi* circles and especially the leaders of the established orders received a share of the rent income in kind or in cash. In addition to these, it is necessary to mention another group of rentiers, which receives a share from the income of the *waqfs*, even though it does not belong to one, several or none of the above-mentioned groups. In addition to these groups, it is necessary to count the allied principalities, privileged landowners (*mâlikâne* and *mülk* owners), and tribal leaders who appropriated the income of the lands with the status of *ocaklık*. In addition, it is possible to evaluate the wealthy merchants who establish and manage the necessary commercial relations networks for the realization of differential rent, although they are not directly members of the rentier class, but as members of the dominant class articulated with the rentier mode of production. In the final analysis, it is understood that all these fractions and layers are in a struggle with each other in order to seize the rent incomes in kind or in cash, to get the biggest share from the realization of the rent, to raise their social status level and to take a place in the decision-making mechanisms -on the other hand, It is seen that the emperors with military and civilian hierarchy coexist in a mutual relationship although traces of rentier contradiction still exist. In this case, while each faction and segment aim to subordinate the other to itself, to make their social position determinant and to realize their self-interest, at the same time, they cannot completely eliminate the groups against them. The mentioned multidimensional relationship forms the basis of the complex discourse examples in the history of political thought that each group has built in order to ground its privileged position and to subordinate other groups politically and economically as well as ideologically.

If the Ottoman political thought is considered as a separate title, some cultural and ideological elements will need to be added to the political-economic framework that had summarized above. Ottoman political thought is organized around real social contradictions, religious and cultural traditions, stereotyped forms of discourse and their

¹⁸¹ It should be underlined that a number of revenue items controlled by the central state are transferred to mosques and madrasah *waqfs* and allocated to religious officials. See: İslamoğlu (2018, pp. 145-46). An important part of these incomes are rent incomes belonging to either land or urban real estate.

strategic variants. Examples of political thought crystallized in historical sources, examples of *diwan* poetry, *menâkibnâmes*, *letâifnâmes*, *âdâb* literature, *siyâsetnâmes*, Law and theology literature, folk narratives and verbal cultural sources etc. are located in the lines of struggle of different social groups around rent and social status. A schematic representation of these lines gives the following basic categories: (i) feudal form of articulation versus bureaucratic autocracy, (ii) state versus tribal organizations, (iii) rentier classes versus peasants and nomads, (iv) internal conflicts of military, administrative, and religious rentier classes themselves (v) and the struggle to access networks of social status and/or state-mediated redistribution of rent. When the history of political thought in Ottoman society is taken into consideration, it is possible to see that these categories have become functional in general, however, political criticism or representations of urban guilds, central and local fractions of the army, various religious communities and sects that more or less correspond to this framework also find their place.¹⁸² It is striking that the dominant political ideology is organized in favor of the rentier classes and around a patriarchal carcass, and its common premise is the preservation and reproduction of the social order. Examples of opposing political discourses develop partly against rentier relations, and partly tend to the religious/mystical ideology envelope surrounding the patriarchal discourse or the tradition to which this envelope belongs. In addition, it also develops a discussion on the ideal social order, harmony and justice, whether it is the dominant ideology or the discourse of resistance, within the whole scheme of social contradictions. While this discourse has a status-quo proposal, which deals with the reproduction of the existing social order around the particular interests of certain class actors when it comes to the dominant ideology, the resistance discourse partly embraces the reformist approach that preaches the provision of justice and partly the apocalyptic discourse that the existing social structure comes to an end. Secondly, the status struggle among the segments (military, administrative, judicial, religious, etc.) that directly or indirectly seize the rent, crosses the examples of political thought.

The examples of political discourse in Ottoman society can be divided into several basic categories in terms of the period and sources as had discussed. The first of these are examples of feudal political discourse, which kept their importance by

¹⁸² For example, the resistance of the tribes against the imperial control was also organized around the Shiite rebellion ideology against the established Sunni religious ideology, and the rent struggle between the small fief holders, the local aristocracy, high civil servants and the *Kapıkulu* army could also take place in the political discourse with a religious character.

decreasing especially until the end of the 15th century. In these examples, despite the development of central state powers, personal relations, individual property, and the social status of frontier warriors (*ghazis*) are prioritized, and a certain critical attitude is taken against the organization of the central treasury and the recruited professional army (*Kapıkulu* army).

Against this discourse, there is another form of political discourse that defends the central treasury and the army, financial control and madrasah-centered religious authority. This second form of discourse came to dominate especially with the second half of the 15th century, and while this was taking place, it also developed the secular political theory and the representation of the monarch under theomorphic forms in order to ground the autocratic power of the monarch. Thirdly, it is seen that a new orientation emerged in the examples of political thought written at the threshold of the 16th century. In these examples, while the political discourse of the imperial regime was developed and reinforced to include administrative and financial relations, the ethnic and religious-based opposition to it is tried to be absorbed with new elements inspired by the Shiite imamate theory, in which the personality of the monarch is endowed with divine features. In all these examples, the social position of the *sūfi* circles, the ulama stratum, the *Kapıkulu* and the timariot cavalry army are tried to be supported from different perspectives and contradictory arguments were tried to be reconciled, so that the arguments revealed about which group should have the rent, status and social privileges are made in both general and particular frameworks.

II.III. The Development of the Ottoman State: From Early-State Form to Empire

In this section, the development of the Ottoman Empire will be tried to be explained in the context of the social groups that played a role in its development, their structural and historical characteristics, motivations and mutual relations. As suggested in the previous section, the structure of the first communities gathered around the Ottoman dynasty, which organized through kinship relations, the framework of which it was not possible to predict exactly, transformed these relations into feudalism during the development of the early state, and finally, the imperial regime emerged within this structure with the organization of the financial/military/religious bureaucracy. If the aforementioned historical process and theoretical framework is accepted as a basis, it can be seen that the social segments called *ghazis* who played a role in the development of feudal relations in the early Ottoman period, the religious/military/commercial

components that played a role in the early state organization, and finally the other social segments must be addressed separately that were the carriers of the Empire structure.

II.III.I. The Ottoman Order in the Establishment Period: Motivations and Functions

It can be thought that the establishment of the Ottoman order consisted of the process of combining and governing two main interrelated social factors under the leadership of the Ottoman dynasty. These factors can be divided into dynamic and static factors. From the term dynamic factor, it can be understood the realization of the interests of declassé pillager groups, and from the term static factor, the protection and promotion of the interests of new landlords, vassals or various strata of the old social order. Although these two factors were present in Anatolian lands before the Ottoman dynasty with varying power and intensity, the Ottoman dynasty was able to create a new order by combining these two factors within the framework of its own class-based vision and development pattern (*sınıfsal izlek*). In this context, Ottoman political thought also follows the aforementioned class vision, but due to the variable priorities given to the interests of different social factors, there are differences in emphasis within political thought.

In order to deal with how the motivations of the social subjects, who are the contractors of both factors, were articulated within the framework of the class vision of the Ottoman dynasty and how it revealed the formal unity of the society, it is necessary to think within a certain scheme. It is possible to call this scheme as three motivation-two function schemes. Three motivations indicate the common motivations of the Ottomans and the local powers, namely the infrastructure of the order:

- (i) Obtaining booty and slaves,
- (ii) Protecting lands and agricultural production, marketplaces, mines and cities,
- (iii) Conquering new lands and expanding the area of domination.

Two functions reveal the functions undertaken by the Ottoman administration within the framework of these motivations:

- (a1) To isolate the activities of *ghaza/pillage* from the activities of other classes,
- (a2) to protect and reproduce existing production activities and trade opportunities in a specific political unity.

(b) To diversify the ways of appropriation of the surplus product as determined by the interests of the Ottoman dynasty, to develop the land regime, to regulate the political and cultural articulations, that is, to develop and institutionalize the subordination scheme.¹⁸³

It can be mentioned that there were three main categories of social subjects in the establishment of the Ottoman state. The first of these is *ghazis*, which is largely based on ‘declassé’ social elements, the second is principalities, urban artisans, free farmers, merchants and *tekfurs* as the remnants/continuers of the pre-Ottoman social order, and the third is a stratified collective power with the Ottoman dynasty at its center. Although these three categories of subjects have their own interests and purposes, they are articulated with each other in some special cases and contradict each other in some other special cases. By minimizing these contradictions or isolating them from each other, the Ottomans gain the leadership of these three subject categories and establish their own class dominance to the extent that they can realize their articulation in line with their class-vision and class-pattern. It is important in explaining the development of the state to evaluate the problem of how the Ottoman order articulated *ghazis* based on a mixture of religious fervor with the motivation to acquire war spoils, plunder and slaves, layers who want to maintain their social privileges, small producers who now put their products on the market and/or want to maintain their subsistence economy, within the framework of their own class motivations.

II.III.II. *Ghazis* and the Ottoman Rule

“They enslaved their people. They killed the *Tekfur*.
Ghazis embraced their beautiful daughters [tm]”.
(Apzd, 2017, p. 146)

¹⁸³ Alternative motivation-function models are not discussed here. Akgündüz’s (1999, p. 48) model can be given as an example. According to him, the rise of the Ottoman Empire has three main factors: (i) ethnic and geographical reasons (founded in Bithynia and being Turkish), (ii) the decline of Byzantium and the contradictions between Christian sects, (iii) Ottomans’ implementation of the provisions of Islamic law. However, this scheme is flawed from the outset in considering Ottoman development as a deterministic outcome, and in general falls into the structuralist error of other models that try to explain Ottoman progress. On the other hand, I think that I use an alternative model that tries to include social struggles and reconciliations within the dialectic of structure and subject.

The subject of the number one motivation in the above-mentioned scheme is the groups called *ghazis*. The existence, motivation and importance of these groups is a matter of debate in itself. It is known that these groups existed before the Ottoman Empire, the Danishmendids hosted *ghazi* groups, and even a warrior population that went to sea wars existed in the Aydin Principality. We see that these groups occasionally plunder in the inner regions, but mostly they carry out war and related plundering activities along the border. Köprülü (2018, p. 136) defines these groups as a parasitic social segment that does not have a land to live on and a job to sustain itself, and seeks their means of livelihood in constant wars and internal plunder in the face of economic necessities. Since it is clear that this definition refers to a deterritorialized social section that has fallen out of established class relations and probably the traditional kinship relations, I also find it appropriate to use the concept of ‘*declassé*’. The word ‘*declassé*’ means degraded, worthless, inferior status in everyday language. By giving this word a literal meaning (and by leaving the above-mentioned pejorative meaning aside), I use it to describe social segments that have fallen out of existing class relations, have become largely deterritorialized and have fallen below the zero point of class relations. This term refers to social segments that are partially or completely independent from their existing class relations. The *declassé* groups within the *ghazis* constitute people who break away from the settled peasantry and become adventurous warriors or wandering dervishes, individuals or family groups that become independent as a result of the dissolution of tribal relations, autonomous tribes that are outside of seignorial or bureaucratic control, and immigrant human communities.

It is also a matter of debate whether the main motivation of these groups is religious or economic, whether it is at the individual or collective-political level or whether it is important. To explain briefly, it remains historically ambiguous whether they see the *ghaza* activity as an individual worship, if they act on the basis of religion, or whether they have a political goal of bringing the regions where the Christian population lives under Islamic domination, or if they act just to gain booty. The importance of this issue is centered on the extent to which these groups adhere to Islamic codes, their obedience to religious authorities and how their desire to plunder can be restrained. Because it is thought that the *ghazis* were an independent and/or semi-dependent power from the Ottomans for a long time and played a decisive role in the expansion of the land. Although the aims of the Ottoman dynasty as a political subject and the aims of the *ghazi* groups overlap in terms of expansion, gaining booty and

creating an element of military pressure, the establishment of the central authority has a problematic dimension in terms of relations with local sovereign powers and non-Muslim groups. In this section, I will try to discuss the phenomenon of *ghaza* and its situation in class relations in the Ottoman establishment period and analyze how this contradictory situation was reflected in the Ottoman political thought.

First, let's take a look at the relationship between *ghaza* and monarchy. Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, p. 98) considers the *ghaza* activity among the responsibilities of the ruler and makes it one of the legitimacy pillars of the sultanate: As long as the rulers make the *ghaza*, "whatever they eat and drink with their body is *halal* [tm]". Ahmedî (2018, p. 567) repeats Şeyhoğlu's view almost word for word: According to this, Muslim begs are those who take it as their duty to fight the infidels and therefore the things they wear and eat become *halal*.¹⁸⁴ Thus, a portrait of a *ghazi*-ruler begins to form. In Ahmedî (2018, p. 90), this portrait was drawn at its most advanced zenith that a ruler is a person who is young, brave, warrior, leader, and seizes property:

Şimdi kim sultânımızdur bu cüvân/ Hem dil-âver-şîr ü hem nev-pehlevân
Bir neberd eyleyelüm kim tâc u taht/ Alına düşmenden ü hem mülk ü baht
Ne gerek çünkim dil-âver ola şâh/ Hasmdan tâc almag u hem taht-gâh
Ol kişi kim olayım dir halka baş/ Ortaya komah gerekdür cân u baş
Ol kişiye kim dil-âver olmaya/ Memleket hergiz müsahhar olmaya
Çün kılıc zahmı-y-la girür mülk ele/ Kılıc ura her ki diler mülk ala
Mülk alam diyen kılıcsuz iy ulu/ Fikri bâtıldur kim ider ol delü¹⁸⁵

A second example can be found in the histories of Oruç Beg and Şükrullah. Oruç Beg (2011, p. 20) defines the Ottoman family as *ghazi*, who defeated the enemy, zealous for the path of religion, revenge against the unbelievers and describes the Ottoman history he wrote as the history of the *ghazas*. Throughout Şükrullah's *Behcetü't-Tevârih*, there are scenes of *ghaza* depicted with emotions at the level of religious

¹⁸⁴ Couplet no: 7548.

¹⁸⁵ Couplet no: 1159-1165., Also see: 1185-1186 and 2898-2903. Now our sultan is young/ He is both a brave lion and a valiant warrior/ Let's fight in such a way that we take the crown and the throne/ The property and the kingdom from the enemy/ To get the crown and throne from the enemy/ The king must be brave/ The person who wants to be the head of the people/ He must put his life bravely/ The one who is not brave / The country never obeys/ As the land is conquered by the swing of the sword/ The one who wants to conquer the land must strike the sword/ The one who says 'I will conquer the land without a sword' / He is a fool with empty thoughts, O great (Ahmedî, 2018, p. 90).

ecstasy. To give an example, the period of Orhan Beg is described as follows (Şükrullah, 2011, p. 207):

When Orhan Beg became the sultan, religious flags were opened more. The measures of the infidels were humiliated, and the ostentation of infidelity decreased or even disappeared. The reputation of Islam increased. It went everywhere, bringing innumerable loot and captives. So much so: They can't find anyone in the Muslim army that they can give *zakat* or *zedakah*. [tm]

The common point of both Oruç bin Adil's and Şükrullah's descriptions is that they draw a portrait of a faithful and warlike ruler and place this at the center of their world of values. Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, p. 61) is of the opinion that these values - especially the attribute of *kahr*- emerged as a result of the manifestation of the supreme attributes of God in the rulers. As can be seen from this and other examples, it is understood that the discourse developed on *ghaza* was used effectively in Ottoman political thought, at least during the early period. This narrative was used both in the organization of the warrior groups and in the strengthening of the dominant position of the ruler with the ties of legitimacy. However, the use of this narrative does not directly prove the existence of the phenomenon of *ghaza*, nor does it make it necessary to argue that the basic foundation of the establishment process of the Ottoman state was *ghaza*.

Tezel (2010, p. 12) argues that *ghaza* and plunder were an institutionalized process for the Ottoman expansion phase and constituted the *raison d'être* of the Ottoman state.¹⁸⁶ For this very reason, according to Tezel (2010, p. 12), the structure of Ottoman administrative and military institutions bears the traces of this reason for existence, and the values (value-orientation) and world views adopted by the executive cadres are shaped within this framework. While this proposition is largely true, it lacks a critical point. Where it is correct, as far as can be seen in the early political thought, the portrait of a warlike *ghazi*-ruler holding a sword, and moreover, with a ruthless attitude towards non-Muslims, this portrait has reached its definite limits. But what is missing is that the portrait of this warlike ruler is balanced with wise viziers, advisers, and administrators, and the need for these latter to reproduce the class domination is obvious. In this respect, it is necessary to find the Ottoman class dominance not in the *ghaza* being *raison d'être*, but in the class-vision and class-pattern being a *raison d'être*

¹⁸⁶ Behind this thesis, we can find Gibbons' (2017, p. 21) view that the Ottomans later became Muslims and this new religion gave them a reason for existence.

that dominates the *ghaza*.¹⁸⁷ In other words, I think we can talk about the Ottoman order to the extent that the reproduction of class domination can override other activities as a reason for existence. Moreover, the activity of *ghaza* needs to be limited historically as well. Tezel's generalization is not a valid and acceptable proposition for the adventure of the Ottoman state until the 19th century. For example, Pitcher (2019, p. 166) claims that the *ghaza* mission was reactivated during the reign of Suleiman I. In this framework, is there a phenomenon that disappears from time to time and then comes back, or is this an ideology that is reconstructed according to the historical context? It is unclear whether Pitcher's proposition refers to the phenomenon of *ghaza* or its ideology. In both cases, the concept of *ghaza* seems to have been largely emptied and reduced to simply meaning a war between Muslim and Christian forces.

In this framework, it is possible to make a critical commentary on the difference between the '*ghaza* discourse' and the '*ghaza* phenomenon'. Imber (2015, p. 178) makes a claim worth considering, although it is impossible to prove definitively. According to him early Ottoman writers may have preferred to reflect the events they experienced as 'raid' or 'looting' activities with the Arabic concept of '*ghaza*' in order to present them in an ideological cover. For example, Ahmedî (2018, p. 571) provides important clue about the transition between the concepts of '*akın*' (raid) and '*ghaza*' in the following couplet: "Those who support religion flowed on the unbelievers/ That's why they made the name of *ghaza* as *akin* [tm]".¹⁸⁸ When the verses of Ahmedî are examined closely, it is seen that the poet put the concept of '*ghaza*' in the center of his discourse as a norm and reflects the phenomenon of '*akın*' as a name given to '*ghaza*' among the people. But historically there is no reason why the reverse should not be true. In other words, the phenomenon and the norm itself are '*akın*', but the way this is conceptualized between ruling groups can be '*ghaza*'. In this framework, it is clear that whatever the phenomenon itself is, we are faced with a semi-autonomous and political-aesthetic connotation enriched with a '*ghaza* discourse' produced about this phenomenon. Also, the term '*ghaza*' is not always used to mean 'holy war'/'jihad'. It is quite surprising that can be seen in the *gazavâtnâme* literature that this term can also

¹⁸⁷ For a similar view, although it has shortcomings, see: Armstrong (2018, p. 118). Armstrong (2018, pp. 117-18) argues that the *ghaza* constituted a kind of *mythomoteur* for the Ottoman expansion and that the status of the state and elite could be maintained thanks to slaves obtained as booty.

¹⁸⁸ Ahmedî, couplet no: 7596. Akdoğan (couplet no, p. 6934): "Kâfir üzre ahdılar a'vân-ı dîn Andan itdiler gazâ adın ahın".

be used simply in the sense of war/conflict/armed conflict, apart from the understanding of Islamic jihad. For example, the following statements are included in the life story of a ruler named Mu'in in the *Battalnâme* (Demir & Erdem, 2006, p. 271): "Because my ancestor passed away, I took the throne. My ancestor had a brother, he was Jewish. He heard that my ancestor died. He rode, came for to make *ghaza* with me and caught me when I was unwary [tm]".

In this context, it is possible to get to the root of the problem by making a brief assessment of the political and aesthetic history of the '*ghaza*' discourse. It is obvious that the stories about hunting and armed conflicts are nearly as old as history of human communities. If the Paleolithic art is examined, for example the Lascaux cave paintings, we encounter the reflections of primitive hunting stories painted on cave walls. The history of war epics is probably as old as the history of patriarchal societies. These epics, which can be started from the story of Gilgamesh, have an almost universal prevalence, from Homeric epics to ancient Chinese heroic tales and Scandinavian myths. Arab poetry, which made exceptional progress in the 6th and 7th centuries, similarly developed a poetry style devoted to tribal wars, hunting and erotic passions (Gibb, 2017, pp. 29 ff.). The pre-Islamic Arabic poetry, known as *Mu'allaqât* poems, offers clear examples in terms of containing the points stated by Gibb (also see Yalrkaya, 1943). When we come to the Middle Ages, the anonymous works named *El Cantar de mio Cid* and *Chanson de Roland*, which are evaluated as important milestones of Western literature today, sprout within the theme as pointed out above. Cohen (1961, p. 12) summarizes the main themes in the literature of this period as follows: "Now the jongleur could sign of knightly virtues, of beauty in women, of constancy in love, and of adventure in strange lands to grasping feudal chieftains (...)". It is clear that this new oral literature is largely similar to the contemporary narratives that emerged in the Middle East. For example, Schimmel (2012, p. 24) shows that in the poem called *Poema di mio Cid*, the war between Christians and Saracens is told and the nickname of the hero of the story, Ruy Diaz de Bivar, "*sidi*" corresponds to the Arabic word "*sayyid*".

The sources where the most competent examples of similar narrative forms are found generally referred to as *gazavât nâmes*. In the past of this literary genre, as well as the 6th century Arabic poetry or the war stories that Firdevsî gave the most competent form in his *Shahname*, fantastic heroic stories such as *Hamzanâme*, *Anternâme*, *Rüstemnâme* (Sezen, 1991, p. 18) created in the oral culture and examples of which can be found in different regions. Erkan (1996) states that the first examples of this genre

appeared in Arabic literature in the 9th century and were called *megāzī*, and Vâkidî's *Kitâbü'l-Megāzī* is the most famous example of this genre. However, regardless of its origin, the emergence of these narratives as a Turkish literary genre centered on the *ghaza* discourse, especially after the 11th century, after the intensification of the Crusades in the region of Anatolia. As Bilkan (2018, p. 22) states, “the wars with the Crusaders in this period are described with a great spirit of *ghaza* in works such as *Battalnâme*, *Saltıknâme* and *Danişmendnâme* [tm]”. In this context, the factual background of the *gazavâtnâme* literature should be sought in the political-military and cultural structures that were shaped during the 8th century Byzantine-Umayyad struggle and the 11th century Crusades. Cahen (1983, pp. 115-116) draws attention to the emergence of similar narrative forms on both the Christian and Muslim sides in this historical context. For example, it is cited in the sources of the period that the Byzantine Emperor Nikephoros Phokas II found the Muslim notion of *jihād* important as a strong military motivation and that an equivalent motivation should be developed for Christianity as well (Lewis, 2021, p. 26). It is understood that another example, the Byzantine epic *Dienis Akritas*, looked at the events of the same period through the eyes of Byzantine warriors (Demir & Erdem, 2006, p. 25). The fact that there is a Byzantine vizier named “Akratis” in the *Battalnâme* and that he is seen as a kind of arch-villain that appears from time to time (Demir & Erdem, 2006, p. 169) shows that the struggle between *Akritas* warriors and Muslim *ghazis* can find reflections in the form of *gazavâtnâme*. In fact, Cohen (1961, p. 11) dates an advanced form of Western literature to the 12th century and underlines that the Crusades were the primary factor in this development. Similarly, it is seen that a literary movement in which individual war adventures, erotic elements and religious references are intensely processed in the Middle Eastern literature in the same period.

In this context, it is understood that *gazavâtnâmes* primarily focused on the Umayyad-Byzantine struggle (Demir & Erdem, 2006, p. 25), and then focused on the Crusades during and after the Abbasid period. Between these two moments, *gazavâtnâmes* about the popular resistance against the Umayyads and finally the removal of the Umayyads from power are also encountered. For example, Abu Muslim epics and *Müseyyebnâme* are examples of such *gazavâtnâmes*. In *Müseyyebnâme*, a heroic story is told in a world after the war of Karbala in which the power is tried to be taken from Yazid I and given to Zayn al-Abidin. Interestingly, this struggle is depicted as the ‘*ghaza*’ of Müseyyeb Khan and the struggles between the ‘Sunnis’ who defended

the caliphate of Ali's sons and the 'Kharijis' who defended the reign of Yazid I. In this context, Abu Muslim epics a phase in which Abu Muslim Khorasani set out against the Umayyads and contributed to the establishment of the Abbasid power. It is seen that there are such elements in the *Battalnâme*, for example, there are arguments that Yazid I 'usurped' the caliphate, committed 'betrayal for seventy-four years', did not mention the name of 'Ali' in his sermons, and that the world was filled with 'kharijis' (Demir & Erdem, 2006, p. 71). It is clear that the epics that make up the verbal content of such *gazavâtnâmes* are especially influential on the Turkmen masses and that the views close to Shiism they contain shaped the early Islamic culture and belief of the Turkmen masses. The elements of Shiite imamate theory in the subtext of *gazavâtnâmes* can thus be conveyed to the masses in the form of a popular epic.¹⁸⁹ In this context, it would be appropriate to think that the *Ahis* included Abu Muslim in their *fütüvvetnâmes* as a privileged figure, their elements of rituals converted to Bektashism, and that this collective memory was also influential in the 16th century's Qizilbash-Sunni split.

If *gazavâtnâmes* are examined more closely, for example, the work named *Battalnâme* deals with the wars in and around Malatya during the Umayyad period, while the *Danishmendnâme* describes the Turkish-Byzantine/Muslim-Christian struggle after the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 (Bilkan, 2018, p. 54), and detailed historical information are included about the wars with the Byzantine Empire in 11th and 11th century Anatolia (Bilkan, 2018, p. 50). In *Saltıknâme*, Sarı Saltuk, whose fantastic adventures are the subject, is placed in the following historical background (as cited in Bilkan, 2018, p. 53): "Sarı Saltuk is a Turkmen tribal chief, religious leader, and at the same time his Turkmen father, who had to go to Dobruca because he was loyal to the young sultan Izzaddin Keykavus II, who took refuge in Byzantium in 1263, after the sultanate of the Anatolian Seljuks under Mongol rule [tm]".

It seems that in the background of the works in the *gazavâtnâme* genre -beyond all the romance and war scenes- there is a political-cultural dialectic based on the Crusades and the resistance of the Muslim states and the people to them. The ideological processing of this historical phenomenon, that is, its acquisition of the form of a popular narrative in order to draw the peasant masses into war, must also be understood within this dialectic. The following words cited by Maalouf (2016, p. 17) in *Les croisades vues*

¹⁸⁹ For example, in *Battalnâme*, the story of Hüseyin Ghazi's encounter with a person who had the war artifacts of various prophets in a cave and whose 'time to leave has not yet come' can be given (Demir & Erdem, 2006, p. 72). This story bears traces of the belief in Twelver Imam Shiism that Muhammad Mahdi was invisible in a cave and will reappear.

par les Arabes and attributed to Saladin reveal why *gazavâtnâmes* are ideologically important: “Look at the Franks! How they fight for their religion; whereas we Muslims are not at all eager on the path of jihad [tm]”. Precisely for this reason, it can be thought that a popular literature of *ghaza* narratives, and hence the genre of *gazavâtnâme*, emerged.

The most important feature of this genre is that a single person, a hero, takes place in the center of the narrative. *Kitab-ı Husheng*, *Kahraman-ı Katil*, *Kıran-i Habesi*, *Kobad-i Ardeshir*, *Kitab-ı Darab* etc. examples of this kind can be called *gazavâtnâme* narratives, or rather warrior epics (Melikoff, 2012, p. 21). For this reason, Kivâmî’s *Fetihnâme* and Tursun Beg’s *Târih-i Ebü'l-Feth* and other chronicles, which are examples of the *gazavâtnâme* genre seen in the Ottomans, are more of the war chronicles compared to the early period of *gazavâtnâme* literature. In this context, it is necessary to consider that the *ghaza* discourse emerged in connection with the Crusades to a large extent and is loaded with religious idealism for this very reason. Since the political-literary examples of the 15th century (such as Ahmedî’s *İskendername* and *Ahval*) and the chronicles of the 15th century (Âşıkpaşazâde, Oruç Beg and Şükrullah) in which this discourse is tried to be reproduced do not have an authentic *ghaza* discourse, they should be careful about what they say about the *ghaza* phenomenon. In this period, the regions where we can think that the dialectical meaning of the *ghaza* phenomenon and ideal still continues, mostly concentrated on the Aegean Sea coast, where the struggle between the Menteşe Principality (and later Aydın Principality) and the Hospitalier Knights continued (Runciman, 2018, p. 39). After the capture of the Akka fortress by the Mamluks in 1291, the Crusader and Muslim struggle in the lands of the Eastern Mediterranean region ended in favor of the latter. As İnalçık underlined (2019), p. 747), Sanudo, one of the Latin authors in the 14th century, states that the military activities of the Crusaders should now focus on the Aegean Sea instead of the Syria-Palestine-Egypt line, that, the Papal State was taking Rhodes and the castle of Izmir and turning them into important bases for this operation.¹⁹⁰ As Baykara (1990, pp. 107-13) points out, the introduction of Enverî’s *Düstûrnâme* was devoted to the *ghazas* of Umur Beg, who was considered a famous *ghazi*-ruler in this period, and that it was

¹⁹⁰ Moreover, the focus of the Crusaders also shifted towards North Africa. While Hospitaller knights are active in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, the Moroccan and Algerian coasts are targeted by the Crusader navies led by the Portuguese and Spanish monarchies (Ivanov, 2013, pp. 1-3). See also: The letter written to Prince Korkud from the Rhodes castle and inviting Bayezid II to the *ghaza* on sea (Korkud, 2022, pp. 228-29).

mentioned in Ibn Battuta's Travel Book (Parmaksızođlu, 1981, pp. 37-39) as a devout/ generous/ valiant person who is capable of jıhad and *ghaza* show us that this region constitutes a prime example in terms of *ghaza* discourse.¹⁹¹ Moreover, in the history of Oru Beg (2011, p. 35), the mention of Umur Beg as "the person whose sainthood has been revealed [tm]" is a clear example of the mystified popularity of this figure. In this context, there was a difference of status exist between the Ottomans of the founding period and the Aydın Principality, as Barkey states (2013, pp. 79-80), in which the glory and fame of the latter predominate until the 1340s. For this reason, we can think that the story of the rise of *ghazi* Umur Beg also constitutes a model for the Ottoman chronicles to be written later. For example, Umur Beg's request for the frontier principality (*u-beyliđi*) from the Seljuk Sultan Alâeddin (Mêlikoff-Sayar, 1954, p. 46) and his start of *ghaza* activities show similarities with Osman Beg's biography. Even Âşıkpaşazâde renews the narrative of *Gazavât-ı Umur Beg*, which is alive in the memories, by conveying the Kefe island expedition made during the reign of Mehmet II in the form of 'ghaza on sea' (Apzd, 2017, p. 191).

Considering the Ottomans in particular, the marriage of Orhan Beg and Theodora, the daughter of Byzantine Emperor Kantakouzenos, practically meant a military alliance that could stop the advance of the Stefan Dušan the King of Serbia to Constantinople, thus providing a guarantee against the Crusader armies (İnalçık, 2017b, p. 13). The disappearance of this alliance came to an end when Bayezid I seized the maritime principalities operating in the Aegean Sea in 1389-1390, fortified the Dardanelles to dominate the sea routes, and built Güzelce Hisar on the Bosphorus. Since it damaged the interests of the Italian Catholic states dealing with the war, it opened the way to the Battle of Niđbolu (İnalçık, 2017b, p. 51). As İnalçık stated, Bayezid I's defeat of the Crusaders in Niđbolu led to his recognition as '*ghazi*' in the Islamic world. Because the experiences of two centuries ago showed that the Crusaders' passing into Anatolia with a large army could intensify the war on the line from Cilicia to Jerusalem and open a new phase of Crusader-Muslim struggle.

On the other hand, it should not be denied that the siege of Constantinople by the Ottomans has a critical importance in terms of the *ghaza* discourse. Especially after Murat II's siege of Constantinople, the increasing danger on Constantinople must have put the possibility of a Crusader army coming from the West into the political agenda of the Ottomans. İnalçık and Ođuz (1989, pp. 80-81) state that in 1439, Byzantine

¹⁹¹ Because there is no similar expression for Orhan Beg in Ibn Battuta.

diplomacy succeeded in making the Christian world accept the plan for the liberation of Constantinople, which was surrounded on all sides, as a Crusade plan, and they almost put Constantinople as a target instead of Jerusalem. Events such as the advance of Hunyadi János and the Battle of Varna, which increased this possibility from potential to the level of reality, led to the re-emergence of the *ghaza* discourse that we saw during the Crusades, which combines jihad with the popular resistance organized against the Crusader advance. For example, Murat II's command calling all Muslims to *ghaza* in the face of the Yanosh advance is a good example of this atmosphere. The words attributed to Murat II are as follows (İnalçık & Oğuz, 1989, p. 12): "(...) çünkü küffar-ı hakisar il ve memleketi çiyneyüb üstümüze geldi. Cemi'an ümmet-i Muhammed olanların üzerlerine farz oldu kim, bu gazaya çıkalar, şöyle kim Rumeli'de eğer atlu ve eğer yayak çomak atmağa kadir olanlar bile çıksun (...)".¹⁹² Similarly, in an Ottoman calendar dated 856 Hijri (1452/53) (Atsız, 2019, p. 212), the information that Murat II gathered the 'people of the world' and went to *ghaza* coincides with the command given above and constitutes a typical example of *ghaza* activity.

Finally, with Mehmet II's conquest of Constantinople, how the Crusaders would react became a special topic on the political agenda. The opposition of Grand Vizier Çandarlı Halil Pasha to the siege of Istanbul due to the dangers that may come from the West (İnalçık, 2017b, p. 113) is important in that it shows that the Crusader threat also created a reservation among the Ottoman officials. It cannot be ignored that Chalkokonydes, Doukas and Nicolo Barboro, who were chronic writers of this period, reproduced the discourse of a Christian-Muslim struggle in the siege of Constantinople, and that this atmosphere was also effective in the Christian world of that day in general. The fact that the Orthodox and Latin Churches were on the eve of unification in the same period must have added historical effectiveness to this discourse. Likewise, it is possible to attribute the importance of the *ghaza* discourse in the 15th century Ottoman chronicles and political thought (Âşıkpaşazâde, Tursun Beg, Oruç Beg, Şükruallah, Kivâmî, etc.) to this development line. Especially the Battle of Kosovo with the Crusaders during the Murat II period and the concern that a new Crusade might occur after the conquest of Constantinople with the importance of Mehmet II, in the final analysis, the *ghaza* discourse may have gained prevalence regardless of the

¹⁹² "(...) because vile infidels trampled on the province and the country and came upon us. It is a religious duty upon all those who were the Ummah of Muhammad to come to this *ghaza*, so that even those who were able to kick a club on horseback or on foot in Rumelia should come (...) [tm]" (İnalçık & Oğuz, 1989, p. 12).

phenomenon. As İnalçık (2017b, p. 115) points out, after the fall of Constantinople, the Papal State tried to persuade the Christian states to organize a new Crusade for almost thirty years, but the failure of this did not prevent the emergence of the *ghaza* discourse.¹⁹³

As a result, when considering the development of the Ottoman state, it should be taken into account that *gazavâtnâmes* are not considered as works that directly reflect the spirit of the period and Ottoman activity, and that the *ghaza* discourse may not directly coincide with the *ghaza* phenomenon, based on the examples of this genre written in the Ottoman period. The historical context of the idealist interpretation of *ghaza*, which was effective in the 11th century, cannot always be considered valid in the 15th century. This genre has shaped popular narratives in the periods after its emergence and continued to influence different genres/narrative forms. For example, Ocak (1992b) states that the source of many items in *Saltuknâme* is the *Battalnâme*. In the examples that were written down in the following centuries, such as the *menâkıbnâme* of Hacı Bektâş-ı Velî, there are descriptions reflecting the ideal of *ghaza*, especially about the life of Hacı Bektâş before he came to Anatolia (Ocak, 1996) and similar motifs with the *Saltuknâme* (such as burned wood thrown into Rum, entering Rum to as a form of pigeon, etc. as cited in Bilkan, 2018, p. 53)¹⁹⁴ suggests that these narratives have a common origin. For this reason, it cannot be claimed that *gazavâtnâmes* circulating in the Ottoman period directly reflect the phenomenon of *ghaza* in the 14th and 15th centuries, on the contrary, it will be possible to determine to what extent they are related to their own era, after competent philological studies. Especially the fact that the Ottomans cooperated with the Byzantine forces until the middle of the 14th century, that there were commanders and units who had not yet been Muslim, such as Köse Mihal, and that even Christian *timar* holders were present proves that the construction of the *ghaza* discourse emerged at a later period (see Beldiceanu, 2019, p. 35).¹⁹⁵ Although it cannot be denied that the *ghaza* ideology sometimes over-determines social relations, I believe that its historical context was more decisive during

¹⁹³ In the memoirs of Janissary Constantine (Beydilli, 2019b, p. 101), a conversation between Evrenosoglu İsa Beg and Mehmet II is included, and Evrenosoglu informs the ruler that the Pope is trying to organize a new Crusade.

¹⁹⁴ In this context, the wooden sword-wielding motif in the Kolu Açık Hacim Sultan's *menâkıbnâme* is another example of this type of narratives.

¹⁹⁵ On the war operations of Amedeo of Savoia and Hungarian King Layos the Great, which emerged in the second half of the 14th century and may have influenced the construction of the *ghaza* discourse, see: Vatin (2019, p. 45).

the Crusades of the 11th and 12th centuries. The adaptation of the phrase “*Battal Kattal*” which is the nickname of Battal Ghazi, in the *gazavâtnâme* of Mihaloglu Ali Beg, for Osman Beg as “*Osman-i Kattal*” (Levend, 2000, p. 253) can be given as an example of the effort to articulate the historical context and discourse. For this reason, as will be mentioned in the next sections, the phenomenon of *ghaza* in the establishment of the Ottoman administration should be considered as an example of military mobilization legitimized by Islamic ideology, which serves to gain more booty and social status. This approach does not necessarily exclude the religious motivations that the *ghaza* may contain, but merely places the possibility of determining these motivations in its historical context. On the other hand, it should also be taken into account that *gazavâtnâmes* may have a vague reflection of the freedom ideals of nomads in the face of the establishment of the Ottoman state and the institutionalization of the class order. This situation shows how the ‘*ghaza* ideal’ can gain contemporary political meanings as a retrospective reconstruction. In other words, the discourse contained in *gazavâtnâmes* can be read as an expression of interest and longing for the *ghaza* spirit of ancient times as a modern reaction rather than reflecting the *ghaza* spirit of its own age. It is possible to observe examples of such expression in Mongolian epics, as Eberhard ([1949] 2020, p. 219) points out. According to Eberhard ([1949] 2020, pp. 218-19), with the nomads’ domination and statehood over settled cultures, social classes and thus contradictions have developed, and the literary reflections of this situation have inevitably emerged:

Nomads were often unaware of this trend. Among them there has emerged a tendency to spontaneously return to the old homeland and relive the old ‘romantic’ life (eg with the Mongols). His epics describe the ideal way of life: they depict warriors conquering one country after another, savoring pleasures, and then advancing to the end of the world. [tm]

II.III.III. Social Foundations of the *Ghaza*

It is possible to consider the theses on the establishment of the Ottoman state under two main headings in terms of having an idealist and materialist approach (Ünlü, 2019, pp. 15-16). Aytekin (2015, pp. 15-17) adds an agnostic view, that is, the ‘blackhole’ discussion, to this scheme. In the final analysis, we see the following map: (a) idealist (Witteck, Köprülü, Turan), (b) materialist (Lindner, Lowry, Werner) and (c) ‘agnostic’ (Imber). While this classification is formally correct in dealing with the

literature on establishment of the Ottoman rule, it is unlikely to determine the content of the literature with an equally easy distinction. The champions of each approach, although not to the extent of Imber, actually distinguish between ‘knowable’ and ‘unknowable’ aspects according to their perspectives, relying on implicit or explicit propositions, for example, whether the ‘faith of the *ghazis*’ can be known, or whether economic impulses can be known. Moreover, many of the authors who wrote works on the subject free themselves from the obligation of making a final judgment by combining one or two of these three approaches. For example, Başkaya (2014, p. 37) uses the term ‘*ghaza*-booty ideology’ for the motivation of war in the establishment period. Moreover, Haldon (2007, p. 234) exhibits such an open-synthesis approach when he writes that the people gathered around Osman Beg are fighting “for the booty as well as for religion”. I am of the opinion that this and such synthetic approaches are not categorically wrong. We find the historical example that supports this opinion in the historian Şükrullah. In the relevant section of Şükrullah’s *Behcetü't-Tevârih*, in which he lists the ethnological characteristics of Turkish tribes, he mentions a Turkish tribe called “Rus” and states that all the work of this tribe is plunder. The author states that this tribe was intimidated and converted to Islam (Atsız, 1939, p. 26): “This was their aim from Islam, so that the booty would be halal for them [tm]”. This discourse gives a two-dimensional example on the topic because the answer to the question of whether ‘being halal’ is important for this community’s own internal structure/belief, or for other communities that impose itself on them is not clear at all. Furthermore, it is not clear whether *ghaza* or plunder is mentioned in this narrative. The paradoxical point is this: The community wants to plunder, but they care that their loots are also halal. In conclusion, what this example shows is that religious motives can easily be synthesized with economic and political motives, and it is often neither necessary nor possible to rely on a concept that over-determines all these motives. For this reason, it would be appropriate to deal with the behavior of the people of this period in a way that tries to cover various possibilities and differences, avoiding bending the rod on both sides at a sharp angle.

Although the studies of Lindner (2019, p. 419), Jennings (2019, p. 438) and Kaldy-Nagy (2019, pp. 401-2) in the literature of the establishment period of the Ottoman rule state that the *ghaza*-ideology is not a driving force, it is often stated in the early examples of Ottoman political thought that the booty *ghazis* obtained through plunder, slaves and concubines, and even boys are spoken of with pride. On the other

hand, it is possible that the word ‘*ghaza*’ in Ahmedî’s *İskendernâme*, one of the famous works of the period, reflects a literary fiction rather than a historical phenomenon (Lowry, 2003, p. 18). The fact that there are some uncertainties in terms of both the interpretation and dating of the inscription of the Şehadet Mosque in Bursa, which Wittek (2013, p. 27) put forward as evidence of the 14th century *ghaza* phenomenon (Lowry, 2003, p. 34), indicates that *ghaza* was not a current phenomenon in the early period, but Bayezid I and after him, it may be a fictive narrative to give legitimacy to the establishment period of the Ottoman rule and thus to the dynasty. An interesting contradiction of these narratives is also encountered in the differences between Ahmedî’s *Diwan* and *İskendernâme*. In his *İskendernâme*, Ahmedî (2018, pp. 567 ff.) refers to the Ottoman rulers as ‘great *ghazis*’ and describes their story as ‘*gazavâtnâme*’. On the other hand, in his poems in *Diwan*, he only mentions Murat I as ‘*ghazi* Khan Murad’ (Akdoğan, 21, VI/19) and in his praise poems to both Emir Suleyman and Çelebi Mehmet does not use concepts such as ‘*ghazi/ghaza/jihad*’, even though it is in rhetorical use.¹⁹⁶ In this case, Ahmedî either does not see the activities of these rulers as *ghaza*, or the *ghaza* discourse is not of great importance when the poems in the *Diwan* are written. In this context, although it is difficult to claim that the *ghaza* discourse is purely fiction, it is not an easy task to reveal its importance and value for its contemporaries.

On the other hand, it should be admitted that there is a certain difference between the *ghaza* discourse and the *ghaza* phenomenon. Although the Ottoman dynasty has developed a discourse of identification and legitimacy, or rather a discourse of status, about its past since the 15th century, this does not mean that a *ghazi*-like movement did not exist in its establishment period. On the contrary, it should be admitted that contradictory social practices can be placed within the concept of *ghaza*, which is perhaps a strong argument as it can contain both truth, illusion and deception. The proof of this is that collective plundering and raiding activity already existed in the Marmara region, both in the Byzantine Empire and in the Anatolian Principalities. First, it is known that there were Byzantine frontier warriors who were sent to the frontiers with a *ghaza*-like mission. Runciman (2018, pp. 36-39) evaluates Byzantine *acritas* in this status. For example, Turan (2003, p. 226) states that the *Epic of Akritas*, which is an epic about the Byzantine frontier warriors, includes the story of people who fight

¹⁹⁶ For example VI, XVI, XIX, XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII and et. all *medhals* in the *Divan*.

with the pain of getting ‘money and women’, and in this context, it could be seen that the activities in question have the same characteristics as plundering.¹⁹⁷

In the examples of early Ottoman political thought, it is clearly stated that some of the Muslim people and Tatars came to Western Anatolia and engaged in banditry and plunder. There is no reason, then, to think that at least one aspect of what we call *ghaza* might be the intensification and organization of such activities on the Byzantine frontier. One aspect that may require us to invoke the term *ghaza* here is whether the activities in question are also supported by the settled villagers, apart from the dynamic groups that already make a living from it, in which case what the sources indicate is that there is also a population that registered to the *ghaza* from the villages. As Giese points out (2019, p. 172), enrolling in the irregular cavalry regiment was appealing to adventurers, especially those who had nothing to lose, when they did not continue to be farmers and artisans. In general, these elements constitute the concrete content of the term ‘declassé’ that we use. In this context, Berkes (1969, p. 17) evaluates raiding as an economic profession, an example of ‘entrepreneurship’. Berkes’ conscious choice of the term ‘entrepreneurship’ as an historian of economics shows that in the final analysis, raiding is not a matter of general religious idealism, but rather a matter of individual economic interest.

It is a matter of serious debate in the literature whether the *ghazis* simply set out for booty or whether they act with religious motivation. Conservative historiography insists on treating the understanding of *ghaza* in the era of establishment as a ‘motivating force’ based mainly on Islamic values. This view cannot be considered completely unfounded. In the work of Johannes Schiltberger (1997, p. 164), who was held as a prisoner in the palaces of Bayezid I and Tamerlane between 1394 and 1427, after he returned to his homeland, there is a mention of a Muslim sect that has sworn not to leave any Christian alive, not to take prisoner, and not to do this for any benefit or money -and it is underlined that this sect also existed in Anatolia and went on military expeditions. But the problem lies in the fact that it is not easy to know how much of this and such judgments speak the truth.¹⁹⁸ In the literature in this context, it is stated that

¹⁹⁷ In fact, Turan (2003, p. 226) accuses the Byzantine frontier warriors of not having a “national and religious” ideal and declares them materialistic. On the other hand, he states that Turkish/Ottoman warriors have *ghaza*/alp idealism, but fails to reveal the objective difference between both military activities.

¹⁹⁸ For example, it is striking that this framework was accepted without question by authors such as Findley (1989, p. 21).

the understanding of *ghaza* is shaped entirely with Islamic motives, that is, to fulfill the *amr-i maruf*, without making any individual or collective-political distinctions, or that the motive of obtaining booty is a part of *ghaza*, but the factor that gives it its integrity is still a religious effort. Those who support the first view, ground that *ghaza* has a religious character based on the provisions of the Qur'an and underline that it was carried out because it is an order of the religion. In particular, in Surah at-Tawba verses 41, 44, 81, 86, there are the terms jihad/jahd/mujahade, which means war with non-Muslims ('infidels and hypocrites'). Based on verse 41 of Surat al-Anfal, it contains a detailed description of how the *ghaza* booty will be divided, as well as the order of *ghaza*. The fact that the catechism (*ilmihal*) studies on *ghaza* of this period regulate *ghaza* practice and *ghaza* law in a very detailed way (Dögüş, 2008, pp. 855-56) indicate that *ghaza* may be carried out with a religious motivation, as well as how plunder made with different motivations can be shared without causing internal conflict. In the examples of political thought, there is a serious difference between the ideal of *ghaza* and the phenomenon of *ghaza*. Ahmedî (2018, p. 568) defines the ideal of *ghaza* entirely within the framework of religious motives:

Bildi anı kim gazâ key iş olur/ Gâzi olanuñ haşri bî-teşvîş olur
 Gâzi olan Hak dîninüñdür âleti/ Lâ-cirem hış olasıdur hâleti
 Gâzi olan Tanğrınıñ ferrâşıdur/ Şirk çirkinden bu yiri arıdur
 Gâzi olan Hak kılıcıdur yakîn/ Gâzi olur püş ü penâh-ı ehl-i dîn
 Anı k'ola Tanğrı yolında şehîd/ Öldi sanma kim diridür ol saîd"¹⁹⁹

I think that these expressions reflect the ideal of *ghaza*, not the phenomenon of *ghaza*, and consciously construct an idealized image of *ghaza*. According to Shaw (1997, p. 25), as the Ottoman rule developed, the *ghazi* characteristics of its military power should be read as a 'theoretical' rather than a practical one. Lowry (2003, p. 21) argues that for the *ghaza* narrative in Ahmedî and Sükrullah the difference between rhetoric and truth is quite clear. While opening his book, Şükrullah (2011, p. 195) uses the expression "the helper of those who fight and struggle in the way of religion, the killer of the infidels and those who persist in evil [tm]" for the Ottoman family. Şükrullah (2011, p. 211)

¹⁹⁹ Couplet no: 7562-7566., Akdoğan (couplet no 6902-6906):

He learned that ghaza is a great activity, that the one who is ghazi/ His situation in the Judgment will be easy/ Since ghazi is the instrument of the religion of God/ Surely his condition will be pleasant/ Ghazi is the broom of the god/ Cleanses this place from blasphemy/ Ghazi is the sword of God in truth/ Ghazi is the back and shelter for the people of religion/ Do not think that he who is martyred in the way of God is dead/ That lucky person is alive.

states that Orhan Beg had no other purpose than to destroy the infidels. Moreover, Ahmedî states that Ertugrul and Osman Beg set out for the *ghaza* activity with the aim of “to kill, destroy, and cleanse the infidels completely [tm] and did not return until they completed it: “Dâr-ı küfre saldı oradan çeri/ K’iller urup öldürelər kâferi/ (...) / Ol yörede durdı birkaç vakt şâh/ Tâ kim ola kâfirün işi tebâh” (Ahmedî, 2019, couplet no: 6913 and 6916).²⁰⁰

But one more interesting example needs to be examined. The following dialogue between Mehmet II and Akşemseddin shows the ‘relative’ importance of the religious side of *ghaza*. According to Kafadar (2019, p. 167), as a result of the prolonged siege of Constantinople, it became necessary to find a solution to this situation; Akşemseddin wrote a letter to Mehmet II and said: “You know... Few people put their life and head for Allah, unless they see a booty, they throw their lives into the fire for worldly goods [tm]”. In these lines, we see in the testimony of a eyewitness that there is no *ghaza* activity that is definitively over-determined by religious motives, but on the contrary, the pursuit of booty, ironically, often easily becomes the dominant motivation. In this context, it is possible to cite a very interesting example from Tursun Beg (2013, pp. 122-23):

When the raiding regiments marched, they first reached a fortress on the Sava coast. They attacked and captured it in a short time. They sent two hundred armed men, horses and their armored infidels to the Pasha (...) The news came that 'Ten regiments are ready, there are gathered enemies'. Consultation meeting was held. Some of the *Tavica* said: "Let's neutralize the bee first, then get the honey"; Others say: 'We came in the raid, there is no need to look for enemies. Let's do our loot (...). If the enemy comes, let's fight over Turkish plunder like a hunter who fights over his prey.' This view was accepted. [tm]

With this example, we see the face of the *ghaza* motivation, especially towards the booty, but in fact, it is also seen that the theme of ‘war against the infidels’ is equally involved, and it is not quite clear which of the two motivations will over-determine the actions of the warriors until the last moment. In this respect, the intertwining of the *ghaza* ideal as both a source of political motivation and an ideological veil covering real

²⁰⁰ Couplet No: 7573 and 7576 (Ahmedî, 2018, p. 569); He sent soldiers from there to the land of the infidels/ So that they could raid the lands and kill the unbelievers /(...) /The Sultan stood in that area for a while/ Until he completely destroyed the infidels.

interests should be considered quite natural. Hocaoglu (1999, p. 149) argues that *ghaza* was not just a 'platonic passion' for the Ottomans, on the contrary, the idea of *ghaza* was both a 'political instrument and source of motivation' and a discourse that covered 'other political instruments and sources of motivation', thus he competently formulates this interpenetration.

In cases where the *ghaza* phenomenon is centered, it is clear that the term in question functions as an argument explaining the Ottoman progress. For example, Gibb (1982, p. 32) defines the Ottoman empire as the '*ghazi state*' ('Ottoman *ghazi state*'). Those who support the second view about the *ghaza* phenomenon (Öz, 2019a, p. 49; Ocak, 2014, p. 114; Shaw, 1997, p. 12) think within the framework of a general formulation that 'booty and plunder are integral parts of the *ghaza* activity, but they are not devoid of spiritual content'. Referring to the primary sources, Oruç Beg (2011, p. 20) has brought both elements together in the closest way, describing the Ottomans as both zealous on the path of religion and 'gathering the goods of the *ghazi* and spending it in the direction of Allah'. Although this is a reasonable view, it is unclear how Divitçioğlu will take his position against the proposition that the *ghazi* and the Alps are separate social groups. While Âşık Paşa describes the Alps in *Garibnâme*, he could only move on to religious elements after counting all the material elements of sword, arrow, bow, lover and horse - which indicates a certain order of priority.

What this view overlooks are the history, which is full of examples of the Janissaries who insisted on going on an expedition as the expectation of booty diminished, or the capture of castles that could not be besieged for months within hours after giving permission to loot, are not possible to put it in a 'spiritual' sheath as it goes into details. For example, Kafadar (1996) draws attention to the fact that *ghazi* is defined as a profitable activity like trade and agriculture in his work called *Gazilik Tarîkası*, which was written in Karesi Principality. The countless size of the loot obtained during this period may explain why the economic aspect of *ghaza* activity should be taken into account. It is possible to briefly determine the amount of booty in question through two examples. When the Pulunya fortress in Rumelia was captured during the reign of Murat I, so many gold and silver trays and utensils were found that the *ghazis* wore them on their heads and had fun (Apzd, 2017, pp. 67-68). Secondly, in the war with the King of Hungary during the reign of Bayezid I, the unit of Umur Beg, the son of Timurtaş, took more than two thousand prisoners, and according to Âşıkpaşazâde (2017, p. 73), there was no one left without slaves in Rumelia and Anatolia. A poem in Âşıkpaşazâde (Kala,

2013, p. 102) clearly exemplifies what a great hedonistic motivation is for *ghazis* to get booty: “Gaziler geçti kafir mülküne hoş/ Nice kafir sarayın ettiler boş/ Çün Rum iline geçti Müslüman/ Gaziler ibriği hep oldu mevcuş/ Gümüş altın çok oldu ellerinde/ Melaletleri oldu cümle bi-hoş”.²⁰¹

A third view argues that *ghaza* activity should ultimately be placed on an economic basis. Divitçioğlu (1996, pp. 44-48), who is the most effective name defending this view, divided the raiders into three as *ghazi*, Alp and Turkmen begs and accepted the religious rituals of the *ghazi* sect and placed all three on the economic plan. Lowry (2006, p. 47) similarly distinguishes between ‘*ghazi*’ and ‘*akıncı*’, defines the ‘*akıncı*’s out of religious motivation and explains the Ottoman expansion with reference to the military activities of the raiders (*akıncıs*) with the direct aim of collecting booty. Moreover, Quataert (2005, p. 16) thinks that the economic nature of the motivating factor outweighs the fact that Greek and Armenian non-Muslims are also involved in looting activities. With a similar understanding, Kafadar (2019, p. 153) states that the terms ‘*jihad*’ and ‘*ghaza*’ are carefully separated from each other and that ‘*ghaza*’ has the meanings of ‘expedition to a foreign land’ or ‘plundering raid’ in the final analysis. Lowry (2003, p. 19), rejecting the *ghaza* proposition completely, evaluates raids for plunder and slavery not within the tradition of *ghaza*, but within the tradition of pre-Islamic Turkish-Mongolian tribes, conquest and plunder. While Barkan (1943, p. 349) and İnalçık (2010a, p. 43, 2016, p. 200) accept the *ghaza* thesis, they think that migration and demographic factors should be examined in a way that can explain this thesis. The search for an explanation of the *ghaza* thesis with non-religious factors or a shift of emphasis to the economic field arises for several reasons. First of all, we can see that the discussions about the origin of the Ottoman dynasty influenced the *ghaza* thesis. For example, H. A. Gibbons suggested that Osman I might have come from a non-Muslim origin, and again G. Kaldy-Nagy questioned the validity of the Islamic motivation thesis, noting that the members of the Ottoman dynasty did not take Islamic names in the early period.²⁰² Lindner’s (1983, pp. 4-5) critique of *ghaza* ideology was based on the fact that Christians played a role in Ottoman rule in the early period and the Ottomans attacked Muslim lands. The fact that Karacahisar, one of the first places captured by the Ottomans, belongs to the Germiyan Principality is an example of this

²⁰¹ Ghazis passed happily to infidel property/ They emptied palaces of many infidels / Because Muslims passed to Rumelia/ The pitcher of the Ghazis is *mevcuş*/ They have a lot of silver and gold in their hands/ It was totally weird that they even got bored.

²⁰² See: Gibbons (2017, p. 21) and Cide (2015, pp. 272-78).

situation. In this respect, the fact that the Ottoman army acted together with the Christian vassal forces on the way to the expedition and did not insist on spreading Islam in the captured region, on the contrary, considering the provision of booty, taxation and land regime sufficient, constitutes important contradictions in placing the concept of *ghaza* on a religious plan.

It is highly doubtful to what extent the idea of *ghazis* uncompromising struggle with non-Muslims reflects the truth in the framework of the political thought of the establishment period -examples of which can be found in Ahmedî and Şükrullah. Lowry (2003, p. 21) states that the classical *ghazi* portrait does not leave unbelievers a choice but to convert to Islam or die, but it is not possible to reduce Ottoman politics to this dichotomy. Because the Ottoman administration neither forced Bithynian Christians to be converting in Islam nor subjected them to the *jizya* tax during its establishment, it simply left the religion issue open-ended (Öz, 2019a, p. 53). But it is clear that Öz's argument was valid for a very short period of Ottoman rule. As far as we can follow from Âşikpaşazâde, the practices of rentier relations gain extraordinary importance in a short time and constitutes an important basis for the institutionalization of the class domination in Ottoman society. Werner (2019a, p. 131) rightly points out that at this stage the Sunni *ulama* tradition became dominant and it was not the Islamization or enslavement of new subjects but their transformation into tax-paying subjects.

Kafadar argues that such examples should be understood in terms of relations such as an existing cohesion between *ghaza* and Islamic belief and practice rather than a contradiction and even law of neighbors-minority law. Kafadar (1996) underlines that both the Ottomans and other principalities continue their military/commercial/cultural relations with the Christian population around them, and that there is a certain common life practice within the framework of the principles of "*müdara*" and "*istimâlet*" even if the idea of *ghaza* is effective. It should be noted that this framework formulated by Kafadar also has some problems. Whether we take *ghaza* as a regular form of warfare or as an act of looting arbitrarily carried out by the declassé elements of society shows that we need a real historical distinction, not a nominal recognition. It is doubtful that details such as the fact that non-Muslims could continue their existence while the *ghaza* activities were going on, that there were Christian soldiers in the *ghaza* armies, and that, for example, Murat I went on a campaign with the Byzantine Emperor Ioannes I, could only fit within the framework of two concepts such as '*müdara*' and '*istimâlet*'. Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, p. 75) advises the sultan as such: "Whether they are male or

female, make an effort and try to eliminate infidels, a hypocrites, blasphemers, all of them [tm]”. It is not easy to fit this advice into the two categories presented above. However, a careful distinction must be made here. As Şeyhoğlu asserts, this situation expresses what the ruler should do if he wishes to treat the God with the title of “*kahr*”. This is the underlying meaning of the argument “Whoever wants to protect his country, he has to persecute, use force and execute [tm]” (Şeyhoğlu, 2013, p. 76). Naturally, within this framework, we can assume that the attribute of '*kahhar*' may not be just a personal preference of the ruler, but rather has a more institutional basis as a part of the threat of terror/intimidation that makes itself felt on non-Muslims from time to time. However, it will be evaluated in the following sections that this threat can easily find an effective application area on the Muslim masses who oppose the social order.

Some features of Islamic law and practice that Kafadar and Cide (2015, p. 280) focus on do not directly explain why *ghaza* was not ‘radical enough’ in the early Ottoman period -for example, Muhammad’s signing of a joint defense agreement with the Jews in Medina or the presence of Christian elements in the Islamic army in the Buwayb Incident that took place during the reign of Caliph Omar. The concept of ‘*müdâra*’ comes from the Arabic root means as ‘to deceive’, and it indicates to be patient and smiling in front of those who give trouble to him (Çağrıç, 2020). The meaning that Kafadar means here actually settles into the background, depending on a kind of Ottoman tolerance and multiculturalism. Because he reinforces this concept with sub-concepts such as ‘commercial relations’, ‘cultural communication’ and ‘neighborhood relations’. But I think that the term has both moved away from its original meaning and lost the explanatory capacity it promised in the context of *ghaza*. In political thought examples, which can be seen as evidence to the contrary, references on neighborhood are encountered. For example, Ahmedî (2018, p. 346) states that being hostile to one’s neighbor has no place in tradition and that anyone who breaks the neighbor’s heart will be excluded from religion. According to an anecdote in Âşıkpaşazâde, Osman Beg was asked, “Why do the unbelievers of Bilecik have respect for you? [tm]” and the answer to the question “They are our neighbors [tm]” is a similar example (Apzd, 2017, p. 26). But both examples should be interpreted with caution. In the first example, Ahmedî speaks not simply of a neighborhood relationship, but of the peaceful cooperation of different rulers, because if thrones and crowns begin to fall, ultimately the dominion of the overthrower will no longer exist: “Fûr senden kem degüldi lîki baht/ Andan alup saña viridi tac u taht/ Girü ol tâcı vü tahtı bi-gümân/ Senden

alup ayruga virür cihân”²⁰³. In the second example, it can be understood that Osman Beg was in mutual solidarity with his ‘neighbors’, saying “When we came to this country as immigrants, they welcomed us, now even we need to respect them [tm]” (Apzd, 2017, p. 26). At the end of the day, when the ‘neighborhood scorecard’ of the Ottomans is examined, it should be added that it is not possible to come across any neighbors to whom the Ottoman sword has not been drawn. For example, Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, p. 134) reveals this attitude in the first step by saying, “If you have an infidel neighbor, you must also have a warlike frontier lord/vizier [tm]”;

If the [ruler's] country is bordered by a land of infidels, it is very necessary and obligatory to have a pious (...) manly and single frontier mind working for Islam. Here, the ruler should give the country's affairs to that lord who does not rest day and night and does not show slack in his work, with a great timar and unlimited soldiers. He must make many raids on the enemy and strike the sword. [tm]

Moreover, if it is examined in the general historical pattern, it can be seen that the ruling classes did not have a firm determination to stick to the legal-traditional frameworks when it comes to the reproduction of their class positions. Because class domination requires the operation of a dynamic social process, and the ruling classes often prefer the leadership of the development of the material world to formalism. The most obvious example of this is the establishment of money *waqfs* that seem forbidden by religion. Based on this, as Köprülü (2005c, p. 35) determined, the fact that the Ottomans prioritized customary law rather than the abstract systematic of Islamic law, despite being Muslims, constitutes an important example in this context. Contrary to what Köprülü (2005c, p. 35) emphasizes, the reason for this should not be sought only in the public interest nor in what is called the old Turkish state tradition. Kılıçbay (2010, pp. 296-97) argues that a particular Islamic tax system and land regime are not included in the primary sources of religion, and that the Islamic tax system was adapted from the laws of the countries captured as a result of Arab expansion. This feature is not only valid for the states that came after the ‘golden age’ of Islam, on the contrary, examples of this can be seen in the first social formation in which Islam developed. For example, it is possible to encounter such contradictions in the practices of the period of the

²⁰³ Couplet no: 4574-4574 (Ahmedî, 2018, p. 344). Ahmedî (2019, couplet no: 4573-4574): Fur was not inferior to you, but fortune/ He took the crown and the throne from him and gave it to you/ Without a doubt, the world takes that crown and throne from you and gives it to someone else.

prophet Muhammad. As Özalp (2017, p. 27) states, while the sale of ‘non-existent’ things is considered invalid in Islamic law, it is a fact that Muhammad accepted the uncultivated products of the Khyber gardens as a worth and made a contract on them. In this case, it is necessary to accept that Islamic practices and *fiqh* theory have already developed within the framework of historical requirements and needs, and that they are not and cannot be as formalistic as it is thought.

In this framework, the point where the discourse and phenomenon of *ghaza* converge is the problem of the particular interests of the ruling classes and their articulation with the general interests (local ruling classes, strata and producers), that is, the issue of ensuring the social order in a way that can also obtain consent. We see examples of this situation in the *ghaza* stories of Melik Danishmend. According to Kafadar (2019, p. 129), in the *Danishmendnâme*, there are events in which 'apostates' were forgiven after they were together with the *ghazis* for a while, who converted to their old religion and organized raids on Muslims. It is not possible to make sense of such examples within the framework of Islamic orthodoxy, leaving aside real-political requirements.

Finally, I think it is possible to put forward a more synthetic view on *ghaza* compared to the above-mentioned views. In this respect, it would be appropriate to count the search for social status among the motivations of the elements participating in the *ghaza*.²⁰⁴ While Jorga (2009a, p. 403) argues that the frontier wars that took place in this framework were carried out by people who seek honor and booty, he emphasizes that the phenomenon of seeking status should be evaluated together with the motivation to gain booty. For example, the following poem in the introduction to the anonymous work of the first half of the 15th century, titled *Gazavât-ı Sultan Murad bin Mehemmed Han* (İnalçık & Oğuz, 1989, p. 1), reflects the quest for status quite well: “Murad olan bu fani dehr içinde/ Eyü namile şöhrettir cihanda/ Gaza vü cehd ile buldu eyü nam/ Ana manend kim ola kim zamanda”.²⁰⁵

In this framework, it seems possible for both declassé social elements participating in the *ghaza* and different social strata (for example, vassals or tribal leaders) to improve their social status through *ghaza*. If we evaluate it within this

²⁰⁴ For example, Cohen (1993, p. 70) states that the Fulani clans in Nigeria synthesized the “cultural and religious superiority” of the nomads under the understanding of jihad and established dominance over the villages which participated in agricultural production.

²⁰⁵ “*Murad*(end) in this mortal world that is/ Fame with good reputation in the world/ Ghaza and struggle found good reputation/ Who will be equal to him at what time.

framework, there may be several different reasons for the *ghazi* groups to seek social status through *ghaza* activities. First, it can be assumed that after the declassé elements return to their tribe or village, their status within their own community will rise due to both the loot they have obtained and their war experience. It is clear that this status change can be supported by the acquisition of higher quality war tools such as swords, shields, helmets, and the comradeship ethos of other *ghazis* with whom they showed solidarity during the *ghaza*. Moreover, it seems possible for *ghazis* to take a leading position in their own communities due to the status they have achieved, or to be included in leading families by establishing marriage ties. Furthermore, the *ghazis*, who contributed to the struggles of frontiers and made a name for themselves, were recognized as vassals by the Ottoman family and rewarded with *mülks* or *timars*, and thus they could pass to a new social status in which they both seize the rent of lands ranging from a few villages to a wide region and continue their military activities in this region. In the letter of Suleyman Pasha to Orhan Beg, published by Ebul'ula Mardin (2006, p. 98), there are details pointing to such situations: In this letter, Suleyman Pasha stated that he would continue the raids after giving enough *ulûfe* and *timar* to the warriors and arranging registers. A document in the Bursa Qadi registers published by İnalçık (1981, p. 70) presents an example of an announcement stating that people who want to gain loot and *timar* should join the army with their weapons.

In any case, it is the possibility of vertical-mobilization at stake. The following poem by Âşıkpaşazâde expresses this situation quite well (Kala, 2013, p. 169): “Tatar bulamazdı ayran içeydi/ Derelere dağ ü hem yayan göçeydi/ Sürüldü geldi akın beyi oldu/ Kafir kızını gözedir kim kapaydı”²⁰⁶. In these lines, there is a motif of status increase and even advancement in class schema, as well as an overtly male-dominated sexual motivation exist. For example, in Mihaloglu Ali Beg’s *gazavâtname*, the religious sublimity of *ghaza*, the abundance of booty, and the attractiveness of sexual satisfaction constitute the dominant elements that are constantly pointed out (Levend, 2000, pp. 269, 277, 316, et al.). In addition to these, it is possible to add an increase in status within the religious discourse. This motivation based on the ideal of martyrdom, that is, a symbolic image of exclusivity, may have been effective in directing the declassé social elements to *ghaza*. The fact that there are elements in the Islamic belief such as that martyrs will go directly to heaven, according to popular belief, they can intercede for

²⁰⁶ Tatar could not find *ayran* to drink/ He used to migrate over streams and mountains by foot/ He was exiled, then he became a raid master/ He cares now who will snatch the infidel girls.

the forgiveness of people they know, and that they will have the highest rank in the sight of God after the prophets, may have strengthened this motivation. However, the belief that martyrs will enter heaven directly cannot be considered completely independent of male-centered depictions of heaven (infinite sexual power, houris and *gilmans*, etc.). In this respect, it is clear that all four elements, consisting of booty, status, religious enthusiasm and sexual fantasies, are the founding elements of *gazavâtnâme* texts. In the final analysis, it becomes clearer that these elements are a part of the patriarchal power schema and should be evaluated within the framework of patriarchal ideology construction.

The possible situations that I have emphasized so far have been experienced quite frequently in terms of the declassé social elements participating in the *ghaza*. But the actors outside them and in the upper reaches of the social strata, -for example, local landowners, vassals, nomadic clan leaders, etc.- participated in the *ghaza* activities with a larger military force and, if they showed usefulness, they could expand their territory and give their sons *mülks*, *timars* or *yurtluks* in new places. Moreover, it is known that these groups were rewarded with symbolic gifts such as *hilat*, sword and fur by the Ottoman family and strengthened their social status. Furthermore, it has been historically determined that ingenious *begs* who had made enough names were accepted into the Ottoman family, were appointed as state officials and obtained *zeâmet*s. Thus, they improve their social status and can rise to the highest positions that can be reached after the royal family. As a result, small combatant groups, whether they came from declassé groups or from the circles of the ruling classes, were able to hold short-term power in the aforementioned period, and even “enjoy glory and fame for a period ranging from fifteen days to fifteen years [tm]” (Kafadar, 2017, p. 66).

As Imber (2019a, p. 60) points out, it is interesting that some reflections of Wittek’s *ghaza*-thesis also manifest themselves in Marxist historiography. In Marxist interpretations, *ghazi*-idealism is presented either as a reflection of the material structure of an egalitarian society or as the moral purity of a classless society. In Kızılcımlı’s history thesis, the proposition of the egalitarianism of the blood-bound tribal society and some romantic interpretations on the common land ownership of a pure Islamic faith seem to come together and merge into the *ghaza* narrative. Thus, *ghazis* are seen as those who ‘clear’ corrupt class domination and establish common land ownership

(the *mîrî* lands belonging to *Bayt-ul Ma'lul-Muslimin*).²⁰⁷ The existence of ethical codes developed by *ghazi* groups within the framework of the social stratum they belong to, the kinship relationships they have emerged from or the war-comradeship cannot be denied. But these codes did not directly lead to the re-establishment of the communitarian mode of production, nor did they guarantee the 'moral' purity of the newly established state. On the contrary, the members of the *ghazi* groups were concerned with the sale of the people in the areas they flocked to as slaves, the appropriation of their assets as loot and the right to gain ground rent by increasing their personal social status.

II.III.IV. State, Ottoman Dynasty and The Ghazis

When the historical sources of this period are examined, the social actors that involved in *ghaza* are often seen as both beneficial and troublesome by central governments/monarchies. It is possible to think that the framework presented by Kafadar and Cide corresponds to a regime in which the *ghazi* elements are limited and ruled by state power, but the reality is often not suitable for this picture. For example, of Nizam'ül-Mülk (2018, p. 147) states that the Turkmen groups, who were fed up with their demands and rebellions for the period in which he lived, made great efforts to help the establishment of the state. It is not surprising that this expression is also valid for the establishment period of the Ottoman Empire. The benefit of the *ghazis* is possible if they take on a function which finds its place in social stratification and class relations.

Indicated function and its limits can be observed, for example, in the political history of Danishmenids, with its negative aspect. According to Wittek (2019, p. 37), the fact that the institutional structure of the Danishmenids, one of the foremost of the 'ghazi states', was quite weak -that is, the class relations and social stratification could not be developed at a level to control the *ghazis*- resulted in its inability to survive despite all the *ghaza* activities. As a result, it is a very valid argument that declassé social elements threaten the social order politically and economically. Firstly, they can damage the political organization of formal unity due to their military power and systematically reduce the government's access to taxes -that is, the amount of rent it receives- due to the increase in the population leaving agricultural production. If we

²⁰⁷ On the other hand, the principle of private property is essential in Islamic law. The relationship between the formation of *Bayt al-Mal* and the commercial activities in Haramayn and the reproduction of the social order should also be examined.

consider the society in the establishment period of the Ottoman Empire as a homogeneous society, these two items will be sufficient to explain the threat posed by the declassé groups. However, if we consider that the Ottoman rule was a class order divided into various horizontal and vertical divisions, we can easily grasp how the *ghaza* policy should be limited from the point of view of the ruling classes. In fact, this role, undertaken by the state and the dynasty itself, should be accepted as one of the founding principles of the Ottoman rule. An interesting example can be cited at this point. Frontier lords of Rumelia (especially *Evrenosoglu* and *Mihaloglu* families) affiliated to the Ottoman state, although they had more military power and land than many small-scale Balkan princes, did not revolt and attempt to establish their own principalities on borders (Kunt, 2015, p. 26).²⁰⁸ This phenomenon pointed out by Kunt should be particularly addressed. The legitimacy and prestige of these lords, who organized the *ghaza*/raid/looting activities, in the eyes of the Balkan peoples, do not reach a level that would support their pursuit of independence. If the noble families of Anatolia are examined, having a small fortress or castle often provides sufficient motivation to act independently and can easily lead to alliance relations with alternative rulers. In other words, raider lords of Rumelia lack the legitimacy bases that can establish a permanent domination over the local people because they were plundering, and they were open to the invasion of regular armies that may come from the central Europe. Precisely for these reasons, ensuring the personal influence of these frontier lords and reproducing the local social order depend on the interventions of another power -the Ottoman administration- that can restrain the plundering actors. The same is true for the relations between the *ghazis*/raiders and the urban groups. The Ottoman administration should keep the *ghazis* away from the ruling classes within the borders as much as they use them to gain land. It is possible to identify an interesting example of *People's Crusade* where this function could not be fulfilled, when the declassé groups who went to the 'holy war' during the First Crusades looted and massacred Jewish property in the cities of Mainz and Worms. As a result, the organization of the *ghaza* and its control within the class order constitute one of the main duties of the state.

²⁰⁸ Sariyannis (2019, p. 29) claims that families such as *Evrenosogullari* and *Mihalogullari* carried out their own conquest movements in Rumelia and that their vassal relations with the Ottoman palace were "nominal". Considering the prevalence of feudal relations in early Ottoman society, this determination can be accepted as correct. On the other hand, the existence of declassé groups transferred from Anatolia to Rumelia or ready to be transferred constitutes another factor that prevents these feudal families from being completely independent.

A phrase narrated from Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî in Şemseddin Ahmet el-Eflâkî's book *Menâkibü'l Ârifîn* summarizes the attitude of the settled ruling classes against the declassé groups quite well: Rum servants should be preferred if construction is desired, Turkish workers should be preferred if demolition is desired, because it is stated that "the construction of the world is reserved for the *Rums*, and the Turks are flawed by destroying the world" (as cited in Kafadar, 2017, p. 90). In this framework, *ghazis* became a source of legitimacy to the extent that they were able to manage this problem, as well as being a threat to the Ottoman government in domestic political sphere. In this respect, the protection of Muslim and Christian landowners, city residents and merchants from the attacks of these declassé groups constitutes an important step for the establishment of the Ottoman rule. On the other hand, Celâleddîn-i Rûmî's use of the term 'dead people riding on the living ones' in his *Masnavi* for political administrators shows us that this urban stratum of the settled classes is quite conscious of their own interests. They know how to protect their interests from both declassé groups and tax officials. The necessity of protecting the cities from the declassé groups is not limited to the pressure of the *ghazis*, the same problem should be considered for *sûfi* groups that can be evaluated in a similar social stratum. When the issue is approached in this way, it becomes easier to understand why the *ghazis* could fight together with the Christians and why the conquered areas were not forcibly Islamized, and Christian property and lands were not touched in some areas. It is a question of social formation, and it is mainly a matter of maintaining and developing social stratification in favor of the ruling classes. For example, Lindner (2019, p. 420) states that early sources are full of examples of close relations between the Ottomans and Christians, and that some Christian groups preferred Ottoman rule to Byzantine rule. It is possible to come across examples of conservative historiography in which this phenomenon is interpreted as a general rule and linked to an Islamic notion of justice. The emergence of social harmony and peace -according to this interpretation- seems like evidence of the superiority of Islam over Christianity in the core of even Byzantine Christians' preference for Islamic rule. Looking at the matter in this way, the idea that the *ghazis* are struggling with religious motivations will outweigh. Thus, a look at the establishment period of the Ottoman Empire in Islamic terms would be valid in a way that would enable a holistic worldview; a Muslim tribe's world domination through *ghaza* vica versa Islam's superiority over unbelief. However, I think the main issue is how the *ghazis* are restrained, rather than whether they act with religious motives or

not. Because the Ottoman state was not simply a tribe, it had a rather complex structure under its rule, which consisted of *tekfurs*, cities, marketplaces, mines, *yürük* tribes, non-Muslims, free farmers, mercenaries, slaves and *timar* holders etc. Within this structure, the social segment dealing with ‘*ghaza*’ most likely remains a warrior minority, while peasants, nomads and urban dwellers constitute the basic pillars of the social regime.

The religious motives inherent in the *ghaza* discourse, rather than having the features that inviting people to *ghaza* -because it is possible, perhaps even easier, to call to *ghaza* with economic motives- to the sharing of goods, the protection of military targets and places/sections that will not be included in the war, and the political leadership can force other social segments to accept its own subordination -such as manifesting Ottoman Dynasty as leader of the *ghazis*. In this respect, one branch of political thought emphasizes the *ghazi* character of the Ottoman dynasty and tries to strengthen its authority over the *ghazis*, while on the other hand, it tries to protect the property relations of different social segments against the *ghazis* by highlighting the provisions of Sharia and the madrasah culture. It is possible to test whether these measures are sufficient due to the establishment of a central army under the command of Orhan Beg in the first step. In this regard, in the work of İdrîs-i Bitlisî named *Heşt Behişt*, there is information that the number of infantrymen gathered from the people increased and they started to behave ‘misdeed’ (Palmer, 2019, p. 503). In the book titled *Mebde-i Kanuni Yeniçeriyân*, the criticism of irregular military units is as follows (Sakin, 2011, p. 162): “(...) since these were temporary servants, it was certain that they would do the service with the tip of their hands. On the other hand, after the expedition, when their duty was finished, they were persecuting and hurting the people on the way back to their homeland [tm]”. In these lines, it is not difficult to see that the problems of a general discipline and military competence are put at the center in terms of social order. Another possibility for the emergence of the Janissaries may be attributed to the fact that the surrender of the city garrisons to a centralized army -rather than the *ghazi* origin warriors, raiders and tribal soldiers- was found more convenient for the settled classes. For example, a Janissary named Constantine states in his memoirs that Bayezid I filled his castles with soldiers of devshirme origin (Beydilli, 2019b, p. 37).²⁰⁹ Thus, by

²⁰⁹ In the sections of the text that deals with the formation of the Ottoman state in general (Beydill, 2019, p. 103), the following statement is included; “The sultan holds all the castles of himself in the whole country and places his janissaries or novice boys as guards there. He confines them to himself, and no one can give even a single castle to a lord without his will

the time of Bayezid I, it is understood that a new structural factor had emerged that affected the development of the Janissaries. As Imber (2002, p. 14) states, the formation of the Ottoman army shows a completely different character compared to the past, it includes Byzantine forces, Serbs, Bulgarians and Albanians.

It is not always a wise choice to have the troops sent by the Christian forces under Ottoman rule and the *ghazis* to fight together. For this reason, the need for a military formation, especially of devshirme origin and affiliated with the Ottoman dynasty, grows and as can be seen in most battles, this group is placed in the center of the army in a way that isolates the different forces on the flanks. Another reason is that if such a force were sent to the Anatolian Principalities, it would not be as persistent as the religiously motivated *ghazis*. The existence of a professional army is essential for such struggles, where the expectation of loot is low and does not comply with the religious war principle. For example, the Timurid invasion clearly showed that both the former principality soldiers and the non-Muslim vassal soldiers could turn against the Ottomans. Soldiers who used to serve the Anatolian principalities changed sides at a decisive moment in the Battle of Ankara, and the presence of Christian soldiers opened the door to questioning the legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire. As Kafadar (2017, p. 59) states, the historian Nizâmeddin Şâmî, who was under Tamerlane's patronage, in his work named *Zafernâme*, describes the soldiers that he met with the term '*Efrenc*' (Franks) and most probably belonged to the troops of King of Serbia, while actually questioning the Islamic faith of the Ottoman army.²¹⁰ Let us note that a similar questioning arose because Bayezid I left the management of the Izmir port to Christians (Zachariadou, 2019, p. 349). On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the Janissaries and the Serbian soldiers of Lazerevic faithfully sided with Bayezid I (Lowry, 2003, p. 25).

It is possible to find one of the lines of articulation-separation between the Ottoman dynasty, the state and the *ghazis* at a special point where cultural-economic-political areas intersect. This point is generally related to the distribution of rent incomes in a way that reproduces class domination. Kılıçbay (2000, p. 24) states that social

[tm]". Thus, it is possible to think that this administrative practice, which is based on *Kapıkulu army*, is a general trend.

²¹⁰ However, as Manz (1998, p. 26) states, the 'accusation' of the army being non-Muslim seems to be directed at each other by both sides. We encounter a similar accusation in Şikârî. One of the tribesmen from Turgud, named Ali, asked Murat I, "Does the Muselman gather infidel soldiers? [tm]" (Şikârî, 2011, p. 209).

phenomena such as *alps/nökers/ghazis* are the phenomena that emerged after the dissolution of kinship communities because they needed the masses behind the war chiefs for the country and the booty. In this respect, the monarch's access to wealth and its redistribution through bestowal should be seen as a politics of articulation with feudal powers. Ahmedî (2018, p. 653) places this notion in political thought with the formula that “the fund of principality is to seizure and its ornament is to give what it has received [tm]”.²¹¹ Moreover, according to Ahmedî (2018, p. 653), the establishment of power is possible by taking it from where it cannot be taken and giving it to a place where it cannot be given. The meaning of words like this enigma is essentially clear. According to the social hierarchy, a bottom-up flow of money, goods and services is considered natural, and in order for this flow to turn into political articulation, a kind of patronage network must be established from the top down.²¹²

In this context, it can be seen that examples of political thought seriously consider the gift policy of the ruler. For example, before his death, Osman Beg advises his son (Apzd, 2017, p. 41) to keep good relations with those who obey him, to bestow favors on his *nökers*, and likens bestowal to a trap. The analogy of a trap in this context is very meaningful because it means that bestowal will attract the *nökers* and ensure their devotion. Similarly, Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, p. 134) draws a very broad framework of this issue, according to which the ruler should recognize the status of the frontier lords, please them, visit, bestow and gain their trust. It should be noted that in these statements, the relations between the *ghazi* groups and/or their commanders and the ruler are not depicted as an absolute subordination relation. While the ruler was advised to get along with these groups and ensure their loyalty, the connection established with these groups was placed in a financial framework that also had ethical aspects. Within this framework, while the cooperation in war activities constitutes the strongest of the ethical ties, the distribution of goods obtained after the war activities and the effective role of the ruler in the distribution of social status correspond to the obligatory functions in the establishment of the ties of feudal subordination.

²¹¹ Couplet No: 8690., Ahmedî (2019) Couplet no: 8024-8025: “Begligün almah-durur ser-mâyesi/ Alduğın virmek-durur pîrâyesi”.

²¹² “Virmeh-ile olur kavî püşt-i sipâh/ Virmeyince kimse olmaz pâdişâh/ Her ki virmege bulamaz dest-res/ Pâdişahlığa iremez bir nefes” Couplet No: 5634-5635. Ahmedî (2019), Couplet No: 5634-5635., Also see: Ahmedî (2018, p. 422)

II.III.V. Ottoman Dynasty and Other Social Actors

Faroqhi (2004, p. 13) defines the ‘Ottoman elite’ or ‘Ottoman ruling group’, and includes viziers, treasurers, provincial administrators (*sancakbeyis*), Janissary officers, *timar* and *zeâmet* holders, qadis and muftis, and even sheiks of urban *sûfi* orders. However, this group should not be seen as an absolute ruler who can take and implement all decisions. On the contrary, the class privileges of this group also depend on their negotiations and articulations with various social segments, from simple producers to urban social strata, from Christian feudal groups to dervish groups, and this structure also determines the paths of intra-class struggles within the ruling class. In this context, it can be quite misleading to focus only on the warrior-*ghazi* population and their direct influence when considering the establishment period. As Jennings stated (2019, p. 440), one of the main missions of the Ottoman administration was to take care of “the inhabitants of the large number of towns and villages on which the early state was built” in a context where a certain part of the population was composed of towns and villages. During the establishment period of the Ottoman administration, it was an important domination strategy to protect the lands, market places, cities producing mines and handicrafts and to develop alliances with the social strata here. It can be hypothetically said that the social segments that the Ottomans encountered during the expansion period and that they have not yet dominated or could not yet dominate, will tend to maintain and even develop their own status and class relations due to the nature of social stratification. The Ottomans, on the other hand, were naturally not in favor of alternative domination zones on their borders that could pose a military threat to them or from which the population could flee. The social contradiction that arises in this case becomes manageable by the destruction of each other by both powers or by the fact that one of them continues to exist under the domination of the other, in a vassal or similar status. Barkey (2013, p. 9) argues that the power established in this context is an alliance with local elites, an institution that has been negotiated. Togan (2000, p. 65) states that the Ottoman dynasty used both power accumulation and power sharing mechanisms skillfully. Within this framework, the Ottoman dynasty developed alliance relations with the *tekfurs* around it, made them vassals in return for paying taxes, and attempted to seize their castles and lands in case they resisted. For example, during the reign of Murat I, the Byzantine Empire, Kingdoms of Bulgaria and Serbia were turned into vassal states, and during the reign of Bayezid I, the Karamanid Principality accepted the Ottoman superiority and was subject to taxation after the 1387 War (Imber, 2002, p.

11). In the Balkans, such vassalage relations developed much earlier and developed gradually. İnalçık (1954, p. 171) states that in Bosnia, Albania, Macedonia, Serbia and Thessaly, the local chivalry class was not abolished, on the contrary, the old seigneur class gained the status of timariot *sipâhî*. In this respect, the administration, which tries to gain the support of the people with the practice of *istimalet*, also pursues a strategy of articulation with the existing ruling classes. Essentially, marriage or military alliances were formed with legitimate Christian rulers during the early period in order to establish dominance over Christian peasants and to place territorial expansion in the pursuit of aristocratic legitimacy. For example, according to Yetişgin and Özdamar (2016, p. 175), relations based on mutual interest and assistance were established between the Ottoman dynasty and the surrounding non-Muslims from the early period, and Osman Beg was invited to the wedding between Köse Mihal's daughter and the lord of Köfalanzoglu, and he was introduced to the local *tekfurs*. Similarly, Orhan Beg's marriages turned into both military and class alliances such as with the Byzantine princess Asporsha, Holofira who is the daughter of the *tekfur* of the Yarhisar, and Theodora the daughter of Kantakouzenos (Imber, 2002, p. 9). But the turning point of these relations is probably the period of Bayezid I. Bayezid I had five of his twelve marriages with the daughters of Byzantine, Serbian and Hungarian nobility. Dumas (2011, p. 257) defines such marriages as "matrimonial alliances".

In general, the feudal articulations in this period can be defined as "the emirate that he had established on the basis of his inheritance from Orhan made of a federation of lords under Ottoman suzerainty" as Imber (2002, p. 13) stated.²¹³ For example, the despot of Epirus Esau Buondelmonti and the Zeta lord George Stracimirovic' Balsic in southern Bosnia became vassals of Murat I (Imber, 2002, p. 12) and the taxation of Karamanid state is sufficient to draw this framework. But the relations between the Ottoman dynasty and the local Christian ruling classes were not limited to this. According to Öz (2019a, p. 53), it is not necessary to be a Muslim to take part in the ruling elite for a long time. As evidence for this situation, as Lowry (2003, p. 59) clarifies based on the work of Spandugnino, three families, two of whom are Christian and one Muslim (*Mihalogulları*, the Greek or Catalan commander of Bursa-Evrenosides and his soldiers, finally *Osmanogulları*)²¹⁴ took decisive part in the

²¹³ On the other hand, this articulation scheme also corresponds to the transition process from early feudal state to proto-emperial structure.

²¹⁴ Johannes Leunclavius, in his work *Pandectes Historiae Turcicae*, claims that the origin of the name Evrenos is Evrenosides, while Claude Cahen states that the name Evren comes from a

establishment of the Ottoman rule. Although Spandugino mentions the *Turaganogullari* as the fourth family in his work, Lowry does not agree because he sees the traces of the existence of this family only in the 15th century. In the captured regions, it is seen that the former ruling class elements were recruited and joined the Ottoman administration as administrators. In this case, in order to preserve the illusion of legitimacy against the *ghazi* and other Muslim elements, the Ottomans oblige Christians to convert. In this way, while Muslims were ideologically seen as a privileged group and the Ottomans as their lords, according to C. Jireček (as cited in İnalcık, 1954, p. 138), however, most of the timariot *sipâhis* in Rumelia still came from old Bulgarian, Serbian, Albanian or Greek noble families. Both the class relations were not completely dissolved, and the Ottoman class dominance was able to settle at the top of the pyramid. In the words of N. Jorga (as cited in İnalcık, 1954, pp. 138-39) the Ottomans ensured “monarchical unity and the peace and tranquility of absolutism by the rule of a single lord [tm]”, and emerged “(...) not as a tribe, but as an army, a dynasty, a dominant class [tm]”. On the other hand, the development of this new ruling class and its alliances with the local classes have not been without problems. As far as we can trace from the history of political thought, both marrying Christian princesses and bringing converts to state offices not only deepened the contradictions between the local lords and the Ottoman dynasty in terms of state-building process, but also rendered them unmanageable in some cases. In terms of social status struggles, the fact that the local Muslim chiefs were under the old Christian lords became a potential cause of rebellion, as the declassé social elements were also in a position to take a stand against such hierarchies.

Another issue is relations within dynasty, state and local Muslim classes and strata. Here, it is necessary to consider the urban and rural classes separately. The most important of the urban classes is the *Ahi* communities, which is mostly made up of artisans. Lindner (2008, p. 14) draws attention to the structure of the *Ahi* community, which blends the interests of the citizens, the *sûfis* and the craftsmen and undertakes an articulating function between the people of the city and the tradesmen. Jennings (2019, p. 440) argues that *Ahis* connect merchants and artisans as being the entrepreneurial segment of society. Arnakis (1953, p. 236) defines the regime applied by the *Ahis* when they dominate the city as “paternalistic despotism, with themselves as ruling caste”.

Hellenized form of Varna. According to a more detailed study, Evrenos Beg may have been one of the Catalans, the mercenaries of the Byzantine Empire (as cited in Lowry, 2003, p. 58). Likewise, Goodwin (2013, p. 43) is of the same opinion. Kitsikis (1996, p. 49) claims that Evrenos was the Byzantine Governor.

Ayas (2020, p. 61-62) argues that *Ahi* tradition emerged in two different forms as people's *futuwwa* and aristocratic *futuwwa* in accordance with the social stratification lines, and that these two tradition found opportunities to articulate throughout history. While I am of the same opinion, I believe that it is necessary to exemplify how some characteristics unique to *Ahis* can be interpreted in terms of social class-relations.

Although a definite consensus has not been reached in the secondary literature about the origin of the word *Ahi* and the development of *Ahi* tradition, this social phenomenon is presented in general terms as follows. The word '*Ahi*' may be derived from the Turkish word '*aki*' and means 'generous, bountiful', or it may be a corrupted version of the Arabic word '*ihvan*' means 'brother' (Anadol, 1991, p. 59; Gölpınarlı, 2020b, p. 138). When the problem is considered historically, it is seen that formations similar to *Ahi* tradition (*Ahilik*) are called '*fitüvvet*' (*futuwwa*) in Arab regions and '*ayyarlık*' in Iran and have common origins.

The fact that the word '*feta*' (young, valiant) lies at the root of the term *futuwwa* (Anadol, 1991, pp. 1-2), suggests that a military function (for example, self-defense units or militia) may also lie in the origin of the *futuwwa* organization. In the pre-Islamic Arab society, the word '*feta*' refers to virtuous, generous, hospitable, noble and brave young people (Güner, 2017, p. 26). Among the first examples of *futuwwa*, when we look at the contracts of the youth gathered in the *Hilfü'l-Fudûl* society (Güner, 2017, p. 27), it is seen that this community was founded by young people from the families of the leading merchants and tribal rulers of Mecca in order to establish social-legitimacy based solidarity relations. This principle of solidarity necessarily includes a military function. It is seen that this military function can turn into banditry from time to time. For example, Ya'kub b. Leys the founder of the Saffari state, which continued its political existence between the 9th and 10th centuries, was a member of the *Ayyar* union, he could easily start blocking merchant roads around Sistan and offering security to the caravans in exchange for tribute (Özdal, 2020, p. 111). Similarly, it is seen that the *fityan* group organized in Baghdad occasionally participated in plundering activities in the 12th century (Anadol, 1991, p. 9).

Similarly, in Takiyu'd-din al-Vasitî's work *Tiryak'ül-munib-bin*, the depiction of Sayyid *Ebü'l-Vefâ*, who is counted in the *Alevî* and *Vefâî* lineages, as a bandit who commits robbery before joining the path of the *sûfîs*, constitutes evidence of the existence of similar transitions (Karakaya-Stump, 2020a, p. 200). Although these

examples may be considered exceptional, the fact that Anatolian *Ahis* are located in the *ghazas* and that they can be articulated with the *ghazis* and *sûfî* circles close to them, such as the Bektashis, shows that some immanent connections are possible. The role of Ahi Hasan in the capture of Bursa by the Ottomans is an example of this situation. Similarly, in the work named *Battalnâme*, we see that the figure of Sayyid Battal Ghazi is often described as ‘*ayyar*’ by the Byzantine rulers, and in this context, it is a negative term used for both warrior-*ghazi* elements and it is used for deceitful persons who know war tricks. Considering that the *ayyars* in the *Battalnâme* are described as deceiving and trying to destroy the imperial dynasty, it can be understood how the figure of Battal Ghazi, a *mansîb* owner from Malatya, was seen through the eyes of his enemies. Throughout the work, Battal Ghazi is depicted as a religious hero who does not take any share from the spoils of war, rushes to the aid of those in need, and protects the city of Malatya, so that some of the *Ahi*-order values become visible on the figure of Battal Ghazi. However, there is no information about the urban tradesmen and manufacturers in his adventures. In this framework, it has been determined that the *Ahi* tradition can also be articulated with *ghazi*-warrior elements from time to time and expand its military presence in this way (Sarıkaya, 1999, p. 32). The basis of this situation is probably the search for assurance by entering into alliances in conjunctures where the central state is weak, or commercial relations between warriors and urban traders on war spoils and combat equipment.

When the history of the *Ahi* organization in Islamic countries is examined, it is seen that the members of this organization have adopted some moral principles and partially built a *sûfî* identity. The general acceptance of principles such as self-knowledge, loyalty to a sheikh, sharing one’s earnings with others, caring for the poor, and seeking a virtuous life adds common elements to the ideology of this group with the *sûfis* living in their own time. Abu Abdurrahman al-Sülemî’s work called *Risalet el-Melametiyye* mentions a union of Melamatis and *futuwwa* members, which is important in terms of showing that these common elements can also evolve into an organizational unity (Gölpınarlı, 2011, p. 18). The articulation of the Anatolian *Ahi* tradition with *Bayramî* and Bektashi *sûfîsm* is significant in terms of showing that the development line of the *futuwwa* and *tariqa* relations is intertwined (Gölpınarlı, 2020b, p. 154; Gölpınarlı, 2011, p. 59; Çelik, 2017, p. 28). Teaschner (1955, p. 19) underlines that *Ahis* often have a dual organization in the form of *kavli* and *seyfî*, and that the group called *kavli* should be understood as a sympathetic (*muhîb*) circle consisting of dervishes and

especially Bektashis who adopt the principles of *futuwwa*. On the other hand, this articulation has some specific limitations. For example, it is not possible for *Ahis* to reconcile with ideological elements such as mystical indifference to the material world and working for profit, which are identified with beggar dervishes or antinomian wandering *sûfis* (Güner, 2017, pp. 72-73). In this context, it is understood that *Ahis* affirm to live by manual labor and collaborative production (Gölpınarlı, 2020b, pp. 130-31), and they do not evaluate strict ascetic practices and wandering dervish circles positively. In this context, the sectarian preferences of the ideological structure of the *Ahis* are frequently discussed. The frequent references to the Ahl al-Bayt in the *fütüvvetnâmes* and the relationship of the *futuwwa* organization with the Melametis are shown as examples of the view that this organization has a Shiite/Alevi belief (Gölpınarlı, 2011, p. 53-54). On the other hand, Yıldırım (2019b, p. 30) argues that the *Ahis* placed in the pattern of Sunni belief systematic, not Shiite, and that the general structure of their thoughts has obvious contradictions with the Shiite tradition. However, the fact that the Shiite-Sunni distinction in the popular works of the period is not always made using a sharply drawn terminology makes this issue unclear. For example, when we look at the works such as *Müseyyebnâme*, the subject of which is set in the 7th century and which tells about the life of a warrior who set out to revenge for the Ahl al-Bayt, it is seen that this person objectively settled in the Shiite political vision, but defined himself and those around him as Sunni (Erdem, 2007, p. 125). This is because the use of the term Sunni in the sense of 'right path' must have paved the way for the development of a political struggle around this term for a long time. In this context, the fact that the members of the *futuwwa* also have elements of both Sunni and Shiite thought can be explained by the fact that they have probably established a certain balance between the two, not the fact that they are directly attached to one of them. Abbasid Caliph Nâsır-Lidînillâh (1180-1225) combined *futuwwa* and mysticism with the contributions of the famous Islamic thinker Suhrawardi during his reign, and at the same time tried to bring different Islamic sects closer and bring them together on a common ground (Anadol, 1991, p. 12; Özdal, 2020, p. 40). Taeschner (1955, pp. 15-16) underlines that the ideological systematic brought by Suhrawardi to *futuwwa* has a moderate codification that opens the door for the coexistence of *sûfîsm*, Sunnism and Imamiyyah Shiism, and argues that the *fityan*-caliph articulation can be realized in this way. The fact that the Abbasid state was changing its preferences in terms of being

affiliated to Shi'ism, Sunnism and even Mu'tazila sects from time to time opened the door to sectarian articulations that can be found in *fütüvvetnâmes* in this period.

The most important feature of *futuwwa/Ahi*-order articulation with *sûfîsm* is the belief that it shares the economic values it produces and acts generously towards the people, and this element is generally associated with the mystical motto 'not covet for worldly goods'. First of all, it is known that the *Ahis* managed the cities on their own and shared their earnings among their members and used the surplus for charity. What is misleading in the assessment of joint distribution of profits and charitable works is that it leads to the erroneous connotation that no capital accumulation exists. It can be assumed that the *Ahis* have very strict rules to rise to apprenticeship and mastery, and within this framework, workers who cannot reach the status of master are used by artisans as a mere labor force. In this context, we should consider that the common distribution of earnings is 'just', that is, respecting the proportional differences.²¹⁵ In general, it is known that *Ahi* masters kept a property worth 18 dirhams silver and gave the rest to the *Ahi* sheikh (Anadol, 1991, p. 70). In addition, it is known that *Ahis* buy raw materials from big merchants as partners, and in this way, they both increase their bargaining chances and control the amount of production (Günaydın, 2015, pp. 71-72). In this respect, the division of profits is part of the joint purchase of raw materials. On the other hand, the notion of 'sharing the profits' can also be considered as a palliative solution to the labor-power shortage that dominated urban economic relations throughout the Middle Ages. Thus, a certain assurance is offered to the urban workforce. Secondly, it is possible that they were giving the impression that they are consuming all their earnings by giving food to the poor in order to save the city from their 'threats' and hide their accumulation regime by obtaining the consent of the declassé groups. This situation can be interpreted within the framework of the ideologies that combine plebeian values and aristocratic values (Arnakis, 1953, p. 237; İnalçık, 2019a, p. 52) developed within the framework of the state-building tendency of the *Ahis*. İnalçık (2019b, pp. 82-85) states that the *Ahi* ideology tries to discipline the poor workers and unemployed groups in the city, and to build an unlimited loyalty, obedience and contentment to the master, and thus constitutes a notion of morality that ensures order in the city. Fuat Köprülü was the first one to express this view. According to Köprülü (2018, p. 113), the leaders of the *Ahis* are among the biggest capital owners in that

²¹⁵ The asymmetrical understanding of justice in medieval societies and its reflection on Ottoman political thought will be discussed in the following sections.

region and their interests are in common with the interests of the state. For this reason, *Ahi* organizations represented the advocacy of capital in the labor-capital conflict and prevented such a conflict, especially for moral reasons (Köprülü, 2018, p. 113).

Although the motto of ‘not hoarding goods’ or ‘spending goods for the benefit of society’ is seen as dominant in the *Ahi* tradition, traders are also included in the *Ahi* organizations and the words of the *Ahi* elders who praised earning/saving money have survived to the present day (Werner, 2019a, p. 103). In fact, it is frequently encountered that the wealthy *Ahi waqfiyyas* make themselves and their children as trustees (İnalçık, 2019b, p. 81). In this context, it becomes clear why the *Ahi* notion of charity should not be exaggerated. Although Barkan (1994, p. 25) states that the *Ahis* should not be regarded as a mere bourgeois-craftsman group because they also had lodges in the countryside and on the mountain tops, this fact was a result of the *Ahis*’ relationship with commercial activities. Because ensuring the security of mountain passes is an issue that the Ottoman administration gave importance as much as the *Ahis*, and for this reason, it is seen that *zawiyas* were established in deserted places and the accommodation of passengers was mandatory in the *zawiya* foundation charters (*waqfiyyas*). In this respect, the function of rushing to the rescue of the people stranded on the trade routes, that is, ensuring the safety of trade routes and cities, was developed by the *Ahis* as an extension of their commercial relations, and this largely explains their exclusion of the customs officers from their guilds. In this context, Ibn Battuta’s *Seyahatnâme* (1981, p. 5) offers very valuable observations on *Ahis*, according to which they welcome foreign guests, take care of them and meet their needs for food/drink/bed, protect them from bandits and thieves, and kill the members of these groups.

Ahis form a closed social group within themselves and undertake social functions such as security and social solidarity. In addition, the fact that *Ahi* groups develop relations with *Ahi* organizations in different cities shows that they have the opportunity to establish a local/regional solidarity network as a certain social stratum (Gölpınarlı, 2011, p. 76). In this framework, *Ahis* also accepted Greeks and Armenians into their guilds (Werner, 2019a, p. 103).²¹⁶ Although Köprülü (2018, p. 114) states that

²¹⁶ However, there is information in the early period *fütüvvetnâmes* that the bath staff (*tellaks*), who also served non-Muslims, were not accepted into the *Ahi* community. On the other hand, as Gölpınarlı (1956b, p. 127) stated, after the 15th century, the bathhouses were accepted to the *Ahi* order. Goshgarian (2017, p. 185) states that although there were some signs that non-Muslims could enter *futuwwa* in the 13th century, it was actually impossible in the 14th century, and that there were organizations similar to *futuwwa* among Christians.

“all kinds of social strata, from the greatest dignitaries to wealthy merchants, sheiks, scholars, wise men, even unemployed and weak vagrants [tm]” can become members of the *Ahi* organization, the situation is a bit more complicated. In the *fütüvvetnâme* dating from 1290 (as cited in Werner, 2019a, p. 102), it is seen that *Ahis* did not accept professions such as “fortune teller, tellak, barber, bellman, peddler, weaver, butcher, surgeon, hunter, customs officer, moneylender [tm]”. The reason why they evaluate these professions as ‘inferior’ is the fact that some of them are not crafts that require mastery skills -or they were evaluated as lower class activities- (every animal breeder of the period can do butchery, women and slave labor were used in weaving etc.)²¹⁷, while some of them are worried that they will wear out their solidarity principles (for example usury, because *Ahis* could already lend and receive interest-free loans among themselves). In this respect, the reason why they did not accept the customs officer among them should be understood in the connection of the *Ahis* with the merchants.

As a result, it is striking that the *Ahis* do not have an orientation other than the state-building movement in the final analysis and that they form a social stratum that can impose their specific interests in binary power structures. It is clear that there was a certain tension between the *Ahis* and the feudal powers on the issue of local tributes in the early stages of the development of the *Ahi* tradition. For example, Alexander the Great is praised by Ahmedî (2018, p. 623) because of his abolishment of tributes, thus could be interpreted as an idealized political expression of this tension between local power centers and central rule: “Then he removed the tribute from all means / He did not receive any goods or tribute from anyone [tm]”. The following statements in a *fütüvvetnâme* give sufficient validity to this thesis (Ülken, 2017, pp. 301-2): “It is necessary for the *Ahi* and the *Sheikh* do not reach the door of lords, maybe the Sultans and the lords do not know the name of the *Ahis* and the *Sheikhs*. Whoever enters the circle of lords (...) That person is a sinner [tm]”. On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that these expressions are valid for a certain historical context. Because the decrease in the influence of the feudal lords and the increase in the power and effectiveness of the central state cannot be considered as a historical phenomenon that must be resisted in every aspect for the *Ahis*. For example, in the *fütüvvetnâme of Dai* written in the 15th century, while the *Ahis* were still advised not to step into the lords’

²¹⁷ In the Bursa *qadi* registers published by İnalçık (1981, p. 65), there is this information dated February 19, 1484: “Hodja Sinan said that they agreed to free Şirmend, the weaver of Slovenian origin, on the condition of weaving ten gulestani kemhas. She was free because she had done and finished all of these [tm]”.

circle, it was permissible to follow the call of the government to give advice (Cin & Akçan, 2018, p. 121). That examples show the binary political position of the *Ahis* that they tend to both preserve their autonomy and secure themselves from feudal power centers as well as nomads by articulating with the central authority.

As Ayas (2020, p. 62) states, there was an articulation between the *Ahis* and the central government during the reign of the Abbasid Caliph Nâsır-Lidînillâh. Izzü'd-Din Keykavus I and Alaü'd-Din Keykubat I joined the *Ahi* organization with great ceremonies and wore shalwar and *şed* (Güner, 2017, p. 39). According to Ibn Bibi (Werner, 2019a, p. 104), *Ahis* supported the Seljuk Sultan in the *Babaî* revolt and protected their cities against nomads and looters. Cahen (2012, p. 329) states that with the weakening of the central authority during the Mongol invasion period, the *Ahis* became stronger and turned into an organized power that could impose their own interests, but this situation did not mean an absolute break, and that the *Ahis* assumed military and administrative duties as allies of the central government. Güner (2017, p. 86) states that the Mongols engaged in a bloody struggle to break the resistance of the *Ahis*, especially in the city of Kayseri. In the middle of the 13th century after Kılıç Arslan IV, who supported by the Mongols, won the throne in the struggle with Izzü'd-din Keykavus II, he persecuted the *Ahi* groups (Güner, 2017, p. 94). In this case, although the disappearance of the central power in the Anatolian Seljuks strengthened the *Ahis*, they were engaged in the re-establishment of the state, but they could not achieve success against the Mongols. On the other hand, it is seen that *Ahi* leaders were killed, and the power of the *Ahi* order was broken during the capture of Konya by the Karamanid dynasty (Güner, 2017, p. 128). Tuna (1989, p. 216) is of the opinion that there is a positive correlation between the urbanization phenomenon and the development of the central government in the Ottoman Empire. It is thought that the *Ahis*, who were a remarkable power in the region before the Ottoman Empire, influenced the systematics in the establishment and state-building stages (Langer & Blake, 2019, p. 222). In general, *Ahis* take over and implement some of the state functions in cases where the central state becomes inoperable, while in cases where the central state becomes stronger, they become articulated with the state and come under its control (Günaydın, 2015, p. 61). If this situation can be expressed theoretically, the *Ahis* tended to organize autonomous political organizations against the feudal powers during the periods when feudal relations were strengthened, however, they were articulated with the imperial authority when the central state developed.

As Giese (2019, p. 161) stated, *Ahis* had an effective support in the establishment of the Ottoman Empire, and Ahi Şemsettin and Ahi Hasan Alp were in the close circle of Osman Beg -both of whom were close relatives of Sheikh Edebâli. The role of Ahi Hasan in the surrender of Bursa is mentioned in early chronicals (Apzd, 2017, p. 40). The first five viziers of the Ottoman Empire -Alaeddin Pasha, Nizameddin Ahmet Pasha, Hacı Pasha, Sinaneddin Yusuf Pasha and Çandarlı Halil Pasha- are thought to be of *Ahi* origin (Taneri, 2019, p. 61). After the death of Orhan Beg, his son Murat was chosen as the ruler by Bursa's *Ahi* organization and called to this capital city, thus showing that the political role of the dynasty was accepted and supported within the current class structure and *Ahi* groups. Gölpınarlı (2020b, p. 136; 2011, p. 59) argues that the traditional Janissary cap has origins from the *Ahi* hat, while the Bektashis adopted the *futuwwet* doctrine, thus emphasizing that the Janissary-Bektashi group and the *Ahi* organization as a whole were influential in the establishment of the Ottoman state.²¹⁸ Öztürk (2020, p. 165) states that Murat I was wearing the 'Şed', the sign of the *Ahi* Order.²¹⁹ Moreover, the inability of Murat I to appoint administrators from his own family due to the intra-dynastic struggle resulted in the fact that Halil of Çandar, who could be considered as the representative of the ruling classes in Bursa and supported by the *Ahis*, was given the title of *qadasker*, and Lala Şahin Pasha, who was most likely a former devshirme, took the title of *Beylerbeyi*. According to İnalçık (1993b, p. 157), the influence of the Çandarlı family was due to the fact that Murat I guaranteed his accession to the throne. Although Arnakis (1953, pp. 234-35) states that *Ahi* organizations declined during the reigns of Murat I and Bayezid I, it is better to mention about a fusion as a result of the state's undertaking of the social functions undertaken by the *Ahis*, rather than directly attributing the cause of this decline to a conflicting/competitive 'centralization' phenomenon. Because, as Barkan (1994, pp. 30-32) states, many *Ahi* sheikhs were granted land in Rumelia, *waqfs* were established and *çiftlik*s were entrusted during the periods of Orhan Beg, Murat I and Bayezid I. On the other hand, the existence of examples in which the struggle against *Ahi* order is also included in the political agenda cannot be ignored. For example, Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, p. 259) defines the *Ahis* among the groups that the ruler should keep under

²¹⁸ The thesis that the Janissary cap comes from the *Ahi* hat should be approached carefully. The fact that Âşıkpaşazâde, who denied the relationship between Janissaries and Bektashis and mentioned *Ahis* positively, did not mention such a relationship needs explanation.

²¹⁹ 'Şed/şedd' means belt or *peştemal* knitted from wool or cotton, and it is a sign of loyalty to a certain authority/order and is the symbol of serving on that path (Algar, 2010).

control and diminish its power. The formulation of this proposal in Şeyhoğlu's *Kenzü'l Kübera*, which he wrote during the reign of Bayezid I, is an example of the stated political tendency. On the other hand, at the end of the 15th century, Âşıkpaşazâde tried to gain prestige to this group by mentioning *Ahiyan-ı Rum* (*Ahis* of the Rum) among the founding elements of the Ottoman Empire.

Unlike Bursa, the *Ahis* in Ankara expelled the Ottoman officials and began to rule the city themselves. It is understood that this social segment, which was seen at the peak of its power at the end of the 14th century and at the beginning of the 15th century, gradually lost its central importance. *Ahis* capacity to organize autonomous power has social limits. The most determinant of these limits is that the urban working class and the wage labor category are not yet sufficiently developed, and therefore the amount of surplus value that the *Ahis* can appropriate is very limited. Yunus Emre's line "whoever has his mind does not work with wages [tm]"²²⁰ reflects the negative view shared for the wage labor category in the rentier social formation, and the material reasons for this view are also common with the reasons for the urban labor shortage. In this framework, the seizure of power by the *Ahis* in the city of Ankara was only possible with their involvement in the land rent - but this development must have seriously made it difficult for them to reproduce their power against the central armies. The interpretation of Arnakis (1953, p. 237) on this matter clarifies how the *Ahis* seized power when they became *ayans*, that is, they became landowners around Ankara and turned into village notables. This shows that the social class balances in different regions did not always develop completely in favor of the Ottoman Empire. Although the *Ahi* organization partially preserved its main features until the 17th century, after this date it lost its political privileges and continued to be organized as a craftsman's guild (*gedik*) (Anadol, 1991, p. 105). In this development, the changing structure of commercial activities in the early modern period, the dominant character of the money economy in the state organization, and the need for securing private property and capital accumulation had an effect.

Secondly, the relations of the Ottoman dynasty with the local ruling families should be examined. An interesting point is that although Orhan Beg made three of his marriages with the members of Byzantine palace or the *tekmur* families and only one with the daughter of Mahmut-Alp, his son Murat I made two marriages with the daughters of local Muslim lords, except for the Bulgarian Princess Tamar (Imber, 2002,

²²⁰Poem no: LXXVI, couplet no: 537, see: Gölpınarlı (2020b, p. 142).

p. 12). In the period from Orhan Beg to the establishment of the reign of Murat I, both the conflict between brothers and the struggle for the throne between father and son (for example, the case of Savcı Beg; see Eroğlu, 2016, pp. 30-32) must have revealed the necessity of direct articulation with representatives of local social classes. During the reign of Bayezid I, this articulation policy became much more developed in terms of both claiming rights on lands and incorporating nobility features on the bloodline of the ruler. Four of the twelve marriages of Bayezid I that we know were carried out with the Dulkadir, Aydın and Karamanid dynasties.²²¹ These marriages made the Ottoman dynasty both able to claim rights on the related lands and strengthened the great suzerain positions on these families. However, the fact that the dynasties of Anatolian principalities passed on the side of Tamerlane during the Timurid occupation and the old ruling class remnants tended to act in the direction of their own autonomous class interests, not the Ottoman dynasty in such cases, caused a change in the policy of the Ottoman administration in this area. While developing such relations, the Ottoman administration acted with a basic motivation: To strengthen and develop their own class position, to ensure the loyalty of local powers and to strengthen consent mechanisms. According to Itzkowitz (2006, p. 19), this path is as follows: The Ottomans first controlled certain regions, then turned them into tributary states -but the nobles and lords of that region maintained their political identity and relative autonomy.

In terms of rural areas, in this context, ensuring the security of the Christian and Muslim population was of great importance for the Ottoman order. For this reason, we must state that the application of the principle of *istimâlet* is one of the decisive elements of the Ottoman class domination.²²² According to İlgürel (2001), the word '*istimâlet*', which means inclination, temptation, and taking heart, was used in the Ottoman chronicles in the sense of "care for the people and especially the non-Muslim subjects, to be tolerant towards them [tm]". Shahabeddin al-Umari, an Egyptian bureaucrat -who concealed his hostility to the Ottomans- writes that "the Ottomans, who went to the raid, not only left rivers of blood behind, but also protected the working people [tm]"

²²¹ For biographical details, see: Alderson (1999), İnalçık (2010b) and Sakaoğlu (2017).

²²² For an alternative use of the term *istismalet* covering interstate relations, see: Amâsi (2016, p. 373). İnalçık (2016a, p. 215) points out that the use of *istimalet* should also be read in terms of local ruling classes: "As a result of the policy of exploitation of the Ottomans in the Balkans and the Byzantine lands, we see that some taxes, the immunity and privileges of some cities and groups, the local military classes, and many institutions that the people have been accustomed to for centuries, left in place [tm]"

(Werner, 2019a, p. 136). Treating the people of the conquered areas well, protecting them, ensuring the safety of life and property against external enemies, giving freedom in religious matters, and facilitating taxation are the main elements of the Ottoman *istimâlet* policy (İlgürel, 2001). The policy of *istimâlet* is recorded with official documents called “*istimâlet hükmü*” or “*istimâlet kağıdı*” (İlgürel, 2001). Moreover, as Itzkowitz (2006, p. 23) states, steps have been taken in order to reproduce the social order, which will gain the support of the local people. For example, the Ottoman administration forgave the feudal period debts or turned them into cash payments with small amounts, in a way, they became the ‘protector of the peasants’ and they succeeded in attracting the population engaged in agricultural production to their own dominion area (Langer & Blake, 2019, p. 209). Fazlıoğlu (2017, p. 10) argues, based on the examples of Palamaz and Dâvud-ı Kayserî, that religious movements that make it possible to build a common living ground between Christians and Muslims are also of great importance in achieving this mission. However, it is doubtful whether the same care was given to the nomads. If we compare the nomads, who are under the pressure of the permanent settlement policy, with the ruling classes and the settled mass, it is possible to encounter a rather negative picture.²²³

The function of the Ottoman administration, which corresponds to this process, which is based on the integration of the peasant masses and partly the ruling classes, can be defined as the restoration of the old imperial regime under new conditions. For example, as Turan (1948, p. 553) stated, the Ottoman advance was largely on the regions that implemented the Seljuk *timar* system. Similarly, the transfer of the *timar* system to Rumelia means the revival of the Byzantine *pronoia*. Uzunçarşılı (1949, p. 99) states that Orhan Beg took the administrative and military forms from the Ilkhanate state and other Anatolian Principalities while making the first arrangements for the state organization. It can be thought that the Ilkhanate, to whom the Ottomans were subordinate, constituted a model that synthesized the central state and steppe feudalism in Anatolia and tried to restore the Seljuk order in favor of the central state. In this context, Aigle (2006, p. 76) and Pamuk (2003, p. 8) state that the Ilkhanate financial system has a highly developed royal mint network and financial control mechanism. For example, the use of Ilkhanate motifs on the first Ottoman coins reveals the attitude towards the continuation of this systematic (Remler, 1980, pp. 168-69). Moreover, as Darling underlined (2019, p.76), the Ottoman clerks were chosen from among those

²²³ See: Oğuz (1997, p. 193).

who had knowledge of the Seljuk and Ilkhanate administrative system and took the Ilkhanate financial books as a model. Especially at the beginning of the 15th century, the presence of copies of Ilkhanate financial registrations in Bursa strengthens the argument regarding this relationship (Afyoncu & Ahışalı, 2022). The existence of such examples shows that the Ottoman state tried to bring feudal relations under the control of bureaucratic autarky. In this case, it is clear that with the development of the central state, the restoration move weighed heavily in favor of the imperial regime. When the Ilkhanate tax inscriptions published by Hinz (1949) are examined, it is seen that the newly imposed arbitrary taxes in the Anatolian region (Ankara, Kırşehir and Niğde) have been eliminated and the tax burden on agricultural producers and city residents has been rearranged. The untimely disappearance of the Ilkhanate state from the stage of history failed this restoration move and caused both a model and an opportunity for the Ottomans to emerge. On the other hand, this restoration move has certain limits. As Gerber (1994b, p. 12) and Karaoğlu (2019, p. 80) stated, the *mîrî* land regime is not a direct extension of the classical Islamic land regime. The effects of this conflict are seen in the relevant regions. For example, in the Kurdish region where Islamic law and land regime are valid, the *mîrî* land system has not been implemented. Turan (2003, p. 567-68) points out the secondary importance of the *timar* system in the Abbasid regime as the reason for this situation, and the fact that *mülk* lands are the basis of the system. It should be considered that this phenomenon is not singular and accidental, but points to a general and structural sociological trend. Because, as Darling (2019, p. 55) points out, the fact that the Arab regions were not subjected to census after the Ottoman conquest in the 16th century indicates that the possibility of their being transferred to the *mîrî* land regime to encounter a traditional resistance was also recognized by the Ottoman administration. Moreover, Turan (2003, pp. 550-52) states that the reform attempt of the Caliph Nâsır-Lidînullâh's vizier Müeyyid'ül-mülk, inspired by the *mîrî* land regime in Ahvaz, was met with severe reactions, and there was not enough information about *mîrî* land in the *fiqh* books of this period -even in the Pir Mehmed Karamanî's work named *Zübdet ül-Fatava*, the ulama of the period stated that the *mîrî* land regime was described as '*fasid*' (null). It is understood from these examples that the boundaries of the restoration movement end in the Muslim regions where the order of *mülk*-lands is settled. Similarly, the confiscation of property lands and foundations during the reign of Mehmet II was met with social reaction and led to a restoration period during the reign of Bayezid II. The reason for this is the fact that the transition to the conditional

land ownership system, which we encountered in the most advanced forms of imperial regimes, met with more vigorous resistance in these regions.

To return to the subject after this long parenthesis, the content of the restoration project of Ottoman rule lies in the establishment of a chain of tasks related to securing the *timars*, *waqfs* and *mülks*, ensuring the safety of merchants, collecting market taxes, collecting tithes and tribute from the villagers, and organizing local anti-banditry work. To the extent that the Ottomans were able to combine such functions with their own motivation, they ensure the restoration of the old regime in the face of the remnants of the disintegrated Byzantine administration and obtain the loyalty of different social segments, which is the key to the transition to the imperial regime. Although there is a famous narrative adopted by the contemporary Ottoman historiography that Christian peasants of Anatolia and Rumelia were subject to the Ottoman regime because they saw it as fairer, this phenomenon would probably have more than one reason in a particular social context. For example, Genç (2014f, p. 308) states that the Ottoman administration abolished corvée and similar feudal exploitation and oppression mechanisms in the regions under its rule, and that it gave the villagers the opportunity to “manage their own goods and services freely [tm]”, and considers this as evidence of rapid expansion. In fact, we can think that this view originates from Nicolae Jorga, as İnalçık (2016a, p. 208) stated, and this point of view should not be regarded as valid to the last degree, because if this whole process was in absolute favor of agricultural producers, the 1416 rebellions should not have occurred. Zachariadou states that some Byzantine villagers, who had difficulty living under the constant pressure of raiders in the border regions, migrated to Ottoman lands, not far from the border, and accepted Ottoman domination, thus gaining security in return for taxes (as cited in Kunt, 2015, p. 25). On the other hand, İnalçık (2016a, p. 210) lists the main tax items paid by the villagers as follows: *Raiyyet* taxes (*resm-i çift*, *resm-i bennak* and *mücerred*, *ispençe* tax from Christian people), extraordinary taxes (*avarız*), taxes on services and land products (*avarız-ı divaniyye* and *aşar*). If we add the taxes arising from the special status of the *harâcî* lands, we can think that the difference between the new tax burden and the old period is not exaggerated. Moreover, as İnalçık (2016a, p. 211) states, the implementation of the old feudal traditions, which can be called *bid’at*, in the Balkans during the Ottoman period shows us that the issue of exploitation and oppression is not a *de jure* issue defined under the legal norms but a *de facto* issue of class struggle.

The increasing arbitrariness of the Byzantine and Seljuk frontier administration resulted in the division of the frontiers into small regions of domination by the plundering groups or the *tekfurs*' bastions that provided security against them, and moreover, the dominance of the Byzantine Empire in some of these regions, and the dominance of the principalities and even Tatar plunderers in some. In this case, the consolidation of the central authority, the balancing of the arbitrary administration of the *tekfurs* and the *voivodes*, the elimination of the lawlessness prevailing in the countryside, the easing of the heavy drudgery conditions and the regulation of the taxes were ultimately in favor of the former inhabitants of these lands, namely the peasant masses, the urban artisans and the merchants. For this reason, the restoration of the old order under new conditions won the support of the broad masses of the people, while the Ottoman dynasty was dealing with the changing population and ethnic differences-based problems that the old order could not fully solve, with a new assertion of social class leadership. As Itzkowitz (2006, p. 19) states, perhaps the region that needs such an order the most is the Balkans; At the end of the 14th century, the political unity in the Balkans had completely disappeared, especially the dissolution of the Serbian Empire after King Dušan's death, making it easier for local lords and noble families to form alliances with the Ottomans against the newly emerging raider groups. As İnalçık (2019c, pp. 75-76) points out, the law on the annual *hyperper* tax payment of land holders of fifty *modioi* (one Ottoman *mud*) in the Byzantine Empire was re-corrected in the 14th century to be equivalent to the Ottoman *resm-i çift* of twenty two *akçes*, the twenty five *akçes* payment, which is the capitation/head tax that every adult Christian male has to pay, was made equivalent to the per capita tax that the *reâyâ* employed in the *pronia/timar* had to pay after the feudal service obligations were subtracted in the Dušan Law. These examples can be considered sufficient in terms of showing the restoration of optimum conditions of reproduction, which from time to time structured by the political formations dominated before the Ottoman Empire.

The need for the organization of a central power by the ruling classes, who were afraid of revolts like the Zealot uprisings in the 14th century, must have contributed to this situation. Seidler (1986, pp. 52-53) states that the Nika revolt of 1258 and the peasant revolt of 1262 ultimately resulted in the victory of the aristocracy. But this can be called a period of relative artificial equilibrium. Especially since the middle of the 14th century, the Zelotes movement gained a serious momentum in its struggle against church properties (*charistikon*) and aristocratic privileges. It is important that the

political and economic aims of these uprisings, which developed to reduce taxes, abolish debts, limit large estates and deprive monasteries of their wealth, were realized, albeit briefly. In this case, while the tendency of the debtor or idler people to join the Ottoman ranks brings them closer to the *ghazi* groups, it is quite plausible that the ruling classes sought a *modus vivendi* with the Ottoman administration (Werner, 2019a, p. 141). In fact, as İnalçık (2016a, p. 208) points out, the Ottoman administration abolished the rent privileges of a series of monasteries and turned some of them into *timars*. In this context, the myth of the monk's dream and subjection, which is mentioned in Yazıcızâde 'Ali's *Selçuknâme* and will be mentioned later, can be evaluated as a reflection of the concern about the future of the monastic properties. Already in this context, the Athos monastery and its region demanded protection and alliance since the reign of Orhan Beg, as revealed by Kolovos (2005, p. 198).

As a sub-title, it is necessary to consider the dervish/*sûfî* groups within this context. In his famous lines, Âşıkpaşazâde also mentions "*Abdalan-ı Rum*" among the four groups came to the region of Rum (Apzd, 2017, p. 319). Ocak (2014, p. 93) states that there were two different interpretations of Islam, both literary and popular, during the establishment period of the Ottoman Empire, and that *Vefâî-Babâî* dervishes were at the center of popular interpretation. It can be followed from primary sources that these dervishes, called *Abdalan-ı Rum*, took place around the Ottoman dynasty (eg. Ede-Bali, Geyikli Baba, Kumral Dede etc.). Barkan (1994, p. 16) formulated the *abdals* of the Rum with the concept of 'colonizer dervishes' and define them as a part of the *ghazi* groups.²²⁴ Moreover, it is known that such religious militant-orders also appeared in the medieval Christian world. For example, the military-orders established in Santiago, Alcantara and Calatrava in 12th century Spain acquired large estates, opened the areas they had seized and ensured their security (Black, 2020, pp. 54-55). It is possible to reach sufficient information about the activities carried out by the militant-dervishes in the early Ottoman chronicles, various *menâkıbnâmes* and *velâyetnâmes*, and also in the *waqf* records. For example, Geyikli Baba's name is mentioned in the capture of

²²⁴ Barkan (1994, p. 16) claims that the type of "colonizer" dervish who owns a *zawiyah*, is engaged in agriculture and goes to *ghaza*, is different from wandering and beggar dervishes as well as from city-dwelling dervishes. While making this conceptualization, it is felt that the model in Barkan's mind carries the weight of Ahi organization (1994, pp. 29-30). I do not include *Ahi* groups here because I have studied them in another part, but it must be admitted that they show similarities with the settled dervish type. On the other hand, it was previously reported that Barkan was based on Z. Gökalp's theses while creating this concept.

Kızılkilise and Abdal Musa in the attack on Bursa, the war stories of Abdal Murat are narrated, and the anecdotes about the *ghaza* activities of Doglu Baba and Kumral Baba survive till today (Ocak, 1992a, p. 89). It is also clear that the dervish groups played a crucial role in driving the masses to the *ghaza*. In any case, it is important that certain dervish circles play a role in the *ghaza*, either in person or as an ideological image, rather than whether these anecdotes or legends are true.²²⁵ It may have been effective in this close relationship that the wandering dervish circles and the *ghazi*-warriors fought together and adopted a common lifestyle, especially in the territorial gains in Rumelia. In an anecdote in *Letâifnâme*, while Murat Khan (probably Murat II) was hunting in a village, a group of Rum *torlaks* came to him and said that they gave the power to the ruler, they conquered lands, and they demanded that a fertile village be given to them (Lâmi'î Çelebi, 2015, p. 86). As seen in this example, wandering dervish circles see the conquests as their own achievements and demand a share of these gains. Kemalpaşazâde attributes the participation of dervishes in the wars to the increase of riches (*nimet*) after the conquest of Bursa, that is, to economic reasons (as cited in Ocak, 2000, p. 70). It is seen that dervishes can take a position parallel to the settled classes due to their relations with the state. As Ocak (2014, p. 94) stated, the Ottoman administration opened *zawiyas* for dervishes, entrusted *waqf*, and thus tried to make them an agent of its own authority. Moreover, Ocak (2014, p. 111) draws attention to the fact that ordinary people recognize the Islamic faith through dervish circles and therefore these circles have a reputation among the people, and underlines that the Ottomans tried to establish ties and develop good relations with these circles from the very beginning.

So, how should one evaluate the social position of dervishes? Is it possible to place the dervish typology, which has polarized around the 'saint' and 'clown' types in popular literature, directly on a cultural-economic basis by getting rid of these prejudices? My approach at this point is that dervish and *sûfî* circles are primarily artistic circles. It is necessary to accept wandering dervishes as performance artists. They arouse the religious feelings of the people with their lifestyles, attitudes and behaviors, impromptu poems, dances and hymn/*münacat*/*kaside*/*şathiye* style poems they recite - in other words, by performing their religious/spiritual/mystic art. For example, according to Melikoff (2000, p. 151); Barak Baba, who recited improvised poems, was

²²⁵ In addition, as Ocak (1992a, p. 96) underlines, the *waqfiye* of the *zawiya* registered under the name of '*Kızıl Deli*' published by Barkan proves that these dervishes played a direct role in the *ghaza*.

an impressive person who performed *sema* rituals with his headdress decorated with horns, a dress decorated with rattles and bones. Karamustafa (2015, p. 78) draws attention to the fact that Barak Baba was an ecstatic person who dances, sings folk songs and hymns. Such dervishes accept donations and alms such as food, drink, clothing in return for the arts they perform. Contemporary writers Spandugino and Menavino state that the *Qalandari* dervishes, whom they call *torlak*, developed dexterous tricks to collect alms from the people (as cited in Karamustafa, 2015, p. 82). While Cahen (2012, p. 349) considers the *Qalandaris* and *Cavlakis* to be composed of wandering dervishes and charlatans, he draws attention to the possibility of the ‘charlatan’ type to live among these groups. In addition, from the discussions on various extraordinary abilities displayed by dervishes since the emergence of *sûfi* circles, it is revealed that these abilities are sometimes seen as an illusion by contemporary observers. In this context, the concepts of *mûcize/keramet/istidrâç/hile* are applied to different examples in negative and positive meanings. *Raka`ik al-hilal fi Dakaik el-Hiyal*, which is thought to have been written at the end of the 13th century and the beginning of the 14th century, includes a series of anecdotes describing the extraordinary states of the famous *sûfi* Hallaj-ı Mansur as a deception (Khawam, 2011, p. 390-98) supports this view. In the *Letâifnâme* written by Lâmi`î Çelebi (2015, p. 220), we encounter jokes about things that show false miracles, for example, the expression ‘a sheikh does not fly, disciples fly him’ shows that the problem of ‘miracles’ was evaluated in the same way at the end of the 15th century and the beginning of the 16th century in particular context.²²⁶

On the other hand, it is clear that these groups did not consist of mere charlatans and systematically brought together the defenders of the Cynic thought and lifestyle. At the heart of the cynic worldview is the critique of pervasive social values, particularly the denial of wealth accumulation, political ambitions, and strict cultural subordinations—for this reason it is appropriate to call such groups antinomian dervishes. In this respect, it is clear that the wandering dervishes, especially those who are directly stripped of moral patterns such as the *Hayderî* and *Cavlakî* groups, can be considered Cynic. When the discussions on Cynic thought and lifestyle in ancient times are examined, it is seen that their world-view was considered a kind of natural philosophy. For example, in the 6th Oration of Emperor Julianus, known as *To the*

²²⁶ The anecdote is as follows (Lâmi`î Çelebi, 2015, p. 220): “They asked a sheikh: ‘My Sultan, they say you fly in the sky, is it real?’. He replied: ‘My lord, we do not fly, but our followers fly us.’”

Uneducated Cynics, written in the 4th century, it is clearly stated that Cynic philosophy has emerged not only in the Greeks but also in other peoples since ancient times, and that it is a natural and universal way of thinking (Luck, 2011, p. 468). In addition, as can be seen in Homeric epics and in works such as *Argonautika* of Apollonios of Rhodes, the belief that the wandering beggar and the poor in ancient cultures could be a God in disguise or a person who had a share of divinity, should also be accepted that the Cynic lifestyle could be effective in gaining a religious authority. In this context, it is possible to mention about the existence of a new version of Indian, Iranian and Anatolian-Balkans Cynicism with Islamic overtones. For example, the nickname of Barak Baba figure has cynical connotations because it means ‘big hairy dog’.²²⁷ Considering that Cynic thought showed transitions with Sophism and Stoicism in its original history, it should be accepted that groups of wandering dervishes similarly gave examples in a wide range from charlatan to asceticism.

These religious art circles are also value-oriented groups in accordance with the political meaning of art. In other words, they are carriers and/or critics of worldviews and social value schemes. The liberation of wandering dervish groups from family ties, tribe/kinship ties, private property ties and the state constitutes the material infrastructure of their value orientation. At this point, it would be more appropriate to focus on the objective social relations in which they are involved, rather than on the reflections of these groups in their own consciousness. Whether they are conscious of the fact that what they are doing is art or not, I think, does not make a big difference on their position because artists of different eras have never hesitated to attribute mystical/metaphysical qualities to their art. It is possible to see the best example of this in the mystical personal notes of Renaissance masters and in the works of poets/painters such as William Blake. For example, the influence of esoteric texts such as *Corpus Hermeticum* on the birth of Renaissance art is a well-known phenomenon today (Schwarz & Ohmann, 2016, pp. 23-26). At this point, a further distinction must be made. As a result of the development of the wandering artist type and its articulation to social relations with multiple ties, a new type of artist-dervish emerged as a dweller-craftsmen. In this context, it is necessary to consider settled *sûfi* circles/orders as a religious art school. These art schools *or tariqas*, where religious sciences, fascination and ecstasy

²²⁷ In fact, the Alevi saints named Hemi Tazi and Usi Lol, who are famous in the Maraş Pazarçık region, and Sewusen from Dersim can be considered the last known representatives of this tradition in the 20th century.

techniques (including the use of cannabis and opium in some places)²²⁸, religious and literary texts were taught, as well as how an artist-dervish should take on social roles in practice. The fact that *tariqas* have become art schools is a fact related to the fact that they have specialized in certain techniques, just like painting schools, and have made certain world views perfect by processing (such as *vahdet-i vücud*, *vahdet-i şuhud*, messianism, etc.). In this respect, it can be said that as religious art schools, *tariqas* also undertake social functions such as cooperation and solidarity, they constitute a status group, and thus they become an important part of social power relations. Âşıkpaşazâde critically expressed the transformation between wandering and dwelling dervishes as follows (Kala, 2013, p. 170): “Hakka talip cihanda az kişi var/ Sufilerin kamusu hod lut umar. Kılur namaz eder niyaz Hakk'a/ Varır bey kapısına hem timar umar.”²²⁹ In these lines, there is a criticism that dervish groups also make various social articulations in order to gain a dominant position in the relations of rentier exploitation. In this framework, the institutionalization of the power of a dweller *sûfî* groups is more or less possible if it enters into a privileged symbiosis with the rentier social formation. This pursuit of the *sûfî* circles bring with it an insurmountable conflict between the claim to have knowledge of religious truth and the necessity of being an agent of the ruling classes. In this context, Âşıkpaşazâde is not alone in the criticisms directed against *tariqas* among dervish circles. *Sûfîs* such as Cemâlî el-Karamânî and Eşrefoğlu Rûmî, who were contemporary of Âşıkpaşazâde, also expressed similar criticisms more vigorously. In his book *Risale fi Etvari's-Süluk*, Cemâlî el-Karamânî states that people should not be deceived by the sheikhs of the time and give them valuables because most of them are heretics, Eşrefoğlu Rûmî, on the other hand, in his work called *Müzekki'n-Nüfus*, states that preachers preach in mosques for worldly blessings and collect coins, that the *danişmends*, who could not find what they hoped for at the lord's gates, took the path of the sheikhs, took the people's property by lying, memorized the words of the sheikhs and subjected the people to them, thus he regretfully tells that they are doing such frauds for the sake of worldly goods, clothes and gifts (Bilkan, 2018, pp. 273-74). The fact that Abdal Musa's *Pendnâme* contains an advice such as “don't sell honor of being a dervish to buy a commodity from someone [tm]” (Çiftçi, 1991, p. 10) shows

²²⁸ Melikoff determined this practice for the circle of Ahmet Yesevî and Baba İlyas (2000, p. 151).

²²⁹ There are few people in the world who aspire to the truth/ All *sûfîs* hope for bliss/ He salaats and prays to God / Also he goes to the door of lords and hopes for a *timar*

that some *tariqas* are trying to develop a discipline mechanism against the indicated danger of corruption and frauds.²³⁰

At this point, two types of *sûfi*/dervish example emerge. First, the declassé wandering dervishes defined as antinomian servants of God that Karamustafa (2015, p. 81) tries to classify and describe. It is thought that these are especially members of the way of *Qalandari*, *Abdal*, *Hayderî*, *Camî* and *Cavlakî* (Ocak, 2000, pp. 73-74). The difference of the *Vefâîs* from this group may be that they are more knowledgeable and more conservative/orthodox about the provisions of Sharia (İnalçık, 2019e, p. 136). As an example, Cengiz & Sarıççek (2011, p. 94) states that Âşık Paşa, a member of *Vefâî tariqa*, similarly represented an Islam close to the official doctrine of the madrasa education. Especially after the 15th century, the lines of development that were articulated with *Zeynî* order resulted in the strengthening of such an understanding of *Vefâî* order (Şahin, 2022a, p. 100). For this reason, the *Vefâî* order can be considered as the midpoint of both groups -and increasingly as part of the second group. We can consider the wandering dervish groups in the first group as deterritorialized performance artists. The interesting clothes they wear, their hair and body shaving styles (for example, *çehar-darb*), their provocative behavior, the symbolic-religious meanings they give to their clothing and their poetic abilities convince us to make this judgment. I am of the opinion that these dervish groups stand against the ruling classes in terms of their ethical attitudes.

As İnalçık (2019c, p. 90) points out, this dervish type occasionally exhibits revolutionary mystic features, which Max Weber called *mystagogue*. Ülken (2017, p. 320) uses the term ‘anarchic mysticism’ to formulate the general political character of this type of dervish circles. As can be seen especially in the example of Otman Baba, the members of this circle engage in a struggle against “those who make oppression for the goods of this world [tm]” (İnalçık, 2019c, p. 92). In this respect, the negation of private property, the defense of the idea of being poor, the notion of not being tied to any land or property were the most dominant moral characteristics of these dervishes. It is possible to think that this ideal brings with it serious criticisms about social class relations. Ülken (2017, p. 248) states that the mystical currents of heterodox and rebellious character “never influenced the general character of the intellectual life that dominated the upper strata [tm]”. It is clear that this result came about not because of a

²³⁰ For a similar criticism, see Sheikh Tirsî’s *Diwan* (Yüce, 2010, p.135) and *velâyetnâme* of Piri Baba (Doğanbaş, 2007, pp. 178-79).

problem with the theological competence of the thought of the revolutionary dervishes, but because of a conscious policy of class isolation and assimilation. Kaplanoğlu (2000, p. 149) interprets the information that ninety percent of the *waqf* lands given during the Osman Beg period were given to *sûfis*, and argues that the purpose of isolating the *sûfis* from urban life by sending them to deserted places was effective in this policy. It is possible to determine that this policy was not only necessary in terms of the class dominance of the Ottoman administration, but also that there was a negative view towards wandering dervishes in the environments where settled class relations prevailed. For example, it is known that Akşemseddin, the caliph of Hacı Bayram Velî, first went to Beypazarı after the death of his sheikh, but could not hold on in this neighborhood due to the religious conservatism of the local people (Abdülbaki [Gölpınarlı], 1931, p. 41). In the *velâyetnâme* of Kolu Açık Hacım Sultan, it is seen that the urban settlers living in the city of Sandıklı expelled Hacım Sultan and similar *İşk/Kalanderi* dervishes from their cities (Gündüz, 2010, p. 83): “Bu bid’at eşi’a buradan gitsün yohsa bizim zararımız dokunur ilde vilayet çok bir aher yire gitsün biz eşi’a sevmeyüz bundan gayri durmasun helak iderüz”. Thus, wandering dervishes are subjected to pressure to either join a settled lodge and engage with the ruling classes, or to leave that region.²³¹ In this framework, it is seen that wandering dervish circles also resisted central control and resisted being attached to a particular lodge or being under the patronage -and therefore subordination- of the ruler. For example, in the *menâkıbnâme* of Şuca’eddin Velî, Timurtaşoğlu Ali Çelebi’s offer to grant gold, city and village *waqfs* to the Sheikh is rejected (Say, 2010, pp. 114-15).²³² It is also stated in the *velâyetnâme* of Kolu Açık Hacım Sultan that Dondul the lord of Karahisar offered to build a dervish lodge to Hacım Sultan, to endow villages and give thirty servants, but he did not accept this offer (Gündüz, 2010, p. 82). Mehmet II also promised Otman Baba to build a lodge ‘like a palace’, to donate *waqfs* and money, but this offer was rejected by the famous dervish (Yalçın, 2008, p. 264). On the other hand, in both Kemalpaşazâde’s *Risalatü’l-Munire* and Lâmi’î Mahmud Çelebi’s *Münşeât-ı Lâmi’î*, there are information that some of the *sûfis* interacted with the state officials and became rich in this way, it is even stated that the Naqshbandi sheikh Emir Ahmed Buharî owned

²³¹ Let these aberrant *ışıks* get out of here or we will be harmed. There are many provinces in the country, let's go far away. We don't like *ışıks*, we kill them if they don't stay here any longer.

²³² The information that Sheikh Edebâli accepted such an offer is included in various Ottoman chronicles, especially in Âşıkpaşazâde. Thus, the difference between settled dervishes and wandering dervishes becomes visible in terms of their attitudes towards *waqfs*.

property in this way (Öngören, 2000, p. 238). Since the increase in the political and economic power of the central state with the 16th century makes such articulations more attractive, theoretical/theological construction attempts have emerged among the sheikhs to establish the legitimacy ground of this articulation. For example, Lâmi'î Mahmud Çelebi said that it is undesirable not to have worldly goods but to love him, and that it is more virtuous to be close to Sheikh Nureddinzâde state dignitaries and give them advice than to guide a thousand disciples, Yunus b. Halil, one of the leaders of *Halvetî tariqa*, argues that the relationship between the ruler and the sheikhs is necessary to take the shares of the poor from the *bayt'al-mal* and finance the lodges (Öngören, 2000, pp. 238-39).

As İnalçık stated (2019c, p. 91), the fact that the religious life in the cities came under the influence of madrasas and jurists in the 14th and 15th centuries brought about the exclusion of these dervishes, called *abdals*, from the society. For example, the description of *abdals* as crazy junkie, slave of lust, homosexual and inferior to animals in *Letâifnâme* makes the negative discourse constructed about them visible (Lâmi'î Çelebi, 2015, p. 86). In the *velâyetnâme* of Otman Baba, it is seen that Otman Baba often lived in the mountains and in the countryside, and he got into trouble whenever he approached the cities. Moreover, Otman Baba does not like the people of the city, for example, when he arrives in the city of Edirne, he beats them wherever he sees them, calling them “ugly city dwellers [tm]” or “ugly townspeople with bloated bellies [tm]” (Yalçın, 2008, p. 197-202). Ocak (1992a, p. 100) mentions the cases of being tried in court and being excluded by madrasah circles, which are frequently mentioned in the *velâyetnâme* of Otman Baba.²³³ The presence of stories about dervishes who had problems with *qadis* in the *velâyetnâme* of Kolu Açık Hacım Sultan shows that this is a general sociological phenomenon (Gündüz, 2010, p. 81). For example, Otman Baba comes across hunters on the Balkan Mountain. Hunters bind the saint and bring him to the court of the *qadi*. The *qadi* thought that Otman Baba was a fugitive and said, “Whose servant are you? [tm]” to Otman Baba, on the other hand, makes him realize that he is a saint (Yalçın, 2008, p. 72). In another story, Otman Baba defends the *abdals* who cut the trees, against the *qadi* (Yalçın, 2008, p. 171). Moreover, he saves the *abdals*, who are threatened with being sent to the dungeon, from the *qadi* (Yalçın, 2008, pp. 172-73). The dervishes around him are declared apostate and infidel by the *qadi* (Yalçın,

²³³ The use of the term “İbn Felatun” (sons of Platon) for the ulama in the *velâyetnâme* of Otman Baba is significant in terms of showing the contradiction (Yalçın, 2008, p. 234).

2008, p. 188). The people of Edirne complain to the *qadi* and accuse Otman Baba of not worshipping (Yalçın, 2008, p. 197). It is important in terms of political history that such a scene is included in the works as a scene that reflects the life of wandering dervishes, as well as whether these examples refer to real historical facts. Similarly, in Barak Baba's *Kelimat*, which was copied in 1449, there is a criticism that the *ulama* members have gone astray, corrupted, and the educated ones deviated from the right path (Hilmi Ziya, 1924).²³⁴ For example, Kaygusuz Abdal, in his work called *Salatnâme*, struggles with the *qadis* who imply that he does not know the prayer, and proves to them that their basic religious knowledge is lacking (Güzel, 1981, pp. 105-6). Kaygusuz's criticisms of the mosque preacher are grouped under the following headings (Güzel, 1999, p. 138); (i) preachers gather with property owners and slander dervishes like Kaygusuz as people who do not like to work, (ii) lovers are called lazy, ascetics are hypocrites, (iii) *danişmends* find the ordinary people ignorant and worthless. Kaygusuz, who says in his *Minbernâme* that if there were a God with words, all Islamic jurists (*fakihs*) would rise to the sky, touches upon the contradiction between the *ulama* and the wandering dervishes (Güzel, 1981, p. 121). In the preamble of Kaygusuz Abdal's *menâkıbnâme* (Güzel, 1999, p. 91), it is stated that this book was written for the *abdals* and other dervishes to read, and that it is not appropriate to be read by the "zahir ulema" (official crude scholars), thus makes the mentioned contradiction visible. In another example, in an anecdote between Hamîdüddin Aksarâyî (Somuncu Baba) and Molla Fenârî, it is implied that the money earned by the *ulama* is *haram* because Aksarâyî's donkey does not eat the grass bought with Molla Fenârî's money -moreover, it pisses on them (Şahin, 2022b, p. 135). It is striking that these examples continue to be enriched with different connotations and discussion topics. For example, in the *menâkıbnâme* of Şuca'eddin Velî, who was also the mentor of Otman Baba, *qadis* were sent to the Şuca'eddin dervishes who were complained about not fasting, but Şuca'eddin Velî miraculously killed the *qadis* along with their entourage by hitting the ground with his staff (Say, 2010, p. 130). In an anecdote in the work called *Letâif-i Lâmi'î* (Lâmi'î Çelebi, 2015, p. 93), an *abdal* shout Molla Hüsrev the *qadi* of Istanbul as "the archdemon is coming, huh! [tm]", this anecdote reveals the level of tension in the relationship between *qadis* and wandering dervishes. It should also be noted that the elements of the settled society, which are in structural contradiction with the *abdals*, cannot be considered only as *ulama*, Sunni sheikhs and central state officials. Also it is

²³⁴ About Barak Baba, see also: Ocak (1992c).

possible to come across social contradictions that developed within the framework of politics and economy between local lords and dervishes. For example, in Kaygusuz Abdal's *menâkıbnâme*, the participation of Kaygusuz (Alaeddin Gaybî), the son of a local lord, was opposed by his father, and the contradiction turned into a fierce struggle for social status, as can be understood from his father's words, "I have lost my honor and pudicity in public from this effort, my honor and pudicity has not remained in the eyes of public [tm]" (Güzel, 1999, p. 94).

While Otman Baba (İnalçık, 2019c, p. 98) accuses "ulama, sūfîs, danişmends and sheikhs" as being hypocritical liars, *Vefâî* dervishes like Âşıkpaşazâde prefer madrasah members to wandering dervishes, claiming that the corruption of wandering dervishes has turned into evil.²³⁵ The view of the *ulama members* towards dervish circles and orders varies. While the members of the ulama circle evaluated some *sūfî* groups as illegitimate (such as *Qalandaris*), they tolerate some groups by necessity, see some of them as harmless but insufficient in Islamic knowledge, and easily adhere to other some of them. In the first place, it is understood that wandering dervishes and antinomian groups resisting the principle of private property were defined as the enemies of the ulama circles. For example, Ahmed bin Hüsameddin Amâsî (2016, p. 349), although he came from a family of both Halvetî sheikhs and ulama; He characterizes this choice of dervishes who have been suspended, separated from society, and lived alone as "*zulm*" and "*cevr*", and he claims that the common people incorrectly think that these people are virtuous. On the other hand, there has been no direct attack from the ulama towards the Bektashi order strategically supported by the Ottoman state in order to restrain the wandering dervishes for a long time. Thirdly, as can be seen in an anecdote in Lâmi'î Çelebi's *Letâifnâme*, even in some cases where a mutual relationship is established between the ulama and dervish circles, the ulama stratum continues to see itself at a high point in the Islamic hierarchy in the final analysis. In the *Letâifnâme*, the anecdote is as follows: Sheikh Şerefüddin asks Mevlânâ İzdüddin where is the Qur'an sheikhs are mentioned. Mevlânâ İzdüddin says that sheikhs and scholars are mentioned together in the Qur'an. According to Mevlânâ, in the verse "*Hel yestevi 'l-lezine ya'alemune ve 'l-lezine la ya'lemun*" (Can those who know and those who do not know are equivalent), sheikhs and scholars are mentioned together, and those who do not know correspond to sheikhs while those who "know" are scholars/ulama (Lâmi'î Çelebi, 2015, p. 218). In the anecdote added to the anecdote, it is stated that ignorant people in the age of the

²³⁵ "Danişmend azsa ışk olur, ışk azsa şeytan olur" (Apzd, 2017, p. 76).

author became sheikhs in order to collect goods from the lords, they deceived the public by embellishing their appearance and deceived them from the right path (Lâmi'î Çelebi, 2015, p. 219). This interpretation is typical in that it shows the struggle between two separate intellectual groups that claim to have the monopoly of “true knowledge” in the final analysis. Finally, it is necessary to mention the articulations established between the ulama stratum and the dervish circles. The popularization of İbnü'l-Arabî's Akbari *sûfîsm* in madrasa circles, or Necmeddîn-i Dâye's doctrines that built a madrasa *sûfîsm*, in this respect, constitute the main references of this articulation dating back to the pre-Ottoman era. In the second half of the 15th century, and especially in the 16th century, it is possible to follow the new development line of the articulation between the ulama members and the *sûfî* orders through examples such as *Vefâî* caliphs' -such as Âşıkpaşazâde and Seyyid Velâyet- started to establish close relations with *Zeyniyye tariqa* (Öngören, 2003, p.126-28), Sinan Pasha's involvement in *Zeyniyye tariqa* his praise of this order in the *Tazarru'nâme* etc. When we add the *Mevlevî*, *Nakshî* and various *Halvetî* groups to this framework, it can be asserted that a certain tradition of articulation has been established between the ulama and the settled dervishes.

The effects of this tradition in terms of articulations at the discursive level are also obvious. Although Eşrefoğlu Rumî 's son-in-law Abdurrahim Tirsî has criticisms about the stratum of ulama, which had tried to be pointed above, the dose of these criticisms is quite low compared to the wandering dervishes who were dominant in the previous generation. Özçelik (2010, p. 313-14) finds that Tirsî describes some people who criticize him, but whom he does not name, as ‘deniers’ and that he criticizes this group quite harshly. The 8th and 9th poems with ‘-se’ rhyme in Tirsî's *Diwan* are examples of these criticisms. In these poems, although Tirsî (Yüce, 2010, pp. 110-11) heavily criticizes people who condemn ‘*ışk*’s, spread deception/lie/discord with ninety thousand sorrows, and are hostile to saints and prophets, he avoids directly naming the social segment that includes them. As a sheikh who remained a *sûfî* leader from the end of the reign of Mehmet II until the end of the reign of Bayezid II, Tirsî became a poet/mystic who exemplifies the process of articulation of the circles of dervish with the central power. In fact, Tirsî can be considered a conscious representative of the aforementioned break in terms of observing that the social legitimacy of the wandering dervish type is decreasing and reflecting this in his poems. Tirsî includes the following couplet in his *Diwan* (Poetry no: 38; Yüce, 2010, p. 134): “Alemleri tama’ tutdı helal

haram farkı gitdi/ Ümmilerün işi bitdi görüp anları ezmişdür”.²³⁶ One of the reasons for this development lies in the Ottoman administration’s attempt to place the wandering dervish groups in a certain lodge or *wakf* and take them under control.

The second of the types of dervishes we will discuss is the settled and state-engaged dervish circles, which we also see in the example of Edebâli. According to Ocak (2000, p. 72) in the establishment period of the Ottoman rule, it is not possible to see any traces of traditional *tariqas* such as *Rifâîs*, *Kadirîs*, *Mevlevîs*, the development of these orders under the Ottoman rule is particularly evident after the 15th century. However, İnalçık (2019c, p. 91) states that the *Bektashi* and *Vefâî* dervish circles reconciled with the political power, they obtained *waqfs* from the state-lands and established *zawiyas*. According to Ocak (2014, p. 148) who shares the same view, *sûfi* circles develop good relations with the state in order to defend the material and moral opportunities given to them by the state, and within this framework, a political relationship established based on mutual interests. It is necessary to consider such *sûfi* circles as an established social stratum and a politically conscious social group. Ocak (2000, p. 73) is of the opinion that these groups are the social segments that settled in big dervish lodges in the cities, fed on the incomes of *waqfs* and adapted to a comfortable life in this way. Theoretically, it is clear that these groups are members of the rentier class with the privilege of rent extraction. Barkan (1994, p. 32) detects the existence of Bektashi dervish lodges collecting tribute from hundreds of villages in Rumelia. In this context, it can be seen that a kind of rentier vassalage relationship has developed. For example, the Sari Saltik tomb in Kaligra (Varna) sent a share of crops of their farms to the *sipâhî* and the sultan, which will be granted the ownership of large *waqfs* (Barkan, 1994, p. 34). Likewise, Barkan (1994, pp. 37-38) states that in the village of Larende, the Sheikh Hacı İsmail *zawiya* has a *mülknâme*, that its trustees collect tithes from the surrounding area, and that and that the *zawiya* looks as rich as a dynasty member’s house or a feudal lord’s mansion to the travelers of this period. It is also recorded that the sheikh named Yakub Halife in Trabzon Körtun had 5 villages consisting of 73 households and did not pay taxes -he was exempt from tithe and duty (Barkan, 1994, pp. 38-39).

It is possible to consider these established dervish groups as either (i) simply as a part of the rentier class, (ii) as an example of a community dominated by collective

²³⁶ The worlds are filled with greed, the difference between *halal* and *haram* is gone/ The illiterates are finished, they saw and crushed them.

ownership, or as (iii) religious craft/art schools, and there are examples in all three categories. The examples of dervish groups who own villages and transfer their income to their children through *waqf* can be considered in the first group, especially since they are concentrated in the hands of certain families. Barkan (1994, p. 54) states that such dervish groups gather around inheritable *zawiyas* and that these *zawiyas* may also have a few slaves. On the other hand, it is possible to find examples of communities that practice collective ownership principles and make a living by agriculture in the records of Barkan (1994 p. 42) as about groups that come as immigrants and cultivate fields in rural areas and mountains etc. The most interesting of the dervish groups, as the third group, must be one of the ‘craft/art school’ type *sûfî* orders, because their endless struggles and *takfirs* between the various *tariqas*, the efforts of a certain craft school to preserve its social status and the not to open a new ‘shop’ for its nearby, that is seems like a kind of guild activity. The fact that the *Ahis* formed a kind of religious order among themselves supports this thesis (Melikoff, 2000, p. 152). Moreover, *Mevlevî* groups (Gölpınarlı, 2020b, p. xvii) are influential in the circles of tradesmen and craftsmen. For example, Salahuddin, the first caliph of Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî, is known as *Zerkûbî*, that means the goldsmith, and is the father-in-law of Mevlânâ’s son Sultan Veled.²³⁷ The fact that Eşrefoğlu Rûmî was the son-in-law of Hacı Bayram-ı Velî and that Hacı Bayram gave him the caliphate shows that the *tariqa* lines gradually resembled the dynastic lines. Also Sheikh Abdürrahim Tirsî, who took the leadership of *Kadirî order* after Eşrefoğlu Rûmî, was also married with Eşrefoğlu’s daughter. Such relationships are not exceptional at all while considering *sûfî* circles. In this context, I think that settled dervish circles were or become a social stratum and they tend to leap to class domination within the framework of their religious activities. Öztürk (2017, p. 558) is of the opinion that the hierarchical network established by the *tariqas* between the *âsitâne/zawiya/tekke*, sheikh/caliph/disciple and the symbolisms of rite/ritual/sacraments, ceremonial dresses, protocol rules, and organizational pattern “include all the functions as a model necessary for a state system [tm]”. İnalçık (2019c, p. 98) states that such dervish circles bequeath their property to their children through

²³⁷ In addition, in the letters and poems written by both Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî and Sultan Veled to the rulers and commanders of the period, it is seen that these two were petitioners on issues such as protection, tax exemption, rights over *waqfs* (see: Peacock, 2017, pp. 167-68, 172, 175). These examples are important in terms of showing the patterns of articulation of the ruling classes among themselves.

waqfs, the sheikhs were wealthy enough to be called 'rich', they were exempt from taxes, and they had acquired a significant part of the *mîrî* lands.

Precisely for this reason, it can be assumed that the Ottoman administration attached special importance to the coexistence of different -and contradicting- dervish groups, since the dominance of a single dervish group in a particular city or administrative circle would mean the establishment of structures dominated by a religious authority, such as Calvinist city-states. As Ocak (2014, p. 149) states, the great influence of the *Bayramî* order in the central Anatolia, or the decisiveness of the *Mevlevî* order in Konya and its surroundings, was seen as a threat from time to time by the Ottoman administration. As Abdûlbaki [Gölpınarlı] (1931, p. 34) points out, the *Bayramîs* directed the attention of the Ottoman administration even during the period of Hacı Bayram-ı Velî, and Hacı Bayram was asked to determine how many followers he had and to inform the civil administration. In this context, Hacı Bayram-ı Velî was exiled to Edirne for a while. Because in the 16th century, it is seen that the *timar* holders and farmers who formed the *Bayramî* circles engaged in messianic movements and attempted to rebel such as Büyamin-i Ayaşî, Pir Ali-i Aksarayî and Hüsameddin Ankaravî movements (Ocak, 2017, p. 52). Moreover, in the last quarter of the 16th century, under the leadership of Hamza Bali, it is seen that the *Bayramî-Melametîs* attempted to establish a new administration by appointing administrators such as sultan, vizier and treasurer among themselves (Ocak, 2015a, p. 40). On the other hand, it is understood that the central government tried to control the *Bayramî* movement and to articulate it during the Murat II and Mehmet II periods. As Çelik (2017, pp. 32-33) points out, the Safavid sheiks in the *Bayramî* line were removed from the official lineage during the reign of Akşemseddin and the state-*Bayramî* relationship was tried to be strengthened in economic and political fields by granting the *waqfs* allocated to Bayram Velî to the possession of the *Şemsî -Bayramî* group. Similarly, it is clear that he developed close relations between the state and mystique orders such as *Zeyniyye*, *Naqshbandiyye* and *Halvetiyye* during the reign of Bayezid II.

In the *menâkıbnâme* of Eşrefoğlu Rûmî (1976, pp. 73-75), there are criticisms about Mehmet II. It is possible to think that this sheikh partially continued his autonomist tendencies, since he also received an *icazetnâme* from Hacı Bayram-ı Velî. On the other hand, if the rumors about the sheikh's daughter, Züleyha, were raised in the palace by one of Mehmet I's wives, and that she asked Sheikh Tirsî to determine which prince would become the ruler, it is understood that the articulation between the

state and the *sûfîs* was carried out almost within two *sûfî* generations. The fact that Grand Vizier Mahmud Pasha had relations with many *sûfî* circles in the development of the articulation process -even for this reason, a *menâkıbnâme* was written and the rank of sainthood was discursively attributed to him, and Bayezid II's patronage of many *sûfî* groups has a great impact. Bayezid II helped the *Naqshbandî*, the *Mevlevî*, the *Kadirî* and the *Bayramî* orders, and even joined the *Bayramî* Sheikhs Muhyiddin Yavsî and Baba Yusuf's disciplines (Demir, 2017, pp. 63-64). The most important factor in the emergence of this situation is that the dervish circles are in a much more privileged and influential position than any other organ of the state in terms of their affinity for the subaltern social classes. It is seen that the dervish circles are closer to the peasants and nomads who constitute subaltern classes, both spatially and discursively, compared to social groups such as *Diwan* members, *Kapıkulu* soldiers, timariot *sipâhîs*, ulama of madrasahs, *qadis*, tax officers etc. Because both the itinerant and ascetic religious orders and the settled *tariqa* members travel between different *zawiyahs*, they can meet with the people directly in the villages and nomadic tribes where they stay, without any reservations. To give an example, an anecdote in the *menâkıbnâme* of Eşrefoğlu Rûmî pretty well sums up the relationship between dervishes and nomads.²³⁸ According to the story told by Bursalı Mehmed Veliyüddin Efendi (1976, pp. 72-73), Sheikh Abdürrahim Tirsî goes to a mountainous place to cut timber to build a mosque on the Tirse plateau. A lot of people come to this mountainous place to help with the sawing of timber. At dinner time, a group of people from the '*Yörükler taifesi*' (*Yörük* tribes, or simply nomads) bring food with them and put it in front of the people there. Later, it is understood that these are not the *Yörüks*, but the angels in the form of *Yörüks*. Sheikh Tirsî interprets this situation as follows: "The reason why they came in the form of *Yörüks* is because *Yörüks* were pure believers [tm]" (Bursalı, 1976, p. 73). According to Islamic belief, angels do not take the form of evil beings. In this story, the details of the Sheikh going to a plateau and wanting to cut timber give an important clue as to which social segments he may have encountered. Those who came to help him in the plateau are probably nomads and *tahtacıs*. In this case, Tirsî's aphorism honors the

²³⁸ In addition, there is a similar story in the *menâkıbnâme* of Otman Baba's (Yalçın, 2008, p. 71) about the nomads who came to the Balkan Mountain to cut trees and accepted Otman Baba as a saint. Moreover, events such as Otman Baba being a shepherd in the villages of the city of Vize and encountering non-Muslim villagers exemplify the way wandering dervishes can establish relationships with people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds (Yalçın, 2008, p. 95).

Yörük groups, saying that the *Yürüks* are pure believers, and does not reproduce the *takfir* discourse expressed by the ulama members about nomadic groups.²³⁹

In addition, interacting with different social segments significantly increases the capacity of the dervish circles to develop political discourses that can be effective among the people, as it makes them familiar with the emotional world of the subaltern people. Moreover, the familiarity of dervish circles with folk poetry and folk tales paves the way for their discourse to spread easily among the people and gain strength and credibility. In this context, the works of poet-mystics such as Âşık Paşa, Hacı Bayram-ı Velî, Kaygusuz Abdal, Abdal Musa, Yunus Emre, Eşrefoğlu Rûmî, Abdürrahim Tirsî, examples of discourse constructed using everyday Turkish such as *ghaza* and miracle narratives, Nasreddin Hodja anecdotes, and have the opportunity to circulate among the public. This opportunity greatly increases the political importance of dervish circles for the central government. Perhaps for this reason, it is a strategic necessity for the social opposition to win dervish circles to their own ranks, and it is possible to trace this strategic line from the *Babaî* Revolt to the *Qizilbash* movement in the 16th century. For example, the narrative in the *velâyetnâme* of Abdal Musa (Alay, 2019, p. 274) that the famous *sûfi* fought and defeated the lord of the Teke region is a significant example in terms of articulating the resistance of the subaltern social classes of the dervish circles. Güzel (1981, pp. 38-39) describes the details of the event and the epic battle scenes as follows:

[Abdal Musa] shouted ‘O Allah’ from where he was sitting. Upon this sound, Abdal Musa started to march against Teke Begi with four or five hundred followers by whirling *sema*. There was a high mountain in the west of the lodge, while Abdal Musa and his followers were whirling, this mountain also walked right after them. (...) Later, Abdal Musa and stones and trees came in a rush and followed him towards the lord of Teke. No matter how many trees and stones there are on Dur Mountain, they are all circles and whirling the *sema* with Abdal Musa. (...) There was a dervish named Baltası Gedik. This dervish slaughtered that monster with an ax [believed to be the spirit of Teke Beg]. Meanwhile, lord of Teke fell from the horse and died, and his soldiers were scattered in all directions. [tm]

²³⁹ It would be wrong to think that the relations between wandering dervishes and *Yürüks* are always in a positive manner. For example, we see in the *velâyetnâme* of Hacım Sultan that the nomads did not want Hacım Sultan in their own highlands and intended to kill him (Gündüz, 2010, p. 85).

Whether it is related to a particular historical reality or not, these and similar narratives are passed on through generations as a cultural residue in terms of showing the political articulation capacity and possibilities of dervish circles. These dervishes, who were believed to manage the forces of nature and possess divine grace, and more importantly, won the favor of the people, could easily take place in the imagination of subaltern classes and declassé groups as supernatural saviors. Since the Ottoman rulers were aware of this situation, they often chose to keep these dervish groups under control but not to destroy them. It is seen that this role has been continued by transforming into a kind of 'advisor' or 'intermediary' role in terms of settled dervish orders articulated with the state. For example, there is information in Hoca Sâdeddin's *Tâcü't-tevârîh*, where a 'miraculous' person whom Bayezid II visited when he was the governor of Amasya, advised him to be more interested in the affairs of the people and not to be fond of hunting entertainment (Öngören, 2000, p. 240). Moreover, after Bayezid II came to the throne, the Naqshbandi sheikh Muslihuddîn Tavîl wrote a pamphlet about the cruelty of the administrators of Kastamonu region and sent it to the ruler (Öngören, 2000, p. 241).

Finally, it is necessary to evaluate the circles of the ulama. The ulama category generally consists of people who have a madrasa education. These people were having a formal Islamic education and were learning an interpretation of Islamic thought that had attained a literary form, systematized, and whose ideological structure was shaped by intellectual instruments such as linguistics, logic, and methodology. The ulama category was also referred to as *faqih*s and *danishmends*²⁴⁰ in the early works, and they were engaged in a series of social positions and jobs from local administration to central state such as *imam*, *qadi*, *naib*, *mufti*, *katib*, accountant, consultant, treasurer, *muderris*, *qadiasker*, council member etc. It is understood that the ulama members developed these functions especially during the Abbasid state and they were also effective in the pre-Ottoman states in the region of Middle East. I think that the ulama members gained own identity as a social stratum or class in the western Anatolia, in parallel with the development of the Ottoman administration.²⁴¹ Atçıl (2017, p. 41) formulates the general character of this social segment as follows:

²⁴⁰ This term is also used for young people from madrasahs who take on the assistantship of *qadis*.

²⁴¹ Although Ocak (2014, p. 124) expressed the same opinion, his definition of the category of social class is not evident.

“High-level scholars studied advanced texts, showed superior competence in religio-legal topics, and acquired the ability to fulfill all the tasks associated with scholars as a class. (...) Generally speaking, therefore, this group of scholars had options and privileges, enabling them to have a certain autonomy.”

The members of the ulama played a very significant role in the reproduction of the social order (education, judiciary and religious services) and even developed the legal and cultural structure of the social order within the framework of their own interests.²⁴² For example, the decisive role they play in issues such as the identification and teaching of the theoretical and practical aspects of Islamic Law, the implementation of the Law, and the establishment of ideological formation is noteworthy. As Zilfi (2008, pp. 5-7) points out, there is a “marriage” between the state and the ulama, such as providing legal education, meeting the need for judges in civil units, supervising/monitoring the Islamic lifestyle of the people, undertaking the role of arbitrator in interpersonal problems, supervising administrative officials and so on. Mumcu (2017, p. 60) states that the application of the Sharia provisions in the field of private law has made the ulama as an absolute legislator without an alternative in this field. Hoexter (2002, p. 123) considers that the legal relations between individuals are guaranteed within the framework of Sharia and that the regulation is provided by the judicial authority of the ulama stratum as the first condition for the formation of a public sphere in the Islamic sense. In this context, the fact that the political debates on the concept of ‘ummah’ are necessarily passed through Islamic law, makes the ulama stratum an important apparatus for both the lower classes and the upper classes in the formation and administration of the public sphere. In addition, the fact that *fiqh* took the opportunity to decide on many issues from the ruler and gave it to jurists and judges in the name of God, and the fact that ‘epistemic investment’ was made in favor of the ulama because of its usefulness in ensuring the social authority of administration (Demir, 2020, p. 34) strengthened the social position of this stratum in the context of Islamic history. When the historical development process of the Ottoman state is examined, it is seen that land was systematically granted to the ulama members,

²⁴² For example, it was determined by Atcil that Molla Fenârî behaved as a member of the same social class in his relations with Bayezid I (2017, p. 42); “These reports indicate that Fenârî had connections beyond the Ottoman territories, even beyond Anatolia, and thus did not feel beholden to the Ottoman sultans. His relationship with them was a cooperation of equals; when that cooperation failed, they parted company.”

especially in the early period. These land grants include *çiftlik* donations and land gifts in the status of *waqf* made to people called *faqih* in the early period, and it is seen that land donations in part *timar* and other status continue in the following periods (see: Beldiceanu, 1985, pp. 36-39; Barkan, 1994, pp. 32-39; Vatin 2019, p. 53, Şahin, 2022c, pp. 136-144). In this context, it is necessary to accept that some of the members of the ulama stratum became a part of the rentier class directly from the early period of the Ottoman state.

Moreover, in the Ottoman case, the fact that the ulama members was largely exempt from taxation, were not executed (İpşirli, 2000) and was able to transfer their private property to their children is an important detail that determines their tendency to rise to the ruling class. We can observe this tendency especially through the fact that it is difficult for the ulama to issue a fatwa for the execution of Sheikh Bedreddin, and the person named Mevlânâ Haydar does not issue a fatwa for the confiscation of Bedreddin's property. Kayapınar, who examined the endowment in Serez, states that the properties belonging to Bedreddin were transformed into *waqf* and left to the management of his family (2017, p. 422). Moreover, the fact that Bedreddin's *Vâridât* has been annotated many times, and great efforts have been made within the ulama class to clear his *fiqh* studies and his name reveal that the ulama class generally act as meticulously in protecting their general social authority.²⁴³ In the final analysis, as Ocak (2014, p. 135) points out, these qualities of the ulama should be related to their social class position and consciousness:

The fact that they were exempt from tax, had under their control the large and rich waqf incomes, and could inherit their possessions and, moreover, even their professional status, made them a privileged class among the other sultan's servants in the truest sense of the word. [tm]

In the establishment period of the Ottoman rule, a flow of ulama towards the Ottoman lands was encountered from most of the centers where traditional madrasah education was organized. As Ocak stated (2014, p. 129), ulama members from Kayseri, Konya, Iran, Syria, Iraq and Egypt came to the Ottoman lands. It is obvious that the Ottoman madrasahs were established in a rising trend, not only by the sultan but also

²⁴³ As an interesting example of continuity, we can note that Yavasî Mehmet Muhiddin Efendi, the father of Ebussuud Efendi, the influential Shaykh al-Islam of the 'classical age', also wrote a *Vâridât* commentary (Ülken, 2017, p. 292).

by other administrators. For example, 23 of the 69 madrasahs established to cover the periods of Orhan Beg and Murat II were founded by the Ottoman dynasty (Atçıl, 2017, p. 29). This figure corresponds to only one third of the total number of madrasahs. It can be assumed that such madrasahs, whose management is transferred to a *waqf* board of trustees, were established and supported by the local rentier classes to train scholars who could defend themselves -and their class interests. According to Atçıl (2017, p. 44): “Thus, scholars who taught in these madrasahs and received their salaries from their endowments had no reason to feel any gratitude toward the Ottoman sultans because their rights came from the endowment deed and thus were protected.” In this case, it should be accepted that the non-dynastic social segments, which strive to protect their own class privileges (by the means of *waqfs*, *Law*, regulations, ideology etc.) have a great influence on the formation of the ulama group as a social stratum and a part of dominant class.

Another issue is the historical continuity of the ulama families and the fact that ulama members necessarily emerged from the families of the local rentiers. It must be admitted that this phenomenon continues to exist in the form of a kind of ‘*noblesse de robe*’. The members of the ulama stratum, who came from large local families, can find the opportunity to reproduce the class privileges of their own families due to their administrative positions such as being a *qadi*, *mufti*, treasurer, *müderris* etc. Divitçioğlu (2000b, p. 124) shows the prevalence of well-known local families having class articulations on the trivet of ulama stratum, bureaucracy and land ownership, by citing the Seljuk society as an example. Similarly, Ahmed bin Hüsameddin Amâsî’s family (*Gümüşlüzâdes*) is in the position of one of the most powerful families of Amasya, who served as *mufti*, *zawiya* sheikh, *nişancı* and treasurer in the Ottoman state (Yılmaz, 2016, p. 13). The situation is similar even in the late 18th century, according to Gerber (1994a, p. 150); “The great majority of Aleppo’s elite families were ulama (religious scholars). Merchants occupied only second place, although this city drew most of its wealth and fame from international trade”. İpşirli (2000), on the other hand, lists the major families in the ulama stratum as follows;

About twenty families, which were at their strongest in different periods, easily obtained the major *ilmiye* positions, and the marriages between the *ilmiye* families further increased the power and influence of the families. Those who wanted to enter the profession from outside this network had great obstacles to overcome. Some of these *ilmiye* families, the most prominent of which were the

Çandarlıs, Fenârîzâdes, Çivîzâdes, Ebüssuûdzâdes, Müeyyedzâdes, Taşkoprülüzâdes, Bostanzâdes, Hoca Sâdeddinzâdes, Kınalîzâdes, Zekerîyyâzâdes, Paşmakçîzâdes, Dürrîzâdes, Arabzâdes, Feyzullahzâdes, Ebûishakzâdes, İvazpaşazâdes held active positions until the collapse of the state.
[tm]

Zilfi (2008, p. 38) states that most of the ulama families emerged after the 17th century and their positions became institutionalized. He states that a gradual degeneration may have occurred, noting that it was accepted not to have a good lineage but to have a good merit in order to rise in the bureaucracy of the ulama as mentioned in the memoirs of the ambassador Busbecq, who was the Habsburg representative in the Ottoman palace in the middle of the 16th century (Zilfi, 2008, p. 27). The accuracy of this judgment is doubtful because, as early as the end of the 15th century, in his work titled *Maârifnâme*, Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 492-96) made a rather early critique of approaches that give importance to genealogy but ignore individual science and moral competence. Moreover, there is historical evidence from the 16th century that members of rentier families rose easily within the ulama bureaucracy. Uzunçarşılı (1988, p. 70) states that due to the fact that the children of prominent families rise rapidly at a young age and without waiting in line (*tehile* and *tafra*), it has become impossible for ordinary madrasa students to rise to these positions and ‘Turkish children’ do not enroll in madrasahs. As a result, the articulation of the ulama class, which constituted an interest group with a cultural and political identity from the very beginning, with other ruling classes in order to protect their own interests and creating a privileged stratum within itself in the distribution of incomes and status appears as a typical class behavior at least since the 15th century.

In the final analysis, it cannot be claimed that the ulama category objectively showed an absolutely distinctive social class character at all times and in all situations. However, it is clear that they have a high level of class-consciousness and they do not hesitate to develop subordination and domination relations under appropriate conditions. Although the particular ideological tendencies of this social class oscillate freely between mystical mentality and opportunism, its general ideological tendencies have been shaped to maintain the robe nobility and to protect the superiority of material interest/prestige/authority. Amâsî (2016, p. 283) criticized the situations such as personal jealousy and conflicts among the ulama, and not sharing their knowledge with

each other, which we can read as the establishment of a common class-consciousness and the search for the protection of interests. The class ideology, which follows the scheme that the world should be lived within the framework of religious rules, that learning these rules (*tahsil-i ilim*) is one of the most honorable worldly activities, and that the groups who know these rules should be decisive in the administration, presents a very competent and complex structure. For example, Ahmed bin Hüsameddin Amâsî, in his work *Mirâtu'l-Mülûk*, separates the ulama and the common people with very precise boundaries and hierarchically. According to Amâsî (2016, pp. 255-57), ignorant people are in the same category as animals, thus, where a scholar speaks, the ignorant keep silent, and this is due to the fact that their “words uttered outside the *ilim* circle are more like the voices of animals than human words [tm]”.

Apart from all these social segments, it would be appropriate to briefly touch upon the sociological characteristics of nomadic groups, which largely continue their social existence as declassé groups. The phenomenon of nomadism has a social impact that cannot be ignored when considering the post-11th century Anatolia. Around the 11th century, the Oghuz tribes began to migrate from the western steppes of Central Asia to Anatolia and the Northern Black Sea, followed by two great waves of Mongol invasions with these groups, and finally, these migrations continued between the Anatolian and Iranian plateau until the end of the 17th century, is enough to create a colorful image about the broad framework of the nomadism issue (see Gündüz, 1997, pp. 25-28). Moreover, considering the history of Slavic, Kurdish and Arab tribes, sect circles, and even refugees who moved to settled agriculture and crafts order after a partial migration life, the framework of the issue expands and its complexity increases.²⁴⁴ When approaching this issue in terms of the establishment and development of the Ottoman state, two decisive topics are encountered. The first of these titles requires addressing the sociological characteristics of nomadic (or semi-nomadic) groups, and the second requires dealing with the political/economic/cultural relations developed by these groups. If the first title is taken into consideration, it is seen that the nomadic groups that can be identified in the Anatolian area are divided into several basic typologies. The first of these typologies is large tribal associations that preserve kinship relations as large tribal structures. Although these tribes, called ‘*boy*’s, tend to preserve their autonomy in the political sphere, they enter into the process of articulation with the central state over time due to the formation of a certain tribal

²⁴⁴ See: Gündüz (2002).

aristocracy and their separation into several parts due to settlements. Especially since the end of the 11th century, when the Great Seljuk state was strong, the existence of a political theme for the disintegration (or moving to the fronts) of the great tribes and the fact that it was applied by various central states are one of the important factors that developed this articulation. In this context, large tribes are divided into small *cemaats*, administrators called ‘*beğ*’ or ‘*keyhuda*’ are assigned to these communities, and in some cases, *cemaat* federations are formed against other nomadic tribes (Halaçoğlu, 2009, p. VII). Secondly, the other types of nomadic group formation that can be observed in the Anatolian region are tribal fragments, large families or ‘*oba*’s that exist in smaller units than tribes. Examples of this nomadic formation may be bonded to large tribes, or they may actually correspond to small autonomous structures as part of tribes whose political power is dissolved. Thirdly, it is necessary to mention the groups of wandering dervishes and especially the small communities of artisans, scholars and peasants who migrated from around Iran and Central Asian cities. These communities either maintain their nomadic status for a short time, either directly colonize and settle a certain area as immigrants or settle in cities and participate in production/education/administrative activities. It is not possible to classify a significant part of this last group as fully nomadic. However, it should not be denied that the wandering dervish life was a common phenomenon in the societies of the period (for example see: Barbaro, 2016, pp. 51, 53), again, it should be taken into account that masons, blacksmiths, gypsies and madrasah students²⁴⁵ - even pirates as sea nomads - constitute social groups that have been deterritorialized for long periods of time.

From a sociological point of view, it can be argued that nomadic groups of the first type are organized as stratified communities that are transitioning from communitarian to rentier mode of production. It is possible to determine that the war chiefs at the head of these communities turned into tribal aristocracy over time, they could develop a taxation system partially based on gift giving, the ruling class had personal retinues and warriors, household slaves could be seen from place to place, and commercial activities could be developed. In this framework, complex *boy* organizations and the nomadic aristocracy that constitutes their center should be accepted as the representatives of a social formation that is leaping into a structure of class-based society. In this context, *iqta/timar* holdership, ownership rights on lands

²⁴⁵ For examples of traveling madrasa student and instructor groups, see: Hira (2012, pp. 156-57) and İpşirli (2021, pp. 12-14).

called *ocaklık* and *yurtluk*, privilege of collecting taxes, tax exemptions, privileges to get a share from the collected taxes are the practices that make the social class character of these groups clear. Secondly, the small nomadic groups pointed in the second typology cannot be considered as a part of the class society in the full sense. The fact that these groups can survive for a long time without taking a certain position in the class order, paying taxes or assuming obligations makes it possible for them to be called *declassé* groups. The fact that nomadic communities were not subject to law and taxation in the early Ottoman period, and that they were not defined as the *re'âyâ* of a particular land, can be accepted as an important indicator of the autonomous status shared by these groups (Halaçoğlu, 1991, pp. 99-101). However, this autonomy started to disappear from the middle of the 15th century, and especially with the second half of the 16th century, their legal status began to become apparent, and they became the subject of taxation (Halaçoğlu, 1991, pp. 101-2). First of all, these groups can be considered as primitive communist communities dominated by face-to-face relations, and within this framework, the level of social stratification they contain is either very weak or does not have institutional continuity. It is seen that these groups played an important role especially in the raids in the frontiers, they participated in wars in return for the right to use *yaylak/kışlak* lands and booty, they entered into short-term relations with the state in the status of *ghazi*, and were sometimes subject to resettlement policies. Small communities or families which separated from the tribes, wandering dervishes and even settled villagers who have become nomads can join these groups and become a part of the search for booty. Considering the Ottoman social structure, it is noticed that all these groups have distinct effects separately. First of all, the expansion process of the Ottoman state in Anatolia and the Balkans has a unique aspect in that it includes both alliances and power struggles established with these groups. According to this, the military advance in Rumelia was possible by transferring small nomadic groups to Rumelia, encouraging looting and resettlement movements, and even rewarding the leaders of these groups with lands in the status of *timar* or *mülk*. On the other hand, the spread of the Ottoman state across Anatolia brought along struggles such as taking the large tribes under control, deprivation of patrons such as Karamanid or Dulkadir dynasties, the disintegration and migration of the large tribes, and the creation of new aristocracies within the small tribes. As a result of such political tensions, nomadic tribes in Anatolia rebelled against the central government until the late Ottoman period, tribes supported some rebellions or engaged into various alliances to protect their

autonomy. To give an example, the tribal aristocracy in Anatolia sided with Timurid army against the Ottoman state, supported the Karamanid dynasty against the Ottoman advance, and sided with the Safavid state in the *Şahkulu* and Nur Ali Halife revolts.

If the economic and cultural aspects of this issue are examined, it is understood that the nomadic groups were mostly communities that carry out foraging and animal husbandry activities and live in a semi-closed economical structure. Among these groups, especially horse, sheep and cattle breeding continue to exist as the dominant economic activity, and the trade of textile products, partially iron tools and wood/leather/wool/root dye constituted the second means of livelihood. Moreover, some of the nomadic groups in the Western Anatolian region and the Taurus Mountains were engaged in woodworking and collecting various natural raw materials. In addition, it can be seen that nomadic groups, who had become semi-sedentary, participated in seasonal agricultural activities and produced commodities such as grain/rice/nut. İnalçık (2021b, p. 5) adds other titles such as transportation services to these economic activities and labor-power supply to established production activities. The most important feature of nomadic groups is that they changed places depending on the seasonal cycles while continuing their economic activities, and in some cases, they could cross large regions irreversibly. It is clear that animals bought from nomadic groups or extracted as taxes were significant source of supply in the provision of armies and in the feeding of cities during the Ottoman period. Since their main economic activity was animal husbandry, nomadic groups struggle with each other in order to use pastures, and for this reason, they may need the regulatory authority of their tribal leaders or the state from time to time. Secondly, it can be determined that some of the nomadic groups were continuing their traditional tribal religions by looking at the shamanic symbols found in the tomb of Isa Sofi and through carpet/rug patterns, nature cults, animistic beliefs, superstitions and oral tradition. On the other hand, it is seen that the religious beliefs of the nomads, who were present in the Anatolian region, especially in the Ottoman period, developed under the influence of popular forms of Shiism, especially since the 13th century, and were shaped under the indoctrination of wandering dervishes, who were named as *baba*, and these groups would be called *Qizilbash* in the 16th century. The fact that these groups develop traditions of belief and worship outside the urban and institutional-Sunni Islamic faith, their combative nature, and their prone to messianism from time to time add a cultural-political dimension to their tension with the central state.

II.III.VI. Administration-State-Empire: The Development of the Ottoman State

The term 'administration' means the regulation of things, environment of living entities and human relations by a certain authority. But most fundamentally, the phenomenon of administration can be understood as the activity of regulating relations among things, between people and between things and people, prioritizing the formation of organizations such as the state. This definition of administration in its broadest sense is also surprisingly valid for different levels of alienation of the phenomenon of administration. While there may be *ad hoc* and temporary forms of administration, it can also be mentioned that there are various patterns/themes and forms that show regularity. The separation of administrative phenomena that develop at different levels of alienation can, in principle, be made on the basis of the relationship between the phenomena of administration and order. In this differentiation, two main forms of administration that go beyond personal span of control and are part of the social order: Organized and institutional. Within the framework of the concepts of administration-organization-institution, it is possible to argue that the phenomenon of administration is included and transcended within the organization, while the organization is included in the institutional administration. When we put the phenomenon of the state in our focus, it takes its form as an administrative structure-administrative activity integrity, and attains its material content due to the differentiation of the organizational and institutional structures in which it carries out this activity in history.

In Western languages, two different noun forms are used as the equivalent of the term 'state'. These can be listed as (i) *estadol/état/state/staat* and (ii) *res publica, monarchia, de administrando imperio*, which includes more emphasis on the type of political regime. In addition to these, the words *állam* (Hungarian), *kratos* (Greek), *država* (Czech), *valsts* (Latgali) and *gosudárstva* (Russian), which are mostly used in Central and Eastern Europe, can be mentioned. In the Middle East and Iranian tradition, the words *mātu* (Akkadian), *dawla* (Persian and Arabic), *şehir* and *kişwer* (Kurdish), *petut' iwn* (Armenian) and *medina* (Hebrew and Arabic) are preferred. Considering the Far East, the terms *guo* in Chinese and *akrandah* in Sanskrit are preferred. It is seen that the words *il* and *budun* in Old Turkish sometimes acquire a meaning similar to 'state'. When the terms are examined in general, they refer to a city (*cit , medina, guo, şehir*), domination over a certain land (*mātu, akrandah, il, kishwer, valsts*), certain forms of political alliances between people (*res publica, država, budun*), or the power to rule (*kratos, imperio, monarchia, petut' iwn, gosudárstva*). In addition, the words

état/state/estado are terms that are constructed from the root of ‘stare’ in relation to ‘stand’ and have the same origin as the words *cit /city/settlement* and are historically related to the phenomena of ‘settlement’ and ‘urbanization’. The word * llam* is also derived from the root * ll*, meaning ‘to stand’. The word *dawla*, on the other hand, has the same origin can be translated as ‘devolution’ and refers to the right to rule for a certain period of time, including the element of chance. In this respect, this last concept also has a side that reflects the primitive-democratic tribal traditions. The origins of the word ‘state’ show that there are traces of a transition from communitarian social formation to rentier relations of production in the development of the state phenomenon. This transition process can be considered under the concept of early state and has a wide historical sample from tribal unions to city states. These terms have also been used within the linguistic tradition to name the forms of the rentier and capitalist state. Consequently, given the development of the state and its development extending to modern forms, it is possible to construct several main typologies.

In this framework, it is possible to talk about three main and twelve subtypes of states. We can consider these main types as (a) early state, (b) mature state, (c) modern state. As I argued above that the early state and mature state type are political structures that provide the formal unity of the society. In this respect, the emergence of the state phenomenon and the disappearance of the organic unity of societies are processes that occur together. Whether egalitarian or not, the transition from communitarian community and kinship-based tribal structure to stratified and classified society emerges as a result of the disintegration of the organic unity of community. The disintegration of organic unity, firstly, leads to the emergence of organic integrity (asymmetrical division of labor), and secondly, to the construction of political unity, valid also in cases where an integrity is not seen.²⁴⁶ The emergence of the modern state form, on the other hand, takes place according to a new model that articulates organic fragmentation and political unity, the “formative unity” model (Derin, 2016, p. 106).

The early state form covers the state formation process and has three main moments, as will be mentioned below. Considering the moments in question, we can

²⁴⁶ One of the most prominent examples of this process is the community-state structuring, which Marx called the ‘Germanic mode of production’ in the *Grundrisse*. According to Bloch (2002, pp. 49-50), this social formation is a shaped as a group of political human being, where there is no organic unity among family groups, each of which consists of whole production units on its own, but who can come together and make decisions for the purpose of religion/peace/war and thus show a kind of formal unity.

list the sub-typologies of the early state as (i) tribal federation and confederation, (ii) city-state, (iv) feudal kingdom. The mature state form, on the other hand, corresponds to a phase when the state formation was completed, and the state structure was institutionalized. The sub-typologies of the mature state type can be examined as follows; (i) centralized kingdom (ii) empire, (iii) absolute monarchy. Finally, let us consider the modern state type. Modern state types, as the inclusion and transcending (*aufhebung*) of formal unity, are important political elements that provide the formative unity of the social formation, and they emerge with the development of infrastructural forms of power, as Michael Mann has shown. The state forms that emerged in this new phase can be listed as (i) capitalist nation-state, (ii) capitalist empire, (iii) modern colonial state, (iv) supranational state and (v) integral state. It is possible to add the modern communitarian state form, that is, the socialist state examples of the 20th century, to these typologies. Since it is not possible to deal with all these state types within the limited framework of this thesis, I find it appropriate to focus on typologies that are valid especially in the context of our research object, the Ottoman politics.

If the Ottoman subordination patterns and mechanisms mentioned, it is seen that the class domination firstly developed as a political administration, then began to take the form of 'impersonal rule' and articulated with professional interlayers, and finally reached the form of centralized empire embodied with both bureaucracy and autocracy. Mandel (1971, p. 9) finds the origin of the state in the state assuming the 'arms' and 'justice' functions as the organization of the ruling classes, in the face of the development of the social division of labor and the emergence of social classes and their fragmentation. The development of the Ottoman state is not excluded from this general formulation, but the staging problem is too complex to be resolved directly within this general formulation. In this context, if it is accepted that there is not much data on the existence of a communitarian tribal structure, as was mentioned at the beginning, it is reasonable to accept two basic phases for the organization of class domination in Ottomans: The early-state phase and the mature state phase under the empire form.

Claessen (1993, p. 235) divided early state formation into three phases: (i) inchoate phase, (ii) typical phase, (iii) transitional phase. The first phase settles in a context in which kinship relations predominate in the political arena, intermediate positions are limited, and taxation forms are still irregular. The characteristic features of the typical early state formation, on the other hand, are in a context in which kinship ties are balanced with territorial ties, the principle of assignment is used in addition to

heredity, appointment and competition, and non-kin officials play a primary role in the administration. Finally, Claessen (1993, p. 236) defines the transitional phase in a context where kinship relations are completely marginalized in terms of management, the public administration apparatus is dominated by appointed officials, and the market economy develops. Moreover, Skalnik (1993, p. 267) characterizes the end of the early state phase when landlords and 'religious organizations of the state' acquire large estates and become independent from the state. The missing part of this model is that the process of making landlords and religious organizations independent from the state, accepts European feudalism as a model. In the case of the Ottoman state, this process can be considered complete when the state organization establishes the conditional ownership form and establishes bureaucratic control over the rentier classes.

Two crucial problems arise within this framework. The first is that the problem of periodizing the end of early state phase. This problem could be solved in a palliative way that the end of the 'classical period' in 17th century could be accepted as the end of the early state phase. But accepting this view also makes it difficult to define the Ottoman state as an 'empire'. The general proposition as generally accepted in the literature, that the Ottoman state took the form of an empire during the reign of Mehmet II and that this form reached its highest form during the reign of Suleiman, do not coincide with the theoretical propositions of the early state discussion. Either it is necessary to begin the end of the early state phase with the reign of Mehmet II, or to begin the imperial phase with Suleiman I. Moreover, Pitcher (2019, p. 147) distinguishes between the imperial structure of the period of Mehmet II and Bayezid II and the imperial structure of the period of Selim I, and defines the latter as the 'new empire'. Similarly, Tezcan (2010) also discusses about the 'second empire' period that developed with the 16th century. Finding a solution to this problem is not as easy as it seems. Because there is no theory of empire that has a competent theoretical form, separated from its ideological and descriptive elements. It is not entirely clear whether the political form called empire is a regime form (oligarchy, monarchy, etc.), or a state typology (confederative, constitutional, absolutist, etc.), or a description of the quantitative size of the domain of domination. If we add anachronistic approaches such as the fact that the Ottoman state was the 'third Roman Empire' to this uncertainty, it will not be difficult to see that we have almost no theoretical clarity left, and that we act with full convictions and expectations. For this reason, it becomes a necessity to make a short theoretical discussion on the imperial regime and to take a position as an extension of this

discussion. Although the terms imperium and emperor originate from the Roman civilization, unfortunately, an agreed definition of empire has not been established yet. Mikhail & Philliou (2012, p. 722) make a justifiable criticism while underlining that the term empire is perhaps the most normative research category in the world and is often accepted without question. The reason for this may be that the concept has two different conceptions, empirical and theoretical, and that empirical conception has a more quantitative reference point such as 'territorial extensity'. For example, Burbank & Copper (2010, p. 8), define empires in terms of "large political units, expansionist or with a memory of power extended over space". Similarly, Muldoon (1999, p. 139) states that this concept can be interpreted in the broadest sense as "great territorial expanse, inhabited by a wide variety of peoples". Goldstone & Haldon (2009, p. 4) formulated this problem as follows: "Should our definitions be descriptive (i.e., empires are just big states) or analytical (i.e., empires operate on different structural bases from simple states)?"

Returning to the theoretical understanding of the phenomenon of empire, at this point, it can be determined that there are either administrative-theoretic or ideological-theoretical approaches, not too different from the first observations. The administrative-theoretic approach can be found in C. Tilly's studies as such: The division of administration into subdivisions (governors), impersonal administration (bureaucracy), and centralism. This discussion proceeds in parallel with the early modern state discussions. Tilly (1997, p. 2) considers empire as a 'state form' and thus attaches special importance as a third pre-modern form after city-state and 'agrarian military domains'. Tilly's definition is as follows (1997, p. 3); "An empire is a large composite policy linked to a central power by indirect rule. The central power exercises some military and fiscal control in each major segments of its imperial domain". Goldstone & Haldon (2009, p. 24) developed the concept of "imperial formation" by expanding the specific content of the term state form: "(...) imperial formations that differ in degree of power over their territories, the integrations of their elites, and the patterns of ideological integration and institutionalized resource extraction and redistribution".

The second approach focuses more on cultural multitude and political authority of the empire form and its administrative mechanisms. The terminology of this second approach, which takes place on a wide scale from criticism to affirmation, evaluates empires under concepts such as 'prison of peoples/nations', 'empire of differences', or 'society of tolerance' etc. In this context, Burbank & Copper (2010, p. 8) states that the

content of the concept of empire includes the phenomenon of the original coexistence of these differences, which is formulated as “presumes that different peoples within the polity will be governed differently”. This definition also has a quantitative side. This definition, which is based on the fact that many peoples of different types and numbers are under a certain political government, is based on the idea of a plurality of specific units under a single government. The ‘prison of peoples/nations’ approach finds its expression in Motyl (1997, p. 20) as “peculiar kind of dictatorial multinational state”. Moreover, this conceptualization is widely used in discussions of ‘eastern despotism’ and concepts such as ‘Soviet empire’ in popular publications with a method that is far from meticulous. In fact, the essence of this approach is based on a simple core-periphery dichotomy and the struggle between them. The elites and population of both the center and the periphery, coming from their own cultural circles, are seen as the main cause of the conflict between the “core and administrative units” (Motyl, 1997, p. 21). I am of the opinion that this conceptualization basically suffers from an anachronism that accepts the nation-state as the latent theoretical norm or reference point.

In this manner there is need to open a wide parenthesis to the ‘prehistory’ of this term. For the first time in Roman history, the empire evolved from an official duty to an unnamed form of monarchy. This is because Roman citizens did not want to accept a king due to its republican past and city aristocracy. The memory of the oligarchic rule that had established by eliminating the first kings was still lively in the memory of the patrician families who founded the Roman Republic around the 1st century - and this ideological line was renewed again during the civil war that started with the murder of Julius Caesar. For example, after Antonius put a crown on Caesar’s head at the Lupercalia (*Lykaia*) festival, implying that he becomes a king and Caesar’s refusal of the crown was applauded by the public, and it was even taken down from the head of the status on which the crown was placed (Plutarch, 2020, pp. 34-35). Plutarch (2020, p. 34) draws attention to the contradiction in how the Romans, who were actually ruled by a king, so avoided the name of the king. In the case of the Roman republic, two important issues arised with the 1st century B.C., the first can be formulated as the intensification of the struggles of the plebs and slaves against the patricians, and the second, the unprecedented development of the money economy and the emergence of ‘multimillionaires’. For example, Cicero bought his new house as a ‘gift’ of around two million *sestertii*. In this context, it is understood that the political system also establishes

deep ties with the money economy. For example, high volume of bribes were involved in the election of consuls, which would later become the tradition of distributing bread to the plebeians. The emergence of personal armies held by the Roman notables by paying with money and their active role in conquest movements and political turmoil constitute another dimension of monetization. Moreover, it is the case that Roman commanders attempted a dictatorship at the head of their personal army of slaves and mercenaries, for example, Sulla plundered temples in the western Anatolia and Africa, collected gold, and established the first military dictatorship.²⁴⁷ It is seen that Caesar, perhaps the most indebted person in the world, took power by using his military charisma to pay off his debts. Montesquieu ([1748] 2019, p. 74) mentions Sulla's corruption of soldiers and commanders with the greed of making money, and the division of the lands of the citizens among the soldiers, as one of the reasons for the collapse of the republican regime in Rome. Three important points stand out here: Monetization, army organization, and struggles leading to the dissolution of social formation. The head of the Roman Republic, which ended as a result of Augustus' seizure of power with a long civil war, is referred to as the emperor, not the king. In the new order, the emperor controls the Roman armies based on his personal charisma and financial power, supervises the legislative work, and dominates the senate due to his military power. In the following process, the term Emperor began to mean the same as the term king/*basileus*, but due to the successive dynastic changes, especially in the Byzantine monarchy, the relationship between the emperor's authority and the support of the local elites preserved the existence of a certain oligarchic election principle. In the Middle Ages of Western societies, the concept of emperor gained alternative connotations with thinkers such as Isidor from Seville, either as the king who dominates the kings, or as the ruler who dominates the countries (Ünlü, 2010, pp. 251-52). The reinterpretation of such connotations with reference to the modern nation state took place in Hegel's work *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*. Hegel (2001, p. 473) argues that Austria is a composite of more than one political organization, so it should be classified as an empire, not a kingdom. The concept of empire as a combination of more than one organization, rule over rulers or a structure of multiple dominance was also applied to antiquity. For example, Finley's (1978, p. 60) definition

²⁴⁷ In his *In Verrem* oratio number II, Cicero explains that this method of Sulla is not a personal event and turns into a general trend, on the example of Verres, a famous commander (Berry, 2008, pp. 30-31).

of the 'empire of Athens' seems to have been heavily influenced by this judgment: "L'exercice durable par un État d'une autorité ou d'une pouvoir ou d'un contrôle sur un ou plusieurs États ou communautés ou peuples".²⁴⁸ In this context, let to state that the concept of empire also means the claim of global domination, although Finley's emphasis is regional.

It is natural to place a dictator, autocrat or emperor at the center of this system, who is *de facto* endowed with extraordinary military powers and potentially has the power to impose his legal and administrative decisions. In fact, the origin of the term 'emperor' comes from the Latin word '*imperare*' and means military command and administration. Wood (2016, p. 42) points out that a "large and expensive" army was essential both in intense exploitation and in the formation of Roman imperialism. The main attribute of the emperor that put him at the center of power is his authority to redistribute. In the establishment of the imperial administration in ancient Rome, this type of authority was especially effective in giving land to veteran soldiers and extended to the redistribution of movable assets and lands. Similarly, in the Ottoman Empire, the redistribution of *timars* and *waqfs* and confiscation practices became the most pressing problem since the reign of Mehmet II. But it is not possible to exhaust all the features of the imperial structure around the power of redistribution. It is necessary to read the emergence of this authority within the framework of a kind of state of emergency regime or an apocalypse for dominant classes that constitutes the critical threshold in the establishment of the imperial regime. In the Roman Empire, this situation emerged clearly in the 1st century B.C., and it also showed itself in the Ottoman Empire during the interregnum period. In this respect, it can be asserted that a catastrophic equivalence between the social classes that constitute the components of the empire was tried to be overcome through the state of emergency regime, and this was eventually overcome with a military dictatorship regulating oligarchic relations. Montesquieu (2019, p. 95) states that Augustus established a regime which was aristocratic against civilians, monarchic against soldiers, and within this framework, he reveals the essence of the imperial regime. Soviet historians Diakov and Kovalev (2015, p. 173) see the way to imperial rule in Rome in the social crisis and summarize it as follows: "The freedom movement of the provinces, the terrible uprising of the slaves and the movement of the democrats shook the Roman state to its foundations. They had made it clear that the

²⁴⁸ The lasting exercise by a state of authority or power or control over one or more states or communities or peoples.

army and its famous leaders were the only forces that could sustain the slave-owning social formation [tm]”.

The second type of imperial period start with the emergence of absolutist monarchies, that was, with the development of cities and money economy, with the central army overcoming particular feudal armies. Ottoman society cannot be excluded from this form of development and historical process. While the phenomenon as be seen in the examples of ancient and modern times gains an expansionist and centralizing appearance if we take Rome, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia to the center, when we consider the history of China and the Byzantine Empire, the expansionist feature is replaced by defensive tendencies. Wood (2016, pp. 42-43) states that especially Rome, which has a colonialist character, and China, which has a static character, constitute two different models. Expansionism in the example of the Roman Empire can be explained more easily if one considers its economic dependence on slaves obtained from new lands. Wood (2016, p. 46) states that there are always more peasants than slaves in the Roman economy, so an analysis based solely on the constraints of the slave-owning economy is not correct. To sum up, the short life span of the slaves in Rome due to the poor living conditions and the power struggle among the ruling class members necessitating cash accumulation and its strategic investment emerge as the two most important factors in terms of expansionism. In terms of the Ottoman Empire, as Kılıçbay (2010, pp. 247-55) mentions, the relative height and mobility of the population, especially the perception of the nomadic population as a threat to the settled classes, accelerated the expansionist tendencies, and the capture of the lands that were given the status of *harâcî* increased the cash revenues considerably, enabling the state apparatus and the central army to be fed. Thus, it became possible for the ulama to join the ruling class and to obtain the consent of the people, by financing the state apparatus and public constructions and prestigious charity projects (*imarets*, etc.). In the final analysis, this method enabled to integrate the specific class interests of frontier lords and *timar* holders around the class interests of the Ottoman dynasty.

It is possible to think of the empire structure as a semi-central political regime in which the administrative-legal-military bureaucracy is formed within a certain money economy. While it is a prominent characteristic of this regime to constantly show centralization tendencies, not being able to achieve a fully centralized structure can be considered the fate of this regime due to the decisiveness of the pre-capitalist economic units. The economic pillars of this regime are in the monetization and the development

of the two specific categories, the centralization of wealth and differential rent forms, which develop together with the monetization. In the final analysis, commercial relations developed in pre-capitalist empires dominated by the rentier mode of production have to be based largely on agricultural production, animal husbandry and commodity production including mines/salt lands/forests. It is not possible to talk about a widespread monetization in cases where the production in these titles is not subject to exchange. On the other hand, due to the increase in the population of cities, the expansion of the central army and bureaucracy, the long-distance trade of agricultural goods, the commercialization of these production categories increases and thus the monetization expands. This situation both paves the way for social segments with rentier control over production to benefit from differential rent, and also creates a field of struggle for the control and central supervision of these resources -or the isolation of direct producers from the possibility of direct ownership. It is undeniable that monetary relations have an intensifying effect on this struggle and facilitating organization.

Monetization shows its effect in more than one relationship form. These relations include obtaining administrative offices, gathering personal armies, structuring the basis and practice of taxation, and the emergence of preconditions for commodity production. To give an example, in Iran, which was under the rule of the Ilkhanate state, it was necessary to have money in order to come to state offices (Aigle, 2006, p. 76). The correlation between personal wealth and the possibility of coming to administrative positions in the Roman Empire remains valid in this example as well. Hope (2016, p. 144) underlines that by keeping a single currency in circulation in the region where under Ilkhanate domination, they try to both articulate regional economies around a single market and centralize tax revenues (Hope, 2016, p. 64). Pamuk (2003, p. 8) states that the Ilkhanate state gained a large amount of silver due to the dominance they established on the trade routes, and they were influential on the Ottomans with their financial/monetary practices. However, as Finley (2007, pp. 244-45) points out, the development of the money economy should not be articulated with a modern concept such as 'trade war' or 'commercial imperialism'. What is at issue here is the intermediary role of monetization in the organization of power. This situation should be evaluated in the use of money for military payments rather than a medium of exchange in the empire-building processes in the ancient Carthage and Persian states (Weber, 1950, pp. 236-37). Moreover, for example, the use of money is also encountered in the stages of the development of the Mongol state. Due to the policies of Kublai Khan,

proliferation of the use of paper money in China is a well-known example. The Marco Polo states that salaries in the khan's army were paid with paper money and due to this practice, the monarch had a more advanced control over his treasury than all other monarchs: "All his Majesty's armies are paid with this currency, which is to them of the same value as if it was gold or silver. Upon these grounds, it may certainly be affirmed that the Great Khan has a more extensive command of treasure than any other sovereign in the universe".²⁴⁹

In this respect, according to Eisenstadt the imperial state is formed by the concentration of 'free-floating' resources at a single point (as cited in Bourdieu, 2015, p. 100). Technical and symbolic resources can be given as examples to these resources, as well as material resources such as gold and silver. This concentration may be based on the state or emperor claiming ownership of all lands or establishing monopoly rights over vacant lands and the resources they contain or establishing commercial monopolies. For example, the existence of such rights over resources such as lands and mines/salt lands in the Ottoman Empire is a well-known issue. In addition, it is seen that the state established a similar monopoly on iron, salt and alcoholic beverages during the Han Empire (Brennan, 2015, p. 47). Bang (2009, pp. 103-4) defines agricultural empires as "tribute-producing enterprises" under the concept of "tributary empire" and argues that the main purpose of these structures is to increase the level, breadth and diversity of resources available to the ruling classes. In fact, it is possible to place population growth in the category of 'free-floating resources' due to its effect on the state-building process (Cohen, 1993, p. 56). Since the population growth rates on the world scale have been quite stable for millennia due to natural reasons, the periods in which the population growth rate and population density change positively due to factors such as migration turn into periods of political change. Thus, the emergence of the limited autonomy of the political field by being alienated from kinship relations and economic relations in a certain way, and thus the emergence of autonomous political goals of the ruling circles, draws the framework of political reason and the 'state reason' that will emerge later.²⁵⁰ According to Cohen (1993, p. 81), making changes that make possible non-kinship appointments to the administrative offices improves the social system towards statehood. Secondly, the separation of political roles from other activities (separation of civil servant from warrior, scribe and clergy) brings the political struggle

²⁴⁹ See: Marco Polo (Travels, Book Second, Part I, Chapter XXIV).

²⁵⁰ See: Eisenstadt (1965, pp. 217, 229-41).

into the political division of labor. Finally, the tendency of the rulers to centralize and intensify the political sphere emerges. The theory of empire, which I have accepted - and applied throughout my thesis - is mostly within this framework.

Empires emerge as political organizations that tend to centralize and are based on organizational capillary within the framework of the rentier mode of production, in which the infrastructural power and its financial/administrative/educational/military bases cannot develop at the modern state level. In this respect, at the factual level, they can always be considered semi-central because they did not complete this process until the development of modern capitalism. At this point, it may be appropriate to briefly touch on the opposite views on centralization. For example, Mehmet Ali Şevki (1968b, p. 118) insists that the phenomenon of ‘centralization’ can only be mentioned after the *Tanzimat* period. According to this argument, the absolutism based on the central financial and administrative organization emerged with the *Tanzimat* reforms, while the previous *timar* and *zeâmet* institution pointed to the control of the hereditary aristocracy. Başkaya (2014, p. 110) follows the thought of Mehmet Ali Şevki and dates the ‘centralized-autocratic’ character of the Ottoman Empire to the 19th century. Ortaylı (2020a, p. 23) shares the same view. If we ascribe a specific character to the modern state structure (for example, an ‘infrastructural power’ as formulated by Mann) while considering the process of state formation and development theoretically, these views need to be accepted in principle. However, if we consider the political, financial and ideological articulation forms that ensure the formal unity of the society within the specific constraints of the rentier mode of production, it will become clear that the centralization process did not occur as late as thought. Precisely for this reason, the Ottoman administrative apparatuses were both bureaucratic and autocratic, and to the extent that the centralization process cannot be completed in terms of bureaucracy, they were riveted by the personal charisma of the ruler and ideological networks. Perhaps the other best-known example of this situation is the political unity of the sophisticated bureaucracy and the divine ruler in Chinese history.²⁵¹

At this point, a unique characteristic of the imperial regime emerges. On the one hand, while the legal system develops, on the other hand, the tendency to concentrate the administrative powers in one hand reveals the dual nature of this regime. In this framework, the development of law and central military power elevates the emperor above local power centers, while on the other hand, another form of ideological and

²⁵¹ For the Han Empire bureaucracy, see: Zhao (2015, pp. 65-66, 68-75).

political relationship, in which the emperors can establish direct relations with the subordinated people, gain legitimacy and bypass the intermediate layers with the mediation of law. This suggests that a populist phase might be necessary in the development of the imperial regime - as can be observed in the reform plans of the Gracchus brothers and Caesarism. In this context, Von Savigny ([1814] 2018, p. 58) states that the development line of Roman law was necessarily in the lively and open to change political spirit of the republican period, which is important both in terms of factual diversity and the possibility of populist approaches. Accordingly, the position of the ruler was expressed in a theomorphic image that depicts all social relations by referring to a dominant power above the administrative/judicial/religious institutions that regulate social relations. This ideological construction also grounds its autocratic power as one of the main pillars of the populist moment of power that is effective in overcoming the social crisis. Official correspondence bears the reflections of this political structure as an ideological median that conveys the autocratic authority of the ruler to the bureaucratic levels. As Ergenç (2012b, p. 459) states, the language used in bureaucratic procedures and documents in the classical period takes the form of either direct orders from the sultan's mouth or direct submissions to the sultan. In other words, edicts and similar orders and demands place the sultan's orders at the center of the operation of the whole system and make it seem like he decides on every detail. But this impression is an illusion. A similar illusion can be seen in the Roman Imperial bureaucracy. The following proposition in *De Re Militari*, the book of Roman author Flavius Vegetiun Renatus (2019, p. 25), points to a similar ideology: "Nothing starts properly without the approval of God and the emperor [tm]". In both examples, the image of a ruler who controls everything that the imperial regime uses to reproduce its authority stands out. But the actual social reality is shaped by the struggle of various classes and strata. In this respect, the role of the emperor should not be considered as a despot, but as an autocrat who regulated different social strata and their oligarchic organization. We can predict that a similar situation developed in the Ottoman society due to the interregnum period in the context of the early state, by examining the social movements that maintained their dynamism for fifty years from the beginning of the 15th century and the intra-dynastic struggles for the throne. Since the preferences of the central state and local power centers are largely decisive in the outcome of these movements, the existence of secret or open oligarchic groups organized at the religious/military/bureaucratic level in the imperial regimes is also effective.

In order to make a general assessment, three basic pillars of the imperial regime, which could be named as bureaucratic autarky, can be identified; (i) military autocracy over oligarchy or aristocracy, (ii) the development of the legal system, and the existence of a citizenship system from simple to complex, (iii) ideological systematic that can manage the multicultural structure. The structural issue pointed out by the military autocracy dominating the oligarchy or the aristocracy is that the existence of a military power that cuts the social classes and strata in common forms the basis of imperial authority. In this sense, a similar proposition can be made for 'steppe empires'. In particular, with the emergence of *nöker/noyad* status, that is, commander and administrator statuses that are not based on consanguineous relations, it can be mentioned an existence of a ground where the imperial structure -even if the money economy is not developed- can emerge. For example, a close relationship can be made between the use of the concept of emperor in the military sense in Rome and the use of the concepts of khagan or khan in Central Asia, and in the final analysis, both point to a leadership that is militarily grounded and ideologically transcended.²⁵² However, this ideological similarity is far from being enough to establish the backbone of an imperial regime. When the history of the Turkish and Mongolian states, which are expressed with the term 'steppe empire', is considered, it is revealed that they tried to develop bureaucratic regimes and imposed the conditional land ownership system, especially during their dissolution period. In this respect, examples such as the Great Seljuk or the Mongol Empire are examples that indicate unsuccessful transition processes or failed empires rather than being typical examples. However, it can be argued that there are some characteristics that do not coincide with the imperial regime theory in Chinese history. For example, Barrington Moore Jr. (1974, p. 171) states that a permanent and large army did not constitute an important place, since the Emperors of China did not face an external military rivalry for a long time. However, Rosenstein stated that the military organization cannot be considered unimportant in the formation of the Chinese imperial structure. Rosenstein (2009, p. 25) states that the aristocratic organization of the army was abandoned, and the army was expanded during the Qi state period. Seidler (2020, p. 9) points to the influence of legal formalism and the creation of a mobile cavalry force in shaping the Qi state. The fact that the works on the art of war written by Sun Tzu and his fellow thinkers basically consist of experiences compiled for the

²⁵² For the arguments regarding the use of these concepts in the context of *translationes imperii*, see (Wigen, 2013, p. 49; Ünlü, 2019, p. 66).

command of large armies strengthens this argument (Rosenstein, 2009, p. 40).²⁵³ This phenomenon can be seen in the transition from the citizen army to personal and mercenary armies in late republican Rome, and in the formation and development of the Janissary corps in the Ottoman state. The systematic increase in the number of Janissaries, especially after the reign of Mehmet II, indicates the development of the military autocracy phenomenon. In the final analysis, the transformation of military power into a disciplined organization acting under the emperor's command and centralization constitute one of the main organizational pillars of the imperial regime. But the organization of this power cannot be considered independent of the emergence of military and civil bureaucracy and legal formation.

Faulkner (2016, p. 75) characterizes the principle of the Roman imperial order as a military dictatorship based on class struggle.²⁵⁴ Hopkins (2009, p. 180) defines the period beginning with Augustus in the Roman Empire as “quasi-constitutional but autocratic monarchy”. The most striking feature of this definition is that it synthesizes the elements of autarky and citizenship in the model as had presented above. In this respect, the development of the legal system and the development of supra-personal norms and regulations that regulate the relations between the elements of the citizenship system and the components of the imperial structure, and this can be evaluated as a necessity for the establishment of class domination. It would be a mistake to equate the concept of ‘citizenship’ here with citizenship in modern bourgeois society. The content of this concept is determined by the existence of civil law, and the state's record keeping, segregation of individuals, classes and groups, and regulation of mutual rights and obligations (a kind of development of public law and bureaucracy). For the Roman Empire, this process started with the proclamation of the Laws of the Twelve Tables and the magistrate's jurisprudence, and finally it reached its most advanced form with the formation of the *Codex Justinianus* and invented the advanced examples of the active-citizenship form. Similarly, the establishment of the Sassanid Empire brought about the grounding and development of the legal system (Diakonoff, 1999, p. 73). In the history of China, the formation of Law, which reached its most developed form during the T'ang dynasty in the 7th century, is another example (Diakonoff, 1999, p.

²⁵³ Similarly, it is known that a series of monographs on the command and administration of the soldier were written in the Roman Empire and the Ottoman Empire. These works are quite different from the examples of the *gazavâtname* literature.

²⁵⁴ For another example in which the imperial regime is generally considered as a dictatorship and the Ottoman example is evaluated in this category, see: Roux (2020, p. 38).

82).²⁵⁵ On the other hand, in the development of the Mongol Empire, the importance of the systematic orders written on steel tablets, called Genghis-Law, in the formation of political unity can be mentioned (Alinge, 1967, p. 31). Similarly, Tamerlane's *Tüzükat* compilation, which establishes occasional affinities between the Genghis Law and the provisions of the Sharia, reveals the extent to which the codification of laws is a method that has been taken for granted in the search for an empire formation. Hassan (2002, pp. 81-84) rightly points out that the Mongol 'yasağ' (law) was in the final analysis a break from the traditional tribal order and indicated an alienated level of government. Seidler (2020, pp. 196-97) argues that the Genghisid state was able to develop a legal formation thanks to the Chinese thinker Yeliu-Chutsai and his followers makes the historical background of this alienation phase more concretely visible. In Russia, although this process developed later, the laws (*Ulozhenie*) structured under the rule of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich in the 16th century can be cited as an example for the development of the empire structure through legal formation (Diakonoff, 1999, p. 129).

In terms of the Ottoman Empire, the development of the legal system is closely related to both the jurisprudence of the *qadis* and the formation of the duty of *qadiasker*, its regulations in the field of private and public law, as well as the establishment of the registry office (*defterdarlik*) and the registration of the subordinated population's settlement, ethnic characteristics and land use information. İnalçık (2019g, p. 219) notes that the registry office maintains sophisticated statistical books that have developed various models, abbreviations and reference systematics, including details such as population, land, product quantity and price. Murphey (1990) documents the advanced census methods for taxation through the examples of Baghdad, Erzurum and Teke-Hamideli. Moreover, for example, Derviş Bihîşt Saruhanî's book *Mifhatu'l-Hisab* presents a detailed model about the methods and subtleties of bookkeeping (Heywood, 1992, p. 152). In addition to these, it is possible to mention the *Kanunnâmes* and *Kavâid* compilations published since the reign of Mehmet II. It is necessary to put the development of such systematics on the basis of state development, especially in terms of taxation, political control and conscription (Scott, 1998, p. 23).

In any case, the development of legal and bureaucratic relations constitutes a basis of citizenship accepted as a reference for the parties of the relationship. While this

²⁵⁵ It shouldn't be surprising to see similar structures form in ancient Chinese history. It is clear that the writing system, imperial ideology, measure and money, road network, law and historiography were tried to be made uniform during the Qin Empire period (see: Lewis, 2007, pp. 53-57).

ground is not standardized as in the modern state, also it is impossible to be completely ignore it. In the Roman Empire, this legal development was preserved in the field of private law, and in the Ottoman state, that the *qadi* courts assumed the same function within the framework of the Islamic inheritance, marriage and appropriation rights and rules. Kılıçbay (1999, p. 195) strongly opposes the use of the term ‘citizen’ in the context of ‘Ottoman citizen’ or the Ottoman state. The author, after stating that there was only a subject, not a citizen, in the Ottoman Empire, and that the people were the *reâyâ*/herd, is of the opinion that citizenship cannot be attributed to the Ottoman Empire as a value gained as a result of long social struggles in Western Europe. I find this view of Kılıçbay not strong enough because he identifies the concept of citizenship with the form of ‘republican citizenship’ that emerged after the French Revolution and presents it as an ideal form. On the contrary, the fact that ‘citizenship’ does not have an ideal form, but itself is a result which being shaped by social struggles. In the ancient Greek site, at least since the Solon reforms, the legal and traditional link between being a member of a certain *domos* and being involved in city affairs forms the basis of the concept of citizenship. In Imperial Rome, on the other hand, there is a civil law that goes beyond the scale of cities. Its framework on political rights and duties is itself the work of social struggles and compromises -an of course it is possible to mention non-democratic citizenship forms and existence of various *de facto* and *de jure* citizenship forms in the same social formation. In this context, Ortaylı (2004a, p. 17) sees the legal basis of the Muslim-non-Muslim distinction in the Ottoman state similar to the *civis-fides* distinction in Rome, with some annotations being reserved. Barkey (2013, p. 99) states that the status of the military class in the Ottoman Empire and the status of Roman citizenship were equivalent to each other and they functioned as a means of assimilation for the imperial regime. The propositions formulated by on the development of Roman law can be considered partially valid for the Ottomans in this context. According to the Pasukanis (2013, p. 163);

The universality of the ethical form (and hence of the legal form – all people are equal, everyone has the same “spirit”, everyone can be a legal subject) was adopted by the Romans as a result of commercial relations with foreigners, i.e. people of different traditions, languages and religions. Not because it involved a rejection of the ingrained traditions of self-love and contempt for foreigners, but for this reason, it was initially difficult to consider by the Romans as something useful. Maine, for example, states that the *jus gentium* itself was the result of the

Romans' unwillingness to grant foreigners the privileges of their country's *ius civile*, and their contempt for any foreign law. [tm]

It is necessary to reform these propositions at some points. First of all, Pasukanis' general postulate of deriving the bourgeois legal form from the commodity form also shows itself in this analysis. This proposition, which is necessary to ensure the transparency between the symbolic nature of the legal form and the real claim about rights, does not directly necessitate the reduction of Roman or Ottoman law to commercial relations. More importantly, it is possible to replace the importance of commercial relations with the administrative requirements of formal unity models that necessitate the rentier mode of production. When the issue is considered from this point of view, it may be possible to get rid of the anachronistic connotations of the emphasis on 'commercial relations', which evokes bourgeois law, and to have a more comprehensive understanding. In other words, by bypassing the argument that Roman law has become the basis of modern law because it contains the commodity form -which is latent in Pasukanis' theory, the principle of integrated administration of multiple cultural, political and economic structures can be adopted in terms of the integrity of both forms.

In this context, returning to the Ottoman example, we see that the *civis-fides* distinction was reconstructed as a Muslim/non-Muslim distinction, and that the *civis* status was given to the Muslim military class members as well as Burgarian *Voynuks*, Jewish chief-*rabbis*, Greek *Phanariots*, Orthodox church metropolitans and their high priests (Ortaylı, 2004a, pp. 17-18). An Islamic notion of universal law is at the base of this legal stratification based on class distinction, and it includes an Islamic variation of the Stoic-Christian basis, which is in the background of Pasukanis' critical emphasis on the 'spirit'. In the determination of the status of the *reâyâ*, class privileges are abolished and the autonomous religious community structure ("millet system") is made functional, following the example of Roman law. Granting certain symbolic superiority privileges to the Muslim *reâyâ* provides a general popular basis for the Muslims to promote their ruler - the emperor - as the head of the social the regime. In this context, it is clear that the Ottoman legal formation developed such a systematic not because of a widespread Islamic tradition of 'tolerance' (*istimâlet*), but as an extension of the administrative requirements with the commodity form, similar to the Roman law. It is not difficult to detect that legal and ideological forms are also articulated with each

other. In this framework, Pasukanis (2013, pp. 69-71) emphasizes that law is a material reality, but also accepts it as a field of psychological experience that comes into contact with power as an ideological form.²⁵⁶ To give an example in this context, Bluntschli (2000, p. 302) states that the *tribunicia potestas* authority of the Roman Emperors enabled him to veto various decisions, thus allowing the emperor to pose as the “champion of the lower classes”. A similar phenomenon can be seen in the emperors’ response (*rescriptum*) on legal matters consulted (Gaudemet, 2015, p. 175). The same example can be found in the submission of the objection to the *qadi* courts to the sultan, that is, the sultan’s function as an authority of appellation. Ertürk-Keskin (2009, p. 52) states that the possibility of appealing to the ruler is an important element in terms of the legitimacy of the power and limits the area of collective action of the opposition forces. Traditions such as ‘*Divan-ı Mezalim*’ and ‘*Ayak Divanı*’ should be seen as political mechanisms through which the sovereign and subjects can establish a direct relationship by bypassing the intermediate layers, and thus the monarch can gain personal legitimacy as an emperor.

The problem of reproduction of the imperial form constitutes a significant field of study. Barkey addresses this problem under three headings (2013, p. 25): (i) the development of ways of appropriating political and economic resources, (ii) the establishment of power mechanisms suitable for managing cultural diversity, (iii) a formulation that can preserve the ideological-cultural legitimacy. In the final analysis, Barkey states that empires that can successfully establish and maintain these three titles will gain historical continuity. Goldstone and Haldon, on the other hand, consider the cultural-ideological element as an essential part of the state formation (2009, pp. 6-7): “A key element (...) is the generation of fairly complex ideological and legitimating systems, on the one hand, and at the same time more impersonalized and institutionalized modes of surplus extraction than proto-states or clan or tribal groupings are capable of developing”. In order to reproduce the empire structure, it is necessary to accept the existence of an ideological formation that can hold together a cultural structure with autogenetic heterogeneity that cannot be homogenized. If the issue is analyzed within this framework, it can be seen that the ‘*ghaza* ideology’ does not have the quality and scope that Haldon meant. For the emergence of such an imperial

²⁵⁶ Karahanoğulları (2017, p. 204) rightly underlines that Pasukanis struggles with seeing Law as an ideological form, but does not reject the ideological appearance of Law, on the contrary, he puts it as a methodological postulate that the material structure of Law can be revealed to the extent that breaking from its ideological understanding.

ideology, it is necessary to look beyond the 15th century. I am of the opinion that this ideology is a kind of ecumenism which blended with certain ethno-potestatic argument seen in other empires as well.

The development of the dominant ideology of the Ottoman Empire developed by denying the ethnocentric context of the *ghaza* idea, which was a limited looting activity with a specific religious background. In particular, the *ghaza* activities carried out by Turkic tribes, declassé Christian peasants and seigneurs who broke away from the old regime, and Rumelian Slavic nomad groups, have a ‘non-state’ identity in terms of their social nature. In this respect, the essence of *ghaza* narratives was an extension of the ethnocentric worldviews of autonomous groups. From the very beginning, the attempt to associate the *ghaza* activity under Islamic discourse aims to make it manageable under a kind of universalist-ethnocentrism by abstracting it from its concrete content. Todorov (1993, pp. 1, 50) formulates ethnocentrism as the definition of local values as universal values, and calls the comprehensive and assertive form of this ideology as universalist-ethnocentrism.²⁵⁷ The dominant ideological discourse of the Ottoman Empire reshaped the ‘*ghaza*’ of autonomous groups as a state-organized war effort, while replacing the ethnic element with its own dynastic genealogy and Islamic universalism. In this way, it has become possible to classify the heterogeneous cultural structure under the claim of universal sovereignty and to manage it under various statuses (such as dhimmi, nomadic, non-Muslim, *harâcî*, vassal, etc.).

In the same way that modern colonial Europe built its ethnocentric ideology on the culture of ancient Greece, Rome, and Christianity, pre-modern empires produced their own universalist-ethnocentrism. For example, the Roman Empire placed itself in the center of the world and claimed rights over the whole world, while at the same time attributed this claim to the superiority of the culture and civilization of its ancestors. I think that this claim in Roman history can be traced back to Polybius’s *Historiæ*, in which he considered Rome superior to other civilizations in terms of institutions and traditions. Polybius (1998, pp. 173-4) argues that Rome was founded in accordance with the purpose of universal dominion and that the Romans, as “masters of the world”, achieved this ideal through their institutions. Similarly, Cicero, states that the Romans established a world-empire in his speeches called *De Imperio Cn. Pompei* (Berry, 2006, p. 127) and *Pro Lege Manilia* (parag. 41 and 53)²⁵⁸, and as in many other examples, he

²⁵⁷ See also: Çırakman (2011, p. 43).

²⁵⁸ See: Cicero (2014).

explains this situation in referred to the power of traditions and customs that have been going on since his ancestors in his speech called *Divinatio in Caecilium* (parag. 5)²⁵⁹. The development of this idea in Ottoman political thought can be followed from the specific form in which the concept of *taxis* was presented in the works of the 15th century, from the dynastic genealogies and the Islamization of the culture. Ottoman political thought, which built its identity through these and similar elements, was openly attached to the ideal of world-empire, especially as in the middle of the 15th century, and finally, in the middle of the 16th century, it was able to create its own ethnocentrism, especially through Islamic culture.

To sum up, the development of class domination in Ottoman society can be mentioned into two main political periods as such: (i) the development of the early state and (ii) the imperial regime. In this context, it can be claimed that the Ottomans made their first conquests as a tribe and built a state out of the tribal structure, or that the Ottomans were familiar with the ruling practices even before they came to Anatolia, and therefore they were based on a certain administrative knowledge and vision. Fundamentals of the first argument are based on the settled patterns of nomadic tribes. Addressing the phenomenon of nomadic conquests in general, Khazanov (1981, p. 169) states that the conquerors often faced the necessity of making a decision about establishing the exploitative relationship (i) in the form of tribute or (ii) in the regular-institutional form; and, in general, the nobles in the captured places were assimilated, and therefore -consciously or unconsciously- the second form predominates. Eberhard ([1949] 2020, pp. 217-18) suggests that there are three possible forms of articulation between invasive nomads and sedentary producers. The first of these is the massacre of the indigenous people, with the exception of some craftsmen, and the conversion of agricultural lands to pasture. The second is the complete enslavement of the indigenous population and its allocation to different tribesmen. The final solution is for the nomadic elites as the dominant class to constitute a privileged group over the settled population, in military and administrative terms, and not change the ongoing mode of production. The third form of articulation offered by Eberhard corresponds to Khazanov's tributary and regular-institutional forms. If this scheme is applied to the Ottoman advance, although it is seen that the second form and enslavement are effective in the historical process, it turns out that the third form becomes the fundamental form of exploitation.

²⁵⁹ See: Cicero (2014).

It is possible to explain the development of the Ottoman state by using the aforementioned scheme. First of all, it is possible to think that the Mongolian-Turkish steppe feudalism was connected to the social organization forms and developed their social formations by articulating with the Seljuk-Islamic (or Byzantine) land regime in terms of the region they settled.²⁶⁰ In fact, this is a frequently encountered example of the history of nomadic-settled relations. For example, Khazanov (1981, p. 167) states that the central Asian nomad group called *Parnis* captured Iran, where the nobles of that region and their own tribal aristocracies merged into a single class and ruled both nomads and agricultural classes together, and that the same model was valid for the Kushan Empire.²⁶¹ In this context, Khazanov (1981, p. 168) states that in the examples of the Seljuk and post-Seljuk Turkish states, the political and economic relations were determined not by the nomads, but by the “agricultural and urban dwellers” they dominated. The principle of this development should be sought not only in the warrior character of the dynasty leader in the early Ottoman state, but also in the active role of the ulama circles. Layish’s (2002) studies reveal how influential the representatives and practitioners of Islamic law (*mufti* and *qadi*, ulama in general) are, especially in the articulation of tribal social units with the state. In the case of the early Ottoman period, a similar function is performed by the ulama in the construction of a central state.

The second model is based on the thesis that the Ottoman dynasty had administrative privileges before they came to Anatolia. At the center of this thesis is the knowledge that the ancestors of the Ottoman dynasty were Mahan rulers. In the 15th century historical sources such as Oruç Beg’s (2011, p. 21) history, Kemal’s (2001, p. 25) *Selâtinname* and various anonymous chronicles (Öztürk, 2000, p. 9; Çan, 2006, p. 57; İğci, 2011, p. 2; Giese, 1992, p. 8), there is a speculation exist that the first generations of the Ottoman family were ‘sultans’ in the city of Mahan, which is located in the Khwarazm region.²⁶² This speculation is also compatible with Lindner’s (2008,

²⁶⁰ Krader (1993, pp. 142-143) underlines that the Turkish-Mongolian society has been a society with social class and state organization since ancient times. He states that this society basically has two classes consisting of producers-shepherds and aristocrats. Erkoç’s analysis (2015) reveals that the first two centuries of Ottoman rule (between the 13th and 15th centuries) included many elements of Mongolian feudalism in terms of administrative understanding, law, culture and terminology.

²⁶¹ İnalçık (2016a, p. 213) points out that “(...) the Ottomans included the local aristocracy, which they saw as loyal to them, into the military class and even accepted the Orthodox metropolitans and bishops among their state servants [tm]”.

²⁶² The proposition that the lineage of the Ottomans was based on a nomadic Turkmen lord, most likely, began to find a place in the sources as a result of the defeat of Uzun Hasan and the turn

p. 40) thesis that Ertugrul and Suleyman Shah may have formed part of the disintegrated Khwarazmshah forces. Similarly, Kantemir (1979, p. L) is of the same opinion and underlines that Suleiman Shah may have been a noble residing around the Caspian Sea.²⁶³ The Seljuk Sultan Alâeddin settled the Khwarazm nobles in the Erzurum highlands as a buffer against the Mongols, this group moved after the Mongolian pressure and demanded a new highland, and finally they followed the same route as the Suleyman Shah-Ertugrul Beg's group (*Pasin Plain, Sürmeli Çukuru*, Erzurum, Erzincan and Northern Syria). Köprülü (2018, p. 98) states that the people of Khwarazm and the *Babaî* rebellion are in close contact with each other. Perhaps this explains why there were so many *Vefâî* (*Babaî*) dervishes integrated with the early Ottoman society. In conclusion, if the class vision is accepted as a form of cultural residual, it is necessary to look for its origins within the framework above. As Bilkan (2018, p. 45) underlines, the fact that the “religious, mystical and narrative-based” works circulating among the Turks were first written in the Khwarazm region and moved from there to Anatolia points to the intellectual roots of the cultural residue in question. Gibbons (2017, p. 221) determines that the origin narrative, which centers the city of Mahan, has similarities with the life story of Celeleddin Khawarazmshah and his relatives. In this context, it is not possible to determine the accuracy of the narrative pointing to the city of Mahan. If there is truth in this narrative, some cultural residues from the dynasty's past (for example, the idea of class domination, the ideal of rentier land expansion, etc.) may have had an effect on the establishment of the Ottoman state. On the other hand, it is possible that this narrative was created in the 15th century in order to establish a certain symbolic parallelism between the famous Celeleddin Khwazamshah, who resisted the Genghis invasion, and the Ottoman dynasty, which resisted the Timurid invasion.

In the final analysis, there is quite insufficient information about the early period of the Ottoman dynasty in the sources we have. The available information points to the members of the ruling dynasty, albeit in a narrow circle, the existence of feudal forms of articulation and the step-by-step development of the state organization. Ünlü (2019,

of Ottoman imperial interest towards Iran in the last part of the 15th century. For example, in the anonymous *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân* published by Köklü (2004, p. 1), a Turkmen leader named Ahmed Beg, who lived near Tabriz and had around ten thousand elite soldiers, is shown as Ertugrul Beg's father. In the *Saltuknâme*, Baysungur Tekin, who is described as the Mahan ruler, is shown as one of the brothers of Ertugrul Beg (Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî, 1988, p. 108).

²⁶³ A much later but more competent version of this narrative is found in Hoca Sâdeddin's *Tâcü't-tevârîh*. But since it is a rather late example, I do not include the version in this work here.

p. 179) argues that the formation process of the early state started from the 1330s. According to him, the transition from raiding activities, which means small military operations, to conquests as a political project, takes place simultaneously with the beginning of social stratification, taxation and the formation of bureaucratic administration. Ünlü (2019, p. 180) presents the period Osman and Orhan Begs as an example of the inchoate early state phase in this context. Because, in the background of this view, the thesis that the Ottomans started from a small kinship community (tribe) and attained a mature state structure lies, but it is not possible to prove this thesis. The fact that Ibn Battuta came to the region during Orhan Beg's period and did not make serious impressions about the Ottoman administration that could leave the impression of nomadism (except that Orhan Beg did not stay in any city for more than a month, Parmaksızoğlu, 1981, p. 42) poses an important problem in this context. It is unreasonable to conceptualize Orhan Beg, who Ibn Battuta (1981, pp. 41-42) refers to as the 'highest' of other Turkmen begs, who owns more than a hundred defensive towers/fortresses, as a small tribal leader.²⁶⁴ Moreover, in the story of *Geyikli Baba* (Apzd, 2017, p. 54), the statements that *Geyikli Baba* planted the poplar tree he brought from the mountain to the inner side of the courtyard gate of the ruler's palace in Bursa, Orhan Beg's nomadic life practices become rather suspicious. In addition, it should be underlined that the administrative center (Hacıgökmen, 2019, p. 16), which is called 'otağ' in nomadic Turks, is not included in the historical sources of the period. In addition, as Köprülü points out (2018, p. 122), it is not possible to conclude that tribal relations had any effect on the nature of the state in the first formation of the Ottoman state. Our view is that at least some of the potentially typical phase characteristics could be seen even in Osman Beg's reign, due to the presence of a non-consanguineous articulation forms such as *nöker/nyad* in the Ottomans. In this case, although there is not enough information in the early sources, the typical state formation process started in the period of Orhan Beg, while the organized power of the state emerged only towards the end of the 14th century.

Eberhard ([1949] 2020, p. 217) in his article examining the state formation in Central Asian nomads, the formation of a "nomadic state" (*Nomadenstaat*), the subordination of different tribes to the authority of a military leader, and the dissolution of the old clan system of these tribes/tribes into military units obeying the leader. What is in question is not a linear development or an unexplained leap from the tribe to the

²⁶⁴ For a criticism on this issue, see: Beldiceanu (2019, p. 36).

state, but a development that takes place within the framework of the class context and ‘cultural residual’. In this framework, Öz (2019b, p. 58) draws attention to the emergence of an institutional state structure during the period of Orhan Beg. İnalçık (2021a, p. 28) concludes that there was a central office that carried out the scribal works according to certain procedures in this period, based on documents such as the *waqf* certificate, trusteeship, and *temliknâmes* from the Orhan Beg period. For this very reason, we can see from the sources that the typical features of the early state became evident in the period of Orhan Beg and that the problems of the transitional phase were encountered in the periods of Murat I and Bayezid I. Vatin (2019, pp. 53-54) claims that the political structure that emerged in this period was an ‘imperial state’ based on the following titles: (i) the existence of a certain colonization policy, (ii) the development of vassal relations, (iii) the administrative state of the ulama groups and financial duties, (iv) the formation of the Janissary army, (v) the emergence of financial registers and *timars*, (vi) the formation of an administrative hierarchy under the *beylerbeyis*. Although these titles, which are generally mentioned, exist in embryo, they do not carry the signs of the development of an imperial regime in the full sense, but the emergence of a state in a mature type.

As Darling (2019, p. 40) points out, an important indicator of this is the existence of an advanced bureaucratic style, which is similar to the Ilkhanate classical finance system, in Ottoman documents since Orhan Beg’s period. Based on this, Darling (2019, p. 40) underlines that the early Ottomans should not be considered as primitive warriors unfamiliar with sophisticated state administration traditions. For example, in Enverî’s work called *Düstûrnâme* (Öztürk, 2012b, p. 24), there is a detail that Orhan Beg “given the *biti* and made his *waqf* strong [tm]” for his son Suleyman Pasha.²⁶⁵ *Biti/bitik/bitig* means writing/sign/edict in the old Turkish-Mongolian tradition, *bitegci/bitekçi* serve as court clerks, and even the head of the secretariat of the council is called *ulu bitikçi* in Ilkhanate state (İpşirli, 1992). It is necessary to accept this example, in which *waqfs*, which have a special place in Islamic law, were given institutional guarantees through writings/edicts, as a specific indicator of statehood. İnalçık (2019c, p. 63) especially emphasizes the complex character of the state formation in the period of Orhan Beg:

Orhan had a highly developed central administration device and there were people who editing documents according to the Sharia rules. The first viziers were ulama. From the contents of the *waqf* and assignment documents belonging

²⁶⁵ Öztürk (2012b, p. 24) “biti verip vakfını muhkem kıldı”.

to this period, it is revealed that the tax principles were already settled in this period. In the waqf certificate he gave to Ahi Musa in 1366, Murad Beg kept him exempt and *musellem* from '*cem*'-i *avariz-i divani* and *tekalif-i örfî, ulak* and *sekban, cerahor, naib* and *salgun*. [tm]

Another piece of evidence is indicated in the early chronicles as prison sentences, which can be considered as an indicator of an institutionalized state structure, started with the period of Bayezid I (Öztürk, 2020, p. 125) and the examples of such punishments increased significantly. Koç (2005, p. 139) states that traces of social stratification can be seen in the early *Kanunnâmes*, but since the end of the 15th century, institutionalization and social stratification began to be expressed in legal texts with very clear lines. As a result, the historical lines of the transition from the early state form to an institutional imperial regime were realized by the development of broad economic, political and cultural subordination relations organized around the Ottoman dynasty and other rentier groups, their revolution into institutional domination relations, and the construction of military/financial/ideological articulations within this framework. The transitional phase is also being completed in a long process that ends at the end of the 15th century as a result of the social struggles that took place and the first cores of the imperial regime appeared. In this respect, as Hassan (2002, p. 160) predicted, the period of Mehmet II can be called the historical moment when the last stages of statehood” were completed and the *imperium* form was established.

CHAPTER III

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OTTOMAN RULE: POLITICAL VISION AND CLASS PATTERN

“They were born, they lived, they killed, they died [tm]”²⁶⁶

(An answer from a ruler asking his scholars
to summarize a hundred volumes of history).

What is the class pattern and vision of the Ottomans and what phases did they go through? Let’s start by defining the concept of ‘class’ first. Throughout this thesis, the concept of class is used in its broadest sense, reducing as much as possible the burdens that may lead to economic determinism. According to this definition, the phenomenon of class formation corresponds to a specific form of social stratification. The phenomenon of social stratification can be defined as “the division of a particular group of people into distinct, fairly broad and more or less unchanging (stable) categories, based on property, status and power, or both, showing a mutual hierarchical order [tm]” (Claessen & Skalnik, 1993, pp. 25-26). What distinguishes classes from other forms of social stratification is that it has historical continuity as an institutionalized mode of stratification that necessarily includes the relationship of economic exploitation. In this framework, dominant classes arise from the economic, cultural and political alienation of a social segment from the rest of the society in a way that dominates the rest and the institutionalization of this level of stratification in a way that spreads this level of economic, cultural and political relations in the same way. According to Castoriadis (2013, pp. 201-202): “alienation emerges as a method of relationship with the institution and through it, the relationship with history” and in this context, the alienation of the society against the institutions of power and the alienation of the institutions from the society, including various narrative forms and historiography, are a whole.

According to this definition, class is a form of social stratification institutionalized and thus alienated by all three forms of social relations. Thus, the

²⁶⁶ Quoted by Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı, Mevlânâ Commemoration Program broadcast on TRT in the 1970’s. See: TRT Arşiv (2019).

appearance and effects of class relations have a static-structural character, while their essence and causes acquire a dynamic-relational character. In this context, as Fried stated, the state structure can also be defined as “a system of specialized institutions that serve to maintain social stratification” (as cited in Cohen, 1993, p. 74). In order to better understand this point of view, it is possible to use the schema that social subordination relations lead to stratification, stratification and subordination relations are institutionalized as a result of social struggles, gaining the form of domination, that is, turning into a class-based relations. Both the transformation of an amorphous multitude into the form of subordination-stratification and the institutionalization of stratification and its evolution into class can be defined as moments of alienation. In this context, alienation affects the forms of social consciousness both formally and contextually and complements its symbolic-imaginary language with real practices, *vice versa*. As Lifšits points out (2019, p. 91), “the world is made ‘similar’ through the ‘alienation’ of human forces [tm]”. With the same meaning, the institutionalization of economic, political and cultural forms of subordination and a form of social stratification in which they are articulated corresponds to a process that extends from the amorphous multitude of people to the organic integrity of the community, and to the formal unity of the society (in the modern era, to the formative unity) with the fragmentation of the organic integrity. As an extension of this process, ‘official’ narratives on history, popular myths, religious formalism, widespread social taboos and dogmas also bring the consciousness of amorphous multitude to common reference points on the imaginary and symbolic plane and make it ‘similar’. I am of the opinion that this process is contingent in the diachronic sense, but creates certain social structures in the synchronic sense.

On the other hand, the clarification of class character emerges with the formation of social intermediate positions. The transition from the subordination schema to the domination schema coincides with the history of the social actor as a class subject and as a mediator. We can theoretically express this historical situation as the fact that a simple subordination element has multiple effects/voice in the different organization of social relations and for each form of subordination relation, the relation between the subordinate and the master becomes alienated again and again, reaching middle terms of secondary importance. To put it more concretely, first of all, the ability of a social subject to subordinate other elements of the society not only economically but also politically and culturally in line with his own interests constitutes an important qualitative leap point in the transition to the domination schema. Secondly, the multiple

subordination structure becomes an asymmetrical power relationship within itself, and intermediate positions are formed. For example, the emergence of intermediate positions such as opinion leaders-intellectuals, religious authorities, tax officers, judicial officials, governors, military bureaucracy means the mediation of social coercive relations and the institutionalization of this mediation to the extent that it is organized. In this respect, the organization of economic use of *coercion* (hunger, decrease in welfare, etc.), political use of *coercion* (violence) and cultural use of *coercion* (dogma or ideology, silencing) through intermediate layers is an important part of the construction of class power. In this respect, it is possible to talk about offices or positions that include status and social role elements. According to Balandier (2016, p. 87), office “means the position filled in accordance with the mandate of the society; determines the power or authority conferred within the framework of political, economic or other organizations; and finally, it compels the limitation of the task undertaken by the person for a time [tm]”. Heper (2012, p. 54) argues that the literature of *âdâb* was built precisely within this framework to support the social roles acquired by bureaucratic elites, namely their organizational socialization, and to identify the state with established values.²⁶⁷

As the subject of this doctoral thesis, the Ottoman community’s transformation from a community/tribe whose past is not fully known to the organizer of a class-based social order can be followed in the literature of political thought as a historical process in which they ensure the formal unity of the society and as a process in which the society experiences alienation at various levels. In this framework, the development of economic, political and cultural subordination schemes and their institutionalization in Ottoman society were in one and the same process with their establishment of a class power relations, and the view of political thoughts on this process is included in various moments of the said class pattern and vision in a negative or positive way. Balandier (2016, p. 78) states that in societies that have an organized government, albeit at a minimum level, power-influence-status relations have certain social origins, and he lists them as “relationship with ancestors, possession of land and material wealth, control of men who can resist external enemies, use of signs and ceremonies [tm]”. If the Ottoman example is on focused in this context, the establishment of class power takes place as

²⁶⁷ Heper’s thesis should be used very sparingly because it has an approach that erases class differences under the status of ‘bureaucratic elite’. I think that this thesis is valid for the *kalemiye* that make up the state bureaucracy, but it is far from presenting a consuming theoretical framework for them because the *ilmiye* develop their own specific interests.

an uneven and combined process that includes all of these titles. First of all, it is seen that subordination relations emerge within the framework of political and cultural relations and gain an institutional character, while economic dominance imposes itself as the process develops. Moreover, not to be excluded from this process, we see that intermediate positions consisting of experts and practitioners have emerged, which will take the 15th century to become institutionalized and detailed. As Kivılcımlı emphasizes, this process develops at different levels from the seizure of product to language and creates terminological variations (as cited in Erdoğan, 2019, p. 100-1). In this framework, the emergence of a stratification pattern that it can be described as class has emerged through three separate moments that include class-based articulation and struggles.

Firstly, it is understood that the Ottomans existed as a passive political actor within the existing class structure during the period from Ertugrul Beg to Osman Beg's thirties, that is, to the 1280s. It is possible to determine that the Ottomans were a part of a certain social stratum consisting of *tekfurs* and vassals in the period from the 1280s to the beginning of the 1300s, and became an active political subject. Finally, in a process that started in the 1300s and continued until the middle of the 14th century, it is seen that the Ottomans established their class positions, that is, they both developed their place in social stratification vertically and institutionalized this position economically, politically and culturally. Thus, class relations developed step by step in a process from Ertugrul Beg to Osman Beg and finally to Orhan Beg and took on its definite character. All of the examples of the history of political thought in the establishment period that were written after the class relations of the Ottomans were definitely established and they reflect the relevant process in detail. It is necessary to divide this process into two main moments. In the first moment, the Ottoman rule develops subordination schemes and takes the first deepening steps of institutional power. It is possible to limit this moment to include the reigns of Osman Beg, Orhan Beg and Murat I. As Öz states (2019c, p. 26), it can be said that the Ottomans entered a political-administrative institutionalization process in line with the characteristics of a settled social structure, starting from the period of Orhan Beg. However, the transformation of this process into a definite class domination schema was only possible with the development and articulation of cultural and economic relations. The second moment coincides with the development of new subordination relations, as well as the stage where the class character is established within the framework of domination, that is, institutionalized. It

would be correct to equate this phase with the period of Murat II to Bayezid II. Bayezid I period, on the other hand, can be considered both as the jumping point of the first period and as the reference point of the second period due to its extraordinary characteristics. The first part of these phases opens the curtain with the political thought developed in the *Garibnâme* of Âşık Paşa, who is a remarkable poet with his farsightedness. Finally, the first phase is completed with Şeyhoğlu Mustafa's *Kenzü'l-Kübera*, Amasi's *Miralu'l-Müluk* and Ahmedî's *İskendernâme*, which gives a highly developed example of political thought. For the second period, it is necessary to refer to the works of a series of chroniclers (Âşıkpaşazâde, Oruç, Şükruallah, Kemal, Tursun Beg, anonymous chronicles etc.) and *sîfîs* (Sinan Paşa, Yazıcıoğlu Ahmet Bîcan etc.). In the final analysis, it is possible to accept that the most competent ideological synthesis of the second phase was realized through a series of historical monographs produced by Neşrî, İdrîs-i Bitlisî and Kemalpaşazâde.

III.I. Emergence of Class Pattern: Order of Subordination

“It has been the custom of wise rulers to respect to the elders and experienced people, to place each of them in an office and rank (...) to build high structures, to marry other dynasties (...), to be involved in religious affairs (...) [tm]”

Nizam'ül-Mülk (2018, pp. 215-16)

When various historical works written in the Ottoman society in the 15th century are examined, it is seen that these works connect the birth of the Ottoman dynasty to a political conflict arising from the class structure of Iran. Although the Seljuks dominated the Abbasid and Buwayhi caliphate based on the Turkmen nomads, they saw that this situation paved the way for Christian attacks, so they adopted the idea of creating a kind of buffer zone. At the same time, as they saw the difficulty of capturing the nomadic Turks politically and militarily, they directed the Turkmen masses towards Anatolia, as in the example of Suleyman Shah (Apzd, 2017, p. 16). The factor that accelerated this migration flow was the great invasion movement of Genghis Khan's Mongol armies in the 13th century. It is thought that Suleyman Shah/Gündüz Alp and Ertugrul Beg, the first known/predicted begs of the Ottoman dynasty, also came to Anatolia during this period. The name of Ertugrul Beg's father appears in the sources of the period in two different ways. As Öztürk stated (2001, p. 24, footnote 68), this name was Suleyman Shah in the histories of Şükruallah, Âşıkpaşazâde, Konevî, Oruç

and Neşrî; In the histories of Ahmedî, Enverî and Rûhî, he is mentioned as Gündüz Alp.²⁶⁸ In the anonymous chronicle published by Köklü (2004, p. 1), a person named Ahmed, who lives near Tabriz, is shown as Ertugrul Beg's father. The contradictions in question show that no information that can be taken seriously about Ertugrul Beg's father was found even in the 15th century.²⁶⁹ Therefore, the relevant proposals are shaped directly according to different political articulations or searches for legitimacy. For example, while the name Suleyman Şah refers to the establishment of the Anatolian Seljuks and the figure of Suleyman Shah the son of Kutalmış, the name Gündüz Alp mostly aims to influence nomadic Turkmens. As Boratav (2016, pp. 41-42) states, the legendary Gök-Alp-Han, who is shown as one of the six sons of Oghuz Kagan in Dede Korkut legends, can also be mentioned as Gün-Han in Arabic manuscripts. Enverî shows Gök-Alp and Gündüz-Alp as the two sons of Seljuk ruler Melikşah in his *Düstûrnâme* and presents the latter as Ertugrul Beg's father (Öztürk, 2012b, pp. 14-19). For this reason, it is possible that the name Suleyman Shah is a fabrication referring to the Seljuks, as well as the name Gündüz Alp, which is a fabrication referring to the Seljuk and/or Oghuz legends. The name Ahmed, which is included in Köklü's anonymous chronicle, should be read as a propaganda element in the Ottoman-Safavid struggle, as it describes a 'non-Qizilbash' person who lived in Tabriz at a time when the Safavids were on the rise.

However, when the details of the route of Osman Beg's ancestors in Anatolia are examined, it is possible to catch some clues about real political relations beyond naming. It is possible that Osman Beg's father Ertugrul came to Anatolia with his tribe as a result of the Anatolian Seljuks starting to gain land under the leadership of Sultan Alâeddin -and Ertugrul apparently to be subordinated by him (Apzd, 2017, p. 17). The interesting point of this narrative is that Suleyman Shah, who is considered the father of Ertugrul Beg, could not hold on to Anatolia where he was not under a settled class rule and turned to Aleppo, while Ertugrul came back to Anatolia subject to this, to the extent

²⁶⁸ It is a possibility that both Suleyman Shah and Gündüz Alp figures may have been taken from the history of the Anatolian Seljuks. In Enverî's *Düstûrnâme*, Melikşah is mentioned as the son of Mir Suleyman and the father of Gök Alp and Gündüz Alp (Öztürk, 2012b, pp. 13-14).

²⁶⁹ Artuk (1980, p. 28) stated that Ertugrul Beg was not mentioned in the historiography of Pachmeres and Kantakouzenos, in Byzantine documents, works of Ibn Fazlullah al-Ömeri, Ibn Battuta, Ibn Dokmak, Ibn el-Firat and Ibn Haldun, that he states that this name can be viewed with skepticism. On the other hand, the fact that the name Ertugrul is included in the coins published by Artuk (1980, pp. 28, 31) and printed in the name of Osman Beg in Bursa in 1326 provides a satisfactory answer to the discussion about the name of Osman Beg's father.

that such domination was established. that is. This situation shows that the raiding/*ghaza* activity also needs to rely on an established political power. Compared to the success of the Mongol raids, the fact that Suleyman Shah could not hold on in the region shows that his group in the raids was small and weak. A raiding activity that mobilizes the masses is much more successful in this case than the small group of Suleyman Shah, and the search for such an articulation is seen in the establishment period. However, it is unclear whether this smallness belongs to a weak tribe or to a small group of nobles with *nökers* around them. Although the chronicles written in the 15th century tried to partially conceal this situation, it cannot be said that they were successful in this. For example, in the anonymous chronicle published by Öztürk (2000, p. 5), it is most likely mentioned that the soldiers under the command of the Seljuk Sultan came to the *Sultan-önü*²⁷⁰ and were accompanied by Ertugrul Beg, Gündüz Alp and Gök Alp. While the anonymous chronicler points out that many people from Oghuz tribes were the ruler's companions, it is confusing that in Ahmedî's *İskendernâme* (2011, p. 139), this information is given as if "many of Oghuz people [tm]" were with Ertugrul Beg. In this context, it turns out that Ertugrul Beg did not act with a large tribe, and the Oghuz groups considered to be his companions were most likely *ghazi*/raider nomads who were companions of the Seljuk Sultan. For example, Kemal in his work called *Selâtinname* claims that Ertugrul Beg was the head of the group that came to Anatolia and that there were one thousand three hundred and forty people with him (Öztürk, 2001, p. 25). In that case, it turns out that the tribal power that would constitute the core of the Ottomans during the Ertugrul Beg period was very low or not at all, and therefore the core group in question could not be a raider group.²⁷¹ For this reason, it can be argued that the development line of the Ottoman rule primarily followed a peaceful path, and this could be reason of the retrospective development of *ghaza* discourse.

²⁷⁰ It is possible to make a comment that directly concerns the subject as to why the name 'Sultan-önü' was used for this position. In *Selâtinname* (Öztürk, 2001, p. 26-28), Sultan-önü is the place where Ertugrul Beg met with the Seljuk Sultan Alâeddin and entered his service. Similarly, in *Düstûrnâme*, Sultan-önü is mentioned as the place where Gök Alp and Gündür Alp bought *dirlik/timar/mülk* from the Seljuk Sultan (Öztürk, 2012b, p. 16).

²⁷¹ Moreover, in response to the thesis that the Ottoman dynasty emerged from a warrior tribe, other alternative suggestions are also included in the sources of this period. There are also examples where the origin of the first Ottomans is referred to as a "Turkmen sailor" (Şerafeddin Yezdî), a peasant engaged in farming (Janissary Constantine Giovanni Angiolello, Miechowita), and the Seljuk sultan's shepherd (Şikarî). See: Karadeniz (2008, p. 150), Beydilli (2019b, p. 33), Şikarî (2011, p. 154), Angiolello (2022, pp. 12-13), Miechowita (2022, p. 113).

At this point, it is understood that this relationship developed as a result of Ertugrul Beg's request for a homeland from Sultan Alâeddin and taking Ermeni Beli and Domaniç as a pastureland and that the tribe under his control assumed a conjunctural function. First of all, they were placed against the Tatar raids, which was the main problem of the vassals and *tekfurs*, who were the members of ruling social classes in the region. According to Âşikpaşazâde, the tribe headed by Ertugrul was tasked with protecting the Karahisar vassal Alişar -who is the ancestor of Germiyanids- and the *tekfur* of Bilecik from the incursions of a Tatar community called Çavdar, and he stated that "With the arrival of Erdugrul Ghazi, the province of those infidels became safe from those Tatars [tm]" (Apzd, 2017, pp. 17-18). Based on Pachymeres, İnalçık and Ortaylı (1999, p. 27) underline that Osman Beg was subject to the Chobanids, who were the Seljuk *sipahsalar* (*beylerbeyi*), the Chobanids to the Seljuks, and the Seljuks to the Ilkhanate state. Kaplanoğlu (2000, p. 101) underlines that within this hierarchy, the *tekfur* of Bilecik seems to be subjected more on the Seljuks than on the Byzantine state. In the anonymous chronicle (Öztürk, 2000, p. 10), the author states that the *tekfur* of Karahisar and the *tekfur* of Bilecik were loyal to Sultan Alâeddin and paid tribute. Moreover, the same anonymous author states that Sultan Alâeddin marched on Baiju Noyan due to Tatar raids and entrusted the security of the Ermenek-Domaniç region to Ertugrul (Öztürk, 2000, p. 10). This information cannot be true as Baiju Noyan died around 1260, but the person meant here must have been Sülemiş, the grandson of Baiju Noyan.²⁷² It is possible to come across some other information about the mission of protecting the settled classes against Tatar raids in *Düstûrnâme*, whose historical accuracy is possibly too weak. For example, according to Enverî, Osman Beg expelled the Tatar forces that occupied the province of Karaman and returned the province to its original owner Mir Karaman, the son of Nura Sofî (Öztürk, 2012b, p. 20). However, Karamanid historian Şikârî claims the opposite and states that Osman Beg was declared a beg as a vassal of Karamanid dynasty (Şikârî; 2011, pp. 131, 235; Togan, 1981, p. 330). It is not clear that Ottomans carried out this mission under whose vassalage. There

²⁷² The person named as Bayancar Tatar in the information in the history of Âşikpaşazâde may also be related to the same person. Or on the contrary, the subject of this narrative could be Bayancar Beg, the Ilkhanate governor of Anatolia. See: Âşikpaşazâde (2017, p. 22). Togan's analysis of this incident is as follows (1981, p. 329); Gazan Khan appoints Bayancar as the governor of Anatolia and Sülemiş, the grandson of Baiju Noyan, who does not accept this, rebels. With the support of the Karamanids, Sülemiş defeats Bayancar in the war in Heraklia. In this war, Osman Beg was on the side of Sülemiş with the Karamanids, however, Varsaks and Germiyanids sided with the Tabriz government.

is a strong possibility that they supported the Sülemiş and Karamanid forces against the Ilkhanate state due to the Sülemiş rebellion. However, the Ottomans may have switched to the Seljuk-Ilkhanate side due to the defeat of Sülemiş. In this case, Osman Beg may have been first awarded by the Karamanids, and secondly, due to his change of side, the Seljuks may have made him a *yurtluk* again in order to isolate the Karamanids. Because the gate of the Germiyanid lands to Byzantium, where the warrior-*ghazi* tribes were strong, thus passed into the hands of the Ottomans, and therefore, a part of the *ghazi* population was under the Ottoman administration. The fact that the Germiyanids took the side of the Ilkhanate forces during this rebellion, and that the lands that were given to the Ottomans as a *yurtluk* afterwards, most likely took place within the Germiyanid land, may be the first starting point of the Ottoman-Germiyanid struggle.

It is a reasonable idea that Ertugrul Beg and subsequently Osman Beg may have taken on a political/military role for the protection of the *tekefur* of Bilecik, which was a Seljuk vassal like them. However, it is not entirely clear whether the Germiyanids were protected or tried to prevent their empowerment. It can be concluded that they were mostly sent there to block the way of Germiyanids.²⁷³ Kemal the writer of *Selâtinname* (Öztürk, 2001, p. 29) attributes the reason why Ertugrul Beg went to the siege of Karahisar castle with Sultan Alâeddin because the province of Germiyan was an infidel: “Ki ol vakt Germiyan iyledi küffar/ Dahı görmüş değildi Türkü niyler”.²⁷⁴²⁷⁵ Because it is known that looters from Germiyan often came to that region and in the 1300s Germiyanids made Karesi, Saruhan and Aydinid principalities as vassals (Werner, 2019a, p. 117). For example, Âşıkpaşazâde stated that, “Osman Ghazi started to get on well with the neighboring infidels when he succeeded his father. But he started enmity with Germiyanids. That's why they always hurt the people of the country they came from [tm]” (Apzd, 2017, p. 18). Neşrî (1949, p. 89) states that Osman Beg protected the Christians living in the region against Germiyanid raids. Here, we can assume that Germiyanids played the role of looter and that the Ottomans blocked this in order to

²⁷³ Lindner (2008, p. 79-80) reports that the Byzantine chronicler Pachimeres considered the lord of Germiyanids more dangerous than Osman Beg. He also states that the person at the head of the Kara Hisar may actually be the Germiyan lords. From these two details, we can understand that the Ottomans were there with the duty of protecting the established order in the region.

²⁷⁴ At that time, the Germiyanids committed blasphemy/ They did not see what the Turk would do.

²⁷⁵ In the early sources, it is seen that the events of Ertugrul Beg and Osman Beg period are intertwined. As we will explain later, it is seen that the siege of Karahisar, which is attributed to Ertugrul Beg in the *Selâtinname*, is attributed to Osman Beg in the history of Âşıkpaşazâde.

prevent further deterioration of the social order in the region. From the last years of Ertugrul Beg to the thirties of Osman Beg (between 1250 and 1280), the policy of getting along well with non-Muslim communities and assuming a positive social role in the existing class context was followed seriously. The cultural characteristics of the Turkmen population who migrated to Western Anatolia may also have an effect on the emergence of this situation. Because, as Cahen (2012, p. 312) states, Turkmen groups who migrated in the 13th and 14th centuries, despite the migration of the warrior-like Turkmen groups that came in the 11th and 12th centuries, are mostly defined as “shepherds living in peace with local villagers”. In this context, it is seen that the political vision of the first Ottomans was not confrontational, but articulative and protective of existing class relations. Barkey (2013, p. 67) draws attention to this issue and states that Osman Beg established a network center by mediating between different groups in this period.

The story of Samsa Çavuş, which takes place in the history of Âşıkpaşazâde, offers us a small-scale model of the rise of the Ottoman rule.²⁷⁶ Samsa Çavuş and those around him, who settled in Söğüt with Ertugrul Beg, they could not stand the raids of the Rums of İnegöl and migrated to the Mudurnu region. Osman Beg gave the responsibility of this area to Samsa Çavuş, on the grounds he “got along well with the infidels of this place” (Apzd, 2017, p. 26).²⁷⁷ In this case, the reason for the first settlement of the Ottomans is that they were peaceful elements that would not harm the interests of the *tekfurs* affiliated to Sultan Alâeddin in the region and could protect them against the attacks of the declassé groups. This policy, of which Osman Beg was a part, was enforced by Samsa Sergeant, who was subordinate to Osman Beg. As another example of peaceful relations, it is seen that Osman Beg made an agreement with the *tekfur* of Bilecik and sought security against the *tekfur* of İnegöl. Due to the fact that Aya Nikola, the *tekfur* of İnegöl, damaged the goods left behind by the nomads, that is looting, Osman Beg made an agreement with the *tekfur* of Bilecik and gained the privilege of leaving the goods in the fortress of this *tekfur*. In return, they bring “cheese, carpets, rugs and lambs as gifts [tm]” (Apzd, 2017, p. 18) to the *tekfur* while returning from the pasture. It is a dubious thesis that these goods are gifts given between equals. Because, first of all, it is necessary to evaluate gift giving not with its modern meaning,

²⁷⁶ Gallotta (2000, p. 60) states that Samsa may have been someone who worked in the service of the Seljuks because he was nicknamed ‘çavuş’.

²⁷⁷ Tezcan (2013, p. 27) argues that Samsa Çavuş is in a “senior position” in the alliance he made with Osman Beg.

but with its archaic meaning, which can acquire a primitive form of exchange and covenant. Mauss (2013, pp. 229-30) in his work which examines the culture of gift giving, exchange and treaty in archaic societies, states that such relations are not individual relations that are directed on the basis of interest, but that are made between communities (clan, family, tribe, etc.) and require mutual obligations, and he underlined that there are interactions of a ceremonial nature. According to Mauss (2013, pp. 245-6), giving and receiving gifts are relations that complement each other as a whole and are generally considered as a sign of equal social status -therefore, refusing to receive or give gifts means a declaration of war. However, the existence of non-reciprocal gift giving does not bring to mind a bond of friendship and a relationship between equals, but a relationship of subordination -and therefore type of rentier taxation.

If we keep our evaluation within this framework, there is no friendship between Osman Beg and the *tekfur*, but rather a relationship of subordination. The ‘gifts’ given by Osman Beg and the group of people accompanying him to the *tekfur* should be considered as rent payments, because in return the *tekfur* offers ‘security’, not a counter-gift. This model corresponds to a kind of class relation schema developed around political models such as the shepherd and tent metaphors or the circle of justice model from ancient societies to the early-modern period, as will be discussed later. In this schema, the dominant person or organization (administrator, ruler, etc.) provides security to the lower classes, while the lower classes support the security function by paying rent. There are also some other indications that the relationship between Osman Beg and the *tekfur* of Bilecik is of such a kind of political subordination. For example, despite Osman Beg’s relationship with ‘gift giving’ (tax or tribute) for many years, they have never met with *tekfur* face to face, it is known that the *tekfur* of Bilecik met Osman Beg only because of the marriage of Köse Mihal’s daughter to Göl-Flanöz-Oglu Beg (Apzd, 2017, p. 27). In this case, it is understood that the relationship between *tekfur* and Osman Beg is an asymmetrical power relationship. The fact that there is an information in the history of Neşrî (1949, p. 95) that Osman Beg kissed the hand of the *tekfur* of Bilecik strengthens this opinion. In this context, the relationship in question takes the form of a relationship between a benevolent *tekfur* and a nomad who offers him a gift. It is possible to offer an alternative explanation for this phenomenon. Eberhard (2020, p. 216), in his article examining the state-building processes of Central Asian nomads, presented a model that could explain the relationship between Osman Beg and the surrounding *tekfurs*. According to this model, nomads tend to develop

symbiotic relationships with sedentary cultures engaged in agricultural production in order to make a living during the winter months when animal products are scarce. In this relationship, nomads exchange various agricultural products for the animal products they produce. According to Eberhard (2020, p. 216), since the exchange of goods between settlers and nomads was often a 'state monopoly', the exchange took place between the resident minister of state and the head of the nomadic union, and since the residents were not dependent on animal products, they were in an advantageous position by using methods such as price increase/boycott in this relationship. An asymmetrical power relationship appears as the settled state makes the nomads dependent and buys their lands by giving loans to their own farmers. At this point, Eberhard (2020, p. 216) argues that nomads resisted this process by abandoning the exchange of goods and by looting and plundering, and that different tribes could unite and form a new political formation by taking the settled states under their own dominance in order to meet their winter agricultural product needs. Eberhard's model can be explanatory considering the gift-giving relationship between Osman Beg and the surrounding *tekfurs* in the early Ottoman chronicles. According to this alternative explanation, there were developed economic relations between Osman Beg and the *tekfurs*, and these relations were either interrupted for an unknown reason or the lands of the tribal forces headed by Osman Beg were endangered. In this case, it can be thought that Osman Beg started the raids and found a place for himself as a landowner in the local power balance.

In this relationship, it comes to mind that the night raid that Osman Beg planned to make on İnegöl and the combat of Ermeni Beli that took place before it may have been made to rein in the raids led by Aya Nikola, which also disrupted the established order of the region, and to prevent his strengthening in the region of the *tekfur* of Bilecik. Because the subject of this struggle are two separate groups of raiders against each other. In the words of Âşikpaşazâde, Osman Beg set fire in İnegöl (Apzd, 2017, p. 19). There is no evidence that this was an incursion into the *ghaza* or even for the purpose of booty, nor is there any hint that it was intended to settle in the Inegol fortress. Moreover, the situation resembles a counter-attack against the military forces of the *tekfur* of İnegöl, who came for a night raid towards Bilecik, as it is stated that Aya Nikola forces had ambushed where the Ermeni Beli ended before they marched on İnegöl. After this point, the emphasis of the story changes somewhat. Osman Beg's success in a war against the forces of the *tekfur* must have given an idea that there might be a change in his social status. As a result of the famous dream myth and the interpretation of it by Sheikh

Edebâli, the expectation that Osman Beg himself and his children saw the way to reign was formed at this point. It is understood that this expectation clearly means a rise in the class hierarchy.²⁷⁸ An important point in this story is that Osman Beg promised to give a city to Derviş Durdu's son, Kumral Dede, the disciple of Sheikh Edebâli, in case Osman Beg becomes the ruler, on the other hand, Kumral Dede saw this a lot and wanted a village and Osman Beg accepted this request (Apzd, 2017, pp. 19-20). Here, it is important to understand the concept of rulership (*padişahlık*)²⁷⁹ and all the right of disposition, namely absolute property, such as owning property, transferring and giving gifts on the property or land one owns.²⁸⁰ A document published by Uzunçarşılı (1939, pp. 102-103) shows that the region of Pambucak stream was given as property to an unnamed commander by Orhan Beg. Erdost (1984, p. 79) attributes Osman Beg's endowment of Kocaağaç Village (followed by Orhan Beg's giving the hamlet of Şarabdar and Pambucak stream as property) to the combination of both state property and private property exist in this period. To interpret, the fact that the Ottoman rulers

²⁷⁸ Another versions of the dream myth exist in the last part of Yazıcızâde 'Ali's *Tarih-i Ali Selçuk*, in a document on Tamerlane quoted by Köprülü, and in historical narrative of Ahmedî. I tried to examine the content of these narratives in the following sections. When we consider all three dream myths, we see that their common point is a prohibition and a divine manifestation that removes this prohibition. It is more correct to explain these dreams by finding out what the prohibition in question is. In Osman Beg's dream, this situation can be translated as conquering some fortresses of his own interest, becoming a ruler instead of the Seljuk sultan, despite the dominance of Sultan Alâeddin. This is about a political taboo and a violation of vassalage. In the second example, the monks of the monastery were trying to secure their position by finding Osman Beg and offering him gold and silver, which means surrendering before the Muslim armies were not even at the door. The monks seem to have broken some sort of divine 'taboo', though not definitively. Of course, at this point, it should be kept in mind that the lands belonging to the monasteries dominate the region, as it is a region where the Zealot uprisings took place. One of the important arguments of the political movements in the last period of Byzantine Empire is the demand for the redistribution of monastic lands. In the last dream, there is a classical theme. Attacking a Muslim ruler like the Emir of Bukhara should be justified by another Muslim ruler, Tamerlane. 'Taboo' here is the war of two Islamic armies.

²⁷⁹ It is clear that this concept belongs to a later interpretation. Nevertheless, Kıvılcımlı (2007, p. 123) interprets this term as the 'foot of the king', giving the meaning of a kind of Ilkhanate vassalage. İnalçık (2017b, p. 49) states that the term may have come from ancient Persian (*patahşa*) and could be interpreted as 'father-king'. The first interpretation supports the thesis that the Ottoman tribe is an egalitarian-kinship community without a claim to sultanate, and the second interpretation supports the thesis that the Ottoman Empire is a patrimonial state. Kıvılcımlı's thesis is etymologically incorrect and does not consider whether the term was actually used in the early period, as it is based on later sources such as Neşrî.

²⁸⁰ Barkan interprets this issue differently. According to him (Barkan, 1994, p. 21), Osman Beg could have given a written insignia, but he may not have given it yet because he did not have the authority to do so within the vassalage hierarchy.

had property lands and consigned land with this status should be considered as proof that they were in the typical phase of transformation from tribe to state.

Whether the dream myth is true or not, the desire to own a settlement and obtain a permanent rulership seems to have been accepted by the Ottomans, as it showed in the Kulaca Hisar raid. It should not be forgotten that the residents of Kulaca Hisar, who have sent news to the *tekmur* of Karaca Hisar up to this point, described the people around Osman as “they are not Turks settled in a place [tm]” (Apzd, 2017, p. 21).²⁸¹ In this framework, the early Ottomans continue to play a secondary/passive role within the existing class structure. However, with a difference, while they acted as a nomadic power protecting the spatial dominance and interests of other powers, not like a principality with spatial dominance in the previous stage, they aim to fulfill the same role by transforming into a settled power by assuming the *ghaza* function in this stage. It seems that the way to act in accordance with these aims is to destroy the *tekmurs* that cause problems in the domain of Sultan Alâeddin or its borders (İnegöl and above) and to acquire a stable base. That is, gaining an equal political status with other *tekmurs*.

For this purpose, it is seen that they first attacked and conquered Kulaca Hisar. In the face of this situation, the Rum raiders in the İnegöl region under the leadership of the *tekmur* of Karaca Hisar (Âşıkpaşazâde calls them ‘infidels of İnegöl’ apart from the *tekmur* forces) and the former residents of Kulaca fortress, attacked Osman Beg’s forces from the vicinity of Domaniç Beli. We do not know the exact outcome of this war, but it is important in terms of its consequences. After this war, Sultan Alâeddin’s effort to discipline his vassals emerged and the Ottomans had the opportunity to establish their spatial dominance based on the results of this situation. According to Âşıkpaşazâde, the attack of the forces led by *tekmur* of Karacahisar against Osman was defined by Sultan Alâeddin as a movement against his own rule (Apzd, 2017, p. 22), and action was taken against them with the support of Osman’s forces. An important detail here is that the *tekmur* of Karaca Hisar acted more cautiously than is supposed, and instead of going himself, he sent a friend named *Kalanoz* (or *Falanoz*) to attack Osman Beg (Apzd, 2017, p. 21). But this attitude did not change the result. Meanwhile, an unexpected incident occurred, Sultan Alâeddin had to abandon the siege of Karaca Hisar (and apparently a series of battles) due to Bayıncar Tatar attacking the Ereğli region, and gave the

²⁸¹ In some sources, this expression is referred to as “su dutar Türk” (Lindner, 2008, p. 79). The term ‘su dutmak’ can be read as settling by a waterside, settling along a stream, dealing with agriculture or administrative activities.

weapons/materials he brought for the war to Osman Beg and ordered him to continue the siege (Apzd, 2017, p. 22). After Osman Beg took over the administration of the war, he continued the siege for a while and finally allowed the castle to be plundered and captured it. He arrested the *tekfur* and sent it to Sultan Alâeddin, distributed the loot, and distributed the houses of the city to the fighters and the people coming from outside (Apzd, 2017, p. 22).

However, with the capture of Karaca Hisar, the role of the Ottoman family evolved into an active class-based subject. I am of the opinion that the political pattern and vision of the Ottoman leaders at this stage was more and more of a class-based nature. Within the existing class structure, they are subject to the orders of the Seljuk sultan. In the history of Karamânî Mehmed Pasha, when it is stated that Osman Beg sent an envoy to Sultan Alâeddin and demanded to be under his command in the *ghaza* expeditions, he indicated that “he took the path of obeying and being attached to him [tm]” (Çiftçioğlu, 1949, p. 344). To put it more clearly, it acts in line with the class-based interests of the Sultan Alâeddin and does not engage in any class struggle apart from these. However, their social status in this framework raises and they are accepted as a vassal. In the history of Karamânî, this situation is expressed as Osman Beg’s rise from “chiefdom and minor emirate to sultanate and great caliphate [tm]” (Çiftçioğlu, 1949, p.344). However, the use of the concepts of ‘sultanate’ and ‘caliphate’ here is deliberately put forward in order to obscure Osman Beg’s vassal position to some extent and has no historical validity. It is possible to see these statements of Karamânî Mehmet Pasha as a distorted interpretation of the information in the historical calendars circulating at the beginning of the 15th century. In a fragment published by Atsız (2019, p. 16), which he thinks is a draft of a calendar, he states that after Osman Beg conquered Karahisar, Sultan Alâeddin sent him *tuğ, tabl, alem*, sword and caftan, and it is stated that he gave permission to Osman to become a ‘*padişah*’ in the castles and countries he conquered. The word ‘*padişah*’ used in this fragment is open to be read as vassal-ruler, which does not correspond to the basic meaning of the word. However, a reinterpretation of this term a century later can naturally take the form of ‘sultan’ or ‘caliph’. On the other hand, as Kunt (2015, p. 20) states, it cannot be thought that the Seljuks under Mongol pressure had a serious control over the frontier lords on the Byzantine border. For this reason, it is possible to think that Osman Beg became a frontier lord and was relatively independent. However, due to the symbolic subordination elements that historical sources unanimously mention, it is necessary to

conclude that the relationship between the Sultan of Seljuks and Osman Beg was at least formally a relationship of subordination.

According to Âşıkpaşazâde, as a result of the capture of Karaca Hisar, Sultan Alâeddin sent Osman Beg a banner, tent, good horses and weapons (Apzd, 2017, p. 23). It is clear that these are symbols of sovereignty and indicate a higher level of allegiance to the sultan, as a vassal.²⁸² The detail that history of Âşıkpaşazâde does not include is whether Osman Beg was dressed in a *hilat*. Köprülü (2005b, p. 254) states that the *hilats*, which are defined as the precious clothes that the rulers send to their subordinates to compliment them, include other items such as a cone, belt, sash, sword, horse, military musical instruments, flag, drum and banner, and money. In this context, we can assume that Osman Beg may have also worn a *hil'at*. Moreover, when Osman Beg took the banner, the drum was beaten, and he stood up. After Âşıkpaşazâde gave this example, he says that this practice was not found in any sultan and cannot provide a logical explanation for it (Apzd, 2017, p. 23). It is true what he said, this practice is not a sign of sultanate, on the contrary, it is a ritual of obedience and devotion. It has nothing to do with the *ghaza* ethos, setting a table and feeding the poor, or giving blessings to the people of the world. As Âşıkpaşazâde points out, it is a part of the 'moral law' (or *homagium*) and indicates the political loyalty of Osman to Sultan Alâeddin in accordance with the vassalage law. On the other hand, the figure of Sultan Alâeddin in this narrative may be a distortion of 15th century historians. Şikârî, the historian of the Karamanids, shows Karamanoğlu as the person who Osman Beg bought the banner and drums. In an anecdote cited by Şikârî, the chief of the Turgut tribe, Ali, addressed Murat I and said, "Wasn't it the son of Karaman, who saved your father from the hand of Germiyanids? Wasn't it the son of Karaman who gave Osman a banner and a drum and made a beg? [tm]" (Şikârî, 2011, p. 209; Togan, 1981, p. 330). Togan (1981, p. 331) argues that these sultanate symbols may have been given to Osman Beg by the rebellious Mongolian governor Sülemis.

In the history of Karamânî, the tradition of standing up when the drum is beaten is mentioned, and it is claimed that this was done to glorify his own rank (Çiftçiöğlü, 1949, p. 345). This type of reevaluation is seeming to be a skillful distortion of the real meaning of incident which refers to a subordination relation. However, Osman Beg's

²⁸² This event is interpreted in *Selâtinname* as Sultan Alâeddin giving Osman Beg "the place of his ancestor" (Öztürk, 2001, p. 33): "Ecel çünküm anun işini bitürdi/ Yirini şah anun oğlına virdi/ (...) / Çıgırdı yanına Osman'ı sultan/ Atası yirin ana itdi ihsan". This means that Kemal interprets that the aforementioned 'insignia of reign' was given to Osman Beg as a sign of loyalty.

participation in the siege of Karaca Hisar alongside Sultan Alâeddin and continuing the siege instead, and the events that followed, give the impression that he has turned into a kind of vassal. Köprülü (2018, p. 95) states that no tax was most likely collected from the nomadic tribes placed on the fringes, but they were recruited into the army under their leader, who is called *il-başı*, in case of war. In this case, although the tax or tribute liability is uncertain, it can be said that he became a frontier commander, who had to join the Sultan's army with his *ghazis* in the wars. According to Lindner (2008, p. 107): As much as the dependence of the Ottomans on the Seljuk dynasty, this dynasty also had obligations to the Mongols. In *Risale-i Falakiye*, one of the last Mongolian accounting treatises, the provinces that provide income to the central government and the dependent regions are given. In this, Orhan is also mentioned among the lords in the frontier provinces of Rum.

Seljuk-Ottoman relations are not clear enough in the early sources. Although the Ottoman chronicles, mostly written at the end of the 15th century and the beginning of the 16th century, want to see a magnificent continuity between the Seljuks and the Ottomans, it is debatable whether this perspective existed in the same way at the beginning of the 15th century. For example, in a poem in his Ahmedî's *Diwan* in which Emir Suleyman is praised, he portrayed the Seljuk rulers as helpless -and almost hostile- characters in the face of Emir Suleyman (Suleyman Çelebi). Ahmedî's verses are as follows (LIII/23-24, pp. 131-32): "Hasmunı memleketde 'azl itdi her 'amelden/ Sevgülerin olalı ile güne 'avamil/ Sancar yüreği kılıcun ansa Sercer/ Tograna yire düşe görse ohunı Tugrul".²⁸³ As can be seen in the other poetic examples had discussed, the poets of the period frequently use comparisons with other rulers or the notables of the dynasty as a literary technique to praise the rulers. On the other hand, there is usually no comparison with elements such as violence or humiliation. Although Ahmedî's verses do not provide enough data to be interpreted as an expression of hostility specifically in this regard, yet they do not meet the traditional criteria of respect and moderation. In this case, if there had been a positive claim of continuity between the Seljuks and Ottomans at the beginning of the 15th century, Ahmedî should have acted with caution in line with the claim in question. Since the poet did not follow this criterion, it would be correct to conclude that such a political discourse was created

²⁸³ He made it impossible for his enemies to act in that country/ When your love is the one acting to the whole world/ Sultan Sencer's heart hurts if he remembers your sword/ Sultan Tugrul falls to pieces if he sees his arrow.

later. According to the narrative in the history of Rûhî, the Seljuk state broke the tradition of the Kayı Khan generation being the ruler, and they became khans by force (Yücel & Cengiz, 1992, pp. 369-70). While the Seljuk state was collapsing, the Turkish begs revived the tradition and chose Osman Beg as Khan (Yücel & Cengiz, 1992, p. 370). Another remarkable detail in history of Rûhî is that Osman Beg did not receive *timar* or *ulûfe* from the Seljuks, that is, he always remained unbonded but did not take part in an uprising against them (Yücel & Cengiz, 1992, p. 370). Moreover, there is an anecdote in *Saltuknâme* stating that the Seljuk state oppressed the people and therefore the right to rule passed to the Ottoman dynasty (Karadeniz, 2008, pp. 65-66). Considering the thesis that the Ottomans were Seljuk vassals, it can be argued that the view on the Seljuk-Ottoman relationship in the early period may have been based on the fact that the latter became independent from the former and did not need it. However, sufficient data have not yet been provided to support this proposition. Another interpretation is that these narratives reflect the traces left in the collective memory because the Ottomans may side with him in the revolt of Sülemiş, but it is difficult to say for sure.

With the development of the Ottoman imperial regime, the theory of breaking away from the Seljuks leaves its place to the idea of being the heir of the Seljuk heritage. In this context, there are more than one rewriting of the political relationship between the Seljuks and the Ottomans at the end of the 15th century and the beginning of the 16th century. For example, *Selâtinname* writer Kemal writes that Ertugrul Beg addressed the sultan as follows in a dialogue he narrated between Ertugrul Beg and Sultan Alâeddin (Öztürk, 2001, p. 28): “Aslında hısmımızsun iy şehinşah/ Anunçün hizmetüne dutduk uş rah/ Dedemüzdi o Şelçük han-ı ‘alem/ Oğuz içre senün dahı benüm hem”.²⁸⁴ As quoted above, it is rumored that in *Selâtinname*, Ertugrul Beg met with Sultan Alâeddin and told him that they were his ‘kin’ because Seljuk Han was the ‘grandfather’ of both. As Imber (2015, p. 185) points out, the superior-subordinate relationship has been directly transformed into a succession relationship in Neşrî’s discourse. According to Neşrî, the Ottomans did not show any disloyalty to the Seljuks and did not expand their territory against them. Moreover, according to Neşrî (1949, p. 52), the Seljuk Sultan Alâeddin II appointed Osman Beg as his heir, since he had no children. Similarly, in the anonymous chronicle published by Köklü (2006, p. 3), on the

²⁸⁴ In fact, you are our kin, O supreme shah/ Therefore, it became our way to enter your service/ Seljuk khan, the sultan of the world, was our grandfather/ Both you and I are from the Oghuz.

deathbed of the Seljuk Sultan Alâeddin, he gathered “Molla Hünkar” and other ulama and asked who he could put on the throne instead of him, and with the acceptance of all, the sultan decided that Osman Beg would take his place. In this narrative, Osman Beg is depicted as enthroned by “Molla Hünkar” who came to Konya and acted as a substitute for the deceased Sultan Alâeddin (Köklü, 2004, pp. 4-5). As Sungur (1943, p. 130) states, the name given to Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî among the people is ‘Molla Hünkar’. Thus, in this narrative, the Ottoman-Seljuk integration is reconstructed in terms of both spatial (Konya), genealogical-potestatic (inheritance of the monarchy) and religious/mystical (in frame of *Mevlevî* order) terms.

It is possible to detect the Ottoman-Seljuk integration in another narrative. As Gallotta (2000, p. 48) states, there is a similarity between the narrative of Ertugrul Beg’s father, Suleyman Shah, and the founder of Anatolian Seljuks, Kutalmışoglu Suleyman.²⁸⁵ The establishment of this similarity is a symbolic extension of the restoration principle, which defines the developmental stage of Ottoman rule. As can be understood from these examples, the vassalage of Osman Beg, which is highly likely to be a historical fact, was either tried to be denied by transforming it into a self-appointed monarch symbology, or a legitimacy claiming dominance over the Seljuk vassals in parallel with the expansion of the lands in Anatolia. principle was rebuilt. For example, in *Düstûrnâme*, Ertugrul Beg’s lineage is attributed to Gündüz Alp, who is claimed to be the son of Seljuk Sultan Melikşah (Öztürk, 2012b, p. 19). Thus, the Ottomans are presented as the legitimate heirs of the Seljuks.

III.II. Development of Economic Subordination Relations and Population Policy

Sheikh Edebâli’s dream and prayer on one side and the flag sent by Sultan Alâeddin on the other, the fact that the Ottomans became a frontier lord was symbolically finalized. In the words of Âşıkpaşazâde: “Osman Ghazi became a sanjak beg and hop on horseback [tm]” (Apzd, 2017, p. 25). At this point, the prayer received from Edebâli and the legal status obtained from Sultan Alâeddin mean that the Ottomans follow their own interests as a political actor with equal status with the *tekfurs*. They were still under the subordination of Sultan Alâeddin, but Osman Beg had the legitimacy to systematically pursue his own specific interests as well. In this framework, we see that the Ottoman family has become a member of higher social stratum and they

²⁸⁵ Tezcan (2013, p. 27) rightly argues that this narrative may be a later reconstructed form of the alliance between the Mongolian commander Sülemiş and the early Ottomans.

would be trying to institutionalize this position. As the first institutionalization step, Ottomans dynasty received legal status from Sultan Alâeddin. The second step is the settlement of the Ottomans in Karaca Hisar and organizing economic and judicial functions that will improve their power there. Âşıkpaşazâde reveals the difference of political approaches on this point quite well. Osman Beg asked his brother Gündüz, “How shall we conquer these countries? How should we act so that soldiers gather around us? [tm]” and Gündüz replied, “Let's plunder the regions around us [tm]” (Apzd, 2017, p. 24). We can easily see that this view is close to a more fluid and temporary understanding of domination, especially the perspective of declassé *ghazi* groups. Osman Beg’s answer, on the other hand, indicated a longer-term and institutional approach: “This Karaca Hisar town will not prosper when we burn and destroy these provinces. This is what needs to be done so that we get along well with our neighbors and live amicably [tm]” (Apzd, 2017, p. 24). As can be understood from Osman Beg’s later military activities, this thought does not mean the suspension or elimination of looting, pillaging and conquest activities. On the contrary, it points to the goal of establishing and developing another level of social relations in addition to raiding. The fact that the difference between these two approaches was clearly stated by an author who was a contemporary of Osman Beg -probably İshak Fakih through Yahşi Fakih, reveals the mistake of evaluating the Ottoman dynasty of the establishment period directly in the category of nomadic raiders. Hayton of Korykos (2015, p. 196) states in his evaluation on the Tatars of the 14th century that Tatar groups could easily conquer various countries, but they were quite ignorant about keeping these lands or settling in cities, they consumed everything they captured and destroyed them without knowing how to protect them. When a comparison is made between the Tatar nomads described by Hayton and Osman Beg -and his followers-, there is a great difference in topics such as settled life/administrative structure/urbanization/reproduction.

The first pillar of the vision of Osman Beg and his followers was standing in the economic plan. After Osman Beg took Karaca Hisar, he had his relatives establish a market (in Eskişehir, Hamam) and ensured security in this marketplace. An interesting example is the disagreement between the non-Muslims who came to the market from Bilecik and the Germiyanids about not paying the price of the purchased goods, Osman Beg was on the side of the traders from Bilecik and got their rights, also as Âşıkpaşazâde stated, he forbade harming the infidels in Bilecik (Apzd, 2017, pp. 24-25). Moreover, we know that a second market was established in Karaca Hisar in the same period, and

with this market, the cash tax procedure was introduced. According to Âşıkpaşazâde Osman Beg made a law that “everyone who brings a load and sells should give two *akçe*, and if he cannot sell anything, he should not give anything [tm]”, and ordered this law to be valid throughout the next Ottoman generations (Apzd, 2017, p. 31). In this case, it can be said that the Ottomans started to subordinate the economic activities around them and contributed to its institutionalization by enacting laws. This taxation issue is highly controversial in the secondary literature. On the one hand, according to what Âşıkpaşazâde tells, Osman Beg does not know what tax is at first, and he rejects it by saying “what a person earns is his own property [tm]” (Apzd, 2017, p. 31). The interpretation of this situation is that the tribe led by Osman was unaware of such tributary distinctions based on social stratification and had an egalitarian order. Since it is forbidden for the rulers to take some taxes called *bac*, *avarız* and *bid’at* taxes in the *Saltuknâme* (Ebü’l-Hayr Rûmî, 1990, p. 102), it is possible to think that such an approach was widely accepted among the people in the 14th and 15th centuries. But, if the issue is examined objectively, Osman Beg put the tax into effect and did not abolish it after this day. In other words, even though he was not aware of this distinction at first, he quickly learned and adopted to benefit from such a taxation form later on. Perhaps even more strikingly, in this anecdote, we can capture the image of a moment of alienation from the difference between Osman Beg’s first and second attitude. It is no coincidence that this moment coincided with the beginning of the Ottoman rule’s economic expansion of subordinative relations. Another pillar of economic subordination emerges in population policy. The first indication of this policy is that Osman Beg and Köse Mihal, together with Köse Mihal, did not take captives during the raid of Göynük and Tarakçı Yenicesi, although they obtained many things in terms of goods and booty. According to Âşıkpaşazâde, the reason why he was not taken prisoner was a decision taken in the direction of “subordinating the people to them [tm]” (Apzd, 2017, p. 26). Moreover, Osman Beg appointed one of his sons as an officer on immigration affairs, resettled the villagers in the fortresses he had taken back to their places as they were, and he began to attract more settlers from nearby settlements (Apzd, 2017, p. 29). Karaca Hisar, on the other hand, was made prosperous by giving houses to people from other provinces (Apzd, 2017, p. 30). During the siege of the city of Bursa, Osman Beg built a new fortress and made the surrounding villages prosperous (Apzd, 2017, p. 34). The term that Âşıkpaşazâde uses for all these prospering activities is “prospering with justice and benevolence” and it appears in this part of his work

(Apzd, 2017, p. 34). Similarly, Ahmedî (2018, p. 68) uses the phrase “whoever wishes to reign, let his country prosper with justice [tm]”. The situation in question in these statements is that welfare policies constitute a basis for establishing and maintaining the power relationship, and welfare is mediated instead of bare domination. It is clear that this strategy constitutes a necessary middle term for the establishment of class relations: In order to establish the asymmetry of political power, it is necessary to raise the economic relations/privileges/interests to a sufficient level.

III.III. The Development of Cultural Subordination Relations and Religious Policy

Secondly, Osman Beg converted some of the churches in Karaca Hisar into a mosque and appointed Dursun Faqih as a preacher.²⁸⁶ He gave the Friday sermon and started to lead the Eid prayer here (Apzd, 2017, p. 30). Lewis (2004, p. 85) summarizes the general importance of giving sermons (*khutba*) at more than one point as follows; (...) the *khutba* was a major vehicle of communication from the rulers to the ruled. It was an accepted method of proclaiming the deposition or accession of a ruler, the nomination of an heir, and more generally, the presentation of both the achievements and the intentions of rulers.

In this context, Dursun Faqih, who is understood to have been an imam for the people before Osman Beg, was equipped with an intermediary function, whose role against the people was determined by the government, together with this appointment/assignment/authorization. In a way, he has become the spokesperson and representative of the power. Thus, the sermon was read on behalf of Osman Beg. On the other hand, in works such as *Gazavât-ı Mukaffa* and *Gazavât-ı Umman* attributed to Dursun Faqih, it is seen that he wrote both heroic stories or the battles of Ali b. Abu Talib appealing to folk imagination and popular Shiism, and Sunni symbols and arguments are included in the subtext.²⁸⁷ An analysis to be made by centering these works reveals that in the appointment of Dursun Fakih, the possibilities of politico-cultural articulation were also integrated in this person.

These examples are important in that they show that religious-cultural power relations were also developed and regulated by Osman Beg. In the final analysis, Osman Beg chose to develop social relations in the cultural field in order to institutionalize his

²⁸⁶ Although Bursalı Mehmet Tahir (1971, p. 211) claims that Dursun Faqih is the son-in-law of Sheikh Edebâli, it is not possible to prove this claim.

²⁸⁷ See: Tursun Fakih (2008a, p. 41; 2008b, p. 41)

power. Âşıkpaşazâde mentions that Alâeddin Pasha, one of Osman Beg's sons, also followed this path and settled in a village (Fudura village on the Kete plain) after the reign passed to Orhan Beg, built a mosque in Bursa and a lodge in Kükürtlü (Apzd, 2017, p. 46). Orhan Beg, after capturing Iznik, converted the great church into a mosque and a monastery into a madrasah, and also built an *imaret*. An important point is that he appointed Dâvûd-i Kayserî as the head professor of this first madrasah (Apzd, 2017, p. 51). Thus, he made the first serious move in order to subordinate the formation of religious education and sciences, and therefore the justice services and religious bureaucracy, to the Ottoman rule. Similarly, Orhan Beg's son, Suleyman Pasha, converted the churches in Izmit into mosques, and one church was converted into a madrasah (Apzd, 2017, p. 47).²⁸⁸

Another tradition that provides the environment in which cultural subordination relations can develop is the 'feast of sultan'. After Osman Beg's death, when his estate was handled and divided among his sons, Alâeddin Pasha tells Orhan Beg to take herds of sheep from his father's property by claiming that those are part of necessary things and the sheep are needed for the feast of sultan (Apzd, 2017, p. 46). It is understood from this that one of the public obligations of the ruler is to open the table and give a feast, which is essential for the consent of different social segments as well as to show the wealth and power of the ruler. In his research on archaic societies, Mauss (2013, p. 310) argues that the *potlatch* tradition, which is based on the distribution of wealth in a feast, is a mechanism that enables the chief or his son to be recognized as military, legal, economic and religious, and to make be grateful to the subjected sections. According to Mauss (2013, p. 308), in *potlatch*, nobles give gifts to the chiefs, lower-ranking people, and relatives who serve them in return for the services rendered, and they motivated by fear of breaking the rules and losing their position. In this respect, 'making others eat and drink', 'setting a dining table', 'organizing banquets' at wedding and circumcision ceremonies and giving gifts are among the common forms of reproduction of power. Âşıkpaşazâde describes the Ottomans in another place as follows: "(...) these are the table owners who feed the poor. They give blessings to the people of the world [tm]" (Apzd, 2017, p. 24). Âşıkpaşazâde mentions the following for Osman Beg and Orhan Beg in the section titled "The Habits and Customs of the Sultans of the Ottoman Dynasty [tm]" at the end of his work *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osmân* (Apzd, 2017, p. 197):

²⁸⁸ İhsanoğlu (2019a, p. 138) states that eleven madrasas were established during the period of Orhan Beg.

Osman Gazinin adeti bu idi: Her üç günde bir yemek pişirir, yoksulları toplayıp yedirirdi. Çıplakları getirip sırtına elbise giydirirdi. Dul hatunlara dahi daima işi gücü sadaka vermektir. Orhan Gazi'nin huyu ve adeti: Bu dahi imaret yaptırdı ki yoksullar gelip her gün imarete yiyeler ve padişaha dua edeler. Ümerayı toplamak için medrese yaptırdı. Ziyade sevdiği dervişlere zaviyeler yaptırdı.²⁸⁹

Şükruallah (2011, p. 207) states that Orhan Beg paid salaries to scholars and *hafizs* in the soup kitchen. It is possible to think of the notion of the 'ruler's bestowal' in two ways in terms of class relations. Firstly, as can be seen in the example of the *ghazis*, there are gifts given to declassé groups or newly distinguished warriors. Secondly, it is necessary to bestow upon members of the existing social classes and strata. In the examples of political thoughts, the necessity of being moderate for both types of benevolence is repeatedly emphasized, because when gifts are given to people that are not suitable for their social status - below or above the normal - the balance of 'justice' between the social strata will be disturbed. In other words, those at higher levels will feel discredited and humiliated as a result of faulty rewards, in which case their commitment may become problematic.

In this period, also the naming of the members of the dynasty also has an order that reflects the cultural and political subordination relations. Traditionally, just as newborn children are named after the father of the father, the Ottomans also give the names of the feudal lords to whom they were attached to their children for a long time, starting with the example of Alâeddin Pasha. Fazlıoğlu exemplifies this relation as such (2017, p. 11):

It is seen that the Ottoman elite knew very well the network of political relations they lived in and acted according to this network, even at the establishment stage. As a matter of fact, Osman Ghazi gave his son the name of Emir Çoban, who he served for a while, representing the Ilkhanate domination in Anatolia; He gave another son the name of Mamluk Sultan Melik Nasır, who had relations with both Turkmen Begs and Anatolian Ilkhanate Begs to end the Iranian-based Ilkhanate domination in Anatolia. [tm]

²⁸⁹ This was the custom of Osman Ghazi: He would cook a meal every three days, gather the poor and feed them. He would bring the naked and put clothes on his back. His job was always to give alms, even to widows. Orhan Ghazi's habit and custom: He even had an imaret built so that the poor could come and eat in the soup kitchen every day and pray to the sultan. He had a madrasah built to collect umera. He had zaviyas built for the dervishes he loved very much.

III.IV. The Development of Political Subordination Relations: *Timar* and *Ghaza*

These relations progress simultaneously with the institutionalization of their privileged social positions of Ottoman dynasty in the political arena. First of all, Osman Beg's intervention in the wedding planned to be held between the daughter of the *tekmur* of Yarhisar and the son of the *tekmur* of Bilecik should be mentioned. This wedding was probably organized with the participation of the *tekmur* of İnegöl in order to establish a kinship relationship and organize a solidarity between the *tekmurs* of Bilecik and Yarhisar, probably due to the strengthening of the Ottomans. Osman was invited to this wedding and *tekmur* of Bilecik said, "Come here. Meet this Turk so that you will be safe from his evil [tm]" (Apzd, 2017, p. 26), he invited most of the *tekmurs* to the wedding. Âşikpaşazâde probably think that this situation was not an opportunity for peace and alliance, and he uses the expression "they could not find a chance to catch Osman Ghazi [tm]" for the wedding guests (Apzd, 2017, p. 26). In another chapter, Âşikpaşazâde reports that Mihal Beg warned Osman Beg and said what the aims of the *tekmurs* were and said "don't be heedless [tm]" (Apzd, 2017, p. 27). In this case, there is no reason for not to think that an alliance based on blood ties will be established between the *tekmurs* and that a conspiracy is being planned to clinch it with blood. As a result, Osman Beg, by using a battle trick, captured Bilecik castle and Yarhisar within a few days, took İnegöl under siege and plundered it, and kidnapped Ülüfer (or Lülüfer), the daughter of Yarhisar's *tekmur*, and married her to his son Orhan Beg (Apzd, 2017, pp. 28-29). This marriage naturally made the Ottomans the natural heirs of the surrounding lands. Moreover, Osman Beg appointed of his brother Dündar as *subaşı* (meaning the person responsible for the city guard) to Karaca Hisar, and this was one of the signs of political institutionalization.²⁹⁰ But at this point, it is necessary to focus on one more detail. The anecdote about Osman-Gündüz meeting quoted above is clear. It is necessary to dwell on the question of whether this anecdote is just about consulting, or is it a kind of 'political tendency survey'? According to the history of Neşri (1949, p. 78), a part of the Ottoman tribe wants to replace Osman Beg with his brother Dündar. Dündar is thought to be the second man of the tribe in terms of kinship status. As İnalçık stated (2007a), the issue of how to conduct relations with non-Muslims settled outside of the

²⁹⁰ *Sübaşı* is a commanding rank in the old Turkish tradition. As such, it cannot be interpreted as an indicator of a new and institutional mechanism. The important point here lies in the fact that the *sübaşı* was appointed as the city guard, that is, he was placed in the political subordination schema as an intermediate layer.

area of reign has come to the point of turning into a political struggle between Osman and Dündar. The key to this question is hidden in the question of whether to act only the *ghaza* or to build an order of establishment/state. By appointing Dündar to the office of *subaşı*, Osman limits his movement area and prevents him from being in the *ghaza*. In return, he brought his son Orhan to the head of his army. We learn the final answer of Osman to this contradiction on his brother Dündar's death by his arrow, and this incident was another crucial turning point in terms of institutionalization.²⁹¹ If the mentioned incident took place in 1299, it can be seen that the role of Osman Beg in the social order has changed since that date. While Osman Beg handed over the military functions, he had previously performed to his son Orhan, he now prefers to be settled in Yenişehir and its surroundings as a central authority figure. It is possible that gout disease had an effect on this, but after 1305, this situation also placed the political distinction between the status of the king and prince.

The three most crucial elements that have not been mentioned yet are Osman Beg's giving the Friday sermon on his behalf, appointing a *subaşı* and appointing Dursun Faqih as a judge/*qadi*. It is clear that these three are signs of establishing an independent administration or rule. Şeyhoğlu (2013, p. 134) states that the appointment of a commander (*subaşı*) and/or *qadi*/judge to a city is an obligation on the rulers. Osman Beg, who stood up only ten years ago when the drum was struck under the banner of Sultan Alâeddin, now seems not to recognize the sultan's suzerainty when it comes to appointing a *qadi* and giving a Friday sermon. Âşıkpaşazâde narrates this event as follows (Apzd, 2017, p. 30):

Dursun Faki: 'My Khaan! Permission will be required from the Sultan,' he said. Osman Ghazi said: 'I took this city with my own sword. What does the sultan have to do with this so that I can get permission from him? God, who gave him the sultanate, gave me the khanate with ghaza. If his gratitude is for this banner, I even raised the banner myself and dealt with the infidels. [tm]

İnalçık asserts that this event may not have happened. According to him (İnalçık, 2007a):

Seljuk Sultan Alâeddin III was taken to Tabriz by the Mongols in 1302, and the administration of the last Seljuk ruler Mesud II lasted until 1308. All Anatolian

²⁹¹ This narration has always been discussed controversially in the literature (Akman, 1997, p. 43; Kafadar, 2010, p. 163). In the stories of Dede Korkut (2019, p. 15), shooting with an arrow during hunting is seen as a method of killing family members.

beg-emir-khans declared their sultanate and became the owners of sermons and coins, only after the death of Abu Said Bahadır Khan in Iran in 1335, when there was no Ikhans from the Genghis lineage left. [tm]

In this case, it is either a fabrication or exaggeration and playing with dates. Yet, regardless of whether or not that was exactly the case, there is no reason for not to believe that Osman Beg had acted more or less autonomously from the existing lord-vassal relationship. The point to be noted here is a state of symbolic alienation that proceeds through the banner element. Moreover, it is possible to support this situation with another turning point, the 1302 Battle of Bapheon. The fact that Sultan Alâeddin was taken to Tabriz in 1302, and the Ottomans defeated the Byzantine army in the Battle of Bapheon, that is, clearly defeated one of the great powers superior to them, and its success against the Byzantine palace, which was the suzerain of some *tekfurs* on the front, put the Ottomans in a superior position both symbolically above the *tekfurs* and brought a class pattern and vision that would subordinate *tekfurs*. In addition, the fact that allies and enemies gathered around Osman Beg in this war (Pachymeres, 1999, p. 366) indicates that he became a central figure in the political arena. We can see this situation in the union of the *tekfurs* of Andranos, Bidnos, Kestel and Kete and declared war on Osman (Apzd, 2017, pp. 32-33). Osman's success in this war strengthened his claim to domination over the *tekfurs* and made him a regional power. For example, the *tekfurs* of Leblebici, Lefke, Çadırlı and Mekece, without the need for a war, came directly under the command of Osman Beg and gained the status of military-feudal adviser/comrade. According to Âşıkpaşazâde "They themselves became the *nökers* of Osman Ghazi [tm]" (Apzd, 2017, p. 35). The word *nöker/nökür/nöküd* is the name given to the warriors who serve as their personal entourage around the clan/tribal chiefs in the Mongolian tradition (Vladimirtsov, 1995, p. 133), and they are considered within the members of dominant class in Mongolian feudal formation (Vladimirtsov, 1995, p. 135). It is known that the Mongols established permanent armies and personal military units based on the *nökers*, and in this case, their status would change to *noyad* (Vladimirtsov, 1995, p. 146). The *nökers* were attached to and served their leaders with 'and' (homagium). There is evidence that such *noyad* and ruler relations existed in the establishment of the Great Seljuk State. For example, Köprülü (2005a, p. 47) finds that some of those who served as great commanders -Atabegs- in the Seljuk army came from Oghuz tribal leaders who were not subject to the state bureaucracy but were directly

subordinate to the ruler. In this respect, it can be assumed that Mihaloglu, whose name is mentioned in the theory of three families, has also become a kind of *noyad* as was indicated (Apzd, 2017, p. 25): “Osman Ghazi, who became a frontier lord and hop a horseback, Kose Mihal would always be with him [tm]”. Timur (1979, p. 85-86) states that the *nökers* cannot be considered as servants, but as a group that forms the basis of a kind of palace aristocracy that struggles with each other to become the ruling class.

The dual position on the market tax that was given as an example for economic subordination applies to this example as well. It is understood the validity of this example from another issue, Osman Beg’s entrusting *timar* and enacting laws on *timars*. Osman Beg gave Karaca Hisar province to his son Orhan, Yar Hisar to his comrade Hasan Alp, İnegöl to Durkut Alp, and gave the income of Bilecik to Edebâli as a *timar* (Apzd, 2017, p. 32). It is seen in the Öztürk chronicle (2000, p. 12) that this division is called Osman Beg’s “granting the provinces he seized [tm]”. Let's also remember that Osman Beg appointed Samsa Sergeant as a deputy to the Mudurnu region before. Here, as the principle of *timar* granting, the obedience of the local people is sought. Âşıkpaşazâde stated by using a consistent terminology that during Orhan Beg’s incursions to the Marmara province, Iznik surroundings and Tekfur Pınarı, the people were subject to him, he gave timars, villages and places were given to each of the *ghazis* (Apzd, 2017, pp. 32-36). Finally, it is necessary to mention the law enacted by Osman Beg on *timar*. According to Âşıkpaşazâde, this law was stated as follows: “If I give a timar to someone, they should not take it from their hands for no reason. When he dies, they give it to his son. Even if it is very small. Let his servants go on an expedition at the time of the expedition, until he is ready for battle [tm]” (Apzd, 2017, p. 31). There are some historical inconsistencies in this law. First, it is claimed that the term ‘*timar*’ was not used in that century. Secondly, in the continuation of these words, Osman Beg said, “Whoever keeps this law, may Allah be pleased with him. If they make my descendants enact a law other than this one, may Allah not be pleased with the one who did it or the one who caused it” (Apzd, 2017, p.31), thus words making us think that Âşıkpaşazâde developed this discourse in order to protect the interests of the *timar* holders in the 15th century.

However, if the prayer/curse part is putted in parentheses for now, the introduction of such an oral law is quite logical in terms of the political and economic institutionalization of Ottoman domination. Because the discussions about the absence of private property in the land regime in the Ottoman Empire undergo a necessary

transformation with this example. This example does not prove private property or a binding legal structure such as a fief contract, but it does consider it necessary to accept the existence of a hereditary land regime under state protection. The principle of ‘not retraining *timars* without reason’ in this text can be understood in two ways: The valid reason for confiscating the *timar* is either a *timar* holder who could not organize agricultural production, or a *timar* holder who rebelled against the ruler or joined rival forces. In both cases, it is seen that the right of the *timar* holder over his lands may be in conditional status, and this status is guaranteed by the state.²⁹² Here we need to depict the issue in detail. The fiefdom may not necessarily corresponds to the form of ‘landownership’. For example, in Mongolian social organization, the *timar* or *mukata’a* unit is composed of human communities. According to Vladimirtsov (1995, p. 150): “Just as a lineage owns a certain land where it lives nomadic life together with its branches, the urux, and men with hereditary serf vassals (unagan bogol), so does a lineage, a people living on a certain land (nutux -nutug) according to the same method can even be the owner of the state (nation) [tm]”. For example, in *The Secret History of the Mongols* (Temir, 1986, pp. 161-62), Genghis Khan divided the peoples under his command among his mother, brothers, and sons. In this respect, it is not easy to distinguish between *yurthuk/dirlik* and *mukata’a/timar* in term of conditional ownership principles and rent grants. In the final analysis, it would be appropriate to think that the rentier mode of production is valid in both cases, but that what is in question here is largely an example of feudal relations as well as the early state phase.

To continue, it should also be noted that the *timars* were also divided into smaller *timars* (subinfeudation) and thus arranged according to the feudal hierarchy. Âşikpaşazâde shows the prevention of attacks from Constantinople as the reason why the Izmit coast was given as a *timar* to Kara Mürsel, but here he uses a dual conceptualization, ‘*timar*’ and ‘*timar-eri*’ (Apzd, 2017, p. 47). The coastline was given to Karamürsel as *timar*, but this *timar* was divided into smaller *timars* and the holders of smaller *timars* were called “*timar-erleri*” as was indicated (Apzd, 2017, p. 47). In other words, the Ottomans in early period were governing in accordance with the hierarchy among the *ghazis*, or in a way that would create a feudal hierarchy. Âşikpaşazâde states this situation as “he gave villages to each of them. He gave places.

²⁹² Öz (2019b, p. 71) thinks that Âşikpaşazâde referred to the lands given as ‘*yurthuk*’ as ‘*timar*’ in accordance with the naming of his time. Because *yurthuks* are inherited from father to son and have a feudal character.

He respected each person according to his value” (Apzd, 2017, p. 34). The word ‘respect’ (*riâyet*) means ‘to obey’ and comes from the same root as *reâyâ*. On the other hand, we can follow from the 15th century sources that the word ‘*riâyet*’ also means to respect, to privilege, to accept superior (for example, Molla Lütüfi’s *Harnâme*; Gökyay, 1986, p. 159, footnote 37). In both cases, there is political recognition of the specific status of individuals and the lands they acquire accordingly. Moreover, the terms ‘*ad*’ / ‘*and*’ / ‘*ant*’ and ‘*ahd*’ (both means oath, *homagium*), which did not appear until that moment in Âşikpaşazâde’s work, gradually appear after *timar* grants, and I think both ‘*aman vermek*’ (giving mercy) and the commitment of social forces lower to the seigneur through a verbal contract.²⁹³ When the Çavdar Tatars attack the bazaar of Karaca Hisar, Orhan Beg follows them to catch the Tatars and have them return what they have taken. He asks Osman Beg for an order on what to do with Çavdaroglu and Osman Beg says, “Let’s give them an oath together with their begs. Then let’s release them [tm]” (Apzd, 2017, p. 36). After a while, Osman Beg, to send a military force against the Tatars, said: “We gave an oath to this Tatar. However, their Tatariness will not disappear [tm]”, and Orhan Beg invites the *ghazis* to fight “on the path of religion [tm]” against the Tatars (Apzd, 2017, p. 37).²⁹⁴ The second use is that Orhan Beg seize a fortress near the Kara Ap Stream with an ‘*ahd*’. The third use is more interesting. Orhan Beg marched on Kara Tigin and said to the keeper of the fort, “Give me this fort. I’ll leave you in the fort again. Let the ad be mine [tm]” (Apzd, 2017, p. 38). When the *tekfur* did not accept this offer, he looted and seized it, appointed Samsa Çavuş to its management, bought his captives and left them in the fortress, “strengthening it with and and yemin [tm]” (Apzd, 2017, p. 38). The fourth example is the surrender of Bursa from to the Ottoman forces. In the face of the siege, *tekfur* of Bursa said, “Let’s get along. Let no one harm us. Then we can give the fortress [tm]”, this is called an offer of ‘*and*’ (Apzd, 2017, p. 40).

All four examples have points in common. First of all, if the question of whether these Tatars are Muslim or not is an exception, it is all done with non-Muslims. Secondly, it is seen that the form of *ad/ahd/and* is made between two groups with a high status and a low status, and rather means that the low is subject to the high under certain

²⁹³ Hassan (2011, p. 150) defines the term ‘ant’ as a ceremony to confirm fraternity and friendship with a stranger.

²⁹⁴ ‘*And*’ / ‘*ant*’ is a form of oath which is also frequently used by Mongolians. Making friends, forming marriage bonds, being blood brothers, forming alliances between rulers, etc. (Roux, 1994, pp. 191-92; Roux, 2017, pp. 32-33).

conditions. In the first example these are Tatars, in the second example is a *tekfur*, third are first a *tekfur* then slaves, and in the last example is again a *tekfur*. The situation of Tatars and a *tekfurs* is clear. So, what kind of ‘*and*’ (oath) and ‘*yemin*’ (vow) is involved with slaves? It can be said that these slaves belonged to Orhan Beg and they were sworn to work in the vicinity, it can be said that they were released in return for taxes/rent and placed in the fortress, or it can be said that they were brought to the status of slave-soldier. The logical interpretation here is that the captives were forgiven by giving the oath that they were already citizens of the city, and they were released in return for tax/loyalty by making them take an oath. It can be thought that some of the remaining examples of oath (*ahd*) mean simply to promise, while the rest mean to be subject to his provisions, because the term ‘*ahid*’/ ‘*ahd*’ is used for agreements of a political nature in the legal sense (Yurdagür, 1988). Moreover, the usage of this term in the history of Islam is related to the appointing of the rulers at lower levels by the caliphs or amirs or granting them some privileges (Yurdagür, 1988). On the other hand, the term ‘*akid*’ (contract) is used for agreements or commitments that concern the field of private law. In this respect, it seems appropriate to use the term *ahid* together with ‘*eman*’ and ‘*dhimme*’ as a political term. Osman Beg’s provision of ‘let us give oath and let go’ for Tatars suggests that there is a closeness of meaning between ‘*and*’ and ‘*eman*’. Furthermore, the proposal of the *tekfur* of Bursa to surrender the fort, but not to touch any life or property as a result of this, is evaluated as an offer of ‘*and*’, that is, it approaches the meaning of giving an ‘*eman*’. In any case, it is clear that the essence of this relationship is subordination and probably conditional ownership pattern within the rentier social formation.²⁹⁵

It should always be kept in mind that an oath (*and*) is an oral contract. For this reason, it is understood that they establish vassalage relations, assignments and *timar* divisions in the early period mostly with ‘*and*’. Âşıkpaşazâde narrates that while Osman Beg gave a village to Kumral Dede, one of the followers of Edebâli, as property, when Kumral Dede asked for paper, he said, “Can I write, do you want paper from me? Here I have a sword (...) I will give it to you. Let me give you a mug too, so they can be yours together [tm]” (Apzd, 2017, p. 20). Exactly for this reason, it indicates how the element of ‘keeping one’s word’ is blessed as one of the moral principles of oral culture.

²⁹⁵ Kemal states that Orhan Beg marched on Iznik after Bursa, and the chiefs of this place accepted to be subordinate to Orhan Beg and gave *tribute* (Öztürk, 2001, p. 51). In Kemal’s account, the meaning of rentier subordination is clearer.

For example, in the *Battalnâme*, this element takes place as follows (Demir & Erdem, 2006, p. 92): “Erlık oldur ki sözünde sadık ola”.²⁹⁶ Ahmedî, one of the writers of the early Ottoman period, expresses this issue as follows (2018, p. 214):

A sultan should try not to break his oath/ Those who want a sultanate to be permanent / He must be reliable in his oath/ Going back on your word is the work of the devil, know well / Make an effort, do not break your word/ A shah who is dishonest in his word/ The pillar of his reign will undoubtedly be rotten.²⁹⁷ [tm]

Ahmedî (2018, pp. 389-390) considers not keeping his word as an end-time instigation, that, he states that in the past, even non-Muslims kept their word, but in his own time, “those who follow the cause of faith [tm]” and ‘believers’ did not keep their oath, that false oaths became a tradition and “deception, lies and cheating [tm]” became the way of thinking of people.²⁹⁸ In this statement, there are observations that contemporary social struggles have increased and the state authority has disappeared in the sources of the period. Thus, keeping one’s oath, as a moral rule, also becomes an important but insufficient element for the sustainability of the social structure. Moreover, it can be understood why, in addition to giving oaths, ‘writing’ and ‘bookkeeping’ and ‘recording’ began to develop in this context.

Finally, it would be appropriate to examine the *ghaza* activities. After the acquisition of Karaca Hisar, the *ghaza* activities accelerated and its area expanded. For example, it is determined that Prince Orhan advanced to the vicinity of Iznik and to the province of Marmara and both conquered and plundered (Apzd, 2017, p. 32), and that the Ottoman forces organized raids as far as Samandıra and Kandıra after the capture of Bursa (Apzd, 2017, p. 42). According to Âşikpaşazâde, the *ghazis* next to Osman Beg are getting stronger thanks to the giving of villages and spoils and they “always want to make *ghaza* [tm]” (Apzd, 2017, p. 34). Moreover, they show homogenization tendencies within themselves, and their internal conflict tendencies are increasing. An interesting

²⁹⁶ Manhood is being true to his word.

²⁹⁷ Also see: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 2828-2832; “Şeh gerek kim ahdine ola dürüst/ Dilese k’olmaya devlet rükni süst/ Devlet ıssı şöyle gerek k’ide cehd/ K’olmaya ayruhsı andan hiç ahd/ Pâdişâhlığın dileyen pâyidâr/ Anda üstine gerekdür üstüvâr/ Nakz-ı ahd İblis işidür bellü bil/ Ahdüñi ayruhsı itme cehd kıl/ Şâh k’olmaya anuñ kavli dürüst/ Bî-şek olur devleti erkânı süst”.

²⁹⁸ See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 5190-5194; “İlerü kâfirler eyledükde ahd/ Hıfzına bu resme iderlerdi cehd/ Şimdi îmân da’vi_ idenler iy aceb/ Nişe_ iderler ahd bozmağı taleb/ Yalan and oldı kamunuñ pişesi/ Hile vü tezvîr ü mekr endişesi/ Lâ-cirem âşüb toldı uş cihân Zâhir oldı fitne-i âhir-zemân/ Çünki kâfir sahlar ola andını/ Mü’min olmaya sıyan sevgendini”.

example is that Osman Beg invited Köse Mihal to convert Islam. Osman Beg says to the *ghazis* (Apzd, 2017, p. 34): “Let’s call Mihal. Let’s invite him to Islam. Let’s convert him to Islam. After that, let’s go wherever you say by the order of Allah. If he doesn’t become a Muslim, let’s plunder his province first [tm]”. At this point, there is a need to bring a new interpretation. As the borders of the Ottoman rule expanded, as indicated in the political documents that a basic strategic trend emerged in the Ottoman administration. This tendency can be summarized as pushing the *ghazis* to the fronts and granting *timars* to their leaders, while keeping the *takfurs* in place with an oath. Thus, it is possible to both shift the declassé groups towards the fronts of the class order and isolate these two from each other and prevent internal conflicts. Mehmet Ali Şevki (1968a, pp. 35-36) is one of the first to describe this process as a tributary/rentier policy:

The nomads’ neighborhood to the settled always lead to clashes and plunder. It is possible for this conflict to be resolved in an order that may seem strange from the outside, when the settlers themselves do not create a solid authority to compel the nomads to obey. The attackers assume the duty of protection and security in return for a tax. This is the mechanism of Turkish conquests and Turkish states. [tm]

On the other hand, declassé *ghazis* rise in the social hierarchy and thus are articulated to class relations. The shifting of the intensity of *ghaza* activities to lands of Rumelia during the Orhan Beg period enabled the said isolation function to be maintained more easily due to the change in geographical orientation. At this point, it is striking that a state organization with a higher organizational capacity is needed in order to fulfill the relevant function. Âşıkpaşazâde uses the first descriptions of the emergence of the *Diwan* organization for the period of Orhan Beg. An important detail is that it became a requirement for the begs who served in the *Diwan* to dress in a way to indicate their high social status, which can be considered as symbolic proof that a new phase of alienation has been entered. Âşıkpaşazâde describes the symbolic differentiation in question as follows (Apzd, 2017, p. 49): “Burma tülband emerged in the time of Orhan. If the begs who came to the Diwan did not have a Burma tülband, they would be ashamed and would say, ‘You came to the diwan, where is your burma tülband?’ They used to wear Burma tülband in the diwan” [tm]. The use of the *burma tülband* (a special form of turban) and the condemnation of those who do not, show that

this symbology of social hierarchy was adopted and reproduced especially by the people in the *Diwan*.

III.V. Âşık Paşa's *Garibnâme* as an Early Institutional Synthesis and Yunus Emre's Poetry as an Early Criticism on Institutionality

Âşık Paşa was a poet and mystic who was the grandson of Baba İlyas and served as the vizier of the Anatolian Governor Timurtaş Pasha -he went into exile or fled to Egypt for political reasons- and finally wrote his work named *Garibnâme* in 1330 (Kut, 1991). Bursalı Mehmet Tahir (1971, p. 42) states that his name is Ali and that the nickname 'Pasha' was given not because of any official duty, but because he was the eldest son of his father. It can be guessed that his real name might be Ali by examining the *waqf* inscription of his son Elvan Çelebi's *zawiya* in Çorum-Mecitözü, but Eyice (1968, p. 223) believes that this phrase is an abbreviation. According to the information given by Yavuz (2000, p. 9):

Since he was born in 1272, Âşık Paşa's childhood passed during the times of Gıyaseddin Keyhusrev III (1266-1284), his youth years during the times of Sultan Mesud II (1284-1296, 1302-1310) and Alaeddin Keykubad III (1298-1302) and he lives his mature ages in the period of Osman Beg. He spent the last seven years of his life in the time of Orhan Beg. [tm]

Brockelmann (1919, p. 1) states that Âşık Paşa wrote in Karaman Turkish. On the other hand, Köprülü (1980, p. 250) states that Âşık Paşa was also influenced by the languages that were in circulation in his age and he may have known some Armenian. Günşen (2006, p. 22) also indicated the use of Hebrew in *Garibnâme*. It is determined that the author has poetic works in the forms of *masnavi* and ode (*gazel*) besides *Garibnâme* (Levend, 1953, 1954).

The breadth of his political experience and knowledge, both historically and personally, makes Âşık Paşa distinctive in terms of political thought, even if he was a *sûfi* poet. Cengiz & Sariçiçek (2011, p. 90) states that Âşık Paşa deals with social issues in his poems within the influence of the cultural context he is in. Gülensoy (1991, p. 156) has shown that the narrative technique called 'parable', which is frequently seen in *sûfi* literature, is not given significance in this work and that he pays attention to expressing his own period and the environment in which he lives. On the other hand, Köprülü (1980, p. 347) states that, contrary to these views, there are almost no local information in Âşık Paşa's work that will show the characteristics of the Anatolian life

of his time, and he claims that the poet is an imitator of Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî and Sultan Veled and in *Garibnâme* there are copious collections of *Masnavi* of Rûmî. On the other hand, Ülken (2017, p. 288) points out that Âşık Paşa was a representator of a specific cultural circle that tended to cut ties with the Seljuks and gathered in Kırşehir. Ülken (2017, p. 288) shows that the most important feature of this cultural environment is that they write in Turkish and appeal to ordinary folk groups, as a rival of the high-*sûfîsm* forms of Iran and the city of Konya, where Persian is effective. Other *sûfîs* such as Hacı Bektaş, Alvan Çelebi, Ahi Nimetullah Evran, Tapduk Emre are shown as other figures of this cultural environment. Within the framework of Ülken, Şeker (2008) argues that *Garibnâme* bears the traces of Kutadgu-Bilig, poetry of Yunus Emre, style of thought of Hacı Bektaş and morality form of *Ahi*-order. According to Kaplan (1976, p. 149), Âşık Paşa tried to establish the “metaphysical and ideological foundations [tm]” of the Ottoman state. The farsightedness of this famous poet, who was included among the ‘spiritual architects of the Ottoman Empire’ and placed in the pantheon by the conservative historiography, is especially worth examining.

In the political theory of Âşık Paşa, the ruler, the ulama and the dervishes take place as privileged social groups, and the figure of the *ghazi/alp* is depicted as an armed group of people who must be loyal to these groups. Although Âşık Paşa’s *Garibnâme* is interpreted in secondary literature as reflecting the worldview of dervish groups, which are generally representative of the *ghazi-alp* figure, it is necessary to make some critical commentaries on this interpretation. Although the figure of the *ghazi-alp* and dervishes occupy an important place in Âşık Paşa’s work, what is directly reflected is not the world view of the *ghazi-alps*, but a presentation depending on their ideal positioning in the general power structure. Yıldırım (2019b, p. 84) stated that Âşık Paşa differed from the semi-nomadic Turkmen population in this context, and that the understanding of Islam in *Garibnâme* had a “very refined and Sunni character compared to the Islamic interpretation and lifestyle common among Turkmen groups foreign to urban culture [tm]”. For this reason, it would be more accurate to accept that Âşık Paşa’s thought reflects his contemporary social groups and relations within the scope required by an established/settled form of power.²⁹⁹

Âşık Paşa’s political theory has a very competent theoretical background and has a framework that can be considered original. It is possible to call this theory the theory

²⁹⁹ For an evaluation of *Garibnâme* as the discursive construction which reflects the pattern of early state development, see: Derin (2023).

of ‘three thrones and a state’. The term ‘three thrones’ refers to three institutional structures that maintain their permanence throughout history, even if the persons/subjects change. These structures -as represented in the text- would not be ‘*zelil*’ (despised) that is, they are exalted, not limited to the life span of a specific person - that is, they are supra-personal and continue their existence as long as the world stands, that is, they are structurally permanent elements in the broadest sense. Âşık Paşa’s statement is as follows (2000, p. 106): “Dünyada üç taht yaratdı ol Celîl/ Kim bulara yok-durur olmak zelîl/ Ger ölürse tahta hükm iden kişi / Taht ölmez bellü bilüñ bu işi/ Zîra kim bunlar-durur göge direk / Niçe kim dünya dura bunlar gerek”.³⁰⁰

In these lines, three symbolic thrones that will continue to exist institutionally are mentioned. The throne symbol in these lines refers to the authority to rule from the divine source. Here, the first of this three thrones is occupied by the *sultan*, the second by the *ulama*, and the third by dervishes. In this context, Âşık Paşa states the following about the authority of sultanate (2000, p. 106): “Birisi sultân-durur hükmi revân/ Mahkûm olur hükmüne cümle cihân/ Diler-ise dünyada ‘adl eyleye/ Ni’met-ile cümle halkı toylaya/ Ger dilerse zulm-ıla yıka ili / Ne ola kim irmeye anuñ eli”.³⁰¹ In these couplets, it is seen that the sultan is symbolized as the absolute ruler: The ruler’s decree is binding for the whole world, and the welfare or downfall of the people of the world depends on his wish; in this preference, no one is beyond his hand or can nullify his move. More interestingly, it is a remarkable detail that even if this throne was established by God, the sultan was not bound by religious provisions. It is clear that this situation is based on the experience of Mongolian invasion, as was tried to be shown through the establishment of the oppression and justice dichotomy. Since the Anatolian people understood very early on that the action of the ruler would not be limited by God, they drew the scale of action of the ruler in a very realistic way.

Secondly, Âşık Paşa gives the following definition for the throne assigned to the *ulama stratum* (2000, p. 106); “Biri ‘ilm ehli-durur kim şer‘-ile/ Dîn içinde hükm ider kıldan kıla/ Mismili murdârı bunlardur bilen / Dîn içinde gösterüp ma‘lûm kılan/ Zîra

³⁰⁰ The immortal god created three thrones in the world/ There is no abomination in the world for them/ If the one dies, the person who rules the throne / The throne does not die, so know for sure/ For they stand directly to the sky / As long as the earth stands, they must also stand.

³⁰¹ One of them is the sultan who ruled / His rule is binding for the whole world/ He gives justice to the world if he wills / All the people feast with blessings/ If he wills, he will destroy the country with oppression / What is it that his hand cannot reach?

kim bunlar-durur dîn diregi / Şer‘ içinde cümle halkuñ yigregi”.³⁰² In these couplets, the role that Âşık Paşa assigned to the ulama is limited to the application of religious sciences, teaching the knowledge of catechism to the public and the function of judgment. Thus, it will be possible to make judgments by avoiding religious prohibitions and to keep the people in the circle of Sharia provisions.

The owner of the third throne is defined as saints by Âşık Paşa. Âşık Paşa expresses the peculiarity of this social group as follows (2000, p. 107): “Hem birisi evliyâdur evliyâ / Bu gönül yüzün gerek bunlar yuya/ Kankı gönül kim yüzi yunmuş-durur / Ol gönüldür kim hak’a dönmiş-durur/ Evliyâdur gönüle saykal uran / Cism içinde nefslereñ boynın buran”.³⁰³ It is also possible to understand the term saints (*evliya*) used in these couplets in the broad sense as high level *sûfis* and fellows of *sûfi* orders (*tariqa*). In these couplets, it is seen that the saints do not have any political functions such as consultation, judging, or ordering the worldly powers. Their activities are limited to a traditional self-perfection and struggle (purging from worldly desires and turning the heart from the world to God). But even in this situation, Âşık Paşa states in his text that the saints are loved by the masses, because according to him, the saints have power over the hearts (2000, p. 107): “Evliyânuñ hükmi gönülde yörir/ Anuñ-ıçun kamular yüzün sürür/ Bunlara viridi Çalap gönül ilin / Bunlara bildürdi hem kudret dilin”.³⁰⁴ In this distinction put forward by Âşık Paşa, the political authority function as the absolute decision-making authority was reserved for the throne of sultanate, the justice function was reserved for the members of the ulama stratum, and the popular consent mechanism was reserved for the dervishes/*sûfis*. The remarkable aspect of this tripartite distinction is that the ruler, as a political authority whose decisions cannot be controlled, assumes all worldly powers and is positioned above social contradictions, while the ulama stratum becomes a judicial authority that resolves social contradictions and is tasked with educating the society within the framework of Sharia. Moreover, the

³⁰² One of them are scholars have the knowledge of Sharia / They judge by paying attention to very fine details in religion/ They know the animal that is slaughtered in accordance with the rules and the animal that is unclean/ They show this in religion and make it open to everyone/ Because these people stand as the pillars of religion/ These people are the best of all people in the Sharia.

³⁰³ Besides, one of them is also saints, they are a saints! / They should wash this heart’s face/ Their heart is that which face is washed / It is the heart that turns to God/ They are the ones who polish the heart/ Break the neck of worldly desires in the material world.

³⁰⁴ The judgment of the saints is valid on the hearts / Therefore all the people will turn their faces to them / God granted the country of the hearts to them / God also taught them the divine language.

function attributed to the dervish circles in this schema, together with the members of the ulama, corresponds to a pedagogical function -but in a mystical framework, not Sharia, and the reputation of the dervish circles among the public gains importance for the reproduction of the social subordination schema. In Âşık Paşa's text, dervishes are expected to use this social reputation especially on the *ghazi/raider* groups called 'alp'. In other words, Âşık Paşa, as Kaplan (1976, p. 157) stated, sees the clergy, imams and sheikhs as the guide of the people as a whole and affirms that they guide the people.

One of the main problems of Âşık Paşa's political thought is how to articulate the social power network of dervish circles, which is based on the religious and mystical plan and spread with discursive mechanisms, with the warrior groups (*alps*). In terms of the solution of this problem, Âşık Paşa proposes the establishment of a series of discursive power mechanisms between both groups. The founding principle of these mechanisms is based on the promise that the religious and mystical knowledge of the dervish groups will protect the warrior groups in a spiritual and worldly context and finally give them supernatural powers. It is possible to list these promises as follows (Âşık Paşa, 2000, pp. 435-437): (i) the warriors receiving spiritual help from a supreme sheikh will protect them from the influence of the devil in foreign lands, (ii) learning the religious sciences of the warriors will enable them to struggle with their own worldly desires, (iii) the warriors' learning of the knowledge of Sharia will help them to gain superiority in this world against their enemies, (iv) and the knowledge of *tawakkul* will enable them to become a saint. Two of these items are directly oriented to the material world and deal with the solution of concrete issues, such as self-control and military confrontation. On the other hand, the other two items mentioned by Âşık Paşa are quite fictional. It is clear that these two items, which can be summarized as protection from the devil and rewarding with holiness, serve as a kind of 'carrot' and 'stick' as the first and last items surrounding concrete items. To put it more clearly, Âşık Paşa activates the feelings of fear and hope by promising to benefit from divine power and intimidation with invisible beings, which is a standard method of religious discourse. While this 'emotional manipulation' places the cognitive focus of the warriors within the framework of religious knowledge, the concrete propositions that complement them constitute the concrete items of a certain power relationship. As it can be easily noticed in this context, Âşık Paşa's propositions were designed to ensure warriors to own self-control, and social control of the warrior groups through their own self-control. The material medium of this connection is 'knowledge'. Âşık Paşa speaks

of two specific types of knowledge throughout his arguments that as had summarized above. The first type of this knowledge is directly knowledge of Sharia, while the second is coded as knowledge of *tawakkul*. The word *tawakkul*, as a term used in the Islamic tradition, means submission to the will of God and accepting the divine determination on life -without rebel or resist- regardless of its good or bad effects on the individual's life. As Âşık Paşa used, *tawakkul* cannot be directly evaluated as an extension of mystical knowledge. What is more in question here is the form of behavior revealed by some kind of religious knowledge, mystical or not. The 'ilm' referred to in this framework does not correspond to an esoteric knowledge. Mengi (1984, p. 493) states that the knowledge that Âşık Paşa claims should exist in warriors is the knowledge of religion and Sharia. On the other hand, the problem of what kind of medium this knowledge will be conveyed leads Âşık Paşa's thought to *sûfi* circles. According to Bilkan (2018, p. 62), the first example where 'alp' and 'wali' as social typologies meet in a single person appears in Âşık Paşa's *Garibnâme*. It is clear that the concrete reference point of this social type is the wandering *sûfi* communities involving into war activities, which are also included in the historical sources of the period. On the other hand, the sub-text that these communities accept religious codes and thus become open to the control of religious authorities constructs the *alp-eren* (warrior-saint) typology as an ideal-type for the members of the warrior community. If it is remembered that this ideal type was constructed within the framework of the Sharia rules in Âşık Paşa's poetry, it becomes clear that there is also a second side of the problem regarding a certain distribution relationship. The combination of frontier warrior tradition and religious morality brings the idea of state control. Bilkan (2018, p. 63) draws the general framework in question as follows: "In this process, putting forward *ijtihads* based on religious sources on many issues such as the ethics of war, the quality of the booty, to give mercy, the non-Muslim rights and the recognition of their exclusivity also brought the 'state assurance' to the fore [tm]".

It should be noted that the control of the warrior groups, the construction of the justice mechanism and the establishment of the authority of the ruler necessarily bring the problem of state-building to the agenda of political thought. The point that makes Âşık Paşa's political thought interesting lies in his ability to gather these three functions under an integrated authority. According to Âşık Paşa, there is no third way between 'companioning the state' and 'being a disbeliever' for the subordinated people, and being attached to the state is only possible by being subject to all three forms of

authority. Âşık Paşa (2000, p. 107) stated that: “Kimsene kim bunlara münkir ola/ Hak didârından gerek mahrûm kala/ İmdi bir görlüm bu tahtlar ne-y-ile / Devlete yoldaş olup gider bile”.³⁰⁵

In this respect, one of the main functions of these three forms of authority is to be able to stand together, which is composed of a multitude that is different from each other and sometimes contradicting each other. In other words, it is the fact that the authority assumes a ‘unifying’ function in the face of the direct complexity of social segments, and in this sense, it becomes an alienated reference point and organizer. In this context, Kaplan (1973, p. 155) states that Âşık Paşa counted the various unequal elements that make up the society and was in favor of the ‘unity’ of these. These elements are included in the *Garibnâme* as follows (Âşık Paşa, 2000, p. 42):

Kimi yohsul kimi baydur kimi bek/ Kimi âsûde kimi darta emek
Kimi câhil kimi âmdur kimi has/ Kimisi bu ortada has-ül-havas
Kimisinün ilmi var bilür hayal/ Kimisi gelür sorar andan sual
Kimisi zâhid kimi fâsık durur/ Kimisi Hak yolma âşık durur
Her birinün gönli bir nesne sever/ Değme bir dilek dutmuş kovar
İkisinün bir degüldür halleri/ Biriküben bile gitmez yolları.³⁰⁶

In these couplets, Âşık Paşa argues that the elements that make up the society consist of completely different parts in terms of wealth, status, knowledge, piety, material interests and desires. The relations of these parts with each other are structured according to a dichotomous -sometimes even antagonistic- principle of separation. For example, the subject of these distinctions is the rich and the poor, the laborer and the people who live comfort, the ignorant and ordinary people and the knowledgeable and distinguished people, the believers and the non-believers and hypocrites. The purpose of Âşık Paşa in describing the social multitude in question is that these differences

³⁰⁵ If anyone denies them/ Deprived of seeing the face of God/ Now let's see how these thrones/
Become the companions to the state.

³⁰⁶ Some are poor, some are rich, some are gentlemen/ Some are comfortable, some are laborers
Some are ignorant, some are ordinary, some are elite / Some are in this case the most elite of the
elite
Some deceitfully think that they have knowledge/ Some come to them and ask questions
Some are ascetic, some are liars/ Some have fallen in love with God's way
Every one's heart loves something/ Even the most distinguished one follows a wish
Even the situation of two people is not the same / Their ways do not go together

cannot reach divine grace unless they reach some kind of social unity - which the thesis necessitates the organization of the multitude under the triple authority structure.

In this context, Âşık Paşa reveals the basic pillars of the political authority organized around a ruler. According to this thesis, the power of the ruler rises on three basic pillars. These can be listed as (i) distinguished lineage, (ii) reason, (iii) organization and officials/slaves. Âşık Paşa (2000, p. 107) explains the content of these elements in the following couplets:

Tahta hükm itmek geñez midür i yâr / Sanmagıl kim degmenüñ hükmi irer
Bunlara üç dürlü hâl lâzım-durur / Anuñ-ıla tahtına hâkim-durur
Kankısınıñ eksük olursa işi / Tahtına hâkim degüldür ol kişi
İşid imdi eydeyüm ol hâl nedür / Kim bilesin bu hikâyet nitedür
Sultanuñ evvel gerek aslı ola / Andan ikinçi bütün ‘aklı ola
Aslı olmazsa aña kim tapısar / ‘Aklı olmazsa ili kim yapısar
Hem üçinçi devleti muhkem ola / Kim halâyık kamusı mahkûm ola
Devleti olmazsa höd sultân degül / Hiç kimesne hükmini kılmaz kabûl
Çün ola aslı vü ‘aklı devleti / Yir yüzini duta anuñ heybeti
Andan ol sultânlığa lâyük ola / Pâdişâhlığı anuñ bayık ola.³⁰⁷

Âşık Paşa attributes the durability of a certain reign -and moreover, the state- to the fulfillment of these three conditions. The first of these conditions, the problem of nobility, is based on the fact that the authority of a particular ruler is a member of the ruling class for at least several generations of the dynasty to which he belongs, and in this way is tied to a certain status among both the ruled people and the ruling classes. The validity of this criterion depends on the extension of the nobility status of the ruler and the ruling class and fractions under his rule to the subordinated social segments. In this respect, the existence of popular literature, folk storytelling, traveling poets and

³⁰⁷ Is it easy to rule the throne, my dear / Do not think that even the most distinguished people can easily rule

Three kinds of things are needed for them/ These people will rule their thrones with these
Whichever one is missing/ That person cannot rule the throne

Hear now let me tell you what are those things/ So that you may know what these stories are for
The sultan must be noble first/ He must have reason second

Who will obey him if he is not noble/ Who will build the country if he has no reason?

Also, thirdly, his state must be strong/ All slaves must be under his rule

If he does not have a state, he cannot be a sultan/ No one accepts his rule

If he becomes noble, reasonable and has a state/ His majesty will spread to the earth

For this reason, he will be worthy of the sultanate / His sultanate will be prosperous.

similar facilities is decisive for the claims of nobility to circulate. Secondly, Âşık Paşa considers it necessary for the ruler to have reason. It is possible that the second criterion or basis in question corresponds to two kinds of imperatives. The first of these is to have mental faculties as a religious prerequisite for being a ruler, which forms the basis of the notion of religious responsibility in the standard Islamic narrative. Secondly, the fact that the ruler has reason does not correspond to the categorical existence of reason, as stated in the previous sentence, but to its practical use. In Âşık Paşa's text quoted above, it is understood that this second meaning is especially dominant because the use of the reason of the ruler is associated with the construction of the country. Finally, the principle is mentioned that the state of a ruler is strong/fortified/firm (*muhkem*) and his slaves are subject to his orders. This last item needs to be explained in more detail. Is Âşık Paşa talking about the 'state' in these lines or a phenomenon that means 'glory' or 'fortune'? This question has not been answered clearly enough. Theoretically, the form of government outlined by Âşık Paşa corresponds to an early-state form with weak institutional foundations, based on vis-à-vis personal relations, and in which social authority was shared between ruler-ulama-*sûfi* groups with leaving certain autonomous areas. In this case, the aforementioned expression can be understood as an organizational structure within the framework of the early state or as an ideological structure that enables the reproduction of personal relations within the same framework. On the other hand, Âşık Paşa's recommendation of the ruler to have slaves in the lines where he mentioned the state problem necessitates the existence of a personal and mercenary army and civil servant organization that is more or less independent from the feudal powers. In this case, it would not be completely out of place to think that what is in question corresponds to the state in the organizational sense. In the final analysis, Âşık Paşa states that if the above-mentioned three pillars are not formed, the sultan's authority will remain weak, and he will not be able to rule the sultan's throne.

In the establishment process of the class-rule of Ottomans, we see that all these titles became reality one by one. As will be analyzed in the following sections of the thesis, the determination of the family tree to the Ottoman dynasty is a systematic subject of political discourse, family trees ranging from Suleyman Shah to Japheth, son of Adam, and even Perseus and Achaemenes have emerged. Secondly, the step-by-step organization and institutionalization of the 'reason of the state' around the ulama stratum and scribal service will be discussed in detail in the following sections. Finally, the development of state organization and the emergence of slave-based armies and

officials -and the political thoughts centered around this phenomenon- will be discussed in the relevant sections of this thesis. This whole process will be determined by the political activity of a class-based social subject that demonstrates its dominance by passing through wide subordination networks from dervish circles to ulama stratum, from economic activities to the context of culture. With all this structure, I think that *Garibnâme* is in a structure that can determine the direction of the search for class-based power and patriarchic political articulations, and it will be possible to consider the establishment and settlement phases of the Ottoman pattern and vision of class-rule through the sections above.

On the other hand, the way another poet, who can be considered a contemporary of Âşık Paşa, Yunus Emre's evaluation of social relations and the way he reflects social segments in his works, creates an interesting contrast with *Garibnâme*.³⁰⁸ Although Âşık Paşa and Yunus Emre were philosophically nourished from a common tradition and use the theory of four elements (*anasır-ı erbaa*), their approaches to real elements in social relations is quite different. For example, Yunus Emre generally evaluates household management, trade and the close-circle of the ruler as centers where the relations of social power intensify and mentions them in a negative way (Gölpınarlı, 2020b, p. 114). Specifically, it is possible to list the sections that Yunus Emre criticized as sultans, *ghazis*/warriors, *ulama/qadis/danishmends* and 'fake/dishonest' dervishes. The poet reminds the rulers that they see the world as an area of absolute dominance and that they do evil, but that their power is limited to their lifespan: "Ey padişah ey padişah her dem için düzedurur/ Dünya onun bustanadır sevdiğini üzedurur/ Yavuzluk eyleme sakın ecel sana senden yakın/ Nicelerin aslın kökün yurd eyleyip bozadurur".³⁰⁹

In Âşık Paşa's poetry, the state and the social segments integrated into the state (*ghazis*/alps, ulama, sheikh) are seen as natural stakeholders of a given field of power, whereas in Yunus Emre's poetry, sovereignty is an ontological quality of God, who is himself of being, and these social segments, who mediate divine power, are often associated with negative references. To explain this proposition, while Âşık Paşa includes many chapters in *Garibnâme* where he discusses the characteristics of the

³⁰⁸ Raif Yelkenci once claimed that Yunus Emre was Âşık Paşa, but this thesis was not accepted in academic circles (Gölpınarlı, 1941, p. 3). See: Raif Yelkenci, *Büyük Türk Şairi Yunus Emre Kimdir*, *Cumhuriyet*, 4 February 1940.

³⁰⁹ O ruler, O ruler, always prepare for it / The world is his orchard, it hurts loved one / Do not oppress, the death is closer to you then you are/ It settles in the origins and roots of many people and degenerates them.

ghazis and glorifies them, there is not a single line in Yunus Emre's poetry written in a positive way on *ghaza* and being *ghazi*. Moreover, there are many indirect references exist in Yunus Emre, in which the warrior ethos is reproached. In his work *Risâletü'n-Nushiyye*, Yunus Emre draws the warrior typology negatively while criticizing the temperament of 'wrath' (Gölpınarlı, 2020b, p. 20):

Nereye kim varsam başlar kesilir/ Kime boşar isem olukdem ölür
Kim ola bencileyin cana kıyar/ Meğer kim ben olam merdane kıyar
(...)
Gözüme yüz bin er zerre görünmez/ Hezar arslan bana berre görünmez/
Boşu derler bana key bahadurum/ Düzenlik bozmağa her (dem) kadirim/
Nereye kim varam ot bitmez onda/ Çünakd oldu kime derd yetmez anda.³¹⁰

It is possible to come across other verses in Yunus Emre in which joining the warriors/*ghazis* is openly condemned. For example, in the couplet "Kibr ü manidir subaşı delim kişidir yoldaşı/ Sen olmagıl onun eşi ona uyan yoldan azar"³¹¹ (Gölpınarlı, 2020b, p. 341), the poet not only directly criticizes military commanders/administrators, but also considers acting together with this group as a moral deviation. It is seen that the same negative view is expressed for the ulama members in Yunus Emre's poetry. For example, the poet argues that the 'little and half' educated ulama who condemns the whirling are ignorant, cannot find any benefit from what they read, and interferes with the work of the dervishes and causes trouble for the people. Some of Yunus Emre's couplets on this subject are as follows:

Bu sema'a girmeyen sonuna pişman olur/ erişir bizim ile ser-be-ser düşman olur
(...)
Şimd' üç buçuk okuyan derin danışman olur/ Danışmanın cahili unamaz
dervişleri³¹²

³¹⁰ Heads are cut wherever I go/ Whoever I get excited about dies at that moment
I think whoever kills/ Even me would kill bravely
A hundred thousand soldiers don't seem as precious to me as dust/ A thousand lions don't look perfect to me

In vain they tell me how valiant they are/ They always have the power to break the order
Wherever they go, grass will not grow/ For those who encounter them, troubles will increase.

³¹¹ Arrogance and an obstacle is a military commander/administrator, his companion is a foolish person/ Don't be like him, whoever follows him will deviate from the way.

³¹² Gölpınarlı (2020b, p. 274): Those who do not attend this whirling ceremony will regret it at the end / He will come to us and become an enemy to each other/ The person who reads a little

(...)

İlim ilim bilmektir ilim kendin bilmektir/ Sen kendini bilmezsen ya nice okumaktır³¹³

(...)

Peygamber yerine geçen hocalar/ Bu halkın başına zahmetli oldu³¹⁴

(...)

İkilikten geçemedin hali kalden seçemedin/ Dosttan yana uçamadın fakılık oldu sana fak³¹⁵

Moreover, Yunus Emre also has criticisms stating that the dervishes who have acquired worldly possessions have moved away from dervish virtues: “Ben dervişüm diyenler haramı yimeyenler/ Haramun yinmedüğü ele girinceyimiş”.³¹⁶ In this context, many social segments receive their share of criticism of Yunus Emre, both in terms of owning property, being articulated with the state, and sharing social power. While Âşık Paşa’s influence on Ottoman political thought and mentality lies in his portraying these groups as legitimate partners of power, Yunus Emre’s poetry does not make such a legitimation. On the contrary, it is observed that Yunus Emre did not ideologically absolutize the institutional power structures and did not make the representatives of these structures a subject of praise. For this reason, it would not be wrong to argue that both poets and mystics reflect different social tendencies in the articulation/conflict line of dervish circles and class domination. To be specific, while Âşık Paşa prefers the institutional power of the ruler, military power of *alps*, ideological priority of ulama circles and *sûfi* orders, Yunus Emre’s poetry takes on the appearance of a river filled with underground currents of the implicit resistance of the social segments that have become the subject of institutional power relations.

now becomes a very knowledgeable madrasa teacher / The ignorant of the madrasa teacher does not approve of dervishes.

³¹³ Gölpınarlı (2020b, p. 275): Knowledge is knowing knowledge, knowledge is knowing yourself/ If you do not know yourself, what kind of reading is this.

³¹⁴ Gölpınarlı (2020b, p. 420): Hodjas who replaced the Prophet / Has been troublesome for the people.

³¹⁵ Gölpınarlı (2020b, p. 280): You couldn't get rid of the duality, you couldn't separate the truth from the words/ You couldn't fly to the friend, being a faqih became a trap for you.

³¹⁶ Alptekin (2012, p. 156): Those who say I am a dervish, those who do not eat the haram / Not to eat the haram is until they get it.

III.VI. The Establishment of Ottoman Class Domination: ‘*Padişahlık Kanunu*’

It is certain that the process of developing subordination networks within the framework of economic, cultural and political relations, which started with Osman and Orhan Begs, gained institutional regularity with Murat I. Goffman (2002, p. 38) states that both strategy and luck are effective in this process. The articulation of the political and economic subordination relations, that is, the beginning of showing a systematic integrity, could be listed as those: The introduction of the method of wearing a white cap (*börk*) in order to distinguish Orhan Beg’s soldiers from the others as the road signs in the previous phase (Apzd, 2017, p. 48), the minting of coins in the name of Orhan Beg in the province of Karasi (Apzd, 2017, p. 53), and the establishment of the office of *Beylerbeyi* of Rumelia and appointing Lala Şahin Beg here during the Murat I period (Apzd, 2017, p. 62). In this process, the articulation of economic, cultural and political relations with each other and gaining new levels indicate the transitivity between multiple subordination relations and the clarification of administrative functions completes this picture. Thus, the systematic integrity of economic-political and political-cultural relations is established, and the principle of this unity is determined by the class pattern of Ottoman rule. The resulting historical environment will ideally be described by Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, p. 69):

It should always ensure that good deeds and charities are done and that prohibitions are not committed. He must undoubtedly keep the roads safe for travelers and travelers, and keep every place in the country free of strife and confusion. Thus, if there is strength and prosperity in that country; comfort, worship, learning knowledge and all good deeds will be done. [tm]

Secondly, the emergence of middle layers/positions in social scheme in this phase causes them to start to follow their own specific interests in the institutionalization process. However, within the same framework, we find that the ulama evolved into a social stratum, the viziers began to influence the administration of the principality in line with their own specific interests, and the *Kapikulu* group entered the path of becoming a political power for the first time, as we will see in the Mehmet II period (Atçıl, 2017, p. 24). Yerasimos formulated this process quite well (1977, pp. 194-95):

(...) The Ottoman Empire begins to build up in Anatolia. Historiographers state that it was under the political-religious influence of the Ahis in the beginning. The Ahis were very helpful in keeping the activities under control in the cities

newly taken from the Byzantines. But as the Ottomans became the rulers of cities such as Bursa or Iznik, and especially when the transition to Thrace opened up unlimited horizons for Turkish expansion, the core of the ruling class, the ulama, swarmed to the west as well as the customary administrators. [tm]

Köprülü evaluated the development of these layers within the development process of bureaucracy. The development process of the structure of the Ottoman state organization was under the influence of the Seljuk, Ilkhanate and Mamluk state organizations, and their first staff consisted of people from the service of Karamanid and Germiyanid Principalities (Köprülü, 2014, p. 142). In this respect, it should be accepted that the institutionalization movement under administrative, cultural and financial headings may have taken these models as reference.³¹⁷ However, more important in terms of the study of political thought is the development and influence of the ulama and advisors from madrasah origin who brought these models into the Ottoman administration and developed the methods and made suggestions. The influence of this cadre on political thought would continue until the ‘decline’ period of Ottoman state.

The reign of Bayezid I emerges as a period in which political thought gained a systematic character for the first time and focused on the order of state. As Yılmaz (2016, p. 22) states, the lost work *Ahlâk-ı Cemalî*, which can be considered as the first Ottoman *siyâsetnâme* or *nasihatnâme*, was written in this period and presented to Bayezid I. Yılmaz (2016, p. 22) states that this work, which we have information about it from Katip Çelebi’s writing, is similar to Amâsî’s *Mirâtu'l-Mülûk*, which was written at the end of the reign of Bayezid I, in terms of its division of topics. The period of interregnum after Bayezid I and its overcoming has likewise been the subject of systematic political thought. We see that the most competent political thinker of the Bayezid I period, whose works will be discussed in detail, is Şeyhoğlu Mustafa in this

³¹⁷ This pattern is clearly expressed -and had been criticized- in the anonymous chronicle published by Giese. See Giese (1992, p. 33): “Kaçan kim Çandarlı Halil ve Karamani Türk Rüstem bu ikisi ol zamanda ulular ve alimler idi, heman kim bular Osman beğleri yanına geldiler, dürlü dürlü hileyile alemler toldurdılar, andan ilerü hesab-defter bilmezlerdi, heman anlar Osman beğleri yanına geldiler, hesab defteri anlar te’lif itdiler. Akçayı yığup hazine idinmek anlardan kaldı”. This narrative could be translated as such: These Çandarlı Halil and Karamani Türk Rüstem were great and learned people at that time, and they immediately came to the Ottoman rulers. They filled the world with all kinds of tricks. Before them, Ottoman rulers did not know book-register and account, they introduced these works after they came. Saving money and owning a treasure was adopted after their time.

context. After Bayezid I, the systematization efforts of Ahmedî, Oruç Beg and other chroniclers would not reach the level of Şeyhoğlu Mustafa until the reign of Mehmet II. The only exception here would be Ahmed bin Hüsameddin Amâsî's work called *Mirâtu'l-Mülûk*. It can be said that this work exceeds the theoretical level of Şeyhoğlu Mustafa with his philosophical propositions in the line of Aristotle and al-Farabi to a large extent, and it can also be said to be a source for Tursun Beg's political arguments. Let's open a wide parenthesis at this point. I think that the most critical phase in the development of Ottoman political thought was the period of Bayezid I. There are key indicators of this. First of all, we can mention the increase of Iranian advisors in the close-circle of Bayezid and the increase of works under Iranian influence. For example, Şeyhoğlu Mustafa's *Kenz'ül-Küberâ ve Mehek'ül-'ulemâ* gives us a holistic view of how an institutionalized power should be. For example, as Köprülü draws his attention (2014, p. 104), the regular form of the *timar* organization during the reign of Bayezid I turns into a detailed picture in the work of Şeyhoğlu, in the form of determining the methods and principles regarding the systematic of *timar* granting -which I will try to evaluate such details in further sections.

III. VI. I. Articulation of Political and Cultural Relations of Subordination

To the extent that the Ottoman rule expanded its borders in Byzantine territory, it also faced the necessity of taking over the social functions undertaken by the ruling classes of Byzantium, and as a part of this, it provided the articulation of Islamic culture and political subordination relations. Baskıcı (2016, p. 240) lists the equivalents of such institutions in the Byzantine Empire as hospitals (*nosokomeia*), elderly homes (*gerokomeia*), orphanages (*orfanotrofeia*) and student dormitories (*xenon*). The remarkable development in this phase was the acceleration of the construction of madrasahs, *imârets* and mosques for Friday prayer, as well as the organization of public ceremonies that marked the dominance of the Ottoman family and the emergence of some pioneering clues about religious control. Şeyhoğlu Mustafa attributes two functions to a ruler about the ulama and *sûfi* circles in this respect (2013, p. 69): “[A ruler] must be ambitious to learn the knowledge of Sharia by keeping the scholars dignified and superior. He should prioritize righteous people and encourage them more in worship, security and peace, knowing them as blessed [tm]”. Likewise, the advice that “the people of religion should always strive for their education, training and perfection [tm]” supports this policy (Şeyhoğlu, 2013, p. 155).

In this framework, it is seen that the Ottoman dynasty started to act in order to articulate and regulate the religious frameworks. First of all, Orhan Beg “started to review [tm]” the dervishes gathered around the *imarets* he had built and that he allocated a certain place to Geyikli Baba in order “to be the courtyard of the dervishes [tm]”, and after Geyikli Baba died, he had built a tomb and a Friday mosque near it (Apzd, 2017, pp. 54-55).³¹⁸ On the other hand, Şükrullah (2011, p. 213) stated that Murat I granted wages to orators, *hâfızs*, *muderis*’ of madrasah, *muids*, students during his reign. As Ahmedî (2018, p. 583) indicated that *waqfs* were established by the early Ottoman rulers.³¹⁹ In the period of Bayezid I, the list of people who were appointed as official and who received money expanded considerably. The assignments of sheikhs, physicians, imams, *muezzins*, *mudarris*’ and *hâfızs* exemplify this situation (Şükrullah, 2011, p. 217). Ahmedî (2018, p. 585) attributes these assignments to Bayezid I as follows: “He loved the people of knowledge, that person with a good name/ He treated them well and respected them/ He liked the worshippers/ He was good to the ascetics [tm]”.³²⁰

Bayezid I deepened the institutionalization by establishing foundations for the hospital, Ebu İshakîhâne, madrasahs and mosques (Şükrullah, 2011, p. 217). In particular, I assert that the *imârethânes* established in this period played an important role in class domination. As Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, p. 94) states the relationship between subjects and the ruler can be established as a patriarchal relationship due to the *imârets*, and it is possible to create the ideological image of the ruler as a father who ‘distributes food to his children’. In addition, since small communities, families and individuals who have been separated from nomadic groups can eat here for free in this places that social conflict is kept under control, the process of transition to settlement is

³¹⁸ On the other hand, we cannot exactly predict that this will whether seen as positive in terms of Geyikli Baba’s ethical-political attitude. In a couplet thought to belong to Geyikli Baba, the *sûfi* says: “Hakikat alemine yol varılmaz/ Bir mülkden külli bizar olmadıkça” (Hilmi Ziya, 1924). Although it is thought that Geyikli Baba is referred to in this way because he ‘dressed in deer skin’, or it is thought that a legend has been devised that deer obey him in order to give him the honor of being a saint, it should not be forgotten that domestication of deer and deer as beasts of burden to make use of their meat is a well-known practice among the nomads of Central Asia (Vladimirtsov, 1995, p. 57). For this reason, Geyikli Baba’s walking with deer or Hacı Bektaş’s depiction with a gazelle under one arm should generally be read as symbols that appeal to nomadic masses. In this context, the relationship between dervishes, whose lifestyles are close to nomads, and representatives of institutional power, is categorically political tension.

³¹⁹ See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 7106.

³²⁰ See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 7130-7131: “İlm ehlini severdi_ol nîg-nâm/ Kılur-ıdı_in’âm iderdi ihtirâm/ Hoş görürdi anı kim âbid ola/ Hoş dutardı anı kim zâhid ola”.

organized and social consent is obtained. Maḥçupyan (2008, p. 53) argues that the main consent mechanism that ensures the dependence of the people on the Ottoman state is the “encompassing patriarchy bond” that will reinforce the belief/opinion that the authority is used for the good of the society. Amâsî (2016, p. 369) evaluates such charity activities as the basis of social peace: “hayrat-ı müşterek selamettür”.³²¹ In this context, it is of great importance to develop elements for the common benefit of society by the organization of the ruling class for the construction of social consent relations.

Secondly, an event that can be interpreted as the circumcision ceremony of the prince for the first time during the Murat I period is indicated in the sources. When Murat I returned to Bursa after the Battle of Sırpsındığı, he had his sons circumcised (Apzd, 2017, p. 64). In the same period, it was determined that the Ottomans invited Karamanid, Hamid, Menteş, Saruhanid, İsfendiyarid begs, Memluk Sultan of Egypt, *sanjakbeys* and noyads such as Evrenos Ghazi to the wedding, due to the wedding of Germiyanid Sultan Hatun and Prince Bayezid, and on this occasion they showed their power and renewed their alliance (Apzd, 2017, pp. 64-65). In the Öztürk chronicle (2000, p. 30), the expression high (*alî*) weddings is used for both circumcision ceremonies and the marriage ceremony of Bayezid I. Based on this statement, it is possible to think that wedding ceremonies were organized in accordance with the power symbology. Another example is the pompous hunting ceremonies (Köprülü, 2014, p. 151). It can be determined from secondary sources that a palace life developed to a certain extent during the reign of Bayezid I (Tekin, 1992, p. 6; Kafadar, 2019, p. 171).³²² Goffman (2002, p. 40) makes a connection between the establishment of court life and the importance of polygamy and alliances through marriage. As AYTEKİN (2015, p. 26) points out, the tendency not to have children from alliance marriages may have increased the importance of concubine women in the palace for the continuation of the lineage and at the same time affected the development of a hidden palace life. Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, p. 133) states that a ‘*hâcib*’ (hajib, doorman) should be appointed in order to establish a relationship between the palace life and the public and to handle

³²¹ Charity organizations that the public can benefit from free of charge lead to salvation.

³²² According to the anonymous Giese (1992, p. 59), Edirne palace was built during the reign of Mehmet Çelebi and while the notable gentlemen lived in Bursa, the sultans began to reside in Edirne. This, too, must be a leap-forward point pointing to an important spatial distinction in the formation of palace life. On the other hand, we can clearly see the spatial establishment of the palace in the period of Murat I. In Rifat Osman’s monograph on the Edirne palace (1989, pp. 13-14), it is seen that two separate palaces, *Saray-ı Atik* and *Saray-ı Cedid*, were built in Edirne, and that these palaces were expanded by building new pavilions by successive rulers.

complaints. The word ‘*hajib*’/’ *hâcib*’ is a derivation of the word ‘*hijab*’, meaning curtain, and the first means the attendant related to the curtain. Over time, this word has gained the meaning of the official who waits at the gates of the rulers and organizes entrances and exits and presentations. Köprülü (2005b, p. 241) states that the duty and title of *hâcib* was established with the beginning of the palace life. In this respect, Hassan’s brief analysis on the institution of *hâcib* details Köprülü’s thesis in terms of social stratification and alienated relations. Hassan (2015, pp. 280-83) states by following Ibn Khaldun that the duty of *hâcib* does not exist in social structures based on consanguineous traditions, and with the development of the state, it has turned into an institution as a product of social stratification, which prevents the people from establishing direct relations with the ruler. In the first half of the 14th century, we come across an observation about the functions undertaken by the *hâcibs* in the Ottoman state in Bertrandan de la Broquière’s travel book. The phenomenon observed by Broquière in the Edirne palace in 1423 is as follows (Schefer, 2000, pp. 242-43): “(...) there were about twenty or thirty lance slaves as guards at the gate. If someone tried to enter through this door, they were told to come back only once, and if he did not obey, they would shoot him out with spears [tm]”. The picture that Broquière drew is more of the guards at the gate, the *hâcibs* rising from this type of post and having a function more like political advisors and even the secretariat of the ruler.

Moreover, Şeyhoğlu Mustafa defines *hâcib* as a person with the qualifications of vizier, which Ibn Haldun also pointed out (Hassan, 2015, p. 283). When the characteristics that are required to be found in *hâcib* determined (as being religious, having knowledge of history, has true belief, and being trustworthy), it is sought that this person has a certain education, that is, that he is suitable for this bureaucratic position created for a specific end. This emphasis shows that Şeyhoğlu again addressed the problem with a bureaucratic perspective. Kunt (1983, p. 6) states that the sultan's household consists of two parts, *Enderun* and *Bîrun*, and the outer section (*Bîrun*) consists of four main parts, including the gatekeeper and *emîralem* (royal band of musicians and tent setters). Except for the ‘wine and kebab’ meetings (Apzd, 2017, p. 75), no further details are mentioned in the early Ottoman political thought about the palace life. Because it must have been neither possible nor necessary to explain this kind of pomp with Islamic concepts, which the life of this palace encounter with interesting figures such as the Jewish physician by the name of Ellisaeus, or such as Plethon, who would be accused of being the founder of Pagan Hellenism. Although we cannot see the

detailed traces of the palace life in the literature written by the scholars, there are rich descriptions of the palace life in the works of the poets of the period, for example in the *Çengnâme* of Ahmed-i Dâî. For example, Ahmed-i Dâî (1992, pp. 344-45) can argue that even while dealing with a central issue in Islamic thought such as the temporality of the world, the ruler who accepts this as a fact should not stay away from business and entertainment: “Gerek dayim ola işretde kişi/ Ki uçmağ ehlinün işretdür işi (...) Geçer çün kim tigitlik ünfüvani/ Geçür bari bu gün hoşlıkda anı (...) Bilürsün dünyenün mihr ü vefasın/ Süre gör ayş ile zek ü safasın”.³²³ Similarly, an observer like Doukas (1975, pp. 87-88) gives the following details about the palace life of Bayezid I:

Boys and girls, selected for their unblemished bodies and beauty of countenance, were there -young and tender youths, and girls who outshone the sun. (...) And Bayazid, living idly and wantonly, never ceased from lascivious sexual acts, indulging in licentious behavior with boys and girls.

While these details provide information about the private and daily lives of the rulers, they also shed light on the consumption culture of the Ottoman palace. In this context, as the class dominance of the Ottoman dynasty deepens, the right to go beyond the social norms in their private lives and the possibility of conspicuous consumption in their public lives emerge. For example, Amâsî (2016, p. 297) approves of a ‘restrained’ conspicuous consumption as a writer who writes at the end of the period: “vechi vacibden ziyade riya ve mübahat için sarf itmeye”.³²⁴ The fact that a certain conspicuous consumption is accepted as ‘*wajib*’ here shows that the symbolic establishment of status relations imposes itself as a certain necessity in the class framework. On the other hand, it is quite interesting that the development of palace life in the Ottoman period was sometimes labeled as ‘non-Muslim influence’ in the sources of the period, and that modern sources reproduced this view in a way that could not be considered more ‘scientific’, such as the ‘acceptance of Byzantine customs’. Because both approaches are reluctant to admit that, in the final analysis, the Ottoman dynasty, whose authority is somehow recognized, might have been ‘degenerated’, or rather transformed, due to its own internal-class dynamics. Interestingly, a similar attitude in can be found in

³²³ It is necessary to attend entertainment meetings regularly / Entertainment is the work of those who go to heaven / Even the title of valor is temporary / At least enjoy this day / You know the word and loyalty of the world / If you have fun and enjoyment. Also see: Ahmed-i Dâî (1992, p. 352): “Ye iç hoş geç ki sultan devridir bu/ Şehenşeh mir Sülman devridir bu”. The person meant is Emir Suleyman, son of Bayezid I.

³²⁴ No more spending on deception and exaggeration than necessary.

historical analyzes of Montesquieu. According to Montesquieu (2019, p. 129), the emperor's residence in Asia and the settlement of Asian style pomp and ostentation were influential in the collapse of the Roman Empire. This time, the passion for conspicuous consumption does not come from non-Muslims, but from 'Asian' or 'barbarian' others. As a result, all three approaches ignore the internal dynamics of the institutionalization of class domination.

Continuing, I am of the opinion that in the early Ottoman political thought, the problem of the source of the right to rule constitutes a part of the cultural and political articulation in terms of its emergence and formulation. In this regard, the common point of the different views and narrative styles in the context of the Ottoman political thought is the grounding of dominance in a heavenly/divine manner. Ocak (2014, p. 86) is of the opinion that the traces of the view that the dominance originates from the heavens can be traced from the Turkish-Mongolian antiquity. For example, Roux (2017, p. 122) shows that monotheism rose during the periods when the Turks established great states, and the ruler was considered the deputy of *Gök-Tengri*. In this context, examples of political discourse that the rulers were appointed by Tengri were recorded in Turkish inscriptions (Roux, 2017, p. 129). When it is examined in a broader perspective, it is clear that domination legitimized by divine reference is a phenomenon that exists in all known class-based civilizations of the ancient world. It is seen in the previous section that the thinker who first expressed the problem of divine dominance in Ottoman political thought was the poet Âşık Paşa and that the reigning throne was handled as an institutional structure created by God and will exist as long as the world exists.

The dream narrative in Âşıkpaşazâde, on the other hand, constitutes a competent example for our subject due to the mythical narrative it developed on the problem of source of the monarchy, although it is not of a theoretical nature. As Ortaylı (2000, p. 11) and Timur (2000, p. 31) point out, the legend genre has one leg in reality, while the other is based on the need for ideological and political formulations. Although this determination is correct, it does not provide a clear enough analysis of which literary genre the dream narrative belongs to. It is also necessary to discuss whether the dream narrative, which can be called 'Osman's dream', is a 'myth' or a 'legend'. Eliade (2009a, p. 409) argues that myths can be read as exemplary history of events that could happen and that can be repeated later. Eliade's definition reveals the common essence of myth and/or legend narratives. On the other hand, Frazer (2020, p. 17) argues that the concepts of myth, legend, and folktale should be distinguished from each other

delicately. Frazer (2020, p. 18) draws attention to the fact that myths are pre-scientific and pre-philosophical narratives that mis-explain human life or humanly observed natural phenomena, and that these can appear in endless fields from the movement of celestial bodies to the discovery of fire, from the beginning of society to the secrets of death. On the other hand, legends are defined as “oral and written traditions that describe the destinies of real people in the past or that are said to have taken place in real places, even if people do not exist [tm]” (Frazer, 2020, p. 18). According to him, extraordinary events or miracles are frequently encountered in legends. Within this theoretical framework, it is necessary to determine what kind of narrative form ‘Osman’s dream’ corresponds to. In Frazer’s distinction, this dream is definitely a myth because it is claimed to take place in a real time and place, and the subjects of the story are real people. It is possible that such a dream has also been seen. At this point, as Eliade states, this dream can be taken as an exemplary history, and considering its similarity with the establishment story of the Seljuk state, it is understood that it was derived from this example itself. On the other hand, ‘Osman’s dream’ also shows mythical features - which can be better understood if the political meaning of the dream is taken into account. Hooke (2002, p. 13) defines the functional meaning of myths as products of imagination that emerge for the purpose of doing something as a result of certain situations. Campbell (2020, p. 58) defines one of the functions of myth as making the person compatible with himself, her social group and the environment in which she lives.³²⁵ In this framework, the ‘political myth’, on one side, aims at the articulation/harmony of the subordinate subject with the transcendent power, on the other hand, it provides a reference point where the dominant social group can internalize their own claim of social priority and acquire an intra-group-ideology suitable for their situation of domination. This is due to the fact that Egyptian pharaohs were seen as a twin/spirit/living example of the sun-God (Müller, 2020, p. 167), and in the discourses on the ruler families included in the Homeric epics, based their ancestors on the gods or attributed the foundation of the great Greek cities to the gods (for example myths on cities and genealogies in the *Bibliotheka* of Apollodoros), or can be seen in examples that go up to the Ares/Mars lineage of Romulus, the founder of Rome. Similarly, the

³²⁵ At the root of the definition lies Cassirer’s approach to mythical thought. According to Cassirer (1984, pp. 49-50) “Individuals have a deep and fervent desire to identify themselves with the life of society and nature [tm]”. The aspect that is emphasized here is the function of myth in terms of the identification of subjects with the social system and their articulation in society, which is the second nature of human being structured by power relations.

Western European doctrine (Kantorowicz, 2018, pp. 33-37), which preaches that the ruler has a mysterious body (*corpus mysticum*) alongside his political body, gains a political function within the same mythical framework. Hooke (2002, p. 14) divides myths into five basic classes according to their functions: Ritual myths, origin myths, cult myths, prestige myths, eschatological myths.³²⁶ In this classification, two types of origin and prestige myths are worth mentioning, especially for our subject. Origin myths, as etiological myths, offer an imaginary explanation of how a custom, a name, or even an object is born (Hooke, 2002, p. 16). On the other hand, prestige myths give an air of mystery and wonder to the birth and actions of a folk hero (Hooke, 2002, p. 18). The myths about the birth of Moses, Sargon, Kyros, Romus and Romulus are cited as examples of this type (Hooke, 2002, p. 18).

Considering in this context, although ‘Osman’s dream’ is a narrative with several variations formed in the form of a legend, it is closer to a myth in terms of its function. If the structure of the myth is taken into consideration, it is seen that the dream myth cannot be considered an ordinary origin myth, but rather fits the type of prestige myths used to justify the legitimacy of political figures. Because this narrative, first voiced in the 15th century, essentially produces a founding myth that the Ottoman state was founded with a divine sign, that is, there was a mythical *causa prima* at the root of the state. For example, in the Öztürk chronicle (2000, p. 11) the author’s title/presentation of the dream myth is as follows: “Ravi şöyle rivayet ider kim Osman Gazi’nün dünyaya gelmesine sebep n’oldı?”.³²⁷ In this presentation, the reader is made to feel from the very beginning that an establishment-myth about the origin of the founder of the Ottoman state and therefore the origin of the Ottoman state will be told. In this respect, unlike the heroic narratives/legends that focus on the divine preeminence of the rulers, the mythical features of the discourse that focuses on the founder of the state as a whole and thus anchoring the emergence of the Ottoman state as an institution to a divine basis predominate. As can be seen, the interpretation of dreams as divine signs since ancient times is a crucial element in asserting the divine source of the rulership (Timur, 2000, p. 32). The fact that the origin of the dream myth formulated by Âşıkpaşazâde is also related to the tradition of Torah (Ocak, 2014, p. 96) supports the argument of Timur. On the other hand, in the Bible (Luke, 2.26), Joseph sees a dream that Mary is pregnant

³²⁶ Kirk (1970, pp. 252-54) proposes that there are three basic mythical functions, which will include Hooke’s five categories: (i) narrative and entertaining, (ii) operative, iterative and validatory, (iii) speculative and explanatory.

³²⁷ The narrator narrated that what caused Osman Ghazi to be born?

with the holy spirit, and will rule, that she receives the good news of the birth of Jesus. Bař and Paksoy (2017, p. 125) state that the genealogy of the dream myth is not of an Islamic nature, but is built with pastoral images such as the moon, tree, mountain and water that may be of Israeli origin, and thus they argue that it is based on images that can also be effective on the Jewish and Christian people of Anatolia. Ocak (2015c, p. 63) agrees in this context and argues that the dream myth is related to the ancient Turkish understanding of domination, and the Middle Eastern rulership tradition observable in the Torah. The existence of a prophecy in William Shakespeare's play Henry VIII (1613) in which the image of a mighty cedar tree to cover the surrounding plains was used for King James I of England (Black, 2019, p. 20), shows that this image was used in Christian culture in a similar way. On the other hand, Lindner (1983, pp. 37-8) and Yıldırım (2020a, p. 74) argue that the elements in the dream myth are meaningful not for nomads but for farmers and traders because they symbolize peace and abundance in terms of settled farming-based culture.

However, it is necessary to critically approach both theses on the origin of the elements in the dream myth, because figures such as the sacred tree appear in the myths of many cultural basins from the Middle East to Scandinavia -even the birth of Brahma, also called '*Atman*' in Indian mythology, it takes place with a tree or flower growing in the belly of God Vishnu (Dallapiccola, 2013, p. 26).³²⁸ Karadeniz (2008, p. 53) states that the tree is considered sacred in Turkish culture and symbolizes the way used to reach God, and argues that for this reason, it turned into a symbol of sultanate in the Islamic period. Roux (2017, pp. 25-26) states that there is a 'cosmic tree' figure in the Epic of Oghuz Kagan. According to this epic, Oghuz Kagan saw a tree in the middle of a lake while he was hunting, and a woman of divine origin stood in the hollow of the tree and he married with this woman (Roux, 2017, p. 26). Oghuz Kagan had three sons from this marriage. In the story in the epic, there are elements of sacred tree-hero-sons of divine origin -who will be rulers, these elements are also present in 'Osman's dream' with various changes. In another dream myth mentioned in *Oguznâme*, an old man with a white beard and white hair sees a bow and three silver arrows in his dream. While one end of the bow extends to sunrise and the other to sunset, three silver arrows fly into the night. When the old man wakes up, he interprets his dream as news from the sky and

³²⁸ Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 501), who wrote his work at the end of the 15th century, likens the state to a tree growing in a garden made up of the body of a god: "Ve devlet öyle bir ulu ağaçtır ki Huda -Azze ve cel- vücudu bahçesine dikilmiştir".

tells Oghuz Kagan the good news that all the lands (the whole world) he sees in his dream will come under Oghuz Kagan's rule (Roux, 2017, pp. 97-98). In this second myth, there are some elements that inspired the 'Osman's dream', such as the content of dream and its interpretation by a wise person, it is also similar in that it contains the ideal of universal domination. In Dede Korkut legends a prayer exist that is repeated at the end of each episode as such "Don't let your great and shady tree be cut down! [tm]" (Boratav, 2016, p. 30). In this example, it is seen that the tree figure can take on a function similar to the tree in 'Osman's dream' by symbolizing ideals such as abundance/status/power.³²⁹ The famous dream of Selçuk Beg, who is considered the founder of the Seljuk state, mentioned in Ahmed bin Mahmud's *Selçuknâme*, can also be considered as another example in this context. In his dream, Selçuk Beg saw that he urinated towards the fire and the sparks from this fire spread to the east and west, when he had this dream interpreted by a dream interpreter, he was informed that his sons would become rulers and rule in the east and west (Ahmed bin Mahmud, 1977, p. 5). Similar examples are as follows: (i) In the establishment of the Seljuk state, three trees emerge from the belly of Dukak, the father of Selçuk Beg, and their branches cover the world, (ii) in one of the Oghuz legends, there are three brothers, the father of these brothers sees in a dream that three trees come out of his own belly and cast a shadow on the world, (iii) Mahmud of Ghazni's father Sebüktigin saw in a dream before his son was born that a tree came out of the hearth in his house and covered the whole world (Karadeniz, 2008, p. 54). Kayabaşı (2016, p. 62) is of the opinion that the basis of these common elements seen in the examples of dream myths is the 'understanding of world domination' dating back to the Karahanlı and Seljuk periods. In addition, the branching tree, as a patrilineal image, has a genealogical meaning in that it symbolizes the male

³²⁹ Another story in which the tree and water motif takes place as a sign of divine sovereignty is as follows: In the *velâyetnâme* of Kolu Açık Hacım Sultan, Gabriel sent an *elif* crown, cardigan, table and prayer rug to the Prophet Muhammad, the Prophet gave them to Ali, and these relics were received from Ali. It is stated that they are passed to Twelve Imams and was given to Ahmet Yesevî by Imam er-Rızâ. Ahmet Yesevî did not give these relics to any of his caliphs and waited for Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli by saying 'it has an owner, he will come'. Hacı Bektaş shows miracles at the time of the morning prayer and makes a fountain flow from the school room, a tree grows and blooms next to this fountain. After Hacı Bektaş proved that he was descended from Ali and performed another miracle, Ahmet Yesevî handed over the holy relics to him (Gündüz, 2010, pp. 75-76). What is in question in this story is not merely the symbolic transition of the cult line from Gabriel to Hacı Bektaş. It is clear that the caliphate is seen as the right of Ali and his sons in the Shiite belief, and the transferred symbols are in this respect both about worldly and divine power.

lineages from a single father that spread and dominate the world. Dervish Vâsî'tî (2011, p. 24) gives an example where the tree image was also used in the genealogy construction in *sûfi* discourse. In this respect, the spreading of the branches of the tree to the world can be interpreted in reference to the ideal of the rulers belonging to a certain dynasty to spread over the whole world and rule it for generations.

Another example can be found in the work *Flos Historiarum Terre Orientis* by Hayton of Korykos, a contemporary of Osman Beg. In this work, Hayton (2015, pp. 73, 79) mentions two dreams of Genghis Khan that heralded the rise of the Mongol Empire, providing a clear example of how dream myths were used to explain state origins and that this was widely known among the people. The fact that Qadi Burhâneddin, who reigned in the 14th century, dreaming of he was wielding a sword from Ali bin Abu Talib and was also become the ruler of the Eretna Principality, and he even have them interpreted (Karadeniz, 2008, pp. 133-35), shows how widespread the dream myth fiction is. On the other hand, it is clear that some of the elements in 'Osman's dream', which are different from these examples, have significant similarities with the Indo-European myths. The story of Afrasiab or the story of Ardeshir, the founder of the Sassanids (Curtis, 2010, pp. 85-86), in this context, is similar to 'Osman's dream'. In all three examples, the element of a divine destiny (born destined to be a ruler), which is an extension of the ancient tragic tradition, and the notification of this to oneself/other rulers/sorcery-clerics through dreams are common.

Let us now move on to the structure of the dream myth. It is seen that the dream takes more than one form in different sources.³³⁰ There are clear differences between these forms in terms of the political discourse constructed. Let's start with Âşikpaşazâde, the author of the best-known version of the myth. Âşikpaşazâde describes the dream as follows (Kala, 2013, p. 41): Osman Beg falls asleep crying and praying to God. In his dream, he sees a moon rising from the belt of Sheikh Edebâli and entering his bosom.³³¹ Then a tree emerges from Osman's belly, and the shadow of the tree covers the whole world. When the mountains are under this shadow and the waters

³³⁰ There is also a pagan version of the dream myth in French sources. According to this, Murat I see Apollon in his dream and thirteen great princes of the west prostrate in front of the ruler. For this version, see: Gibbons (2017, p. 172).

³³¹ There is another version where the stories of seeing the dream and the blessing of the ruler differ from each other. According to this version, the person who went to Edebâli's house and respected the Qur'an until the morning was Ertugrul Beg, while the person who saw the dream was his son Osman Beg. For this version in history of Rûhî, see: Yücel and Cengiz (1992, pp. 379-80).

appear under the mountains, people drink from these waters, water the gardens and make fountains run. Osman Beg wakes up and tells his dream to Sheikh Edebâli, and the Sheikh says, ‘Son Osman, may the sultanate be blessed to you and your descendants’.³³² Âşikpaşazâde ends the narrative with the following couplets (Kala, 2013, p. 41): “Der oğlum fırsat u nusret senindir/ Hidayet menzili nimet senindir/ Sana verildi taht düşmesin baht/ Ezel i ta ebed devlet senindir”.³³³

It is understood from the development of the story and finally from the couplets that are written that the event described here is nothing but the God’s granting of sovereignty (Barkan, 1994, p. 5). İnalçık (2019e, p. 132) states that the history of belief that God bestows sovereignty on a person and declares it through a blessed person, a shaman or a saint goes back to the Central Asian Turkish-Mongolian tradition.³³⁴ It can be predicted that this view has become widespread especially in dervish circles. In the introductory part of the *velâyetnâme* named *Menâkıbü’l Tâcü’l-ârifin Ebü’l-Vefâ*, which was translated at the request of *Vefâi* sheikh Seyyid Velâyet, Âşikpaşazâde’s son-in-law, the following statement inscribed besides the dream myth: “He attained the throne of sultan and the crown of sainthood by receiving divine grace in his supreme lodge [tm]” (as cited in İnalçık, 2019h, p. 143). In this context, it is enough to remember that the dervishes who adhere to the Sunni interpretation of Islam claimed the holiness of the sultans in a tradition that has survived to the present day. For example, Âşikpaşazâde uses the expression “Now, this Ottoman dynasty is a group whose miracles are known [tm]” (Kala, 2013, p. 308). I do not think that this view is simply an idealization. Rather,

³³² In this part of the myth, Edebâli or the person who interprets the dream marries his daughter to Osman Beg. The narrative of the blessed marriage based on the dream is also included in the works of the period as another myth. For example, the marriage of Seyyid Ebü’l-Vefâ with the daughter of the sheikh in the place where he was staying (Vâsıt’î, 2011, p. 45) or the marriage of Emir Sultan with the daughter of Bayezid I (Halepli İbrahim Çelebi, 2021, p. 118).

³³³ Says my son, the opportunity and the help of God are yours/ The blessings leading to guidance are yours/ The throne has been given to you, let your luck not diminish/ The state/glory is yours from creation to eternity.

³³⁴ While this view is correct, it is incomplete. Theoretically, I think that this figure comes into play in the ruptures as well as the continuity of the legitimacy of the power. In almost all societies in which class relations developed in the ancient world, a relationship was established between the ruler and the god. This relationship does not have to be re-established by a dervish/sorcerer/saint figure as long as the power remains in the same family. On the other hand, in the historical moments when the power change takes place, or when a new power group rises, a new narrative that will replace the old claims of divine grace should come into play. The inclusion of the saint/dervish/sorcerer figures in the story as a third person is characterized by a function that serves to consecrate the groups that jumped in the social power schema, just as the new ruling class members built places of worship.

it should be regarded as a kind of Sharia trick that stems from the separation between Sharia and customary law. Because in the understanding of *sūfism*, it is widely believed that some states of saints may appear contrary to the Sharia, but that there is a distinction between the apparent and the esoteric realm, and that these states are realized on the esoteric side of reality with divine intuition and grace. In this context, it becomes possible to adapt the non-religious attitudes and behaviors of the Ottoman dynasty to the religious cover, from the highest pitch.

There is another version of the dream myth in an anonymous historical work written in the same period as the history of Âşıkpaşazâde. The dream narrative in the work published by Köklü (2004, p. 1) highlights a Turkmen Beg living in the vicinity of Tabriz named Ahmed, whom is claimed to be the father of Ertugrul Beg, in order to herald the domination of the Ottoman lineage.³³⁵ The tree that grows from the belly of this person gives branches and leaves and puts the world in its shadow, under him, everyone “puts their commodity in the market and does sale and buy [tm]” (Köklü, 2004, p. 1). In this narrative, however, it is striking that Ahmed Beg was attached to a lord named Muhammed Shah who was ‘not a Qizilbash’ and paid taxes, the tree growing in his belly was called “munteha dıraht” and he told his dream to a *mufti*. Thus, a version emerges that this story was reconstructed on the axis of Qizilbashes versus Sunni belief, that the nomenclature ‘munteha dıraht’ refers to the term ‘*sidret-ül munteha*’, which means the last border tree before reaching the God in the Sunni tradition, and that the dream was interpreted by an official ulama (*mufti*), which is the authority of fatwa. Moreover, in the continuation of this story, it is told how the mufti of the Iranian ruler falsified the Qur’an, and Ertugrul Beg, who did not consent to this, immigrated to Anatolia (Köklü, 2004, pp. 2-3). Thus, the narrative was brought closer to an institutional Sunni character and gained a sectarian dimension regarding the Safavid-Ottoman struggle.

Another version of the dream myth is found in the chronicles published by Giese (1992) and Öztürk (2000). According to these anonymous chronicles, although the content of the dream is largely the same as that of Âşıkpaşazâde formulated (the moon

³³⁵ Another version that connects the dream narrative to Turkmen groups is Ayaz/Iyaz's dream in *Düstûrnâme*. In this narrative, Iyaz, as the father of Oghuz Khan, is shown as a Quraishi, and upon having a dream that the tree growing from his grave will hold the earth, he has Sa'd ibn Vakkas interpret this dream and receives the good news that his sons will become rulers (Öztürk, 2012b, pp. 8-9). Ayaz married Turunç Hatun, the daughter of Tümen Han, causing the birth of Oghuz Kagan, and the Ottoman lineage was born in this way.

born from the Sheikh's bosom, the tree growing from the belly, the spread of the shadow of the tree to the world, the waters flowing from the mountains, the people's use of these waters to irrigate vineyards and gardens), the people who see and interpret the dream are different. According to the anonymous authors of the chronicle of Giese (1992, p. 10) and Öztürk (2000, p. 11) he is Ertugrul Beg who sees the dream and the dream heralds the coming of Osman Beg to the world. In this respect, the myth can also be read as a *mawlid* embellishment. Ertugrul Beg, who saw the dream, went to Konya to interpret it and found a *mu'abbir* (dream interpreter) person named Abdü'l-aziz. In this version of the dream, Ertugrul Beg's visit to Konya and receive the good news are crucial details because Konya was the capital of the Seljuk state of the period. Note that in the previous sections, as mentioned about the invention of a political discourse that associates the Seljuks and the Ottomans with each other as successor-predecessor. For example, there is a legend in the Köklü chronicle (2006, pp. 3-5) that when Sultan Alâeddin, on his deathbed, gathered Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî and other ulama and asked them to determine the person who will succeed him, this assembly proposed Osman Beg. In this context, the interpretation of Ertugrul Beg's dream in Konya is loaded with a similar symbolic meaning and evokes the discourse of inheriting the right to rule from the Seljuks. Nevertheless, the authors of the chronicles Giese (1992, p. 10) and Öztürk (2000, p. 11) do not hesitate to state that there is another version of this narrative attributed to Sheik Edebâli, although they do not use a second phrase other than Konya about the place where the dream was interpreted. Another dream myth based in Konya takes place in Çan anonymous. In the anonymous of Çan (2006, p. 59), it is reported that after Ertugrul Beg had a 'weird' dream one night, after chanting the God until the morning, he rode his horse and came to Konya and told his dream to a dream interpreter named Abdü'l-aziz. After it is stated that Sultan Alâeddin also 'believes' to this person, the dream interpreter Abdü'l-aziz -the author states that some people call this person Edebâli - gives the good news that Ertugrul Beg's generation has been granted reign and gives his daughter to Osman, son of Ertugrul. Although the narrative elements in this dream myth are mostly the same as in the other chronicles, the detail in which Sultan Alâeddin is shown to the dream interpreter sheik is a crucial part of this story. Thanks to this detail, the anonymous chronicler makes the reader feel that the divine judgement 'The Ertugrul lineage has been given the reign' by the sheik whose words binds Sultan Alâeddin and other members Seljuk house. Interestingly, there is a similar dream myth in the *menâkıbnâme* of Sheikh Bedreddin. According to

Hâfız Halîl (2015, pp. 22-24), the grandson of Sheik Bedreddin, Sheikh's grandfather Abdü'l-aziz was a *ghazi* from the lineage of Sultan Alâeddin, he was born in Konya and was close to Mevlânâ Celâleddîn and even became the chief officer of his harem.³³⁶ According to Hâfız Halîl (2015, p. 26), Orhan Beg's son, Suleyman Pasha, had a dream one night: All the soldiers gathered together, place a candle in front of them, and in the flame of that candle they saw the far parts of the region Rumelia. In this image, minarets were built in the far parts of the Rumelia and the call to prayer was being recited out loud. The next day, Suleyman Pasha tells his dream to Abdü'l-aziz, and this person interprets the dream as a "sign of conquest" and thus the first step of the transition to Rumelia is taken (Hâfız Halîl, 2015, p. 27). In both dreams, it is seen that a person named Abdü'l-aziz, who is connected with the Sultan of Konya and the *Mevlevî* order, gives the good news of conquest to the Ottoman sultan or his prince. It seems that these dream myths have more than one form circulating among the people, and an important part of them narrates the symbolic takeover of power from the Seljuks by the Ottomans.

Historian Kemal, on the other hand, states that there are two different forms of the famous dream that came to his own time and narrates both in turn. There are some important differences in the dream versions conveyed by Kemal compared to the examples above. In the first version of the dream, a tree grows not in Osman Beg's belly but in the middle of the "*havl*"³³⁷, its roots spread to the world and its shadow covers the world. Kemal adds a motif to the rest of the dream that other writers do not have (Öztürk, 2001, p. 35): "Dahı gördi hüma kuşın elinde/ Dogan gibi oturur bileğinde/ El urup [anı] alurken elinde/ Tagılmış gördi cevher yünlerinde/ O cevherden aluban hayli anda/ Şalar konına ol şah-ı cihan da".³³⁸ The word '*hüma*' is the name of a bird believed to fly quite high, which can take the form of '*humay*' in Persian, '*kumay*' in various

³³⁶ It is interesting that there is a tendency among the *süfîs* of the period to ascribe ancestry to the Seljuk Sultans. For example, there is a common legend that Barak Baba is the son of Izzeddin Keykavus II. It is possible that this legend, which is attributed to the figure of Barak Baba, who is also famous in Rumelia as a follower of Sari Saltuk, was also used for Sheikh Bedreddin, who was politically active in the same region. It is not surprising that the same legend was produced for Kaygusuz Abdal. According to the tradition, Kaygusuz Abdal is the son of Alaiye Beg, Husameddin Mahmud, who is descended from the Seljuk begs on one side and a member of the Karamanid family on the other side (Güzel, 1986, p. 283).

³³⁷ '*Havl*' is an Arabic word meaning surrounding/around or power/strength (Ayverdi, 2010, p. 486).

³³⁸ Moreover, he saw the Huma bird in his hand/ He found it sitting on his wrist like a falcon/ He intervened with his hand and took it in his hand/ He saw the scattered ore in the bird's wool/ At that moment, while he was taking a lot of that ore/ He fills them in his bosom, that world ruler.

Turkish dialects, and ‘*hüma*’ or ‘*huma*’ in Anatolian Turkish (Kurnaz, 1998). It is known that the most distinguished game birds among Central Asian Turks are called ‘*kumay*’. For this reason, a connection may have been established between the huma bird and the right to rule in nomadic societies engaged in hunting.³³⁹ Batislam (2002, p. 187) states that there is a belief that whoever casts its shadow on or scatters it, that person will be crowned and reach high rank.³⁴⁰ Boratav (2016, p. 99) states that a motif is quite common in Turkish tales, where all the people gather to choose a new ruler, and it is believed that whoever lands on the head of a person, fate chooses him as ruler. It is possible to establish a similarity between the Huma bird and the goddess Umay in Turkish belief (Batislam, 2002, p. 188). Inan (1976, p. 26) states that the Yakut Turks believed in the existence of a spirit called ‘*Ogo umita*’, and that if this “child’s imi” sang over the child’s head in the form of a bird, it was thought that the child’s generation would be fruitful. In this context, the goddess named Umay, who is related to the continuation of the generation and birth, can be associated with the rulership, because in patriarchal societies the eminence of a particular family is largely due to its size and having many sons. The meaning given to the word Umay by Kaşgarlı Mahmud is also related to birth in *Divân-ı Lügât it-Türk*, it is expressed as the “last piece after birth” and the belief that if this is worshiped, the child will be a boy (İnan, 1976, p. 24). Thus, the goddess Umay, who is associated with birth/fertility/having a son, is also articulated with the *huma-kumay* connection to the image of superiority in hunting and martial arts. The fact that the *hüma* motif is included in the *Saltuknâme* (Ebü’l-Hayr Rûmî, 1990, p. 50) indicates that this legend could find a place in popular memory even in the 15th century.

³³⁹ A motif derived from the bird, called phoenix/*anak* in the Semitic tradition, is also found in the Bible: [Matthew, 3.16; Mark, 1.10; Luke, 3.22; John, 1.32] The Holy Spirit appears to Jesus as a dove and declares that he is the son of God. The figure of the dove descending on Jesus is frequently featured in Christian iconography.

³⁴⁰ Şeyhoğlu Mustafa also uses this symbology. According to him (2013, p. 207) Allah has put a secret from his divine secrets on the huma bird, and if the shadow of this bird falls on a person’s head, that person is given the glad tidings of sultanate. Moreover, in Kaygusuz Abdal’s masnavi (*Mesevi-i Baba Kaygusuz*), the Huma bird motif is mentioned together with the monarchy (couplet no: 656): “Her padişah ‘adl ü insaf bilmeye/ Her kuşun gölgesi Hüma olmaya” (Oktay, 2013, p. 138). On the other hand, there is an example in which the Huma bird motif turns into the ‘ball of the state’. In Abdulvasi Çelebi’s work called *Halilnâme*, the marriage of the Prophet Abraham to the ruler’s daughter is symbolized by the golden ball left on Abraham’s lap by the girl’s side: “The ball of state fell on Abraham” (Gültaş, 1996, p. 174).

The use of the *hüma* bird motif in the ancient Turkish religion and Persian poetry in the *Selatinnâme* suggests that this bird is a hunting bird that ascribes divine grace to the ruler. Kemal (Öztürk, 2001, p. 35) states that this bird stands like a falcon on Osman Beg's wrist, that is, Osman Beg controls the *hüma* like a hunter who controls the hunting bird. On the other hand, another narrative element not found in ancient Turkish mythology has a place in *Selatinnâme*. In the dream version narrated by Kemal, there are precious stones in the feathers of the *hüma* and Osman Beg stuffs these stones into his bosom. This motif can be interpreted as the author's inclusion of the legendary *Zümrüd-ü Anka* (emerald phoenix), which has similarities with the *hüma* bird, in the text. Since the phoenix is depicted as similar to the green 'bird of paradise' and is essentially of Semitic origin (from the Hebrew word for 'anak'), its likeness to an emerald is understandable within the Arabic poetic tradition (the imaginary connection between nature and heaven in terms of green color). The literal understanding of this connection may have led the author to create an image of the *hüma* bird having precious stones on its wings. On the other hand, it can be said that the fact that this poem was written at the end of the 15th century and that the ruler's possession of treasures and precious stones was considered positive, as will be mentioned with in the following sections, combined the privileged image of the ruler with the treasures of divine origin and placed it in this poem. In the continuation of the dream version that we have discussed, Osman hears the voice of an old man which called Osman to wake up from sleep and make interpreted his dream to the guest staying in the *imârethâne* he had built (Öztürk, 2001, p. 36). Moreover, the voice in his dream states that a messenger has come to Osman at his house, that he should not be surprised, that this 'fortune' (*fal*) is an oath to the power he will gain, and that this sign that comes during sleep is a divine 'grace' (Öztürk, 2001, p. 36). Osman Beg wakes up from a dream, and when he sees that 'a great sayyid' is a guest in the *imâret* he has built, he greets him and receives the answer, "(..) God help you / May every day be better than the other, O ruler of rulers [tm]". Edebâli or any other saint is not mentioned in this version of the dream myth. It is only mentioned about a 'great sayyid' who gathered many people around him: "Var idi bilesince hayli yoldaş/ İdinmişler idi bu seyyidi baş" (Öztürk, 2001, p. 36).³⁴¹ Moreover, Osman Beg does not interpret his dream to this person, and the response he receives after the greeting is accepted as a kind of miracle. Osman Beg evaluates the answer given by the people around the great sayyid as follows (Öztürk, 2001, p. 37):

³⁴¹ He even had a lot of comrades/ They accept this sayyid as their leader.

“Görür Osman ki kur’a düşdi fala/ Ki hacet olmadı [hergiz] suale/ Didi düşümi yordunuz o ki var/ Hemişe şadman olasız iy yar”.³⁴² In this version of the dream, there is no element such as the marriage of the sayyid’s daughter with Ertugrul or Osman or his son, and even the sayyid does not seem to have an important role in the interpretation of the dream. Interestingly, Osman Beg did not wait for the sayyid’s permission or expression to seize the throne. Sayyid’s words the moment he met Osman Beg have a meaning more like the confirmation of the dream. Although this version of the dream was mainly constructed according to the classical schema of establishing divine power in the relationship between dervish and ruler, the dervish's role was reduced and Osman Beg’s receiving of divine signs (as in the *hüma* bird motif) was made more direct.

There is also a more interesting example of the transition to dream myth narratives in which the status of the ulama members is emphasized rather than the status of the dervishes. This version is found in the *menâkıbnâme* of Seyyid Ali Sultan. The author of this *menâkıbnâme* tells a story that the ruler -Orhan Beg according to one copy and Bayezid I according to the other- begged God for help, as a result of this, the God spoke to him and said that Seyyid Ali Sultan and a virtuous person named Rüstem from Khorasan would come and help him soon (Yıldırım, 2007, p. 162). The interesting aspect of this narrative is that it attributes the Ottoman advance in Rumelia to the both miracle of Mevlânâ Rüstem, who imposed the one-fifth tax which was therefore disliked by the wandering warriors, and the wandering Bektashi dervishes. In the continuation of the story, there are details such as the Prophet Muhammad appearing to Orhan Beg/ Bayezid I, ordering Mevlânâ Rüstem to adopt taxation methods (Yıldırım, 2007, p. 166), and Mevlânâ Rüstem appearing in the dream and asking for a land assignment. In this narrative, too, the mystification of the dervishes-ulama couple under the umbrella of Bektashi order draws attention, that the Ottoman progress was referred on both the tax base of the central state control and the achievements of the *ghazi*/Turkmen groups.

The second ‘Osman’s dream’ narrative, presented by the historian and poet Kemal in *Selâtinname*, centers on a more orthodox Islamic figure who is closer to the ulama rather than the wandering dervishes figure. In the work, the title of the first version of the dream is “Osman düş gördüğünü beyan ider”, while the second version

³⁴² Osman saw that the word was said as indicated in the fortune / There was no need to ask any questions / He said that you interpreted my dream as it was / Then you will always be happy, my precious.

is “Huda’dan Osman’a beşaret olduğun beyan ider” (Öztürk, 2001, pp. 35, 37).³⁴³ If we pay attention to the titles, it is striking that the title of the second version was created in a way to indicate more certainty in the matter of divine providence than the first one. In this second version, the writer begins the story by saying that one day a Qur’an scholar was a guest in the *imârethâne* made built by Osman (Öztürk, 2001, p. 38). Kemal (Öztürk, 2001, p. 38) states that this person had a *Mushaf* (pages, text of the Qur’an) with him, recited the Qur’an, and was very knowledgeable. It is understood that this description represents a much more formal understanding of religion than the wandering dervish figure in the first version. According to him, Osman Beg is among those who come to listen to the recitation of the Qur’an and asks what the scholar is reading and why he is so respected (Öztürk, 2001, p. 38). The scholar says that what he reads on this question is the word of God, that the things in the world are carried out by its order, that it is necessary to enter heaven after death, that souls are taken with its decree, that humans and jinn are saved by its decree, that he indicates that it inside of this book is filled with the name of Allah (Öztürk, 2001, p. 38). There is a subtext in this story that suggests that Osman Beg was unaware of the Qur’an and became a Muslim after this event. The same story is also represented in *Saltuknâme* (Ebü’l-Hayr Rûmî, 1990, pp. 273-74). Kemal (Öztürk, 2001, pp. 38-39) writes that after hearing these words, Osman Beg replied, “Didi pes niçün itmedin haberdar/ Beni bu sırdan iy dana-yı esrar”³⁴⁴ and invited the scholar and everyone who was there to a feast in his own house. Stating that everyone dispersed except the scholar and the scholar fell asleep after the feast, the author claims that Osman Beg stood until the morning out of respect for the Qur’an, prayed to God, and heard a ‘dazzling’ sound in the morning (Öztürk, 2001, pp. 39-40). This voice said (Öztürk, 2001, pp. 40): “Sonun gür olsun iy şah- ser-efraz/ Benüm aduma sen ‘izzetler itdün/ Yüz urup namıma hürmetler itdün/ Ola oğlanlarun her ulu hanlar/ Seraser server-i sahib-kıranlar”.³⁴⁵ Thus, the sovereignty was presented as a divine grant for the Ottomans, and the legitimacy of this grant was directly attached to a discourse constructed using the Qur’an and the word of God. In the example of this version of the dream myth in *Saltuknâme*, God talks to Osman Beg and says that they

³⁴³ [This episode] tells that Osman is dreaming, and, [this episode] tells Osman that good news came from God.

³⁴⁴ He said enough, why didn't you inform me of this secret, O person who knows secrets.

³⁴⁵ May your end be majestic, O lord of the highest/ You have honored my name/ You have respected my reputation/ May your sons be supreme rulers/ Let your sons be the rulers of all great rulers.

made him and his succeeding sons ‘saints’ as long as the Qur’an exist in the world (Ebü’l-Hayr Rûmî, 1990, p. 274). Another version of this narrative example created for Ertugrul Beg is in *Düstûrnâme*. According to Enverî, Ertugrul Beg receives the good news from *Hızır* (*el-Khader*) that he will cause for the Islamic conquests and that his descendants will conquer Rumelia (Öztürk, 2012b, pp. 19-20).

A different version of the dream myth is included in the last part of Yazıcızâde ‘Ali’s *Tarih-i Âl-i Selçuk* (Bakır, 2008, p. 788); In the myth narrated by Yazıcızâde, the monks living in the Margarit monastery of Siruz province saw in the stars (with the help of my knowledge of astrology) that a sultan who will appear in the province of Söğüt and conquer Rumelia. Thereupon, they find Osman Beg and make a deal by giving him gold and silver, according to which *kharaj* and *avarız* taxes will not be collected from the *waqf* villages and monks of the Manastır province when Rumelia is conquered. There is another interesting example indicates the Tamerlane’s expedition. According to the myth is cited by Köprülü, Tamerlane saw Ahmet Yesevî in his dream and Yesevî told him that he was the one who would kill the king of Bukhara, so Tamerlane went on a campaign (Köprülü, 1993, p. 41). There is also another example of dream myth is narrated in *İskendernâme*. According to Ahmedî’s (2018, pp. 74-78) fiction, Alexander the Great had a dream. In this dream, an angel comes down from the sky and gives a sword and tells him that this sword was sent to him by Allah, that he should pull against his enemy, fight with the sultans, so that he will become the ruler of the east and the west. After Alexander wakes up, he tells his dream to Aristotle for interpretation. Aristotle interprets the dream as a divine inspiration and declares that Alexander will flock to the seven climates and conquer them with the sword. Divitçioğlu (2000, p. 46) drew attention to the similar structure of the foundation legends of Seljuk state. Gallotta (2000, p. 48) similarly underlines the similarity between the story of Osman Beg’s grandfather Suleyman Shah and the founder of Anatolian Seljuks, Kutalmışoğlu Suleyman. Turan (2003, p. 103) points out that the narratives on the foundation Ottoman state actually overlap with the foundation legends of the Seljuk State:

Selçuk’s father, Dukak, saw in his dream that three trees came out of his navel, and their branches were rising to the sky, and Korkut-ata gave him the good news that his children would become the sultan of the world. According to the other narrative, Seljuk, who accepted Islam, urinated on the fire in his dream and thus, the sparks splashed around the world. This is expressed as the Seljuk sons will dominate the world. According to the third narration, the Prophet blessed him and

his sons in his dream because he was a Dukak who accepted Islam and honored the Qur'an very much (...). [tm]

The creation of such an Ottoman foundation myth brings to mind the three function ideologies in Dumézil's Indo-European people's epics. According to Dumézil, the traces of a triple social stratification consisting of king, sorcerer-warrior and producers in Indian, Persian, Ancient Greek and Scandinavian myths continued for a long time and played an active role in legitimizing the social order. With the institutionalization of the Ottoman rule and the clarification of the state form, the opening of Ottoman political thought to Indo-Iranian influence and the domination of Indo-European peoples may have been effective in the creation of such a myth. In general terms, this foundation myth can be interpreted built around a king (Seljuk Sultan Alâeddin), a warrior (Ertugrul Beg-Osman Beg) and a magician/religious figure (*Abd'ül-aziz* /Sheikh Edebâli /Ulu Sayyid) in this way.³⁴⁶ Divitçioğlu (1996, p. 100) notes that in old Turkish epics, events generally developed over two functions and there were distinctions such as *akbudun-karabudun*, sun-moon, arrow and bow. For example, Şükrullah (2011, p. 199) uses the dichotomic terminology consisting of 'white bone' and 'black bone'. Alinge (1967, p. 6) states that the term 'white bone' denotes steppe nobles.³⁴⁷ Başkaya (2014, p. 108) underlines that these concepts indicate social class belonging. Ülken (2017, p. 31) underlines that the concept of the *Gök-tengri* is especially the representation of the noble ruling class. For this reason, I think that the above story may have emerged at a time when Iranian influence was established, since this dualism-based class-ideology is the ideology of steppe feudalism and is based on the separation of military class and common people.³⁴⁸ The most important factors

³⁴⁶ See: Yıldırım (2001, p. 114) and Divitçioğlu (1999, pp. 40, 123-130).

³⁴⁷ The 'bone' element has an important place in ancient Turkish beliefs. It is widely believed that bones have the essence of a living human or animal, and that it is possible to come back to life by using them. The word bone has gained a term meaning over time and has become to describe the lineages. For this reason, while the ancient Turks were hiding the bones of significant people, they would destroy the bones of the enemy by burning them (Roux, 2017, pp. 85-86). Examples of this practice can be seen even in the 15th century. When the Karamanid soldiers occupied Bursa during the Ottoman interregnum period, they took the bones of Bayezid I from the grave and burned them in the furnace of the Nalıncılar bath. There may also be a symbolic connection between the separation of white and black bones and the burning of bones.

³⁴⁸ Ziya Gökalp is the first person to examine binary, triple and multiple classification systems in the Turkish tradition. It is possible that the studies given by Kıvılcımlı (2007, pp. 75-79) under the title of "social and political schemes [tm]" were also taken from Gökalp. The following works can be consulted on this subject: Gökalp (1976, pp. 51-64; 1981, pp. 15-27; 1991, pp. 93-113).

supporting this thesis are that, in the process of re-establishing the class domination of the Ottoman dynasty after the invasion of Tamerlane, he connected his own generation to Turkish tribes through Suleyman Shah and Ertugrul Beg, similar to Tamerlane, and also described the activities of the establishment period with Islamic concepts. Another reason may be the Ottomans' search for power over the Turkmen groups living in Eastern Anatolia. For this very reason, a common foundation myth with the Seljuks may have been adopted.

Despite the structural limitations of the approach that refers to the dream myth, another approach considers the subjective and divine factors separately about the source of the reign, and ultimately reaches a synthesis under divine over-determination. First, at the empirical level, Ahmedî (2018, p. 66) states that obtaining the throne and crown –that is, gaining a place in the institutional structure, as Âşık Paşa states – will be by gaining property and fortune in the world: “Ol kişi ala cihânda mülk ü baht/ Hem sezâ ola ki bula tâc u that”.³⁴⁹ Although this statement can be understood as a tautological statement at first reading, it points to a very simple fact in essence. Property and fortune are won by war and struggle, while crown and throne are symbols possessed by the legitimate rulers of an institutionalized order. In this case, the first condition of being a ruler is to fight. But this is not enough. Secondly, there is the question of the legitimacy of the sultanate case, which is surrounded by a moral streak. Ahmedî uses the following expressions in this regard: “Sen dahı iy saltanat da'vî kılan/ Cehd it da'vî ki olmaya yalan/ Girü dilküsin bu reng'alданmagıl/ Olmaz adı kendüzün'adanmagıl/ Saltanat dilerseñ istihkâk-ıla/ Nefsünî tehzîb it ahlâk-ıla”.³⁵⁰ From these verses, it is understood that those who aim to reign must have assumed a moral notion, at least in appearance, so that the cause is not a lie, and that in essence, it is necessary to have a moral notion that can be summarized as undertaking broad social functions, including self-education, in order to deserve the sultanate. Ahmedî (2018, p. 149) calls this notion justice in another couplet³⁵¹ and places this value at the base of the country's welfare.

In the final analysis, Ahmedî prefers to synthesize both possession by the right of the sword and the possession of the crown by connecting it to divine grace at a higher

³⁴⁹ He who gains wealth and fortune in the world/ is worthy of finding a crown and throne. See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 833.

³⁵⁰ O keeper of the sultanate case/ You also try not to make the case groundless/ You're a fox again, don't be fooled by this color/ If you want to deserve the sultanate / Beautify your soul with morality. See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 7378-7380. Also see: Ahmedî (2018, p. 604).

³⁵¹ Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 1967.

level. First, Ahmedî negates the example he put forward on the sword and struggle as follows: “Bu ki şeh dir kim kılıcumuzla Rûm/ Alınup oldu bizüm ol merzibûm/ Hâlıküñdur mülk anı_ol pâdişâh/ Kime kim diler virüp eyleye şâh/ Mülk anuñdur Mâlikü’l-Mülk ol hemin/ Hiçdür Dârâb u İskender yakîn”.³⁵² Secondly, by saying that God is the one who grants the crown and throne to whomever he wishes, Ahmedî essentially negates the moral notion with an idealistic argument: “Sâni’-i âlem Kadîm-i Lem-yezel/ Kim anuñ sun’ında yoh-durur halel/ Giceyi gündüz kılan oldur yakîn/ Gündüzi gice iden oldur hemin/ Ol virür kime dilerse tâc u that/ Ol alur kimden alursa mülk ü baht”.³⁵³ As a result, Ahmedî, who evaluated power as the source of reign in the first two examples and morality as the source of legitimacy, felt the need to lean on a kind of theodicy in the last two examples and replaced the secular foundations with idealist ones. The situation can be read in the second example is an understanding of reign based on the belief that God is infallible and that everything he creates is therefore perfect. In this framework, the ruler is also appointed by God, and it is obligatory to obey him. Ahmedî crowns this idea with the notion of ‘serving the state’: “Olmasun bed-hâh-ı devlet olasın/ Devlete kul ol ki devlet bulasın/ Devletüñ tâcın virene dâd-ger/ Hizmet-içün bagla ney bigi kemer/ Her kişi k’ide anı Hakk ihtiyâr/ Aña hidmet iden olur bahtiyâr/ Her ki bağlamaya ney bigi kemer/ Hizmetine devletüñ olur kem er”.³⁵⁴

But it is also noticed that Ahmedî does not put forward a principle that the reign conferred by God should be used in accordance with the rules of Sharia. The definitive formulation of such a principle is found in Şeyhoğlu Mustafa. According to Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, p. 60), if the shadow of the *hüma* bird falls on a person’s head, that person attains the fortune of state and gains glory in the country. This is a situation that arises entirely out of divine grace. God chooses a servant and “takes him into his shadow

³⁵² See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 1012-1014. Also see: Ahmedî (2018, p. 79). The ruler said that the Greek was taken with our sword / These borders are ours/ The property belongs to the creator/god, he is the sultan/ He gives it to whomever he wishes and makes him a king/ The property is his, he is the sole owner/ Darius and Alexander are really nothing.

³⁵³ See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 2000-2002. Also see: Ahmedî (2018, p. 151). Creator of the realm and immortal builder/ There is no fault in what he does/ Surely it is he who makes the night day/ He alone makes the day night/ He gives crown and throne to whomever He wishes/ He takes property and fortune from whomever he wishes.

³⁵⁴ See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 1996, 2003-2005. Also see: Ahmedî (2018, p. 151). Let no one wish the evil of the sultanate, let him die/ Be a servant to the state to find happiness/ To the one who is worthy of the crown of sultanate / Tie a belt like a ney for service/ Everyone who serves the person chosen by God / Everyone will be happy/ In the service of the state/ He who does not fasten a belt like ney becomes a vile person.

[tm]”, creates him “capable and suitable for the shadow of his essence and attributes [tm]” (Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, 2013, p. 60). Because the ruler is a distinguished person as the person who do the works of God on earth, and this provision is the first principle of ruling in the world and conditions of sultanate (Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, 2013, pp. 60, 63). Amâsî (2016, p. 347), on the other hand, states that there is a need for a ruler who is distinguished from other people by a ‘divine confirmation’ in every era and who will perfect other ones. Şeyhoğlu develops and deepens this perspective as follows (2013, p. 60):

Behold, how fortunate it is, how much state and land, superiority and benevolence gathers in that chosen and honored person. Whether he is worthy or not, when a helpless, incapable person leaves the gaze of love and benevolence on that person’s side for a moment, he becomes the beloved and valued friend of the whole world. [tm]

It is clear that these expressions describe the ruler as the shadow of God on earth (*Zillullah-i fil ard*)³⁵⁵ and base the question of the origin of the rulership on divine grace, excluding even merit. Kılıçbay (2000, p. 29) considers the concept of the shadow of God as a kind of ‘stewardship’; “(...) this concept of steward is also of Mesopotamian origin or Egyptian origin. It originated in the agricultural empire. This is manifested in the form of the sultan, the shadow of God on earth, as *Zilullah-i fil-alem* [tm]”. However, as Yılmaz stated (1998, p. 64), it should not be assumed that this approach will directly construct the image of an absolute ruler. Showing divine grace as the only source also obliges rulers to act in accordance with divine laws in order to remain on their thrones and narrows the field of arbitrary administration. Because, in order for the ruler not to lose grace, he must live in accordance with his rules and prohibitions, similar to God, or God’s torment and suffering (Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, 2013, p. 86) will find himself. The fact that the same warning takes place in Amâsî (2016, p. 399) shows the strategic importance of the said argument for the ulama members. In this framework, he should follow the divine orders and limits, especially at the point of law-making, and we can see the opposite in the ‘corruption’ literature in the lines as such “Ruler made laws according to his own thought/ The orders of God have disappeared [tm]” (Şeyhoğlu, 2013, p. 56). Moreover, it should be noted that in Amâsî (2016, p. 347) the

³⁵⁵ Oktay (2017b, p. 103) argues that this term was adopted by both the Byzantine and Ottoman emperors and therefore does not come from an essentially Islamic origin.

function of the ruler is limited to applying the principles of divine law. In this framework, the view that the rulership is of divine origin also includes the demand for the reproduction of the class order to be made within the framework of religious rules, thus paving the way for the division of power with the ulama. The fact that the group that put Osman and Orhan Beg on the throne in the anonymous chronicle (Köklü, 2004, p. 5) belonged to the ulama stratum is a meaningful reference in this regard.

Moreover, the ruler is not the only one who is endowed with divine grace, it is possible to talk about the other ‘dream myths’, founding legends and the claim of divine privilege of the ulama members and *sûfi* orders within this framework. Although some of these may be folk tales written for entertainment purposes (Frazer, 2020, p. 19), the majority of them have projections from legend to myth, especially in narratives about *Melâmî qutbs*. For example, there is an anecdote in the *velâyetnâme* of Otman Baba that Mehmet II came across Otman Baba while he was visiting a city, and Otman Baba asked the ruler, “Quick answer, are you the sultan, or am I? [tm]”. In this anecdote, Mehmet II gets to know Otman Baba, and after getting off his horse and kissing his hand, he says, “You are the sultan and you are the secret of God, and I am your servant, my precious father [tm]” (Yalçın, 2008, p. 85). In the versions of these stories created for Hacı Bektâş-ı Velî, about that the famous saint granted the right of reign to the Ottoman dynasty. According to the story in *Selâtinname* (Öztürk, 2001, p. 41), Hacı Bektaş is a guest in Osman Beg’s guesthouse and Osman shows him even more respect when the saint shows miracles. Thereupon, Hacı Bektaş turned to Osman Beg and wished that many rulers would be his servants, gave him a crown, and ordered him to rule the world. According to the example in the *Saltuknâme*, Osman Beg meets Hacı Bektaş, kisses his hand and receives his blessing (Ebü’l-Hayr Rûmî, 1990, p. 274). Cohen (1993, p. 94) states that in early states, the ruler has a religious character that assumes the role of an intermediary between the God and his people, and underlines that the basis of this claim is the development of the religious functions of local leaders. But at this point there is a different argumentation than is seen in the dream myth. In the dream myth formation, although the divine origin of the rulership is accepted, its interpretation is entrusted to the ‘clergy’ - for example, Sheikh Edebâli, a *mufti* around Tabriz or Ahmet Yesevî. The ruler does not have the privilege of making religious interpretations in those examples. In the cases where the ruler is defined as ‘*Zillullahi fil ard*’, the ruler becomes the leader and patron of the clergy stratum. Thus, he is also a member of a social stratum that interprets religious orders. However, the privilege of interpreting religion is still in the

hands of the indicated stratum. In this context, it should be taken into account that the ruler is not the only 'steward', but the dervishes and the ulama are 'the stewards of the God' too. Thus, this formation authority gains the character of an element of positional struggle. While for the clergy, the origin and significance of power is expressed under this term in order to inform the divine law and direct the ruler, this term can be used for some members of non-religious officials to remind that the ruler is above the ulama stratum. For example, Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, p. 62) says, "the Almighty Allah has sultans dressed in old robes [tm]", and gives dervishes a share of the essence of rulership. For example, in some anecdotes, it is claimed that Barak Baba, a disciple of Sarı Saltuk, was descended from a ruling dynasty (Melikoff, 2000, p. 151). It is stated in the *velâyetnâme* of Hacım Sultan that Hacı Bektâş-ı Velî was also the son of Sultan İbrahim in Khorasan, and the reign was offered to him, but the famous *sûfi* did not accept it (Gündüz, 2010, p. 75). It is known that Otman Baba also used the titles sultan, shah and padişâh to indicate his absolute authority in the universe (İnalçık, 2019c, p. 92). Küçük Abdal, the author of the *menâkıbnâme* of Otman Baba, writes the following words from Otman Baba's mouth: "Ulu beğleri ve ulu şeyh u meşayihleri yudup ol ulu sarayları Hakk emri birle ıssuz koyan benim"³⁵⁶ (Yalçın, 2008, p. 228). Details such as Otman Baba's having a bridge built (Yalçın, 2008, pp. 77-78), reconstructing Istanbul (Yalçın, 2008, pp. 82-83), presenting himself as a shepherd protecting his flock from horned rams (Yalçın, 2008, p. 173) show that dervish groups took upon themselves elements such as public projects of the rulers or the function of justice. Similarly, in the *menâkıbnâme* of Şuca'eddin Veli, images appearing as the sheikh establishing peace between wolves and the lambs, or even herding the lambs to the wolf as a shepherd (Say, 2010, p. 100), or Hacı Bektâş-ı Velî's distribution of *mansibs* (Gündüz, 2010, p. 77) indirectly reflect that dervish groups claim political power. Thus, we have come very close to the problem of the distribution of power posed in the 'three thrones' theory developed by Âşık Paşa. In particular, the function undertaken by the ulama is carefully privileged in this narrative. At this point, it can be thought that there is an implicit distinction between authority and power. To the extent that authority is tied to religious origin it becomes shared with the clergy, and power is revealed by referring to the military power of the ruler. But it would be a mistake to think that these three groups are willing to essentially share power with one another. Like every social stratum or

³⁵⁶ I am the one who swallowed the great lords and the great sheikhs and made the great palaces empty by the order of God.

class-based social subject, these segments tend to expand, not share, their power. For example, Pir Ali from Aksaray argues that, “If İbrahim Ethem had lived in our time, he would not have given him permission to leave the sultanate, he would have attained perfection and become the sultan of the world and the hereafter. It is not necessary for faithful followers to abandon the world of reign [tm]”, and the claim of being the *Mahdi* has been attributed to him (Gölpınarlı, 1931, p. 43). Here, an example is encountered in which dervish circles reveal their vision of assuming power without dividing it, through concepts that combine both secular and spiritual administration, such as the *Mahdi*. It is possible to see similar examples of refined management ideals in the philosopher-ruler image constructed by the ulama members or in theomorphic images constructed for a ruler.

III. VI. II. Articulation of Political and Economic Relations of Subordination

Secondly, let's review the new moment of synthesis in which relations of subordination are articulated. The first pillar of this moment is the articulation of political and economic subordination relations. Towards the end of the Orhan Beg period, it is seen that the *tekfurs* in the captured lands were mostly appointed as the managers of the fortresses. For example, *tekfur* of Ulubat and *tekfur* of Kirmastı were left in their places (Apzd, 2017, pp. 52-53), although they were removed later for breaking their homagium, and old families of the country and *timar*-holders were kept in their original places in Bergama (Apzd, 2017, p. 53) is seen. It is understood that during the reign of Murat I, the same policy was followed against the *tekfurs* who were tied to the ruler with homagium in a similar way. In other words, we know from the seizure systematic of Bantoz and Silivri forts (Apzd, 2017, pp. 59-60) and Çatalca fort (Apzd, 2017, p. 67) that local power relations and production practices have not been touched. As Köprülü (2014, p. 107) states, during the reign of Murat I, *timar* holding procedures seems to have more or less regained its final order, which would be valid even during the reign of Mehmet II. Although it can be seen in an old law digest that with the encouragement of Timurtaş Pasha, *Beylerbeyi* of Rumelia (later, Anatolia), the distinction between small and large *timars* (*timar* and *zeâmet*) was made, Köprülü (2014, p. 103) naturally means a continuation of the Seljuk land order and its restoration with minor changes.

The sparse population in the newly conquered areas, especially in Rumelia, necessitated the active use of the settlement policy in order to re-establish and develop

relations of production. According to Âşıkpaşazâde, Orhan Beg's son Suleyman Pasha says, "Now it should be known that the fortresses and countries conquered here need more Muslims men to prosper [tm]", and then Orhan Beg started to settle the nomadic Arab houses and people from the Karasi people in Rumelia (Apzd, 2017, p. 57). In this process, it is thought that an economic recovery and abundance occurred in Anatolia and Rumelia. Ahmedî (2011, p. 155) describes this situation as follows:

Geldi darülmülkine otırdı şad/ Memleketde kıldı gayet 'adl ü dad/ Halk ol 'adli
çün andan buldılar/ Ulu, kiçi işe meşgul oldular/ Bu kamu Rum içre bir yer
kalmadı/ Kim anun 'adliyle ma'mur olmadı/ Kalmadı kişverde ne sahra, ne dağ/
Ki olmadı ol kişt ya bustan ya bağ.³⁵⁷

Although the description of the Bayezid I period as a period of abundance by Ahmedî (2011, p. 155) contains exaggerations, this view is shared by Şükrullah (2011, p. 216) and it may have a certain reality, because Oruç (2011, p. 54) mentions about the scarcity that emerged in the post-Bayezid I period. When these lines were interpreted, it is seen that a certain factual necessity is established between the existence of the central power and the continuity of the relations of production. The famine that occurred after the period of Bayezid I may be related to the looting and attacks of the Tatars, as well as the emergence of local dynasties and the failure of trade. Another data to support this view, I think, lies in the fact that the Timurid army seized some of the money and precious metals in circulation as taxes and/or booty.

There are some clues about the monetary and spatial enclosure activities of the state during the reign of Bayezid I. The following words of Âşıkpaşazâde constitute the clearest evidence in this regard; "It was during the time of Ali Pasha that no one shopped with old akçe in this country and did not go to another country [tm]" (Apzd, 2017, p. 75). From the term 'old coins' (*eski akçe*) here we can understand Ottoman coins minted before the Bayezid I period, and even other coins used by local principalities. As Zhukov (1999, p. 261) points out, it is possible to think that a close network of economic relations developed between the Ottomans, Karesi and Saruhanid states in the middle of the 14th century and a common economic region was formed due to the similar

³⁵⁷ He came and sat on the throne of property happily/ He made justice and equality in the country/ That's why the people found justice in him/ The honorable and commoners were busy with work/ There is no place left in this Rum province/ Those who do not prosper with his justice/ There is neither a plain nor a mountain left around/ What does not turn into a field, orchard or vineyard.

weights of the minted coins. For this reason, when the relevant principalities were captured, the use of their similar coins in circulation was prohibited. The issue of ‘prohibition to go to another country’ is a little more complicated. This can be a prohibition to go to another country for shopping, or it can be interpreted as a prohibition to leave the land and go to another country, that is, a kind of serfdom. It is seen that Oruç Beg clarified this issue. What is in question is the bans imposed to prevent the old *akçe* from going to other countries (Oruç, 2011, p. 46). However, it is possible to predict that a monetary shortage may have occurred due to this reason (Akkuş, 2009). However, if we give an alternative explanation to this, as Akdağ (1977, pp. 505-6) states, the high amount of silver in the coins minted during the Murat I period must have made the *akçe* a tool of saving in the final analysis. Considering the abundance and the emergence of the palace treasury during the reign of Bayezid I, it can be easily understood that the amount of money may not have been sufficient. For this reason, the amount of silver in the coin was reduced from 6.5-7 carats to 5.75 (Akdağ, 1977, p. 506). Thus, it is possible to transfer income to the central treasury through the adulteration of the value of the *akçe*, and since the unitary money-zone is established, the state’s policy on the *akçe* can be imposed on the public.

In addition to these, an alternative military unit called ‘serehor’ / ‘cerehor’ emerged during the reign of Bayezid I.³⁵⁸ This term was used for people who are called to military service in return for the taxes they are liable for (Özcan, 1993).³⁵⁹ Âşıkpaşazâde criticizes the emergence of this category as follows: “He also gathered the soldier called serehor. Serehor was established in Anatolia during the time of Bayezid Khan. This mind was given to him by Vizier Ali Pasha [tm]” (Apzd, 2017, p. 82). This term is used for people who are called to military service in return for the taxes they are liable for (Özcan, 1993). Âşıkpaşazâde’s criticism can be read as an extension of the reaction to the breaking of the monopoly of the Muslim people in the military field. In Oruç Beg (2011, p. 76), this term is used as “cerehor kafır” (infidels of cerehor) and should be understood as conscription from Christian villagers in return for money or tax. In other words, it is seen that monetary relations have gained much more importance compared to the previous period, which is even a subject of criticism in the

³⁵⁸ Fodor (1984b, pp. 369-70) states that the term ‘cerehor’ is a degenerated version of the word ‘ecrihar’ and that there were mercenaries in the Seljuks who formed reserve units to use in emergencies.

³⁵⁹ In the following centuries, this method turned into a kind of state service/drudgery for a low fee (Özcan, 1993).

form of ‘money accumulation’. In this context, it was very crucial for the Ottomans to gain the dominance of the ports where the Silk Road opened (for example, the port of Ephesus, İnalçık, 2018b, p. 272) and the cities on the road such as Ankara, Amasya, Erzincan (İnalçık, 2018b, p. 271). For this development, Kafadar (2019, p. 48) argues that “The power of the Ottoman expansion also lies in its logic that goes beyond politics in targeting important trade routes and production areas [tm]”, which shows us how a class vision that developed in the economic plan could diversify even though its essence did not change. Moreover, İnalçık (2019g, p. 70) states that another benefit of dominance over international trade routes was mentioned in anonymous chronicles: State officials complained that the merchants ruled the state during the Bayezid period. The increase in tribute-rent, mine and salt revenues has a great impact on these monetary developments. The seizure of the places conquered in Rumelia and especially Serbian silver mines had an effect on the increase in rent incomes: “They sent men to all mines in and around Kıratoğa [tm]” (Apzd, 2017, p. 70). Aytekin (2015, p. 27) states that there is data on the use of tax farming since the first half of the 15th century, but it is possible that this practice dates back to earlier times. Based on this foresight, it can be thought that the first developments regarding tax farming may have started in this period. The development of monetary relations made possible a group of salaried people to gather under the banner of Ottoman administration with the abundance of money. The traces of scholars, *hâfızs*, preachers, *qadis*, ulama, advisors and poets can be seen more clearly in this period. For example, the fact that the scholars and poets in the Germiyanid and Aydinid palaces went into Ottoman service in this period constitutes the concrete image of this tendency (Tekin, 1992, p. 196). I will try to analyze the effects of these social sections on the palace culture and literary culture in related sections.

Finally, it would be appropriate to mention two separate developments here as examples of political and economic articulation. In this context, economic relations have begun to be expressed with new terms and medians in terms of vassals and *ghaza* activities. The first of these is the frequent use of the term *kharaj* and the other is the determination of the principles of policy regarding the distribution of booty goods. Both of these political conceptualizations and discussions were taken place in political agenda which was shaped after the rapid territorial expansion of Ottoman rule in Rumelia. Ahmedî (2018, p. 574) used the term *kharaj* firstly for the raids of Suleyman Pasha to Rumelia: “They gave him many castles as goods and taxes/ Took a lot of *kharaj*

from the infidel lords [tm]”.³⁶⁰ Âşıkpaşazâde used the term *kharaj* firstly in reference to the agreement made with the Christian residents of Çatalca fortress. The inhabitants of the fortress obeyed and agreed to pay *kharaj* in return for being left in their places (Apzd, 2017, p. 67). In the anonymous chronicle (Köklü, 2004, p. 10), this term is used for the first time in the short section that deals with the reign of Murat I and the principality of Bayezid I, and it is stated that they seize tax and *kharaj* from surrounding regions. In addition, there is information in the sources that Evrenos Beg conquered Büre, Isteke and Marulya and sent the *kharaj* of these regions to Murat I (Apzd, 2017, p. 68). Similarly, the province of Manastır obeyed and *kharaj* imposed on them (Apzd, 2017, p. 69). In addition to the *kharaj*, the share taken by the Ottoman ruler from the *ghaza* activities was placed on a legal basis in this period. After the seizure of Konur fortress, Âşıkpaşazâde states that “they took what was necessary for the ruler. They shared the *ghazis* with what is worthy of the *ghazis*” (Apzd, 2017, p. 58). Although it is not clear what this expression means in terms of proportional distribution, Âşıkpaşazâde defines this principle more clearly in the following sections (Apzd, 2017, pp. 61-62)³⁶¹:

One day, a knowledgeable person called Kara Rüstem came from Karaman province. He came to Halil of Çandar, who was a Qadiasker. He said: ‘Master! Why would you waste so much khanate property?’ The qadi asked: ‘What property is that?’ Rustam said: ‘These are the captives who are taken by the *ghazis*, one-fifth of them belongs to the khan by God’s command. Why won’t you take it?’ Qadiasker presented it to the khan. Khan said, ‘Do whatever God commands. He went to Gallipoli. He took twenty-five akçes from each prisoner.’³⁶² [tm]

In both examples, it is understood that tax liability -whether it is over land or booty- is tied to a religious premise. As a rentier tax category, *kharaj* is a type of tax levied on land belonging to non-Muslims in Islamic property law, separately from other taxes (Demir, 2012, p. 241), and *kharaj* lands (*harâcî*) are considered the property of

³⁶⁰ See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 6985, “Kal’alar virdiler aña mâl u bâc/ Aldı kâfir beglerinden çoh harâc”.

³⁶¹ Similarly, see: Anonymous chronicle (Öztürk, 2000, p. 28).

³⁶² If there are no five captives, twenty-five akçe is taken for each prisoner (Apzd, 2017, p. 62). Oruç Beg, on the other hand, states that twenty-five akçes were taken from each prisoner, and that one of the five captives was also taken (2011, p. 38). In the *menâkıbnâme* of Sheikh Bedreddin, Hâfız Halîl (2015, p. 37) mentioned Bedreddin’s father Israel as such: “He was a scholar, they made him a qadi/ He would take one of the five captives in each raid/ He seizure and send it to the principality/ He would divide what the rest.

farmers who cultivate here, according to Hanafî ijtiḥad. They are obliged to pay land-rent even not cultivated this land (Demir, 2012, p. 240). The regulation regarding the values seized through *ghaza* is also based on Islamic property law. As Demir (2012, p. 212) states, the practice based on the 41st verse of Surat al-Anfal envisages that 4/5 of the booty goods be distributed among the *ghazis*, and the rest is confiscated by the ruler or state.³⁶³ In this example, since prisoners are concerned, it can be assumed that a certain percentage of the Ottomans' confiscation of booty in general existed before. The loot, which is subject to regulation here, has been expanded to directly include the captives. Thus, the methods of taking economic shares from the newly captured areas are institutionalized based on Islamic law and are determined as both *kharaj* and one-fifth share taken from the captives. Âşikpaşazâde (2017, p. 68) reflects this practice to us as "they applied the law of sultanate in the places they conquered [tm]".

We can estimate how important this institutionalization move is by analyzing two separate outcomes. First of all, it is seen that the incoming prisoners were gathered under the supervision of a *qadi* and were given to Turkish families and used in service "until they became Muslims [tm]", that is, they were used as slave labor³⁶⁴, and then they were recruited as Janissaries corps (Apzd, 2017, p. 62), which is a new military power to create an alternative to the *ghazis*. İnalçık (2018b, p. 9) states that the number of Janissaries reached five thousand as of the reign of Bayezid I. In this respect, the emergence of military specialization and the fact that the dynasty's slave army has a power that can impose the class interests of the dynasty, even if it does not have a monopoly of violence, are important indicators in terms of state building. Hassan (2011, p. 277) evaluates the emergence of the distinction between armed and unarmed persons as a necessity for the use of force by one part of the society on the other. Thus, as an extension of the dynastic family, one of the administrative apparatuses of the centralization process became the Janissaries (Kafadar, 2019, p. 47). Şeyhoğlu Mustafa wrote a tenth chapter in addition to the end of his book, *Kitâb-ı Düstûr-ı Şâhî Fî-hikâyet-i Pâdişâhî*, which is a translation of *Marzubânnâme*, and clearly reveals the organization principle of the soldier in this chapter (2016, p. 606): "(...) cümle çerinün gönli bir ola

³⁶³ Qur'an (8:41) (Dawood, 1999, pp. 129-30): "Know that one-fifth of your spoils shall belong to God, the Apostle, the Apostle's kinsfolk, the orphans, the destitute, and the traveller in need: if you truly believe in God and what We revealed to Our servant on the day of victory, the day when the two armies met. God has power over all things."

³⁶⁴ For example, these captives are used in agricultural field, see: Oruç (2011, p. 38).

ve çeri padişah buyrugına muhalefet kılmaya”.³⁶⁵ I assert that this description reveals a certain class-based commonality between the legacy of past kingdoms that developed the *ghulam* system and the current situation of the Ottoman Empire. Although this expression may seem very simple, when free foot soldiers and cavalries were the main warrior force and the text refers to command of a sultan, not simply a *ghazi*, it points to tasks that cannot be fulfilled without accepting a serious institutionalization requirement.³⁶⁶ It should be discussed whether the gathering of foot soldiers from the people means creating an alternative to the *ghazi* leaders in another way. Karamuk (2019, p. 561) interprets this practice as an expression of the need for permanent and paid army units. Âşıkpaşazâde’s statement is that Sheik Edebâli gave advice to Çandarlı to take a foot soldier from the people, and he also stated that Sheikh and Çandarlı are relatives (Apzd, 2017, p. 48). Oruç Beg (2011, p. 32) expresses this decision as “recruiting foot soldiers from Anatolia [tm]”. In that case, it should be discussed whether this decision is for the benefit of the *Ahis* or not. Âşıkpaşazâde states that when the central army started to be formed for the first time, that is, when Orhan Beg decided to dress the soldiers in white *bork*, by bribing the *qadi*, many people were recruited to the paid units wearing white *bork* as foot soldiers. As a result, being a soldier creates an opportunity to advance in a class schema and opens the door to gaining booty and *timar*. However, to be able to ‘bribe’, it is necessary to have a certain amount of cash saving. On the other hand, recruiting with the *pençik* method prevents such arbitrariness and helps the production to continue by keeping in place the sections that are likely to break away from rural production and even enlist in the army - even by providing them with free slave labor. Thus, it both secured the state’s monopoly on violence and facilitated the continuation of agricultural production.

In addition to this article, Çandarlı Halil, who implemented the new policy of captives, in which one-fifth share of the booty was taken, was promoted to the office of vizier (Apzd, 2017, p. 62). It is clear that this appointment is both a commendation and means that someone who comes from the *qadi* office in the implementation of new Islamic provisions is brought to this new position of authority and is considered suitable

³⁶⁵ The hearts of all soldiers must unite, and the soldiers must not resist the ruler’s order.

³⁶⁶ In the same period, the statements of Ahmed-i Dâî the author of the work named *Çengnâme*, praising the fact that there were slaves at the disposal of the ruler, supports our judgment. Ahmed-i Dâî (1992, p. 317) praises his boss, Emir Suleyman, son of Bayezid I, in the introduction section of the *Çengnâme*, with the couplet “Çün öldür saltanat tahtına layık/ Bu gün ol şaha kuldur hep halayık”. The word ‘halayık’ means captive or purchased female slave.

for the regulation of the institutionalized order. Going a step further, it can be argued that this development is one of the manifestations of another simultaneous development: The development of the ulama circles as a social stratum and its gaining political decisiveness. Oruç Beg (2011, p. 45) argued that “When Halil Pasha appointed as a grand vizier, his orders were unquestionably enforced [tm]”. First of all, by examining the story of the rise of Çandarlı Halil, it is seen that new political career opportunities are possible for the members of the ulama. In this context, Âşıkpaşazâde narrated the rise of Çandarlı Halil from being a judge in Bilecik, then İznik and Bursa to the position of qadi, and then to the viziership by being given the pasha title (Apzd, 2017, p. 59). Ahmedî deals with this rise in a similar way, but in more peculiar terms: “Bî-nevâlıkdan koyuban çandarı/ Katına geldi Halil-i Çandarî/ Bu kamusı-y-la ki ilmi az-ıdı/ Her hünemde âri-î vü nâ-sâz-ıdı”.³⁶⁷ Şükrullah (2011, p. 214), on the other hand, states that during the reign of Bayezid I, Sheikh Ramazan, when he was poor, acquired villages and castles under the patronage of the sultan and rose to the rank of *qadiasker*. One of the most important factors of this development line lies in the increasing number of madrasahs and *qadi* courts. It is an important factor in this situation that the Ottomans became the executive of the juridical functions in the places they rule. In addition, the madrasahs should not be seen only as educational places that shape the institution of *qadi* authority. Since most of the courses in the madrasahs of that period were held in a way that everyone could attend, it is known that the people of the city were able to follow these courses between prayer hours. In this context, madrasah scholars gain an area where they can show their ‘scholarly superiority’ to the public, gather supporters and be a part of social power relations around the Islamic ideology. Thus, they both shaped the *qadi* candidates and the people with the method of Islamic thought and became a representative of the divine power. According to Köprülü (2012, p. 71):

After the Ottoman Principality expanded and developed properly and a more or less regular administrative organization was established in the Orhan period, the ulama from the Hanafi sect, who came running from the great centers of Anatolia and even from distant Islamic countries, gradually gained great importance, regular madrasahs were opened in the towns, in short, as the central administration strengthened, the political importance of the Ahis and their Turkmen fathers

³⁶⁷ Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 7017-7018. Also see: Ahmedî (2018, p. 577). Leaving Çandar out of poverty/ Halil from Çandar came to his great presence/ This person had little knowledge in everything/ He was a man without any skill and incompetent.

decreased, and on the contrary, the *sūfīs* who could reconcile the Ahl al-Sunnah creed and theory -even in appearance- began to dominate. This current, which was quite peculiar even in the time of Murat I, manifested completely after a magnificent palace life developed in the time of Yıldırım Bayezid (...). [tm]

In any case, the word that best reflects the reaction of the dervishes in this period must have been “taqwa left aside, fatwa is accepted as fulcrum [tm]” in the anonymous chronicle (Öztürk, 2000, p. 31). Oruç Beg (2011, p. 46) also uses this expression as follows: “They put the fatwa, they abolished the taqwa [tm]”. ‘The first example of this discourse, the regulatory power of the fatwa as a kind of Sharia trick has emerged on the occasion of Murat I’s expedition on the Anatolian principalities. When Murat I was going to march on Karamanid state, he had to make a choice according to Şükrullah. He overcame the distinction between raiding the Serbian province and subordinating Muslim Turkish lords by consulting the ulama (or by ordering them to find a religious cover of his choice). In this case, the war with the Serbs was defined as “*farz-i kifaye*” (secondary fard), and the war in Anatolia to “repel the evil that will come to Muslims [tm]” was defined as “*farz-i ayn*” (primary fard), and Murat I started to march on Ankara, “because he is religious and just, leaving the war of infidels behind [tm]” according to Şükrullah (2011, p. 212).

The ‘power of the fatwa’ will also pave the way for the financial interests of the ulama members to develop and for the ulama to claim rights as a social stratum. In accordance with the reforms of Ali Pasha, the *qadis* began to receive two akçes from the Sharia letters (Oruç, 2011, p. 47) and the salaries of the *qadis* began to be appointed from the tax they received at the rate of twenty acres per thousand (Apzd, 2017, p. 76); “It is Ali Pasha’s patronage so that qadis can have many akçe and be at the same level as pashas and qadiaskers [tm]”. As Okumuş (2005, p. 18) underlines, it is possible to say that the ulama has become a status group at this point. This reaction is meaningful because according to what Şükrullah tells, there were some practices that restricted the *qadis* from acting in line with their own interests during the Orhan Beg period. For example, it was envisaged that a *qadi* should spend the income of the *waqf* of an *imâret* in Bursa for himself and not to collect taxes from the people (Şükrullah, 2011, p. 207). If these lines are interpreted, it can be said that the rise of the ulama and *qadis* as a social stratum aware of their own interests has created unrest among the other members of the ruling class. For example, as Köprülü (2014, p. 105) quotes from anonymous *Tevârih-i*

Âl-i Osmân, Ali Pasha changed the *timar* inheritance system, and by preventing girls and widows from being granted *timars*, he turned to an unconventional practice in finding new holders for old *timars*.

Secondly, we can mention two events in which the Ottomans gained territory without war. First, let us consider the kinship offer from Germiyanids to Murat I. The advice Germiyanid ruler gave to his son in order to protect his family's class position is as follows: "Son! If you wish, unite with the Ottomans if this province remains in your hands" (Apzd, 2017, p. 64). In this case, the marriage of Bayezid, the son of Murat I, and one of the daughters of Germiyanid dynasty was deemed appropriate, and the Germiyanids committed to give Kütahya, Simav, Eğrigöz, Tavşanlı regions and a few more parts of the fortress as a dowry (Apzd, 2017, p. 64). It is possible to determine in the sources that this marriage took place. Secondly, it can be mentioned that Murat I bought the lands of the Hamidoğlu Principality. After Hamidoğlu Hussein Beg agreed on the exchange of lands for money, Murat I marched on Kütahya and made Hussein Beg fulfill his promise. Thus, the Ottomans captured Akşehir, Beyşehir, Seydişehir, Yalavaç, Karaağaç and Isparta without war and distributed these regions as *timars* (Apzd, 2017, pp. 66-67). In Ahmedî's words (2011, p. 153): "Rum elini çün müsehhar eyledi/ Beglerin kendüye çaker eyledi".³⁶⁸ In both examples, it is seen the formation of the Anatolian hinterland of the Ottoman state and the preservation of the war-free situation here. The strategic choice of the Ottoman rule to maintain the peace situation in Anatolia as much as possible and to support the fortifications in Rumelia as the weight center of the war power is closely related to the state's transition to an Islamic phase in ideological manner. In fact, Imber (2015, p. 184) points out that the seizure of some lands without war may be just an ideological distortion, and that this discourse, which emerged in the 15th century, contributed to covering up the accusation that the Ottoman state was at war with Muslims. On the other hand, in the work called *Bezm ü Rezm*, which was written for Qadi Burhanuddin during the reign of Bayezid I, another view is expressed contrary to Imber. The author of the work, Esterâbâdî (1990, p. 372) states that during the reign of Bayezid I, the Ottomans became stronger due to "the number of people who joined them and came to their aid [tm]", that the notables of the region "competed in terms of obedience and devotion [tm]" to Bayezid I, and handed over the castles and cities to him. Esterâbâdî may be right in these views, but on the contrary, he may have made such an assessment to undermine the success of Ottoman expansion. In

³⁶⁸ "Because he dominated the Rum country/ He made its lords servants of him.

both cases, the opinion of the author, who is the witness of the period, should be taken into account. The fact that great lords were voluntarily subordinated to the great ruler is not a common but a possibility that cannot be ignored.

As a result, the Ottoman rule tightened its authority in its own region with Islamic ideology and legal regulations and placed it on the balance of the war-peace duality. The ‘holy war’ carried to the Balkans is on one side, ‘safety/justice’ policy for the Christians who accepted the Ottoman rule, and peace with other Muslim principalities that developed good relations with the Ottomans on the other. This balance will not continue, but in order to disrupt the balance, it is necessary to move to a new stage of organizing class relations. I think this step was taken during the reign of Bayezid I. First of all, the balance was disturbed by the untimely death of Murat I, and while Bayezid I had just ascended to the throne, the Anatolian principalities took action to take their old lands back. In this case, it is easy to understand why Bayezid I bent the stick upside down in the matter of principalities. He did not destroy them, but he did not neglect to punish them either. As expressed by Ahmedî (2018, p. 32), the issue of vassalage brings its own centralizing criteria. According to the story told through the parable of Dara (Darius) in *İskendernâme*, Dara, who captured the Anatolia, divided it into cities as an administrative unit and gave each city to a person. These people are required to send goods to him. According to Ahmedî; “Rûmı Dârâ kısmet itdi şehir şehir/ Kıldı herbir şehri bir kişiye behr/ Tâ ki her kişi yirinde mâh u sâl/ Oturuban virbiye Dârâya mâl/ Virdi Yûnân illerini ser-te-ser/ Feylekûs-ı Rûmiye ol tâc-ver”.³⁶⁹ In order for this rentier systematic to continue, the people who are appointed as vassals must take care of the interests of their rulers, not their own interests as Ahmedî indicates: “Mülke düşmesün dir-iseñ mefsede/ Terbiyet eyleme hergiz müfside/ Mâr-durur fi’l-mesel müfsid yakîn/ Zehr olur mârdan hâsıl hemin”.³⁷⁰

The two issues that give the dominant characteristic to the period of Bayezid I are as follows; the institutionalization of the central administration and the disintegration of the formal unity of the Ottomans due to the Timurid invasion. Both

³⁶⁹ Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 380-383., Also see: Ahmedî (2018, p. 32). Dara granted the Rum country city by city/ He gave each city as a gift to one person/ These people who sat in their place for months for years/ They used to give Dara valuable goods as long as stayed in that place/ He gave the Greek provinces whole / Crowned the Feylekus of Rum.

³⁷⁰ Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 827-828., Also see: Ahmedî (2018, p. 65). If you say that the country should not be harmed/ Never feed the mischief-maker/ The mischief-maker is really like a snake/ Only poison comes from the snake.

points seem to be parts of a single process that develops in relation to each other. The issue of institutionalization of the central administration should be addressed in terms of the development of economic, political and cultural relations. Emecen (2019a, p. 85), Eroğlu (2016, p. 36) and İnalçık (2019g, p. 69) agree to define the period of Bayezid I as a phase in which the foundation steps of a central empire were taken. According to İnalçık (1992b):

Bayezid adopted the goal of eliminating subordinated dynasties in Anatolia and Rumelia and establishing a central state within the framework of the Near East Islamic state concept. He was partially successful in this aim, by establishing the first central administration, he arranged and settled the *kul* system, brought new customary law practices, and issued *kanunnâmes*. In his time, from the Danube to the Euphrates, a central state system administered by the sultan's servants was successfully implemented. [tm]

The first level of the indication of this definition can be considered as establishing dominance over the Anatolian lords. Emecen (2019a, p. 78) argues that as a formula for this, the vassalage relationship created during the reign of Murat I should be abolished and replaced by a direct subordination relationship. However, as Emecen admitted (2019a, pp. 75, 79), Bayezid I did not completely uproot the vassals resided from his father's time but gave them a certain amount of land. In this case, it can be assumed that the vassal status of the Anatolian lords continues, but they have become imperial vassals -not simply feudal vassals- in terms of their political status. This change only shows a new arrangement in the asymmetry of the power relationship. In this context, the Ottomans seized the lands of Aydın Principality with homagium and gave some of the *timars* to the same family, acquired the Saruhanid lands by agreement, marched on the Menteş Principality and left the "timars to their former owners [tm]" and took over the right of ruling (Apzd, 2017, pp. 71-72). In this context Ottomans subordinated İsfendiyarid dynasty and seized some of their lands, took Amasya from its owner, surrendered Sivas by calling of the notables of the country, the Erzincan ruler Tahratan was subordinate to them, similarly, although they took Malatya, Darende and Divriği (Apzd, 2017, pp. 78-79). In addition to these, it can be mentioned that it imposed a tribute of ten thousand gold coins per year on the Byzantine state and made it compulsory to establish a Muslim quarter in Constantinople where a *qadi* and a mosque were present (Apzd, 2017, p. 74). Doukas (1975, p. 83) states that the most significant

reason for the appointment of a *qadi* in Constantinople is the conduct of commercial relations. As a result, in a short time, Bayezid I made most of the Anatolian principalities his vassals, seized the lands of some of them directly, tied the Byzantines to tribute, and laid the foundation of an intermediary institution that could conduct commercial relations with a large metropolis like Constantinople.

At this point, the Ottoman state was definitively established and gained its final form with vassalage ties attached to each other with extensive subordination networks. As Ahmedî said (2011, p. 155): “Ne Aydın u ne Menteşe ne Germiyan/ Kastomoniyye dahi feth oldu-ana/ Böyle olur devlet işi çün ana”.³⁷¹ However, it is necessary not to act hastily in order to judge that this structure has realized all its possible results. Because the Ottomans, who took the position of suzerain both in the Balkans and in Anatolia, were far from institutionalizing this position yet. Naturally, due to the Timurid invasion and a series of civil wars that brought the period of interregnum, it would take about a century for them to re-establish and institutionalize the same subordination relations. Âşıkpaşazâde describes very clearly the “custom of khanate”, that is, the suzerain-vassal relationship, against the former owners of the Anatolian principalities who took refuge in him from the words of Tamerlane (Apzd, 2017, p. 80):

O lords! Now this Yıldırım Khan is a ghazi khan. You say that we have no sin. Khans don't hurt anyone for no reason. There are various reasons for this. If he asks you for money, he asks you to come and obey him, when he goes to ghaza he asks you to give him soldiers, now if you do not do any of these requests, custom is that he would hurts you. [tm]

It can be argued that a relationship within this framework developed, at least formally, for the period of Bayezid I. For example, in the Battle of Nicopolis, the support of vassal forces is obvious. However, it is quite doubtful to what extent its content, namely the responsibility and commitment to the superior, has developed. Particularly, the fact that some of the members of the local dynasties fled and took refuge in Timurid side made the subordination of the remaining one's problematic. In this respect, I think the thesis on subordination of Anatolian principalities, which is considered as one of the main pillars of the thesis of ‘centralization/becoming an empire’, does not reflect the

³⁷¹ Neither Aydın nor Menteşe nor Germiyan/ Also Kastomoniyya was conquered by him/ Because that is how his state administration works.

whole reality.³⁷² It is possible to think that this thesis is based on works written to legitimize the political conjuncture at the end of the 15th century, not because of the subordination relations in the reign of Bayezid I. For example, in the *Selâtinname* (Öztürk, 2001, pp. 71-73), it is explained at length how Bayezid I took various provinces under his rule in Anatolia, and it is emphasized that this is a privilege given by God.³⁷³ It is not possible to see this boastful tone in the *İskendernâme* or any similar work written in the earlier period. The main issue here is a centralized concentration of power based on the establishment of a central treasury and the rise of *Kapıkulus* in state administration, *timar* distribution and army commands (İnalçık, 2019g, p. 69). Emecen states that important duties are given to people of slave origin (2019a, p. 86), which, in my opinion, does not yet mean direct centralization—that is, the center gaining a decisive role in the establishment and reproduction of social power relations. Rather, it is a condensation phase whose consequences have not yet emerged. At this stage, I guess that the center did not have a definite authority yet, but it was also in search of an authority to complement its military power and power based on the agility of the ruler. For example, the demand for a title from the Islamic Caliph in Cairo (Emecen, 2019a, p. 86), and the opportunity to legitimize his own position as the heir of the Anatolian Seljuks (İnalçık, 2019g, p. 69) by taking the title “Sultân’ül Rum” are the most important indicators of a kind of search. As was mentioned, one of the indirect results of this search is the strengthening of the ulama stratum.

Thirdly, the examples in which the understanding of mass religious homogenization developed support the empire thesis. At this point, the most powerful

³⁷² On the other hand, it is certain that there is a political tendency against local rulers and their tribal bases, at least for the establishment of central power. It is only in the second half of the 15th century and the beginning of the 16th century that this tendency becomes a decisive political practice and transforms the political sphere irreversibly. In this framework, Hacıgökmen (2019, pp. 14-15) describes the abolition of Anatolian principalities and the distribution of tribes with a settlement policy as a decisive break.

³⁷³ Kemal states that Bayezid I conquered the following regions: Karasi province, Hamid province, Amasya and Osmançık, Beyşehir, Akşehir, Menteş-province, Kastamonu, Seydişehir, Samsun, Canik, Karaman, Konya, Larende, Kayseri and Aksaray (Öztürk, 2001, pp. 71-73). It is pointed out that the first eleven of these regions, including Canik, were taken from the Germiyanid state. If so, it can be thought that these places were either directly ruled by the Germiyanids or were vassals of Germiyanid dynasty. He states that the chiefs of these provinces are subject to the ruler, he writes that only the Karamanid lords fought a lot with the Ottoman ruler and that Bayezid I did not “have harmony with these provincial lords” (Öztürk, 2001, p. 72). For this reason, if the enmity with the Karamanids is left aside, there is only a change of suzerain for other regions.

work seems to be Amâsî's *Mirâtu'l-Mülûk*. Amâsî (2016, p. 175) states that people need to be guided to the right path "sometimes with beauty and sometimes with force [tm]" and this is a duty on scholars (*muallims*) and *müeddibs* (instructors of *âdâb*). According to Amâsî (2016, p. 207), the teachers of every society are divine law (*namus-ı ilahi*) and righteous people (*ehl-i temyiz*). According to Amâsî (2016, p. 207), what ensures the continuation of the human beings, and the construction of the social order (*nizam-ı alem*) is the discipline and punishment of people through "thinking, the power to distinguish good from evil, legal rules, politics and educational institutions [tm]". In this framework, the role of the ulama stratum appears to be to discipline people *en masse* and thus to build the social order on the division of labor and hierarchy. It should be particularly noted that Amâsî (2016, p. 239) understands the term 'cooperation', 'serving' and 'exchange' in the context of the idea of social order. Based on this, it is clear that moral pedagogy, which Amâsî attributes a social function, gains importance in terms of the reproduction of division of labor (cooperation), social hierarchies (serving) and exchange relations, and therefore aims to reproduce the class domination.

CHAPTER IV

THE BIRTH OF INTER-CLASS STRUGGLE: RULER, ULAMA, VIZIERS, ADVISORS, SOLDIERS

At this point, there are three social segments that are subject to the most political criticism: (i) ulama stratum/*qadis*, (ii) viziers and state administrators, (iii) advisors/madrasah scholars. However, the fact that these sections were not always clearly separated from each other in the early works complicates the analysis. It is seen that the bureaucratic staff, advisors and some effective viziers of the period were generally belonged to the ulama stratum. Although it is possible to evaluate each of these in a single framework, under the category of bureaucracy with religious formation, this judgment does not always reflect the truth. Those who graduated from the *Sahn-i Semân* Madrasahs established during the reign of Mehmet II are called *danishmend* (Ortaylı, 2019, p. 25). This term is also used for advanced madrasah students (Sayılı, 2011, p. 81). In the above context, it is understood that this concept is used in the meaning of madrasah origin managers who have taken the formation of Islamic *fiqh*. In the light of political discussions, it is understood that this group of people make decisions based on the Islamic formation that constitutes the infrastructure of the education they receive, or they influence their decision-making processes by providing political advice. In addition, an absolute political unity cannot be mentioned among the sections with an Islamic formation, for example, the articulation between the qadis and the ulama is not always free of problems. In this respect, it can be mentioned that there are several basic lines of social conflict in terms of the social segments in question. While the first of these lines generally focuses on the determination of the status of the ulama stratum relative to other social segments, the other deals with the regulation of privileges between different segments with Islamic formations.

First of all, Amâsî (2016, pp. 361-63) places the Islamic intellectuals, whom he defines as the “pillars of religion and state [tm]” above the farmers, merchants-craftsmen and soldiers, and the members of the ulama, as their leading ones, at the top of the social hierarchy in the section of his work that lists various social classes and categories. According to Amâsî (2016, pp. 361-63): “(...) the first community is the people of the pen; scholars, jurists, judges, scribes, accountants, engineers, astrologers,

doctors and poets [tm]”. This framework includes both state bureaucrats and palace officials. It is understood that the ideological dominance of the members of the ulama has been naturalized over these groups. Moreover, Amâsî states that the “mujahideen, ghazis, courageous ones and helpers of the state [tm]” as a group, which he defines by those who use weapons, maintains the order of the world (*nizam-ı alem*), and attributes a function to this group under the domination of Islamic intellectuals. For example, in another passage, Amâsî (2016, p. 371) develops an important argument to indicate the difference in status between soldiers and ulama, while advising the sultan to gather around the *ehl-i rey* (right-minded) and *ehl-i fazl* (virtuous ones) and to discuss ideas with them: “padişahun fikri memleket saklamakda leşkerler kuvvetinden azimdür”.³⁷⁴ In the final analysis, this vision brings the Islamic intellectuals with to the ruler to the position of the designer and author of a certain political idea, and the military professionals to the degree of an implementer.

Kortepeter (1991a, p. 3; 1991b, pp. 47-48) and argues that the “Islamic-Ottoman social order” was shaped within the tradition of Platonic political thought. Kılıçbay (2000, p. 29), Çaylak (2018, pp. 85-86) and Karpat (2019, pp. 23-26) similarly state that the formation of social classes in Ottoman political thought took place according to a Platonic model. The basis of the Platonic model underlying this proposition is the existence of the social model divided into three strata among aristocratic-intellectual administrators, soldiers and workers in the examples of Islamic political theory. Especially in texts of *Meşşâî* philosophy or its followers, the emphasis that the ruler or the powerful aristocratic assembly should consist of morally distinguished (virtuous) people and the combination of philosophical knowledge and religious leadership strengthens this opinion. On the other hand, this model is neither openly accepted by all social segments, nor is the social formation directly built according to this model. In this respect, it is necessary to carefully distinguish the fact that the model in question takes place in political thought as an ideological element and its practical reality. I believe that this model reflects the management strategies of certain social strata, not the formation of social classes. One of the most obvious uses of this model can be identified in the formulation of Amâsî above. It is clear that the social segment that advocates such a model is the ulama stratum, that is, an expression of their specific interests can be found in this model. In the examples where this model is put forward, the discussion mainly focuses on the distribution of social privileges,

³⁷⁴ The idea of the sultan is greater than the strength of the soldiers in protecting the country.

state offices and status among social classes. The arguments produced in this framework not only define the social status of the ulama, but also make the principles of appointment as a subject of political thought. In particular, the views describing the ulama stratum on other social segments, with the exception of the ruler, can be based on religious idealism as well as on the basis of practical political necessities. Similarly, criticisms of the social status and political function of the ulama stratum and its representatives at various levels can be evaluated within this framework.

First, it is possible to begin the analysis with the problem of how the practical function of the ulama and Islamic intellectuals in general is defined in the state. At this point, two political advices that Amâsî offered to the rulers are identified, and these advices preach the solution of political problems through diplomatic and moral means instead of violent practices. The first of these is the practice of *istimâlet* and is defined by Amâsî as the principle of “seeking ways to deal with the enemy to the last degree and to win hearts so that there is no need for hot conflict and war [tm]” (2016, p. 373). The second one is based on a more moral narrative and preaches that the rulers should be merciful, forgive in any case and and not take revenge (Amâsî, 2016, pp. 263-65). It is not possible to claim that these political proposals are applicable or have been implemented in any case in real politics. However, it is noteworthy that they gain expression in the formation of political thought, especially in terms of promoting the effectiveness of the ulama over military tendencies. In both cases, indirect, diplomatic, moral and ideological policies of ulama members are suggested in the face of direct violence-based political solutions. Moreover, in the background of these advice, there is a struggle for distribution about how the treasure will be evaluated. For example, Amâsî expresses this problem as follows (2016, p. 461); “The worst of the viziers is the one who provokes the sultan to war for a benefit that can be settled without a fight. Because war empties the treasury in any case and causes the destruction of people and innocent living things [tm]”. The point that draws attention in this paragraph is that warlike tendencies are tried to be restrained in favor of accumulation through established relations of production. War empties the central treasury, which is very important for the ulama, and causes direct producers and livestock to perish. In another chapter he wrote on this subject, Amâsî (2016, p. 375) touches on the problem of war accounting:

Again, the following evaluation was made on this subject; [with regard to war] careful calculation must be made, as the merchant calculates his earnings; Every

effort should be made to protect weapons, soldiers and equipment, and war should not be waged unless much gain is made. [tm]

This last assessment suggests that the determinant principle in the organization of war activities as an extension of politics should be 'calculation'. Knowledge of calculation, as Amâsî mentioned above, is monopolized by people who have received a madrasa education and are members of the ulama stratum. In this respect, the proposition that war activities should be organized in accordance with the reason of calculation is, in the final analysis, a proposition to increase the decisiveness of the ulama class in the political decision-making mechanisms.

The second issue that will be discussed is the criteria for appointment to office, which is one of the main areas in which the social struggle between the dominant class intensifies, or the problem of the distribution of offices and ranks. Şeyhoğlu Mustafa wrote the harshest criticisms on this subject in his time (2013, p. 153):

(...) positions and authorities are not given to their rightful place and to those who are worthy. (...) for this reason, religious positions have often passed into the hands of the incompetent, and there has been a lot of corruption. Wherever there are foolish, ignorant, vile people, some of them have become vizier, some judge, some sheikh or religious leader. [tm]

As far as a sense of justice is mentioned, which adopts the principle of 'keeping every social segment in its place', while the places of the lower classes are quite clear, there is essentially no limit to the rise of the members of the ruling class. For this reason, at a symbolic or real level, who will take place in which office and to what extent their authority will be accepted becomes an important political issue. Ahmedî's (2018, p. 403) answer to this question begins with a classic defense of merit. According to Ahmedî (2018, p. 403), qualified people should be brought to the offices, noble people should be in the sultan's circle of conversation, skillful and ingenuity should take office, otherwise the sultan will not be able to be a ruler with his right.³⁷⁵ In cases where appointments in accordance with the principle of merit are not realized, the idea that

³⁷⁵ See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 5373-5378.

‘corruption’ will occur in the social order is common in the political discourse of the period.³⁷⁶

The most interesting area where the class struggle through the examples of political thought thus concentrates on the examples, that can be called the literature of ‘corruption’. For example, Şeyhoğlu Mustafa devoted a large part of his work to the criticism of the types of ‘administrators who made mischief in the country’, that is, to the disclosure of people who abuse their place and position and exceeds the line of legitimacy. Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, p. 261) stated that the people he defines as “the common people and the lowly people, the unfounded and the scammers and the hypocrites and the corrupters and the oppressors and the greedy workers and the people of corruption and deceit [tm]”, as they found closeness to the sultan, rank and authority, they levied tax in the form of *bid’at* and increased their tax amounts, that collected taxes from travelers and merchants, made unfair profits from *waqfs* and deprived real owners of right, and finally cut off the donations of the ulama and dervish groups. All these examples can be read as an attack on the economic, cultural and political articulation points of the institutional order. This element of criticism is common in the political ideas formulated by both Ahmedî and Şeyhoğlu Mustafa. Both authors try to find an answer to the question of who will rise in the state organization on the basis of educational merit rather than ‘personal commitment’ because they mainly defend the interests of the ulama stratum and Islamic intellectuals. For example, Ahmedî (2018, p. 163) embodies this attitude by saying that “only the people of knowledge are worthy of the rank, wherever there is a seat of honor, it belongs to the scholar [tm]”.³⁷⁷ At this point, the notion of having knowledge should be evaluated in terms of both having knowledge of the order and its reproduction and being equipped with a religious morality to defend it. Thus, both the social position of the ulama stratum is improved and the supra-personal position of the social order is secured.

The two categories that carry out the political functions of the ulama stratum formulated within this framework, but are also most exposed to social criticism, are *qadis* and advisors. As of the historical period examined, travelers, thinkers, theologians

³⁷⁶ The criticism and corruption discourse directed by the dervish circles towards the members of the ulama puts this privileged position at the center. The sections in the work named *Tasvirü'l-Kulub* attributed to Börklüce Mustafa, which states that the members of the ulama “favor to the leadership, the rank and the world” and therefore degenerate and move away from *ilm*, are a typical example of this criticism (Gümüsoğlu, 2015, pp. 283-84).

³⁷⁷ See: Ahmedî (2019), couple no: 2165.

or translators from various Islamic countries are subject to patronage relations in Anatolian principalities and can be promoted to palace counsellors.³⁷⁸ In this context, the highest authority they can reach is the vizierate. Such relationships are often represented in the literary works of the period. For example, Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, in his work *Hurşidnâme*, makes the ruler a member of the advisory council before every important decision, together with people such as the ulama, the administrative bureaucracy, and the country's notables in many places.³⁷⁹ For example, Şeyhoğlu Mustafa uses the character of philosopher-vizier as the ideal type of such consultation activities. Moreover, Şeyhoğlu Mustafa makes the importance of consultation and advice the subject of his work (1979, p. 355): “Öğüt virmekle hiç kılman taksir/ Ki öğütdür cihanda kesb ü tevfir/ Öğüt acı gelür er yatlusına/ Eyüler uyar irer tatlusına/ Öğüt ilkin kulakdan zahmet eyler/ Velikin sonra canı rahat eder”.³⁸⁰

In this and such examples, there is no reason not to think that adviser candidates such as Şeyhoğlu Mustafa are also promoting their own professions. On the other hand, social reactions against advisers also develop simultaneously. These criticisms are generally directed to madrasah teachers and ulama, and in particular, the sultan's close advisers from the same circles are the subject. In an example, which is in the first category of such criticism, Âşıkpaşazâde confronts the advisers and the *sûfis* as parties to a social contradiction (Kala, 2013, p. 136): “Cihan hükmü ger hanlar elinde/ Veli kalbi danışmend dilinde/ Dokur kuluna bin hile ipi/ Kurar tuzak Müslümanlar yolunda/ Hususa kim ola sufi danışmend/Neler düzer bu hanların ilinde”.³⁸¹

Two approaches can be followed in the interpretation of these strings. According to the first of these approaches, it can be interpreted that the dervishes resisted an established interpretation of Islam and did not adopt ulama authority, since they also showed some non-Sharia characteristics. In my opinion, even if this interpretation

³⁷⁸ Shaw (1997, p. 24) also states that, due to marriages with Bulgarian, Serbian and Byzantine ruling dynasties, Christian advisors also entered the Ottoman palace in the entourage of brides.

³⁷⁹ See such chapters under those titles: *Meşveret-Kerden-i Padişah Ba-Ekabir ü Ümera vü Vüzera-i Hiş*, *Meşveret-Kerden-i Padişah Ba-Vezirani*, *Cem-Kerden-i Ümera vü Vüzera*, *Handen-i Padişah Kazi vü Müfti vü Ulema vü Fuzala ve Meşveret Kerden*.

³⁸⁰ There is no fault in giving advice/ Advice is what leads to success in the world/ Advice is painful to the mean man/ Good people follow it and enjoy it/ Hearing advice first hurts the ear/ But then the one who listens to advice finds comfort.

³⁸¹ The rule of the world is always in the hands of the khans / The heart of the saints is in the language of the danishmends/ A thousand trick threads for his servants / Sets a trap on the way of Muslims/ In particular, who is the *sûfi* danışmend/ What will he do in the province of these khans?

seems to be correct, as of the historical period in question, there is neither an investigation nor a trace of sanctions against heterodox *sûfî* orders, and it does not seem very likely that such a reaction will emerge for the early period. Moreover, Âşikpaşazâde was a member of the *Vefâî* order, which, as was mentioned in the first chapter, is 'settled' and has strong relations with the state. The second interpretation is the beginning of a multidimensional (on rent, social status, political power, etc.) struggle between the ulama and the *sûfî* circles regarding the use of religious authority. In this context, we can deduce that the struggle is developing over *waqf* properties and land assignments, and this second interpretation would be more correct. There are also enough clues to think that the ulama and the dervishes were in a struggle based on social status. For example, legends about people who left the ulama stratum and became a dervish are frequently told in dervish *menâkibnâmes*. For example, the story that Hacı Bayram-ı Velî was once a *muderris* in the city of Ankara and joined the dervishes following the call of Sheikh Hamidüddin Aksarayî, known as Somuncu Baba (Çelik, 2017, p. 25), is constructed in a very similar way as such as Mevlânâ Celâleddîn's anecdote, which symbolizes the subsequent fallow of Şems-i Tebrizî and the transition from external knowledge to esoteric knowledge. The hero of another such anecdote is Eşrefoğlu Rûmî. In the *menâkibnâme* of Eşrefoğlu Rûmî, there is a narrative that this person once served as a danishmend in a madrasah founded by Mehmet Çelebi, and even engaged in external sciences for forty years, but later on, with the miracle of a dervish named Abdal Mehemed, he left the office of danishmend and became a dervish (Bursalı, 1976, pp. 32-34). Although it is a late example, a similar narrative is also found in the famous story of Mahmûd Hüdâî, who left the *qadi* office of Bursa and sold liver for the Üftâde convent. In this and similar stories, it is told that people who enter the path of *sûfîs* seem to have fallen in social class, but in essence they increase their closeness to God and gain spiritual degrees. The political main idea of such stories is the view put forward by the dervish circles that the danishmends, who have high social status and economic opportunities in real life, are lower than the dervishes in terms of morality and closeness to God. The prevalence of these stories reveals the struggle in question.

Another issue is that the position of vizier becomes a crucial position in the distribution of resources and authorities in the struggle. Şeyhoğlu Mustafa ascribes the office of vizier almost more central importance than the throne of ruler. According to him, the viziership is "the pillar of the sultanate and the great pillar of the country [tm]"

(Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, 2013, p. 139), and the role played by the mind for the heart plays the role of the vizier for the sultan (Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, 2013, p. 114): “The heart is the sultan, and the mind is its absolute vizier/ Already without the vizier, the sultan cannot practice {tm}”. In fact, a sultan’s attempt to do the work of a vizier will disrupt the order of a country, as it will be against the sultan’s tradition (Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, 2013, p. 124). In this case, it is clear that the vizier is highlighted as the real decision maker in the country’s administration (Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, 2013, pp. 114-15):

(...) it is imperative that they consult him in every situation and in all matters, big or small. Then all the dignitaries of the state, those dealing with the affairs of the sultan, the commanders of the army, those who direct and administer the people, and the sipahis should apply to the vizier and inform him of their situation. [tm]

In the final analysis, Şeyhoğlu Mustafa informs that the person sitting in the office of vizier, which is given such importance and authority, may be open to corruption and warns the ruler about this issue. For example, the vizier’s alliance with the bribers (*viyiciler*), his sedition and mischief to do his work, and even his own greed making enemies and oppressing the country are evaluated in this context (Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, 2013, pp. 146-47). Another point is that with the process of political power of the ulama stratum, the ‘cunning vizier’/’just ruler’ dichotomy, which is frequently seen in Eastern literature³⁸², began to settle as a prototype and that the rulers would need ‘honest and moral’ advisers against the viziers who would follow their own autonomous interests in these narrations. The source of this narrative is based on the struggle of different social strata with each other to rise in the power hierarchy, and in the final analysis, they are likely to turn into a kind of palace intrigue.

Qadis, on the other hand, constitute the common enemies of different writers in most of the examples of political thought. There are three reasons for this. First, there is a fundamental contradiction between the *qadis* and the *ghazi*-warriors about the use of power, and the origin of this contradiction is rooted back to the pre-Ottoman period. For example, in the work called *Battalnâme*, a fictional Baghdad *qadi* named Ukbe appears as a villain. This *qadi* occupies a significant position in the court of the caliph of the period and has an influence in the state administration. On the other hand, it is tried to legitimize the struggle of the *ghazis* through gossip narratives that *qadi* Ukbe is actually a ‘hidden infidel’, causing difficulties for the *ghazis*, and trying to poison

³⁸² For example, for *Kırkvezir Hikayeleri*. See Kızıltan (1991).

Sayyid Battal Ghazi and his friends. Pointing out the contradictions between the *ghazis* and the *qadis* in this work, which was written in the 15th century, in which the events of the 11th century were narrated, shows that this contradiction has existed since the early periods of Islamic history.

An important reason why *qadis* are criticized is that they are at the bottom of the *ulama stratum* and are seen as an ‘easy target’. Because it is relatively easy to fight them, and it is quite simple to unite against them as they form the lowest stratum of the *ulama* and benefit from the people in their own interests. However, it is always necessary to approach the criticisms about *qadis* with caution, because some of these criticisms reflect the thoughts of some *ulama* members who want to take on the task of reforming the lower levels in order to rise in their duties and who criticize the *qadis* for this. It is clear that these people are especially from the *ulama stratum*. However, another group of criticism differs from this first one, although it takes similar forms in wording. The second group of criticisms comes mostly from *sûfi* circles. These critiques also have two orientations that are difficult to distinguish definitively. The first is the plebeian criticism of dervishes with egalitarian aspects who position themselves as the voice of the subalterns, and the second is the criticism of the spokespersons of the established *sûfi* orders that engage in an intra-class struggle with the *ulama stratum* over the moral leadership of the people. Wandering dervish circles in the first group are uncomfortable with the Orthodox and formal/*fiqh*-based understanding of Islam represented by *qadis*. This discomfort has real foundations in terms of both the *qadis* trying to discipline the wandering dervishes and the pressure applied by threatening them with court and execution, as seen in the legends of Şuca’eddin Veli and Otman Baba. This relationship will be discussed in more detail in the following sections. Finally, it would be appropriate to think that some of the criticisms directed at the *qadis* were made by the urban shopkeepers and the soldiers who actually *timar* holders.

Let us first consider Ahmedî’s criticisms. In his poem titled *Kaside Der-Medh-i Emir Sülmân* included in his *Diwan*, he criticized both *qadis* and jurists and *sûfis* by claiming that two sections of the people of Bursa were “quite strange enemies [tm]”.³⁸³ The relevant part of the poem is as follows:

Bursa hûb şehrdür lîkin/ Halkı gâyet garîb düşmendür
Fukahâsı-durur kamu süfehâ/ Sûfîları kamudan edvendür
Sûfi-yi bî-safâ fakîh-i sefîh/ Râst nice ola ki reh-zendür

³⁸³ Poem no: XXXII. See: Ahmedî, *Divan*, pp. 87-9.

Zerkdür işleri vü mahşerde/ Zerk ehli n' olur mucayyendür
İçleri tolduđı nifāk-ıla şirk/ Taşlarından kamu mübeyyendür
Bunlaruñ bigi kişiyer dimegil/ Ne muhannes ki rûspî-zendür.³⁸⁴

Ahmedî asserts that both *sûfis* and *qadis* are dissolute/immoral/despicable, road blockers (*reh-zen*), liars (people of *zerk*), detractors, and apostates (people of discord and polytheism), that they are treacherous/despicable (*muhannas*) and that they are men. He argues that it would be more appropriate to say 'prostitute-woman' (*ruspi-zen*) to them rather than a man. Ahmedî also complains to Emir Suleyman, stating that all the people complain about the harms of these two groups. It is surprising that such harsh criticisms take place in an ode in which the ruler is praised. However, it is possible that the people of Bursa or the members of ruling classes in there, who demanded that the criticisms about these groups be conveyed to Emir Suleyman, opened a door for their criticism to be heard by commissioning an ode to Ahmedî that praised the ruler's 'justice'. If the discussions on this subject throughout the period are evaluated, it is understood that there were serious criticisms about the *qadis* and that this problem was tried to be solved radically by Bayezid I a few years before Emir Suleyman's accession to the throne.

Âşıkpaşazâde (2017, p. 76) and Oruç Beg (2011, pp. 46-47) state that the *qadis* were gathered in a house by Bayezid I and threatened with being burned because they were accustomed to bribery and plotting mischief. Şükrullah (2011, p. 215) and Ahmedî (2018, pp. 586-587) do not mention about the burning incident, probably because they do not see the punishment of the ruler as religiously permissible, but they do not mention that the *qadis* took bribes, acted unjustly and violated the Sharia, reversed the religious prohibitions and thus indicate that they are making financial gains. Although Ahmedî (2018, p. 587) does not say what exactly happened, he states that Bayezid I punished the judges to bring them to the right and "reformed them a little bit [tm]", but in the final analysis he is hopeless: "how can they be on the right path though? [tm]". It is seen that Şeyhođlu Mustafa is the one who formulates the widest criticism in this regard.

³⁸⁴ See: Ahmedî, Divan, p. 88. Bursa is a beautiful city, but/ Its people are a very strange enemy. Islamic jurists are utterly miserable/ *Sûfis* are the cheapest of all/ Foul *sûfi*, wretched islamic jurist/ How you meet are road blockers/ Their job in the world is to lying/ What will be the end of the lyer in the Court is clear/ They are full of discrimination and polytheism/ All people complain about the stones they throw/ People like these are not called men/ They are so hypocritical that they look like a bitch.

According to Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, p. 187), *qadis* take bribes under various appearances, change the “writing of the registers, records and marriage contracts [tm]”, “buy property, accept servants, exchange goods [tm]” from the plaintiffs, makes unlawful savings from the property of heirs and orphans, “spends the income of waqfs unnecessarily and even saves them [tm]”, “gives masjids, schools and madrasas, lodges and shops [tm]” to free riders in exchange for bribes or services, disrupts market and shop control and even establish their own “bakery, butcher, soap maker shop [tm]”, and therefore they do not carry out weighing and tax audits. In these lines, there are examples of arbitrary administration and extortion that emerge in all areas from guardianship to adjudication, from the regulation of *waqfs* and control of markets to marriages, which are essentially in the field of duty of *qadis* (Ortaylı, 2019, p. 11). Sheikh Bedreddin, in his work *Câmiu'l-fusuleyn*, deals with these problems within the framework of Islamic law, affirms that many disorders have emerged in the views and practices of the *qadis* of his time, and openly argues that the testimony of two people from the public against the *qadi* should be accepted as correct against the testimony of *qadi* (Hira , 2012, p. 265). It is necessary to see all these disorders not only as personal deviations, but as social problems that disrupt the Ottoman administration. The fact that the *qadis* are out of the scope of duty poses a great problem in property relations and production relations, as it causes problems that would make it difficult to reproduce the Ottoman class domination. Especially since the end of the 16th century and the 17th century, the institution of *qadi* courts was irreformably deteriorated, its articulation with local notables and *ayan* (Ortaylı, 2019, pp. 51, 81), and it began to determine the *qadi naibs* with the tax farming method (Ortaylı, 2019, p. 46). It has developed in parallel with the fact that the society has transformed into a different formation with new social classes and strata.

Another criticism is directed at the *qadis* in the economic plan. Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, pp. 13-133) states that *waqf* properties are seized and corruption occurs in “waqfs and charity foundations [tm]”, and it seems that *qadis* are primarily responsible for this: The one who gives license to spend the revenues of foundations elsewhere may be cruel, ignorant or knowledgeable. (...) They should not be trusted. It is never permissible to give it to places other than the waqfs’ own expense. (...) all those who only give a fatwa, command, are involved in that business, and who can remove or not drive away the person who intends with other intentions, are partners in this deception, fraud, responsibility, and even oppression. [tm]

The suggestion of Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, p. 131) is to appoint someone who will remove the hands of the state-affiliated “oppressors and eaters [tm]” from the *waqfs*, as the head of the foundations. But there is no emphasis on the ulama in this proposal. The development of the central treasury seems to have brought together the religious and administrative professionals (*ulama* and *umera*) clustered around it and third-party individuals who profited from the management of charitable works and *waqfs*, and started the struggle for distribution among them. It is possible to see various reflections of these reactions in Ahmet Bîcan and Âşıkpaşazâde. For example, Âşıkpaşazâde asserts that the newly formed ulama group is involved in mischief and that their salaries have been increased unfairly (Apzd, 2017, p. 75):

Ulama existed in the time of Orhan and the time of Ghazi Murat Khan. They were not sinister until they came to Çandarlı Halil. When Halil came, Turk Rüstem came, they called Mevlânâ Rüstem, they mixed fraud with the world. When Halil’s son Ali Pasha became a vizier, there were even many danishmends in his time. When they came, they issued fatwas with fraud. [tm]

It is possible to reach more information in the anonymous chronicles about the content of the decisions that Âşıkpaşazâde describes as fraudulent fatwas. In the anonymous chronicle published by Öztürk (2000, pp. 38-39), the criticisms on the formation of the *Kapıkulu* units and the distribution of the *timars* and *mansibs* are at the forefront. The central criticism expressed by the anonymous chronicler is that the *mansibs* were not given to the retired persons before, and that the *timars* did not pass from father to son (Öztürk, 2000, p. 38). The author sees the development of *Kapıkulu* units as the cause of this problem (Öztürk, 2000, p. 38): “(...) Kara Halil-oğlu Ali Paşa vezir oldu, fisk u fücür ziyade oldu. Mahbub oğlanları yanına aldı. Adını iç oğlanı kodı. Bir nice zaman ne gerekse ider. Andan çıkarup mansıb virür oldılar”.³⁸⁵ This version of the anti-homosexual discourse, which can be seen in other works of the period, is quite striking. The anonymous chronicler attributes the establishment of the *Kapıkulu* organization to the sodomy of the ulama-origin pashas and strongly criticizes the giving of these people to offices. These patriarchal expressions, which can manipulate the political reaction of the Muslim warriors with the ‘masculinity’ ethos, thus aim to undermine the endowment of offices in terms of social legitimacy.

³⁸⁵ Kara Halil’s son Ali Pasha became a vizier, and lies and immorality increased even more. He took the beloved boys with him. He named it private boys. They did whatever they wanted for a while, then they took them out and gave them official duties.

In this context, it is seen that the criticisms directed at the *qadis* in the anonymous chronicles, which also express the views of local *sûfî* groups and *ghazi*/raider social groups, have gained a harsher and more negative attitude. Anonymous chroniclers (Giese, 1992, pp. 31-33; Öztürk, 2000, pp. 37-8) state that the teachers in the madrasas did not want to be a *qadi* in the past, but now they are in a position to draw swords on each other for being a *qadi*, that ignorant people can get appointed an office of *qadi* through nepotism, and that it is to accumulate wealth through extorting the people. The author(s) criticize the *qadis* very heavily through poetry (Giese, 1992, p. 32; Öztürk, 2000, pp. 36-37):

N' oldu şimdi ilvi da'vi eyleyen/ Ya hakimem deyüben söz söyleyen
Kim olupdur hırsla canı paymal/ Karnı doymaz dirdüğince genç ü mal
Taylasan urunuş da'vi-riş/ Liki yigregdür nefste andan keşiş
Eyle sevmiş işbu dünya mezilin/ Kim tutat candan aziz ab u gilin
Husb ü tezvir ü hased endişesi/ İt bigi halkı talamak pişesi
(...)
Genc-i Karun'ı virürsen birine/ Bir pulum yok diyü girü yiyine
Başı tolu kibr içi hubs ile kin/ Ana rehber olmuş iblis-i la'in.³⁸⁶

There are two aspects of this criticism that deserve attention. First, the method of the *qadis*' tendency to acquire property and, secondly, the reason for this should be clarified. Although *qadis* are often criticized for collecting goods in the historical sources of the period, it is not clear how this was done. As can be seen in the lines of Şeyhoğlu Mustafa above, some of these criticisms focus on bribery, favoring influential people and improper use of *waqf* revenues. But there is another detail in the background of the subject. Anonymous chronicles generally contain statements that state records did not exist in the past and that it has just been invented (Öztürk, 2000, p. 38). This expression reflects the effect of the establishment of the central state organization and the spread of subordination models and controls based on record-keeping on the people.

³⁸⁶ What happened now, who took science as an ideal for himself / Who spoke saying I'm a wise(scholar)/ His soul has been shattered by greed/ As he collected treasures and goods, he became insatiable/ He looks like a dervish with a tail wrapped around his turban/ But even monks are more precious than him in the soul/ He so loved the purposes of this world/ He keeps water and mud more sacred than his own soul/ Worry about sinister, lies and jealousy / His job is to bite people like a dog/ If you give the treasures of Karun to one of them / He says I don't even have a coin/ His head is full of arrogance, heart is full of iniquity and hatred/ Cursed satan guided him.

One of the possible effects of state control becomes visible in the reactions to the books kept by the *qadis*, their role as legal supervision and intermediary, and the fees they receive to carry them out. In this context, it is seen that the *qadis/ulama* have the authority to control the *sûfi* circles and the *waqfs/properties* they own, and this authority disturbs the *sûfi* circles. Moreover, if it is assumed that the *sûfi* circles may have assumed a role similar to the *qadis* in resolving local disputes, it can be more clearly understood that the struggle between morality and the law, which is one of the main sources of law, also re-emerged under the social authority struggle of the *ulama* members and *sûfis*. The author's portrayal of the *ulama* as 'full of arrogance' in the above-mentioned lines exemplifies the way the *ulama* based on *fiqh* knowledge deserves the highest status of religion and the reaction of the *sûfi* circles to this status claim. For example, it is seen that the criticisms in the anonymous chronicle published by Öztürk ultimately evolved into the defense of the sheikhs against the *qadis*. After criticizing the *ulama* members, the anonymous chronicle writer signs the sheikhs as the main source of "*ilm*" and praises them with the following words (Giese, 1992, p. 33; Öztürk, 2000, p. 37): "Kim ola her gayb orada aşikar/ Hem ledünni ilm ide anda karar/ İlm kim ol kişi le gele ele/ Enbiyadan nicesi miras ala/ Keşf durur keşf-i ilm-i enbiya/ Anı miras aldı olardan evliya".³⁸⁷

Secondly, it is necessary to clarify the reason why the *ulama* or *qadis* collect wealth. One of the most important structural factors of this situation is that the *ulama* stratum has the right to private property and can accumulate. Although reasons such as the low income of *qadis* are suggested in the chronicles of the period (Apzd, 2017, p. 76; Oruç Beg, 2011, p. 47), it is doubtful whether this judgment will suffice to explain the 'exorbitant' and 'fraudulent' accumulation trend that *qadis* are accused of. Precisely for this reason, the sources of the period developed a moral criticism that the *qadis* did not fulfill the requirements of religious morality and that they were transform into devils (Giese, 1992, p. 32; Öztürk, 2000, p. 37). In the subtext of this criticism, it is possible to find traces of social struggles between the *ulama* and *sûfi* circles over the moral leadership of the society. It should also be noted that with an interesting articulation, dervishes can become groups that radically defend the interests of the poor, that is, they can function as traditional intellectuals. Therefore, the criticism of the *ulama*, which

³⁸⁷ Who is it that every hidden thing is open to him/ Who has esoteric knowledge/ With whose help is this knowledge gained/ To inherit from many of the prophets/ He discovers the esoteric knowledge of the prophets/ The saints inherit this knowledge from them.

focuses on politically subordinating the poor people, can also often gain connotations as a moral criticism that turns *sûfî* circles into political subjects. The fact that both Giese (1992, pp. 27-28) and Öztürk anonymous (2000, p. 32) encounter a highly critical dialogue example describing the struggle between the *sûfî* circles and the ulama reinforces our argument. The dialogue in the anonymous chronicle is as follows (Öztürk, 2020, p. 32):

Anadolu'da Yenişehir civarında Ak Bıyık Dedem kim var idi. Bursa'da Mevlana Yigen ile otururken Ak Bıyık ayıttı: 'İy Mevlana, bu ümmi kavm ne kadar günah iderlerse her ehl-i ilm sebebdür. Ol günahları Hak ta'ala sizden sorsa gerekdür' dedi. Bu kez Mevlana Yigen aydur: 'Ne sebepten ötür, bizden sorar' dedi. Andan Ak Bıyık Dedem aydur: Siz zina itdünüz ve livata itdünüz ve akçayı ribaya virdünüz ve helal haram fark itmediniz. Ümmi halk dahı sizi gördi. (...) Hiçbir ehl-i ilm var mıdır ki, bu haramdur ve şübhelüdür diyeler. Haram olsun helal olsun heman eline girsün. Eğer haram ve şübhelü nesne olsa anların katında gereklü olur. Bari ömrinde birin red ideydi. Red itmek ne mümkün? Haram olsun helal olsun tek eline girsün. Evet hikmet budur kim yimeğe dahı kıyamaz. Vermek ve yidürmek ehl-i ilm katında katı aybdur.³⁸⁸

The first of the characters in this short dialogue, Ak Bıyık Dede, is probably either an old Turkmen/opinion leader or a dervish, as he distinguishes himself from the second character, who is called '*ehl-i ilm*' and uses the title 'Mevlânâ', which is common among the ulama. Historically, it is known that there was a sheik named Ak Bıyık, one of the Hacı Bayram caliphs residing in Bursa (Bayramoğlu & Azamat, 1992). Bursalı Mehmet Tahir (1971, p. 28) states that this person came to the siege of Istanbul with Akşemseddin and became his friend in *sûfî* order, and then Akşemseddin was sent to Göynük and Akbıyık Abdullah Sultan to Bursa. In the history of Âşıkpaşazâde, there is

³⁸⁸ There was a man named Ak Bıyık Dede in the vicinity of Yenişehir in Anatolia. While sitting with Mevlânâ Yigen in Bursa, the Ak Bıyık said: 'O Mevlânâ, no matter how much sin this illiterate people may be, every scholar is the cause. He said, 'God should ask about those sins to you'. This time, Mevlânâ Yigen says: 'Why does God ask us' he said. Then Ak Bıyık Dede said: 'You committed adultery and sodomy and gave the money to interest and did not separate halal and haram. Even the illiterate people have seen you. (...) Is there any scholar who should say to something that this is haram and doubtful? Whether it is haram or halal, they want it to be in their hands immediately. If it is a haram and doubtful object, it is considered obligatory in the eyes of these ones. If only he had refused one of these in his lifetime. Is it possible to refuse? Let it be haram, let it be halal, as long as it is his. Yes, this is the wisdom that he cannot even eat what he takes. Giving and eating is a grave mistake in the eyes of the scholars.

information that this person was known as a dervish, he participated in the Second Kosovo War with Murat II and a horse was given to him as a gift (Apzd, 2017, p. 139).³⁸⁹ In the statements quoted above, Akbıyık accuses the ulama members of ignoring religious provisions for their personal interests, and states that they do not share the wealth they collect with anyone, which is considered a crucial principle of virtue. Moreover, the argument that the ulama members cannot lead the public in the moral field because they violate the religious prohibitions such as adultery/sodomy/interest is perceived between the lines.³⁹⁰ Thus, *sûfî* circles criticize the religion in terms of formalism, denying the primary distinction of the ulama stratum, and revealing their superiority with their moral criticism.

Another issue seen in the works of the period is the tendency of the ruler to accumulate wealth and treasure, and the criticism and evaluations directed against it. Iranian poet and moralist Sa'dî-yi Şîrâzî (2016, p. 52), who wrote his works a century before the writers of the period, advises in his work *Nasîhatü'l-Mülûk* that “the treasury should always be full and unnecessary expenditures should not be made [tm]”. Interestingly, the first Ottoman *siyâsetnâme* writers did not agree with him. The reason for this is that can be followed in political thought how different development levels class relations determine the tendency to collect and spend goods. For example, the fact that the anonymous chronicle (Öztürk, 2000, p. 31) states the exitance of ulama members who deceived Murat I by claiming that “the rulers need the treasure [tm]” is a significant proof of how critical the view on the central wealth accumulation is. Anonymous historian narrates the formation of the treasury as follows (Öztürk, 2000, p. 31):

Ol zamanda haraç az idi. Şöyle alınırdı ki kafirler dahı incinmez idi. Kebesin ve öküzün veya oğlın kızın satdurup veya rehin kodurup almazlardı. Ol zaman padişahları tama'kar değüllerdi. Heman kim Hayreddin Paşa kapuya geldi ve padişahlar ile tama'kar danışmendler musahip oldu, takvayı koyup fetvaya yürüdiler, hazine dahı padişah olana gerekdür didiler. Padişahı kendülerine uydurdılar. Tama' ve zulm peyda oldu.³⁹¹

³⁸⁹ For the legends about Akbıyık and the variations of the above anecdote, see: Pehlivan (2015).

³⁹⁰ For the humorous version of a similar criticism, see: Deli Birader (2007, p. 148).

³⁹¹ At that time, the amount of kharaj was small. It was taken as such that even unbelievers would not be harmed. They did not get kharaj by having their clothes and oxen or son or daughter sold or pawned. At that time, the sultans were not greedy. Immediately, whoever Hayreddin Pasha came to power and the sultans and the greedy danishmends became friends, they forgot the taqwa

There are three notable points in the anonymous historian's critique that require emphasis. The first of these is the motivation for the formation and filling of the treasury of sultanate, the second is the collection of taxes accrued through the forcible confiscation of the people's property (oppression) in order to realize this motivation, and the third is the organization of this new financial order by the ulama and danishmends. In addition to these, religious criticism expressed through the assertion of the 'taqwa and fatwa' dichotomy should also be taken into account.

The common thought axis of the political thinkers of this period is that the ruler should be careful about saving and spending money and property. We encounter the first criticisms on this issue in Ahmedî. Ahmedî reveals his point of view with the following couplets (2018, p. 63): "Why increase wealth when life is short/ What is the reason for this greed and grasping/ Keep it so that you collect the treasure of the world/ What good is it after you go without eating [tm]".³⁹² The interesting point about these lines is that the benefit of collecting wealth is seen as limited to the life span of the ruler, that is, the perspective on the institutionalization of power is not found in the author of these lines. In another couplet, Ahmedî (2018, p. 160) says, "Now that sultanate is in the hands of who collect the property/ Neither eat it, nor give it to anyone/ Oh, we have reached such a bad time/ We have seen that the lowly are the rulers of the country [tm]".³⁹³ It cannot be thought that these couplets directly refer to a specific ruler, but this does not make the abstract-theoretical thought it contains worthless. First of all, the place where Ahmedî positioned the state and the ruler gains meaning within the framework of a subordination order in the triangle of reâyâ-feudal lords-suzerain. The ruler is a person who expected to distribute "city, property, land and valuables [tm]" he has captured to the lords under his command and thus ensures their loyalty (Ahmedî, 2018, p. 272).³⁹⁴ In this context, bestowal of the ruler is essential for gaining the loyalty of the warriors and ulama. In this framework, the separation of status groups from each other and their hierarchical ordering also establishes itself in the symbolic field as an activity of bestowal and gift giving (Ahmedî, 2018, p. 529): "A person who does not

and put the fatwa into effect, they said that even a treasury is needed for a sultan. They made the sultan similar to themselves. Greed and cruelty appeared.

³⁹² See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 790-791.

³⁹³ See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 2126-2127.

³⁹⁴ See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 3601.

have justice and generosity/ cannot be worthy of the ownership of the country and the emirate [tm]”.³⁹⁵

Şeyhoğlu Mustafa’s criticism of the accumulation of wealth and money is based on a similar rhetoric to that of Ahmedî. Those who collect wealth and money will eventually die and their goods will change hands and disperse (Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, 2013, p. 102): “give the stingy person the good news of a grave or heir [tm]”. However, behind this rhetorical similarity lies another emphasis on how they are obtained and how they are spent, rather than the criticism of possession. Because Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, p. 118), in the last analysis, is not against the accumulation of property and even against waste under the name of generosity. However, he still states that there should be a certain measure between saving and spending, and sets the criterion for this as the continuation of social status: “(...) do not bring property collection to the level of stinginess, strictness or condemnation, because they will denigrate you with these [tm]” (Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, 2013, p. 119). In other words, saving and spending are equally important for maintaining social status. The fact that the principle of accumulation is found to be appropriate or even compulsory is an important difference between Şeyhoğlu Mustafa and Ahmedî.

To continue, another important issue is the method of accumulation. Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, p. 102) argues that the sultans could deviate to the path of oppression by collecting goods as a result of the deception of the advisors: “They try to collect worldly goods without saying halal and haram. They paint their faces with the blood of the poor and collect golden coins (...) [tm]”. In the interpretation of these lines, it is necessary to consider the expression ‘without saying halal and haram’ not only as a religious rhetoric, but as an element that has a counterpart in social classes. It will be much easier to understand if we give an example. Âşıkpaşazâde describes the proposal that Fazlullah, one of the viziers of Murat II, presented to the ruler in order to solve the problem of the financial difficulty of the state treasury (2017, p. 199):

Fazlullah saw that the sultan needed halal goods from time to time, he said: ‘My great sultan! Require treasury to sultans. If my sultan commands, I will collect treasure’. The sultan said, ‘How can you collect it?’ Fazlullah said: ‘My Sultan! The people of this country have a lot of property. It is customary for sultans to bring that property to the sultan’s treasury for a reason’. The sultan asked: ‘For what reasons does this property come into being?’ he said. Fazlullah said: ‘Most

³⁹⁵ See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 6387.

of the people of this country do not give *zakat*. In that case, it is necessary to take the *zakat* of these people by force from their entire country. For this reason, a lot of goods will be collected' [tm].

As can be expected, in this anecdote, Fazlullah's proposal was not accepted, and the sultan dismissed him. As a justification, the ruler claims that he cannot make his soldiers eat haram goods. First of all, it is clear that the method of forced *zakat* collection cannot be regarded as absolutely haram. After the death of Muhammad, war was waged on the tribes who did not want to give *zakat*. This method proposed by Fazlullah was mainly applied in the first century of Islam by the Caliph Abu Bakr against the *zakat* revolt of the Bedouin tribes. It is unthinkable that Fazlullah was unaware of this historical example, which is an elementary-level knowledge of Islamic history. Because this anecdote begins with Murat II's desire to send money to the poor of Jerusalem, Mecca and Medina, but the treasury could not find any money for it, but ends with a rhetorical exit when he is denied to collect money through illegitimate ways. That is, the actions of the rulers are combined with a religious framework that limits it in terms of purpose (sending money to Mecca and Medina) and means (compulsory collection of taxes). However, in any case, it is understood that collecting money from the people is directly related to the interests of local lords, *timar* holders and other sections ruling classes and strata that are able to make accumulation. In this case, Şeyhoğlu's expression as 'painting faces with the blood of the poor' brings to mind that the dominant social strata will be able to resist the ruler with the support of the popular segments. We encounter a similar reference in the anonymous chronicle. Anonymous chronicler (Öztürk, 2000, p. 31) asserted that "of course, where there is greed, there must be oppression [tm]" and argues that the danishmends, who are seen as the perpetrators of this oppression, did not act with *ilm*, and that if they act compatible with their *ilm*, "even the illiterate people would follow them [tm]". From these statements, important clues are reached regarding the potential existence of a social resistance against the ulama and the financial/bureaucratic order they are trying to establish.

In addition, the term 'poor' (*fukara*) used in the expressions quoted from Şeyhoğlu Mustafa above should be understood not as just the 'poor', as Ergenç stated (2012a, p. 424), but as a *reâyâ* in the broad sense in contrast with the ruling class.³⁹⁶

³⁹⁶ There is also another usage of the word 'fukara' meaning 'dervishes'. We will see an example of this in the next sections.

Fazlullah's statement 'the people of this country have a lot of property' indicates that especially the parts of the people who accumulate wealth and money are taken into consideration. Such large property transfers increase the possibility of strengthening the possibilities and tendencies to articulate for resistance among the various intermediate strata and the *reâyâ*. In the final analysis, Şeyhoğlu Mustafa does not negate the necessity of the ruler to accumulate wealth and money, but suggests that the method and measure of this should be carefully considered for the continuity of domination. In this sense, it can be determined that more ideas about institutional power mechanisms have developed in Şeyhoğlu. In this context, the ulama became the representative of the local ruling class fractions dealing with agricultural production and trade in the face of ruler, namely the social function organized in accordance with the issue of interpretation of Islamic law. As can be seen in the examples above, this issue also constitutes evidence of a field of struggle between ulama, advisors, soldiers, *sûfis* and bureaucrats.

Finally, it should be taken into account that the relationship between military administrators and the ulama is not without contradiction. The most interesting manifestation of the contradictions that come to the surface from time to time between these two sections in the field of aesthetics is in the eulogy of the pen and the sword in the *Diwan* of Ahmedî. In this poem, Ahmedî brings the pen and the sword together and conveys the superiority claims of both to the lines. For example, while the sword claims that the protector of dominance is with itself, the pen responds with the argument that the endurance of religion depends on it.³⁹⁷ In another couplet, the sword claims that the greatness of the notables of the country is with itself, while the pen answers that the virtuous people are the pride itself.³⁹⁸ Moreover, Ahmedî argues that the sword conquers countries, while the pen maintains order in the country.³⁹⁹ In the final analysis, he states that both the sword and the pen dominate the world and that the pen performs the works of saving/calculating while receiving tribute from other countries.⁴⁰⁰ Thus, the author, who expresses the endless power struggle between the soldiers and the ulama with the language of poetry, also states that an institutionalized social power does not have a chance to ignore both functions. On the other hand, in the examples of political thought written at the threshold of the 16th century, it is seen that this theme was reinterpreted by gaining new variations.

³⁹⁷ See: Ahmedî, *Divan*, p. 69, poem no: XXV/4.

³⁹⁸ Ahmedî, *Divan*, p. 70, Poem no: XXXV/7.

³⁹⁹ Ahmedî, *Divan*, p. 70, Poem no: XXXV/8.

⁴⁰⁰ Ahmedî, *Divan*, p. 70-71, Poem no: XXV/23, XXV/24.

IV.I. Justice and the State: The Birth of Theoretical Models

“Every king can be killed by an infantry,
and the life of countries ends in stupidity [tm]”.

(Şükrullah, 2011, p. 201)

The struggle of the sword and the pen (and even within the sections represented by the pen) presents researchers with a class schema that should be integrated with ‘reasonable’ strategies in order to ensure the formal unity of the society, taking into account the wider range of merchants, peasants and dervishes. In this section, I will examine the theoretical models that emerged during the considered period. Considering the establishment period of the Ottoman state, the problem of the construction of the political formation is shaped under the influence of more than one social power that contradicts each other but sometimes creates a whole. The centers of concentration of these social forces are dispersed between the systematic state organization and the relatively free world of cities and border fighters. It is understood that at the threshold of the 15th century, the distinction between these two worlds became more and more institutionalized and, in this respect, more visible in the contradictions between them. These contradictions can be seen in military practices, land concessions, taxation, as well as in religious texts, poetry and political thought.

Let’s start with an interesting manifestation of these contradictions. It is felt that there is some kind of conflict between Şeyhoğlu Mustafa and Ahmedî. Atsız (2011, p. 131) states that this situation may have arisen as a result of a kind of jealousy. While this is a reasonable view, it is worth examining whether the conflict has well-established social foundations. In his critique of the notables of his time, Ahmedî says, “Ol ki Şeyhoğlundan ögrene mağâl/ Bile mi ne reng-ile söyler Kemâl”⁴⁰¹, thus criticizing Şeyhoğlu Mustafa for his inexperience in poetry -and of course spiritual issues. In yet another couplet, Ahmedî uses the expression “Şeyhoğlu değülem ki didüğüm sözün kamu/ Kimisi tercüme ola vü kimi müntehal”.⁴⁰² Other accusations in Ahmedî’s *Diwan* are as follows: Ahmedî has the power of discovery, Şeyhoğlu’s poems do not have this, Şeyhoğlu’s poems are welcome for those who do not appreciate Ahmedî’s word, or,

⁴⁰¹ Can anyone who learns words from Şeyhoğlu/ Can know the color of perfection in words?. See: Ahmedî (2018, p. 37), and Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 454.

⁴⁰² I am not Şeyhoğlu that so some of the words I say are not translations and some are plagiarism. See: Ahmedî, *Divan*, poem no: LV/27, p. 139.

where Ahmedî's *Diwan* is read, Şeyhoğlu's poems would be considered "ebter" (extinct, far from creativity) like Şeyhoğlu himself etc.⁴⁰³

Ahmedî accuses Şeyhoğlu of 'inexperience', 'plagiarism/theft', 'incompetence' and even 'worthlessness/cheapness', which, whether or not this accusation reflects the truth, is actually a collision of two different worldviews. Among the representatives of these views, the effects of religious formalism are felt in the first and empirical observations of his own age in the second. While Şeyhoğlu Mustafa settles in the Iranian political thought tradition under the bureaucratic worldview of the ruling classes, Ahmedî synthesizes the view of the frontier warriors and dervishes with the notion of reason.⁴⁰⁴ Institutionalized power perspective is dominant in the first person, and the warrior ethos dominates in the second person. While the reason is valuable as an independent reference point for Ahmedî, the reason is valuable for Şeyhoğlu because it has an engaged existence. For example, while Ahmedî likes to give advice from Aristotle, Platon, *Buklat* (Hippocrate)⁴⁰⁵ and Socrates, mostly made up by himself, and mentions the importance of reason at every opportunity, Şeyhoğlu always operates the symbol of reason in the hands of viziers and in the state order. Because what is valuable to him is the Sharia and the attitude of state officials, which in itself is a sign of institutionalization: The idea of organizational integrity between law, ideology and the state. On the other hand, it is seen that Abdülvasi Çelebi supported Ahmedî against Şeyhoğlu and sympathized with his views (Güldaş, 1996, p. 271) -which proves that the contradiction mentioned continues to affect different names as well.

This contradiction also manifests itself in terms of the social segments and patronage relations of Ahmedî and Şeyhoğlu Mustafa. Ahmedî implicitly criticizes Şeyhoğlu by making the reader feel that his relationship with the state or his lineage-based status is not important, and states that one should not brag about name of his father or having an official position.⁴⁰⁶ Another example can be found in the following verses: "Kendüzin düzüp-durur ol bir fakir/ Kim aña muhtâcdur şâh u emir/

⁴⁰³ See: Ahmedî, *Divan*, poem no: 237/9, 256/9, 358/7, pp. 383, 372, 434.

⁴⁰⁴ In the *Düstürnâme*, Enverî claims that while Ahmedî was a dervish, he was enriched by Emir Suleyman (Öztürk 2012b, p. 37). The term 'dervish' used by Enverî should be understood as poor, but may also include a secondary reference to Ahmedî's possible relationship with the *sûfi* circles.

⁴⁰⁵ The name of Hippocrates is referred to as '*Bukratis*' or '*Bukrat*' in Islamic sources. Yılmaz (2016, p. 259) gives this information based on Miskaveyn's *Tehzibu'l-Ahlak*.

⁴⁰⁶ See: Ahmedî (2018, p. 36), Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 440.

Kendünüñdür her ne varsa nağd-i hâs/ Ayruğun ğışşından olmışdur halâs”⁴⁰⁷ Ahmedî maintains the above-mentioned point of view in these couplets. The first line indicates that it is not connected to any patron, while the second line has double-meaning. While the first meaning is that he makes a living himself, the second meaning indicates that the poems he wrote are original rather than imitation and translation, that is, he is not an imitator of other poets. It can be concluded that the figures that Ahmedî confronts are those who are in need of sheikhs and emirs and make a living from the labor of others. In fact, based on the qasidas in Ahmedî’s *Diwan* and dedicated to Emir Suleyman, it is understood that the poet was once a member of the circle of ruler and benefited from its privileges. The fact that the poet, who wrote odes to Mehmet Çelebi after Emir Suleyman’s death, could not hold on to the inner circle of power as before, is understood from the low number of these poems. In the new period, the fact that Şeyhoğlu Mustafa and members of ulama stratum became closer to the palace instead of the Ahmedî also evolves this situation into a struggle that gains social connotations. In the final analysis, these lines reflect the face of the contradictions between different social segments and groups crystallized in the tension between the ‘patronage and independent poetry’, and this difference will also show itself in the metaphors of social order. In fact, Ahmedî’s praising the wealth of Suleyman Çelebi in his *Diwan*, while criticizing the collection of treasures in his *İskendernâme* suggests that these two texts may have been structured for reader groups belonging to different social classes. In this respect, the difference between the *Diwan* poems in which Ahmedî is sitting close to the feet of the ruler and the poems of *İskendernâme*, in which he gives voice to the ‘independent and honorable’ frontier warriors, is both the poet’s different moments in the articulation process with political power as an intellectual, and his symbolic relationship with different social segments with which he feels close.

In the period we examined, we see that a primitive notion of justice, which is based on the principle of ‘keeping every social segment in its proper place’ (Tezel, 2010, p. 16), was developing in Ottoman *political thought*. Moreover, as was seen in Amâsî (2016, p. 343), the principle of keeping everyone in their own position and degree is formulated as the founding principle of political administration. Oktay (2017b, pp. 98-99), in his analogy between Ottoman and Byzantine political ideologies, finds the term

⁴⁰⁷ Shah and amirs are in need of him/ This poor man takes care of himself/ Whatever solid coin he has is his own/ Free from other people's counterfeit money. See: Ahmedî (2018, p. 37), Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 444-445.

nizam-ı âlem semantically close to *taxis* (i.e. the order and sequence of things), and the term justice (when considered together with *istimâlet*) to *oikonomia* (i.e. the ability to adapt to new conditions without harming the ideal *taxis*, household management). In this respect, it can be thought that the principles of *taxis* and *oikonomia* articulate with each other, thus supporting a principle of action that could mean ‘keeping everyone in their place’. On the other hand, Heper (2012, p. 55) argues that the term justice in the Ottoman Empire is an expression of the state’s aim to “maintain the order in its current state by taking into account its position and function and providing neither more nor less than it deserves [tm]”. Amâsî formulated this notion in the most sophisticated way. According to him, justice is the maintenance of social division of labor and class distinction (Amâsî, 2016, p. 239): “Since humans are social creatures by nature, they need mutual assistance to survive, as will be explained below. Helping people requires some people to serve others and people to trade with each other in a state where mutual equality and balance can be achieved [tm]”. In this case, Amâsî (2016, pp. 239-241) argues that justice based on division of labor and social hierarchy will be provided by three instruments: Money, divine law and ruler. Only when examined on a historical basis, it becomes clear that the principle of ‘keeping the social segments in place’ has two Janus-like faces. While the first aspect is related to the social position of the subordinate classes, the second aspect is related to the duty of the state to protect the class privileges of the ruling classes. İnalçık (1981, p. 65) published an example of the case of a person alleged to be a *reâyâ* in the *qadi* registries of Bursa. In this example dated February 25, 1484, it is claimed by *Subaşı* that Mehmet, son of Ivaz, from the people of Toma village of Bursa, had the status of *reâyâ*, and the contrary was proved in the court. In this example, it is seen that class privileges are protected through the justice organization and this event should be considered as a general policy, not as a single example. Because what is understood from the *qadi* register is that the state recognizes and protects the original social status of the person, as a member of ruling class, even though the person is not wealthy and is persistently shown to be included in his own villagers by *Subaşı*.

In the introductory part of *Kenzü'l-küberâ*, written by Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, p. 191), he outlines the concept of justice by stating the state, purpose and behavioral norms of a few elite groups among people. Ahmedî (2018, p. 550) formulates this definition as follows: “If you are a servant, you must be like a servant (...) If the sultan made his servant a sultan/ Even in this case, the servant must know that he is a servant

[tm]”⁴⁰⁸ and reinforces this notion. Another issue that must be discussed in this context is the existence of arguments pointing to the origins of the concept of justice in the texts in question. Ahmedî defines the concept of justice simply as ‘righteousness’⁴⁰⁹. He claims that the persecution of the rulers will miss the blessings on the earth, destroy the country and cause him to be dismissed from his reign.⁴¹⁰ As an example of oppression, which is the opposite of the concept of justice, the descriptions in the following lines of Ahmedî can be given as an example: “Katı cebbâr oldı vü gerden-firâz Her yañadan kıldı halka türkû-tâz/ Yıhuban ol kudsi gâret eyledi/ Halkı kırıp çoh hasâret eyledi”.⁴¹¹ These lines clearly show that the concept of justice means maintaining the existing relations of production and a peaceful environment. In another place, Ahmedî (2018, p. 556) tells that a people who were persecuted left their homeland and took refuge in a neighboring country, and they became slaves by begging the ruler of this country to save them.⁴¹² This example reveals the link between the notion of justice and the continuation of the usual production cycle. The term justice also acquires a cosmological meaning in this context. The natural order and cycle of the world is sometimes equated with justice in Ahmedî: “Âlem işi adl-ile tutdı nizam/ Yir ü gök hem adl-ile oldı temâm”.⁴¹³ In this context, Ahmedî’s term justice is based, on the one hand, on an empirical experience of prosperity and peace, and on the other, on its cosmological generalization.

The development of this concept should also be examined. Because every moment of alienation and institutionalization develops with its own symbolic network, as Castoriadis states (2013, p. 205). As Bloch (1974) revealed, the increase in symbolic actions also corresponds to an increase in the degree of elaboration of authority (as cited in Cohen, 1993, p. 92). Moreover, as Lowry points out (2003, p. 17-18) Ahmedî uses the term justice in contrast with the concept of oppression at the very beginning of his book titled *İskendernâme*. Following lines of Ahmedî should be read closely in this context (Ahmedî, 2011, p. 137):

⁴⁰⁸ “Ol ki kuldur kul bigi olmah gerek (...) Padişâh kulin eger sultân kıla/ Kul gerek kim kul-idugını bile”, see: Ahmedî (2018, p. 550), Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 6662 and 6664.

⁴⁰⁹ See: Ahmedî (2018, p. 420), Ahmedî (2019), “Adl nedür râstlıhdur ol i yâr/ Râstlıh it kim olasın reste-gâr”, see: couplet no: 5599.

⁴¹⁰ See: Ahmedî (2018, p. 419), Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 5592-5597.

⁴¹¹ See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 5586-5587, Ahmedî (2018, p. 419).

⁴¹² See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 6735-6740.

⁴¹³ The affairs of the world were in order with justice/ Heaven and earth perfected (completed) with justice. See: Ahmedî (2018, p. 64), Ahmedî (2019), couplet: 807.

Kimi kafır idi, kimi ehl-i sitem/ Kahr idi anlarda biş ü mihr kem
Ol Moğol sultanlarınun adlini/ Niceyidi dinle, gel ahvalini
Etmediler anı kim Cengiz Han/ Zulmdan eder idi halka ‘ayan
Zulm etdiler, veli kanun ile/ Ellerini boyamadılar hun ile
Zulm kim kanun u zabt ile olur/ ‘Adl bigi halka ol asan gelür.⁴¹⁴

In these lines, the term justice is used as the opposite of the bloodshed and oppression, which is associated with Genghis Khan and the Mongol armies. Moreover, the fact that transactions made by enacting laws and keeping records are also a form of persecution are expressed by Ahmedî, which points to widespread taxation practices. In the political thought of the period, the Mongols were indicated as cruel invaders because they disrupted the social order, undermined production activities, displaced the settled ruling classes, but could not face anything but massacres and turmoil. It is possible to detect that a similar expression is also used for Tamerlane in Ahmedî: “Bu arada Ruma yüridi Temur/ Mülk doldu fitne vü havf u fütun/ Çün Temurun hiç ‘adli yog-ıdı/ Laciirem kim zulm ü cevri çoğ-ıdı”.⁴¹⁵ In the last analysis, when the concept of justice is used, in the simplest sense, an order should come to mind in which people are not massacred and are made the subjects of the ruler and continue their production activities without excessive exploitation. The establishment and settlement of this order in the Ottoman country already means the institutionalization of the regular class rule in rentier mode of production.

However, the only concept of justice formulated in the founding period does not belong to Ahmedî. Şeyhoğlu Mustafa’s concept of justice does not refer to a cosmological meaning, on the contrary, he organizes its content within the framework of a theological meaning. Şeyhoğlu’s term justice, as used by Ahmedî, also bears no association with the empirical content of the term and has been established in a rather formalist way. The fact that the concept of justice does not have an empirical basis result

⁴¹⁴ See: Ahmedî (2018, pp. 566-567), Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 6880-6884. Some were unbelievers, some were oppressors/ They had a lot of cruelty and their blessings were little/ The justice of those Mongol sultans / How was it, come and listen/ They did not commit the obvious cruelty that Genghis Khan did to the people/ They persecuted by the supreme law/ They did not paint their hands in blood/ If persecution takes place by law and registration/ It looks nice to the public like justice.

⁴¹⁵ Meanwhile, Tamerlane attacked the Rum country/ The country was full of strife, fear and sorrow/ Because Tamerlane had no justice/ Surely, his oppression and persecution were great. See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 7168-7169.

in its being purged of its concrete social essence and tied to a transcendent principle. In the final analysis, the concept of justice gains a determination within the provisions of Sharia: The ruler should “govern according to the order of God, even if he adjudges, it should not according to himself, according to the Sharia and for God, not for the other things created by God [tm]” (Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, 2013, p. 65). The essence of this complex formulation is clear: Justice exists only if it is practiced according to religious references. Şeyhoğlu Mustafa expresses this essence quite strikingly in a few lines (2013, p. 65): “Justice for oneself is not justice/ O Sultan, justice is to rule according to the Sharia/ If man does justice to the serpent/ Finally, look how he persecutes the gardener [tm]”. What is seen in these lines is both an exclusionary interpretation of justice that does not apply to everything that exists in a cosmological sense, and a strictly religious legitimation of this exclusion. In this context, the role attributed to the ruler is “working according to the order of God and following the Sharia [tm]” (Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, 2013, p. 86). Bilkan (2018, p. 36) evaluates this interpretation of Şeyhoğlu Mustafa within the tradition of Sassanid political thought, and affirms that it acts from a presupposition that requires the implementation of justice in accordance with the Sharia of God, not as the grace and benevolence of the ruler.

Interestingly, it is seen that Hüsameddin bin Amâsî, who came from a locally powerful family that had landowners, ulama members and state officials, developed an understanding of justice that emphasized private property, trade and law. According to Amâsî (2016, p. 241), three things are needed in order for justice to be achieved: “namus-i ilahî, hakim-i insani ve dinar-ı madeni”, that is, the divine law, the ruler and the metal coin. If we examine the first element, according to Amâsî, justice is both a cosmic-theological and a social notion. The cosmic-theological part of this notion is that God makes *anâsır-ı erbaa* (water, fire, air, earth) balanced with each other and creates “the heavens and the earth in justice” (Amâsî, 2016, pp. 237-39). As it has been seen in other parts of *Mirâtu'l-Mülûk*, these four elements correspond to the four strata of society (Amâsî, 2016, pp. 361-63): (i) *Ulama* and *ümera* with water, (ii) soldiers with fire, (iii) merchants and artisans with air, (iv) farmers with earth. It is interesting, however, that Amâsî, in this first chapter, in which he deals with the subject of justice, focuses directly on the part of the notion of justice that is related to the social division of labor and money, instead of giving place to his views on the four strata. Moreover, while the coin and the ruler are material instruments, the notion of honor appears to be a purely cosmological construct and its social meaning is uncertain without interpreting

this notion in terms of *Meşşâî* philosophy. Due to the interpretations and annotations made in the following section, it is possible to interpret the social meaning of this notion as obeying God's orders and performing worship (Amâsî, 2016, p. 243). But what kind of contribution this has for divine justice is in need of interpretation. Amâsî (2016, p. 243) formulates justice of the first kind as people's giving and striving for God's due, and conceptualizes God as the source of all blessings and donations.

If such formulation "[first justice] is about man's giving Allah his due and working towards it, because He is the reason for the existence of all blessings, and He is the source and donor of all good deeds [tm]" (Amâsî, 2016, p. 243), the divine law should be placed in the social plan. If it is accepted as a practice of God, it is possible to make a such comment that the main argument is the creation and judgment of the social layers. If these statements are accepted as the application of divine law to the social plan, they can be interpreted as that the social strata are created by God. Thus, the acceptance of the position in the social hierarchy should be read as the acceptance of divine law. However, this does not mean anything beyond the abstract-ideological conception of justice. In this respect, it can be said that the focus of the notion of justice in Amâsî has shifted to material relations and especially commercial relations. Such a view should not be considered strange for a member of the ulama who grew up in a port city like Amasya and also in a wealthy family. According to Amâsî, the starting point of the notion of justice –if the few lines he reserved for cosmic-theological rhetoric are left out– is that human being is a social being and needs cooperation in order to survive. It is clear that this argument is an extension of the notion of the social division of labor that can be seen in the thought of Plato and Aristotle as well as al-Farabi and his followers. Moreover, referring to Aristotle's concept of proportional justice, Amâsî (2016, p. 239) states that cooperation can take place in a context where mutual balance and equality are ensured as well as the existence privileged social groups. Amâsî's (2016, p. 239) emphasis focuses on helping as (a) some people serving others, and (b) doing it through exchange. Here, Amâsî (2016, p. 239) uses the words "bazısından ala bazısına vire" for the concept of shopping.⁴¹⁶ It is not clear what is meant by these words about the form of exchange, that is, whether it is a simple exchange, sharing according to need, or trade. However, since Amâsî states in the following lines that an intermediary (vehicle) is needed for the transaction in question and that it is money, we can think that the form in question is a commercial form and indicates commodity circulation.

⁴¹⁶ Take from some and give to some.

According to Amâsî (2016, p. 239), “money is a just intermediary, but a dumb one, that ensures this equivalence in relations between people [tm]”. In this framework, Amâsî refers the justice established through money. However, in cases where the “dumb fair” (*adil-i samit*) money is insufficient, that is, it cannot provide assistance, a “speaking fair” (*adil-i natık*) is needed. In this context, a ruler is needed in cases where the social order developed only within the framework of monetary relations, that is, the relations of social subordination organized around service and shopping, cannot be maintained. Amâsî states that the order was re-established by the help of the ruler (2016, pp. 239-41):

Pes dinar halk arasında adil ve mütavassıt ola lakin adil-i samit ola pes adil-i natıka ihtiyaç ola ki eğer samit ile taavün ve istikamet olmaya adil-i natıktan istianet dilene ve ol dahi dinara ianet kıla ta nizam bi'l-fil mevcut ola. Ve ol adil-i natık insandur pes bu cihetden bir hâkime ihtiyaç ola.⁴¹⁷

It is quite unclear who or which authority the administrator in these lines corresponds to. Amâsî does not seem to be referring to a sultan or local ruler, as he uses the term ‘*hakim*’ (means bot ruler and judge) rather than the term sultan or ruler. The type of ruler he implied seems more reminiscent of qadis from the ulama stratum. Since Amâsî (2016, p. 243) gives more detailed information about the role of the ‘*hakim*’ in the following sections, it is possible to make an inference on this matter: A series of functions that fit with the intermediary role of the ‘*hakim*’, which is expressed as “the follow of the law of the people towards each other, the fulfillment of the trusts, the respect of the rulers and the act of honesty in the transactions [tm]”. This, formulating describes an administrator who performs the judiciary, register-based duties, and duties of discipline and control. It is highly probable that the ruler referred to in this context may have been a *qadi*. Finally, the notion of justice fulfilled with the help of money becomes visible in Amâsî (2016, p. 243) in two concrete ways: “fulfillment of wills and enforcement of law [tm]”. In this context, Amâsî (2016, p. 241) refers to the evils brought about by disrupting the justice provided by money as “extortion, looting of goods, various betrayals [tm]”. When the judgments in question are evaluated, it can be see that these examples place the issue of protection and transfer of private property

⁴¹⁷ As a result, money should be just and medium among the people, but since the dumb just exist, there is a need for a speaking just as well. If it is not possible to determine direction with dumb justice, the speaking justice is asked for support and helps with money until an order is actually established. And this speaking justice is human and therefore a ruler is needed.

within the notion of justice. The fact that Amâsî devoted a significant part of his work to household management and his special interest in subjects such as private property, accumulation and utilizing labor reflects such a tendency. For example, for the first time in Amâsî, we come across arguments about the importance and method of collecting goods in detail. According to Amâsî (2016, p. 293), “the biggest adornment is one’s wealth [tm]”. For this, attention should be paid to financial procedures, and incomes should be more than expenses (Amâsî, 2016, p. 295). Amâsî (2016, pp. 295-97) recommends that a wise person should accumulate goods and supplies in advance, and that this accumulation should be in some cash, some goods and products, and some real estate and animals. It is clear that only segments of the ruling class, large landowners and merchants were in a position to make such an appropriation. In this context, Amâsî (2016, p. 299) underlines the necessity of getting married and having children in order to protect private property and to continue the accumulation after the death. Amâsî also mentions the help of slaves and servants in the use of this accumulation, and states that slaves are more useful than servants (2016, p. 335) and claims that they should be seen instruments such as the hands and feet of the person in housework (2016, p. 329). In the final analysis, all this analysis details the privileged position that Amâsî names as the ‘*muamele ehli*’, that is, to the tradesmen, artisans, craftsmen and tax collectors within the notion of justice.

IV.II. Social Classes and Models of Power Relations

“Ra’iyyet olmasa beg olmaz idi
Fakir olmasa baylar gülmez idi”⁴¹⁸
Halilnâme (Güldaş, 1996, p. 181).

In the political thought of the establishment period of Ottoman rule, a series of power/state/sultanate/society models that differ from each other in form and content, contradictory and/or complement each other in terms of focus and relations exist. These models are the forms of domination models, ideologies, and the administrative and class domination skills of the past states that have been inherited from the Ottoman political thought since ancient centuries. These models, with different contents and new imagery, correspond to forms of political thinking that affected political thought and actions in

⁴¹⁸ Without the subject people, there would be no lords/ If the poor did not exist, the rich would not be happy.

Mediterranean and Middle Eastern states for centuries. Arendt (1977, p. 136) used the imagery as “statesman as a healer and physician, as expert, as helmsman, as the master who knows, as educator, as the wise man”, which can be seen in the models that will be discussed in the following subsections. These models are like examples in which both class consciousness and class ideologies, as well as the logic of social order and management, crystallize, and when necessary, these power relations have a clear formulation in order to facilitate their understanding and implementation. By means of these models, it is seen that Ottoman political thought benefited from the legacy of class domination of the past centuries and adapted them to its own age with the changes it made at the points it deems necessary. There are five basic models of power relations in the early political thought: (i) the model of circle of justice as a schema of social stratification under the class rule found in Ahmedî, Amâsî, Şirvânî, (ii) the tenth metaphor as a model of state organization found in Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, (iii) the body metaphor as a model of corporal organization of class domination found in Dâvûd-i Kayserî, Şeyhoğlu Mustafa and Amâsî, (iv) the shepherd metaphor as a model of direct relation with ruler and subjects found in Şeyhoğlu Mustafa and Sinan Pasha, (v) the model based on Aristotelian philosophy which indicates the common good and division of labor in the works of Amâsî and Tursun Beg. Since the first four of these models are directly related to the period we are dealing with, I will analyze them in this section in order not to disturb the chronological presentation order. Although the last model was adopted by Şeyhoğlu Mustafa and Amâsî, I will examine the last part of this section, where I discuss the period in which the imperial administration developed. Thus, while discussing the views of Sinan Pasha and Tursun Beg in the last part of this section, it will be possible to compare the perspectives of Şeyhoğlu and Amâsî. I hope this schema of presentation will provide a more fruitful basis for comparison, with minimal strain on chronological elaboration.

IV. II. I. The Model of Circle of Justice (*Dâire-i Adâlet*)

“Eben derselbe Gedanke kann, an einem andern Orte,
einen ganz andern Wert haben”⁴¹⁹

Lessing, Leibniz von den ewigen Strafen.
(as cited in Strauss, 1945, p. 357).

⁴¹⁹ The identical thought can have a completely different meaning in an other place.

In the period we discussed, different definitions of the circle of justice of Ahmedî, Amâsî and Şirvânî are encountered. The historical background of this model has not been clearly explained. Ünlü (2019, p. 127) claims that this model originated in the Akkadian Empire, and that it came from this origin and reached Iran and the Ottoman Empire. Darling (2013, pp. 15-17) states that the idea of the circle of justice was first written down in Sumerian tablets around 2500 BC. This model of power relations, whose traces continued to exist in ancient Mesopotamian civilizations, reached advanced forms through civilizations based in Iran. While it is possible to encounter traces of the circle of justice in documents from the Achaemenids, Seleucids and Parthians, the re-recognition of this model in the Middle Ages was through the Sassanid Empire and the Islamic states that inherited it (Darling, 2013, p. 33). It is possible to realize through *Kutadgu Bilig* that the Turkish states also recognized this model due to their relations with the Iranian region and adopted it to the extent that their contact with Islamic sources increased (Ertürk-Keskin, 2009, p. 51).

The circle of justice model constructs a schema that considers how there is a necessary relationship between domination, military power, economic relations, and concepts of justice/consent/legitimacy. Aytekin (2015, p. 27) defines this model as the official Ottoman ideology. The general meaning of the model lies in giving an example of an institutional structure on how the ruler can reproduce his class-based power and explaining what kind of social relations he should establish in this context. As a form, the syllogism form is used, in which the related items require each other as antecedent and conclusion. Heper (1980, p. 7) interprets this model in terms of the Ottoman political system as follows:

In the Ottoman political philosophy, the political system was considered to consist of a state with superiority and a charismatic authority, an administrative staff responsible for ensuring the superiority and interests of the state, and the subjects that needed to be protected because they provided income to the state. In this philosophy, there is no room for other political forces (*pouvoir intermedianes*) to take place between the state and the subjects. In this system, justice means the recognition of a corporate structure as it is. [tm]

However, Heper's mistake is that he thinks that there is only one definite and complete form of the cycle he derived from the circle of justice model, based on the assumption that the social strata participating in the state administration cannot have

their own specific interests. Barkey (2013, p. 138), on the other hand, states that this model is a contract between the state and society, which emphasizes the security function of the state rather than the superiority of the state. When the Ottoman political thought is examined, neither a structure in which the state is dominant, as Heper states, nor a kind of social contract model as Barkey puts forward is encountered. Rather, it is seen that different social strata interpret the circle of justice model differently, and within this framework, they assign different intermediary roles to themselves and also take a share of the power. If Berkey's conceptualization is interpreted to include the meaning of 'moral economy', it could gain a certain validity. However, in this interpretation, too, it is more likely to see a moral legitimacy model that is not oriented from the bottom up, but a moral model that different social strata reconcile and expand to the social base, that is, to the direct producers. For this reason, rather than a general presentation of the circle of justice model, I will try to elaborate the Ottoman political thought, how it gained new nuances and emphases within the examples of political thought in different periods. Many definitions of circle of justice were made in the Ottoman classical period and the transformation phase, and their starting point and the relations they emphasized always differ from each other.⁴²⁰ At the origin of this difference, as Keskintaş (2017, p. 152) states, lies the differences of opinion about different classes and their relative status-relationships. For example, Kinalızade's approach begins with the lines "Adldir mucib-i salah-ı cihan/ Cihan bir bağıdır divarı devlet/ Devletin nazmı şeriattır"⁴²¹ and emphasizes the problem of how it will be organized around the state by accepting the social order as given from the beginning (Keskintaş, 2017, p. 152). Koçi Beg, on the other hand, states that the given situation is the imperial regime, which he refers to as the 'supreme sultanate', with the expressions "Velhasıl yüksek saltanatın gücü ve dayanağı askerdir/ askerin bekası hazine iledir"⁴²² (Keskintaş, 2017, p. 152) and that the priority element in this requires military power and treasury. The comment of Defterdar Sarı Mehmet Pasha on this subject primarily highlights the bureaucratic strata: "nizam-ı sultan rical iledir"⁴²³ (Keskintaş, 2017, p.

⁴²⁰ For example, Şeker (2013, pp. 135-136) briefly mentioned thirteen of them in his work. Although Şeker is of the opinion that they are similar and complement each other, in our opinion, this thesis is a typical example of the idealization of the notion of justice in the Ottoman Empire.

⁴²¹ Justice is necessary for the comfort of the world/ The world is an orchard, its wall is the state/ The order of the state is Sharia.

⁴²² In short, the power and support of the supreme sultanate is the soldier / The existence of the soldier is with the treasury.

⁴²³ The order of sultanate is possible with high-ranking state officials.

152). As Keskintaş (2017, p. 153) points out, we can follow these and many different approaches in the works of authors such as Naîmâ, Akhisârî, Kâtibî, Ibn al-Firuz and others.

Although Ünlü (2019, p. 202) dates the entry of this model to the Ottoman thought with the translation of Sassanid-Iranian advice literature (*nasihatnâmes*), similar to the examples given above, we actually come across the model in question in Ahmedî's *İskendernâme* for the first time in Ottoman political thought. In this work, while Ahmedî narrates the events of Alexander the Great's conquest of Near East and India in the form of poetry, he felt the need to open a special chapter and explain how Alexander, who went to the conquest of the Indian country, dominated Iran and where his power came from. He made these statements in accordance with the model known as the circle of justice. Ahmedî (2018, p. 148) first begins the explanation of the model with the following couplet: "For those who want to conquer the country and become a sultan/ Needs both wealth and many soldiers [tm]".⁴²⁴ If this introductory argument is analyzed, Ahmedî first begins by taking for granted the conquest motivation of a ruler who wanted to acquire new lands, as seen in his own time, not the reproduction of an existing political order. Note that Ahmedî's justification primarily refers to subjective motivation, namely the ethos of conquest and warfare. In this framework, it can be thought that Ahmedî's systematic of thought that brings *ghaza* to the fore also manifests itself at the starting point of the notion of circle of justice. The second emphasis of Ahmedî is the need for goods and soldiers for the realization of the conquest: "Kim sipâhî-y-la olur hasm olsa kam'/ Mâl-ıla olur sipâh olursa cem"⁴²⁵ The most crucial point in the interpretation of this couplet is the explanation of the term '*mal*' (goods). It should be noted that the term '*mal*' is not used as money or treasury here, or it is not detailed by concepts that indicate kind of money accumulation. However, it is clear that there are also uses in the literature to indicate cash accumulation. For example, Âşık Paşa uses the expression as such: "Mâl u mülk ü sîm ü zer cem'eylemek"⁴²⁶ As will be examined in the next parts on the 'accumulation of goods' by the rulers, the meaning of the term here can be understood as agricultural products to be used to feed the army.

⁴²⁴ "Her ki diler mülk'ola vü ola şâh/ Mâl gerek aña vü bî-had-sipâh", see: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 1961.

⁴²⁵ To defeat the enemy requires soldiers / To recruit soldiers requires goods. See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 1962.

⁴²⁶ Hoarding goods and property and silver and gold. See: Âşık Paşa (2000, p. 243), couplet no: 4697.

For example, in *Âşıkpaşazâde*, stated that Bayezid I accumulated goods and thus resulting in famine, on the contrary the ideal practice is to distribute the goods to the soldiers and keep the soldiers satiated: “The solid army is what they say, be full and be crowded. Not to worry about hunger [tm]” (Apzd, 2017, p. 200). Here again, the fact that the ruler has lands and farms where he can collect the surplus product as a rent can also be understood in terms of his goods and properties. In the next line, Ahmedî makes the connection between the collection of goods and production: “Mâl ele gelse imâretle gelür”.⁴²⁷ In this context, the improvement of the owned lands, the continuation of the production activities, the growth of the wealth owned by the ruler, this allows the soldiers to be fed, thus increasing the war capacity and realizing the conquering tendencies. Therefore, the essence of class domination emerges as domination over production and the sustainability/reproduction of relations of production. This term may also be used in a broad sense to include movable assets, but even so, the concept does not cause a major change in the class basis of the relationship. In order to realize this principle, Ahmedî puts the most important term that we have mentioned from the beginning into effect at this point: Justice. According to Ahmedî: “Adlsüz hergiz imâret olmaya/ Çün imâret yoh imâret olmaya”.⁴²⁸ In these lines, production (and wealth) and the political regulation of production (justice function) are used together and lay the foundations of the reign. Thus, it is seen that the exploitation of agricultural producers is the basis for all claims to reign, and that it is the rational imperative of class domination to use the rate of exploitation and the means of maintaining exploitation in moderation. To express this situation in Ahmedî’s words: “Adldür kim beglige bünyâd olur/ Her binâ bünyâd-ıla âbâd olur”.⁴²⁹ In this context, the dichotomy of oppression and justice is encountered again, “Zulm ider yavuz melikler adını/ Zulm yıhar memleket bünyâdını”.⁴³⁰ The fall of the reputation of the monarchs can be understood as the dysfunction of the consent mechanism, and the destruction of the building of country can be understood as the disintegration of the class order and even the disappearance of the entire production order / disintegration of the social formation. As a result, Ahmedî’s

⁴²⁷ Goods are provided by the welfare of the country. See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 1963.

⁴²⁸ There is no prosperity without justice/ Therefore, there is no rulership without prosperity. See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 1964.

⁴²⁹ Justice becomes the support for the reign/ Every building becomes prosper with this support and remains for the future. See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 1965.

⁴³⁰ Oppression makes the reputation of a king awful / Oppression destroys the building of country. See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 1966.

interpretation consists of two levels. At the first level there is the preservation of class order, at the second level the realization of the ethos of conquest. At the first level, the political economy of Ahmedî rule gives us the condition that agricultural surplus should be exploited and that this order should be maintained without especially eliminating consent mechanisms. At the second level, Ahmedî emphasizes the use of surplus in the conduct of military activities and the expansion of dominance. Thus, to use a metaphor, it can be said that Ahmedî gives the form and principle of articulation of the infrastructure and superstructure of the class domination.

Secondly, it is necessary to deal with another author and his work who talked about the circle of justice model in the establishment period of Ottoman rule. Ahmed bin Husameddin Amâsî used the notion of circle of justice in his work *Mirâtu'l-Mülûk*, in accordance with the same Iranian tradition. The formulation of Amâsî (2016, p. 409) is as follows: “’Inne’d-dine bi’l-meliki ve’l-meliku bi’l-cundi ve’l-cundu bi’l-mali ve’l-malu bi-imarati’l-biladi ve imarati’l-biladi bi’l-adli beyne’l-ibadi”. The meaning of Amâsî’s long proposition is: Certainly, religion stands with the ruler, the ruler remains with the army, the army exists with wealth, wealth is achieved by the welfare of the country, and the welfare of the country is provided by justice.⁴³¹ Since Amâsî’s formulation does not contain as much detail as Ahmedî’s, I will consider the latter in a shorter way to avoid repetition. Although at first glance there may not seem to be a difference between the circle of justice formulations of Ahmedî and Amâsî, upon closer inspection there are several significant differences in emphasis between the two. Firstly, while Ahmedî started to describe the conquest of the country by the ruler or the candidate for the reign, Amâsî put forward the purpose of making religion stand as *causa prima*. Although it is possible to interpret Amâsî’s statement as a reflection of the aim of spreading religion, this is not a correct interpretation. Because mainly, there is no specific section or emphasis on *ghaza/jihad* in Amâsî’s work. On the contrary, Amâsî is a kind of thinker who suggested that war activities should be carried out with a financial account, that is, by taking into account the return and cost. For this reason, the element of ‘making religion stand’ should be understood as ensuring that people live in accordance with religious rules. In this expression, the need for a ruler to maintain the religion is a clear expression of the ideological formation of the ulama stratum, that is, a reflection of the mentality of the ruler’s decisions to be limited by the ulama and the social order to be shaped according to the interests of the ulama stratum. The second

⁴³¹ See: Yılmaz (2016, p. 409).

proposition is that the ruler is strong with the army. There is not much to say about this proposition beyond our comment to Ahmedî. Likewise, on the subject that the army requires wealth and wealth requires general welfare or production. To speculate, it is possible that Amâsî may have used the term ‘*mal*’ to include movable wealth, as he frequently emphasized the significance of collecting coins and treasures in his work. For example, Amâsî’s emphasis that it is necessary to seek the solution of political problems through peaceful means because war will empty the treasury becomes meaningful at this point (Amâsî, 2016, p. 461). Finally, let’s take a look at the connection between the welfare of the country and justice. This connection is quite clear: If the country is to be rebuilt, justice must prevail. But behind this clarity, there are still some dark points that can be analyzed about the meaning of the term justice and the duty of the ruler. According to Amâsî (2016, p. 241), justice in a country needs three things: Divine law, a judge to enforce it, and a coin. In this context a ruler is a person in charge of enforcing the divine law. The figure of ruler is also in charge of helping the money if the justice provided by the money is insufficient. This idea, which was developed around the terms ‘*adil-i natik*’ and ‘*adil-i samit*’, has been mentioned before. In this case, it is seen that the figure of ruler is formulated as a ruler torn between money and religious law (which symbolized merchants and ulama). In this framework, it is possible to reconstruct Amâsî’s model of circle of justice from the end to the beginning. First, justice is needed for a country to be prosperous. Justice is established with the help of money, the ruler who helps the money, and the religious law. The ruler also benefits from the prosperity of the country and feeds soldiers. The military power of the ruler is necessary for the stand of the religion. In this framework, the role of the ulama seems to be quite dominant for the interpretation of religion and the provision of justice in monetary relations. While the role assigned to the ruler was dominant in Ahmedî’s model, in Amâsî this role was narrowed mainly within the framework of religious and commercial provisions, that is, within the framework of the interests of two social segments indicated above. For this reason, it is necessary to evaluate Amâsî’s formulation of the circle of justice as a model centered on the provision and reproduction of the interests of the ulama stratum. In fact, Amâsî evaluates the ulama and *ümera* as the head of social classes and the ‘pillar of religion’ in his theory of four elements.

Finally, there is another version of the circle of justice model, interestingly, in the work of Mahmud Şirvânî’s *Tuhfe-i Murâdî* dated 1430, presented to Murat II. In this

section, I will focus only on the notion of circle of justice formulated in the work and discuss how and why such works became widespread at the beginning of the 15th century in the following sections. Mahmud Şîrvânî formulates the idea of circle of justice as follows (as cited in Bilkan, 2018, p. 334):

Cevahir ve mukavviyat ve itriyyat ‘ilmiden ve ‘amelinden padişahlara enseb ‘ilm görmedüm. (...) Nitekim Erdeşir-i Babegan, Hikmet’inde eydür: ‘Ayş u neşat u ferah meliklere milksüz müyesser olmaz ve milk çerisüz olmaz ve çeri malıla cem’ olur ve mal ‘imaretile ve ‘imaret ‘adl ü siyasetile olur. Milkün sermayesi mal durur ve malun hulasası ve padişahlara gereklüsi nefis cevahir durur, hacet vaktında gereğince mu’avini durur, tutmağıla çürümez ve harab olmaz.⁴³²

It has been stated above that Ahmedî accepted the policy of conquest and Amâsî considered the survival of religion as the main motivation of the rulers. The founding principle, on which Şîrvânî bases the circle of justice model, is that rulers eat and drink without reckoning, that is, the symbol of benefiting from the blessings of power at the highest level. While the context in which Ahmedî and Amâsî reveal the founding principles of the circle of justice in general is determined by social legitimacy concerns, material concerns seem to come to the fore in Şîrvânî. For example, while Ahmedî legitimized the politics of conquest with the ideology of *ghaza* in the final analysis, or while the legitimacy of the ruler was tied to the survival of religion in Amâsî, Şîrvânî focused directly on meeting the personal and arbitrary needs of the ruler. In this respect, Şîrvânî’s arguments differ from the other two thinkers in that he did not see any problem in mentioning the class privileges presented directly as material privileges, in contrast with an ideological cover formed in Ahmedî and Amâsî. There are two important reasons for this situation. First of all, the subject of Şîrvânî’s book is precious metals, stones and jewels (*cevâhîrnâme*), and it is not possible to justify their possession easily by being tied to religious or mystical schemes. For example, in the work *Ezharü’l-Efkâr*, which has a similar content, translated from Arabic by Şîrvânî, the reason for the desire

⁴³² I have not seen a more suitable knowledge for the sultans than the knowledge and practice of precious stones and strengtheners and fragrant herbs. (...) As a matter of fact, Erdeşir-i Babegan says in his Hikmet: Eating and drinking in comfort cannot be obtained for rulers without property, and it is not possible to obtain property without soldiers, soldiers are gathered with goods and goods is achieved by wealth and wealth by justice and politics. The capital of the property is the goods and the essence of the goods that necessary for rulers are precious stones, when needed, these become the ruler’s assistants, they are not spoiled and destroyed by stocking.

to have precious stones presented as drug making, embellishment-boasting and trade (Bilkan, 2018, p. 334).

The fact that Şîrvânî is a physician and for these reasons, he can enter the personal circle of the rulers, in fact, opens a specific window on what the personal needs of the rulers are.⁴³³ In this respect, it is necessary to make sense of the fact that precious stones, strengtheners and geranium are indispensable for a ruler at the entrance of the passage quoted above, within this framework. The terms '*mukavviyat*' and '*itriyyat*' refer to sexual enhancement mixtures and fragrances/perfumes. It is clear that the context in which rulers needed these commodities largely corresponded to palace life. Precious stones, on the other hand, are substances that are needed in more than one area, as Şîrvânî states. For example, drug making responds to the individual needs of rulers, while adornment functions as a status symbol in both the palace life and for the people under rulers' command. Finally, precious stones, as materials with economic value, gain a function in the reproduction of power. At the junction of these three functions, the personal needs of the ruler, including forms political and economic power, are associated with precious metals.

Şîrvânî's formulation of the circle of justice consists of two latent cycles. The first of these is the cycle that constitutes the political formation in which the interests of the ruling classes are at the center. The second is the cycle that constitutes the mode of production in which the power relationship between the dominant classes and the subordinated classes is included. The author first reveals that the most important needs of rulers are eating and drinking without measure, requiring health, attractiveness and power. According to him, the objective condition for accessing it is to own the property. It takes soldiers to collect goods, and to recruit soldiers to have goods to distribute to them. Thus, Şîrvânî writes down the first cycle consisting of (i) the needs of the ruler, (ii) property and (iii) soldiers. This first cycle is completed by the second cycle, which marks the creation of the social conditions necessary for the production of goods. The production of goods is possible with the development of welfare, and the development of welfare depends on justice and politics. There is a significant contradiction between these two cycles. First of all, the type of goods collected from the public and the type of goods given to the soldiers may not be one and the same. For example, when collecting grain from the people, it is necessary to give money to the soldiers. Secondly, while the ruler needs goods to meet his needs, he also needs goods to give to the soldiers in order

⁴³³ See: Okumuş (2010).

to collect goods. What this means is that the ruler needs some kind of ‘capital’ with which he can restart the goods-soldier-property cycle. In this case, in order for the ‘capital’ to be accumulated, both the positive effect of the fiscal cycle on the ruler's account and the instruments of movable wealth in which the surplus in the fiscal cycle can be stored are needed. In this context, Şirvânî reveals that goods are the ‘capital of property’ and precious stones are a concentrated form of goods/capital. These materials, which do not rot by hoarding or are not destroyed like money, are considered by Şirvânî as means of accumulation in the final analysis for the reproduction of power and thus the fulfillment of the needs of the ruler.

While Ahmedî's circle of justice model focuses on the warrior ethos and the privileged position of soldiers close to the ruler, Amâsî's model corresponds more to a *fiqh* regulations, that is, the privileged placement of the interests of the ulama stratum and merchants close to the ruler. In the final analysis, both authors try to synthesize the general social interests and the particular interests of the ruling classes. However, Şirvânî's model does not directly express the interests of these social groups. Şirvânî was a physician and it can be guessed that he was in the position of an expert in the precious stone trade or a buyer to use it in medicine. In this respect, he tries to ensure that precious stones become a means of accumulation and tries to provide a privilege to the merchants operating in this field and even to himself, and while trying to do this, he gives particular importance to the personal needs and wishes of the ruler. In this context, Şirvânî expresses the role of an intermediary in which the particular interests of the merchants and the individual interests of both him and the ruler can be shared. But the translation of this mediation into the language of the circle of justice reveals the general utility of using precious stones as a means of accumulation for the reproduction of the rulership.

IV.II.II. The Tenth Metaphor as a Model of State Organization

“Cihanı tutsun uçdan uca külli

Anun bahtı hıyaminun tınabı”

Halilnâme (Gültaş, 1996, p. 495)⁴³⁴

The tent metaphor is a widely known metaphor in Ottoman political thought, although it is not subject to in-depth investigations and elaborations, it is often used as

⁴³⁴ Let it cover the whole world from end to end/ The rope of his tent of fortune.

a parable. Distinctive elaboration on the content of this metaphor is found in Şeyhoğlu Mustafa's *Kenzü'l-küberâ*. However, before examining how Şeyhoğlu uses the tent metaphor, it is significant to focus on the historical origins of this metaphor and its other aspects in related Ottoman political thought, in terms of presenting a detailed interpretation of the metaphor. For example, Âşıkpaşazâde (Kala, 2013, p. 60) makes use of this metaphor by comparing the state to a tent in the couplet as such: "Kuruldu devleti çetri ezelden/ Ebed baki kalır bil nesli Osman".⁴³⁵ In general, this analogy can be interpreted as the state's inclusive positioning and providing security over its subjects. Just as the tent blocks the sun and provides shade, the state also provides security to its subjects. On the other hand, it can be thought that the state also has a shadow on the properties, that is, it provides security to the properties of both ruling class members and subjects. In the subtext of this metaphor, there is an analogical relationship established between the state and the sky. Just as the tent covers the sky, the state also covers the sky of its subjects, and the ruler becomes the 'shadow' for his subjects as the symbol of the power and protection of the God. It can also be mentioned that the tent and shadow symbols have a secondary meaning that the ruler has information about his subjects and watches over them. Although such connotations gained by the tent metaphor are often not included in the texts of political thought, the interpretation of the tent metaphor, as required by the common understanding about power relations of the period, makes such connotations more evident. Another connotation is seen in the couplets of Âşıkpaşazâde: "Kuruldı bu cihan hayme-i hali/ Yine tizcek o haymeler düdüldü/ Veli hayme kuran kayyimmakamdur/ Hezaran hayme kuruldu bozuldu"⁴³⁶ (Yavuz & Saraç, 2003, p. 441). In these couplets, the term tent is used both as a metaphor that symbolizes the world and in the sense of power/rulership/state. Although what is meant by the analogy of setting up and breaking down tents can be interpreted as God's creation and destruction of many realms, the fact that Âşıkpaşazâde wrote this couplet after Murat I handed over his brother Mustafa to the hangman, the power was taken from one person by God and transferred to another. Thus, it could be interpreted as an advice that is given to the ruler about should not be proud of reigning.

⁴³⁵ The tent of your state has been established from time immemorial / Know that the Ottoman lineage will stand forever.

⁴³⁶ This world was set up as a desolate tent/ Those tents were gathered quickly again/ But he is the owner of the authority who set up those supreme tents/ Thousands of tents were set up and dismantled.

It is seen that both the words ‘*çetr*’ and ‘*hayme*’ are used in the use of the tent metaphor in Âşıkpaşazâde. Although no definite conclusion has been reached about the etymological origin of the word ‘*çetr*’, the debate is based on the Middle Persian word ‘*çatur*’ (cover), the Old Turkic verb ‘*çat*’ (to join, to fasten together, to crack) or the Sanskrit ‘*çhattra*’ (umbrella, bower, etc.).⁴³⁷ In my opinion, the possibility of ‘*çar-dar*’ (four poles, four-posted canopy) should also be evaluated as the etymological origin of the word, because the word *çar-tak* (arbour) can be used to mean a four-corner tent (Develioğlu, 1991, p. 221). Ho Kai-lung (2008, p. 48) states that the word *cadar*, which he claims to be a Persian word, has been exist in Mongolian form *cadir/cacir* since at least 1240. Moreover, the use of the term as the name of an official organization in the Chinese state during the Yuan dynasty (13th century) adds to the complexity. According to Liu (1992, p. 276), the Chinese phrase *Ch’a-tieh-erh chü*, derived from the word ‘*çetr*’, means tent-service and serves under the Ministry of Works -the administrative office dealing with public constructions. Within these uses, it remains unclear whether the nomadic Turkish-Mongolian tribes’ daily life or Indo-European language and culture lie at the root of the tent metaphor. On the other hand, in Semitic culture, the tent has a special importance in terms of social imagination. In the Creation (18/6-33) section of the Torah, there are details about the tent life of the prophet Abraham, and in other sections, there is information that the Israelites slept in a tent in the desert after they left Egypt and built a temple (indicated as the dwelling of God) made of tents (Exodus, 26/6-38; Numbers, 11/16; 12/4). According to the Torah, God ordered Moses to set up a meeting tent and met with him as two friends in this tent (Exodus, 33/7-11). In fact, when the cloud of God descended on the tent, the Israelites stopped traveling/migrating in the desert, and when the cloud lifted, they continued on their way (Exodus, 40/34-38). In the lines in the Torah, it is seen that the tent is used both as a tool to reflect divine splendor and often as a place of worship. The presence of tents in the descriptions of paradise in the Qur’an must be a phenomenon related to the nomadic origins of the Semitic religions and the daily life practices of the Arab society. The expressions in the Qur’an (ar-Rahman, 55:72-74) are as follows (Dawood, 1999, p. 378): “Each planted with fruit-trees, the palm and the pomegranate. Which of your Lord’s blessings would you deny? (...) dark-eyed virgins, sheltered in their tents (...) whom neither man nor jinnee will have touched before”.

⁴³⁷ See: Bozkurt (1993).

The word “مَقْصُورَاتٌ” (*maksûratun*) in this verse, meaning closed/restrained/reserved, indicates an example where the tent also functions as a patriarchal confinement area.⁴³⁸ In fact, this image consists of an inverted form of the tent image as a space of lust and freedom, which is also found in pre-Islamic Arabic poetry. For example, in a poem of the 6th century poet Abid b. al-Abras, the following expressions are included (as cited in Izutsu, 2002, p. 49): “Yea, many the tent from whose chambers the scent of musk floated forth have I entered, mayhap in secret, mayhap as an open wooer; And many the songstress whose voice the wine had rendered hoarse”. The second reference to the tent symbol in the Qur’an is in the tenth verse of Surah Fajr (89:8-10) (Ali, 2000, p. 536): “And with the Thamud (people), who cut out (huge) rocks in the valley?- And with Pharaoh, lord of stakes?”. According to the interpretation of the Diyanet commission (2011, p. 684, footnote 2), it is possible that the word “الأوتاد” (stakes) is a reference to the stakes of the tents in the army of the Pharaoh, and in this way, the excess of the number of soldiers in the army is emphasized.⁴³⁹ This second tent analogy seems to be related to military and political power. Holding tents also means being militarily powerful. It will be considered later that this meaning has a certain similarity with the connotations of the word tent in Turkish.

It can be thought that the etymological origins of the relationship between tent and temple are influenced by the word altar in meaning, derived from the root *hwt* in the ancient Egyptian language. The word *hmn*⁴⁴⁰ in Aramaic means chapel, and in Ugaritic it means both altar and chapel and tent/awning. In Arabic, the word *hayme* (هَيْمَة) is used in the sense of tent, similar to both the Hebrew and Ugaritic traditions. This word is used as the general name of the woolen tents of the Bedouins, and the words *khiyam/khayme* in relation to it have meanings such as settling in a region, making it safe, dwelling (Badawi & Abdel Haleem, 2008, pp. 294-95). Similarly, there is the word *xaima* in Urdu. In this context, the word *yurd* can be accepted as the Turkish equivalent of the word *hayme*. Although the word ‘*yurd*’ is used in the sense of big tent (Güney, 2002, p. 15), Baykara (2001, p. 82) argues that this term is mostly used to denote the specific land on which houses are built. In this context, there is a basic distinction that can be identified sociologically in the development of the words

⁴³⁸ Yusuf Ali (2000, p. 463) translate this word as “pavilions”.

⁴³⁹ On the other hand Dawood (1999, p. 425) interpreted this word as a reference to punishment of impalement by using stakes.

⁴⁴⁰ See: (“Hmn”, 2023).

hayme/yurd/çadır. These terms express mostly nomadic shelters for nomadic societies, and in settled societies, their meanings are met with the meaning of village as well as the meaning of house/shack. It can be thought that this second meaning has developed over the course of history. Secondly, it can be thought that the words *hayme/yurd* refer to primitive forms of private property that crystallize as family property. Baykara (2001, p. 76) states that Turkic tribes use tents, not *yurds*, for their accommodation during nomadic expeditions. For this reason, it can be thought that the tent refers to a temporary accommodation form, while *yurd* is the equipment of a relatively settled lifestyle and therefore a symbol more persistent authority structure in the nomadic culture.

In this context, among the public representations of the tent image, the symbolization of the ruler's family property is also included. Baykara (2001, p. 79) states that the form of nomadic tents peculiar to the rulers is called *otağ*. The size, splendor and interior division of this type of tent suggest that it was arranged to symbolize the power of the ruler. Demirci (2019, p. 141) stated that in the ancient Turkic tribes the tent was accepted as the "concrete view of the world [tm]", and that the Chou people compared the world to a cylindrical and domed *otağ*, also he states that the world (or the sky dome) was thought of as "a cylindrical and domed *otağ* of ruler [tm]" among the Gokturk and Uyghur people. Öngel (1982, p. 22) states that in the Oghuz Khan epic written in Uyghur, the expression "let the sky be our tent [tm]" is used, and this expression is based on the nomadic Turks' comparison of the *otağ* to the sky dome and the base of the *otağ* (*yurd*) to the earth. In post-Islamic Iranian poetry, these similes were taken over and domes were compared to the sky, and mosques to the throne of God (Schimmel, 2012, p. 113).

Demirci (2019, p. 141) states that in the Central Asian and Northern Altai Turkish epics, the pole of the tent is considered as the 'pillar of the sky', and the meanings of "the collapse of the pole of the tent, the breakdown of the family, the death of the father, who is the pillar of the house [tm]", are added to this image. In this context, the tent, which is called *otağ*, is both a symbol of patriarchal power and one of the signs of the rulership as the 'khan's tent' (Kafesoğlu, 1987, p. 57). It is also seen that the name '*ordu*' was used in terms of *otağ* in the Mongols, and this second naming may be related to the use of the tent as a military headquarter. Moreover, it is understood that in the book of Dede Korkut, the term '*ban ev*' is used in the sense of big tent (Karatay, 2006, p. 103) and it has a similar meaning with 'khan's tent'. Yazıcızâde 'Ali states in his work named *Selçuknâme* that after Oghuz Khan conquered a country and became the

ruler, he lived in an “altundan tuglu büyük derim ban”⁴⁴¹ (Bakır, 2008, p. 12) that the term ‘*derim-ban*’ is considered as a magnificent ‘tent of sultan’ (Öngel, 1982, p. 105). Yazıcızâde ‘Ali uses the tent as an element of social status in the *Oğuznâme* section he added to his work titled *Selçuknâme* as follows: “akça çadır çangallu uzun ulu begler yığınagı devletlü Oguz”⁴⁴² (Bakır, 2008, p. 828).

The tent metaphor comes to the fore in the political literature around the 13th century, when the Seljuks faced the Mongol invasion. This metaphor is found in Yahya ibn Sa’ad’s *Hadayeq al-Siyar* and Necmeddîn-i Dâye’s *Mirsâdü’l-ibâd*, and It is possible to think that through these sources the use of this symbol effected the Şeyhoğlu Mustafa’s *Kenzü’l-küberâ*. But this connection does not necessarily occur in all writers of the period. For example, although Uşşâkî’s work *Yenbû-ı Hikmet*, one of the 15th century poets, was written mostly on the basis of the theoretical framework of Necmeddîn-i Dâye’s *Mirsâdu’l-ibâd*, Uşşâkî did not include the fifth chapter -which contains the political theory- in his own work (Yılmaz, 2018c, p. 58; Yılmaz, 2019, p. 184). On the other hand, Şeyhoğlu’s efforts to articulate with the state administration may have enabled him to process this chapter as an independent work. Darling (2007, p. 335) counts Yahya ibn Sa’ad, one of the first names to use the tent metaphor, among a series of bureaucrats who wrote secretarial handbooks in the 13th century Seljuk state together with Nizam’ül-Mülk and Ahmed bin Hamid Kirmânî. In this respect, it is natural for the metaphor and its author to be interested in the internal organization of the state, and it should be accepted that Şeyhoğlu shares a similar interest, especially considering the changes he made in the metaphor.

While discussing the use of tent metaphor in Ottoman political thought, the etymological and cultural connections that we tried to summarize above become visible. In the thought of Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, the tent is called ‘*hayme*’, identified with the state, and attaches special importance to the ‘*pillar*’ among its sections. Şeyhoğlu Mustafa makes analogy with the sultanate and a tent (*hayme*). The author counts (i) the pole, (ii) the *tanabs* (thick ropes), (iii) the small ropes (iv) the rings and (v) the stake that fixes the tent to the ground as parts of the tent, and considers them as elements of functional importance in terms of the sultanate/rulership. In this context, it can be seen that he makes an interpretation of both the organization and discipline of the state and the

⁴⁴¹ Great tent of ruler with golden banners.

⁴⁴² The majestic Oghuz, a group of tall high lords, with the hook of the white tent.

meaning of the state in referred to tent metaphor. Şeyhoğlu's presentation of the subject is as follows (2013, pp. 306-307):

Misal; padişahlıgun misali hayme bigidür, ve ol haymenün direği bir re'y issi ve firaset ehli ve hikmet bilici vezirdür. Ve anun tanabları iri ve uşuk begler ve sübaşılardur ve ol uvak ipler ki tanab iplerine bağlarlar, leşker bigidir nayibler ve 'amiller şol halkalar bigidür ki tanab iplerin ana geçürürler ve çadırın kazukları padişahun 'adli ve insafi bigidür.⁴⁴³

Şeyhoğlu Mustafa's quintuple division begins with defining the rulership. According to him, the object which the rulership is compared is a tent. The pillar that enables this tent to stand is the vizier. The *tinabs* (thick ropes) of the tent, that is, the 'rope that connects the tent to the stake', are small and large begs and army commanders. Small ropes tied to thick ropes are soldiers, and the rings that are attached to thick ropes are defined as *naibs*/regents and *amils*⁴⁴⁴/governors. Finally, the stakes of the tent are likened to the justice and mercy of the ruler. There are two different analogy mechanisms exist in this metaphor. The first of these contains the analogy of the internal mechanism of the state, and the second includes the analogy of the principle of the state and its relationship with its subordinates. The tent metaphor is generally a symbol that combines these two analogies. Since the internal organization of the state is based on the principle of the state and its relationship with the subordinate groups, it is necessary to analyze the second analogy first.

The basic structure of the second analogy lies in the formal relationship of 'stakes', 'ropes', 'pole' and 'rings'. This development of analogy is mainly contained in the work of Yahya ibn Sa'ad, one of the Seljuk scribes, named *Hadayeq al-Siyar*. According to Darling (2013, p. 98), the stick, stake and rope elements in Sa'ad's analogy were used in the sense of "maintained a stable balance and justice supplied the solidity". If these elements are associated with the principle of the state being 'solidly built' and 'unshakable', and solidity/stativity is presented as the founding principle of the state.

⁴⁴³ The sultanate is like a tent, and the pillar of that tent is a vizier who has the right idea, has wisdom, and understands the secrets of existence. The thick ropes of the tent are like big and small begs and army commanders. The little ropes they tie to those thick ropes are like an army. Regents and governors are similar to the rings on which the thick ropes are passed. The stakes of the tent are in the justice and mercy of the sultan.

⁴⁴⁴ According to the *Kubbealtı Dictionary*, the meaning of the term '*Âmil*' is as follows (Ayverdi, 2010, p. 52): "The title given to those who are assigned to collect taxes, administrative affairs and governorship by Islamic caliphs, rulers and Emirs [tm]".

The realization of this principle essentially requires the tent to be securely fastened to its stakes. In this context, Şeyhoğlu (2013, p. 307) states that even if all the elements of a tent are in place, it will not set in place without a stake. Thus, the stakes are likened to a foundation or substructure, to use the metaphor of a building. But beyond being a static basis, the 'stake' analogy implies a relationship, not a concrete object. Although the 'stakes' are presented as the symbol of the ruler's justice and mercy in the text, they have no value on their own. In the final analysis, justice is a phenomenon that emerges in the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, and mercy is an indirect factor to the emergence of justice rather than a personal quality. In this framework, it is the service, rent-tax and consent of the subjects that give the state its static structure and fix it 'on the ground'. This fixation process is determined by economic and political relations. In the same work, Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, p. 96) emphasizes these two qualities while describing the characteristics of just administration: (i) not to cause sorrow and oppression to the people and soldiers with bad laws, (ii) not to impose heavy taxes on the people. In the final analysis, it is concluded from Şeyhoğlu's analogy that the solidity of the state depends on its ability to reproduce its political and economic dominance over the subordinates. In this context, it is a striking proposition that army commanders and begs, who are likened to thick ropes, directly assume the function of tying the tent to the stakes. If the tent is understood as 'the sultanate', that is, the general class domination, the political and economic apparatuses of this domination, and therefore the leading members of the ruling classes, are the begs and the army commanders. Therefore, the relationship that this stratum establish with the subordinate groups is the founding relationship of the tent, and principles of moderation/justice/mercy required to reproduce this relationship is the obligatory strategic pattern. Moreover, the connotations of the tent metaphor, such as shadow/protection, which is mentioned in the introduction, find its counterpart with the ruler's operation of justice and giving mercy. In the final analysis, the image of state's providing shade to the subordinates as a tent depends on the operation of the justice mechanism -as a strategy to reproduce its power. This type of use of the metaphor can be seen in the examples of dream myths which called as 'Osman's dream'. In the dream myth, the shadow of the tree, which is shown as a sign of rulership, covers the whole world and the people under that shadow, so they can work and live in safety.

Onay (2013, p. 72) states that the shadow/shadowing metaphor in political discourse constructs the supreme-subject relationship in the form of protecting -being

protected instead of intimidation-fear. In this respect, it would be appropriate to consider the shadowing claim in the tent metaphor as a symbolic reversal of the frightening-fearing relationship. If we examine the elements in the frightening-fearing relationship and the protecting -being protected relationship, it becomes clear that an identical presentation of the subordinate social position in terms of fear and protection elements is made. The subordinate social position needs protection because of afraid. Fear and protection elements are interconnected in a cause-effect relationship and thus provide an example of a passive moral behavior pattern for those who are afraid and protected. On the other hand, the elements of the relevant relationship on the side of the dominant social position are determined as frightening and protection. The distribution of elements, which appears to be directly consistent for the subordinate social position, is directly inconsistent with the dominant social position. Because there is no direct cause-effect relationship between the elements of frightening and protection. In this case, it is an important question whether the relationship between the two elements is established indirectly. It is possible to talk about two kinds of mediation relations between these two elements. The first of these is a symbolic mediation, while the second is a real mediation. Symbolic mediation is established as follows: While the dominant social classes are on the 'frightening' side in their relations with the subordinate social classes, this relationship is symbolically reversed in order to reproduce power relations and the negativity of the 'frightening' element is re-expressed in a positive way as 'protecting'. Secondly, the real mediation is established as follows: The element of fear emerged because the dominant social classes threatened the subordinate classes, however, the dominant social classes apparently resolved this contradiction by offering 'protection services' to the subordinate social classes in order to make the fear component manageable. As a result, the indirect establishment of the frightening-protecting relationship as a cause-effect relationship is a symbolic reversal and a real mediation relationship. In the final analysis, this relationship aims to prevent the real reversal of the feared-protected relationship, that is, the challenge of class domination in such a way that the transformation of a one who fears is to the one who is frightening and the one who protects is to the one is fearful.

To continue, the first of the analogies that make up the tent metaphor deals with the internal mechanism of the state. As examined above, the founding elements of metaphor in Şeyhoğlu's model consist of a tent, a thick rope and a stake. While these three elements signify the three positions of the social hierarchy, in the first analogy

included in the metaphor, it is seen that pole, small ropes and rings are added to these three principles. The figure seen as the pole of the tent is the vizier, and according to Şeyhoğlu (2013, p. 307), the high and strong pole makes the sultanate tent prestigious/honorable/bright, majestic and beautiful. The figure of the vizier is not posed in a direct contact with the subordinated people in this model. On the other hand, the form of the relationship between stakes, tick ropes and tent depend on the pole. The majesty and influence of the tent depends on the systematic operation of the relations between dominant and subordinate strata, in other words, the order of the state. In this respect, the vizier is responsible for the internal order of the state and is the only figure posed 'inside' the tent in the administrative hierarchy. Small ropes correspond to soldiers, and rings correspond to local administrators appointed from the center. In this part of the analogy, both small ropes and rings are attached to the thick ropes. According to this analogy, both soldiers, *naibs* and *amils* are secondary actors connected to the dominant relationship and are appendages that be subalterns of begs and army commanders. In this respect, in the social hierarchy expressed by the tent metaphor, *naib* and the *amils* are indirectly tied to the stakes, but their relations with the ruler are also indirectly realized. In this mediation, it is seen that the ruling stratum, which are at the head of the hierarchy, are effective. Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, p. 307) argues that putting two thick ropes on a stake will cause damage to the tent. Putting two ropes on a stake means that social relations are not established 'in proper place', and the abstract expression of this is that the balance of the tent cannot be achieved. In this context, if the tick ropes are considered as begs and military commanders, the implementation that will cause the state to deteriorate will be conflicts in the division of administrative offices, authorities and hierarchy.

This type of use of the metaphor is also found in *Mirsâdü'l-ibâd*.⁴⁴⁵ Necmeddîn-i Dâye (1933, p. 266) lists the elements of the tent as pole (*vizier*), ropes (*ümera*, notables and high officers), nails (*adl*, *insaf* and *muruvvet*). According to him, some of the ropes are big and some are small, and they are similar to the big and small ones of the notables of a county (*eşrefül memleket*). Dâye states that there are also some other ropes attached to the skirt of the tent, and they are like *naibs*, pencil holders and commanders (1933, p. 266). Baltacı (2009, p. 276) interpreted the term '*nevvab*' here as *qadis*, not *naibs*, but it is understood that Dâye directly refers to those in the state

⁴⁴⁵ I would like to express my gratitude to Siamak Pourkeivannour, who helped me a lot in finding this book and translating its relevant parts.

service and uses this term to mean administrators, not *qadis*. Because, in the previous parts of the same work, Dâye (1933, p. 249) criticized the *qadis* within the metaphor of the shepherd and categorized them with the term ‘*guzzat*’, not ‘*nevvab*’. Finally, Dâye (1933, p. 266) argues that the stakes make the tent stander and resemble the ruler’s justice, mercy, courage and graciousness. In the tent metaphor used by Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, there are important differences compared to Necmeddîn-i Dâye, and the reasons for these are worth examining specifically. Unlike Necmeddîn-i Dâye, Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, p. 140) evaluates the status of military officers as more important in terms of the central organization of the state. Dâye devoted the upper echelon of the state mainly to the feudal aristocracy and officers and did not attach any special importance to bureaucrats. The term *ümera*, begs and the hierarchical statuses under them express this dichotomy. In Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, this group is expressed as great and small begs and army commanders, and it has been argued that the ordinary members of army are tied to these ropes. Dâye, on the other hand, argues that the army commanders and the army in general are tied to the skirt of the tent and mentions this section after the *naibs* and the people of the pen. While Dâye’s order is as ruler-vizier-aristocracy-bureaucracy-army, Şeyhoğlu’s order is as ruler-vizier-begs and commanders-army-regents and governors. It is possible to assume that Şeyhoğlu’s schema belongs to a more developed state organization than Şeyhoğlu’s use of tent metaphor, because both the status of the people of pen is higher than the army, and the political administration and the army are separated from each other in more precise terms. I do not think that the qualities of justice have a special meaning, fairness and generosity, which are likened to tent stakes in Dâye and claimed to be possessed by the ruler, have been reduced to just justice and mercy in Şeyhoğlu. Even though this difference can be interpreted as being associated with Bayezid I’s frequent criticism for ‘accumulating wealth’, that is, his lack of ‘generosity’, but this would be an over-interpretation. Şeyhoğlu Mustafa was probably trying to save himself from repeating Dâye directly by deducting an element of schema. It is difficult to determine whether this difference between the works of *Mirsâdü’l-ibâd* and *Kenzü’l-küberâ* whether have a particular significance for Ottoman political thought. In order to facilitate the interpretation on this subject, *Irşadü’l-murid ile’l-murad fî tercemeti Mirsâdü’l-ibâd* should be examined. This book is a translation of *Mirsâdü’l-ibâd* made by Kasım b. Mahmud Karahisarî at the beginning of the 15th century and dedicated to Murat II. In the Karahisarî’s translation, the tent metaphor is used as follows (2019, p. 96):

İmdi padişahluğun misali çadır gibidür. Ve anun direği bir vezir-i sahib-re'ydür ve tanabları beglerdür. Nitekim tanabların ba'zısı ulu ve bak'zısı kiçi olur, hem beglerün dahu ba'zısı ulu ve ba'zısı kiçi olur. Ve dahı naibler ve 'amiller ve kalan ashab ol tanablardur ki çadırın şerhasında halka olmuşlardır. Ve hakikade ol çadırın mihları padişahun 'adlidür ki çadır anunla kaim ve sabitdür.⁴⁴⁶

There are some important differences between the manuscripts of the work found in the Hagia Sophia (manuscript no: 1650) and Fatih (manuscript no: 2576) collections, and the terms '*naib*' and '*amil*' in the above quote is not included in the Fatih Library copy.⁴⁴⁷ For this reason, it is understood that the tent metaphor is not only a model in which class domination or the internal organization of the state is discussed, but also a model in which the authority-responsibility-status relations of the ruling class are reflected, and the versions in both Şeyhoğlu Mustafa and Karahisarî reflect the current power relations. While in Dâye's version, both the executive level was detailed and a special place was reserved for the elites and administrative staff who were subordinate to them, in Şeyhoğlu's version, the high-level executive staff was limited to commanders and begs, followed by the army and minor administrators. In Karahisarî's translation, it is seen that such a detail was not made about the administrative staff, and in the Hagia Sophia copy of the work, a dual hierarchy was established between begs, naibs and governors. This situation can be evaluated as a kind of expression of the contradictions between the central administration and the provincial organization. The political layers in the central organization of the late Seljuk state, which can be considered more developed than the early Ottoman state, were more clearly included in Dâye's work, and on the other hand, the local elites and administrators, who could be considered relatively independent, were also included in the tent metaphor in accordance with the Seljuk rule divided between the central bureaucracy and feudal powers. On the other hand, in the Ottoman version of the tent metaphor, the role of the army commanders and the army was prioritized compared to the Seljuk example, and the status of local administrators and notables was not reflected in the same way. In the

⁴⁴⁶ Know that the example of the sultanate is like a tent. And his pillar is a rightful-minded vizier, and its strings are begs. As a matter of fact, some of the ropes will be big, some small, and some of the begs will be high and some will be ordinary. And also the regents and governors and the rest became rope rings attached to the parts of the tent. And indeed the nails of that tent are the justice of the sultan and the tent stands and becomes stable with them.

⁴⁴⁷ See: Footnote 6, (Kavak, 2019a, p. 96).

Karahisarî version of the book, the role given to the local notables was minimized or even deducted. The reason for this is that the related translation was probably written in one of the dates 1419/1422/1436 (Kavak, 2019b, pp. 32-33), and therefore it was written as an aim to represent centralizing tendencies in the Ottoman state. For example, the category of *ehl-i mansıb* is not among the status groups in Şeyhoğlu and Karahisarî. On the other hand, in the context of the shepherd metaphor, which we will examine in the next section, it is interesting that the category of the *ehl-i mansıb*, among the sections where the ruler is considered responsible for protecting the people, was removed from the text by Şeyhoğlu, but in the Karahisarî's translation (2019, p. 81) it was emphasized by avoiding the original division of Dâye. If so, the fact that these social segments, whose status is not recognized in this tent metaphor, are mentioned in a negative context later on shows that the political discourse on this issue is structured consciously.

IV.II.III. The Theory of Four Elements and the Body Metaphor as the Model of Corporal Organization of Class Domination

“Ve devlet öyle bir ulu ağaçtır ki
Huda –Azze ve cel- vücudu bahçesine dikilmiştir”.⁴⁴⁸
Sinan Paşa (2013, p. 501)

It is seen that the body metaphor in Ottoman political thought gained significance especially during the discussed period and was frequently used in various works. This metaphor finds its roots in Islamic philosophy and thus in ancient Greek thought, and manifests itself by splitting into two relative forms. One of these manifestations developed through cosmological myths and the theory established about the order of the universe was adapted to the social structure in terms of *anâsır-ı erbaa* (four elements) model. In the second manifestation, similarly, the cosmological explanations developed about the order of the universe were adapted to the theory of medicine and therefore to the human body, thus, a second analogous typology was formed in which societies were conceived as a political body (for example, *anâsır-ı erbaa*, *hâlet-i erbaa* or alternative analogies using the body parts). This subsection will be presented in three main parts; The body metaphor and the theory of the four elements will be examined comparatively, firstly in mythology and ancient philosophy, secondly

⁴⁴⁸ And the state is such a great tree that/ It was planted in the garden of the body of the honorable and supreme God.

in Islamic philosophy and *sūfi* thought, and finally in Ottoman political thought. In this context, it will be examined how the body metaphor developed from mythical origins and how it took place in Ottoman political thought, and it will be tried to reveal the meanings of this metaphor in the context of social class relations.

The history of thinking cosmic, social, or mental structures by analogy with a living body can be traced back to the history of human languages. In Babylonian creation myths, before the gods were created, there was a chaos in which there were a large body of water named *Apsu* and a giant-monster named *Tiamat*. The gods were born from chaos and the god Marduk defeated Tiamat and divided her body into parts, creating the earth, sky and celestial bodies from these parts, seasons were formed, and established an 'order' of the world (King, 2019, pp. 55-72). King (2019, p. 54) states that the word '*tehom*', which means 'deep-sea' in the creation narrative in the Torah, is directly equivalent to the word *Tiamat*, which means the beast of the deep that animates chaos and turmoil. The same myth entered the ancient Egyptian belief after 2500 BC and the figure of *Tiamat* was transformed into the gigantic serpent '*Apop*' and depicted as the enemy of the sun-God (Müller, 2020, pp. 101-2). In all three narratives, it is seen that the creative power that defeats/eliminates the monster of chaos is related to the sun. In the Babylonian narrative, this figure is the Marduk, in the Torah narrative the Jewish God whose name is hidden behind the creation of light passages, and in Egyptian mythology Osiris-Horus or the sons of Horus. In this framework, the myth of creation is perceived as the 'incarnation of the world' with various differentiations in the ancient Babylonian and Semitic traditions, and the body image is articulated with the process of transition from chaos to 'order'. Moreover, the significance of the 'light' or sun figure in this narrative establishes a link between the order of the world and the order of the sun. Thus, the body of the world is associated with the three elements, which are basically earth, water and sun, and the wind element is also included in the Babylonian myth. Eliade (2020, p. 27) states that in Semitic cosmology the mountains created from the primeval waters (*Tehom*) are called the 'pillars of the earth'. Thus, the foundation of a systematic determination relationship between the founding elements of the world and the idea of order and balance was laid. It is surprising that a similar relationship also takes place in the mythology of the Nordic tribes. It is believed that the '*Ginnungagap*', first depicted as a vast void in Norse mythology, existed and that one side (*Muspellsheim*) was covered with fire and the other side (*Niflheim*) was frozen. As the heat melts the ice, the first river (*Elivagar*) begins to flow and beams of light reveal the

first living things (Munch, 2020, pp. 17-18). The first creatures were a giant named *Ymir/Aurgelmir* and the cow that feeds him is called *Audhumla*. Let us note that the figure of the cow was associated with the sun in ancient civilizations. The descendants of *Audhumla* are *Odin*, *Vili* and *Ve*, who are considered to be the first gods, and these gods killed the giant *Ymir* and created the earth, sky, sea and many things on earth from his body (Munch, 2020, p. 18). In this myth, there are elements of the dismemberment of the body and the arrangement of the world by the gods based on them. Furthermore, Panglase (1997, p. 3) states that the Babylonian myth also found its counterpart in ancient Greece, for example, the figures of *Oceanaos* and *Tethys* in Homer's *Iliad* correspond to *Apsu* and *Tiamat*. The myth that the ballocks of the god *Uranus* (sky) were cut off and thrown into the sea in Hesiod's *Theogonia* and in the *Bibliotheka* of Apollodorus of Rhodes can be interpreted within this framework. According to Hesiodos (2006, pp. 17-18), *Kronos* (time) cuts off the ballocks of *Uranus*, *Eriyes* (goddesses of vengeance) emerge from the drops of blood falling on the land, and *Aphrodite* is born from the ballocks that fall into the sea. In his notes to the *Bibliotheka*, Frazer (2020, p. 58; footnote 6) points to the existence of approaches that interpret this myth as the forced separation of heaven and earth. Another important point to be emphasized in the myths written by Hesiodos (2006, p. 13) is that *Gaia* (earth) created *Uranos* (sky), *Pontos* (sea) and mountains from her own body without mating with anyone. Thus, the transition from *Chaos* to the order of the cosmos takes place with the emergence of the earth, sky and sea.

The history of myths related to the association of the human body with the four elements can also be traced back to ancient Mesopotamia. The birth of the hero *Enkidu* in the Sumerian epic *Gilgamesh* was made possible by the Goddess *Aruru* kneading him from clay. This is the first version of the myth of man's creation from clay/mud that we encounter in the Semitic tradition. At the beginning of the 14th century, in the work called *Dürü't-Ticân*, written by the historian named Ebûbekir b. Abdullah b. Aybek ed-Devadârî, the mythical stories created by the Turkic tribes about the first people are encountered. Mentioning about a book called *Ulu Han Ata Bitikçi*, he states that the birth of the first human being in this work takes place as follows; On the mountain called *Karadağci*, water and soil filled the caverns and the strong heat of the sun cooked this mud and warm winds blew over the mud for nine months (İndirkaş, 2013, p. 33). In this myth, the emergence of the first man is possible by the combination of the four elements. The origins of this myth are largely based on agricultural societies. Elements of earth,

water, air and fire (Sun/temperature) can be observed empirically as the necessary conditions for a seed to grow. The combination of these four elements has been equated with the natural emergence of life, starting from the example of the seed. The fact that nature/universe is also seen as a living entity in an explanation in related with animism formed the basis for the empirical model establishing the relationship between the seed, the four elements, and life to gain a cosmological-mythical connotation. In this context, it should not be surprising that the same model has been applied to ideas about human vitality/health. Thus, the basis of human life is attributed to the four elements as well as the health of crops. It has been determined that the four elements were also used in medical applications in the ancient world. If the inseparability of medicine-healing-magic practices is accepted as one of the distinctive characteristics of the ancient age, the symbolic relationship established between the universe and the human body in Hittite sorcery and its transformation into therapeutic practices is based on a prominent use of the body metaphor. Eliade (2020, p. 35) mentions that, in Hittite magic the human head was compared to the sky, his hands were liken the earth, his eyes were in related with water, and therefore there was a magical medicine practice in which headaches are cured by throwing them to the sky and hand aches to the ground.

It is seen that both the ancient Babylonian, Egyptian and Semitic traditions, the Nordic mythology, and the theogony myths in Hesiodos and Homeros are also ‘prima-causa’ myths, identifying the first elements on which the order of the world is based and forming stories about them. The theoretical regularity of these stories was realized with the systematization efforts of Ionian philosophy of nature. As Cornford (2017, pp. 13-14) states, with the Ionian natural philosophy, theogony myths have turned into cosmogonic narratives and a philosophical relationship has been established between the beginning (*arkhe*), the elements of the cosmos and the order of the world. Ionian thinkers, who established a relationship between elements such as air, water and fire, which were considered the building blocks of the universe at that time, reduced them to each other. For example, Thales accepted water as the founding substance of the universe, Anaximenes accepted air⁴⁴⁹, Herakleitos (2016, p. 39; Fragment 30) argued that fire is the first matter (*arkhe*), and Empedocles (Laertius, 2007, p. 406) added earth

⁴⁴⁹ These thinkers determined arkhes within the framework of the theory of substances. That is, water or air should be considered as carrier-substances. For fragments from these thinkers, see: Thales & Anaximandros & Anaximenes (2019).

to these three elements⁴⁵⁰ and defined a quartet categorization as the first substance of the universe.⁴⁵¹ Anaximandros, a contemporary, friend and student of Thales, put forward the element of *aperion* as *arkhe*, which is considered a further abstraction in this context. Nietzsche (2018, p. 145) states that in the lecture notes of 1872-73, Anaximander put forward hot and cold as the principle of water, and theorized the *aperion*, that is, the ‘womb’ of all existence, as the principle of both. Nietzsche (2018, pp. 145-46) underlines that in Anaximander’s thought, formation and corruption of the matter is shaped by *tisis* and *dik tes adikias* (error and injustice), and this, in the final analysis, has also revolutionized the way ethical issues are addressed.⁴⁵² These elements (fire-water and error/injustice-change) also become the constituent elements of the body metaphor in the political use.

Xenophanes, a student of Anaximander, repeated other thinkers with his views that everything comes from earth and returns to earth, and that everything that is born and grows consists of earth and water (Xenophanes, 2019, p. 29). In this framework, Xenophanes puts forward the idea of the ‘unity’ of nature/universe and grounds it with reference to the absoluteness of divine power. Although there is no reference to the figure of God in Ionian philosophy of nature in general, the grounding of Xenophanes gives an important clue about the direction that this way of thinking will develop in the following centuries. As Schrödinger (2020, p. 68) states, one of the distinguishing features of the Ionian philosophy is to exclude the subject/subjectivity while creating a rational world design, and the design that emerges in this way is largely a structuralist world design. The logos, albeit in different forms, is shown as the inherent element of this design. For example, in the second fragment, Herakleitos (2016, p. 11) theorized the contradiction between subject and structure in favor of the latter, saying that even though the logos are common, many people live as if they have thoughts of their own. On the other hand, another important element that Herakleitos brought to the discussions about the structure of the universe is the relationship of conflict and

⁴⁵⁰ Empedocles also has a book on medicine, which is now considered lost, and suggests that the medical relationship between the four elements and the body may have been established by this philosopher as well.

⁴⁵¹ Let’s also note that the Pythagoreans considered the number four as the symbol of the mathematical perfection underlying the universe, and that this thought could have an effect on the theory of the four elements.

⁴⁵² Nietzsche’s early interpretation of Anaximander bears a serious resemblance to the worldview of ancient Christians—especially Augustine of Hippo. In this regard, it should be evaluated carefully.

harmony. According to the philosopher (Herakleitos, 2016, p. 17, Fragment 8): “Everything unites with its opposite, and the most beautiful harmony arises from the union of those in opposite directions. Everything is the result of conflict [tm]”.⁴⁵³ On the other hand, Empedocles’ view on the subject is that similar things tend towards similar things, and the thinker argues that the coexistence of similar things ensures harmony (Aristoteles, 2014, p. 385).

The relevant discussions of pre-Socratic thinkers were discussed in Aristotle’s *Physika*, *A meta ta physika*, *Peri geneseôs kai phthoras*, *Peri Politika* and *Ethika Nikomakheia*, and reached its final form, which was influential in both Islamic and Western philosophical traditions in the Middle Ages. He first accepts that the founding principles of existence are limited and follows Empedocles in limiting their number to four elements in physical sense (Aristoteles, 2017, p. 33). On the other hand, his critique of Empedocles focuses on the existence/continuance of opposites, not the orientation of similar things to each other in order for things to alter, which is why Aristotle’s thought became closer the model of Herakleitos (Aristoteles, 2019, p. 71). Thus, Aristotle developed a four-pole world design from which he could deduce the structural properties and changes of the being through induction. These four poles coexist both in contradiction with each other and as a mixture among existing things.⁴⁵⁴ Aristotle took this idea one level further in his work *Peri geneseôs kai phthoras*, reinterpreting the four substances of matter consisting of fire, air, water and earth as analogies and reformulated them in a relational way. According to Aristotle (2019, p. 77), the four elements are just a metaphor, and they are fire-shaped (*pyroeides*), air-shaped (*aeroeides*) things that resemble fire and air etc. There is a crucial difference between thinking that being is physically composed of four elements (fire, air, water, earth) and

⁴⁵³ Diogenes Laertius (2007, p. 423) states that Herakleitos’ work *On Nature* consists of three parts, and these are the universe, politics and theology. Grammarian Diodotos, who had the opportunity to examine this work in antiquity, argues that this work is actually about the state, and the discussion on nature was made to exemplify the state (Laertius, 2007, p. 427). In this context, it is possible to argue that in the thought of Herakleitos, the order of nature, the polis and the ethics are handled in a unity in accordance with the logos.

⁴⁵⁴ Galenus, in his work called *De methodo medendi*, claims that Aristotle took this idea from Hippocrates and developed it (as cited in Johnston, 2006, p. 14). On the other hand, it is clear that the roots of the understanding of treatment based on hot-cold dry-wet categories in the field of medicine go back much further. For example, while Diogenes Laertius (2007, p. 423) tells how Herakleitos died, he informs that the philosopher’s body collected water and died by entering a pile of hot dung to evaporate the water to remove it - according to an alternative narrative, he covered his body with dung and lay under the sun. These treatment techniques are basically based on the relationship between hot-cold, dry and wet.

thinking that it consists of four elements, fire-form, air-form, water-form, and earth-form. This difference lies in the fact that the format/similarity relationship can now be easily applied to medical, moral and political problems. In this context, Aristotle (2019, p. 75) goes to a new conceptualization to explain both the four substances and the relations between things. In this new conceptualization, the relationship between both substances and things -hence becoming and change- reduced to the relations between coldness-hotness and wetness-dryness. In this new schema, fire appears as wet and dry, air hot and wet, water cold and wet, earth cold and dry. Thus, while Aristotle reveals the possibilities of articulation between the four elements that are in conflict with each other, he also formulates the idea that the harmony and disharmony found in objects is a substantive relationship at the base. This formation of thought will necessarily reveal the assumption that the harmony and balance of the human body and political structures, that is, there must be a balance between the elements that make up it in order to be sustained. He summarizes this mechanism in *Physika* Book I [188b10] as follows (Aristoteles, 2017, p. 29): “Actually, every ‘harmonious’ must consist of ‘non-harmonious’ and ‘non-harmonious’ must consist of ‘harmonious’; again, in corruption, it is necessary for the ‘harmonious’ to become ‘non-harmonious’ [tm]”. The direct extensions of this idea are the idea of disharmony as the cause of bodily diseases, and Aristotle’s modeling on the causes of change between political regimes, which he deals with in the fifth book *Peri Politika*.

First, let’s examine how the idea of harmony and disharmony is handled in Aristotle’s political philosophy. According to Aristotle, political unity (*polis*) consists of multitude (*plethos*). In this respect, the polis is a result of the coexistence of different elements. Aristotle argues that what makes the police sustainable is diversity and a proportional justice based on it (Barker, 1977, p. 41). In this model, the contradictions of difference create a harmonious result and a balance occurs depending on their keeping together in the right proportion. Within this framework, changes in the *polis* must also be proportional – “just as a body consists of parts that must grow proportionally if it is to maintain its balance [tm]” (Aristoteles, 2018, p. 388). The change in the wealth, status or population/land balance in the police drags the political unity from harmony to disharmony (Aristoteles, 2018, p. 386). Thus, the police and its regime, which emerge as a result of being together of its elements at a certain proportion, go from harmony to disharmony and have to change. In line with this theory, Aristotle defines the ideal city/best regime as a ‘self-sufficient’ economic and political unit, and

argues that its balance can only be achieved to the extent that certain social segments coexist but do not interfere, and the relationship between them is carried out in a just manner. In order, there are farmers for food, artisans for tools, soldiers for security, priests for religious rituals, and wealthy people for justice and administration (Aristoteles, 2018, p. 493-94). Aristotle also examines the principles on which political relations between these social sections should be established in order to maintain order in the best city. According to the philosopher, the farmers, artisans and workers are the essential elements of the city, but they are not the essential elements, the essential elements are the soldiers and the administration classes (Aristoteles, 2018, p. 497). This is because the manual laborers (and merchants) do not have a noble life and cannot be virtuous because free time is needed for developing virtue and involving in political activities (Aristoteles, 2018, p. 495). Although Aristotle divides the working branches into five (farmer, craftsman, clergyman, soldier, administrator) in the social system he designed, since he foresees a transition between soldiers/commanders and administrators based on age and natural tendencies, he basically went for a society categorization based on four different classes. It is the condition of reproduction of the social structure that the people in these four categories do not mix with each other in terms of their jobs and functions, and differ in a measured way in terms of their number and social power. Aristotle gave the political and moral leadership of this social structure to the wealthy classes and soldiers. In the tenth book of *Ethika Nicomacheia*, Aristotle clarifies how the virtue-morality relationship and the political system become projections of each other. According to Aristotle, most people obey obligations and punishments, not reasoning and good sense, for this reason, the virtue of people in the political union, hence harmony and happiness, depends on the abilities of the rulers (Aristoteles, 2014, p. 520). In this context, Aristotle establishes an analogy between the rulers and the physicians and assumes that the ruler or educator will morally improve their interlocutors due to the episteme they have, just as the decisions made by physicians with universal knowledge and individual characteristics will heal their patients (Aristoteles, 201, pp. 523-24). In this model, the four elements that make up the society are organized within the framework of an abstract teleology that necessitates the moral leadership of the ruling class, and a concrete teleology based on the division of labor. In the following parts of this section, we will briefly touch on how this model developed by Aristotle had an impact on Islamic political thought, especially on al-Farabi.

While examining the Aristotelian origins of the philosophical use of body metaphor, it is necessary to consider how the relationship between the body and politics is established, especially through medical analogies. Aristotle's reasoning on the formation and corruption of existence was also found suitable for the explanation of diseases as bodily change and dissolution. In this context, an exemplary text in which the Aristotelian interpretation of the four-element theory is used in medical studies is the *Problemata Physika*. Although it has not been proven that this text directly belongs to Aristotle, it can be thought that it had one or more authors from the Peripatetic school, or that its writing continued with various extensions over several generations of students. The work generally includes various diseases, their causes and suggestions about their treatment, winds, moods, folk beliefs, characteristics of anatomical parts, senses etc. In the first book of the work, the author discusses why the changes in the seasons cause diseases and argues that these changes occur in the hot-cold and wet-dry axes, and that health depends on these factors being harmonious (Aristoteles, 2016, pp. 9-10). Throughout the work, the causes and treatments of various diseases and even the observations about why some people's traditions and external appearances are 'barbaric' (Aristoteles, 2016, p. 203) are explained based on the transitions of hot-cold and wet-dry. The practitioner and thinker who made the most advanced work on the premises of Aristotle is the physician Galenus from Pergamon, who lived in the 2nd century. Although Hippocrates, before Galenus, put forward the view that the balance of the four elements is the key to health, Galenus reconsidered this theory in the scale of the organs that he attributed functions one by one, and the four elements are not elements in the sense of "the smallest part of the whole", but principles (*archai*) in the sense of "things that can change the least" (as cited in Hankinson, 2008, p. 214). This means that elements such as air, water, earth, fire are determined in pairs, one being dominant, by the principles of dry-wet-cold-hot (Hankinson, 2008, p. 215): "Thus water is cold and moist, air moist and hot, fire hot and dry, earth dry and cold, although more the first than the second in each case". The aforementioned theory of Galenus influenced both al-Kindi and thus *Meşşâî* philosophy in general, and Avicenna as a physician in a particular sense. In particular, the contribution of this connection to Ottoman political thought through Avicenna should be discussed separately.

Secondly, let's continue with the introduction of the theory of the four elements into the world of Islamic thought. First of all, it can be assumed that the creation myths that exist in most of the ancient traditions and the archaic four-element doctrine they

contain are also known in Islamic geography and are a part of popular memory, especially through Semitic myths. On the other hand, it is not possible to come across this teaching directly in the Qur'an or hadiths. Ayar (2014, p. 88) states that although the terminology of the four elements is not used directly, these four elements are also mentioned in the Qur'an. The formation of nature and the power of God are exemplified by referring to the elements of earth, water and fire, respectively in Surah Vaki'a (56:63-76). In the lines describing the myth that Iblis did not prostrate to Adam in the Qur'an, there is an implicit meaning about the conflict of two of the four elements. According to this myth, Iblis was created from smokeless fire as a jinni, while Adam was created from dry mud as a human being (Hijr, 15:27-29). The expression "مِنْ نَّارِ السَّمُومِ" (*min naris semum*) in the Qur'an means fire without smoke/wind, and the expression "صَلْصَالٍ" is interpreted as dry mud (Komisyon, 2011, p. 282). From these expressions, it is possible to understand that the smoke, that is, the air element, was not mixed with the fire, and the water element was not mixed with the mud. In other words, it indicates the purity of the elements. In the continuation of the text, when the God blows his own spirit into the dry mud (نَفَخْتُ فِيهِ مِنْ رُوحِي), he demands that the devil prostrate to him (Adam), but the devil refuses to prostrate because he considers himself (fire) superior to Adam's essence (earth) (Hijr, 15:29-33). In this narrative, there are complex symbolic relations regarding both the superiority of the four elements and their superiority over each other and the combination of the divine breath with these elements and superiority over the other. As Yasin (2018, p. 11) points out, there are references in the Surah al-Anbya (21:30) and an-Nur (64:45) that all living things on earth were created from water. Since pre-Islamic Arab culture and life shows that Sumerian/Mesopotamian cultures were influential in the religious beliefs of Arab communities (Usta, 2019, p. 130), it is possible to accept that the theory of the four elements took place in the creation myth as a sub-text that spread from this source. The apparent entry of the four elements doctrine into the world of Islamic thought is related to the influence of Sassanid culture and ideology during the Abbasid period. Gutas (2003, pp. 70-71) stated that the Abbasid state placed itself in the position of the heir of Sassanid political institutions and thought during the reign of the Abbasid caliph al-Mansur, but this situation required the defense of Islamic thought against movements such as Manicheanism, Bardesanism, Marcionism, Christianity and Judaism during the reign of the caliph al-Mahdi. This situation necessitates reversing the weapons of the Persian tradition, which combines ancient Greek philosophy with Zoroastrian texts in the

Hellenistic period, and mastering the ancient philosophical elements used by the Manicheans - which is why the Greek-Arabic translation movement started. The first work translated within this framework was Aristotle's *Organon* (section of *Topika*), which contains the principles of discussion (dialectics), justification and refutation that Islamic thinkers may need in their intellectual struggles with other thought and belief groups. The translation of Aristotle's *Peri geneseôs kai phthoras* into Arabic under the name of *Kitâbü'l-Kevn ve'l-fesâd* by Ishak b. Hunayn⁴⁵⁵ and Ebu Osman ed-Dımaşki made the theory of the four elements known among Muslim intellectuals (Karlığa, 1991). The thinker who made the first systematic study on this subject was al-Kindi, and Adamson (2007, p. 161) states that Aristotle's theory of four elements constitutes the basic infrastructure of all al-Kindi's writings on physics. As al-Kindi dealt with in his treatises, the world consists of four elements, and being and corruption are made up of entities that are opposite to each other, and their origin lies in heat-coldness, dryness-wetness (Şulul, 1990, pp. 9-10). Contrary to ancient Greek philosophy, al-Kindi believed that God was the indirect cause of everything in the universe, and thus combined the theory of the four elements with divine determination -so that he could formulate the four elements as creatures rather than as eternal things. As Adamson and Pormann (2012, pp. 153-54) stated, while the main cause of things occurring in the universe is God (*remote agent cause*), the *proximate agent cause* is the transition between heat-coldness, humidity-dryness in al-Kindi. In addition, as a result of al-Kindi's work, he combined the Greek theories about geometric proportions with the theory of the four elements in being and corruption and adapted them to medicine (Sunar, 1976, p. 53). Since al-Kindi's works on politics and administration are missing, we do not have a chance to know exactly how this theory is applied to the field of political thought. On the other hand, it is possible to find a competent application of the theory of four elements in the field of Islamic political thought in the works of al-Farabi. Al-Farabi in his work named *Mabadi Ara Ahl al-Madina al-Fadila* connects to the Aristotelian tradition by claiming that there are four elements (*stoixeion/ustukusat*) are opposite to each other, and that are availed process of being (Farabi, 2018, p. 38). The author, who accepts these four elements as the substance of all bodies, argues that beings are ranked hierarchically, based on this, this hierarchy is as follows: (i) first matter, (ii) elements, (iii) minerals, (iv) plants, (v) animals without language and thought, (vi)

⁴⁵⁵ The same translator translated nineteen books of Galenus for Ibn Masawayh (Gutas, 2003, p. 119).

animals with language and thought (Farabi, 2018, p. 39). The thinker, who suggests that the lower forms of existence should serve the upper forms of existence, states that within this framework, the body also has an administrative hierarchy. It is possible to grasp al-Farabi's hierarchy of bodily administration roughly as a distinction and gradation between *vita activa* and *vita contemplativa*. He conceptualizes the active life forces as nutrition, senses, imagination and will, and accepts the heart as the ruler of these forces (Farabi, 2018, pp. 66-67). Farabi (2018, p. 66) predicted a systematic relationship of hierarchy between the heart and other organs:

(...) other forces, in their actions, follow the natural purpose of their master, whose center is the heart: Stomach, liver, spleen and the organs that serve them, organs that serve these organs and other organs that serve the organs are of this type. Because the liver is both an officer and a commanding organ. It is an officer of the heart, but the chief of the gall, kidneys and other similar organs. [tm]

In addition, the will power in the heart dominates the activities of the parts of the body, and the parts are understood as the servants of the will. On the other hand, the dominance of the mental force is not on the parts, but on the dominant forces (nutrition, imagination, sense) that dominate the body (Farabi, 2018, p. 67). Al-Farabi also applies the organic hierarchy model he developed on the organization of the body to political structures. According to him, just as the commanding organ in the body is completer and more perfect than the others, the ruler in political unions is superior to those under him as the most perfect person (Farabi, 2018, p. 101). The grounding of this superiority is made both cosmologically and functionally. Cosmologically, *prima causa*, which is the cause of the emergence of all other beings, resembles the ruler/administrator of the political structure; Similar to the fact that objects are teleologically connected to the first cause, all parts of political associations must follow the purpose of the first ruler (Farabi, 2018, pp. 102-3). Functionally, according to al-Farabi, political unions are systematically linked and arranged with each other in terms of their various parts (Farabi, 2018, p. 102). The principle of this systematic articulation is the hierarchy between superior and subordinate, and the ruler is at the head of this hierarchy. Al-Farabi clarifies this issue in his work named *Fusus el-Medeni* (Farabi, 1987, p. 37):

Just as the human body is made up of a certain number of various parts, some superior, some inferior, adjacent to each other and divided into degrees, each performing a certain action, all of which unite in mutual aid for the completion of the purpose in the human body, so is the city and the house each consist of a

certain number of different parts, some inferior, some superior, adjacent to each other and of different degrees, each independently performing a certain deed, whose acts combine in mutual aid to accomplish the purpose of the city or house. (...) This can again be compared to the body: for the relation of the head, chest, abdomen, back, hands and feet to the body is like the relation of the houses of the city to the city. The action of each of the great organs is different from the action of the other, and the parts of each of these great organs help each other with their different actions in order to complete the purpose of that main organ. [tm]

In this context, keeping the political structures that exhibit organic integrity in harmony is similar to the detection and treatment of diseases that may lead to their corruption, thus functioning of an administrator is like a physician. According to al-Farabi a physician is responsible for restoring the organs in a way that will benefit the whole body and other organs, while an administrator similarly manages all parts of the city in a way that will benefit the whole city and other organs (Farabi, 1987, pp. 37-38). In this framework, an analogy is established between the ruler and the heart (Farabi, 2018, p. 101):

Just as the heart is formed first, then the existence of the other organs of the body, the formation of their forces, their emergence in the order of existence peculiar to them, and if one of these organs is corrupted, the heart itself is the cause of the elimination of this disorder, in the same way, in the same way, the ruler of the city must first come into existence, and then the parts of the city, the volitional faculties of these parts, must be the reason for their emergence in the order of their existence. [tm]

Al-Farabi grounds this hierarchical organization with reference to the essential hierarchy between the parts of the political unity. According to him, some of the human activities that contribute to political unity exist to serve the city, just like some of the people, and some are suitable for governing. In this context, it is seen that al-Farabi explains both an organic division of labor in the establishment of society and a medical analogy in its administration based on the body metaphor. It is obvious that the duty attributed to the administrator by al-Farabi is also a moral treatment-management duty, and in the final analysis, the society's behavior in accordance with the hierarchy of existence is seen as an important factor in its orientation to moral competence (Farabi, 1987, p. 38). In the background of this relationship established between moral

competence and social/cosmic harmony, there is an archaic identity established between illness and ‘sin/breaking the law’. Eliade (2020, p. 62) states that evaluating the sin against the holy/harmony/laws as a cause of illness is a common way of thinking in many ancient societies from Yucatan to Palestine, and in this context, establishes a relationship between magic and medicine. Essentially, al-Farabi’s philosophy, which combines the philosopher-prophet-administrator figures and incurs them responsible for the ‘healthy’ existence of society, constructs an Islamic version of the ancient conception based largely on ‘cosmic laws’ and their application to society.

It can be followed from his work *El-Kevn ve el-Fesad*, in which Avicenna interpreted the theory of elements and developed an interpretation of becoming and corruption that would be accepted throughout the Middle Ages (McGinnis, 2013, p. 88 ff.). According to Avicenna, the main elements cannot be reduced to a single one, they are not considered infinitely many and cannot be transformed into each other (Topdemir, 2009, pp. 99-100). In his work with Platinos’ influences, Avicenna claimed that becoming is not a mere change, but an ongoing process, and in order to justify this, the four elements are not pure and unchangeable, on the contrary, they exist in a mixed state, where one of them is dominant and the other is subordinate. He argues that they are in relation, and that the transformation emerges from this contradiction (Topdemir, 2009, p. 81). Although Avicenna’s connection with Aristotle’s physics is clear in this respect, his way of associating physics, which investigates the structural properties of the universe, with medicine in his work called *el-Kanun fi el-Tib*, covers a wider theoretical and practical scale compared to the examples in the ancient philosophy (Pormann, 2013, p. 94):

Medicine considers the elements (*al-arka n̄*); mixtures; humours; simple and compound parts [of the body]; pneumas and their natural, vital and psychic faculties; actions; states of the body such as sickness, health and the middle state; their causes such as food, drink, airs, waters, places, dwellings, evacuation and constipation, professions, habits, bodily and psychic movements, rest; age; gender; strange things that occur to the body; regimen through food, drink, choice of air, choice of movement and rest; treatment; drugs; and surgery, [all] to preserve health and to cure each disease.

The field in which Avicenna categorizes medical science necessarily establishes the figure of the physician as a person with moral dominance over his patient, and while

placing the foundations of this dominance in the forms of cosmological, *istorik* and practical knowledge, he expands the field of application from daily life to habits. Because the disease is always considered as a deviation and disorder from the normal situation (Topdemir, 2009, p. 441), the construction of ‘harmonious/regular/normal’ has become the aim of dominating the body and actions. The ideas developed by Avicenna on the structure and ruling of political associations are similar to the idea of the organization and maintenance of a living body. First of all, in his work *el-Kanun fi el-Tib*, Avicenna (2009, p. 391) formulates a dual hierarchy between the organs, similar to al-Farabi: While the heart, brain and liver are the essential organs (as centers of life, feeling and movement, nutrition), organs such as lungs, veins, nerves, tissues either help the essential organs or become a tool of their function (the object they use). The chapter of *al-Ilahiyyat* of book titled *Kitabü’ş-Şifa* -especially fourth and fifth chapters of the tenth book- Avicenna’s formulates the relationship between the legislator, administrator and the people of the city as a harmonic relationship aimed at benefit and virtue. In this context, Avicenna (2005, p. 370) argues that the legislator should first organize the political unit as consisting of three groups as administrators-craftsmen-protectors and argues that the other members of the political structure should be placed under three social layers, from small-administrators to ‘ordinary people’.⁴⁵⁶ The duty of the legislator is to prevent anyone from being dysfunctional in this hierarchy (Avicenna, 2005, p. 370), to impose penalties and prohibitions to protect the order from corruption (Avicenna, 2005, p. 377) and to establish the moral codes and traditions necessary for the purification of the soul as well as the use of worldly powers when necessary (Avicenna, 2005, pp. 377-78). In the final analysis, the legislator and the administrator, as physicians of the political body, ensure that it is organized, fulfilled its functions and cured its diseases, and they also assume the responsibility of spiritual/moral leadership.

The fact that the influences coming from both the ancient Greek philosophy and the *Meşşâî* philosophy became a part of the Ottoman political thought was realized by a series of administrators, thinkers and mystics who carried and processed these ideas to the Anatolian region. For example, there is an early and traditional use of this metaphor in Nizam’ül-Mülk’s *Siyâsetnâme*. Nizam’ül-Mülk (2009, p. 157) deals with a story that Alptekin narrated to the Samanid ruler Emir Mansur as follows: “This

⁴⁵⁶ Hall (2004, pp. 69-70) argues that Avicenna’s theory of celestial hierarchies and its implications in psychological theory also contain a subtext on political theory. However, since these are generally related to the concept of ‘soul’, their relevance to the body metaphor is limited. For details of the subject, see: Rahman (1981, pp. 32 ff.).

sultanate is a body, and the head of this body is mine. If the head goes, the body goes too [tm]”. In this analogy quoted by Nizam’ül-Mülk, there is no elaboration on the elements of the state, the emphasis is more on the ‘indispensability’ of the warrior/commander Alptekin for the existence of the state. On the other hand, the body metaphor is used in more detail in Necmeddîn-i Dâye’s works titled *Mirsadü’l-ibad* and Nasîrüddin Tûsî’s *Ahlak-ı Nâsirî*. In addition, the body metaphor has found a place for itself in various works of İbnü’l-Arabî, Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî’s *Masnavi*, Hacı Bektâş-ı Velî’s *Makâlât*, Yunus Emre’s poems and Âşık Paşa’s *Garibnâme*. In this context, how the aforementioned thinkers, poets and mystics use the body metaphor will be briefly discussed. Necmeddîn-i Dâye divides the elements of the state into four main groups as the heart, mind, organs of sensation and other anatomical parts as instruments of these. According to Dâye, the ruler holds in the same position as the heart, and if the heart reaches *salah* (healing/righteousness/peace), the world will be right, and if the heart is broken, the world will also be corrupted (Kantar, 2019a, p. 282). As Kantar (2019a, p. 282) states, the analogy established between ruler and heart has mystical connotations and includes a sub-text such as spiritual healing and purification. On the other hand, the identification of the ruler with the world brings with it the assertion that the world is a body and state is seen as the heart of this body. The fact that the body element in this analogy covers all elements such as production, administration and security that only function in the organization of the material world, reflects a worldview in which all the elements that make up the material world are combined in terms of purpose and morality under the domination of the ruler. Secondly, Necmeddîn-i Dâye likens the vizier to the mind and argues that the heart needs reason for its own good in state administration (Kantar, 2019a, p. 283). The third category of Dâye is the sense organs and these correspond to high-level bureaucratic positions such as *hacib*, treasurer and minister in the real state organization (Kantar, 2019a, p. 283). Finally, Dâye divides the anatomical parts as instruments into two, firstly the head/hand/foot/lungs are compared to begs, and the fingers and joints are likened to governors/*naikibs/naibs*. Secondary tools are listed as soldiers and ordinary people, which are seen as veins, nerves, hairs (Kantar, 2019a, p. 283). Necmeddîn-i Dâye’s classification follows Avicenna’s distinction between essential and secondary organs. On the other hand, the concrete determinations of the roles of the essential and secondary organs in the state organization follow the lines of class distinction. At the top of the class hierarchy are the ruler and his nearby high-ranking officials, while below him are the lords and local

government ranks. Finally, the soldiers and the people are mentioned. Although this classification refers to a central state, it has an eclectic form in which the military organization is carried out by local lords/feudal powers.

Nasîrûddin Tûsî's use of the body metaphor, on the other hand, refers to a more developed philosophical background compared to Necmeddîn-i Dâye's. While using the metaphor of the body, Tûsî refers to both the theory of the four elements and the methodology of medicine based on their harmony, and ultimately combines both theories in terms of the reproduction of social structures. According to Tûsî, health in the human body depends on the establishment of harmony between the four elements, and the harmony of the society depends on the establishment of a mutual relationship/correspondence between different strata of the people (Tusi, 1964, p. 230; Tusi, 2005, p. 228). In this framework, Tûsî considered the elements of society as structural poles and classified them as organs that undertake completely different functions from each other. According to Tûsî, society consists of four segments corresponding to the four elements. The first group is the 'people of the pen' corresponding to water, and they are scholars, teachers, jurists, judges, clerks, geometry scholars, engineers, astrologers, physicians and poets (Tusi, 2005, p. 228). The second group is swordsmen and is likened to fire, and they are "(...) fighters, warriors, volunteers, skirmishers, frontier-guards, sentries, valiant men, supporters of the realm and guardians of the state" (Tusi, 1964, p. 230).⁴⁵⁷ The third group is named as 'men of negotiation' after being likened to air and consists of merchants, artisans and tax collectors (Tusi, 2005, p. 229). The fourth group consists of villagers who are likened to the earth. Tûsî assigned an essential purpose to each section; The first section ensures the continuity of the world and religion, the second section ensures the order of the world, the third section provides people's livelihood and circulation of goods, and the last section provides the nutritional needs of people (Tusi, 2005, pp. 228-29). Tûsî formulates that none of these four parts is superior to the other as the founding principle of the relationship between them and identifies this with the balance in the body based on the harmony between the four elements. The point that makes Tûsî's use of the metaphor of the body interesting is that this metaphor takes the establishment of the society in accordance with the economic division of labor and does not include the ruler among the four elements. Tûsî's interpretation is likely to have a philosophical background. As can be seen in *Meşşâî* philosophy, the existence of four elements

⁴⁵⁷ Also see: Tusi (2005, p. 229)

accepted as the basis of the being and corruption in the world. However, since the God is conceived as a transcendent being from the circle of being and corruption, it is not considered among the four elements, but as the creator of the four elements and the first cause of the world (*causa prima*). In this case, the position that Tûsî also positions the ruler can be understood as regulating and harmonizing the relations between the four elements. Although this position is not a divine position in the final analysis, it is the position of a physician equipped with divine knowledge (philosophy/theology/revelation), and within this framework, the ruler is responsible for the health of the social body.

Finally, it will be beneficial to examine how the body metaphor finds its place in *sûfî* schools of thought. Although the body metaphor is used in various *sûfî* schools, the most influential representatives of this model living in the 13th and 14th century Anatolia are İbnü'l-Arabî (1165-1240), Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî (1207-1273), Hacı Bektâş-ı Velî (1209-1271), Yunus Emre (1238-1338) and Âşık Paşa (1272-1332). It is necessary to briefly consider the ways in which the aforementioned mystics use the body metaphor and the theory of the four elements. First of all, İbnü'l-Arabî formulates his ontological assumption, which forms the basis of *sûfî* thought, as the unity of existence as a body (*vahdet-i vücûd*). İbnü'l-Arabî expresses his ontological proposition with the help of various analogies, and one of them is the analogy made between the body and its organs in his work named *Fusûsü'l-hikem*. Afiffî (1975, p. 33) states that this analogy refers to the idea of a wholeness, in which all the parts of existence are separate but have no meaning if they are not relative to the whole, and as İbnü'l-Arabî asserts the existence in the last analysis goes beyond being-material integrity and have spiritual wholeness. Similar to Averroes, İbnü'l-Arabî considers all beings as becoming, but does not divide existence into two eternal and contingent categories (and therefore does not distinguish between the God and nature), instead he places the God and nature as a whole under the category of Being, and treats the visible entities of nature as an epiphenomenon (Afiffî, 1975, p. 42). İbnü'l-Arabî argues that the four elements are the elements of the visible world (Afiffî, 1975, p. 107), but their effect on the creation of existing things is unclear in İbnü'l-Arabî's thought.⁴⁵⁸ According to İbnü'l-Arabî, divine

⁴⁵⁸ While using the theory of four elements, İbnü'l-Arabî developed a line of thought that there is a water-formed (*hydroeides*) element on the basis of everything in the universe, as required by his monist philosophy (Izutsu, 1998, p. 215). On the other hand, the traces of the theory of four elements are clear in İbnü'l-Arabî's views on cosmological-physical phenomenon (Yousef, 2008, pp. 9-10, 42, 73 ff.).

creation is also one and the same process as the emanation of nature, and the God's attribution of himself establishes apparent world, which appears as the reflection of nature (Izutsu, 1998, p. 199). In this case, the four elements and the things arising from them are nothing more than images of nature as the God's attribution of himself (Izutsu, 1998, pp. 199-200). On the other hand, İbnü'l-Arabî states that the God rules the world both through the world itself and through its image. The first of these styles of rule is the attachment of the realm to certain rules (cause-effect relations), and the second is the realization of the images of the God in the world and the perception of these images (Izutsu, 1998, pp. 319-20). Since İbnü'l-Arabî evaluates human beings as the one of the images of the God, he argues that everything that exists in the world, from the four elements to metal-plant-animals, also exists in human beings, and he concludes that everything in the world is under the influence of human beings, whether he is aware of it or not (Izutsu, 1998, p. 321). In this framework, harmony (the sameness between the conflicted state of the visible and the unity of existence) emerges as a result of human beings' having the knowledge to unite himself with God (being a perfect human being).⁴⁵⁹ It is seen that İbnü'l-Arabî continued his mystical views in his comments in the field of political philosophy. In his work *et-Tedbîrâtü'l-ilâhîye fî Islahî'l-Memleketi'l-İnsânîye*, İbnü'l-Arabî evaluates the human body as a country/city, its soul as the caliph of this country and his heart as the material office of the caliph, and he claims that the body, which he named '*medine-i cism*', was built on *ustukussat* and *anâsır-ı erbaa* (İbn Arabî, 2004, pp. 105-6).⁴⁶⁰ First of all, he draws similarities between the human body, the city and country as a center of administration. According to İbnü'l-Arabî (İbn Arabî, 2004, p. 113), similar to the residence of the ruler, the brain was built in a high place with a wide field of view, doors and windows were opened in it (ear, eye, nose), a treasury (dream, memory, idea), vizier's office (reason), command and prohibition office (*nafs*) were established. İbnü'l-Arabî states that reign as rule to a country and rule which means the rule of one's own body, are ontologically one, and both refers to the concept of caliph, which is entrusted by the God (İbn Arabî, 2004, pp.

⁴⁵⁹ See: The poem numbered XXIX in İbnü'l-Arabî's *Tercümanü'l-eşvak* and its commentary; Landau (2008, pp. 113-15).

⁴⁶⁰ The term '*ustucus*' is the equivalent of the Greek term '*stoixeion*' and means four elements (Ahmet Arslan's footnote 3; Farabi, 2018, p. 38). In the commentary of *et-Tedbirâtü'l-ilahîyye* made by Ahmet Avni Konuk, he states that the word *ustukus* means "the whole of heat, coldness, wetness, dryness" in Greek (2004, p. 106). In this case, İbnü'l-Arabî refers both to the four elements of being and corruption, and to the four elements of matter in the form of fire-water-earth-air.

153-54). Thus, İbnü'l-Arabî not only applied the body metaphor to mystical thought through political analogies, but also reinterpreted political institutions based on mystical thought.

Secondly, let us consider how the body metaphor is used in the poems of Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî. Ertem (2004, p. 63) states that Mevlânâ Rûmî follows the general mystical tendency and sees human beings as a microcosm and therefore argues that it should be understood as an integrated state of the realms where all the reflections of existence can be seen. This idea, as be seen in other thinkers and mystics in this period, associates the elements of the world with the elements of human beings and seeks the order/health of both in the harmony of common principles. Hıra (2020, pp. 310-21) lists the relevant verses of Mevlânâ Rûmî in his article showing how often the theory of four elements is used in the first notebook of the *Masnâvi*. In these lines, it is seen that Mevlânâ Rûmî considers the four elements consisting of fire-water-earth-air as material elements that are decisive in the coming into being of both the human body and nature. For example, Mevlânâ Rûmî asserts that (Hıra, 2020, pp. 318-19): “Especially if there is a piece gathered from many opposites, and if there is a collection from water, earth, fire, wind/Health is the peace of opposites. Death is a fight between them [tm]”. In these couplets, Mevlânâ Rûmî states that both the merging of the opposite elements causes the formation of the being the continuation of the being needs the harmony between the opposites, and the struggle between the opposites exterminates the being. In this context, Mevlânâ Rûmî, in his work called *Fîhi Mâ Fih*, defines the existence of the state as ensuring the peace of the society (Erten, 2004, p. 67). In his work named *Masnevi*, the *sûfî* likens the social structure to the body, similar to Nizam'ül-Mülk, and argues that in order for a body to be healthy, it must be united under the ruler, who is likened to the head (Erten, 2004, p. 68).

Thirdly, it would be useful to briefly discuss the use of the theory of four elements in the work of Hacı Bektâş-ı Velî called *Makâlât*. Gölpınarlı (1941, p. 19) argues that there is a conceptualization in *Makâlât* that all that exists in the world and in the hereafter exists in human being, and that this gives the impression of “*adem-peresti*” (worship of man), which is an extremely harsh criticism. Although I do not agree with Gölpınarlı’s argument, it is clear that the continuation of the relationship established since ancient philosophy between the ontological and epistemological aspects of human being, the universe and the divine order is seen in the *Makâlât*. In *Makâlât*, Hacı Bektâş directly evaluated the theory of the four elements as the basic elements of human beings

and classified the four levels of the *sûfis* based on these. According to Hacı Bektâş-ı Velî (1990, p. 60), man was created from the darkness of the four elements and illuminated by reason. Hacı Bektâş's proposition is as follows (1990, p. 3):

Allah Subhanahu wa Ta'ala created Adam from four kinds of objects and divided him into four divisions. All four divisions have four kinds of worship, four kinds of desires, and four kinds of moods. Henceforth, the first of these four kinds of objects from which man was created is earth, the second water, the third fire, and the fourth wind. [tm] ⁴⁶¹

Hacı Bektâş (1990, pp. 3-7) states that there are four different human beings in accordance with the four elements in question, and lists these human segments as (i) worshipers, whom he likens to air, (ii) ascetics, who he likens to fire, (iii) wise, who he likens to water, and (iv) followers, who he likens to earth. He lists these four groups according to the rank they occupy in the course of perfection (*seyr-i süluk*) (Sharia, *tariqa*, truth, ingenuity) and states that each rank both includes and exceeds the previous one. In this context, it is seen that Hacı Bektâş uses the theory of four elements not according to the economic and political distinctions of different social segments, but by centered on an understanding of spiritual perfection based on religious knowledge and actions. In addition, it is seen that Hacı Bektâş established an analogy between the body and the city, but he did this not to speculate in the context of political philosophy, but to make a mystical abstraction based on political phenomena. In this context, he likens the human heart to a city and argues that all elements of existence take place in that city (Hacı Bektaş Veli, 1990, p. 23). These elements are described as sultan (intellect), naib (faith), sübaşı (poverty), castle guards (knowledge, generosity, modesty, patience, abstinence, fear, decency), hilats (inspiration, conversation, etc.) (Hacı Bektaş Veli, 1990, p. 23).⁴⁶² Although there is no apparent contradiction between the four elements in Hacı Bektâş's thought, the narrative element in which the contradiction intensifies appears in the moral field and is explained through conceptual dualities such as darkness/light, science/ignorance, evil/goodness.

⁴⁶¹ The original text is as follows (Hacı Bektaş, 2007, p. 44): “(...) Ademi dört dürlü nesneden yaratdı ve hem dört güruh kıldı ve hem dördin dört dürlü taatda kodı”. The original Arabic version of the work is lost. The oldest of the available Arabic copies is dated 1508, on the other hand, there is a Turkish translation dated 1424 (2007, pp. 23-24). Mélikoff (2010, pp. 108, 113) states that an Arabic copy of the work may never have existed and there are legitimate doubts that the work belongs to Hacı Bektâş.

⁴⁶² The analogy established between the heart and the city is also found in Hacı Bayram-ı Velî (Cebecioğlu, 1989, p. 250).

The interpretation of Islamic belief elements based on body analogy is also included in the works of Kaygusuz Abdal, who is also a discipline of the Bektashi tradition.⁴⁶³ In his work named *Gulistan*, Kaygusuz Abdal (Güzel, 1981, pp. 106-7) explains that the whole universe was created from the soul of the Prophet Muhammad, water was created first, seas and lands were created from water, the sky was created from the mist of the seas, and angels were created from there. In this narrative, the detail that the first substance is water is emphasized several times. In his poem named *Mesnevi-i Baba Kaygusuz*, Kaygusuz Abdal mentioned the four elements as the main elements of the body, but he claimed that human existence is not just these because it has a soul (Oktay, 2013, pp. 82, 130). In the work named *Elifnâme*, direct references are made to İbnü'l-Arabî and Hacı Bektaş-ı Velî. In the work called *Vücutnâme*, elements such as blood, bone, meat were compared to planets, and the twelve signs were interpreted to correspond to human limbs (Güzel, 1981, pp. 137-38). In the work named *Dilgüşâ*, Kaygusuz (Güzel, 1981, p. 143) likens the human body to a city, and in a poem that continues as “earth is my body, waters are my veins, sky is my tent, the zenith of the sky is my canopy, rotation of the planets is my whirl, the stars are my torch (...) [tm]” that he likened it to both the body and the tools associated with human beings to the cosmic elements. In *Saraynâme*, he likens the world to a palace, and sees the people as the servants of the ruler (God) who owns this palace (Güzel, 1981, pp. 147-51).⁴⁶⁴

Fourthly, some traces of the theory of four elements can be found in Yunus Emre’s poetry. It is seen that four elements are frequently referred to in Yunus Emre’s poems both in his work called *Risâletü’n-Nushiyye* and generally in his *Diwan*. Some of these references are made to directly describe the material existence of elements such as the world and the body, while another part is used to deal with the *nafs* and therefore moral existence as Ayar (2014, p. 91) states. Yunus Emre uses the theory of four elements in his poems by elaborating a few basic categories. The first of these is that the idea of universe was created from four elements. According to the poet, the God created an ore from his own power, looked at this ore and melted it, and earth-sky-sea-

⁴⁶³ For example, see: *er-Risâletun Kaygusuz ‘Abdal* (Guzel, 1986, pp. 286-98), *Elifnâme* (Özkan, 2012, pp. 193-97), *Gülistân* (Güzel, 1981, p. 106), *Mesnevi-i Baba Kaygusuz* (Guzel, 1981, p. 109), *Mesnevi-i Sani* (Guzel, 1981, p. 114), *Mesnevi-i Salis* (Güzel, 1981, p. 118) etc.

⁴⁶⁴ It is possible to think that Hacı Bayram-ı Velî had a similar mystical understanding of the body. The fact that we have only four poems known to belong to Hacı Bayram makes it difficult to make detailed analysis in this issue, but there are elements related to the mystical use of the body metaphor is clearly seen in Hacı Bayram’s one of the hymns, which begins as “Çalabım bir şâr yaratmış/ İki cihan aresinde/ Bakıcak didâr görünür/ Ol şehrin kenaresinde”.

mountains were formed from this ore. In this context, Yunus Emre states that the world was created from a single substance, albeit divided into different elements, which is a view generally accepted in mystical interpretations on creation.⁴⁶⁵ In another poem, he uses a terminology reminiscent of İbnü'l-Arabî's ideas, stating that the four elements are copies and that the 'four walls' of human beings are formed from these contradictory elements: "(...)/ Su vu toprak u yel oldu suret/ Dört muhtelif nesneden bu dört divarım".⁴⁶⁶ Yunus Emre's poems about watching everything in the world in his own body (or finding them in the body of the God) can be considered as a continuation of the *sûfî* view that human beings, the God and everything that exists have a common substance.⁴⁶⁷ Yaşın (2018, pp. 13-14) considers these couplets as a reflection of the idea that human beings were in unity with God before they was created.

The second issue Yunus Emre emphasizes is that the first human being was created by the God based on four elements. For example, the poet goes beyond the standard Islamic narrative and creates an alternative narrative in which Adam was created from all four elements, in the following lines in his work called *Risâletü'n-Nushiyye*: "Padişahın kudreti gör n'eyledi/ Od u su toprağ u yele söyledi/ (...) / Toprağ ile suyu bünyad eyledi/ Ana Âdem demeği ad eyledi/ Yel Gelip ardınca dağıttı anı/ Andan oldu cism-i Âdem bil bunu/ Od dahi geldi vü kızdırdı anı/ Çünkü kızdı cisme ulaştı canı"⁴⁶⁸. Similarly, in other poems of the Yunus Emre, there are references to the idea that the human body is composed of four elements -for example, "Dört türlü nesneden hasıl bilin benim işte delil/ Od ile su toprağ u yel bünyad kılan yezdan benim".⁴⁶⁹ The idea that the God created the human body from four elements gains moral connotations in Yunus Emre's poetry, such as that there is a proper division of the soul into four elements, that the states of the soul are divided according to four main categories, and that the four elements can be compared to four different types of reign.

⁴⁶⁵ Poem no CLXIII, couplet no: 1242-44, Gölpınarlı (2020b, p. 249).

⁴⁶⁶ Water and earth and wind became images/ Four walls formed me from four various objects. Poem no CLXV, couplet no: 1257-8, Gölpınarlı (2020b, p. 251).

⁴⁶⁷ For example, see those poems; CXXIII, CXXIV, CXXV, CCXXII etc.

⁴⁶⁸ Look what the sultan's might did/ He spoke to fire, water, earth and wind/ (...) He built a building from earth and water/ He named him Adam/ The wind came and scattered him/ Therefore, Adam's body was formed, learn about it/ Fire came and warmed him/ His soul reached the substance because it was warmed. *Risâletü'n-Nushiyye*, couplet no: 1-5. Gölpınarlı (2020b, p. 3).

⁴⁶⁹ There is evidence that you can know that I exist because of four kinds of things / I am the god who unites fire and water, earth and wind. Poem no CXXXII, couplet no: 985. Gölpınarlı (2020b, p. 210).

Yunus Emre states that his own soul is also ‘in the four natures’⁴⁷⁰ and establishes a direct relationship between these four natures and the four light of the God and the four moral temperaments of human beings. For example, in *Risaletü’n-Nushiyye* (Gölpınarlı, 2020b, p. 4), there is an analogy established between the God and sultan and four elements attained as attributes of God, such as fire is described as the wrath of the god, air/wind as the majesty of God, water as the life of God, and earth as the light of the god. The human temperaments/moods corresponding to these four elements are as follows: Fire means “lust, arrogance, greed, envy [tm]”, air/wind means “lie, hypocrisy, haste [tm]”, water is used to mean “pleasure, generosity, good treatment and getting back to one’s loved one [tm]”, soil represents moral values such as “patience, trust and good nature [tm]” (Gölpınarlı, 2020b, p. 4). Ayar (2014, p. 93) states that these qualities are considered as innate characteristics that enter the structure of human beings. These four features actually correspond to the four steps of the perfection of soul, as it can be seen in the *Makâlât* of Hacı Bektaş-ı Velî. The earth-like element, which symbolizes absolute surrender to God, corresponds to the moment of ingenuity as the highest order in both *sûfis*. Finally, Yunus Emre likens the body, which consists of four elements, to a city and a country. For example, the poet reproduces the city-country-body similarity in the lines “İşbu vücud şehrine bir hoş nazar kıldı”⁴⁷¹ and “Hani bu mülkün sultanı bu ten ise hani canı”⁴⁷². According to this similarity, the soul also rules the body, similar to the ruler’s management of his property or country. Although Yunus Emre likened the body to the city, he did not find any similarity between the political, economic or cultural structure of the city and the concepts of body-spirit-morality. On the other hand, the fact that he evaluates mystical purity and renunciation as a solution to the criticisms he developed about his own age shows that the poet accepts the healing-morality relationship latently.

Finally, the second part of our discussion could be concluded in analyze of the use of the body metaphor ins thought by taking a look at how the main body theory is used within the framework of the body metaphor in Âşık Paşa’s work named *Garibnâme*. As Çelik (2019) reveals, the theory of four elements has been used quite frequently in Âşık Paşa’s poetry. The contexts of the use of these symbols could be

⁴⁷⁰Poem no CXCVII, couplet no: 1539. Gölpınarlı (2020b, p. 304).

⁴⁷¹ He looked at the city of body with a pleasant look. Poem no LVIII, couplet no: 408. Gölpınarlı (2020b, p. 123).

⁴⁷² Who/where is the sultan of this property, if this is a body, where is his soul? Poem no: CXIX, couplet no: 844. Gölpınarlı (2020b, p. 192).

listed as the creation of the world, the ordering of the world, its relationship with human beings, the formation of the body and spiritual hierarchy, and the management of mind to the elements of body (Çelik, 2019, pp. 318-25). As it was discussed in the previous sections, it is seen that the poet/mystic applied the theory of four elements to the field of political thought, to the extent that the fourth element is taken as God in the theory of ‘three thrones and one state’ formulated by Âşık Paşa.

Lastly, it is necessary to focus on the use of this symbology in Ottoman political thought. It is understood that this metaphor was used frequently in the period of Ottoman political thought -roughly from the middle of the 14th century to the beginning of the 15th century. As can be seen from the examples above, with this metaphor, the theory of four elements and the human body were sometimes combined, sometimes a discursive relationship was established between the body and the city/management, and an analogical relationship is established between health/disease/body and the political system. The works in which the body metaphor was used in Ottoman political thought can be listed as follows: Dâvûd-i Kayserî’s *al-Îthâfu’s-Süleymânî fi’l-ahdi’l-Ûrhâni*, Ahmedî’s *İskendernâme*, Amâsî’s *Miratu’l-Müluk* and Şeyhoğlu Mustafa’s work named *Kenz’ül-Küberâ*.

Let us first consider the work of Dâvûd-i Kayserî named *al-Îthâfu’s-Süleymânî fi’l-ahdi’l-Ûrhâni*. This work was dedicated to Orhan Beg’s son Suleyman Pasha and is a type of *enmûzec* book thought to have been written between 1337 and 1348 (Fazlıoğlu, 2017, pp. 26-27). It is understood that Dâvûd-i Kayserî wrote this work in a way that he mentions/gives a core of various sciences in order to respond to Suleyman Pasha, who gifted him a valuable book, and in this way, he showed his own scientific proficiency in the new circle he entered (Fazlıoğlu, 2017, p. 27). The work consists of three parts, in the first part, religious sciences, in the second part, rational sciences and in the last part, Arabic sciences (linguistics). The subjects in the field of political thoughts are handled in the second part of the work, in the subsection about morality. Dâvûd-i Kayserî is the chief muderris of the first Ottoman madrasa founded in Iznik (there is a debate that it may have been founded in Izmit)⁴⁷³, and he was also influential in the Ottoman thought because he was knowledgeable about Akbari *sûfîsm* and *Meşşâî* philosophy. The *tariqa* line of Dâvûd-i Kayserî reaches İbnü’l-Arabî through his teacher Sadreddin Konevî, and this connection can be followed intellectually as the thinker has adopted the idea of unity of existence (Bayrakdar, 1994). On the other hand, it is

⁴⁷³ See: Fazlıoğlu (2017, p. 20).

understood that Dâvûd-i Kayserî had a great competence about the tradition of *Meşşâî* philosophy and the knowledge of natural sciences and mathematics/geometry of the period. This second aspect connects Dâvûd-i Kayserî to ar-Razi, Avicenna and other Islamic circles of philosophy. Dâvûd-i Kayserî dealt with Avicenna's views in the *İlmu't-tib* section of his work *el-İthâfu's-Süleymânî fi'l-ahdi'l-Ûrhâni* and suggested that a balance between hot-cold and wet-dry elements is needed for a balanced state of mood to emerge (Fazlıoğlu, 2017, p. 65). In the section *İlmu'l-ahlak*, which he wrote following the medicine section, the thinker draws a similarity between morality and medicine and compares the practitioners of morality to physicians (Fazlıoğlu, 2017, pp. 65-66). According to Dâvûd-i Kayserî, ethics is similar to medical science, one is concerned with the health and illness of the body, while the other is concerned with the illness and health of the soul. In this framework, while doctors protect health (*hifzu's-sihha*), moralists are responsible for protecting virtues (*hifzu'l-fezâil*). The health of the soul stems from virtues, and its diseases stem from sins/disgrace. Like the physician of the body, the 'physicians' of the soul are prophets and philosophers, and the rules/laws brought by them include the morality that ensures the soul to be healthy (Fazlıoğlu, 2017, pp. 65-66). Dâvûd-i Kayserî's use of the body metaphor has combined two dominant elements in *Meşşâî* philosophy. The first of these elements is the idea of making the soul healthy/happy by making it virtuous, which is derived from ancient Greek philosophy. Within the framework of this model, Dâvûd-i Kayserî also connects the healing of the soul to moral healing, and by using al-Farabi's theory of prophecy, he makes the legislator-prophet the subject of moral improvement. In this context, Dâvûd-i Kayserî did not expand the analogy he established between the soul and the body in terms of the similarities of the body to the political structure and limited this similarity to the management of the souls only. In this respect, the body metaphor used by Dâvûd-i Kayserî is characterized by a two-level subordination model that prioritizes the spirit and therefore morality, in parallel between the soul and the body, rather than describing the organs of the political body and the hierarchy between them. In the final analysis, it is seen that the metaphor used by Dâvûd-i Kayserî bears a significant similarity with the metaphor of the shepherd.

Secondly, the body metaphor is considered as is used in Ahmedî's *İskendernâme*. Ahmedî mentions about the theory of the four elements, the creation of the universe and human nature in various parts of *İskendernâme*. Ahmedî first divides the realm into two parts, high and low, and the high realm consists of stars and skies, and the lower realm

consists of the earth.⁴⁷⁴ The lower realm has two parts, simple and composite, the first of which is fire, air, water and earth, and the second part is the existing-everything, which is a mixture of these.⁴⁷⁵ Ahmedî states that these four elements constitute the essence of every existing compound-matter, and that minerals, animals and plants are born from them.⁴⁷⁶ The poet also makes use of the theory of oppositions based on four elements in the lines he describes the creation, according to him, solid and liquid mix, heavy and light combine, water takes heat from fire and fire takes the power of coldness from water.⁴⁷⁷ As could be seen from these expressions, Ahmedî inherits the ancient philosophical tradition and *Meşşâî* thought and considers this as the basis of existence, although not with philosophical certainty. Based on the Ahmedî four-element theory, he also explains bodily changes. For example, he claims that what a person sees in his dreams is determined by which of the four elements is dominant in his body, and he shows that the soul loosens during sleep and the body loses its inner balance.⁴⁷⁸ It is clear that this theory is based on the origin of the interpretation of the ancient medical tradition in the context of *Meşşâî* philosophy, which can be seen also in Dâvûd-i Kayserî. But the more crucial point lies in Ahmedî's unification of the body with the four elements. The poet uses this model in the examples where he compares the parts of the body with the parts of the city and thus uses the body metaphor in a political sense. Ahmedî use of this schema is largely based on İbnü'l-Arabî's model and with latent *sûfî* references. Ahmedî argues that a body is like a city, and thus he likens the political order, plan and elements of a city to the elements of a body. This analogy is also significant in that it describes an ideal city in Ahmedî's mind. According to Ahmedî, the body is structured like a city, its basis is the contrast of four elements and its basis is nine substances.⁴⁷⁹ In this city/body consists of two hundred and forty-eight pillars, seven hundred and twenty vineyards, a fountain and three hundred and sixty rivers coming out of it, houses, ten treasures, twelve gates, eight builders, five guards, two wings and two pillars, three tribes and a ruler.⁴⁸⁰ Ahmedî explains these similes one by one: Nine ores are marrow-bone-meat-blood-vessels-nerves-skin-fat and hair; two

⁴⁷⁴ See: Ahmedî (2018, p. 275). Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 3641-3642.

⁴⁷⁵ See: Ahmedî (2018, p. 275). Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 3643-3645.

⁴⁷⁶ See: Ahmedî (2018, pp. 173-75). Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 2310-2317.

⁴⁷⁷ See: Ahmedî (2018, p. 173). Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 2318-2319.

⁴⁷⁸ See: Ahmedî (2018, p. 75). Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 960-961.

⁴⁷⁹ See: Ahmedî (2018, p. 195). Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 2580-2581.

⁴⁸⁰ See: Ahmedî (2018, pp. 195-96). Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 2582-2593.

hundred and forty-eight pillars are bones; seven hundred and twenty ligaments are nerves; the fountain is the heart, and three hundred and sixty rivers are the veins; the twelve gates are the nostrils-eyes-ears-navel-hole-mouth-excretory holes; the five guards are tasting-touch-hearing-seeing and smelling; eight builders (stages of the digestive system from mouth to defecation and growth and development of the body, imagining, reproduction, etc.); the ruler is reason, the shadow of god; treasures are listed as brain-heart-liver-intestines-gall-spleen-stomach-kidney-bladder-ballocks; two poles are feet and two wings are hands; the three tribes are human-jinn-angels.⁴⁸¹ The analogy that Ahmedî establishes between the body and the city attributes the establishment of the city mainly to the elements of administration, livelihood and architecture. A monarch is a ruler who must be subordinated to and identified with reason, and the organs that help him are the watchdogs and the treasury. The city's food needs are provided by its vineyards and orchards, and its water needs are met from fountains and rivers. The pillars, gates and builders of the city are there for its operation to be planned. In the final analysis, as Ahmedî states, elements that are each for a certain thing, that is, functionally articulated, form a city.⁴⁸² As a ruler, Ahmedî places the reason in this schema and gives the mind the title of 'light of God, the shadow of God', and he evaluates the reason to rule the body as necessary for the happiness of the body, for it to go to heaven and find abundance, comfort and eternal life there. In this analogy, the function of the reason and the ruler is the happiness of the body, both earthly and otherworldly. Thus, it becomes clear that Ahmedî also uses the metaphor of the body by giving a similar meaning to the metaphor of the shepherd. However, while the shepherd metaphor is based on external functionalism as the management of souls, the body metaphor is based on an internal functionalism as the functional integrity of organs.

Thirdly, Hüsameddin Amâsî is the author who used the body metaphor and the theory of *anâsır-ı erbaa* (four elements) in Ottoman political thought. In Amâsî's *Mirâtu'l-Mülûk*, the ontological argument based on four elements was applied to the human body and social structure, and the condition of existence based on the harmony between the four elements was used to explain the specific structures of these elements as the prerequisite for the health of the body, temperament/mood, and society. According to Amâsî (2016, p. 361), the creation of balanced mixtures of existing things

⁴⁸¹ See: Ahmedî (2018, pp. 197-200). Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 2602-2672.

⁴⁸² See: Ahmedî (2018, p. 197). Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 2606.

is only possible if the four elements in it come together in sufficient quantities. This principle applies both to the health of the human body and to the continuity of social structures. Amâsî (2016, p. 245) uses this principle in two ways; the first of these refers to the medical and the second to the spiritual dimension. According to him, the health of the body depends on the balance of the human temperament (Amâsî, 2016, p. 245): “Çünkü kanun-i hıfz-i sıhhat-i beden tıbda mülayim mizaç istimal kılmakdur (...)”.⁴⁸³ Yılmaz (2016, p. 245, footnote 1) states that the term ‘*mizaç*’ that Amâsî uses in these statements is used with reference to four elements -which are blood, bile, phlegm, and love- mean moral virtue. In this framework, just as the harmony of moral values creates the health of the body, according to Amâsî, the health of the soul is determined by the mixture of social relations of human beings. People are influenced by the people they meet and to be friend with, and whether these people are morally good or bad determines whether the person has acquired good moral qualities (Amâsî, 2016, 245-46). In this context, Amâsî grounds this form of mixing between people, with quotations from Galenos, the principle of such mixing between people is *philia*, that people should adopt “*fazıl-ı kamil*” (virtuous) people as friends and be open to moral criticism by them (Amâsî, 2016, p. 247). Thus, moral perfection becomes possible. In this schema, the successful elements are (i) mixing, (ii) the rational management of the mixture, and (iii) moral evolution as the governing principle of rational management. While the use of the theory of the four elements in ontological terms is the mixing of the four elements in terms of being and corruption, in medical thought this schema is transformed into the rational management of formation and corruption in terms of the health of the body. This schema is directly transferred to the moral formation and corruption of individuals, and the elements are divided into two as good and bad (virtuous and sinful, smart and unwise, decent and corrupt, etc.) and managing the orientation of human beings among these elements has become a form of management aimed at moral health. Amâsî applied the triple schema, which the main titles were pointed above, to the social structure. According to Amâsî, societies consist of four groups of people, similar to the four elements. These groups are four: (i) people of the pen, (ii) people of arms, (iii) people of trade, (iv) people of agriculture (Amâsî, 2016, pp. 361-63). The way Amâsî defines the four groups is taken directly from Tûsî. As was examined above, Tûsî also divided the society into four parts and formulated them as the people of the pen, the swordsmen,

⁴⁸³ Because the law of preserving the health of the body in medicine to reveal a mild temperament.

the tradesmen and the farmers, whom he likened to water, fire, air and earth. The contents of these four groups in Amâsî are as follows: (i) the people of the pen are composed of ulama, faqihs, qadis, clerks, accountants, engineers, astrologers, physicians and poets. Amâsî (2016, p. 363) describes this group as the pillar of religion and state and likens it to water. The ‘pillar’ analogy is close to the tent metaphor, but what is being suggested here is more of a building or a body. The ‘water’ analogy is also worth examining. The element of water has been identified with cleanliness/purity as mystical symbology, and the ability to clean other objects has been attributed to it. In addition, the fact that knowledge is likened to a sea in classical sources and that scientists/mystics/’*alims* are described as people immersed in this sea constitute the symbolic sources of the aforementioned analogy. Finally, the water element is similar to the pen ink used by all the people of the pen. In the thought of Hacı Bektâş-ı Velî, water symbolizes wise people, because wise people morally ‘cleanse’ other people with their words and actions. In this context, it is understood that Amâsî also gave the first group the moral leadership of the society and assigned the task of managing the moral orientations of the society in religious and rational terms. On the other hand, among the people of the pen, the people closest to the analogy of water are the members of the ulama. Since all segments of the said group can be seen to be more or less related to madrasah education, the senior ulama, the organizer of madrasah education, will be seen as the natural leader and most elite segment of this group. In this respect, the water analogy mostly describes the most competent member of this group. For example, while the relevance of the water element with the scribes is limited only to the fact that the ink is made of water, it has more semantic connections for the ulama.

Amâsî likens the second group to fire and calls it the people of arms. He places mujahideen, *ghazis*, brave people and state officials in this group (Amâsî, 2016, p. 363). Tûsî defines this group as warriors, *ghazis*, border guards, guards, wrestlers, palace and state guards (Tusi, 2005, p. 229). Although there is no significant difference between the ways in which the two thinkers define the second group in terms of symbolic or real content, it is seen that Amâsî combines different sections under common categories instead of counting them at length. Both thinkers have formulated the social function of this group as protecting the ‘order of the world’. The identification of this group with fire is due to the burning/damaging/dangerous nature of fire. Precisely for this reason, this second group, which is counted among the elements that make up the state, also poses a certain danger for the ruling classes and is under the moral and legal control of

the ulama stratum. In this respect, fire symbology characterizes the armed groups by using an element of the four elements that has relatively more negative qualities. As it can be seen in Yunus Emre's *Risâletü'n-Nushiyye*, the element of fire represents the malevolent tendencies of the soul, and there is a sub-text about the creation of the devil/demon from kind of fire at the origins of this view. In the thought of Hacı Bektâş, the element of fire, together with the air, constitutes the two lowest elements of spiritual perfection.

The third group that Amâsî mentions is the people of treatment, which is likened to air, and consists of merchants, artisans, in addition to tax collectors. The definition of Amâsî is exactly the same as Tûsî. It is seen that both of them take the merchants, who are the most advanced example of this group, as a model while making this definition. Because the common element among artisans, tax collectors and merchants is money, and the most advanced form of circulation of money is found in merchant capital as of the period in question. In this respect, the analogy of air symbolizes the circulation of money. On the other hand, in both Yunus Emre and Hacı Bektâş, it is seen that the element of air is partly the representative of the inferior or lowly qualities of existence. For example, in Yunus Emre, the element of air symbolizes the features of 'lying, pleading, squeaky/hurryness', which are also similar to the features attributed to the medieval merchant typology.

Finally, Amâsî mentions the *ehl-i zer* and *ehl-i hars* as the fourth element that makes up the societies. This expression refers to the sections of people dealing with land and agriculture. The social function of these elements is to produce necessities, according to Amâsî (2016, p. 363), "halk bunlarsız müteazzirdir".⁴⁸⁴ While both Amâsî and Tûsî detail all these social segments, they do not provide any information about this segment, except for a few lines. In Hacı Bektaş and Yunus Emre, the earth symbol means silence, obeying the power of God, being contented, having patience and ingenuity. In this respect, the analogy of the farmers to the earth in Amâsî and Tûsî is related to the fact that these people deal with the land and that they are expected to obey the power silently. While the earth analogy is associated with essentially superior qualities in *sûfî* discourse, it is characterized in a much more secular way in Amâsî and Tûsî and means more 'base/ground'. For example, Hâfız Halil (2015, p. 141) relates the following words of Sheikh Bedreddin, addressed to Karaman Beg, residing in Konya: "If you can become soil on this road/ All the fruits will grow from you/ If you become

⁴⁸⁴ The people are in distress and necessity without them.

soil on this road/ Your inside is filled with miracles/ If you become soil on this road/ You will be a source of wisdom”. The mystical view reflected by Bedreddin shows the land as the source of both worldly blessings and divine secrets, similar to the cult of the mother goddess or the cult of Demeter. But land, as used by Tûsî and Amâsî, is only a means of production and an idealized representation of the obedience of those who use it.

In the final analysis, Amâsî argues that the balance to be established between these four groups is essential for social cohesion (2016, p. 367). According to Amâsî, none of the four segments should dominate in this mix: “(...) tabayide şöyle ki anasırdan birisi bakı anasır üzerine galebe kılursa inhiraf-i mizaç ve inhilal-i terkib lazım gelür. Hem-cünan bu esnafun dahi birisi bakısı üzere galebe kılursa emr-i içtima münharif olur ve fesad-ı nev lazım gelür”.⁴⁸⁵ This argument is worth examining. Amâsî argues that if one of the four elements becomes dominant, the society will deteriorate in the same way that the substance composition deteriorates. But what does it mean when one element becomes ‘dominant’ (*galebe*) over another, one class/segment over another? What is the form and content of the domination in question? Should the term ‘*galebe*’ be understood as one class or segment of people ‘ruling’ another? Since the term ‘*galebe*’ means the abolition of the ‘normal’ relationship between social segments in favor of a particular social segment, it must first be focused on the problem of how the ‘normal’ or ‘ideal’ relationship is established between social segments in theory in question. Amâsî (2016, p. 365) conceives the relationship between the four elements of society as a relationship of division of labor: “Fazılatu-‘l-fallahın huva’t-taavuni bi’l-amal va fazılatu’t-tuccar huva’t-taavuni bi’l-amval, va fazılatu’l-muluk huva’t-taavuni bi’l-arai ve’s-siyasati, ve fazılatu’l-ilahiyyın huva’t-taavunu bi’l-hikami’l-hakıkiyyeti summa hum yataavanune ala imarati’l-muduni bi’l-hayrati va’l-fazayili””.⁴⁸⁶

Amâsî states that he quoted the passage I quoted above from the ‘ancient philosophers’. In this excerpt, the figure of the ruler is substituted for soldiers, and the social hierarchy rises from farmers to merchants, from soldiers/rulers to ulama. Amâsî’s

⁴⁸⁵ If one of the four elements in nature comes to the fore more than the other elements, it will be inevitable for the balanced mixture to be disrupted and the combination to be dissolved. Similarly, if one of the social segments is more dominant than the others, then the social cohesion is damaged and the degradation of the specie is inevitable. Also see: Yılmaz (2016, p. 363-65).

⁴⁸⁶ The virtue of farmers is their cooperation in business, the virtue of merchants is their cooperation in goods, the virtue of rulers is their cooperation in views and politics, the virtue of theologians is their cooperation in reaching true knowledge. Then they all cooperate in building the cities with virtues and goodness.

own division does not include the ruler, since the ruler as a god-like figure is responsible for managing the coexistence of the four elements. The contribution of the social segments in question to the division of labor is as follows: Farmers involve in agricultural production, traders ensure the circulation of goods, the ruler cooperates in ideas and is in charge of politics, and the ulama are responsible for the society's access to 'true' knowledge. In this schema, it is clear that farmers and traders do not assume any management function. This means that the ruler in the political sense and the ulama in the moral sense undertake the administrative function. In this framework, the concept of 'mis-domination' is when one group eliminates another group. To take the term in its superficial sense, it means that one of the four segments governs the others. However, this meaning becomes invalid if, for example, the composition of the people of pen group is taken into account, because the social function of faqihs and qadis is ultimately related to legal and judicial administration. In this case, the term '*galebe*' should not be understood as one group leading another, but as one group destroying or replacing another. So, what does this 'destroy' or 'replace' mean? There are several typical forms of the situation indicated by this word: (i) soldiers, farmers, or merchants seizing the moral leadership of society by displacing the ulama; (ii) farmers abandon production and replace soldiers or traders; (iii) ulama or soldiers downgrade in class schema to become merchants or farmers; (iv) the upgrading or downgrading of traders and artisans by abandoning production. If we remember that the role of the ruler in Amâsî's schema is to preserve the integrity of the four elements and reproduce their boundaries, it becomes clear what the four typical 'deterioration' situations we have mentioned above mean in social context. In the first case, if the ulama stratum, which is considered to be the 'pillar of religion and the world', loses its class privileges and social status, the ruler will be overthrown because he will be deprived of the scribal service, religious ideology and religious law, which are the basis of his class domination. In the second case, the abandonment of agricultural production by the farmers will prevent the ruler from appropriating agricultural rent and his class power will disappear. In the third case, the loss of class privileges of the soldiers and the ulama will leave the ruler without basis for use of violence, legal and religious administration, and moreover, it will eliminate his class domination as it will eliminate the possibility of articulating with these groups. In the last case, as trade and crafts will disappear, commodity circulation will be interrupted, and production will also be interrupted since it will not be possible to supply the necessary means of production for agricultural production and city life, and

equipment for the daily use. In the final analysis, in the political model put forward by Amâsî, the relationship between the four elements is provided according to a proportional benefit/justice measure among themselves, and this relationship allows the ruler to reproduce his power. The controlled and measured mixing of the four elements creates four kinds of social consumption objects and services and the class that produces them;

(i) Agricultural surplus or overproduction (food and raw materials) + trade/crafts/taxes (weapons, clothing, money) + science (registers, knowledge of ideology-production, war and management) = security, invasion, maintaining order (soldiers, army).

(ii) Agricultural surplus or overproduction (food and raw materials) + trade/craft products and tax (clothes, money, books, ink, etc.) + security (law enforcement) = knowledge of management, religion, military strategy, legal, administrative and ideological control (*ilmiyye* and *kalemiyye*).

(iii) Agricultural surplus or overproduction (food and raw materials) + security (law enforcement, order on trade routes) + science (knowledge of accounting, commercial law, law of obligations and court practice) = development of trade and crafts (traders and artisans) + taxation (tax officers).

(iv) Security (law enforcement, coercive apparatus) + ideology (religious myths) + production tools (craft products) = agricultural surplus or overproduction (farmers).

Presenting the issue in this way brings Amâsî's model closer to the circle of justice model. In this model, it is natural for the soldiers and the ulama to be in the executive position because they embody the political and ideological functions that hold the social formation together. Other categories, on the other hand, can participate in the general schema of society simply within the framework of their economic role. In this context, it is natural that a ruler is also a part of the dominant stratum formed by soldiers and ulama members, and in the final analysis, he is responsible for the management of both the relations between these two groups in particular and the relations between the four social segments in general. The reproduction of this schema is primarily in the interest of the ruling class, so the balance between the four elements of society depends

primarily on the ability to reproduce the classes that claim political and ideological/moral leadership, that is, the ‘healthy’ class structure of the society. Thus, the argument presented as the ‘continuity of society’ is essentially nothing but the construction of society in such a way as to provide the conditions of existence for the ruling classes.

Finally, I will discuss how the body metaphor is used in Şeyhoğlu Mustafa’s *Kenz’ül-Küberâ ve Mehek’ül-‘ulemâ*. Şeyhoğlu Mustafa uses the body metaphor based on a dualistic categorization. This categorization is generally characterized within the framework of master-servant, ends-means duality. Şeyhoğlu operates this dualistic schema in two different contexts. The first of these refers to the dominance relationship between the ruler and the ruler’s own body and soul *nefs*, and the second refers to the dominance relationship between the ruler and the state officials and the people under his rule. To illustrate the first analogy, according to Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, p. 248), the rulership is divided into two as “*has*” (notables) and “*am*” (ordinary people), and those who cannot fulfill the first cannot execute the second. Rulership over ‘*has*’ is the ruler’s dominion over his own *nefs* and body. According to Şeyhoğlu (2013, p. 249), a person’s own hands, feet, body parts, soul, heart, external and internal feelings constitute his “*has*” domain of rule, that his true subordinates (*ra’iyyah*) are them. It is possible to dominate these sections by subordinating them to the rule of Sharia (Şeyhoğlu, 2013, p. 246-47): “(...) kendü nefisine tevhid hasıl ide ve ihsan itdügi kendü ellerinün ve ayaklarınun ve cemî’i endamlarınun hakların ri’ayet itmekdür. Farızalarınun ve sünnetlerün ‘uhdesinden gelmeg-ile. Ya’ni nefisine muhalefet itmek bigi ve gönül-ile mürakıp olmak bigi”.⁴⁸⁷ Although the purpose of this subordination model presented by Şeyhoğlu is the happiness in the world and the hereafter, this purpose is not completely immanent in the human body itself. This purpose must be brought to the human body from outside (obedience to religious orders and worship) and must be controlled by the heart. The fact that Şeyhoğlu does not mention the element of reason while talking about the dominance of one’s own body needs explanation. In Şeyhoğlu’s schema, being subject to the moral discourse built by the ulama and sheikhs and internalizing it in the heart is seen as the domination of one’s own body, the only personal element in this is the conscious imposition of religious moral codes against one’s own desires. Şeyhoğlu

⁴⁸⁷ This is to bring about unity in one’s own *nefs* and to act in accordance with the rights of one’s own hands and feet and all other body parts that it treats well. This is done by doing what is necessary for the religious orders and sunnahs. In other words, it is like opposing your *nefs* and controlling it with your heart.

has also adapted the body metaphor, which consists of the elements of the principle of ruler-ruled-rule, to social relations. According to him, hand-foot-organs etc. in the human body. The ruler-subject relationship, which is valid for the social body, is also suitable for describing a real state of domination in the social body. According to him, the ruler-subject relationship, which is valid in terms of hand-foot-organs and the like in the human body, is also suitable for describing a real state of domination in the ‘social body’. Şeyhoğlu Mustafa embodies the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, which he thinks within the framework of the body metaphor, by dividing the society into six large parts. In the thought of Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, the analogy between organs and social segments was established as follows (2013, pp. 283-84): (i) sultan is similar to a heart; (ii) a vizier is similar to the mind; (iii) state officials (officers, notables, ministers, ‘*arızs*, clerk, treasurer, *silahdars*, sergeants, emirs, *mansib* holders and other officers) are like the feelings in the body and in the head, thus, these are the common senses such as eyes, ears, nose, mouth, touch, and two parts as thinking, imagination, particular cognition (*vehm*), memory, language and remaining sensations; (iv) begs resemble the prominent organs such as hand-foot and liver, liver, lung, spleen, gall; (v) ‘*ameldars* (lower servants), servants, *naibs*, *nakibs*, and remaining servants are like fingers, knuckles, and intestines; (vi) *sipâhî* and *raiyyet* resemble veins, nerves, bones, muscles and hairs according to their degree in hierarchy.

The first feature of the body metaphor, as applied by Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, is that he uses a type of categorization derived from the medical literature, as can be seen in the works of Avicenna. In this type of division, no distinction is made between the head and the body, corresponding to the political/social hierarchy, and the head and the mind and senses associated with it are a tool for the heart. Secondly, among the six social segments that Şeyhoğlu enumerated, there is no direct and one-by-one relationship between means-ends, principal-accident. In the metaphor of the body used by Avicenna, there is such a distinction. Şeyhoğlu Mustafa essentially divided the body into two main parts and the hierarchy established between them was not detailed enough. It is possible to reconstruct the said distinction and to interpret the characteristics of the hierarchical relationship. Şeyhoğlu’s original division divides the society into two parts. These parts can be defined as (i) important organs, (ii) relatively less important organs. While the important organs are the ruler, the vizier, the state officials and the begs, the organs that are pointed as relatively less important are the servants, cavalry and *reâyâ*. However, when the Şeyhoğlu’s analogy reevaluated in this way, the distinction between the two

groups of organs is neither appropriate for the hierarchical relations of officers nor the military class- *re'âyâ* duality. In addition, Şeyhoğlu Mustafa insists that all organs are significant, saying that the lack of organs will create a deficiency in the body (2013, p. 284). In this context, there are two different alternative interpretations that we can elaborate the Şeyhoğlu's model of hierarchy. The first of these is the dual hierarchy separated on the basis of decision making and implementation. In this model, the ruler and the vizier are shown as decision-making bodies. Although Şeyhoğlu's substitution of the ruler for the 'heart' was based on the central importance given to medieval medicine as it basically pumped blood to all organs from the heart, it also has moral implications. In the lines above, in which Şeyhoğlu used the metaphor of the body to describe the idea of the ruler having control over his own body, he saw that the duty of the heart is to make the religious rules dominant over the body. In this case, the duty imposed on the ruler makes the society obey to religious rules. Şeyhoğlu (2013, pp. 286-87) grounds this argument as follows: "Bilgil ki padişah bu cihanda gönül bigidür gövdede çi kün padişah salah-ıla ola cihan ehli salahıladur ve çün fesad-ıla ola halayık cemî'i fesadda olur".⁴⁸⁸

The assistant of the heart, on the other hand, is the state official who is in charge of bureaucratic tasks such as providing the necessary information for making decisions and recording, notifying and financing the decisions. In other words, the sense organs are the assistants of the heart and mind. At the second level, there are practitioners. These are begs, servants, *sipâhîs* and *re'âyâ*. Among the practitioners, the begs, who are called important/leading organs (*a'za-i re'ise*), are located above the others. In that case, the section that will help the begs in the implementation of the decisions are the members of the *ameldars*, the servants, the *naibs* and similar elements. For example, begs are likened to the hand and servants are likened to the finger, whereas the hand is the whole finger and the part (the first includes the second). In this state, the body metaphor used by Şeyhoğlu can be read as a representation of the political authority in accordance with the relationship between the commander-officer, command-obedience, by putting the state in the center. The ruling group basically constitutes two groups. The ruler and vizier are at the head of the commanding group, and the begs are at the head of the officer group. In that case, the survival of the body in general depends on the full

⁴⁸⁸ Know that in this world, the sultan is like the heart in the body, because the sultan's righteousness is also the righteousness of the world's people, and if the sultan becomes corrupt, all the servants become corrupt too.

functioning of all segments, and this is possible with the reproduction of the subordination relationship.

Secondly, Şeyhoğlu's division can also be considered on the basis of a two-layered division as *reâyâ* and others, because most of the segments mentioned by the author are government officials and ordinary people are met with a single category (*reâyâ*). It is clear that this partitioning is suitable for the two-class society structure in the form of military class and *reâyâ* division. If the distinction made by Şeyhoğlu is basically considered in a binary way as *reâyâ* and others, it can be understood that the main purpose of the author in making this distinction is to present the class schema through the metaphor of the body. All social segments composed of five strata have 'ridden on' the *reâyâ* category. If so, the purpose of this schema is to indicate the status of social segments other than the *reâyâ* and, accordingly, their class function. At the bottom of this schema are *sipâhîs* and *reâyâ*. It is unclear whether the *sipâhîs* mentioned here were soldiers gathered from the people, mounted raiders/*ghazis*, *cebelüs* or *timar* holders. But the mention of this group at the bottom suggests that they were ordinary soldiers. Şeyhoğlu Mustafa likens the lower sections to vessels, nerves, bones, muscles and hairs. These elements of the body evoke the elements of doing work with 'arm power'. In order for an arm to move, the muscles that make it up must contract and relax, in order to achieve this, the tendons must provide the connection between the bones and the muscles, and the blood must be pumped to the muscles. If so, it is understood that the section meant here consists of soldiers, villagers or nomads who do not have any administrative duties. When we look at the diagram in general, it is seen that the organs (except the fingers) that the other five layers are likened to are the elements of the internal organization of the body and their functions are systematic. For example, while the state officials constitute all the functions of the 'senses', the begs constitute the secretions, respiration and blood production, the lower level servants and *naibs* the digestive system and the joints, the *sipâhî* and *reâyâ* are basically external and unsystematic. For this reason, while the other five categories are parts of a coherent system, the last category, *sipâhî* and *reâyâ*, is an instrument that is absolutely subordinate to this system.

Şeyhoğlu Mustafa describes a functional state structure and/or social system by using the metaphor whose parts as are tried to be analyzed. According to Şeyhoğlu (2013, p. 284), these elements constitute the integrity of the human body, and since the need for these elements is an essential feature of the establishment of the body, the

absence of any one of them means that the body is also lacking. For this reason, the duty of the ruler is to assign these elements correctly and to keep them together. It should be ensured that these elements are not ‘exceeding the limit’, that is, their functional frameworks should be well delimited and controlled (Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, 2013, p. 285). Finally, Şeyhoğlu Mustafa states *dirlik*, *iqta* and *timar* that these social elements will need should be deposited (2013, p. 285). So, Şeyhoğlu’s administrative model includes economic distribution mechanisms as well as class and administrative hierarchy. However, these second mechanisms are not fully indicated in the body metaphor used by the author.

IV.II.IV. Shepherd Metaphor as a Model of Direct Political Relation with Ruler and Subjects

The figure of the shepherd has generally gained political connotations in all ancient societies and was used to describe the phenomenon of political administration in a wide area from ancient Egyptian symbology to the Indo-Iranian advice tradition, *nasihatnâmes* (Bağdatlı, 2018, p. 194). Foucault (2014, pp. 28-29) states that the Egyptian Pharaohs took on the character of a shepherd symbolically and received a shepherd’s staff at the coronation ceremony, that the title of ‘shepherd of people’ was one of the official titles of the kings of Babylonia, and in a hymn addressed to the king of Assyria there are such descriptions which sings the figure of shepherd: “The hardworking comrade of the meadows, you who take care of your land and feed it, shepherd of abundance”. Moreover, the rulers who have dominion over more than one city in Akkad are called ‘great shepherds’ (Seidler, 2020, p. 53). In Homeros’ (2020, pp. 78, 92, 106) Iliad, it is seen that he addresses various heroes with similar expressions: Bias, Astynoo, Hyperion and Menelaos are referred to as ‘shepherds of men’. The fact that there is a certain similarity between the various uses of the shepherd figure shows that this metaphor has a deep-rooted history in the Middle Eastern tradition of political thinking. It is possible to see this similarity in the reference to both the description of the ruler-ruled relationship and the fact that this relationship offers material and moral benefits for the governed segments. For example, the following statements were write from the mouth of the King of Kutha in the tablets called the Kutha Creation Legend belonging to the Babylonians continue to echo in the Semitic tradition, as will be examined later (King, 2019, p. 78): “What have I brought to my

kingdom!/ I am a king who brings no prosperity to his people/ And a shepherd who gives no wealth to his people [tm]”.

It is widely accepted that the shepherd figure has become a central element of political discourse, especially in the Mediterranean region and in Semitic cultures. In this context, André G. Haudricourt compared the *pastoral* and *gardiner* cultures, starting from the hypothesis that a parallel relationship can be established between the processing of nature and the regulation of relations within people, and from this point of view, he discussed the differences in social mentality (Ferret, 2012, pp. 114-16). The two types of social action that Haudricourt (1962, p. 41-43) named “*le modèle de l'action indirecte négative*” and “*le modèle de l'action directe positive*” show a certain integrity with the forms of planting and animal breeding and they differ from the differentiation in the form of direct intervention or indirect interaction with the object of the action. According to Haudricourt (1962, pp. 41-43) the indirect form of action that corresponds to gardening focuses on facilitating its growth in its natural environment without any direct intervention or harsh contact with it, while in constant contact with the direct-action object corresponding to shepherding, who directs, supervises and, when it is needed, has a punishing method. Vernant (2017, p. 115) diversifies Haudricourt’s analysis as follows: “The domestication of animals has led pastoral peoples to grasp human action on the other -especially the power of the king over his subjects- by the example of the shepherd’s relation to his flock, that is, in the guise of direct, coercive intervening [tm]”. Baker (2012, p. 27) argues that the shepherding mechanism based on the ‘direct positive action’ type is a form of despotism that crystallized in monotheistic religions and Middle Eastern empires. According to Baker (2011, p. 108), the origins of this political form and mentality lie in the production practices of Western civilization – “dry farming, total harvesting, (...) herd-mass herding [tm]” and the like. However, when the issue analyzed historically and mythologically, it turns out that agriculture and animal husbandry practices are not directly perceived as part of one and the same culture in the regions of Mediterranean and Mesopotamia.⁴⁸⁹

Considering the ancient Mediterranean and Mesopotamian cultures, it is noticed that the development of the shepherd figure has a very archaic and sometimes contradictory history. The first source we encounter the figure of a shepherd is the ancient Sumerian myths, and in a myth fragment whose end we do not know exactly,

⁴⁸⁹ For a similar criticism see: Erdoğan (2017).

the cattle-god Lahar and the grain-goddess Ashnan together donate livestock and agricultural products to people (Kramer, 2018, pp. 104-6). In the surviving part of this myth, there is no contradiction between shepherding and agricultural production or any struggle between these lifestyles denoted. On the other hand, in another Sumerian myth, it is seen that the goddess Ianna wanted to choose a husband for herself and shepherd-god Dumuzi and farmer-god Enkimdu were suitors for her. Kramer (2018, pp. 178-79) states that this myth is very similar to the Abel-Cain myth originating from the Torah. According to the myth, Ianna prefers the farmer-god Enkimdu to the shepherd-god Dumuzi in choosing a wife, proving that farming is superior to shepherding. The interesting side of the myth expressing a stereotypical struggle between farmers and shepherds and portraying the shepherd character as a belligerent and the farmer as a wary personality (Kramer, 2018, p. 179). In the aforementioned ancient Sumerian myth, although the farmer character won the struggle, in the version of this myth in the Torah, a clearly different preference was made and the character who had the love of the God was coded as the shepherd. According to the story told in Genesis book 4.2-8, the farmer Cain and the shepherd Abel offered sacrifices to the god from the specific produce they had produced, and the god refused the offerings of agricultural products. Enraged by this situation, Cain kills his brother Abel and is cursed by God. Contrary to the Sumerian myth, this story asserts the superiority of shepherds over farmers. In another story (Genesis, 46.34) in the Torah, while the story of the Jacobites settling in Egypt is told, there is a detail that they were shepherds and that the Egyptians were 'disgusted' with shepherds. Fromm (2016, p. 15) argues that most of the contradictions in the Torah arose as a result of the Hebrews settling in Babylon while living as small, nomadic tribes. Similarly, in the examples given above, it is seen how the nomadic peoples (here the Hebrews) symbolically defended their lifestyles and relations with the world when they encountered settled peoples. Within this lifestyle, it is natural for nomads to imagine their gods as a kind of shepherd. The passage in which the Torah blessed the son of Israel, Joseph, in the book of Genesis (48.15) in the name of the god who 'shepherded him all his life' is one of the first known examples of the establishment of a shepherd-god relationship in Semitic literature. In the *B'midbar* section of the Torah (27.15-17), the shepherd and ruler/leader figures were combined and gained the final form that would later enter the Christian thought. According to the relevant section, God informs Moses that he will die, and Moses asks God to appoint a leader/administrator to the Israelites. Here is the words Moses used:

Moses spoke to the Lord, saying ‘Let the Lord, the God of spirits of all flesh, appoint someone over the community, who shall go forth before them and come in before them, who shall take them out and bring them in, so that the Lord’s community may not be like sheep that have no shepherd’.⁴⁹⁰

The general presentation of the issue in the Torah has been completed with this and the following passages, and the articulation of the concepts of herd-people, shepherd-ruler-god and shepherd-social order-security. For example, in the Kings I chapter of the Torah (22.17) the Israelites are described as sheep without a shepherd scattered in the mountains and lead to return their homes in safeness. This narrative is indicating the herd-people and security/household relationship. This conceptual articulation was transferred from the Jewish culture to the Christian faith.

In this context, it is seen that the figure of the shepherd gains a metaphorical meaning around the notion of society. Just as the shepherd’s being at the head of his flock gives unity and order to the herd in line with its ‘purpose’, the allusion to the ruler-shepherd points to this meaning in the examples of political discourse in which social order and integrity are affirmed. This allusion has two aspects, in the first it is affirmed that material social relations form a coherent whole, and in the second, it shows integrity/orderliness in terms of the ideological formation of society. For example, in the Gospel of Matthew [9.36] the ‘confused and scattered’ people are compared to ‘sheep without a shepherd’.⁴⁹¹ The domination of the shepherds over the animals is thus symbolically translated into an ideological and political form of domination. Moreover, the fact that Jesus ordered the twelve Apostles in the Bible to go towards the lost sheep of the house of Israel strengthens the shepherd-animal-oikos connection. Thus, the household manager (*despotike*/father) also becomes a part of the shepherd figure. The shepherd’s ability to keep the house in order and to ‘yield’ from his animals depends on his ability to lead -and this ability also includes a claim to the well-being of those who are led, as it is seen in the discussion of ‘not being caught by the wolves’ of domestic

⁴⁹⁰ See: Torah (Plaut, 1981, p. 1204-5).

⁴⁹¹ For example, in the Torah, Psalm 23 depicts the god as a shepherd who leads his flock to waters and meadows, protects and guides they from being lost, reassures them against danger, and protects them from enemies. In the book of Ezekial 34, God assigns duties such as strengthening the weak, healing the sick, and treating the wounded to the rulers, whom he calls shepherds, and punishes the shepherds by stating that he will ‘herd the sheep himself’ because the rulers cannot fulfill these duties. Thus, God envisions himself as the ‘owner of the pasture’ (Ezekial 34.31) and the shepherd.

animals.⁴⁹² Because 'oikos' is also a symbol that is represented in values such as trust/peace/protection.

It is seen that the metaphor of the shepherd continues to be developed and enriched in the early texts of Christianity. For example, in the 1st Letter of Peter (Epistle I, Peter: 2.25) Jesus is referred to as "the shepherd and overseer of spirits" who gathers "the lost sheep".⁴⁹³ Again in the same letter (Epistle I, Peter: 3-4), Jesus is referred to as the "chief shepherd" and the elders of the Christian community are advised to act as overseers and shepherds as a good example for the 'herd' until Jesus' resurrection. Similarly, while St. Augustine (2019, p. 451) describes God as a shepherd who is the owner of the flock, he emphasizes that the shepherd is the shelter and protector of the flock. In the development stage of Christianity, political analogies in the Bible were not completely developed over the figure of the "shepherd", due to the relations developed with the Roman Empire, which was established beyond the shepherd practice of the early Hebrew people, and the influence of the eastern Mediterranean culture, and the figures of the farmer / planter / fisherman and the analogies of wheat/seed/yeast/grass/pearl/treasure are used at least as often as the shepherd figure. However, the destruction of the Roman Empire by the Germanic raids and the fact that the Germanic and Gothic tribes still preserve their nomadic customs caused Christian thought to use the shepherd symbology more effectively and widely than other metaphors.

It is interesting that the metaphor of the shepherd is not given an important place in the Qur'an, which is considered the holy book of another Semitic culture, which has similarities with the Torah and the Bible, compared to other works. The reason for this is that from the very beginning, Islam had an urban rather than a nomadic character and tried to systematically separate itself from the Judeo-Christian tradition. Although the story of Abel and Cain, which was discussed above, is mentioned in the Qur'an (5:27-29) there is no clear emphasis on the duality of shepherd and farmer. Apart from this, there are three metaphors of a shepherd in the Qur'an, and they are evaluated with a negative meaning, except for one. The first of these is the following statement in Surah al-Baqarah (2:104) (Dawood, 1999, p. 20): "Believers, do not say *Rā'inā*, but say

⁴⁹² For example, the Apostle Jude (Epistle, 12) likens those who mislead the congregation to "shepherds who feed only themselves". In this metaphor, it is argued that the relationship between the shepherd and the herd is not a direct exploitation relationship, but a mutual interest relationship for the benefit of the herd.

⁴⁹³ Overseer: Episkopos/Bishop.

Unzurnā. Take heed; woeful punishment awaits the unbelievers”.⁴⁹⁴ Secondly, in Surah al-Baqarah (2:171) (Dawood, 1999, p. 26), prophets are likened to shepherd who call animals who do not understand anything: “The unbelievers are like beasts which, call out to him as one may, can hear nothing but a shout and a cry”. Finally, similar to the first example, the term shepherd is used in Surah An-Nisa (4:46) (Dawood, 1999, pp. 65-66) as follows:

Some Jews take words out of their context and say: ‘We hear, but disobey. May you be bereft of hearing! *Rā‘inā!*’ — thus distorting the phrase with their tongues and reviling the true faith. But if they said: ‘We hear and obey: hear us and *Unzurnā*, it would be better and more proper for them. God has cursed them in their unbelief. They have no faith, except a few of them.

When these three passages are examined comparatively, it is understood that the shepherd figure in Islamic thought displays a dual character, meaning both the continuation of the Semitic tradition and its denial. The shepherd figure, which is used in similar ways in the 104th verse of the Surah al-Baqarah and the 46th verse of the Surah An-Nisa, is originally the Semitic shepherd figure and emerged as a result of the Jews who came to the Islamic prophet and listened to his words, calling Muhammad ‘*Rā‘inā*’. According to the footnote of the Religious Commission’s translation of the Qur’an (Komisyon, 2011, pp. 21, 96) to explain the relevant sections, the Jews who came to Muhammad call him our shepherd/*rā‘inā* which would mean insulting him, and the reason for this verse was to avoid to use words that can be misunderstood. The interpretation of the High Council of Religious Affairs, which is affiliated to the Presidency of Religious Affairs, is correct on one side, but incomplete. As can be seen in the sections above, the figure of the shepherd in Jewish tradition is used for both prophets, God and rulers. In this respect, the use of the term by Jews is far from being an insult. On the contrary, it is Muhammad’s attempt to systematically separate himself from the Jewish tradition. However, this distinction is only at the terminological level and does not cover the content of the concept, because the word ‘*unzurnā*’, which is suggested to be used instead of the term ‘*rā‘inā*’, exactly reflects the function of the figure of shepherd: This word, which comes from the root of ‘نظر’, means to look, to

⁴⁹⁴ Dawood (1999, p. 20, footnote I) stated that the word ‘*rā‘inā*’ means “listen to us” and ‘*unzurnā*’ means “look upon us”, but he indicated that the word ‘*rā‘inā*’ used by Arabic Jews in the meaning of “our evil one”.

watch, to control. There is a similar meaning in verse number two above (Qur'an, 4:46). In verse 171 of Surah al-Baqarah, the prophet is likened to a shepherd who calls animals. Similarly, there is a famous hadith where the metaphor of the shepherd is used in the discussion of management. According to this hadith, Muhammad used the following expression: "Küllüküm râin ve küllüküm mes'ûlün an raiyyetihi. Ve'l emiyru râin. Ve'racülü râin alâ ehli beytihi, ve'l meretü râiyetün alâ beyti zevcihâ ve veledihi, fe küllüküm râin ve küllüküm mes'ûlün an raiyyetihi".⁴⁹⁵ In this hadith, it is seen that the community manager/head of state (*imam*), the man as the head of the family, the woman in charge of the household management and the servant in charge of the property are compared to a shepherd. In this regard, the management of goods, children and people emerge as the object of shepherding activity. Interestingly, this model does not include the 'leading to / healing of souls' element in the Christian tradition and reflects a purely secular management hierarchy. On the other hand, the emphasis on being responsible for the herd has a content that goes beyond the mere means of managing them and also means taking care of the well-being of the managed ones. It is seen that the metaphor of the shepherd, which was not frequently used in the early periods of Islam, gained value especially in the Umayyad period and became a part of Islamic political thought. The fact that the Mecca administration was in the hands of an aristocratic assembly (*Darü'l Nedve*) in the years when Islam was born and the Medina administration, which was established after the *hijra*, was also organized as a multi-ethnic/religious city-state (Dursun, 1984, pp. 24, 57), are political factors which directly makes it difficult to accept the 'shepherd' figure in political discourse. Darling (2013, p. 52) states that with the development of the concept of caliphate in the Umayyads, the Umayyad rulers began to be called 'the shepherd of God'. In this context, the metaphor of the shepherd found a widespread use in Islamic political thought after the famous hadith as was mentioned above was used by *fiqh* scholars and moralists during the Abbasid period. Lewis (2011, p. 34) shows Abu Yusuf's book *Kitabü'l Kharaj*, which is one of the first significant texts written in the field of Islamic political thought, as one of the first examples where this image finds a developed use in Islamic thought. In this work, the ruler is compared

⁴⁹⁵ You are all shepherds and all of you are responsible for your flock. The Imam is a shepherd and is responsible for his flock. The man is the shepherd of his family and is responsible for his flock. A woman is a shepherd in her husband's house, and he is responsible for his flock. A servant is responsible for his master's property and is responsible for his flock. See: Çoban (n.d.) and Bukhari, Ahkam 1, Cum`a 11, İstikraz 20, Itk 17, 19, Vesaya 9, Nikah 81, 90; Abu Müslim, İmaret 20, (1829); at-Tirmizi, Cihad 27, 1705; Abu Davud, İmaret 1, (2928).

to a shepherd appointed by God and held responsible for his flock, and it is claimed that the happiest shepherd is the one who makes his flock the happiest (Kanar, 2019a, pp. 91-92). Thus, the metaphor of the shepherd has been divided into two layers: Both a unilateral and God-determined right to rule, and the necessity for this rule to produce positive results for its subjects. It is possible to argue that the first of these layers builds the ideology of the transcendence of power, and the second builds the ideology of the secular legitimacy of power. It is natural that both layers are intrinsically reserved for the privilege and responsibility of the ruler to supervise his subjects. Different interpretations and images of ‘shepherding’ that have developed over the years in the literature of Islamic political thought have generally come to life through expansions, variations and analyzes of these two levels. For example, in al-Cahiz’s book *Kitabü't-Tac fi Ahlaki'l-Müluk*, the duty of the ruler, which is legitimized through the metaphor of the shepherd, is to have information about the secret affairs and intentions of the people or to try to be (Kanar, 2019a, p. 103). This use of the shepherd metaphor, which means surveillance, concentrates on the ruler’s control of his subjects by obtaining information about them. On the other hand, al-Turtushi in *Siracü'l-Müluk*, based on the Bukhari hadith that was quoted above (Kanar, 2019a, p. 230), stating that being a shepherd means “to take care of the rights of other [tm]” and that the word ‘rai’ can be interpreted as “respecting the rights [tm]”. Thus, he legitimized within a juridical definition of justice based on ruler’s supervision. In these two examples, it is clearly seen how the focus of the issue oscillates between domination and legitimacy. The metaphor of the shepherd was also interpreted in Necmeddîn-i Dâye’s (1933, pp. 248-49) work *Mirsâdü'l-İbâd* as the need for the ruler to protect the people from other ruling classes such as *mansıb* owners, army commanders, naibs and qadis, etc., and it is used in Ibn Taymiyya’s work named *Siyâsetü’ş-Şer’iyye* to justify the necessity of appointing administrators according to merit (Kanar, 2019a, p. 323).⁴⁹⁶ These types of uses of metaphor generally focus on the social order and reproduction of class domination in the context of multi-class complexity.

In addition, ideal social order images in which the lamb and wolf figures do not harm each other develop in an implicit relationship with the shepherd metaphor. But I think the ‘wolf and lamb’ dichotomy is an analogy because of the semantic connection of ‘lamb’ with the terms ‘herd/*reâyâ*’. What is meant here is not that wolves do not

⁴⁹⁶ For similar uses of the shepherd metaphor in Islamic political thought, see: Türk (2018, pp. 143-73).

attack the sheep herds due to the miracle of the ruler, but that the *reâyâ* is safe and the social balance is not disturbed thanks to the ‘shepherd’s ability’. Caliph Omar is depicted in the famous Islamic parable as a ruler in which a lamb and a wolf walked together during his rule. Since I did not have access to the first version of this famous parable, it was not possible for me to give a sound interpretation. Most likely, such a parable was not in circulation during the reign of Caliph Omar. Darling shows that the image of just order, in which the lamb and the wolf travel together, is a version created to praise the justice of King Anushirvan in Ferdowsi’s *Shahnameh* (as cited in Darling, 2013, p. 70): “He filled with justice all the face of earth/ And cultivated all the barren lands/ Both great and small slept safely on the waste/ And sheep and wolf came to one trough”. A version of this ancient Iranian narrative may have been created at the time of Caliph Omar’s conquests, attributed to Omar. However, the origin of this narrative in the Middle East is surprisingly old. According to the myth in the Sumerian tablets analyzed by Kramer, peace and justice in the land of Dilmun, where the water god Enki lived and ruled, is described as follows (as cited in Kramer, 2018, p. 107): “The raven doesn’t make a sound/ The kite doesn’t make the kite sound/ The lion doesn’t kill/ The wolf doesn’t catch the lamb/ The dog that strangles the kid is unknown/ The grain-eating wild pig is unknown [tm]”. The fact that the names of old men and women, young girls, river-crossers (most likely merchants), foremen, singers, agricultural producers, and boatmen are also mentioned in the following lines of this Sumerian myth brings to mind an image of a social order in which different social segments live in ideal conditions.⁴⁹⁷

To continue, other shepherd figures derived from a very similar origin with the shepherd figure of the Torah, namely the nomadic tribal order dealing with animal husbandry, are frequently observed in other peoples of the world. It is seen that this figure has a privileged place in the power symbology of nomadic peoples and especially steppe feudalism. Animal husbandry is the basis of economic activities in ancient Turks and similar nomadic peoples, and since these activities are carried out in the limited grasslands of the steppe, it is important to determine the pastures, migrate among them or search for new pastures (Mandaloglu, 2014, p. 78). For this reason, nomads, who lead an active life, need shepherds to manage the animals on the migration routes and to feed them adequately in the pastures. In this respect, the figure of the shepherd gains connotations related to social status in terms of both physical strength and dexterity and

⁴⁹⁷ Roux (2005, p. 45) argues that these expressions reflect “a dreamland, a real paradise”, the Sumerians’ dreams about the country they migrated to long ago.

the size of the herd. In societies where animal husbandry is the dominant economic activity, the fact that animal ownership is a form of accumulation with a high level of social meaning -hence wealth and exclusivity- builds the figure of the shepherd, who owns animals and deals with their care and management, as a prototype that gains political connotations for this reason. For example, Oghuz Khan is first portrayed as a shepherd in heroic stories and proves himself by defeating the monster that attacks the horse herds (Kalaycı, 2019, p. 212). As Boratav (2016, p. 51) states, Turkish folk narratives tend to attribute a supernatural personality to shepherds, for example, in the book of Dede Korkut, the chief shepherd herding Kazan Khan's large herd of ten thousand sheep, together with his two brothers, was able to defeat an enemy army of six hundred people using only a slingshot. According to Boratav (2016, p. 52), many places in Anatolia, which are places of pilgrimage or cult, are dedicated to shepherds, who are attributed miraculous powers. This shepherd type is called the “*kutlu çoban*” (holy shepherd) and they are depicted as saints helping the heroes in folk tales (Çoban, 2015, p. 46). The shepherd figure also finds its place in Islamic folk legends. As Çoban (2015, p. 29) states, Moses is named as the leader of the shepherds in the *fütüvvetnâmes*, and the prophets Salih, Abraham and David are associated with shepherding.

There are also examples where the term ‘*çoban*’ (shepherd) is used directly as the title of administrators. When the Avars invaded Central Europe after the 6th century, they gave the name ‘*Ban*’ to the ruler of a certain administrative region (province), and they gave the title of ‘*Jupan*’, a deteriorated version of the word ‘*çoban*’, to the ruler of the region bordered by a valley or plain under it (Karatay, 2006, pp. 115-16). It is interesting that the first form of the word is ‘*župan*’ (*jupan*) in proto-Bulgarian and has meanings such as “village headman/regional administrator” (Clauson, 1972, pp. 397-98). In *Divân-ı Lügât it-Türk*, the word ‘*çoban*’ means the assistant of the headman of a village and it is compatible with the examples above (İsi, 2014, p. 182). Also, the word ‘*Ban*’ is probably a deteriorated form of ‘*khan*’ and means ‘great ruler/senior’.⁴⁹⁸ On the other hand, it can be thought that the word ‘*Jupan/çoban*’ derives from the Persian word ‘*sheban/shebyan*’. The word ‘*şüban*’ used by Ahmedî in *İskendernâme* is derived from the word ‘*şeb*’ (night) and refers to the activity of people who care for animals to wait and watch their herds at night (Ahmedî, 2019, pp. 838, unnumbered footnote). This expression, which means a kind of night guard, may have gained the meaning of local administrator by referring to the armed power of the village administrators by expanding

⁴⁹⁸ The word ‘*Ak-ban*’ in the stories of Dede Korkut (2019, p. 143) is used in the sense of ‘*Khan*’.

its meaning. On the other hand, although it is debatable whether the Turkic tribes took the word ‘*çoban*’ from Persian, it is determined that until the 11th century in Turkish, they used the words ‘*udçu/koyçu/konçu*’ instead of the word ‘shepherd’ (İsi, 2014, p. 177). In this context, it is possible to argue that the word ‘*çoban*’ emerged within the framework of a symbiotic relationship established between nomads and sedentary groups, and necessitated the existence of a village community.⁴⁹⁹ If this thesis is correct, it is necessary to understand it with reference to a social history associated with the figure of the shepherd gaining political connotations, the dominance of the nomadic invaders over the settled people and their transformation into a ‘shepherd of the people’ in a way.⁵⁰⁰ It is seen that the shepherd figure in the steppe legends and the shepherd metaphor developed in settled societies have been articulated throughout history. For example, Yusuf Has Hacib, in his work named *Kutadgu Bilig*, combines steppe traditions and Islamic culture -especially by using Islam as the central legitimacy ground- and in this context, he also includes the shepherd metaphor in his work. He characterizes the ruler as a beg and argues that his good moral/ethical qualities are essential for the well-being of his people, because the beg, as a shepherd, is responsible for the well-being of his people (Kanar, 2019a, p. 200):

Many hungry wolves have gathered at the gate; O ruler, protect the sheep well
(...) Destroy those who oppress the people in the country, and do not leave a
single bandit in the outer states. Bring the wicked to the right path with
punishment; The bad person deserves to be mistreated, so do it. [tm]

In this example, the ethos of bravery brought by the steppe culture and the secular benefit-based structure of the shepherd metaphor in the Islamic sense are synthesized.

⁴⁹⁹ Kösemihal (1967, pp. 18-19) defends a similar idea: “Among them, some of those who migrated to the east came to Anatolia via Iran. Turkish nomadic shepherds who came to these places clashed with agricultural societies created by arable land; The local agriculturalists, who could not stand the shepherds’ attacks and looting, eventually persuaded the shepherds to protect themselves in return for taxes. Thus, nomadic shepherds settled on these agricultural communities and established states. This is the mechanism of the Turkish states. Ghaznavids and Seljuks have always established a state in this way.” [tm]

⁵⁰⁰ On the other hand, with the decline of nomadic culture and agriculture becoming the dominant production activity, it is seen that the figure of the shepherd has ‘degraded’. As the prevalence and organizational capacity of settled societies increase, it is understood that the figure of the shepherd regresses to the position of a servant, not a ruler (Yılmaz, 2011, p. 524). An example can be found in the love story of a Kazakh girl, *Kız Jibek*, written in the 17th century. To Koren, the hero of the story, Jibek said, “Don't be a khan, go to the ground, if you really are a khan, aren't you ashamed to walk around like a shepherd like this?” (Avezov, 1997, p. 179).

The shepherd figure and the metaphor of the shepherd are frequently used in Ottoman political thought. The formal features of this metaphor, as it took place in Ottoman political thought, are shaped in accordance with the ancient Mesopotamian and Mediterranean myths and Semitic tradition that we have examined above. The metaphor of the shepherd is presented within the concepts of God-ruler-security-management, especially in the works of the members of ruling classes who have a direct relationship with the state. On the other hand, it is clear that the hero-shepherd figure, as it takes place in the Turkish tribal tradition, may have been used as a symbol of resistance in popular folk narratives. In addition to these, it is understood that the metaphor of the shepherd gained a mystical meaning in the 13th century and this meaning was accepted, albeit limited, in Ottoman *sûfî* thought in the following periods. In Ottoman political thought, the shepherd figure is often used by turning it into a parable. In this usage, although the content and details of the metaphor are not given, one or two elements from the pastoral lifestyle are associated with the shepherd figure in a way that does not distort the general meaning of the metaphor, and in this way, a political advice/principle is presented to the reader/listener. Generally, this usage is used in the form of poetry to describe a certain event or situation or to emphasize the general social meaning of a singular event.

A good example of this type of use is found in Ahmedî's *İskendernâme*. Ahmedî (2018, pp. 552-53), in his lines in which he deals with the struggle for power between Emir Çoban and Ebu Said Bahadır Khan among the Ilkhanate State, he tells the reader that after Abu Said defeated and eliminated Emir Çoban, he remained the sole ruler, but spent his days in wine and entertainment meetings.⁵⁰¹ According to Ahmedî, this will bring the end of Abu Said because the duty of the ruler is to deal with the affairs of the sultanate and the situation of the people like a shepherd:

Hâşılı ne bādenüñ şerr ü fużül/ Bāde içen pend mi éder kabül
 Lā-cerem her yaña düşdi şeytanat/ Süst oldı anda şugl-i saltanat
 Çün şübān mest ola yata uyıya/ Kırd u uğrı aña koyun mı kıoya
 Bāde-y-ile memleket cem' olımaz/ Ol olan yérde dağı_ış yér bulımaz
 Gördiler kim mülk kaygusun yémez/ Meyden artuğ nesneye bénüm démez
 Halk anuñ işinden āzār oldılar/ Belki andan cümle bī-zār oldılar.⁵⁰²

⁵⁰¹ See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 6676-6687.

⁵⁰² See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 6701-6706. What is the essence of wine, evil and uselessness / Does a drinker accept advice? / Doubtless, demons swarmed all around / Reign affairs were not done there / If the shepherd gets drunk and sleeps / Does the wolf and the thief leave sheep for

Ahmedî discusses several principles in these lines. The duty of the ruler, who is likened to a shepherd, is to unite the country, to prioritize working, to carry out the affairs of the country and to bear the responsibility of it, and therefore to ‘take care of his property’. The shepherd figure of ancient civilizations and Judeo-Christian tradition, which was summarized at the beginning of the chapter, adorned with meanings such as transcendent authority or spiritual leadership, and the shepherd figure used by Ahmedî do not fully overlap with this use. In this context, it is understood that the metaphor of the shepherd used by Ahmedî directly metaphorizes the relationship between the owner and the property. The metaphor of the shepherd, which is considered as a kind of *oikos* management in early Islamic thought, is much closer to the proposition of Ahmedî. Ahmedî’s assertion that if the shepherd does not fulfill his duty, his own property will also be lost, which essentially reveals the establishment of the metaphor based on the economic relationship in question. On the other hand, Ahmedî’s statement in the last couplet that the public was harmed and fed up with Abu Said’s weakness in government adds another meaning to the poet’s use of the shepherd metaphor in the macro-political framework besides the economy, and pulls it to the limits of the traditional form. Since Abu Said is not interested in the affairs of the country, both the goods under his rule are damaged and the people suffer. Ahmedî’s use of metaphor exemplifies the use of metaphor to describe the reproduction mechanisms of class domination, although it does not have clear explanations or analogies about the duties of the shepherd figure.

Secondly, it is necessary to consider how Şeyhoğlu Mustafa uses the metaphor of the shepherd. Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, unlike Ahmedî, has added more specific content to the metaphor of the shepherd and provided an advanced usage area. Şeyhoğlu Mustafa constructed the shepherd metaphor in a refined and interesting way using pastoral elements, and listed the two basic ‘shepherd’ functions that the ruler had to fulfill and the nuances related to them as the content of this metaphor. The first of these metaphors is based on the principle of protection, while the second is surveillance. Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, pp. 97, 256-57) first starts by constructing the metaphor as follows:

- (i) Sultans are like shepherds and people are like herds (“Fasl ve dahı bilmek gerek ki padişah çoban bigidür ve kalan halayık sürü bigidür”).

him?/ Countries do not unite by drinking/ Where it is, there is no place to work/ They saw that he did not have any concern for the country/ He doesn’t say this is mine to anything but a drink/ The people were hurt by what he did/ Maybe all the people got tired of him.

(ii) The shepherd must protect the flock from wolves, bandits, thieves and malicious people (“Ve çobana vacibdür ki sürüyi kurddan ve her şer ehlinden bekleye ve saklaya”).

(iii) There are horned rams and goats in the herd that can harm others (“Şol hadde ki ger sürüde koç ola ve boynuzı yiti keçi ola”).

(iv) The shepherd should protect the hornless animals in the flock from the horned animals (“Koyınlar ola boynuzsuz ve ol boynuz isleri dileyeler ki boynuzsuzlara güç ideler ve hyf gösteredeler. Ol boynuzlularun afetin gerek ki çoban ol boynuzsuzlardan zayil kıla”).

First of all, Şeyhoğlu Mustafa established an analogy between sultans and shepherd, and likens people to a herd. It is understood that with the term ‘*halaik*’/‘*hala*’*ik*’ the author meant all the segments under the ruler. He strengthens this meaning with the following lines (Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, 2013, p. 260): “Ola ki seni ‘aleme sultan kodı/ Ya’ni ki bu gelleye çoban kodı/ Bekleyesin büzügi vü hurdı sen/ Dimediler kim olasın kurdı sen”.⁵⁰³ In these verses, Şeyhoğlu also states that the authority of shepherd was given to the ruler by God, and he claims that this is proven in the hadiths as he mentioned in the subsequent lines of this argument. The hadith quoted by Şeyhoğlu (2013, p. 260) is the first line of the hadith that started with the phrase ‘You are all shepherds, all of you are responsible for those under your command’, and its meaning is also given in Turkish as such: “Dükelünüz çobandur ve dükelünüz sorulmuşdur ra’iyyetinden; pes beg dahı çobandur ra’iyyetine ve ol dahı sorılmış olur ra’iyyetinden”.⁵⁰⁴

Şeyhoğlu explains the real equivalent of the metaphor he uses in his work and examines the functions that the rulers should fulfill through the shepherd metaphor. As it appears in the lines you have given above, Şeyhoğlu assigns the ruler the function of protecting and supervising over his flock like a shepherd. In order to fulfill this function, there are two different social segments that need to be contradicted. The first of these is ‘infidels’, while the other is non-Muslims in and notable people of the country. According to him, the part that is likened to the herd is defined as ‘people of Islam’ and the wolf that the shepherd protects his herd from as ‘oppressors and unbelievers’

⁵⁰³ You should know that the one who appointed you sultan to the world made you a shepherd to this herd/ You should protect the big and the small; You must not be the wolf of this herd.

⁵⁰⁴ You are all shepherds and are in responsible of your flock. Even a beg is the shepherd of his flock and is in responsible of his flock.

(Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, 2013, p. 256). Şeyhoğlu uses the wolf symbol to a large extent to sign the category of ‘infidels’. According to Şeyhoğlu (2013, p. 256), while Islam was in a difficult situation against the infidels in the past, thanks to the victories of Bayezid I, the ‘wolf’ was killed, while the horned rams and goats in the herd were broken and defeated. In this context, the ruler’s leading the *ghaza* is considered one of the shepherd’s political functions, and it is predicted that the power of non-Muslim communities in the country will be broken as a result of the *ghaza*. According to Şeyhoğlu (2013, pp. 258-59), the rulers should protect the Muslims from the infidels, even if the unbelievers do not harm the Muslims, the ruler should invite them to Islam and if they do not accept, he should go to war with them. Secondly, he argues that the ruler/shepherd should protect other animals from the harm of horned animals in his herd. Şeyhoğlu (2013, p. 259) refers to these people as oppressors and refers to those who take part in state affairs: “Koç ve keçiler didigümüz yir yir zalimlerdür ki sehel hükümet ellerine girmeg-ile el uzadurlar”.⁵⁰⁵ He lists the groups in question as members of the *Diwan*, notables, *naibs* and ignorant *qadis*, *subaşı*s, *kethüdas*, governors, *Ahis*, *rinds*, thieves and people of mischief (Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, 2013, p. 259). The ‘horned animal’ analogy that Şeyhoğlu uses in the metaphor of the shepherd is not an unknown analogy in terms of Islamic thought. It is possible to see the same analogy in Necmeddîn-i Dâye’s work titled *Mirsâd’ül-İbâd*. Necmeddîn-i Dâye (1933, pp. 248-49), as inspiring Şeyhoğlu, he likens the ‘oppressors’ in the herd to ‘horned rams’ and listed them as “ümera, ecnad ve eshab-ı divan, erbab-ı menasıb ve nevvab, gumastigan-ı hazret ve ammal-u rüesa ve guzzat ve rünud ve hodbaş”.⁵⁰⁶

While Şeyhoğlu Mustafa uses Necmeddîn-i Dâye’s schema exactly, he contributed to the real determinations of its content. Şeyhoğlu mentioned the commanders (*şübaşı*) after the *qadis* and did not distinguish between the members of the council as civil and military. While Dâye mentioned the *qadis* among the groups with a high probability of being ‘horned rams’, Şeyhoğlu made a special distinction and narrowed this category as ‘ignorant *qadis*’. It is also seen that Şeyhoğlu does not use the category of *mansıb* holders, instead he is content with counting many offices in

⁵⁰⁵ The people we call rams and goats are cruel from time to time, when they come to power, they take the property of the people.

⁵⁰⁶ Emirs, military and civil members of Diwan, officers and naibs, high and seconder governors, qadis, wandering dervishes and bandits.

general.⁵⁰⁷ He added the *Ahis* to this scheme, and under the category of people of mischief, he probably meant wandering dervishes and/or Islamic heterodoxy. In the final analysis, it is seen that Şeyhoğlu ranks all these categories according to their social status. While the members of the *Diwan* are mentioned first, notables and *qadis* come after them, and this group is held above the local administrators in terms of status relations and the social status of *Ahis* and dervishes (*rind*) is represented very close to bandits. In addition, it is noticed that the author refrains from criticizing the *mansib* holders and takes care not to put all the *qadis* under suspicion. With this schema, Şeyhoğlu gave one of the most developed examples of the shepherd metaphor in Ottoman thought, not only did he draw up a general schema of authority by counting most of the segments that had -and could- have an involvement in the state administration, but he also underlines the limitation of the power of these sections as necessary for the legitimacy and continuity of the ruler's power. Thus, reining the specific interests of the various factions of the ruling classes is equated with the realization of the specific interests of the ruler in terms of paving the way for popular legitimacy. As a result, Seyhoğlu Mustafa assigned the function of protecting the people to the rulers by using the metaphor of the shepherd and refined the metaphor on external security (protection of Muslims from infidels) and internal balance (protection of the lower classes from the ruling classes) in order to fulfill this function. In the final analysis, this dual functional structure makes it possible to establish a political relationship between the ruler and subaltern social groups, albeit symbolically directly and actually indirectly, and to derive legitimacy from this.

Finally, the issue of second function that Şeyhoğlu attributed to the rulers within the metaphor of the shepherd can be considered. The second function that should be considered together with the protection/security function which is discussed above is the surveillance function. Although it can be argued that this function developed depending on the first function, it would be more accurate to read it as a semi-independent function aiming to reproduce the social order that emerged as a result of

⁵⁰⁷ However, in the translation of *Mirsâdü'l-İbâd* made during the Murat II period, the translator Karahisarî (2019, p. 81) placed only four main social groups under the category of 'horned ram': (i) *begler leşkeri*, (ii) *ehl-i menasib*, (iii) *naib* and (iv) *qadis*. In Karahisarî's translation, it is seen that special efforts were made not to mention the higher offices of the state in a critical context, and the criticisms were mostly directed at semi-independent local power centers. In a way, this is in line with the principles of 'administration of pashas', which we will discuss in the following sections, and again makes centralizing tendencies visible.

the fulfillment of the first function. According to Şeyhoğlu, the ruler is responsible to God for the actions of all rulers and people under him, and therefore he has to oversee all their affairs (2013, pp. 260-61): “(...) dayim tafahhus idedurmak gerek. Her bir tayifeyi ki kıyamet gününde bankır ve kutmır cümle halayıkın ahvalını padişahlardan sorısalar”.⁵⁰⁸ It is clear that Şeyhoğlu’s assessment refers to a permanent surveillance function, as stated above in al-Cahiz’s *Kitabü't-Tac fi Ahlaki'l-Müluk* (Kanar, 2019a, p. 103). In this context, one of the defining characteristics of the pastoral power relationship to which the metaphor of the shepherd refers is that the ruler knows all the individuals of his ‘flock’ one by one, has knowledge about them and pays attention to them. Foucault (2013, p. 115) states that pastoral power is an individualizing type of power, that even one of the sheep should not ‘get away from’ in order for the shepherd to herd the flock well, and therefore “the shepherd's eye should be on the whole and each individual, omnes et singulatim”. In this context, it can be thought that the metaphor of the shepherd used in Ottoman political thought refers to a dual protection and surveillance relationship. First, the ruler must have knowledge of the deeds of those under his rule, which is especially crucial for other members of the ruling class. Secondly, the ruler should know living conditions of the lower classes under his rule and act justly for them. This function is clearly stated in the circle of justice model, and it finds historical examples in the practices of the *diwan-i mezalim*, which will be discussed in the following sections. Allowing individual applications (such as *ayak diwani*, *diwan-ı mezalim* et.) to fulfill the justice function is one of the methods for the ruler to be informed about the problems of the subjects. However, it is not possible to explain the protection and surveillance functions with purely judicial measures. Techniques such as using journal organizations, spies or messengers point to the other side of the surveillance function. Abou-El-Haj (2000, p. 76) states that in Ottoman political thought, it was generally considered significant to keep the people under constant surveillance because an implicit assumption that the social order would collapse if the people could not be controlled was included in the sub-text of political thoughts.

Finally, the mystical interpretation of the shepherd metaphor needs to be addressed in terms of Ottoman political thought. The introduction of the shepherd metaphor to Ottoman *sûfîsm* can be attributed to the influence of İbnü'l-Arabî.

⁵⁰⁸ The Sultan must always follow and spy on them openly and secretly. Here, every group of people, big or small, will be asked from the sultans about their condition on the Day of Judgment.

According to Öztürk (2017, pp. 555-56), the hadith ‘you are all shepherds and you are responsible for your flock’ is the basis of the *sûfî* theory of obedience, and according to İbnü'l-Arabî's interpretation of this words, every human being is the sultan/ruler of his own realm, as the shepherd of his own body, outwardly and inwardly responsible for its power. Thus, subjects at a certain knowledge-power level are also made responsible for their own existence, both depending on the general hierarchy and authorized for dispositions of particulars, and responsible for their deeds (Öztürk, 2017, p. 262). Öztürk (2017, p. 205) explains this obedience-responsibility relationship as follows:

(...) imamate has basically been studied in two ways, big and small. While the great caliphate/imamate (...) is to be the caliph over the whole world, the minor caliphate/imamate (...) is the ruler's being the caliph to his own property, which is his own self. Between these two levels, there are many levels of caliphate, and each level of caliphate is larger and more comprehensive than the one below it. In the middle of these two levels are the administrative levels on family members, children, students and property. [tm]

Secondly, the use of the shepherd metaphor takes place in the works of Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî. According to Erten (2004, p. 70), in his *Masnavi* (3/479-80), Mevlânâ dealt with the understanding of social hierarchy and responsibility within the framework of the famous hadith which quoted above, which compares everyone to a shepherd and everyone to a herd. It is seen that this metaphor is also used in the *menâkıbnâme* of Otman Baba, which will be discussed in another context in the following sections. This *sûfî* interpretation of the obedience-responsibility relationship, in which the shepherd's metaphor is used, reached its most developed form in the works of İsmail Hakkı Bursevî, especially in the 17th century. Since our thesis is out of the scope of the period, it is contended to write this much about the mystical interpretation of the shepherd metaphor, which we gave in its most general terms.

To sum up, in the examples above, how both Ahmedî and Şeyhoğlu Mustafa use the metaphor of the shepherd is discussed. While Ahmedî used this metaphor to enumerate the functions undertaken by the ruler in order to manage his own property and obtain the consent of the people, Şeyhoğlu Mustafa acted with a similar purpose, but diversified the functions he assigned to the ruler and equipped it with a real social content. In general, the ruler's fulfillment of the responsibilities of the sultanate and the shepherd metaphor based on their content thus makes specific inferences about the

administration-security-surveillance concept set. When we look at the secondary literature, there are two different approaches to the problem of interpreting the metaphor of the shepherd in terms of social relations in general. Bağdatlı (2018, p. 197) identifies the principle that lies at the origin of both approaches as a specific contradiction in the content of the shepherd metaphor: “Is the ruler an official appointed by God to serve the people, or a shepherd who leads the people in a flock or a lord who leads the servants? [tm]”. It can be said that the debate that developed around the metaphor of the shepherd emerged due to the contradiction between these two qualities attributed to the ruler. In this framework, in general terms, the mentioned contradiction can be put forward as a security-equality contradiction, and in a special sense, it is possible to interpret this contradiction in terms of social stratification.

Critical interpretations of the shepherd metaphor highlight the equality dimension of the issue in problematic sense. For example, Kıvılcımlı (2007, p. 74) analyzes the shepherd analogy as a form of self-glorification by the rulers and argues that this is not a human way of thinking, but a metaphor that degrades human beings in the final analysis. N. Berkes, on the other hand, argues that the shepherd metaphor is an expression of the rupture between society and the state. According to Berkes (1969, p. 43), there is an insurmountable gap between the state and society in the Ottoman example due to the fact that the state was/perceived as ‘descending from the sky’ (referring to divine origin) or ‘coming from outside’ (ruling dynasties came to a dominant position with conquest/occupation), for this reason, the shepherd is a figure of the state as a guide/director/ruler. Berkes claims that this metaphor reflects an inequality-centered mentality where the mutual relationship between the state and the population/society is denied. Similarly, Türk (2018, p. 173) states that in the shepherd metaphor, the ruler and the God, the subjects and the servants of the god are semantically brought closer, an ‘earthly god’ is created from the ruler and submission and obedience to him are made compulsory in political sense. Şirin (2002, pp. 271-72) reveals that the shepherd metaphor can be imagined as a kind of ‘kingdom of fear’, that the shepherd/ruler makes the subjects believe in his own legitimacy by producing external dangers, and in this respect, members who do not recognize his own power are directly defined as ‘enemy/danger’. According to Şirin’s evaluations, the shepherd exists not for the survival of the herd, but for the shepherd to maintain his power (2002, p. 273).

Secondly, it is necessary to consider the approach that interprets the shepherd metaphor from a perspective of the idea of security. Although there are various versions of this view, it is basically based on a common argument that the shepherd metaphor does not contain any pejorative meaning. For example, Öz (2017, p. 185) argues that the concepts of shepherd-herd should be understood in the sense of metaphor, not analogy, and in this context, there is no question of comparing the people to the ‘herd’ in a contemptuous way, on the contrary, a metaphor is used that indicates the vulnerability of the people to the bandits or oppressive rulers. However, in most Ottoman documents, the term ‘reâyâ’ was used to denote real taxpayers, and the word ‘herd’, which corresponds to the lexical meaning of the word, thus corresponds to a real social hierarchy, not metaphorically. Although Öz’s interpretation implicitly acknowledges inequality, the proposition that the people are absolutely vulnerable does not reflect the truth in terms of the shepherd metaphor. Şirin (2002, p. 271) argues that in order for the shepherd-herd relationship to become functional, the shepherd must ‘produce danger’, that is, the weakness against the wolf is itself images produced in the name of the shepherd’s power. In this respect, the metaphor of the shepherd carries as a sub-text the fear that if the people develop self-defense, there will be no need for a ruler, or that the class domination will suffer greatly due to internal conflicts. Precisely for this reason, the shepherd metaphor indicates the need to encode the existence of the shepherd as a necessity, although this need is put forward with reference to a divine source, in the final analysis it is an ideological reflection of a need arising from the class position of the ruler.

On the other hand, the security approach argues that it is not correct to consider the shepherd metaphor in class-based terms, and affirms it as one of the legitimate forms of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. According to Öztürk (2017, pp. 160-61), understanding the shepherd metaphor “can only be possible by leaving aside the class-based and pejorative evaluations of the modern mind [tm]”. Öztürk (2017, pp. 160-61) argues that the elements of the shepherd metaphor (shepherd, herd, wolf, safety-entrust) will mean sultan, *reâyâ*, powerful forces against county, security and responsibility when interpreted politically, and this relationship is a benevolent power relationship whose aim is salvation and peace. Öztürk (2017, p. 161) evaluates this relationship as both a legitimate and an ideal form by asking “Isn’t the aim of all power areas should be salvation anyway? [tm]”. Öztürk (2017, p. 558) adds to his evaluations that the examples in which the shepherd metaphor is used in terms of sheikh-disciple

relations cannot be considered as a relationship of management such as “a strict power exercise of a dominant regime over people [tm]” and can only be seen as a “peaceful/salvation-based power regime [tm]”. The ambiguous aspect of Öztürk’s approach is that it is not clear enough what he means by the terms ‘*selâmet*’ and ‘*selâmetçi*’. The word ‘*selâmet*’ means both peace/security and spiritual salvation. It can be thought that the author uses both meanings of the word ‘*selâmet*’ within the concept of the ‘*selâmetçi*’ regime of power. On the other hand, it should also be discussed whether the doctrine of ‘*selâmetçilik*’ is a material quality of the pastoral power relationship or an idealized element of the pastoral power relationship in the discourse of legitimacy. For Foucault, prioritizing the welfare of the herd is the defining feature of the pastoral form of power. He argues that all definitions of religious, moral and political power have the feature of benevolence and that it is natural to claim “doing good” in terms of the function, purpose and justification of power (Foucault, 2013, p. 113). On the other hand, the reason for the existence of the pastoral power is only the salvation of the herd, which is accepted as the *lex suprema* of the operation of the pastoral power (Foucault, 2013, p. 113).

The appearance of the pastoral form of power in the shepherd metaphor basically hides real social inequalities behind the element of ‘salvation’. To accept as a necessary principle that the herd needs a shepherd in the first place requires asserting that the herd is either unaware of its own interests, or incapable of carrying out these interests in an organized manner. More interestingly, if these two arguments are not accepted, it must be admitted that the possibility of the flock to be conscious of its own interests and to pursue them would directly conflict with the interests of the shepherd. Therefore, the relationship between the herd and the shepherd is transformed into a divine relationship in various interpretations of the shepherd metaphor, so that it is possible to establish an idealist hierarchy between the herd’s secular desires and the shepherd’s divine knowledge. Although the shepherd figure is not necessarily the bearer of divine knowledge, he will be able to emerge as the maintainer of divine knowledge (sacred books or traditions) and lead his herd to ‘salvation’. Or, the purpose of protecting the herd from wolves is attributed to the extraordinary power of the shepherd, which, if this second interpretation is applied to the social plan, in fact, the shepherd must have military power through social stratification and specialization.

CHAPTER V

TIMURID INVASION AND DISSOLUTION

As the subject of this chapter, I will deal with the disintegration of formal unity of Ottoman country and how it is evaluated in political thought. It is possible to call this phase 'disordination' due to the dissolution of subordination relations and the disintegration of the institutional structure. What kind of criticisms the political thought brings about the Timurid invasion and the disintegration of the political union, rather than the historical details, is significant in terms of political thoughts. Because how the Timurid invasion and interregnum were approached both carries a critical retrospective meaning on the social order and characteristics of rule in the reign of Bayezid I, and also reveals the political approaches of the writers about their contemporary context and future. The significance of these approaches stems from the fact that the Timurid invasion and the interregnum period had a decisive influence on the future attitude of the Ottomans, that is, on how they would institutionalize the Empire. Because the reasons and results of this incident and the necessity of not repeating them again have shown the effect of class domination on the institutionalization tendencies for a long time.

The defeat of Bayezid I by Tamerlane and the beginning of the interregnum period, the Ottoman domination 'disenchanted', and for this reason the need for more realistic thinking emerged in political context. Not all writers of the period share this tendency, for example, it is seen that Ahmedî was still under the influence of an idealist approach. The kind of power and ruler where he draws the border lines; His sword is strong, honest to its allies, and just to the people, but it has at most a middle-range principality. To explain, it is certain that a phase in which social strata gained consciousness has opened up for whom saw that this situation was not God-given and that the reign would not continue unless it was supported by strategic moves, despite the people of early phase who naturally accepted and experienced a 'god-given and spontaneous' development line of Ottoman borders. In this context, it can be noticed that some of the writers of *siyâsetnâmes* and *nasihatnâmes* bring social criticism in a world that has been disenchanted. Until the reign of Mehmet II and afterwards, especially after the reigns of Selim I and Suleiman I, this enchantment was rebuilt and surrounded political thought. But this phase will not last long. With the *Celâlî* revolts

and the unsustainable *timar* regime, it was inevitable that a new style of political thought would emerge that tried to produce realistic solutions. So, it is possible to argue that the ongoing struggle between idealist and realist approaches is also valid in terms of political discourses in Ottoman history, and that the first phase of this cycle reached its peak at the beginning of the 15th century.

The common point of most writers of the period is that, as a historical fact, the Anatolian begs, consisting of the members of Tehratan, Germiyanid, Düzme-Aydinid, Menteşe and İsfendiyarid dynasties, were on the side of Tamerlane, and that the soldiers of these principalities and the Tatars changed sides in the Battle of Ankara, which changed the fate of the battle. In addition (İnalçık, 2019g, p. 72), it is seen that Tamerlane wrote letters to the Tatar begs, promised to make the Tatars dominant against the Turkmen, and summoned the Tatars to his side. For this reason, Neşrî (1949, p. 350) argues in the first step that Tatars became ‘traitors’ in that context. A second point is that after the death of the Mamluk Sultan, Bayazid I took Malatya, Darende and Benisni from the Mamluks and this ruined the chance of a possible alliance against Timurids. Oruç (2011, p. 49) states that the begs of these provinces took refuge in the Arab provinces and during the Timurid invasion, Melik Eşref helped these lords and gave them back their old places. It is possible to collect the views of the writers of this period on a few main topics. While the first group of arguments is about the negative features gathered in the personality of Bayezid I, the second group of arguments points to the disruption of the subordination order. Arguments focusing on personal characteristics focus on the excessive love of conquest, impulsiveness and moral corruption, while arguments focusing on the disruption of the subordination order highlight the violation of the tendencies regarding the distribution of property/goods and the social status of the vassals. In the final analysis, it is possible to argue that moral criticism gains the ‘value of truth’ because of its foundation on the idealized religious principles. Criticism at the personal level, on the other hand, ultimately finds its foundations in arguing the failure of the ‘reason of state’ to operate. The best example of this type of criticism can be found in the work named *Nasihatü Sultan Murat Han*.⁵⁰⁹ In this work, the following

⁵⁰⁹ Throughout my thesis, I chose not to use *Nasihatü Sultan Murat Han* except for two minor citations. Although *Nasihatü Sultan Murat*’s importance as a work supposed to contain political and moral advice of Murat II to Mehmet II under normal circumstances, in terms of the history of political thought in the 15th century, the authenticity problem on the work have made this work largely out of use. Aydın (2007, p. 70) states that this book is a translation of Cicero’s *De Senectute* renamed as *Kitab-ı der Medh-i Piri* and that the Venetian ballios of the time Marino

rhetorical question is asked from Murat II to Prince Mehmet (1975, p. 66); “Dedem Yıldırım Sultân Bâyezid Hân mücerred kılıcına ve zûr-ı bâzûya dayanamayup akli dahi kullanmış olaydı Timurlenk vakıasına uğrar mıydı?”⁵¹⁰ Another similar example is mentioned in the anonymous Ottoman chronicle. Öztürk (2020, p. 110) states that the following statements in the anonymous chronicle criticize Bayezid I’s determination of political actions only with his own view: “Meşveretsiz işini iş sanmagıl/ Kendi reyinle işe el sunmagıl/ Meşveretten kimse hüsrân bulmadı/ Meşveret eden peşiman olmadı/ Meşverette hasıl olur her ümit/ Meşverettir bağı işlere kilit”.⁵¹¹

di Lavalli and the translator Murat may have made such an adaptation to attract the attention of Suleiman I. Uğur (1992, p. 99) believes that this book has authenticity but its final form was edited by a third person. Uçman (2015, p. 7) asserts that this book is authentic and that it was “written directly from the mouth of the sultan” by Venetian ballios Andrea Coscolo, and translated by ballios Marino di Cavallo to translator Murat Beg at a later date. In my opinion, the work should be considered an authentic *siyâsetnâme*, which is an interesting example of its kind in general, although some of the arguments that Cicero uses to argue why old age is not inferior to youth are also used in this work. The arguments that Cicero criticizes Epicureanism in *De Senectute* translated into criticism about the drinking and entertainment gatherings, the examples he gave from the Roman and ancient Greek history turned into examples from the Ottoman history and the Iranian states, and although the senate element disappeared, the main political conflict is common to both texts and attracts political thought. The management of old and smart people against young and mighty despots is the main subject in both works. While the struggle of Caesar and Clodius against the Senate in Rome constitutes this line of conflict, the struggle of the ulama against the conquering rulers and Janissary commanders in the Ottoman Empire, and this situation is completely valid for the periods of Murat II and Mehmet II. However, it is not clear whether the expressions in the book came directly from Murat II’s mouth. It is probable that some of these advices to Mehmet II, written by Coscolo in Latin, and may be extended later. The rumors that Mehmet II knew Greek and Latin (see Chronicon Minus of Yorgios Sfrancis) show us that it is possible for him to be interested in such a book. Barker (1995, p. 27) states that at the beginning of the 15th century, Manuel II wrote to his son the principles that he thought would be useful for the education of a ruler, and that this was not the only *siyâsetnâme* a ruler wrote to his son in the Byzantine tradition. One possibility is that the book named *Nasîhatü Sultan Murat* may have been written by seeing the work of Manue II. In particular, Mehmed II’s seeing himself as the heir to the Roman/Byzantine throne after capturing Constantinople may have caused such a work to be fabricated in a similar meaning. At the same time, for example, Ahmed-i Dâî’s translation of *Vasıyyet-i Nûşîrevân-ı Âdil be-Pusereş Hürmuz-i Tâcdâr* may have inspired Murat II’s will, and this may have briefly revived an ancient and distinguished tradition of rulers advising their successors. In any case, the fact that the original copy of the work, written in Turkish, Persian or Arabic, has not yet been found, leaves it in the dark whether it was a fabricated work in the mid-16th century, and as such it falls outside the scope of our analysis up to the beginning of the 16th.

⁵¹⁰ If my grandfather Yıldırım Sultan Bayezid Khan had used his reason instead of relying only on his sword and arm strength, would he have suffered the Tamerlane incident?

⁵¹¹ Do not think that the work done without consultation is right/ Do not start a thing with only your own opinion/ No one was harmed by consulting/ A person who consulted did not regret/ All kinds of hope arise during consultation / The solution to difficult problems is in consultation.

Âşıkpaşazâde's criticism on this issue focuses on the subject of deviation from Islamic principles and morally corrupt rulers, and he does not hesitate to voice an economic-based criticism. Firstly, Âşıkpaşazâde points out Bayezid I's drinking habit as a sign of moral corruption.⁵¹² According to Âşıkpaşazâde, Bayezid I, who married the sister of the King of Serbia, learned to set up drinking meetings from him, and had a wine and kebab meeting set up with the help of Ali Pasha (Apzd, 2017, p. 75). This situation is attributed to the corruption of Ali Pasha and the Persian *danishmends* gathered next to him (Apzd, 2017, p. 76): "Ali Pasha, after all, caused the Ottoman dynasty to sin. Because deceitful Persian danishmends used to come to him a lot [tm]". In the anonymous chronicle, although Ali Pasha's name is not mentioned, it is stated that the ulama members did not take a stand against the sins of the ruler during the reign of Bayezid I, and it is criticized that the ruler was allowed to drink wine - thus, the criticism of moral corruption became the dominant theme (Öztürk, 2000, p. 36).⁵¹³ Âşıkpaşazâde implies that Ali Pasha also took bribes. When Bayezid I took action to conquer Constantinople, Byzantine Emperor sent a hundred fish filled with gold and silver to Ali Pasha, and Ali Pasha, in return, acted as an intermediary on behalf of the Emperor and persuaded Bayezid I to abandon the expedition and make an agreement (Apzd, 2017, p. 74). Finally, the claim that Ali Pasha influenced the war plan against the Tamerlane attack is included in the historical sources (Apzd, 2017, p. 74):

(...) Bayezid Khan to his viziers: 'Get ready quickly so that we can go against Temürlenk. I will not take him beyond his country' he said. Ali Pasha said: My magnificent sultan! No need to trouble our soldiers. Let's let he come and enter our country. Let's kill them in such a way that we send their news to their own country. Begs found this idea and trick appropriate and liked it. They found it worthy, and all accepted it. They did not allow Bayezid Han to implement his own thought. [tm]

In addition, Âşıkpaşazâde cites a conversation rumored to have taken place between Bayezid I and Solak Karaca. Solak Karaca said to Bayezid I when it was understood that the Battle of Ankara would be lost: "Hey Bayazıd Han! Hani o güvendiğin oğulların, o sancak beğlerin, ya o sarhoş vezirlerin? Sana ne güzel yoldaşlık

⁵¹² Also Oruç Beg (2011, p. 45) asserts the same argument.

⁵¹³ A similar criticism attributed to Hacı Bektâş-ı Velî can be found in the letters of Manuel II Palailogos. See: Keçiş (2013), Kılıç and Demir (2017).

ettiler! Akçayı harcetmedin. Hazineye koydun. Oğlancıklarımın rızkıdır dedin” (Apzd, 2017, p. 83).⁵¹⁴ This critique of hoarding is a fairly common theme in early political thought. Even in the anonymous chronicle, there is the expression as such “mübalâğa mal cem’ itdi”⁵¹⁵ for Bayezid I (Öztürk, 2000, p. 36). In the *Selâtinname*, before describing the Timurid invasion, the author tells three stories about the ‘disastrous ends of greedy rulers’. The titles of these stories are quite meaningful in terms of giving a preliminary idea about the subject: “*Hikayet-i Tama’kar*”, “*Hikayet-i Tama-kar vü Kimyakarı*” and “*Sual u Cevb-ı Nuşirrevan*” (Öztürk, 2001, pp. 80, 83, 106).⁵¹⁶ Through these stories, the author criticizes Bayezid I’s treasure hoarding, but prefers to do it in the subtext. He gives his views on the subject in two sections, which he has arranged in the style of a *siyâsetname*. These thoughts in the first of these are mentioned in the section about *pendâme* below. The second part is called “*Beyan-ı Dil-Azari*” and the author/poet includes the following lines: Cihanda ol durur şah-ı girami/ Eyü adıla çıkar anun namı/ (...) Şehinşehlere iki iş gerekdür/ Sehavet hem şeca’at yigirekdür/ Şehinşah olana mal eksük olmaz/ Cihanda hiç ecelsüz kimse olmaz”.⁵¹⁷ In these lines, *Selâtinname* author Kemal uses a well-known theme while he cautiously criticizes the accumulation of goods. The ruler must be generous, and the world/life is finite. We see that in Suleyman Çelebi’s work called *Vesiletü Vesiletü’n-necât*, a similar theme is handled, but there are differences in emphasis, and there are also places where the text is silent. Suleyman Çelebi (2021, p. 31) describes the characteristics of the ideal ruler through the prophet Muhammad in this popular work as such, while Muhammed is a ruler in both worlds, he was a “*hem-rah*” (comrade/friend) with the poor and is proud of poverty and avoids arrogance and rebellion to God, Suleyman Çelebi praises his humility, and underlines that his inclination is not about “*hayf*” (cruelty/oppression) but about grace and justice when making judgments. The missing point in this text, in which the image of an ideal ruler who both fully possesses the power (the king of two world) and does not break the legitimacy relationship with the lowest classes, is reproduced, is that it does not contain any signs of ‘accumulation of goods’ or ‘treasure’. The

⁵¹⁴ Hey Bayezid Khan! What about those sons you trust, those flag lords, those drunk viziers? What a good company they’ve been to you! You didn’t spend the money. You put it in the treasure. You said it is the sustenance of my boys.

⁵¹⁵ He has accumulated quite a lot of wealth.

⁵¹⁶ The last story will be analyzed in succeeding parts of this thesis.

⁵¹⁷ There is that venerable ruler in the world/ His reputation is called with a good name/ The rulers of the rulers need to do two things/ Generosity and courage are needed/ The person who is the rulings of the rulers can always seize wealth/ There is no immortal person in the world.

contradictory narrative between the ruler's grace, moral habits/virtues and his having a developed financial power presents an important theme that can reveal the social positions of the narrators to the researchers.

It is necessary to focus on the history and meaning of this theme. This theme first emerged in Ottoman political thought around the problem of describing/reporting the death of Osman Beg. Kemal (Öztürk, 2001, p. 47) gives priority to contentment while giving some advice to the rulers at the end of the section where deals with the death of Osman Beg: "İgende meyl kılma mal a zinhar/ Ziyade meyl idenler oldılar zar".⁵¹⁸ After Osman Beg's death, Osman Beg's estate was examined in order to distribute goods between his sons Orhan and Aladdin, and it was understood that he had no assets other than a few pairs of horses, oxen and sheep herds, and that he had no wealth in kind of gold or silver coins (Apzd, 2017, p. 45).⁵¹⁹ Âşikpaşazâde narrates this incident with a pride peculiar to dervishes, thus indicates a similarity between the financial situation and lifestyle of Osman Beg and poor dervishes. The second example is what Evrenoz Beg, who is known as the vizier of the *tekfür* of Bursa, said to Orhan Beg when Bursa was conquered. Evrenoz Beg states that the reason why they lost the city is that the *tekfür* accumulated goods and could not find the opportunity to give, receive the debts, or sell the goods in case of need, and in the final analysis, the goods did not benefit (Apzd, 2017, p. 40). In these two examples, it is seen how the hoarding of goods in cash and in kind is considered as a crippling idea for the reproduction of the class order. As a result, Âşikpaşazâde devotes the entire 157th chapter of his historical work to the 'exemplary ends of the sultans who collected a lot of goods'; "Deceased Yıldırım Hünkar collected goods. He made a precaution for the country. He used to collect coins and put them in treasuries. There was famine and cost in the country. In the end, unfortunate Tamerlane took that property. The country was trampled underfoot [tm]". Doukas (1975, p. 96) gives detailed information about the contents of the treasure in question: Gold, silver, bushels of precious stones and pearls, captive young men and virgins. As a result, Âşikpaşazâde recommends spending the collected goods and using them functionally (Apzd, 2017, p. 200); "The property is that it is good to spend. The friend of the sultans is he who is full and true. A solid army is one that is full and

⁵¹⁸ Do not tend to acquire a lot of wealth/ Those who tend to this more than necessary will suffer.

⁵¹⁹ In the history of Rûhî, it is stated that Osman Beg did not have property (*mal*), but there were many horses and large herds of sheep (Yücel & Cengiz, 1992, p. 383). In this narrative, property is likely to mean precious metals or coins, while having large herds suggests a certain taxation in kind or accumulation of booty.

crowded. Not to worry about hunger [tm]”. Âşıkpaşazâde’s discourse quoted above bears a certain resemblance to the conversation allegedly between the Mongol commander Hulagu and the caliph al-Mu’tasim during the invasion of Baghdad by Mongol army. A contemporary writer (Hayton, 2015, p. 108) who quoted this speech indicates that Hulagu asked the surrendered caliph why he had accumulated great treasures instead of using them to recruit soldiers, and when he did not get a satisfactory answer, he decided that the caliph was thirsty for gold, and he ordered that only pearls and gold be given to him instead of food. This anecdote, between a ruler who accumulates treasure and the ‘Tatar’ forces who plunder him, will be repeated in the Tamerlane-Bayezid struggle since it is drawn for the popular imagination. An important point here is that Hulagu criticizes not the accumulation of wealth, but the misuse of it. In this respect, the criticism of accumulation of goods should be read in two ways.

Firstly, there is a realist criticism about not spending the collected goods on soldiers, and secondly, there is the idealist criticism directed at the collection itself. The fact that the first criticism is in the anonymous chronicle (Köklü, 2004, p. 11) that Bayezid I did not give their salary to the soldiers suggests that this impression may have objective historical foundations. In another anonymous chronicle, it is stated that during the reign of Murat I, the rulers were not greedy, they did not know what treasure was, and they gave the income they collected to warriors and brave people (Giese, 1992, p. 27; Öztürk, 2000, p. 31). In *Saltuknâme*, it is stated that the Seljuk ruler Alâeddin persecuted the *reâyâ* and thus he established a treasury and acquired slaves (*ghulams*) (Ebü’l-Hayr Rûmî, 1990, p. 131). In this respect, it can be said that there was a reaction against both establishing a treasury and recruiting devshirme soldiers in the *Saltuknâme*. Abdülvasi Çelebi expresses a similar view in his work called *Halilnâme* and states that collecting goods is not appropriate action in the context of religious provisions (Gültaş, 1996, p. 282). As it is understood from these examples, the most important social segment that tries to have privileges in the redistribution of state revenues is the warriors, not only *ghazis*/frontier warriors or warrior- *sûfi* circles, but also the official units.

In the second aspect, I believe that this approach stems from an attitude peculiar to *sûfi* circles as an idealist criticism. This concern is clearly visible in the lines that Âşıkpaşazâde added in the relevant sections (Kala, 2013, p. 313): “Diler kim dünyasın suya yitüre/ Nice susuzları suya yitüre/ Muhabbet-i malı onu dinden çıkardı/ Yüzi kara

günah yükin götüre”.⁵²⁰ Âşıkpaşazâde’s opinion that hoarding wealth, like getting involved in sins, will corrupt the state and cause its destruction, can be better justified if we look at his Islamic-moralist attitude in general. Similarly, Ahmedî criticizes the accumulation of goods in kind, which was mentioned before (2018, p. 160).⁵²¹ In fact, in these reproaches the demand of the dervish circles can be observed for the redistribution of the property within the framework of their own interests. In the final analysis, Âşıkpaşazâde also indirectly points to the dervish circles for redistribution (Apzd, 2017, p. 200): “They asked one of the wise: ‘Do sultans need treasure?’ they said. Wise one replied: ‘There is one real treasure. It is necessary’. They asked: ‘What is the real treasure?’. Wise one said: ‘The blessings of his subjects are treasures to the sultans’ [tm]”. According to this view, or at least that is the expectation, there will be a redistribution system that feeds dervishes, *zâkirs*, and *hâfız*s gains the greatest ‘blessing’ indicated in these lines.

Oruç Beg, on the other hand, does not give any place to the criticism of hoarding, preferring another narrative instead. This situation can be interpreted as affirming the accumulation of goods, or at least thinking that the state should save money and goods in a moderate way. But this interpretation is not necessarily only accurate option. In my opinion, Oruç Beg, who defended the interests of the *ghazis* and the frontier lords, may have drawn attention to the military obligation-vassalité relationship and avoided commenting on the treasury -because it became a class-based necessity in his own time. Oruç Beg’s criticism is that Bayezid I was too harsh towards his own soldiers (2011, p. 51): “(...) The soldiers were hurt by Yıldırım Khan’s harsh behavior. He was very cruel to his soldiers. (...) Begs from all sides and from every country turned their backs on him on the war front [tm]”.⁵²² There is also a criticism in the anonymous Giese (1992, p. 40) that the begs who were loyal to Bayezid I broke up with the ruler because of his ‘arrogance’. For this reason, it is possible to understand Oruç Beg’s criticism not only as a ‘harsness’ directed against ordinary soldiers, but also as a search for absolute power against vassals and upper-class commanders. Because the point emphasized in Oruç Beg’s text quoted above is that the vassal-lords who were subject to Bayezid I left him during the war. In this case, the relationship that is subject to criticism is not only the

⁵²⁰ Whoever wants to drown his world/ It has drowned many thirsty/ Love for wealth has made him apostate/ His black face carries the burden of sin.

⁵²¹ See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 2126.

⁵²² In anonymous chronicles, there is criticism that Bayezid I offended and hurt the soldiers because of his harshness (İğci, 2011, p. 18).

personal temperament or morality of Bayezid I, but the power relationship between the local begs and him and its schema of development.

Oruç Beg (2011, p. 53) continues to draw the portrait of Bayezid I as follows: “Yıldırım Khan was very emotional and harsh natured. Because of that harsh nature, many things happen to man. As long as the heart is firm, the head is healthy/ If the heart is shaken, it will be a moving wound [tm]”. It is understood from the description of Oruç Beg and the related verse that the criticism of Bayezid I for being harsh or being emotional should be understood as not being able to restrain his excitement and carefully evaluating the results of what he said. Moreover, Amâsî, who did not include the criticism of hoarding goods on a parallel line to Oruç Beg, also criticized the element of anger under the qualifications of rulership at the theoretical level, he evaluates that anger can never be a virtuous behavior but only means “persecution of oneself, his friends, those around him, his servants and entourage [tm]”. In the anonymous chronicle (Köklü, 2004, p. 11) there is information that Bayezid I acted according to his own ideas, did not listen to advice, acted contrary to the advice and was a bit of ‘*şirret*’ (hussy). The author of the anonymous chronicle of Öztürk (2000, p. 39) claims that Bayezid I was ‘*gazaplı*’ (wrathful) and describes him as a person who inflicts severe punishments: “bir sehcelce sudan ötüri nice kişileri helak ederdi ve kimini sakad iderdi”.⁵²³ There is another example on this subject in Kemal’s *Selâtinname*, according to him, Bayezid I, who was angry with Tamerlane’s envoy, ordered the envoy to be caught and his ear and nose cut off (Öztürk, 2011, p. 92).

Various anecdotes about the anger of Bayezid I are also found in non-Ottoman sources. In this regard, Werner (2019a, p. 82) states that in the meeting where Manuel II met with his vassals in Serres, Bayezid I gave the order to kill all the vassals, but the order was not fulfilled, and he explained this situation to the vassals and tried to scare them.⁵²⁴ Moreover, Lord Kinross (2008, p. 63), indicated that Bayezid I told the ambassadors from Italy that after conquering lands of Hungary, he would go to Rome and feed barley to his horse at the altar of St Pierre Cathedral. Both examples show that Bayezid I could engage in impulsive behaviors that disregard the ‘reason of state’, that is, the principle of precaution, and his criticisms in this regard constitute evidence. Doukas (1975, p. 91) draws attention to a similar phenomenon; According to him, while Tamerlane’s troops were strategically choosing the battlefield and settling in, Bayezid

⁵²³ He got people killed and some maimed for a petty crime.

⁵²⁴ See also: Vatin (2019, p. 59).

I ordered his army to go hunting and all army units were engaged in deer hunting for three days. In the history of Timurids, İbnü'l-Arabshah states that Bayezid I was “brave, impatient, he lost himself when he spoke [tm]” (as cited in İnalçık, 2019g, p. 72). In this case, Oruç Beg sees the insulting letters that Bayezid I wrote to Tamerlane and the wrong attitude towards his own soldier as the main reason for the disaster of Battle of Ankara. In this respect, the couplet he wrote down can be read as a principle of political morality that preaches mastery of language and emotions, that is, indirectly brings the reason to the fore.

Ahmedî puts it at the center of his statement that, after the death of the Egyptian Sultan Barkuk, Bayezid I fell in love with the idea of conquering Damascus and Egypt, he seized Malatya for this reason, but the fate turned upside down. His critique is essentially a moral critique (Ahmedî, 2011, p. 156): “Demedi ki ol öldi ben dahi-ölürem/ Şöyle kim ol oldu ben dahi-oluram/ Öldüğünden sana gerekse haber/ Konşılar öldüğüne eyle nazar”.⁵²⁵ Similarly, Şükrullah (2011, p. 217) states in a careful tone that the “desire to take Egypt and Damascus falls in the hearts [tm]”. But the point that differs from the others in Şükrullah’s narrative is that he describes the war of Tamerlane and Bayezid I by putting it in the form of the Battle of Karbala between Huseyn ibn Ali and Yazid. Moreover, Şükrullah makes a distortion that the soldiers of the King of Serbia, who is stated to have fought well in other sources, sided with the Tatars at the very first step and ‘rebel against Islam’. Both Âşıkpaşazâde and Oruç Beg and Ahmedî refer to Tamerlane’s devotion to the *Ahl al-Bayt*, they especially describe in detail Yazid’s grave being dug up and his bones burned, and his grave filled with soldiers’ excrement by the order of Tamerlane. The fact that Şükrullah compares Tamerlane to Yazid and Bayezid I to Huseyn ibn Ali is an ideological distortion in itself. Köprülü (2012, pp. 94-95) claims that Tamerlane had a Sunni belief with influences of Alevism. Ibn Khaldun, on the other hand, is of the opinion that Tamerlane only uses religion wisely, the parties are not so important to him. So why does Şükrullah need such a distortion? The answer to this question is the search to show Bayezid I as ‘oppressed’ in terms of Timurid invasion. Only in this way is the author able to relate the period of interregnum in Ottoman history to an Islamic narrative.

⁵²⁵ He didn't say he [Sultan of Egypt] died, I'll die too/ What happened to him, it happens to me too/ If you want information that one day you will die/ Look carefully at the death of your neighbors.

V.I. On the Period of Interregnum

The interregnum period, which started after the Timurid invasion, is worth examining not only by its effects at the beginning of the 15th century, but also in terms of affecting the future centuries in the development of the Ottoman state, both as a political reference point and as an example of practical policy. For this reason, in this subsection, the general characteristics of the interregnum and its reflection on political thought will be examined. Âşıkpaşazâde presents the struggle during the interregnum period -if we do not take into account the incident of Düzmece Mustafa, which will take place later- as a struggle between three brothers. In this narrative, the liberation and re-engagement of three social segments and fractions with the Ottoman rule and established order is discussed. These groups are (i) *ghazi* circles in Rumelia, (ii) *timar* holders in Rumelia and Anatolia, (iii) Christian vassal states.⁵²⁶ Âşıkpaşazâde's narrative conveys the contradictions and relations between these groups through the sons of Bayezid I: Emir Suleyman, who made an agreement with Byzantium, Musa Çelebi, who was based on the military power of the declassé *ghazi* groups, and Mehmet Çelebi, who was under the protection of the Anatolian begs. It is not difficult to read this tripartite presentation as the representation of three alternative centers of power that were under the subordination of the Ottoman administration before the interregnum. First of all, Suleyman Çelebi –or Emir Suleyman is treated as a conciliator between these three groups. In Doukas's narrative (1975, p. 100), there is information that Emir Suleyman fell at the feet of the Byzantine Emperor and demanded to be recognized as the ruler of Thrace, Doukas also stated that he was like son of Emperor. According to Âşıkpaşazâde, Emir Suleyman left his sister Fatma and brother Kasım to the Byzantine Emperor as hostages (Apzd, 2017, p. 85). Pitcher (2019, p. 100) states that in accordance with the agreement made between Emir Suleyman and the Byzantine Empire, Byzantine merchants was exempted from taxation, Turkish ships were subject to imperial permission for entry and exit from the Dardanelles, and it was decided to transfer Thessaloniki and its surroundings to Byzantine Empire. Secondly, Âşıkpaşazâde indicated that Mehmet Çelebi declared his subordination to Emir Suleyman and he made peace with Karamanid, Germiyanid, İsfendiyarid states (Apzd, 2017, pp. 85-86). Moreover, it is possible to mention in this context that Emir Suleyman signed peace

⁵²⁶ Tamerlane (1994, p. 212) places the center of the class struggle in this period in the conflict that took place between the timariots/feudal lords and the *Kapıkulu* members. Although this model is generally included in most works, far from revealing all class conflict, it shows a quality that is largely under the influence of center-periphery theory.

agreements with Mircea the King of Wallachia (Salgırlı, 2012, pp. 42-43). Also Emir Suleyman took alongside the representative/vizier of the pre-interregnum period, Ali Pasha, İne Beg Subaşı and Hasan Ağa⁵²⁷ (Apzd, 2017, p. 85). What are missing in the configuration that emerged under the reign of Emir Suleyman are the *ghazis* and plundering activities. Salgırlı (2012, pp. 46-47) emphasizes that Emir Suleyman apologized for the events around Coron and Moron, the only military activity (1407), after stating that the Ottoman military operations had almost completely disappeared between 1403 and 1410, based on the Venetian reports. Historian Kemal (Öztürk, 2011, pp. 115-16) describes Emir Suleyman as a person who does not like to acquire property, and his era as a peaceful period in which the wolf and the sheep/ dog and the rabbit do not harm each other.⁵²⁸ Âşıkpaşazâde stated in a critical tone that Emir Suleyman stayed on a waterfront around Göynük, lived there from summer to winter, came to İznik from there, and moved to Edirne after his brother Musa appeared in Rumelia (Apzd, 2017, p. 86). Âşıkpaşazâde indicates at all these stops Emir Suleyman was “is busy chatting with free wine of Ali Pasha [tm]” (Apzd, 2017, p. 86). These statements should not be taken simply as a moral critique, but as part of a more sophisticated political critique, namely, a critique of morality of rulership. In this period, if a ruler is expected to fulfill some social functions in political thought, the most important of these is to produce policies that will meet the interests and wishes of the social strata under his rule. In this context, the statements of Âşıkpaşazâde summarized above show that Emir Suleyman spent the summer months, which were the campaign months with wine and conversation -not plundering (Apzd, 2017, p. 86). Öztürk’s anonymous (2000, p. 57) contains the following detail on the subject: “(...) yine sohbetle meşgul oldu. Gördiler kim şarabdan hali olmaz, cümle halk ol huyından incindiler”.⁵²⁹

In this case, two important problems arise: The organization of *ghaza*/looting activities fails and the necessity of centrally reproducing the status differences between the *timar* holders cannot be fulfilled. Ahmedî describes the general military state in the period of Emir Suleyman very well in a single couplet in this context: “Gerçi leşker vâ

⁵²⁷ Salgırlı (2012, p. 42) states that Hasan Ağa was a Janissary commander.

⁵²⁸ For comparison, see: Kemal describes Musa Çelebi as someone who receives tribute, customs and benefits from all Rumelia (Öztürk, 2001, p. 118).

⁵²⁹ Emir Suleyman spent his time chatting again. They saw that he did not leave wine, and all the people were hurt by his habit.

u genc ü dest-res/ Lîkin itmez mülk almaga heves”.⁵³⁰ In this case, it is clear that the possibility of a change of ruler has emerged, and moreover, a certain power model based on consensus may have come to an end. Emir Suleiman’s conciliatory model of political relations was disrupted by the social strata in Rumelia. Âşıkpaşazâde describes this change of political atmosphere as follows: “Even the chiefs of Rumelia knew that Musa crossed to Rumelia and came to Wallachia, and they sent message to him. They said: ‘Come, your brother has nothing to do with the sultanate. Because he is inseparable from the entertainment meeting day and night [tm]’” (Apzd, 2017, p. 86). Oruç Beg (2011, p. 56) expresses the situation as follows: “The begs of Rumelia knew that Emir Suleyman was busy with pleasure and not interested in country affairs. Even the begs turned away from him [tm]”. These statements reveal the demands of the social strata under the Ottoman rule, as well as expressing the opinion that Emir Suleyman did not have the qualifications to be ruler in the eyes of the frontier lords. The person who is expected to be a ‘sultan’ is expected to be directly involved in state affairs and to fulfill various military and political functions. To the extent that he cannot fulfill this, it is inevitable that the loyalty to him shall disappear. And so it happened: “Rumeli’nin tavcıları ve timar erleri hepsi Musa’ya geldiler. Doğru Edirne’ye sürdüler” (Apzd, 2017, p. 86; Giese, 1992, p. 52; Öztürk, 2000, p. 57).⁵³¹ The word written as *tavcı/tovuça/tovuca/duvica* means a kind of volunteer soldier and is used in the sense of raider (Atsız, 2011, p. 87, footnote 56; Çıpa, 2017, p. 33, footnote 118). The expression ‘*timar eri*’ should be understood as a kind of secondary vassal.⁵³² In Veneziova’s (2017, p. 337) etymological-toponymic analysis, it was determined that this term was used for the commanders at a lower level than the sanjak begs as the head of the raiders, and that the villages with the name *tovcu/taviçe* and the *timars* granted to these people overlapped. In that case, it can be argued that *toviçes* are raider commanders who have not yet received a *timar* in the distinction between *timar eri* and *tavcu/tovcu/toviçe*. Oruç Beg (2011, p. 56) attributes the reason why the *tovcus* were subordinate to Musa Çelebi, because Musa Çelebi was “a lord of raiders [tm]” during the reign of Bayezid I, and he

⁵³⁰ Even though he has soldiers, treasury and wealth, he does not aspire to conquer countries., See: Ahmedî (2019), couplet no: 7179, Ahmedî (2018, p. 589).

⁵³¹ All of Rumeli’s *tavcıs* and *timar eris* came to Musa. They directly moved towards Edirne.

⁵³² For example, Kivâmî (2018, p. 359) determines the status of ‘*timar eri*’ in his work titled *Fetihnâme* as follows: The sultan informs the begs, begs informs *subaşı*s and *timar eris* and invites them to an expedition. In this hierarchy, it is understood that *timar eris* were placed under the begs and *subaşı*s.

was “accustomed to the *tovcus* [tm]”. In this case, the lowest level of *ghazis* and *timar* holders are not satisfied with the rule of Emir Suleyman. There may be two main reasons for this situation: Firstly, it can be thought that the larger *timar* holders seize their lands from the small *timar* holders, which is very likely to be Christian lords, and it can be thought that it is difficult for the *ghazis* to reach new lands and loot due to this new political *status-qua*. Moreover, Kastritsis (2007, p. 122) underlines that Emir Suleyman commissioned a new land survey, based on *Ahval-i Sultan Mehmed bin Bayezid Han* written by Ahmedî. This development also restricts the movement area of the landlords and raiders and contradicts their class interests. At this point, to put forward a third hypothesis, there is good reason to think that the subordinated social classes -actually peasants- were also dissatisfied with the administration due to the pressure of the landlords. Aytekin (2017a, p. 529) underlines the failure of the ruling class to fulfill its role in political relations based on reciprocity, which is an important part of this dissatisfaction within the framework of the concept of ‘moral economy’. Salgırlı (2012) emphasizes that peasant revolts developed spontaneously in Anatolia and Rumelia due to the economic difficulties brought by the interregnum period and the increasing pressures of the ruling classes. I think an interesting example here is the murder of Emir Suleiman in the village he entered while fleeing from his brother Musa Çelebi. In the anonymous chronicle (Öztürk, 2000, p. 58), there is information that Emir Suleiman came across a village while fleeing towards Constantinople, that there was a wedding in the village at that time, that the former ruler approached the wedding to ask for directions, and that the villagers (*Düğünciler*) recognized and killed him.⁵³³ In the poem named *Mersiye-i Emir Sülman* in *Diwan* of Ahmedî, this incident is narrated as “Şeyyatin leşkerini cem 'idüben/ Helak itdi Süleyman-ı zamanı” and it is said that Emir Suleyman was killed without a sword and without spilling his blood.⁵³⁴ However, since the detail that there was no bloodshed is not included in other sources, it can be thought that this is a discourse created by Ahmedî and aimed at protecting the honor of the ex-ruler.

⁵³³ However, what is in question here is most likely a Turkmen tribe named *Düğünce*. The incident takes place in the history of Rûhî as follows (Yücel & Cengiz, 1992, p. 426): A Turkmen guide who run Emir Suleyman to Constantinople is informed to the nearby “Düğünce ili”, and while the Turks (*Etrak*) there are discussing whether to kill Emir Suleyman, Musa Çelebi arrives and has his brother strangled.

⁵³⁴ Gathering the soldiers of the devils / Killed the Solomon of the era. See: *Divan, Terkib-i Bend* no: VII/5, p. 214.

This incident was severely punished. Musa Çelebi burned all the villagers together with the village (Apzd, 2017, p. 86). It is necessary at least as a hypothesis to read both the murder case and the severe punishment as a class-based reaction. The villagers may have killed the former ruler in vengeance, as they saw him as responsible for the oppression. There are clues supporting this hypothesis in anonymous *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osmân* (Giese, 1992, p. 53); According to the author(s) of the anonymous chronicle, “the people and the begs were hurt by the trouble [tm]” and they committed this murder by saying “let’s get out of scourge [tm]”. In Öztürk anonymous (2000, p. 59), it is claimed that the people who killed Emir Suleyman were both ‘people’ and ‘begs’, and there are some clues that they might have an emancipatory perspective: “Zira kim halk ve beğler birbirin kovup kendülerine zahmet çekmekden incinmişlerdi, ya’ni bunlardan kurtulalum sandılar”.⁵³⁵ In this case, the reaction of Musa Çelebi, although it has personal aspects, can be read as an intimidation against the possibility of the lower classes to revolt and attack the ruling classes. It is possible to understand from the following advice of Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, p. 155) to the ruler that the ruling classes are equipped with class consciousness against such incident: “O high-flying friend, put out the fire before it grows; If it rebels, it will completely burn the country down [tm]”.

The accuracy of the last hypothesis will be confirmed by the incidents in the Börklüce Mustafa rebellion, which will be examined in more detail later. It is possible to test the accuracy of the first two hypotheses with the incidents after Musa Çelebi’s accession to the throne in Rumelia. According to Âşıkpaşazâde, when Musa Çelebi came to power, “all of the sanjak begs and timariots came and obeyed him completely. The infidel lords in the vicinity became rebels again [tm]” (Apzd, 2017, p. 97). In this context, we can see that the class balance deteriorated in favor of small *timar* holders and *ghazis*, and in return, at least hypothetically, feudal lords with vassal status and the surrounding independent Christian principalities rebelled against the rule of Musa Çelebi. Âşıkpaşazâde states that in accordance with this new articulation, Musa Çelebi refocused on *ghaza* activities, captured Vidin, Pirevidin, Matar, Köprülü and Oğcabolu, and organizing raids continuously (Apzd, 2017, p. 87). Oruç Beg (2011, p. 57) has a similar view on this issue and uses the following expressions: “Musa began to pave the way for provinces and countries without stopping. He would send raiders everywhere, and he would go with them [tm]”. Thus, the class balance changes day by day in favor

⁵³⁵ So the people and the beg were hurt by fighting and toiling each other, so they thought they would get rid of them.

of the *ghazis* and is shaped against the settled ruling classes. Arıkan (2017, p. 197) claims that Musa Çelebi hated big feudal lords, wealthy scholars (ulama) and aristocrats. Şükrullah (2011, p. 222) states that in this context, “Musa Çelebi would kill and rob the infidels he defeated, and he would take tribute and tax from them [tm]”. This description can be considered normal in the general development of the Ottoman rule, but it is possible to think that the persistent and intense expressions such as ‘killing and plundering’ have an emphasis beyond normal. In this context, the history of Neşrî (1957, pp. 488-89) informs that Musa Çelebi confiscated the wealthy ones. For example, Werner (2019a, p. 243) states that Serbian feudal leaders Vuk and Georg Brankovic were executed. In the history of Rûhî, there is information that Musa Çelebi tried to eliminate the great lords of Rumelia or demanded tribute from them because he did not trust them (Yücel & Cengiz, 1992, p. 427).

So, how should these indicators be evaluated, and Arıkan’s (2017, p. 197) interpretation in class-based terms commented? If the fact is evaluated that Musa Çelebi appointed Sheikh Bedreddin as a *qadiasker*, what kind of result emerges in this context? For example, should the portrait of Musa Çelebi be painted as a ruler in struggling to social inequalities, on the side of the *ghazis* and the lower classes? For example, Filipovic (1971, p. 439) claims in his work *Princ Musa i şeyh Bedreddin* that Musa Çelebi aimed to abolish the class domination of the feudal nobility and in this respect, he broke away from his own class-origin (as cited in Werner, 2019a, p. 247). Oğuz takes this view too far (1997, p. 188):

Muslim and Christian poor peasants and peoples took their place next to Musa Çelebi. Therefore, this struggle appeared as a popular movement, of the King of Serbia, Byzantine and Ottoman aristocrats, namely that the ‘holy alliance’ struggle against him saw the Musa Çelebi as a threat to the ruling circles. (...) Musa chose Sheikh Bedreddin as Qadiasker, that is, to the highest rank of the ulama class, who, after a few years, would become the head of a great social and religious movement that promoted a kind of communism and brotherhood with Christians. [tm]

Oğuz’s lines essentially reproduce the image of the *ghazis* and Ottoman frontier lords, who are honored as ‘egalitarian-knights’ that a kind of argument also seen in the works of Kuvâcılı. My opinion is not in this direction and the answer I will give to the above questions is negative. It is necessary to explain the appointment of Sheikh

Bedreddin as a *qadiasker* with the real or fabricated prestige of his grandfather and father among the *ghazis*, as will be discussed later. In this regard, Musa Çelebi's policy mostly focused on (i) re-establishing ties with the ulama (appointing Sheikh Bedreddin as a *qadiasker*), (ii) re-gaining the support of people from 'kul' (slave) origin (appointments to sanjaks) and (iii) reproducing the support of the *ghazis* throughout this entire process. While pursuing this policy, it is seen that the title of *Beylerbeyi* of Rumelia was given to Mihaloglu Mehmet Beg, who was a member of one of the great *ghazi* families, while all sanjaks were given to "kul"s (servants) (Apzd, 2017, p. 97; Oruç 2011, p. 57). However, Werner (2019a, p. 250) interprets the segment indicated by the term 'kul's here as pirates and sailors consisting of former villagers within the framework of the term '*azap begi*' in the texts of the period. He bases this claim on the statements in the documents that the '*azap*'s are of Turkish origin (Werner, 2019a, p. 249). In this case, although the term 'kul' covers '*azap*'s, it is needed to understand both the existence of people of devshirme origins and the militias gathered from the villages. Köprülü (2005b, p. 138) states that this term is used both as naval soldiers engaged in piracy and as castle guards, and that a military class among *hassa nökkers* is also called with this term. Halaçoğlu (1991, p. 52), on the other hand, states that the term '*azap*' should be understood as the castle guards and the troops that resist the first attack in front of the Janissary units. On the other hand, Âşıkpaşazâde used this term later in a section on the Düzmece Mustafa movement, "he also called azaps (...) he called and brought all the toycas he had. In short, no one named *sipâhî* left in Rumelia [tm]" (Apzd, 2017, p. 99). From this, it can be concluded that the *azaps* should be evaluated in the *sipâhî* class. Bostan (1991) describes the formation of *azaps* in the Ottomans as follows;

(...) Azebs were established before the Janissary organization and joined the army as a light archer. In later periods, azebs who participated in the war as a frontier force were collected by the neighborhood imams and kethüdas from among the Turks and from the provinces in return for certain avarız taxes. [tm]

However, Werner overlooks that one of the three great commanders who went to Rumelia with Emir Suleyman was Hasan, the Janissary agha. Kastritsis (2007, p. 164) is of the opinion that the term '*azap*' is used for those who are of servant origin. İnalçık (2019g, p. 95) underlines that Hasan, the chief of the Janissaries, left the ranks of Emir Suleyman and went over to Musa Çelebi's side with all other *Kapıkulus*. The anonymous chronicler (Giese, 1992, pp. 54-55) states that Musa Çelebi closely caring

over his servants, and that only his “servants and janissaries [tm]” remained with him after Mehmet Çelebi moved to Rumelia. Kastirtsis (2007, p. 164) is of the opinion that the term ‘*azap*’ is used for people of slave origin. During this period, the Janissary group as a part of *Kapikulus*, gained a social status, for example, they were freed, and they appeared on the stage of history as a new political actor. This issue will be mentioned later. In this context, it is clearly seen that Musa Çelebi tried to restore the Ottoman rule with a new social configuration in which the servants were more privileged over the *ghazi*-raider begs and thus might be second move of his political strategy. The fact that Musa Çelebi provides high official positions especially to the ulama and the *Kapikulus* makes it possible for this restoration to evolve into a central state form. Lines in the anonymous chronicle (Giese, 1992, pp. 54-55) claiming that Musa Çelebi was very generous towards the Janissaries and people of slave origin, that he mixed silver and gold coins and presented them in a silver mug, even removed their caps and filled them with coins, that is why the arrival of Mehmet Çelebi ends with the knowledge that all Rumelia become ‘traitor’. So, at what point did Musa Çelebi play his pieces wrong? We do not know this exactly, but it seems clear that a contradiction has arisen between the ‘*kul*’s and the landowner *ghazis*. A data that will be a basis for this is included in the Öztürk anonymous chronicle. According to the anonymous author (Öztürk, 2000, p. 59), Musa Çelebi’s approach to the local lords is very harsh and he protects the people of slave origin against them: “Çün Musa Çelebi kulların ilerü çekdi, Rum Beğlerin mansıbdan düşirdi. (...) Ve kangı beğde, kim şübhesi var idi kim, kast itdi kim cümlesin helak ide ve kimini dahı habs ide. Bu hali bilüp Rum beğleri çekilüp oturdılar, ruzigarı gözlediler kim göstere”.⁵³⁶ In the lines pointed out, it is revealed that the group that Musa Çelebi gave status was the devshirme group. In this context, the anonymous chronicles reproduces the classical dichotomy between devshirmes and local notables. Although the local begs were not satisfied with this loss of status, their silence for a while in the face of the force of Musa Çelebi does not mean that they accepted the new political configuration. In general, it can be thought that Musa Çelebi supported the small *timar* holders against the big seigneurs who gained autonomy, but tried to place the Janissary power at the center of the military authority he was trying to establish. In

⁵³⁶ Because Musa Çelebi showed favor to the slave origins and took the rank of the begs of Rumelia. And whatever beg he suspected, he tried to kill some of them and imprison some of them. Realizing this situation, begs of Rumelia retreated and waited, observing what the time would bring.

this respect, it can be estimated that the socio-political model presented by Mehmet Çelebi offers a more preferable framework for the class-based actors of the period.

In this regard, it is possible to make some inferences based on the story of Mehmet Çelebi's rise to the throne. First of all, it is understood that Mehmet Çelebi established dominance over the trade routes in Anatolia and protected the interests of the settled classes. First of all, Mehmet Çelebi seized Amasya, a port city, and after the defeat of Emir Suleyman, he started to rule Bursa.⁵³⁷ It can be more or less guessed that the people of Bursa would like to see him as their ruler, since they came to greet him (Apzd, 2017, p. 87; Oruç, 2011, p. 58). Moreover, it is seen that Mehmet Çelebi made an alliance with the begs in the Amasya region, and as a result, the land grants of '*mâlikâne-dîvânî*' status increased above the normal in that region (Çelik, 2017, p. 210). Especially the *sipâhîs* of Karasi, Sahunan and Aydın regions came and pledged allegiance after Mehmet Çelebi ascended the throne, which supports this view (Kastritsis, 2007, pp. 97-98). According to the information in the history of Rûhî (Yücel & Cengiz, 1992, p. 405), Mehmet Çelebi says that before the war with İnal-oglu, he will give grants to those who participate in this war and rise them to the status of beg. Secondly, Mehmet Çelebi protects his dominance from looters, which resembles the function undertaken by Osman and Orhan Begs during the establishment of the Ottoman principality. The main ones of these groups are listed as İnal-oglu, Gözler-oglu and Köpek-oglu in the history of Rûhî (Yücel & Cengiz, 1992, pp. 405-7). Kastritsis (2007, pp. 79-80) states that Mehmet Çelebi succeeded in establishing alliances with the people of Germiyan, Karaman and Dulkadir. Pitcher (2019, p. 95) argues that the people of Amasya, Niksar, Tokat and Sivas preferred the rule of Mehmet Çelebi as an alternative to the rule of the Turkmen lords. For example, it is possible to learn in the history of Şükrullah (2011, p. 222) that Mehmet Çelebi successfully protected Amasya from the raids of Tatar groups led by Kara Devletşah, and Bolu from İsfendiyaroglu. Moreover, Âşıkpaşazâde states that after Mehmet Çelebi gained power, he exiled the Tatar chiefs and households from the İskilip region to the Plovdiv region (Apzd, 2017, p. 94).⁵³⁸ Thus, Mehmet Çelebi was able to carry out a relative restoration in the region and

⁵³⁷ Thus, Musa Çelebi, who was supported by the Janissaries and raiders based on the spoils of Rumelia, and Mehmet Çelebi, who based his central army on the trade income of Bursa and Amasya and received the support of the begs of Anatolia, came into a structural contradiction.

⁵³⁸ Kemal's (Öztürk, 2001, p. 119) devoting a chapter to Mehmet Çelebi's success against the Tatars shows that this is considered crucial policy-perhaps in the sense of a moral superiority against the Timurids.

actively used the superiority he established over the Tatars in the war between his brothers. The fact that Neşrî (1949, p. 140) pointed the information that Mehmet Çelebi used ‘Mugal valiants’ in the Battle of Çamurlu with Musa Çelebi provides a picture of the complex consensus that emerged.

The political thought developed by Amâsî also prioritizes a model that fits Mehmet Çelebi’s actions around the notion of justice. According to Amâsî (2016, pp. 231-33) there are three kinds of justice: The first is related to the distribution of goods and benevolence, the second is related to commercial relations and parts of exchange relations, and the third is related to politics and forms of discipline. The principle of securing commercial relations has been briefly demonstrated above in the context of his effort to secure commercial routes and cities. It is seen the distribution of goods and grants, which is the first of the principles in this scheme, in Mehmet Çelebi’s land assignments with the status of *mâlikâne-dîvânî*. Finally, it would be appropriate to examine the notion of the institutionalization of the forms of politics and discipline, namely the class-based social order, and the appropriate affirmation of all segments. Amâsî has slightly changed the content of the understanding of ‘bestowal’ that was pointed earlier and evaluates it as a part of political articulations. In the previous sections, examples of policies focused on benevolence to the commanders and the soldiers and aiming to keep the political allies through gifts were mentioned. Amâsî (2016, p. 369), on the other hand, added this political principle as a point to be considered in order to maintain the state order (*tedbîr-i memleket*), brings to the fore the bestowal to the people (*reâyâ*). He sees it as the most crucial policy after the principle of justice, especially to those in need (*ashab-i hacet*) in excess of the amount determined by religious obligations. In this context, it is possible to evaluate the following statements, within the framework of Amâsî, that he is re-developing the subordination relations before the interregnum (Şükruallah, 2011, p. 222): “The sultan of Islam came to the capital Bursa and spent the days protecting the people with justice, winning the love of the soldiers, glorifying the scholars and honoring the sheikhs. He would take care of them according to the value and rank of each and win their hearts [tm]”. From these statements, it can be also understood that Mehmet Çelebi developed close relations with the ulama and *sûfî* leaders, resurrected institutions such as *imâret* and supported the *Kapikulu* members. İhsanoğlu (2019a, p. 141) states that Mehmet Çelebi built eight new madrasas during his eight-year reign. For example, the fact that Bayezid Pasha, of devshirme origin, was appointed as a vizier supports this restoration move

(Taneri, 1992). Finally, he must have found ways to get along with the Byzantine Empire and the Timurids. It is stated in secondary sources that Mehmet Çelebi addressed Emperor Manuel II as ‘father’ (Emecen, 2019a, p. 102) and that name of Tamerlane was mentioned on the coins he minted (İnalçık, 2019g, p. 92).

In this framework, it can be thought that Mehmet Çelebi’s handicap is to stay away from *ghaza* activities. But to close this gap, he will take advantage of another gap of Musa Çelebi, namely his disagreement with the Byzantine Empire. Âşıkpaşazâde points out that the vizier of Musa Çelebi, Kör Şahmelik, while fighting with Byzantium, agreed and crossed to the opposite side and fled to Constantinople (Apzd, 2017, p. 87). In this balance of power, Mehmet Çelebi and the Byzantine palace would agree and decide to act jointly to withdraw Musa Çelebi’s raiding activities from the gates of Constantinople. The political mediation in this issue has executed by Kör Şahmelik, who proposed to send an envoy to the Byzantine Emperor and suggested to make peace with him (Öztürk, 2000, p. 61). With the help of Kör Şahmelik and Fazlullah the *qadi* of Gebze, Mehmet Çelebi made an agreement with the Byzantine ruler and went to Rumelia with his ships (Apzd, 2017, p. 88). It is seen that, with Çelebi Mehmet’s transition to Rumelia, large *timar* holding *ghazi* families gathered around him, but the declassé groups continued to support Musa Çelebi. According to Âşıkpaşazâde, Evrenosoglu Ali Beg, Mihaloglu Yahşi Beg and Mihaloglu Mehmet Beg’s son, joined the forces Mehmet Çelebi (Apzd, p.2017, p. 88). This situation is expressed in the anonymous chronicle as follows: ““Rum-ili beğleri her kim var ise kaçdı. Sultan Mehmed katına geldiler” (Öztürk, 2000, p. 61).⁵³⁹ Oruç (2011, p. 58), on the other hand, indicates that only the raiders remained with Musa Beg. It is clear that the alliance with the Byzantine Empire, which may have had an effect on the Christian lords, and the change of sides of the great lords of Rumelia were effective in this outcome. Another example of the alliance with the Byzantine palace and the raiders’ opposition to the class composition led by Mehmed Çelebi is mentioned in *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân* (Apzd, 2017, p. 90):

While Sultan Mehmed was fighting with his brother Musa, the Istanbul takfür did not want to take Emir Suleyman’s son. In other words, he had a treaty with Sultan Mehmed. That’s why he wanted to say that I did not accept his son. Even the boy came out of Istanbul. He wanted to go to Wallachia. The raiders of Karun Plain

⁵³⁹ All begs of Rumelia fled and came to Sultan Mohammed.

arrived near the boy. They said: ‘Come on! We’ll be with you’. They took him to Yanbolu. [tm]

Interestingly, during this period, we see that the first criticisms against the *ghazis* were also developed in political thought. In the work *Mirâtu'l-Mülûk*, written during the interregnum period and presented to Mehmet Çelebi, Amâsî both establishes a symbolic relationship between the orientation to *ghaza* and ‘the power of wrath’ of the spirit, and implicitly criticizes the activities such as looting and seeking social status, which we count among the causes of *ghaza*. Amâsî’s (2016, p. 161) theoretical formulation on ‘the power of wrath’ sees it as the source of human beings’ power to be superior to others, to dominate others, to cope with fearful situations and to ward off self-harm. This formulation has two axes, the first is wrath, which drives the quest for dominance, and the second, which enables courage and underlies the notion of self-preservation. Amâsî (2016, p. 225) defines some of the actions that he considers “like courage but not essentially courage [tm]” as follows: “There are people who go to war or engage in dangerous activities in order to acquire property, slaves, concubines, or other desirable things [tm]”. Amâsî (2016, p. 227) argues that the type of people he points out participates in such activities “just to be pointed out among their own groups and peers, to gain fame and reputation [tm]”. But he does not give an answer as to whether they are in search of ‘dominance’. However, the main point of denigration of both groups, which they consider dangerous and immoral, is that they act in the direction of their own interests and desires. Amâsî (2016, p. 227) is of the opinion that, in the final analysis, the aim of war (*jihad*) should be made to glorify the God’s name. The author’s completion of all this criticism based on the divine purpose of *jihad*, in the final analysis, points to a moral criticism of the autonomy of *ghazi* groups.

Finally, after Mehmet Çelebi seizes the throne and establishes his power, he will take one last step towards the restoration of the old order: The re-subordination of former vassals. In this political context, Mehmet Çelebi sent envoys to former vassals and neighboring states and made peace with lords of Rumelia (Apzd, 2017, p. 89) and Anatolia (Oruç, 2011, p. 60). The only exception is that the Karamanid dynasty, who did not respond to the call for peace, marched on Bursa and besieged the city. Thereupon, Mehmet Çelebi together with their vassal forces such as İsfendiyaroglu, Hamidoglu, Germiyanoglu, Menteşoglu and Aydınoglu, launched a military expedition against the Karamanid Principality and defeated them (Oruç, 2011, p. 60). However,

Mehmet Çelebi's main restoration move was to tie Karamanid princes as vassals of himself instead of continuing the protracted war with the Karamanids and holding the lands he had won, such as Akşehir and Kırşehir, and to abolish the struggle in this area, at least for a while. Âşıkpaşazâde gives much more detail about the symbolic elements of re-vassalization (Apzd, 2017, p. 92): "They made complete peace. Sultan Mehmed gave a caftan to Karamanoglu. He gave a banner. He gave stable of horses, mules and camels. Sent them [tm]". Finally, Mehmet Çelebi made the Lord of Wallachia as his vassal again (Apzd, 2017, p. 92) and succeeded in restoring the old order, at least formally in the eyes the ruling classes. The same form of articulation can be seen in the fact that İzmiroglu Cuneyd was not executed even though he rebelled twice (Werner, 2019a, p. 236).

Of course, this does not mean that the unrest of the declassé masses and the lower classes has completely disappeared. In the final analysis, it should be admitted that Mehmet Çelebi has succeeded in restoring certain subordination relations, but that the multiple articulation of these relations and their support by intermediate positions has not yet been sufficiently developed at the level of institutional framework. For this very reason, we see closely that the class domination scheme is still quite open to change in the 1416 rebellions led by Sheikh Bedreddin and Börklüce Mustafa and the Düzmece Mustafa incident.

CHAPTER VI

THE RECHARACTERIZATION OF CLASS DOMINANCE: FROM MEHMET I TO MEHMET II

“(...) nasirü’l ibad amirü’l bilad dafirü’l zulm vel fesad”⁵⁴⁰

The inscription on the tomb
sarcophagus of Çelebi Mehmet

One of the well-known examples of 15th century Turkish literature, which is repeated even in schools today, is the satirical masnevi of the famous Germiyan poet Şeyhî named *Harnâme* and is thought to have been presented to Mehmet Çelebi (Demirtaş, 1949, pp. 371-72). The incident that led to the writing of the work is as follows: Mehmed Çelebi gave a *timar* to the Şeyhî around the village of Tokuzlu as an *arpalık* (kind of benefice), when the poet went there with the sultan’s edict, he was beaten by the former owners of this *timar*, his valuables were stolen and he had to flee (Demirtaş, 1949, p. 370). Upon this incident, Şeyhî tells the story of an unfortunate donkey who emulates the oxen grazing on the pasture and wants to be like them, but whose ears and tail were cut off by the owner of the wheat field he entered, and he establishes an allegorical connection between what happened to the donkey and what happened to him. Donkeys work hard but are poor, oxen never work but are fat. Donkeys are frail, oxen have magnificent horns. When a donkey wonders the reason for this situation, he gets the following answer from another wise and old donkey: “Dün ü gün arpa buğday işlerler/ Anı otlayup anı dişlerler/ Çün bular oldı ol azize sebep/ Virdi o izzeti bulara Çalap/ Tac-ı devlet konıldı başlarına/ Et ü yağ toldı iç ü taşlarına”⁵⁴¹ (Demirtaş, 1949, p. 385). Thereupon, this donkey, the hero of our story, decides to cultivate barley and wheat, but his search for a comfortable life ends when he is punished by the owner of the wheat field. According to Timurtaş (1971, p. 13), this short story has the main idea that “everyone is worthy of welfare as much as the value of their work, which puts forward a view of social justice, connects the issue to fate in

⁵⁴⁰ The helper of his servants, the builder of the provinces, the repellent of oppression and mischief.

⁵⁴¹ They grow barley and wheat every day/ They graze there and eat it/ These caused that holy thing to grow/ God gave them glory/ The crown of state was placed on their heads/ They were filled with meat and oil inside and outside.

the end, and states that those who act against the order will be punished [tm]”. There are some faulty points in Timurtaş’s interpretation. The story is about social injustice rather than social justice. Because there is no reference in the work that the work done by a donkey is less valuable than oxen, or even that oxen do any work.

As Bilkan (2018, p. 91) states, this story has an important political message and is revealed in the following couplets: “Batıl isteyu hakdan ayrıldum/ Boynuz umdum kulaktan ayrıldum”.⁵⁴² That is, the donkey wants something forbidden that it shouldn’t want, so it loses what it has. This short story not only explains the incident that experienced Şeyhî personally, but also contains more than one social representation, which provides information about the general social structure and needs to be emphasized. Ayan (1999, p. 208) is of the opinion that this short *masnavi* brings a criticism of mentality. Horned oxen, that is symbolically, armed *sipâhîs* who hold a *timar*, feed and rule freely on the land, but the real owner of the land is the sultan, who has the power to punish them. If the sultan allows, a ‘donkey’ can feed on the field and live without working. On the other hand, the peasants who work non-stop do not have the right and power to disrupt the social order of their own volition, even though they emulate the *sipâhîs*. These requests of the lower classes are considered to be ‘null’ in religious sense, and they will meet with the strong reaction of the ruler: “Kim ola bari bir iki eclaf/ Ki’de tevki-i padişaha hilaf/ Şah kahrı ne’ uzü-billah eger/ Çarh baş çekse ide zir u zeber” (Demirtaş, 1949, p. 387). The translation of these lines is as follows (Kanar, 2018, p. 44): “Who are one or two ignorant people/ How can he disobey the Sultan’s order/ God forbid, if the ruler damn/ If the sky rebels, he will turn it upside down [tm]”. This short story was written at the end of the interregnum period and is quite suitable for the general characteristics of the period. It allegorically portrays the lower-classes who want an equal share of welfare and the ruler who fiercely defends his interests based on the class-based social order. Moreover, the incident of Şeyhî show us that the holders of the *timar* may not hesitate to defend their interests even against the ruler. Keeping this allegory in mind, we can begin to examine the social structure and political thought in the post-interregnum period.

It is quite interesting that the Ottomans, after an interregnum period of about fifteen years, were able to regain their thrones and continue to expand their lands as if nothing had happened. The explanation for this situation can be made by the fact that

⁵⁴² I left the righteousness by wanting null things / I wanted to have horns, my ear is gone. See: Demirtaş (1949, p. 386).

the institutionalization move they developed before the interregnum was successful in some places, as well as the need for a state again by the dominant classes. When the possibility of the disappearance of the class order (Börklüce Rebellion) or its reform (Sheikh Bedreddin Rebellion) looms on the horizon, it is seen that those who are determined to preserve class relations also unite around the Ottoman rule. In this framework, the re-establishment and institutionalization of the Ottoman rule as a class-based administration took place simultaneously with the stifling of demands for social order change, and they are closely linked to each other with a cause-effect relationship. As İnalçık (2019b, p. 60) states, the *timar* registers, which were started to be created during the reign of Bayezid I, guarantee the right of disposition of the *timar* holders and therefore, the *timar* holders give the impression of the most organized interest group that has attempted to restore the Ottoman order during the interregnum period. Moreover, it should be noted that the restoration closely followed the subordination paths of the pre-interregnum period.

According to İnalçık (2019e, p. 120), Mehmet Çelebi's obtaining the support of the Turkmens in the Central Anatolian region also put him in an advantageous position against his brothers. In this context, Kastritsis (2007, p. 75) interprets that the recurring theme in the contemporary chronicle *Ahval* is a reflection of Mehmet Çelebi's defeat of the Turkmen lords and their subordination to him. It can be evaluated that Murat II was trying to develop the same political position, from the fact that he took Âşikpaşazâde, that is, a Turkmen *Vefâî* dervish, with Mihaloglu in the Düzmece-Mustafa rebellion. In addition, Werner (2019a, p. 244) states that based on a freed document published by Filipovic, the Janissaries also sided with Mehmet Çelebi instead of Musa Çelebi. But what effect this issue of freed had on the social status of the Janissaries is not clear enough, at least for this example.

In the second plan, it should be mentioned that the trace left by the interregnum period on the relations between the ruler and the subject people/producers is of considerable importance. While the interregnum brought about the reorganization of the relations between the ruling class and factions, the liquidation of some of them and the changes in the social status of others, it also necessitates the reconsideration of the relationship between the lower classes and the upper classes. While the experience of the interregnum leaves the lower classes in a dilemma of freedom (example of 1416 revolts) and security (invasion of the Timurid army), the upper classes face the problem of a dual strategy that tends to gain the consent of the people or rely on systematic

oppression to maintain class privileges. At this point, it is not a coincidence that lines dealing with the ways of ‘winning the heart/consent of the people’ and models that attach importance to the establishment and development of an institutional power structure can be found together in Ottoman political thought. Ahmedî exemplifies how these two aspects are integrated in the sense of class power in one of his poems. In his *Diwan*, in the section titled *Padişah-ı Hürmuz Piser-i Nuşirevan*, he argues that Nuşirevan’s (Anushirvan’s) son Hürmuz (Hormizd) was not able to carry out state affairs during his reign, so he fell into a ridiculous position in the eyes of the people and was dismissed by the people for this reason: “İtdi her işde ki var taksir ol/ idemedi devlete tedbir ol/ (...) / Olduğu-çun işleri peyveste hezl/ Eylediler memleketde an azl”.⁵⁴³ The concept of ‘*tedbîr*’ has a specific place in Islamic political thought, as it will be evaluated in the following sections, and it also influenced Ottoman political thought by surpassing the thought of Ibn al-Muqaffa and Nasîrüddin Tûsî. For example, Ibn al-Muqaffa uses the concept of ‘*tedbîr*’ (prudencia) in his work named *al-Edebü’s-Sagir* as follows, “The condemnation of the weak does not harm the prudencia of the strong”, and Bagdatli (2018, p. 286) interprets this expression as a reflection of the idea that “the power should continue despite the complaints of the people [tm]”.

In this framework, Ahmedî primarily stipulates that the ruler should carry out the administrative affairs as required. Thus, the idea that mere consent is not sufficient, on the contrary, that the consent necessary for the reproduction of power must be gained through administrative mediation, finds its place in Ahmedî. The poem numbered XXVI and titled *Der-Medh-i Sultân Mehemmed* in the *Diwan* of Ahmedî constitutes a very interesting example in terms of humorously handling the aforementioned relationship between consent and administration. This poem, which offers a retrospective view of the interregnum period and the 1416 Revolts, in terms of the loyalty of the people to the ruler, should be briefly discussed. The aforementioned poem of Ahmedî is basically based on the idea that no one can escape the criticism and ridicule of the people, and therefore power cannot be established solely on the consent of the people. Thus, ‘*tedbîr*’s appears to be more effective than simple consensual articulation, implicitly pointing to the strategic architecture of an institutionalized stratified social order. Ahmedî argues that no matter what rulers do, their shame will appear in the eyes of the

⁵⁴³ He made mistakes in every affairs/ He couldn’t be prudent in the state affairs/ (...) / Because his every deed was mixed with entertainment/ They dismissed him from the country’s administration. Ahmedî, *Divan*, poem name: Mevlid, couplet no: 37 and 40, pp. 629-30.

people because it is a phenomenon from which even prophets or saints cannot escape.⁵⁴⁴ This means that popular criticism and ridicule directed at the ruling segments is a universal phenomenon, and these criticisms, which cannot be eliminated, can only be bypassed with '*tedbîr*'. The examples given by the author about the popular criticism are quite interesting.

Ahmedî presents a long list explaining such situations that if the ruler prays at night and fasts during the day, his name will become a liar and a cheat (XXVI/9), if he isolates himself, his name will become a coward, and even if he shows courage, his name will turn out to be bloodthirsty (XXVI/11), If he is generous, he will be considered a lavish, and if he is not generous, he will be considered poor (XXVI/13), If he eats and is fond of feeding others, he will be called unfortunate, otherwise he will be said to keep his treasure separate (XXVI/14), if he drinks, he will be called a sinner, if he does not drink, he will be called a stingy (XXVI/ 15), if he is dignified, he will be called harsh/hard, if he is good-natured, he will be called harassing (XXVI/16), if he looks at a woman, his name will be dishonest and people will want to hang him for this (XXVI/17), If he is not content with what he has, he will be called greedy, if he is contented, he will be called lazy (XXVI/18), if he is in seclusion, he will be called a person who makes a *bidat*, but if he is with the congregation, various people will make a joke about him (XXVI/19), if he deals with science, he will be called a beggar and the people will not give anything (XXVI/20), if he wears quality clothes, the people will call him adorned like a bride, and if he does not wear good clothes, the people will call him the unclean (XXVI/21-22).

Interestingly, there are widespread usage the discourse on 'whatever you do, you cannot escape the criticism of the public' in folk narratives. For example, one can refer to Abdurrahim Tirsî's poem with "*-dirler*" rhyme (Yüce, 2010, pp. 132-33). In this poem, contradictory views of people from different social segments about Sheik Tirsî are listed. For example, some people say that the Sheikh is living in wealth as such "one hand in oil and one hand in honey [tm]", while others criticize him as a poor and helpless person, some say he is a saint, some are cross-eyed, some are stupid, some are

⁵⁴⁴ See: Ahmedî, Divan, poem no: XXVI/7 and XXVI/29, pp.77-8. It is clear that this judgment stems from the Judeo-Christian tradition. Cf. Mathew [5.11-12]: "Blessed are you when people insult you, persecute you and falsely say all kinds of evil against you because of me. Rejoice and be glad, because great is your reward in heaven, for in the same way they persecuted the prophets who were before you".

wali.⁵⁴⁵ For another example, in a famous story attributed to Nasreddin Hodja, the hodja and his son are traveling with a donkey⁵⁴⁶, and they are criticized by the people they meet on the way, in cases where the hodja rides on the donkey but his son does not, his son gets on and the hodja does not, both get on and neither of them get on (Köprülü, 2004, pp. 139-43; Boratav, 2007, pp. 290-91). The story ends with such a message (Yaşaroğlu, 1961, p. 20): “Whatever you do, you can’t get rid of the people’s talking. If anyone can get rid of this people’s talking, well done to him! Do what you know, no matter what others say. The mouth of the people is not a bag so that you can sew it [tm]”. In this story, it is advised that one should act in accordance with one’s own mind, needs and conscience. When a systematic comparison is made between the poem in *Diwan* of Ahmedî, which was quoted above, and the anecdote attributed to Nasreddin Hodja, it is seen that they are the same in terms of subject but different in terms of the message they contain. The subject of both narratives is that although the public generally has a similar moral formation, they will make different judgments on the same subject, and it is impossible for a person to act if they accept all of them. However, while the message of the Nasreddin Hodja joke is that it puts the individual needs and interests of the people in the center while acting, Ahmedî’s poem is that the ruler behaves in accordance with his place in the social hierarchy and makes his decision-making power/will independent from these criticisms in a way that reproduces his class position. Thus, the fundamental difference between the two narratives emerges. In the Nasreddin Hodja joke, while the criticisms of the people emerge as moral judgments alien to the concrete situation of Nasreddin Hodja and his son, in Ahmedî’s poem the ruler emerges as an alienated figure of power in the face of the criticisms directed by the people. In this respect, while Nasreddin Hodja’s advice points to a conformity that can be explained as not paying too much attention to the criticisms of the people, Ahmedî’s advice corresponds to a need for institutionalization that can raise the ruler ‘above’ the criticisms of the people. Ahmedî recommends ‘religion’, ‘sword’, ‘conspicuity’ and ‘will’ as ways to achieve this. Thus, while Nasreddin Hodja’s

⁵⁴⁵ For a similar poem, see: *Diwan* of Sheik Tirsî, poem no: 65 (Yüce, 2010, p. 157-58). It is necessary to reconsider these and similar examples within the framework of Bakhtin’s concept of *heteroglossia* in the context of popular discursive mechanisms.

⁵⁴⁶ Kaya Erginer, who researches on Nasreddin Hodja jokes, claims that the people satirized in Nasreddin Hodja jokes are represented as donkeys, therefore an alternative interpretation of Hodja’s jokes about donkeys can be made (as cited in Boratav, 2007, p. 31). Boratav (2007, pp. 30-32) states that this theory and some similar theories try to gentrify the figure of Nasreddin Hodja, but this does not reflect the truth.

resistance to criticism takes place directly, the ruler's resistance needs the military/political and cultural mediations.

VI.I. The 1416 Revolts: Class-Based Political Relations and Ideo-Philosophical Complexity

First, let's analyze the social class relations lying behind the Sheikh Bedreddin movement. The most crucial feature of this movement is that the social segments that do not need the existence of the great seigneur, moreover, are against it, are included in this movement in search of a kind of reformation in the class schema. Werner (2019a, p. 279) insists that Bedreddin's movement is a "*reformatio*" and a "*renovatio*" movement, but it is not essentially revolutionary one.⁵⁴⁷ Gölpınarlı (1966, p. 40) uses another ambiguous term that can meet both meanings and have revolutionary connotations, he states that Bedreddin intends to make a social reform (*inkılâb*).⁵⁴⁸ Thus, we are faced with a movement that is directly opposed to class domination of Ottoman dynasty, but a movement that emerges at the level of the ruling classes. According to *menâkıbnâme* of Sheik Bedreddin, which written by his grandson Hâfız Halîl (2015, p. 139), Bedreddin first gained the loyalty of the Aleppo Turkmens when he headed for Anatolia. Secondly, it is mentioned in the *menâkıbnâme* that Karamanid Mehmed b. Alaeddin Ali, Germiyanid Yakub and İzmiroglu Cuneyd were followers of Bedreddin (Hâfız Halîl, 2015, p. 142-144). It is stated that many non-Muslims, especially Christians in Chios, become followers of the Sheik (Hâfız Halîl, 2015, pp. 148-50). Finally, it is recorded that Sheik Bedreddin met with Mircea the ruler of Wallachia (Pienaru, 2017, p. 285) and İsfendiyaroglu (Apzd, 2017, p. 95). In addition, it was also pointed out that during the time he took refuge in İsfendiyaroglu, he wanted to meet with Shahrukh, the ruler of the Timurids (Ocak, 2014, p. 194). It is also important with which title Sheikh Bedreddin used in these meetings. Although it is clear that the title used in the talks and meetings mentioned above was a religious title (sheikh and scholar), it seems possible that the title he used while carrying out the reform program was a political one. Perhaps for this reason, he was sentenced to death not according to

⁵⁴⁷ For a series of articles that interpreted the rebellion movement led by Sheikh Bedreddin within the framework of Marxist arguments, see (ed.) Çoban (2011).

⁵⁴⁸ However, it should be noted that at the time Gölpınarlı wrote his work, the expression 'social reform' was used sparingly in such a way as to imply a 'revolution'. There are indications that the expression can be interpreted in the second way in Gölpınarlı's work and will be criticized in the following sections of our thesis.

Sharia, but according to customary law, that is, for the crime of rebellion against the state (Ocak, 2014, p. 205). Yananlı (2016a, p. 39) states that Bedreddin should have been executed for the crime of heresy, because if he was hanged for the crime of rebellion, a *fatwa* would be issued for right to confiscate his property along sentenced him to the death.⁵⁴⁹ In this respect, Yananlı (2016a, p. 39) claims that he should have been hanged politically, not in accordance with the current *fiqh* provisions. In this case, it becomes difficult to determine the exact crime charged against him, and it is possible that he was hanged for the crime of rebellion in an era when the prosecution of heresy was not yet institutionalized. If so, not confiscating his property may possibly be a propagandistic state decision to pacify his supporters in Rumelia. Hâfiz Halîl (2015, pp. 192-93) states that his grandfather could not be executed according to the Sharia because the ulama could not defeat him by arguing, in this case he states that the decision was taken to ‘follow the custom’ for the execution of Sheikh Bedreddin. For this reason, it must be a political decision not to confiscate his property after his execution.

According to Âşıkpaşazâde, the main reason for the Sheikh to take action was that he wanted to become a ruler (Kala, 2013, p. 172): “Danışmend beylik ister gör asıldı”.⁵⁵⁰ In Öztürk’s anonymous (2000, p. 63), there is information that Sheikh Bedreddin opened a banner said “beğlik benimdür ve taht bana virildi (...) Milk bana musarrahdur” and then he rebelled.⁵⁵¹ The only one who opposes this claim is Bedreddin’s grandson, Hâfiz Halîl. According to him, Bedreddin did not even have the idea of being a ruler in mind, it was the enemies of the sheikh who harmed him (Hâfiz Halîl, 2015, p. 188). Âşıkpaşazâde on the other hand, narrates how Sheikh Bedreddin claimed his right to rule after crossing the Sea of Trees (*Ludogorie*) with the following words (Apzd, 2017, p. 95): “Come! From now on, the kingdom is mine. The throne is in my hand. If you want a banner, come. Those who want timar, those who want command should come. In short, whatever you wish, come here. I’ve already rebelled. I am the caliph of this country [tm]”.

It is possible to deduce from different sources that this claim also has a hereditary basis. As Amâsî points out (2016, p. 355), ‘*übüvvet*’, that is, the line of nobility inherited from the father, is significant for the claim of right to rule: “*übüvvet*

⁵⁴⁹ For a contrary view, see: Gündoğdu (2023, p. 49).

⁵⁵⁰ Danışmend wanted a principality, see, he was hanged.

⁵⁵¹ The kingdom is mine and the throne has been given to me (...) The county is subordinate to me.

ki mucib-i mahabbettdür, ve halk gözüne mehabettdür asanlığıla”.⁵⁵² According to the author of the *menâkıbnâme*, Sheikh Bedreddin’s grandfather Abdul-Aziz is descended from Seljuk Sultan Alâeddin (Hâfiz Halîl, 2015, pp. 23-24). In addition, in the same source, the information that *ghaza* leaders of Rumelia Hacı İlbegi and Ghazi Ece belong to the same lineage is included with an interesting subtext. The fact that Abdul-Aziz, coming from the Seljuk lineage, emphasized that other two names were the son-in-law, constitutes the basis for the claim of a hereditary hierarchy (Hâfiz Halîl, 2015, p. 25). In addition, it was emphasized that both Abdul-Aziz and Bedreddin’s father, Ghazi Israil, were distinguished *ghazis* (Hâfiz Halîl, 2015, p. 25), and even Ghazi Israil was *qadi* of the *ghazis* (*kadi’l guzat*) (Çıpa, 2017, pp. 115-16). I am of the opinion that the allegations in question can be considered as a clear justification for political legitimacy. In addition, as Kayapınar (2017, p. 416) states, the presence of people from the Seljuk dynasty in the Balkans during the Sheikh Bedreddin movement and that period, and it is possible to establish a relationship with this claim of Bedreddin. Although Ocak states that such a claim to reign is unfounded in terms of historical evidence (2014, pp. 198-200), genealogies - which can also be fabricated - listing the dynasties of rulers is a method frequently used by the rebels to gain legitimacy⁵⁵³, and Bedreddin may have done the same.

The document Pienaru (2017, p. 285) published revealed that after the death of Musa Çelebi, Sheikh Bedreddin and Cuneyd the Emir of Aydın, took refuge with Mustafa Çelebi in Wallachia. Stoyanov (2017, p. 484), on the other hand, states that it is possible that there is a connection between them due to the simultaneous development of the Düzmece Mustafa rebellion and the Sheikh Bedreddin movement. In my opinion, the most correct interpretation in this context is that although Sheikh Bedreddin’s movement developed depending on Mustafa Çelebi and that Sheikh Bedreddin provoked rebellions in Anatolia with the help of his caliphs, he might have provoked these in order to break power Mehmet Çelebi in Anatolia and on behalf of Mustafa Çelebi. İnalçık (2018a, p. 25) states that during the Düzmece Mustafa rebellion, the Venetian navy attacked the Ottoman ships in Gallipoli and Mircea protected Bedreddin in *Deliorman* (*Ludogorie*). In this framework, more clues emerge that the articulation noted has a systematic character. On the other hand, this interpretation is far from

⁵⁵² Having ancestry is a prerequisite for being loved/intimacy, and love in the public eye brings convenience.

⁵⁵³ Also see: Uzunçarşılı (1988b, p. 361, footnote 1).

analyzing the absolute character of the rebellions. However, after a point - probably after the class basis of the rebellions in Anatolia was revealed -they parted ways with Mustafa Çelebi and Bedreddin claimed the right to rule on his own account. It is understood from Hâfız Halîl's narrative that this claim may be based not only on genealogical line but also on political legitimacy (2015, p. 190): The ruler asked the Sheikh, who was in court in front of Mehmet Çelebi, "Why did you stand against religious orders (*ulülemir*)? [tm]" the Sheikh asks, "Why did you stand against the Truth? [tm]" answers as. In this dialogue, what is meant by the term '*ulülemir*' is that the religious provision that believers should obey their rulers. On the other hand, the expression as such 'being against the truth' signifies the idea that if the rulers behave in contradiction with the Islamic provisions, it will no longer a religious obligation exist for believers to follow them.

As Âşıkpaşazâde stated, at the point where the claim to rule meets the reality, Sheikh Bedreddin "gathered great strength [tm]", "appointed governors and commanders [tm]", and many "*tovca*" and *timar* holders gathered around him (Apzd, 2017, p. 95), as well as *sûfîs* that mentioned in anonymous chronicle (Çan, 2006, p. 78). According to Hâfız Halîl (2015, p. 176), *tovcas/duvicas*, who saw the benefits of the Sheikh when he was a *qadiasker*, came to the Sheikh with gifts, stayed with him for a few days, took advice and dispersed. Oyan (2016, p. 98) interprets these developments as the reaction of the Turkish-origin high class to the servant-origin people (*kuls*). Although this can be accepted as a factor, I think it is not decisive because it cannot be said yet that the people of servant-origin were leading the political power absolutely in this era. At this point, a differentiation in the class character of the movement seems to have emerged. Werner (2019a, p. 276) argues that Bedreddin must have understood after the Börklüce Mustafa Rebellion that he could not seize power without gaining the support of the *sipâhis*. Ocak (2014, p. 191) states that Bedreddin had three caliphs who were rebelling besides himself, Börklüce Mustafa, Dorlak (Torlak) Hü Kemal and Aygiloglu. Hâfız Halîl (2015, p. 185), on the other hand, mentions all three names as people who participated in the rebellion, without specifying whether these people were Bedreddin's caliphs. While chronicles (Çan, 2006, p. 78; Apzd, 2017, p. 95) report that Bedreddin mentions Börklüce Mustafa by saying "he is my servant too [tm]". On the other hand, Oruç Beg (2011, p. 63) refers this dialogue with a crucial detail that the Sheik mentioned him in this version as "Börklüce Mustafa in Aydın province was my servant, he did it wrong [tm]". This second statement shows that the mystical connection

(*tariqa* fellowship) and the political connection between Börklüce Mustafa and Sheik Bedreddin were not as inseparable as one might think. Hâfiz Halîl (2015, p. 184), on the other hand, claims that Börklüce Mustafa was a ‘crazy’ person and infects Bedreddin with the ‘disease’ that led him to death. The analogy of ‘disease’ in these statements can be understood as religiously, politically or morally corrupting/harming ideas and behaviors. However, since Hâfiz Halîl’s general tendency was to acquit his grandfather Bedreddin in the eyes of those in power, it can be thought that he used the analogy of disease to emphasize that he pointed to Börklüce as the culprit of the rebellion and that Bedreddin was also hanged because of him unjustly.

There can be two explanations for the difference in these expressions, first, the attitude of not owning this event as a result of the failure of the Böklüce Mustafa rebellion, and the second, the attitude of not accepting the class character of the Böklüce Mustafa rebellion. In both cases, the possibility of the Bedreddin movement to mobilize the lower classes must have resulted in the withdrawal of the support of the great *timar* holders. According to Âşıkpaşazâde, the reaction of the ruling classes resulted in the suppression of the rebellion within itself (Apzd, 2017, p. 96): “Those who came saw that there is no good in it. They caught the son of the qadi of Sınavna immediately and took him to Sultan Mehmed in Serres [tm]”. According to Ocak (2014, p. 203), the information that later sources such as İdris-i Bitlisî, Hoca Sâdeddin, Solakzâde and Hüseyin Efendi were in alliance, Ottoman administration gave assurances to the landowners who involved in Bedreddin movement that the lands those would be returned, and as a result of this guarantee the fact that the *timar* holders have changed sides. The *timar* registers that Kayapınar (2017, p. 421) compared support this claim as they show that some of the *timars* that we could identify given during the Musa Çelebi period were left to their owners in later periods. The fact that those who carried out this action, that is, those who liquidated the rebel forces, also joined once the same forces, suggesting that they may have been *timar* holders from the upper strata, and it is likely that they would have been horrified by the possible development lines of the Börklüce Mustafa rebellion. While the witness of the period, the Venetian Ballios, in his letter dated September 23, 1415, stated that a Cretan priest preached as “all peasants are free [tm]” and that these words were “extremely dangerous for the authority of the seigneur [tm]” (as cited in Bavilet, 2000, p. 81), expressed a similar concern with the ruling classes in Rumelia. A direct witness of the period and events, Doukas describes the Börklüce Mustafa rebellion as follows (1975, p. 120):

After he had duped the peasants with this doctrine, he guilefully sought to win the friendship of the Christians. He expounded the doctrine that anyone among the Turks who contended that the Christians are not God-fearing, is himself ungodly. The followers of his teaching, when meeting a Christian, would offer him hospitality and honor him as an angel of Zeus. (...) explaining to them his doctrine that the only way for all to be saved is by being in accord with the faith of the Christians.

In fact, these descriptions make us think that Börklüce Mustafa may be claiming to be the Messiah. The themes of a primitive Christian egalitarianism and the unification of religions are clearly seen in these descriptions. Şükrullah (2011, p. 224), while speaking of Börklüce Mustafa as a ‘*ibahi*’, points out with horror that he made permissible things that were considered *haram* for Muslims.⁵⁵⁴ In particular, Ocak (2014, p. 208) underlines that Sheikh Bedreddin and his rebellious caliphs propagated a belief that is a mixture of Islam, Christianity and Judaism. Doukas (1975, p. 120) points out that Börklüce Mustafa’s heralds also maintained relations with monasteries and the upper echelons of the church hierarchy. Moreover, according to Doukas (1975, p. 121) the supporters of Börklüce Mustafa claim that he is superior to the prophet. If this is so, it is easier to understand why the expression that Börklüce declared himself a ‘prophet’ was repeated in Ottoman sources.⁵⁵⁵ Because in Christian and Muslim beliefs, the concept of the Messiah is imagined as the reincarnation of Jesus Christ. In this context, although he did not say ‘I am Jesus’, he may be presenting his views in a theology that implies this. For this reason, although it is not certain that Börklüce was executed by crucifixion in Ephesus, it can gain meaning as a torture with “planned public display” (Salgırlı, 2012, p. 62). The discourses of the Chios priest quoted by Doukas (that Börklüce walked on water and did not die even though he was crucified) are clear examples of such implications. An example cited by Filipovic (1971, p. 569) supports this view; A priest from Chios tells the following dream that legitimizes Bedreddin’s rule: “I dreamed of a man in the sky, he was in the full moon, he was with

⁵⁵⁴ Georgius de Hungaria, one of the direct witnesses of the 15th century, also finds that such thoughts are common among the Hurufis. The thoughts were summarized by Georgius de Hungaria show interesting parallels with those of Börklüce Mustafa. See: Stevenson (2016, pp. 82-83).

⁵⁵⁵ See: Apzd (2017, p. 95), Oruç (2011, p. 62), Şükrullah (2011, p. 224), Giese anonymous (1992, p. 58), Öztürk anonymous (2000, p. 64).

the spirit of God [tm]” (as cited in Werner, 2019a, p. 267). However, it is unclear whether the expression here refers to Bedreddin or Börklüce Mustafa. Because similarly, Doukas does not mention the name of Bedreddin in his work. However, Hâfiz Halîl (2015, p. 145) states that Bedreddin was invited to Chios. According to him, this invitation is made by the priests of the island, and they receive support from the lords of the island (Hâfiz Halîl, 2015, p. 145): “Perhaps he will accept the invitation/ He will tell us the secret of the Messiah/ (...) / Seeing this tendency in their lords/ All the priests came together that day/ They said: Let us all go together/ Let us invite that great one here [tm]”. While Sheikh Bedreddin was on his way to Chios, a storm broke out at sea, and after the ship was in danger of sinking, he was saved thanks to the Sheikh’s miracle. Hâfiz Halîl (2015, p. 148) states that after this event, the lord of island had a long discussion and chat with Bedreddin and that the people around him said, “This is the second Messiah, his (...) breath revives the dead [tm]”.⁵⁵⁶ In another anecdotes narrated by (Hâfiz Halîl, 2015, p. 149), the Sheikh established a circle of *dhikr* and that the people who entered that circle levitate after saying “*hu*”, states that due to this incident, some of the lords and priests of the island changed their religion and joined the Sheikh.⁵⁵⁷ It is possible that the trip to Chios, which Hâfiz Halîl attributed to Bedreddin, was made by Börklüce Mustafa. On the other hand, it is not considered possible for the lords of the island to join him, as it was mentioned in the letter of the Venetian Ballios on September 23, 1415. At most, this information may have something related to supporting the Düzmece Mustafa movement through Börklüce Mustafa. Hâfiz Halîl (2015, p. 184) states that there were also criticisms that accuses Bedreddin to “claiming prophethood of himself [tm]” at that time, and he rejects those accuses. However, the same author also determines that the Sheikh quoted a hadith such as “a Sheikh among his people, like a prophet among the believers [tm]” (Hâfiz Halîl, 2015, p. 184). However, the fact that a similar story is encountered in the *Saltuknâme* compiled in

⁵⁵⁶ This expression is a common pattern used in *sûfi* literature as well. What is meant by this is the awakening of hearts that are unaware of God and their opening to the truth - that is, resurrection. The use of the phrase “Jesus-breathing” when using this pattern is a reference to the miracle of Jesus believed to resurrect the dead (see: Schimmel, 1992, p. 74). In the final analysis, it is not entirely clear whether the expression used above is used as a pattern in *sûfi* literature or as an element of religious propaganda. On the other hand, the ‘miracle of the sea’ shown on an island dominated by shipping, maritime trade and fishing is perfect for making religious propaganda to the people of this island.

⁵⁵⁷ There is an alternative version of this anecdote that was made up for Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî, and it also includes the motif of Christian priests as well as Bedreddin’s miracle.

Rumelia, about sixty years after the 1416 rebellions, makes it a strong possibility that the person who went to Chios, whether Bedreddin or not, was seen as the messiah or presented himself as the messiah. According to the story in the *Saltuknâme*, Sarı Saltuk performs miracles at sea while passing to Rumelia, introduces himself as the messiah and gives sermons (Yıldırım, 2019b, pp. 161-62). A part of this narrative is similar to anecdotes of Bedreddin or Börklüce, who went to Chios, but it also includes tricks are seen in *epics* such as *Battalnâme*, such as ‘dressing like a Christian’, ‘preaching in a church’, ‘making battle tactics/*hila*’, ‘deceiving the Christian clergy with a divine knowledge’.

In Sheikh Bedreddin’s mystical work named *Varidat* (Yananlı, 2016b, p. 56), the section asserting ‘Jesus is dead in body but alive in spirit’ may possibly have a common origin with the views of Börklüce and the dream told by Doukas. As Ocak (2014, p. 221) stated, no claim can be made that the work named *Varidat* was directly written by Sheikh Bedreddin, or that it was revised and corrected by him. Gölpınarlı (1966, p. 30) states that the work is in the form of fragments and notes talking about various subjects and that it is not contain an introduction that includes the reason for its writing. In this context, in contrast to Yıldırım (2019a, p. 440), *Varidat* cannot be mentioned as similar to a political treatise/brochure. It is clear that its existing copies belong to the period after the death of Sheikh Bedreddin. For this reason, I am content to attribute the parallelism between this work and Börklüce’s views to a kind of ‘common origin’.⁵⁵⁸ Although Ocak (2014, p. 199) and Gölpınarlı (1966, pp. 10, 40) state that Sheikh Bedreddin movement has a millenarian connotation (or parallels between the *Mahdi* ideology), I think there is no such claim exist directly in *Varidat*. Moreover, if this work is read superficially, the author of the work states that ‘the apocalypse will not come’, for example, it claims that it is not as it seems for those who are waiting for the doomsday (Gölpınarlı, 1966, p. 75): “Hâlbuki, esenlik ona, Peygamber’in zamânından beri selkiz yüz yıl geldi, geçti de avâmın hayâl ettiği şeylerden hiçbiri zuhûr etmedi; daha da binlerce yıl gelir-geçer, onların hayâl ettikleri şeylerden hiç biri olmaz; sandıkları gibi cesedler de haşredilmez.”⁵⁵⁹

⁵⁵⁸ The fact that there is a direct reference to many ideas also seen in *Varidat* in the work named *Tasvirü'l-Kulub*, which is claimed to have been written by Börklüce Mustafa, strengthens the possibility of such a connection. For these similarities, see: Gümüšoğlu (2015, pp. 24-35).

⁵⁵⁹ However, peace be upon him, eight hundred years have passed since the time of the Prophet, and none of the things that the common people dreamed of appeared; thousands more years come

Nevertheless, it is necessary to interpret these statements within the framework of Bedreddin's general understanding of *sūfism*, without being stuck in purely superficial reading. Here, the thought put forward by Bedreddin should be interpreted as "things like these will not appear [tm]" as in the Yananlı's (2016b, p. 109) translation, but the meaning of the word 'appear' (*zuhur*) should not be ignored. Because '*zuhur etmeme*' means 'not appearing', but it is used not to mean that the apocalypse will not occur, but to mean that it will not appear as it is supposed. To put it more clearly, according to Bedreddin, the apocalypse will appear in a different way. In the final analysis, the apparent meaning of the text lies in this context: The appearance of the apocalypse will be very different from the narratives/popular images/expectations about apparent omens. In fact, the idea that the images in the holy books are things made up to educate the public and that the truth is very different from this is found between the lines of *Meşşâî* philosophy, which makes it possible to interpret Bedreddin's implication in this direction.

Although it is possible that Bedreddin was referring to himself in the comments about the arise of the '*sahib-i zaman*' (owner of the time, *mahdi*, *wali*, *qutb* etc.) (Gölpınarlı, 1966, p. 72; Yananlı, 2016b, p. 100)⁵⁶⁰ in *Varidat* -but there is no fully evident clue about this (Babinger, 2015, p. 92), the historically prevailing interpretation is that these propositions were adopted by his followers, and especially by Börklüce Mustafa. Venezia (2017, p. 375) mentions an interesting detail. Traveler Adam Niyl, who passed through the village of Torlak on the Bucharest-Ruse-Razgrad-Varna road at the beginning of the 19th century, notes that a dervish order emerged from the inhabitants of this village and they made their living by wandering the villages and making prophecies. The most interesting aspect of these observations is that they took an old man, whom they claimed to be the incarnation of God, with them and frightened the villagers with his disaster scenarios. Although it is unclear how much these observations can be applied to the *Qalandari*-like *sūfi* order to which Torlak Kemal belonged, it is clear that the narrative of the reincarnation of God in the human body has a certain parallelism with Börklüce's messianic narrative. Especially in the branches of

and go, none of the things they dream of happens; corpses would not resurrected like they thought.

⁵⁶⁰ The expression, which Gölpınarlı translated as '*sahib-i zaman*', interprets Yananlı as '*Resul-i Ekrem*'. It is obvious that Yananlı made a clear distortion. He not only names the episode 'apocalypse' but also claims that this episode does not have apocalyptic references and has a purely mystical meaning (Yananlı, 2016b, pp. 99-100).

Shiism called Iraqi *ghulat*, both *hulul* and apocalyptic elements are common. According to Gölpınarlı (1967, pp. 40-41), a group called ‘Bedreddin *sūffis*’ mingled with the Qizilbashes and established an order-center called *ocak* of Bedreddin, and that the members of this *ocak* believed that Bedreddin did not die, but that one day he would come back to the world and bring order to the world. This last example is an element of belief found largely in Ismaili Shiism, in the *ghulat* movements, and partly in the Twelver sect. In the final analysis, Bavilet (2019b, p. 161) also considers an important possibility that the Börklüce movement “may be based on messianic eschatological ideas [tm]”. The statements attributed to Sheikh Bedreddin in the anonymous Giese shall be a reflection of such a political idea (1992, p. 58): “Bana Melik Mehdi dirler, sancak açaym, huruç ideyin”⁵⁶¹, in this context, provides an important clue about the Mahdiist side of the 1416 revolts. However, as it is discussed in the section above, Sheikh Bedreddin’s claim to ‘being a ruler’ is repeated over the term ‘*Melik*’ in these lines as well, and while transactions such as taking and granting *mansibs*, which will be the basis for this claim are included in the chronicles of the period, there is not enough information about his claim to be the *Mahdi*. The claim, attributed to Börklüce Mustafa, that he ‘had called himself the prophet’ becomes somewhat meaningful in this context. If an interpretation is made of this contradiction in line with the belief that the figure of the *Mahdi* and then the Messiah appears in Islamic eschatology, it can be thought that Sheikh Bedreddin declared himself as the Mahdi and Börklüce as the Messiah, but it is not possible to prove this claim by following the sources of the period.

Gölpınarlı (1966, p. 33) finds a point in *Varidat* where the views on the soul were not clear or set in contradictory and stated that there could be two types of interpretations of this point: The first is that the soul will disappear with the body (materialistic interpretation), and the second is reincarnation, that is, the soul’s revival in another body after death (mystical interpretation). Proponents of the materialist interpretation, which claims that Sheikh Bedreddin is a proponent of a primitive communist order, prefers the first interpretation because he wants to see the traces of a materialist philosophy in the Sheikh himself. It is not possible to completely reject this explanation, because, as İhsanoğlu points out (2019d, pp. 112-13), the fact that philosophy was removed from the Ottoman madrasah curriculum and that a rule to prohibit philosophy education was often explicitly included in the madrasa foundation charters. Thus, a measure in order to prevent the emergence of Bedreddin and his likes in the context of institutional

⁵⁶¹ They call me Melik Mahdi, I will set the banner, I will rebel.

Islamic education. In the policy of prohibition on philosophy, it is tried to prevent the spread of the thoughts of the *Meşşâî* school of philosophy, namely al-Kindi, er-Razi, al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes as their successors. While the notion of keeping reason above religion and various materialist tendencies are observed in the first three of these names (Bloch, 2017), communist ideas inspired by Plato are encountered in Averroes, based on the commentary on *Politeia*. In this context, although it is wrong to suggest that the example of Bedreddin was completely decisive in the prohibition of philosophy, it is clear that this should be taken as a factor along with other experiences in the Islamic world. Because this prohibition seems to have gradually disappeared after the 16th century (İhsanoğlu, 2019d, p. 117).

It can be accepted that Bedreddin may have read the Aristotle's *Peri Psyches*, and based on this, he may be close to the view that the soul exists but will die with the body. The source of all these influences may be the *Meşşâî* school, which was influenced by the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, and even tried to combine them, as it is seen in al-Farabi. While accepting the immortality of the soul (Rahman, 1981, p. 58), the idea that corpses will not be resurrected belongs to Avicenna and is one of the most attacked views throughout the history of Islam (Gutas, 2004a, pp. 23-24). In Averroes' commentary on *Peri Psykes*, however, the immortality of the soul is accepted, but this understanding of the soul corresponds to a universal logos, not an individual one. In Averroes' (1986, p. 331) work called *Tehâfütü Tehâfütü'l-Felâsife*, it is clearly stated that bodies will not be resurrected as corporeal beings in this world. For another similarity, it is necessary to compare the passage in *Varidat* on the apocalypse that 'will not break out as thought' with the theory of knowledge discussed in the metaphysics paragraph seventy nine of Avicenna's book named *Kitab al-Şifa* (Topdemir, 2009, p. 273):

For example, when you say, 'The Hour will come', you have understood the 'Doomsday', you have understood 'will come', and you have made the 'will come' in the self a predicate to the Doomsday in the self. Namely: This meaning may be true in another meaning in the reason. This is to think that it is characterized by a third rational meaning in the future tense, which is existence. This is also the case when it is mentioned the past. It is clear, then, that what is notified about must exist in the self with any being. In fact, notice is from the being present in the self, indirectly from the present beings in the outside world.

Now you understand how the term ‘thing’ differs from the terms present and outcome, even though they require each other [tm].

In his views presented here, Avicenna states that the meaning meant by the concept of apocalypse can be understood by the images that are experienced by people in their daily lives and that already exist in their minds. This view can be interpreted in two interrelated ways. First, although the prophets used images to educate the public, it refers to the view that the truth is not imaginal but demonstrative and rational (Farabi, 2018, p. 44). Secondly, within this framework, the image that the public ascribes to the concept of the apocalypse, the reality of the apocalypse, will have completely different contents. This is the meaning that Bedreddin also means, and it is possible to produce esoteric interpretations of the concept of the apocalypse through this path. Similarly, Averroes (1986, p. 331), in which he responded to al-Ghazali’s criticisms of the philosophers in his work called *Tehâfütü Tehâfütü’l-Felâsife*, asserted that “it is better to explain apocalypse to people in physical terms so that ordinary people can understand the apocalypse and regulate their behavior accordingly [tm]”. However, this indicates that it is not necessary to understand the truth of the apocalypse as it takes place in concrete expressions, just as it is seen in ideas of Avicenna and Bedreddin. Moreover, Bedreddin’s definition of concepts such as becoming and corruption (*kevn ü fesad*), eternity of the universe, angels and devils etc. shows that he was formally influenced by the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. These concepts were also used in the works of Averroes, who was the most competent interpreter of Aristotle in the Middle Ages, the thinker claimed that the world is eternal, but that it is not based on a single creation, but in a continuous state of creation (*hudus*) (Sunar, 1967, p. 148). In this context, the idea that one cannot be a believer without being an unbeliever in *Varidat* can be interpreted as a dialectical principle to reject the *takfiri* criticisms directed at *Meşşâî* philosophy in general.⁵⁶² Averroes formulated this principle in the clearest way, and recommends a way to reach god/divine knowledge (*ittisal*) both the way of the mystics who allow seclusion and asceticism that could be manifest themselves as God (*en-el hak*), and the way of the philosophers, where the mind is cleared from the narratives of Sharia based

⁵⁶² A similar expression is also used in the *Diwan* of Yunus Emre: “Unutum din diyanet kaldı benden/ Bu ne mezhebdürür dinden içeri/ Dinin terk edenin küfürdür işi/ Bu ne küfürdür imandan içeri” (CXXV, beyit no: 925-26, Gölpınarlı, 2020b, p. 202). In the *menâkıbnâme* written by Hâfız Halil (2015, p. 135), Bedreddin’s grandson, it is mentioned that the Sheikh was fond of Yunus Emre’s poems and even read one of his poems many times until his death.

on imaginations (Sunar, 1967, p. 156). As can be seen in these examples, it is possible to detect the effects of *Meşşâî* philosophy on *Varidat*⁵⁶³, but a definite conclusion can only be reached by examining Bedreddin's books on *fiqh* theory and problems.⁵⁶⁴

On the other hand, the use of these concepts cannot be considered sufficient for Bedreddin and his thought to be considered a rationalist or Aristotelian directly. As Gölpınarlı (1966, p. 38) points out, in Bedreddin's person, elements such as vision (*keşf*) and 'true dreaming' and reason show a contradictory coexistence. Various theories have been developed about the subject of dream/vision, especially in Avicenna and Averroes, in particular in *Meşşâî* philosophy. In this respect, the dream/vision element may be the subject of another common theme, and the comparative scheme given by Gutas (2013, p. 294) provides an adequate idea in this regard. However, the information about dreams and visions in Bedreddin need not be directly influenced by the philosophy of Avicenna, as such practices such as belief and dream interpretation had almost universal prevalence in the 14th century. However, if Bedreddin's declaration of he is Mahdi or Messiah and therefore bringing a new Sharia is in question, it can be thought that the way of explaining the relationship between dreams and revelation of *Meşşâî* philosophy is effective in this. However, there is insufficient evidence to make this interpretation. In *Varidat*, there is a contradictory unity between the interpretation of dreams and visions as divine signs, and a secularized interpretation of Islamic theology (heaven and hell is in this world, angels, demons and djinns are the passions of the soul, etc.). For this reason, interpreting Bedreddin's ideas on the soul within the framework of the unity of the soul (in parallel of the idea of 'unity of souls' in Averroes) and its re-emergence (this element is absent in *Meşşâî* philosophy, but can be found in popular Shiism) makes it easier to explain some of the basic ideological motives of the revolt of Börklüce Mustafa as well as its materialistic interpretation.

The belief in the Messiah and millenarism is based on the image of a 'golden age' when the difference between religions and social inequality will disappear. In this respect, the second sign that should be pointed out is that Börklüce Mustafa accepts

⁵⁶³ There is an important contradiction at this point. Although there are traces of the *Meşşâî* tradition in *Varidat*, the work named *Tasvirü'l-Kulub*, which is attributed to Börklüce Mustafa, is widely referenced to al-Ghazali. See: Gümüšoğlu (2015, pp. 199, 203 ff.).

⁵⁶⁴ Bursalı Mehmet Tahir (1971, p. 64) states that all of Bedreddin's works are thirty-eight pieces and lists the main ones as follows: *Nuru'l-Kulub*, *Letaifü'l-işarat*, *Şerh-i Tehsil*, *Cami-ül Fusuleyn*, *Cami-ül-fetava*, *Meserreatülkülup*, *Varidat-i Kübra*, *Ukudü'l-Cevahir*, *Çerağu'l-futuh*. For brief information about these works, see: Hira (2012, pp. 107-150).

everyone to the rebellion who says ‘there is only one God’ and does not stipulate to say that ‘Muhammad is the messenger of God’: “Derler ki: ‘Yoktur tapacak, Çalaptır ancak’ diyen, ama ‘Muhammed Tanrı elçisidir’ demiyen, kendi şeyhlerini yalavaç sayan 4000’den artık sofı (...)” (Şükrullah, 2011, p. 224).⁵⁶⁵ Kemal defines the Börklüce revolt as “*sûfi cengi*” (clash of the *sûfis*), that is, as it is seen in Şükrullah, he evaluates those gathered around Börklüce Mustafa as followers with a religious/mystic devotion, and again expresses the phenomenon of religious syncretism as follows (Öztürk, 2001, p. 127): “iderler idi dün gün zikru’llah/ Dimezlerdi Muhammed Resule’llah”.⁵⁶⁶ It is interesting that Börklüce Mustafa is mentioned with nearly same words in all sources of 15th century. If it is accepted that Börklüce Mustafa really believed and behaved in this way, it is worth investigating whether this view has a counterpart in Bedreddin’s works. The principle of ‘*tawhid*’ as presented in Bedreddin’s *Varidat* can be interpreted within this framework: Esoterically removing the dichotomy between appearance and essence, and in appearance melting all religions into unity (*tawhid*). Bedreddin explains this issue in *Varidat* as follows (as cited in Gölpınarlı, 1966, p. 72):

Tâ hâ sûresinde, dağları sorarlarsa sana, deki: Rabbim onları un-ufak eder, kum gibi savurur da yeryüzünde bir îniş de göremezsin, bir tümsek de denmiştir. Son zamanda zâtın zuhuruna, tevhidin yayılacağına, tek zâtın buyruk yürüteceğine, sıfatlar saltanatının kalkacağına, zamanın sahibinin tümünden tevhide mazhar olacağına, halkı da bu tevhide çağıracağına, bir inişi, bir tümseği bulunmayan, dümdüz olan sırrına davet edeceğine, kalbleri yumuşatmaya, sıfatlara mazhar olanların, Allah ve Rahman adlariyle anılan zâtın hükümlerini kabule çağıracağına ve zât hükümlerinin meydana çıkıp sıfatlara ait hükümlerin gizleneceğine, eserleri bile görünmiyeceğine işarettir.⁵⁶⁷

⁵⁶⁵ It is said that more than four thousand *sûfis* who say, ‘There is no one to be worshiped except God’, but who do not say that ‘Muhammad is the messenger of God’, consider their own sheikhs as prophet. [tm]

⁵⁶⁶ They make dhikr to remember Allah day and night/ They would not say that Muhammad is the messenger of God.

⁵⁶⁷ In the Surah Ta ha it is said that, if they ask you about the mountains, say: My Lord will crush them into small pieces and scatter them like sand, so You can’t see a hole in the earth, not a mound. This statement means that the person mentioned will appear at the end of time, the tawhid will spread, the right to rule will belong to a single person, the dominance of the attributes of things will disappear, and the owner of the time will fully provide tawhid, he will call the people to this tawhid, that he will invite the public to his secret, which is flat and obvious without any pits or bumps, softening the hearts, that those who are endowed with attributes will invite people to accept provisions of the one who are called by the names of Allah and Rahman, the provisions

I think that the search for syncretism among the religions expressed in this passage existed as an undercurrent as well as exist in the early period of the Ottoman rule.⁵⁶⁸ There are three important examples of this movement, the first is that Bayezid I named a significant part of his sons by the names of Jewish-Christian-Islamic prophets (Musa, Suleyman, Isa, Mustafa and Mehemmed), and secondly, one of a preacher of this period in Bursa said, “There is no difference between the prophets [tm]”⁵⁶⁹ and the people’s favor towards this Iranian preacher (Pekolcay, 1980, pp. 15-16)⁵⁷⁰, the last example is hidden in some details about the architectural style of Bursa Ulu Mosque. In addition to these, there is an anecdote in *Letâif-i Lâmi’î* that Saruca Pasha, one of the viziers of Murat I and Bayezid I, wanted to build a church.⁵⁷¹ According to this anecdote, Saruca Pasha wants to have a “heart-opening, big church [tm]” built in Hungary or around Wallachia (Lâmi’î Çelebi, 2015, p. 208). Saruca Pasha grounds this intention as follows (Lâmi’î Çelebi, 2015, p. 208): “Hele şimdilik her iki dinde de amelimiz olsun. Yarın kıyamet arsasında ve Arasat meydanında hangisinin sözü doğru ve rızası muvafık (...) çıkarsa, o dindeki amel ve hayrımız bize şefaati (...) olur”.⁵⁷² Although this is a humorous anecdote in the final analysis, it is crucial in that it reflects a social type trying to keep a balance between both religions. Saruca Pasha, who states in the paragraph that Muslims see Christianity as invalid, and Christians argue that the Islam is a “rite that

of the self and the attributes will be revealed and the provisions of the attributes will be hidden, and even their signs will not be seen.

⁵⁶⁸ For the fusions between Judaism, Christianity and Islam in Western Anatolia in the 14th century, see: Zhukov (2020, p. 93-97).

⁵⁶⁹ There is interesting evidence that the debate about which prophet was superior continued into the second half of the 15th century. In the memoirs of Janissary Constantine (Beydilli, 2019b, p. 31), it is seen that some dervishes argued that Jesus was superior in the debate that the dervishes had in the presence of Mahmud Pasha during the reign of Mehmet II. Moreover, in the *velâyetnâme* of Otman Baba, it is seen that Otman Baba claims that he is Muhammad and Jesus and Moses and Adam (Yalçın, 2008, p. 61).

⁵⁷⁰ This event is seen as the reason for the writing of Suleyman Çelebi’s famous work called *Vesîletü'n-necât*.

⁵⁷¹ Lâmi’î Çelebi (2015, p. 208) states that Saruca Pasha was the commander of *yayas* (foot-soldiers) during the reign of Murat I, and become a vizier during the reign of Bayezid I. Bostan (2009) states that Saruca Pasha was a Rum devshirme who was taken into service as a servant in the last periods of Bayezid I, in the period of Murat II, he rose to the position of sanjak beg, *beylerbeyi* and vizier, and in the period of Mehmet II he was the second vizier. He states that he served on the *Diwan* until he was dismissed.

⁵⁷² Let us have good deeds in both religions, especially for now. Whichever one’s word is correct and acceptable (...) in the doomsday land and meeting square tomorrow, our acts and good deeds in that religion will be intercessors for us (...).

emerged later [tm]” because their religion emerged before, thus Saruca Pasha wants to guarantee his positions in the hereafter by satisfying two contradicting disciplines. In this anecdote, there is a humorous criticism about the religious syncretism of the devshirme-origin officers, and there is also a certain reference to the atmosphere of the period. The comment made by Lâmi’î Çelebi (2015, p. 209) (or his son Abdullah Çelebi) in this anecdote is that Saruca Pasha is illiterate, thinks unbelief is faith and does not know his religion. On the other hand, it is unclear whether this was a cultural project designed to increase the representation capacity of the Ottoman monarchy and to articulate with the large mass of Christian people. In any case, it gives an example of amorphous but real syncretism outside of the orthodox Islamic understanding, and the fact that it emerged within the high bureaucracy encourages further research on this subject.

Another example in which syncretic searches in the religious plan become visible as a state policy emerges in the case of Bursa Ulu Mosque. Even Tursun Beg (2013, p. 76) states that magnificent buildings will strengthen the power of rulers, it is difficult to reject the semiotic connection between architecture and ideology. Kuran (1968, pp. 103-5) states that he sought a form in the Hüdavendigâr mosques built in Bursa and Edirne in this period and describes them as experimental Ottoman buildings. Ousterhout (2004, p. 168), on the other hand, underlines that Bursa Hüdavendigâr Mosque inherited especially Byzantine architectural practices. Furthermore, for example, there is a debate on whether the mosque built in Edirne during the reign of Murat I was built on an old Christian structure due to its architectural style (Kuran, 1968, p. 107). Considering these stylistic formations, Ayverdi and Yüksel (1976, p. 20-21) point out the architectural structure of the Ulu Mosque based on the central plan, and find the reflections of the “central administration mentality” of the Ottoman state in this building.

The Bursa Ulu Mosque, on the other hand, was interestingly built with a pool or, more accurately, a fountain-*abdesthâne* in the middle. In the sources of the period, there are some information about why the mosque was built in this way. According to the sources in question, there is an old non-Muslim woman’s house in the place where the mosque will be built. The location of this house corresponds exactly to the point where the pool in the middle of the mosque is located today. According to this narrative, old woman did not agree to allocate or sell the land of her house for the construction of a mosque. This problem is the subject of various legendary solutions in folk narratives. For example, in the *menâkıbnâme* of Emir Sultan (Kahraman, 2009, p. 160), this issue

is discussed and it is claimed that the old woman became a Muslim and was persuaded by Emir Sultan to sell her land through dreams.⁵⁷³ However, it is certain that there is something 'strange' about the architectural plan where the fountain is located, and this is tried to be explained through some tales circulating among the people. Ayverdi (1972, p. 405) states that these rumors circulating among the people may be true and documents that the house where the fountain is located was not bought and that three hundred and sixty *akçes* were paid annually to the beneficiaries as the rent of the ground. Beyond whether these narratives are true or not, the fountain-*abdesthâne* was built similar model as a baptistery and placed in the middle of the mosque. The presence of three doors of the mosque may represent three great monotheistic religions in this respect. There is an official sign revealing the architectural unusualness of the mosque exist in a phrase in a *Salmâne* of Bursa as such: "Ahvâl-i umûmiyyesinden binayı yapan mimarın Rum olduğu anlaşılıyor" (Yavaş, 2012).⁵⁷⁴ For this reason, it is possible to consider the legend about the construction of the Mosque either as an example of an ideology of 'tolerance' or as a colloquial expression of the ambiguous meaning of the building between Christianity and Islam within the empire-building process. In the final analysis, although it is difficult to claim that the rulers who built the Great Mosque (Bayezid I and the various repair periods that followed) had an idea of unifying religions, it would be appropriate to think that the possible development of a synthetic iconography for groups that had just converted to Islam. It is also possible to express a similar view for the architectural structure of the *Dar'ül-şifa* of Divriği Great Mosque, which was built at the 13th century. In the final analysis, as Shukurov (2017, pp. 97, 120) examined in detail, the formation of "dual identities" between Christianity and Islam in Seljuk period and early Ottoman rule in Anatolia and the existence of transitions between them were effective in the emergence of such phenomena.

The second characteristic of Messianic thought is the ideal of egalitarianism. Whether the ideal of egalitarianism was among the defining characteristics of the 1416 Revolts is an issue that deserves special attention. In this context, it would be appropriate to briefly mention whether there was a certain idea of equality in properties or redistribution of goods in the movements led by both Sheikh Bedreddin and Börklüce Mustafa. First of all, in a series of *fiqh* works written by Sheikh Bedreddin before the rebellion, it is seen that he clearly based on the Sunni-Hanefi legal system (Hira, 2012,

⁵⁷³ For a similar narrative, see: Çoruh (195?, p. 147).

⁵⁷⁴ From its general structure, it is understood that the architect who built this building was Rum.

p. 165) and in this framework, he recognized the right of private property and inheritance on the land. Accordingly, Bedreddin recognizes private property on the land as an individual right, and sees the purchase and sale of property, grants and inheritance as a part of this right (Sayar, 2018, pp. 217, 221). There is no mention of common ownership in Sheikh Bedreddin's studies on *fiqh*, but Sheik gives place to the view that people are partners only in 'water, grass and fire' based on hadith sources (Sayar, 2018, p. 223). It is clear that neither land nor goods were counted among these three elements. On the contrary, the person who has labor in making dead lands (*mewat*) available for use is considered by Bedreddin as the owner of that land (Sayar, 2018, p. 223). On the other hand, while examining the social character of Sheikh Bedreddin's movement, Gölpınarlı (1966, p. 40) makes the reader feel that Bedreddin may be open to communist-egalitarian ideas, with two quotations, but does not make a final judgment.⁵⁷⁵ Quotations given by Gölpınarlı are as follows (1966, p. 40):

İnsanların bir kısmı, bir kısmına tapıyor; kimisi de altın ve gümüş paralara, yenecek, içilecek şeylere, yüceliklere, övünülecek şeylere ibadet ediyor da Allah'a ibadet ediyoruz sanıyor. (...) İnsanlar, Câhiliyyet devrinde, görünen putlara taparlardı. Şimdiki zamanda da vehmettikleri putlara tapıyorlar, umarım ki Allah, gerçeği meydana çıkarır da gerçek olarak Hakk'a taparlar.⁵⁷⁶

However, although Gölpınarlı knows best that the narrative in this example is in the pattern seen and repeated in the life stories of many *sûfîs*, he leaves this interpretation in suspense. For example, Abdulkâdir-i Geylânî's statement in Baghdad that 'what you worship is under my feet' and a cube of gold came out when digging there, and Muhyiddin İbnü'l-Arabî's version of the same story in Damascus are two well-known examples.⁵⁷⁷ From these words, it is understood that Bedreddin brought an original social critique and had egalitarian ideas, on the contrary, he repeated the same traditional parable. Moreover, unless these expressions are understood with their

⁵⁷⁵ Işıktaş makes a similar interpretation more clearly. Işıktaş (2015, p. 41) states that in the work named *Tasvirü'l-Kulub*, which is claimed to belong to Börklüce Mustafa, although he cannot identify a clear communist proposal, he states that the sections containing the criticism of wealth should be read as a proposal for 'dispossession'.

⁵⁷⁶ "Some people worship some of the other people; Others worship gold and silver coins, things to eat and drink, things to be proud of, but think that they are worshipping Allah. (...) People used to worship visible idols before Islam. In the present, they worship the idols they speculate about, I hope God will reveal the truth and they will truly worship the Truth.

⁵⁷⁷ On the theme of idolizing gold and silver and worshipping them, see also: *Mesnevi-i Baba Kaygusuz*, couplet no 639-644, (Oktay, 2013, p. 137). Similar views are also found in the pamphlet *Tasvirü'l-Kulub* attributed to Börklüce Mustafa, see: Işıktaş (2020, p. 314).

mystical aspects, they cannot gain a certain clarity in terms of interpretation. For example, these should be compared with the following statements of Bedreddin (Yananlı, 2016b, p. 122):

One day, when I was between sleep and wakefulness, an image appeared before me. He said many words to me. One of them was the sentence ‘I will distance the one who loves me and the one who earns me away from Allah’. When I opened my eyes and realized that it was a dream, I interpreted the image I saw as the symbol of the World [tm].

In this example, it is understood that things that are ‘loved’ and ‘earned’ in a classical and well-known way (gold-silver, food-drink, status, etc. in the previous example) are vilified because they are worldly goods that turn people away from God, not because of social inequality. In another example, Sheikh Bedreddin argues that there are different grounds for gaining rank in the world and the hereafter, the first of these is goods, the second is through worship, and that loving the world will lead people out of religion (Kozan & Akyol, 2013, p. 101). As was mentioned, these expressions are a very common rhetorical pattern in *sûfi* discourse. For example, Amâsî (2016, p. 277) asserts that “World property is a trust from Allah and all people are partners in this property (...) The power to hold or take back this property belongs to Allah [tm]”, but he does not aim to defend a communist order, on the contrary, he criticizes the excessive love attached people to wealth and worldly goods within the framework of a Stoic ideal of peace (protecting soul from sorrow and sadness).⁵⁷⁸

Finally, it is necessary to pay special attention to the use of the concepts of ‘messiah’ and ‘*mahdi*’ in the political thought of the 14th and 15th centuries. These concepts can be adopted by political orientations that promise to eliminate the unequal social order and bring a prosperous ‘divine order’ to the world, or they can become an adjective ascribed to political actors who establish social order in the face of disorder, oppression or anarchy. An interesting example is the fact that the administration during the rule Timurtaş-Noyan (1317-1327)⁵⁷⁹, one of the Mongolian general governors who occupied Anatolia after the Battle of Köse Dağ, was peaceful and prosperous compared to the previous periods, and he was called the ‘*mahdi*’ among the people (Turan, 1969,

⁵⁷⁸ On the other hand, in his work *El-Medinetü'l Fazila*, al-Farabi (2001, p. 112) heavily criticizes the Stoic ideal of *ataraxia* as a kind of religious heresy and self-interest.

⁵⁷⁹ Haykıran (2009, p. 164) agrees with Turan about the general welfare and peace, but gives the interval between 1314-1328 when Timurtaş (Demirtaş) Noyan served as the governor of Anatolia.

p. 230). It is possible to see a similar expression in Abdülvasî Çelebi's work *Halilnâme*. Abdülvasî Çelebi argues that Mehmet I is the Mahdi because before his time the order of the world was broken and justice disappeared, but during this reign, order and happiness emerge again (Güldaş, 1996, p. 255; Kastritsis, 2013, p. 8).⁵⁸⁰ In these examples, it is clear that there is no political expression exist such as an ideal of egalitarianism. Still, it is interesting that a seventy-three couplet-long version of the work called *Câmasbnâme*, which expresses the ancient Iranian tradition and contains various prophecies, was translated into Turkish by Ahmed-i Dâî at the beginning of the 15th century.⁵⁸¹ The sections in this work that contain prophecies describing the events that will occur in 1378 show that the expectation of the Mahdi may have developed in connection with the Mongol invasion. The following expressions are used in the translation of Ahmed-i Dâî (as cited in Bilkan, 2018, pp. 284-85):

There will be strife and wars in Khorasan province. A big army will come out of Bukhara and a lame and seditious person (...) will hold the whole Iranian province this year. At another time, a great *sahib-kıran* will appear and strife and war in the Arabs, the situation of the Tatars cry and shout, Iran and Turan countries will be devastated with an army coming out of the province of Turan. Mardin and Mosul will be destroyed with soldiers from Shiraz and Kirman, and the lands of Hejaz, Medina and Yemen will be filled with strife. Subsequently, the order of the world will be restored, Kharijites and heretics will be killed, a descendant of the Prophet will emerge and prosper the world with justice. In 1397-98, the coming of the Mahdi will draw closer, and Islam will spread in Rum, Indian, Khitay and Chinese countries [tm].

⁵⁸⁰ See: Kastritsis (2013, p. 8): “God made him an unmixed good/ He made him king of this world, in order to heal it/ Justice had disappeared, but now has returned/ The world is well-managed, and now wears a smile/ Could this man who healed the world be the *Mahdî*?/ Men have found joy, and all sadness is gone/ If this is not the *Mahdî*, then who is the *Mahdî*?/ He has made a cradle for the child of justice/ The cosmos is joyful, the world is well-administered/ This is a sign of the *Mahdî*, whose disposition is famous/ Wherever he goes, with divine assistance he conquers provinces/ Whenever he makes it his goal, *begs* submit to him/ A great khan, of great lineage and great *devlet*/ That is the proof that he is the *Mahdî*!/ His name is Muhammad, his custom the Sharia/ If the *Mahdî* appears, then so does divine truth!”

⁵⁸¹ See: Erkan (1996).

It is clear that the Mongol invasions and the apocalypse narratives and thus the rise of the Mahdi/Messiah expectations may be related to each other. Because about a century ago, the Mongol expansion was likened to the emergence of Gog and Magog, in the XII century travel book of Johann de Plano Carpini (2000, pp. 123-24), Möngke Khan is called ‘Magog’ and reference is made to the prophecy of this tribe in the book of Ezekiel of the Torah. Although it is not known to what extent these concerns became a common imaginary element among the people, it can be seen that the fear of the invasion of the Timurids, that is, the re-emergence of the Mongolian advance, constitutes a starting point for popular *mahdi* narratives. In a treatise of Kaygusuz Abdal, *er-Risaletü Kaygusuz ‘Abdal*, who wrote his works in the same period, there are evaluations that a “Jesus-faced [tm]” person from the Khorasan region will emerge, and that this person will be the Mahdi and carry the banner of the Prophet Muhammad (Güzel, 1986, p. 287). These references that the expected Mahdi will come from Khorasan suggest that Shiite-millennarist tendencies are common among Turks and that they are probably fed and spread by *ghaza* stories attributed to Abu Muslim. Because in the classical Sunni sources of Islam, it is generally believed that the Mahdi will emerge from Jerusalem and that Jesus will appear in the White Minaret in Damascus.⁵⁸² In this context, it can be thought that Sheikh Bedreddin’s rebellion also followed the narrative in question and found a suitable environment for the fulfillment of the prophecy after the Battle of Ankara, which does not necessarily require to reproduce of the ideal of equality. With the same meaning, Mehmet I is also referred to as the Mahdi in *Ahval*, indicating that the imagination about the Mahdi figure had become widespread among the people, and it is possible that this belief may had been used as an opportunity for articulation by different social segments who aspire to power. In the final analysis, when the views written by or attributed to Sheikh Bedreddin are evaluated, it is not possible to directly encounter an egalitarianism or a messianism based on this idea. On

⁵⁸² Although Kaygusuz Abdal states that the Jesus will descend to “*Menare-i Ag*” (Güzel, 1986, p. 288), he interprets this hadith by likening it to the human body. He also likens the expressions *Beytü'l-mamur* and *Beytü'l-Atik* mentioned in classical sources to the human body. And he claims that Gabriel is the human mind (Güzel, 1986, p. 289). He interprets the hadiths stating that the Antichrist cannot enter the city of Medina by pointing to the human body (Güzel, 1986, p. 291). In this framework, Kaygusuz Abdal interprets the apocalypse narrative in an esoteric way, as it is seen in Sheikh Bedreddin. Since we could not find the details of Sheikh Bedreddin’s interpretation in *Varidat*, let us be content with saying that his understanding of *me’ad* is similar to Kaygusuz in that it contains a materialistic interpretation. In this respect, both mystics seem to be influenced by the *Meşşâî* tradition.

the contrary, as Sayar (2018, pp. 80, 217) puts forward, Sheikh Bedreddin's arguments on relations of property advocated private ownership against the Ottoman *mîrî* land regime -and the tax system attached to it- and therefore his legal standpoint combines small *timar* holders and free peasants were placed on the same policy line.

On the other hand, the Börklüce Mustafa rebellion seems to have a highly developed egalitarian ideal. This situation finds its place in Doukas's work as follows (1975, pp. 119-120):

In those days there appeared near the mountain situated at the entrance of the bay of Ionia commonly called Styliarion, and to the east opposite Chios, a simple-minded Turkish peasant. He taught the Turks that they must own no property and decreed that, with the exception of women, everything must be shared in common-provisions, clothing, yokes of beasts, and fields. 'I shall have access to your house as though it were mine and you shall have access to my house as though it were yours, with the exception of the female members'.

It is understood from these statements that a description of a kind of social order, in which goods and means of production were equally divided and used collectively, supported by a monastic ideology such as voluntary poverty, was shared by the rebels. Thus, political vision could be mentioned as an ideal of a kind of communitarian social formation. Ottoman chroniclers also support this judgment by series of comparisons. Şükrullah (2011, p. 224) describes Börklüce Mustafa as someone who gathers many people next to him, "like an heretic who emerged in Khorasan in the age of Nuşirevan [tm]". There is no question that the reference here is to *Mazdak*. There is a common theme of hostility towards the Börklüce Mustafa movement in the Ottoman chronicles and history of Doukas (2000, p. 73), which should be evaluated as a class-based reaction. Thus, the revolutionary side of this uprising, which aims to change rentier social formation, is definitively revealed.

On the other hand, if we consider that the Byzantine state increased its pressure on the monasteries during the interregnum period, the connection of this movement with a kind of monastic-communism ideal in the final analysis becomes possible. Werner (2019a, p. 238) states that Emperor Manuel II robbed the monasteries in 1404 and 1408. Moreover, Balivet (2009a, p. 124) states that Mehmet I made raids around the holy Athos Monastery in 1416. For this reason, it is possible that the monastic circles also participated in resistance movements. In this framework, it can be thought that the political vision of Börklüce Mustafa is based on an ideal of communitarian equality

similar to the monastic life and its religious-ideological formulation. It has been suggested in detail by Zhukov (2020, p. 100, 108) that Franciscan monks' troops or popular expansions in the East may also be effective in the development of this idea. In Doukas's narrative, the fact that Börklüce Mustafa attracts a Cretan monk to his side makes this common theme visible. Thus, Börklüce claims that (Doukas, 1975, p. 120): "I am a fellow ascetic who adores the same God you worship". Of course, this ideal has broader social foundations, including monastic life. Siniosoglou (2011, p. 334) evaluates this ideal as close to the idea of a social life free from domestic ties, which is also seen in Plato's political thought in a more general sense and establishes a similarity between the ideas of the Byzantine thinker Plethon and the Bedreddin-Börklüce movement. As Terzibaşoğlu (2017, p. 437) and Aytekin (2017a, p. 532) point out, it can be said that there was a universal characteristic of cooperative practices in agricultural production economy in the Middle Ages, which even in the later periods it can be observed in the form of joint use of forests and pastures, and the rotational cultivation of village lands. The argument that the Christian and Jewish people also took place side by side in the Börklüce Mustafa rebellion should also be read from this perspective. As Michalopoulos (2017, p. 449) points out, it can be thought that the collectivist movement led by groups called Zealot in Byzantine Thessaloniki in the mid-14th century has common roots with the Börklüce rebellion.⁵⁸³ According to Barker (1995, p. 195), the Zelotis were demanding some dispossession of monasteries and confiscation of the wealth of the rich. But this demand was expressed to apply to some of the monastic estates. According to the description of Nikholas Kabasilas, it is understood that this could be a moral economy movement. Because he states that the Zelotis want the monastic wealth and foundations to be used in accordance with their purpose, namely, to care for the poor (Barker, 1995, p. 197). In this respect, it is quite possible that such a goal of redistribution lies at the heart of the Börklüce Mustafa movement, and the restitution of monasteries is one of the inseparable parts of this goal.

The Bedreddin movement, on the other hand, has left the stage of history by serving as an important political litmus paper due to its general reformative character. For example, granting *timars* to "*beğ kulları*" (servants of begs) was an important factor in the suppression of the Börklüce Mustafa rebellion as indicated in anonymous chronicle (Öztürk, 2000, p. 64). This movement is crucial in terms of its results, as it

⁵⁸³ For an article that draws attention to the possible relationship between the Zealot rebellion and the Bedreddin movement, see Kaygusuz (2011, pp. 114-19).

shows that feudal elements, allied with the Ottoman State, could easily change sides. For this reason, the establishment of central state control has become a significant item of political agenda for the ruling classes and has been a crucial motivation for the transition to the imperial regime. Moreover, the Bedreddin movement set a unique example in terms of demonstrating the social mobilization power of the ulama members. As Hassan (2002, p. 184) underlined, the ulama stratum strengthened its position in the state administration after the Bedreddin movement. There are two reasons for this; Firstly, their intellectual power that could guide social unrests became visible, and secondly, their importance in terms of class domination increased because they were a factor that could regulate or neutralize social struggles. To this situation, it is necessary to add the need of centralizing tendencies for legal, financial and register-based formalism. On the other hand, the increasing importance of the ulama stratum has also brought their control within the state organization into the political agenda. It will be further discussed how this new political object fulfilled or discussed in political thought in succeeding chapters.

VI.II. Establishment of the ‘Administration of the Pashas’

“(..) bu iş benim dediğim gibi olursa ne güzel,
amma ‘aksi zuhur edecek olursa Padişah söz tutmaz derler.

Heman olısı budur ki, askerimizi geri çekelim (...)”.⁵⁸⁴

The words of Murat II evaluating Turahan Beg’s withdrawal proposal

Anonymous gazavâtnâme (İnalçık & Oğuz, 1989, p. 25)

If the political meaning of the exodus from the interregnum depends on the construction of mechanisms that maintain class domination against destructive social struggles from below, on the other hand, it leads to the reorganization of the modalities of power sharing within the ruling classes. In this context, it is necessary to deal with the reorganization of the power relations between the ruling classes within the framework of the increase in the political power and representation capacity of the viziers. The development process of this new formation becomes more evident especially after Prince Mustafa’s claim to the throne. For this reason, in this section, it

⁵⁸⁴ It would be nice if this job will be done as I said, but if the opposite result occurs, they say that the Sultan does not listen to advice. This is what will be done immediately, let’s retreat our troops.

will be first discussed Prince Mustafa's search for power. The movement, which is known as 'Düzmece Mustafa' by some of the historians of the period, has two separate phases. The first is the period when Mustafa, one of the sons of Bayezid I, was released by the Timurid ruler Shahrukh around 1416 and moved to Rumelia, where he started to gather supporters together with İzmiroglu Cuneyd. It is understood that Mircea, the ruler of Wallachia, supported the rebel prince in this struggle. The presence of the Sheikh Bedreddin movement in the same period and Mircea's invasion of *Deli Orman* (*Ludogorie*) and its attack on Silistre (İnalçık, 2019g, p. 88) indicate that there is a certain connection between these two movements.⁵⁸⁵ Sheikh Bedreddin's grandson, Hâfız Halîl (2015, p. 184), uses the phrase in this regard, "The two Mustafas were together at that time/ The unrest of the End Times emerged [tm]", and one of the names he refers to is Düzmece Mustafa while the other is Börklüce Mustafa. In this context, Bavilet (2000, p. 90) states that it is necessary to talk about a single rebellion, not two different social movements. However, it is interesting that Prince Mustafa could not find enough support from the frontier lords and in return for a certain ransom, Byzantine Emperor Manuel agreed to send him to Lesbos Island with Cuneyd Beg, until Mehmet I died (Eroğlu, 2016, p. 48). The Ottoman chronicles (Âşıkpaşazâde, Oruç, Şükrullah) have taken a common silence about this first attempt. The reason for this silence is clear. In accordance with the theory of political legitimacy in that period, the right to rule is hereditarily transferred to children, so Prince Mustafa should be considered the rightful owner of the throne. However, in order to neutralize this claim in the first place, the Murat II's administration chose to claim that Prince Mustafa died and that the person who replaced him was a liar (İnalçık, 2019g, p. 90). Actually, since the validity of this claim, which was put forward during the second appearance of Prince Mustafa, can be ensured by not mentioning his first appearance - that is, by hiding the historical continuity and insistence from the eyes -thus, it can be thought that the chroniclers took such an attitude whether they knew this fact or not. However, a poet like Hâfız Halîl (2015, p. 183) who was a witness of the period clearly expresses this contradiction: "O zamanlar Düzme Mustafa/ Kale içinde saklanır derlerdi/ Derler ki Yıldırım Han'ın gerçek oğludur/ Gerçi ona açıkça Düzme dediler".⁵⁸⁶

⁵⁸⁵ Pitcher (2019, p. 111) states that the Ottoman state's occupation of Dobruca was aimed at ending the activities of Sheikh Bedreddin in the Deli Orman region.

⁵⁸⁶ At that time, they used to say that Düzme Mustafa/ He is hiding in the castle/ They used to say that he is Yıldırım Han's real son/ Although they openly called him Düzme (false).

The second appearance of Prince Mustafa took place in Rumelia, after Mehmet I died and was succeeded by Murat II. İnalçık (2018a, p. 26) draws the general political framework of the incident by stating that Mustafa was recognized by the notables of Rumelia and that the ulama members and Janissaries sided with Murat II. According to Âşıkpaşazâde, Mustafa left Thessaloniki and advanced to Vardar Yenicesi, some members of Evrenos family took his side, Murat II's vizier Bayezid Pasha passed by his side, and İzmiroğlu Cüneyd armed some of foot soldiers of Rumelia, paid some of them fifty *akçes* a day and gathered a large military force (Apzd, 2017, p. 99). As stated before, he took *tovca/tavcı* and *azap* units with him, and thus he captured Edirne after recruiting some of the timariots and villagers in Rumelia to his side. In this case, it is possible to think that he has taken over the throne, at least for a while.

After this point, the forces of Prince Mustafa crossed over to the Anatolian side and struggled to obtain the rest of the country. The detail on which the sources agree is that the great vassal families of Rumelia passed to Mustafa's side. Oruç Beg (2011, p. 66) states that these are the sons of Turahan Beg, Kümelioglu Beg and Evrenos Beg. In this case, it is possible to think that the claim that Prince Mustafa could not get the support of the frontier lords in Rumelia in his first rebellion does not reflect whole the truth. There must be another explanation for the failure in the first time, as can be seen that in the second appearance of Mustafa, he attracted both Murat II's vizier Bayezid Pasha and his frontier lords such as Turahan, Gümlüoglu and Evrenos in Rumelia (Eroğlu, 2016, p. 51). A crucial detail here should be the change of attitude of the Byzantine Emperor. In the first case, the Byzantine Emperor did not want to disturb the relative political balance and peace he had achieved thanks to his alliance with Mehmet I. In the second case, as Eroğlu (2016, p. 49) points out, based on the anonymous *gazavâtnâme* named *Gazavât-ı Sultan Murat b. Mehemed Han* and the anonymous Ottoman History in Greek, after the change of power, the young emperor, son of Manuel II, tried this time to regain the lost lands and helped Prince Mustafa from his treasury. Consequently, this factor should be taken into account in explaining the difference between the two initiatives. Another interpretation is that the relative autonomy of the begs of Rumelia may have been decreasing, which may have pushed them to support the Prince Mustafa movement this time. Âşıkpaşazâde states that in the face of this development, as we will discuss below, five pashas who shared the power emerged, and they tried to free Mihaloglu and thus attract the lords of Rumelia to their side. According to him (Apzd, 2017, p. 100), it is seen that when the forces of Prince Mustafa and Murat

II took positions on both sides of the Ulubat Bridge, Mihaloglu summoned Turahan, Kümelioglu and members of Evrenosoglu family and invited them to change sides. The next day, we can determine that the clash was over before it started and the lords of Rumelia were again subject to Murat II (Oruç, 2011, pp. 65-66). At this point, a disagreement arises between the pashas. While İbrahim Pasha says that all the surrendered lords of Rumelia should be killed, Hacı İvaz Pasha argues that all of them should be forgiven (Apzd, 2017, p. 101). In this context, it is important to recognize the rift between the absolute interests of the state bureaucracy and the dynasty and the relative interests of the frontier lords. Aşıkpaşazâde's narration of the events is as follows (Apzd, 2017, p. 101):

Hacı İvaz Paşa bir kişinin bir kılımı kestirmedi. Bu kaçmayan beyler ve toycalar geldiler. Murat'ın elini öptüler. (...) Hacı İvaz Paşa: 'Kırmak caiz değildir. Onun için ki bunları İzmiroğlu fesada verdi. zira onun gibi bir beğ kişi Düzme'yi bekledi. Bunlar ne bilirler? Onun düzmeliğini bilmeyip döndüler' dedi.⁵⁸⁷

In other words, the fabricated information that Prince Mustafa was not a member of the dynasty becomes a pillar for the forgiveness of the lords of Rumelia and also enables İvaz Pasha to take the position of the patron of the frontier lords. There are indications that Murat II remained in power by using more balance and rewarding mechanisms. For example, Kemal (Öztürk, 2001, p. 132) states that Murat II distributed many *timars* and enriched his soldiers. As Reidl (2014, p. 41) points out, the real decisiveness of the ruler in state affairs is always a question mark, but it is possible to determine that it was especially overshadowed in this period. In any case, when the emerging political landscape is interpreted, it is possible to detect that the initiative in maintaining class domination has left the hands of the ruler and has become dependent on the compromise between the *timar* holders, the frontier lords and the state bureaucracy (*ulama* and *ümera*). Oruç Beg (2011, p. 64) states that when Mehmet I died, those pashas in power were three people (İvaz, İbrahim and Bayezid). Moreover, it would be appropriate to use the first beginning of the term 'administration of pashas' for the rule of these three pashas. Because, according to chronicles (Apzd, 2017, p. 97; Giese, 1992, p. 60), when Mehmet I died, these three pashas kept the corpse for forty

⁵⁸⁷ Hacı İvaz Pasha did not cut a single hair of a person. These begs and *toycas* who did not run away came. They kissed Murat's hand. (...) Hacı İvaz Pasha said: 'It is not permissible to kill. Because İzmiroğlu deceived them, because a beg person like him waited for Düzme. What do they know? They didn't know that he was fake and changed sides.'

days and started to rule the state by maintaining *Diwan* meetings and granting and taking back sanjaks and *timars*.⁵⁸⁸ Probably one of those pashas had also visited the Emperor of Byzantine Empire in order to inform him about the current situation of Ottoman state or misguide him about the rumors about the death of the Sultan Mehmet (Gökbilgin, 2021, p. 18). A particular attention should be paid to the statements that the pashas grant and take back *timars*. If only granting *timars* was a question to please the allies, it may not be fully understood what the three pashas did. Since the granting and taking of *timars* would mean changing hands of *timars*, that is, strengthening of the fractions attached to the pashas, it indicates redistributive changes in the configuration of power relations. This is what makes the ‘administration of pashas’ possible. Abdülvasi Çelebi, in his work called *Halilnâme*, has reserved a section of ode for Bayezid Pasha, and some clues of the administration of the pashas in question can be observed in this ode. In this part, Abdülvasi Çelebi (Gültaş, 1996, p. 271) defined Bayezid Pasha as the ‘leading vizier’ (*vezir-i server*) of the world, the ‘only source’ (*yegane membağ*) and support (*kan*) of the state. Abdülvasi Çelebi (Gültaş, 1996, p. 271) prays that God will support Bayezid Pasha’s state/majesty and power (“Çalabum devletin payende kılsın”) and other lords to be servants to him (“Cihan beğlerin ana bende kılsın”). Moreover, Abdülvasi Çelebi (Gültaş, 1996, p. 271), with the couplet “Cihan beğleri anun kapısında/ Hemişe durup istihzar kılsın”⁵⁸⁹, is praying for him to be superior to and dominating the other begs. In these couplets, the term ‘*devlet*’ is used with a twofold meaning. Both in terms of grandeur and dominance, and in terms of organization. While this ambiguity underlines Bayezid Pasha’s privileged place in the Ottoman state—but without denying his position as subordinate to the ruler -it also consciously allows for a second heterodox interpretation that shows him as the ‘owner of the state’. That this second interpretation is made to be felt by the reader as a subtext should be read as a sign of how powerful the administration of pashas is. Abdülvasi Çelebi also included

⁵⁸⁸ It is also rumored that these three pashas drove the Janissaries away from the city by saying that there was a campaign in Anatolia (Giese, 1992, p. 60). These movements of the pashas can be read as an expression that the Janissaries, who plundered Edirne and Istanbul during the Buçuktepe revolt and after the death of Mehmet II, were tried to be get undercontrol at that time, when the anonymous chronicle was written. However, the main issue is that the Janissary power, which directly affected the change of ruler in the future, could be kept out for a while in this period. It is not a coincidence that similar situations were observed in the history of the Anatolian Seljuks. Gordlevski (1988, p. 154-55) states that feudal lords were effective in the changes of rulers, they closed the capital in the outside world and took security, and they concealed the death of the ruler.

⁵⁸⁹ The begs of the world is at his door/ Let always stand and wait.

praise sections for İvaz Pasha and İbrahim Pasha in his work (Güldaş, 1996, pp. 272-73). For comparison, although Şeyhoğlu Mustafa's *Kenz 'ül-Küberâ* is dedicated to Paşa Agha, it does not contain such statements. This work contains only a simple prayer (Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, 2013, p. 375): "May the bearer of the responsibility of the country, the commander-in-chief of the sultanate (...) may God bless his state and blessings and rise his rank [tm]". On the other hand, an example from the later periods of the administration of pashas, Şükrullah's (2011, p. 231) praise to Mahmud Pasha is quite similar to the couplets of Abdülvasi Çelebi: "The great vizier, the sultan of the viziers on earth, the shelter of the weak and the poor, the shelter of the scholars in the world, the elite of water and land, the full moon of the state, religion and the world, the support of the khans and khagans (...) [tm]". It is possible to say that the principle of administration of pashas will maintain its relative power throughout the imperial regime.⁵⁹⁰

Âşıkpaşazâde counts the people with whom Murat II had to share his power, one by one (Apzd, 2017, p. 100); "The quantity of pashas has become five: İbrahim Pasha, Hacı İvaz Pasha, and even three sons of the Temürtaş pashas: One was Umur, one was Oruç, and one was Ali. It was become five pashas. They allied themselves so that they could release Mihaloglu Mehmed Beg from Tokat prison [tm]". In this case, we see that, as a result of Bayezid Pasha's passing to the opposite side and his death, two of Mehmet I's pashas continued to be effective during the reign of Murat II, and in addition, three of the Temürtaş sons became pasha. It is understood that behind this decision, another family, which played a major role in the capture of Rumelia and had a stronger engagement with the central state, was brought to the fore in order to balance the power of the frontier lords of Rumelia.⁵⁹¹ Mihaloglu's release from prison, on the other hand, resulted in the subordination of these two families to the other frontier lords due to their influence in Rumelia.⁵⁹² It is difficult to ascertain the length of this period, but it shows

⁵⁹⁰ An interesting example in this regard can be found in İdrîs-i Bitlisî's *Selîmnâme*. According to İdrîs-i Bitlisî, a few members of the council who were in the last period of Bayezid II's administration took over the administration and are trying to put Prince Ahmet in charge so that their power will continue (Aksoy, 2021, p. 56). Considering that large irregularities emerged in the *timar* distribution in the same period and that some *sipâhîs* supported the Şahkulu rebellion, it can be assumed that the political fractions in the central government extended its articulations to local interest groups. Moreover, at the period of Ahmet III the concept of administration of pashas gained great visibility.

⁵⁹¹ See: Emecen (2012).

⁵⁹² Öztürk (2020, p. 28) states that during this period, people with the title of *qadi*, *beylerbeyi* or vizier were frequently imprisoned. In particular, it was during this period that the prison sentence

us that a new field of struggle has opened up, which constitutes an appendix to the ‘birth of intra-class struggle’ that was tried to be outlined in the previous chapter. Moreover, the indications that the representatives of the dominant social class can unite around their own interests reveal that this struggle has gained the form of a positional war progressing with various alliances and purges.⁵⁹³

To continue, for example, the abdication of Murat II and his re-enthronement, Mehmet II’s order of execution of Halil Pasha of Çandar and Mahmud Pasha reveal that this process is not short and conjunctural. In this context, Âşıkpaşazâde mentions two crucial examples. The first is that the pashas began to determine their land assignments and relations of alliances (Apzd, 2017, p. 103):

Vılakoğlu’na Niş Doğanı’nı gönderdiler. Vılakoğlu dahi bir elçi gönderdi. Babası için taziyetname yazdı. Ve kendisine de padişahlığı kutluladı. Elçiye de hayli saygı gösterdi. Kendi elçisine dedi ki: ‘Sofya’dan berisini iste. Bana versinler. Ben de onun hasılatından çok miktarda göndereyim.’ Elçi geldi. Bu sözü paşalara söyledi. Paşalar dahi: ‘Hele kabul ettik’ dediler. Vılakoğlu da çok armağanlar gönderdi. Ve dedi ki: ‘kızımı dahi vereyim’. Vılakoğlu ile anlaştılar. İstanbul tekfürüne Gebze kadısı Fazlullah’ı elçi gönderdiler. (...) ‘Bana dahi Vize’den berisini verin. Sizin ile barışayım’ dedi. Kadı: ‘Çorlu’dan hudut olsun’ dedi. İncüğöz’i de birlikte verdiler.⁵⁹⁴

developed as a disciplinary institution. There are also examples of series of prison sentences in Ahmedî’s work called *Ahval-i Sultan Mehmed* (İnalçık, 2021a, p. 438). This issue will be discussed in more detail later on.

⁵⁹³ For example, during the Battle of Varna, Prince Mehmet had a trench dug around Edirne and started defense preparations. Within the framework of these preparations, it was ordered that all the grain owned by the people living around Edirne be placed in the warehouses of the city. While Şahin Pasha and Halil Pasha were involved in the collection of the grain of the people, on the other hand, they sent their goods and supplies in the city to Dimetoka and secured them. They made up various excuses after the public reaction. In the anonymous *gazavâtnâme* (İnalçık & Oğuz, 1998, p. 43), it is stated that the excuses put forward by the pashas are invalid and their aim is to secure their property if the castle falls. The coming together of these two pashas from different ‘parties’ when their class-based interests are in question can be observed on this example.

⁵⁹⁴ They sent the Niş Dogan to Vilakoglu. Even Vilakoglu sent an envoy. He wrote his condolences for his father. And he congratulated himself on the new ruler. He also showed great respect to the envoy. He said to his own envoy: ‘Demand the property of the other side from Sofia. Let them give it to me. And I’ll send a large amount of its revenues’. The envoy has arrived. He said this word to the pashas. Even the pashas said: ‘Okay, we accepted’. Vilakoglu also sent many gifts. And he said: ‘Let me even give my daughter’. They agreed with Vilakoglu. They sent the qadi of Gebze, Fazlullah, as an envoy to the tekfür of Constantinople. (...) ‘Give

It will be meaningful to take a closer look at the language used by Âşıkpaşazâde in this passage. Âşıkpaşazâde does not use any expression that it was Murat II who made the decision about taking and granting land and establishing peace. On the contrary, he constructs all sentences as ‘they said we accepted’, ‘agreed’, ‘they gave’ in plural form and indicates pashas as the subject of these agreements. Âşıkpaşazâde states that after Murad II eliminated the enemy threat, he found the number of viziers too much and dismissed a few of them (Apzd, 2017, p. 105). Murat II, based on the authority given to him by the war successes, dismisses the sons of Timurtaş from the viziership and appoints them to lower positions, and removes them from the capital. For this reason, it is need to be understand that after the elimination of external enemies, it is the turn of the internal -or intra-class- adversaries. Here, external enemies are competitors threatening class domination of ruling classes in general, while internal adversaries are social strata in which class privileges is shared. It is possible to think that this was a joint decision taken to restore the dynasty’s dominance and consolidate the power of the remaining two pashas. In this case, the authority of the two viziers once again rose above the others. The first of these is Ivaz Pasha, he is from the origin of timariot *sipâhîs*⁵⁹⁵, and the second one is Çandarlı İbrahim Pasha from the family of ulama which organized the first Jannissary groups.⁵⁹⁶ This class origin must have had an effect on Çandarlı İbrahim’s gaining the support of the first Şeyh’ül-İslam Molla Fenârî. In the final analysis, the alliance of the *sipâhîs* and the Janissaries under the financial, legal and ideological regulation of the ulama stratum has been decisive in terms of the construction of the state structure and the establishment of political power. It can be followed from two different sources that Ivaz Pasha acted as if he was a ruler. The first is that Ivaz Pasha was the builder and architect of many buildings, and even emphasized his own name rather than the sultan in their inscriptions.⁵⁹⁷ The second sign in this regard is the words Âşıkpaşazâde wrote for him in a disparaging tone (2017, p. 206): “Pashas learned from him to feast with huge trays at the gate of the Ottoman dynasty [tm]”. In other words, acting like a sultan at the sultan’s door was seen as a symbolic violation of the authority of ruler.

me even the lands beyond the Visa. So, I can make peace with you’. The qadi said: ‘Let Çorlu be the border’. They also gave İncügez with other places.

⁵⁹⁵ See: Özcan (1996).

⁵⁹⁶ See: Aktepe (1993).

⁵⁹⁷ See: Sönmez (1996).

Âşikpaşazâde mentions that these two pashas resolved with the help of bribery what kind of judgment should be given as a result of the war between İsfendiyaroglu and Murat II and the defeat of İsfendiyaroglu (Apzd, 2017, p. 106): “Paşalara dahi kızıl filöriden elçi gönderdi. O kızıl filörü adamın yüzünü kızartır. Çok utandırıcı kişidir. İnsanı kendi haline bırakmaz. Paşalar dahi, doğrusunu söylemek gerek, o gelen elçiden utandılar. Hünkârı barışa meşgul ettiler. Hünkârı razı eylediler”.⁵⁹⁸ But the balance between the powerful pashas will not last long, as Oruç Beg (2011, p. 67) states, Ivaz Pasha’s eyes will be gouged out and he will be driven out of power. In the history of Neşrî (1957, p. 587), the rumors about Ivaz Pasha that he made an alliance with the servants of slave origin (*kul*) and tried to become the ruler are shown as the reason for this purge. These rumors point to the existence of a group of people that is uncomfortable with the military power that Ivaz Pasha gathered around him. Aktepe (1993) formulates the end of this process in his words: “Murad II preferred İbrâhim Pasha to Hacı İvaz Pasha, son of Ahi Bayezid from Tokat, with the influence of Molla Fanari, who was the qadiasker of the time, and left him unrivaled in the administration of state affairs [tm]”. The information given by Oruç Beg (2011, p. 68) on the appointment Halil Pasha as a vizier after İbrahim Pasha’s death confirms this interpretation. Thus, in the new order, the ulama members would surpass the timariots and frontier lords, and they would rise to the position of the main ally of the Ottoman dynasty because of their support for the centralization move and their articulation with the Janissaries. With the influence of the ulama, the land registers and *timar* system was developed, and the continuity of the status and land law was ensured in this way in order to keep all these social strata together (İnalçık, 2019g, p. 91). Thus, the central administration took an important step to institutionalize the subordination relations by establishing its position as an intermediary in determining the social situation of the local powers.

According to Âşikpaşazâde, Murat II married one of his daughters to the Karaca the *Beylerbeyi* of Anatolia and the other to the son of İbrahim Pasha, moreover, by marrying his three daughters to the Karamanids and two of his daughters to the İsfendiyarids, he re-established the kinship relations between the ruling classes in Anatolia and the layers in the state administration and the Ottoman dynasty (Apzd,

⁵⁹⁸ He sent envoys to the pashas in the form of red filoris (gold coins). That red filori makes people blush. He is a very embarrassing person. It does not leave the person free to make their own choices, it does not go out of their mind. Even the pashas, to tell the truth, were ashamed of that envoy. They kept the Sultan busy with peace. They consented to the sultan.

2017, p. 109). Thus, while one pillar of this class alliance settled on the establishment of the status quo in Anatolia in the first step, it was determined as the continuation of raiding and plundering activities in Rumelia. In this regard, Oruç Beg (2011, p. 66-68) mentions Murat II's military expeditions to Albania, Thessaloniki, Wallachia, Lazeli and Hungary. Finally, it is seen that the new order -as well as the old one- was based on an alliance with the urban classes. Âşıkpaşazâde told the story of the *sûfi* leaders and Ahi of Bursa, who stepped in to make peace in the event that Murat II's younger brother Mustafa claimed to right to reign and marched on Bursa (Apzd, 2017, pp. 103-4). According to this narrative, in response to Mustafa's march on Bursa, the notables of the city collected valuable fabrics and coins from the city and sent Ahi Yakub and Ahi Kadem to Mustafa's tutor, Sarabdar İlyas, as ambassadors and ensured that he did not enter the city. Eroğlu (2016, p. 52) interprets this event as the purchasing of the anti-establishment opposition by the notables of Bursa. The second event is the elimination of the Turkmen group called *Kızıl Koca Oglanları*, which makes people traveling between the cities of Amasya and Tokat, which are on the trade routes, unable to go without crowd group of companions (Apzd, 2017, p. 113).⁵⁹⁹ Yörgüç Pasha defrauded this group of four hundred people and had them tied up, the heads of the ringleaders were cut, the rest were thrown into the dungeon on top of each other and suffocated by making smoke. Moreover, Yörgüç Pasha raided the Turkmen houses in the Çorum region in the morning, killed some of them, and plundered their property and cattle. In both cases, it can be seen that the interests of the dominant classes are always based on not disrupting the social order, and they support the ruler and the state authority in this framework. In particular, the continuation of commercial activities constitutes the common interest of the urban groups and merchants engaged in commercial production, and they expect the state to undertake a definite function in this regard. In this regard, the notion that Amâsî (2016, p. 367) advises the ruler to pay attention to in order to be fair, is to pay attention on the situation of the people of the city, and to show respect to benevolent people, and to discipline 'harmful' people by force. If the 'harmful' people go beyond their borders, it is advocated by Amâsî to eliminate their evil (2016, p. 367): "The view of the majority is as follows; Whichever part of the person causes evil, such as his hand, foot, tongue, should be punished by cutting off that part of him [tm]". The

⁵⁹⁹ İnalçık (2016b, p. 249) finds the support of the notables of the Amasya-Tokat region important for Murat II's establishment of his domination. The reason for this is shown as (that the lands of the notables of the region were transferred to the status of *timar* and left in their hands again (İnalçık, 2016b, p. 289).

example given by Âşıkpaşazâde above, although not from an urban group, is in accordance with Amâsî's proposals, since it mentions a segment that threatens the interests of the urban groups and its elimination.

VI.III.I. The 'Two-Party Paradigm': Towards an Imperial Political Order

“Is it God’s wisdom or what,
when someone tries to reform the state, soon his head is rolling”
Kara Çelebizade, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar* (as cited from Berkes, 1969, p. 115)

The handicap of conservative/Islamic historiography arises from the fact that it often sees the Ottoman state and the circles around it as a homogeneous bloc and, in the final analysis, accepts their commitment to the state and, to mean the same thing, to Islamic ideology as the primary reference point. Within this framework, it cannot escape assuming that people and groups who ‘betray the state’ deviate from the given norm and thus cause corruption. Essentially, this ideal, which can be read as a state and authority fetishist self-reflection of the conservative worldview, has no historical validity. Moreover, writers of the period were also aware of this situation and often do not feel the need to hide it. For example, in his book titled *Maârifnâme*, Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 729) clearly expresses the principles on which the members of the military stratum working in the state try to realize their own specific interests: “The disaster of begs is moral deviation/ The disaster of the viziers is that they have bad intentions/ The disaster of the landlords is the weakness of their government/ The disaster of scholars is their fondness for administrative offices [tm]”.

As in every advanced class society, the position of the ruling classes in the Ottoman society has contradictions that cause divisions among themselves and sometimes destructive conflicts in accordance with the differences in interests and orientations. While these contradictions are understandable at the individual level in some cases, they also correspond to general historical trends in some cases, so it is necessary to use intellectual models in order to deal with this second kind of contradictions in a single historical plan. In this section, I will try to use the party-polarity model, which is not the most perfect of these models, but is a good starting point. The first use of the concept of ‘party’ in pre-modern Ottoman context was made by Halil İnalcık as ‘Şehabeddin-Zağanoz party’ (1954, p. 90), then other examples of the use of concept as such, “peace camp” used by Lowry (2006, p. 49), Mumcu used

the concept of ‘party of devshirmes’ and ‘party of Turks’ (2017, pp. 34, 82), moreover Hassan (2002, p. 167) used the concept as ‘sharia/ulama party’ and ‘devshirme party’ and the term ‘party of Bayezid’ used by Uzunçarşılı (1970, p. 233). The concept’s transformation as an analytical concept that can be used for macro-political analysis from its descriptive meaning exemplified above, was through the acquisition of content that could formulate the structural features of Ottoman society and politics, and this development took place in the analyzes of Berkes (1969) and Küçük (1990).

During this period, it is seen that the Ottoman administration was divided into two wings and tendencies, and as Küçük (1990, p. 119) stated with the concept of ‘two-party order’, they were divided into two as war and peace (order) parties. The administration of the pashas which was argued that is the first core of the indicated division. This situation essentially proves that development level of the class relations and so the Ottoman administration has reached the maturity to build and perform a new level of alienation and this process has been completed with the establishment of the imperial administration. Both parties have different focuses in terms of accumulation regimes and different distribution models based on this. The perspective of the war party focuses on a path where most of the revenues collected in the center are transferred to the warriors as wages and benefits, and the spoils and official positions are divided in a way that the warriors take priority. The party of peace or order, on the other hand, puts the ulama and *umera* at the center in the distribution of incomes and offices, and places a system of patronage that narrows towards their allies and places a capillary system at the center of redistribution. As the locomotive of this separation, the expansion of the devshirme-based military power (the Janissaries) and its ability to suppress the semi-autonomous class pursuits (frontier lords and timariots) outside themselves should be considered as an important factor. In this context, it can be mentioned that there are two power blocs. The first is the military section made up of devshirme and the bureaucrats (*Kapıkulu* officials) trained in the palace, under the leadership the Ottoman dynasty, and the second is the local notables, large *timar* holders and the ulama stratum represented by the Çandarlı family.

Although the roots of the concept of ‘two parties’ go back to the distinction between the *patricii/pleb-populares/optimates* division in the Roman Empire and the ‘blue and green parties’ of the Byzantine Empire, the concept’s first practitioner for Ottoman history –with the exception of the descriptive meaning given to the concept by İnalçık- was Niyazi Berkes (1969, p. 104):

(...) when two of the trio of sultan, servants and ulama came together, the third party was doomed to lose. Sometimes the sultan takes the ulama with him, sometimes the ulama may unite with the servants, sometimes the sultan may oppose the ulama together with the servants. Various combinations are possible. But none of them were random. This is determined by situations of both economic and political conflict. [tm]⁶⁰⁰

It should be noted that frontier lords and merchants can be located on both sides of the two-party pendulum. Because the frontier lords are mainly in the status of large *timar* holders, and they intend to expand their lands through war and get a larger share from the distribution of booty. Traders, on the other hand, always prioritize principles of reconciliation and guaranteeing the security of trade lines in case of war. In this case, it is possible to think that the merchants will stay close to the peace-oriented first party and therefore the ulama members, while the frontier lords will be stuck in the middle and remain in an insoluble position. On the other hand, although the capture of Constantinople during the reign of Mehmet II and the extensive privileges given to the merchants of Florentine (İnalçık, 2016a, p. 213), the construction of bazaar-inn-caravanserai, covered bazaars and crafts houses (Genç, 2014g, p. 315), caused a close relationship between the Ottoman merchants and the war party, the reasons such as the reactions to the confiscation of the *waqfs* and private lands made the peace party dominant at the end of the period.

Moreover, the frontier lords, on the one hand, need the equipment and discipline superiority of the central army as a result of the emergence of the regular troops of Hunyadi János in the field of Hungary, on the other hand, they lose their relative autonomy as a result of the *Kapıkulu* group's share of the booty and their rise to the

⁶⁰⁰ The emergence of the said party pattern among the second generation representatives of the Genghis Empire suggests that this may be the logical result of the multidimensional relationship between steppe feudalism and local-settled classes. Seidler (2020, p. 210) states that the military motivation of the nomadic groups contradicts the idea of 'peaceful administration under the central and powerful authority of the khan', which emerged especially under Ögedei and Möngke, and that the latter was supported by the local aristocracy, the inhabitants of the city, the merchants and the peasants. As Khazanov (1981, pp. 168-69) underlined, it is possible to argue that this is one of the final links of the social transformation scheme, which is completed by the nomads forming a settled state structure and their assimilation by the natives in the nomadic-settled relationship. Since the repercussions of this relationship were felt for a long time after the establishment of the state structure, a similar partying phenomenon may have emerged in the 15th century Ottoman administration.

position of governor and vizier. Moreover, the conciliatory attitude of the peace party was an obstacle for them to obtain booty and land. But the same peace party could give legal guarantee to the landowners of the *timars*.⁶⁰¹ Just because they cannot resolve this contradiction, the position of the frontier lords in the class hierarchy will gradually lose their status. As İnalçık stated (2016a, pp. 203-4), people of slave origin will start to be appointed as frontier lords during the reign of Murat II, and during the reign of Mehmet II, the frontier lords irreversibly lose their privileged position. Moreover, it is doubtful whether medium-sized and small *timar* holders constitute a class-for-itself despite their class-in-itself characteristics. Berkes (1969, p. 56) expresses the structural contradictions of the timariots as follows;

Timariot begs were not a homogene category, neither in origin nor in composition. They were found in a dispersed state, but they would develop a united units in the work of war. There was quite a competition between them in catching the beneficium that the Sultan would throw in front of them. Later, when the system broke down, this competition even turned into a fight. In the Ottoman order (...) the general tendency of the categories at the state level was to be a corporation (such as the Janissary and the ulama), but the Sipahizade corps could not be permanent and traditional corporations. [tm]

Although this determination of Berkes is valuable, it is incomplete. In Doğan Avcıoğlu's posthumous drafts on Ottoman history (2013, p. 28), it is argued that *timar* holders necessarily had a class solidarity against both the high nobility and the commoners. Similarly, Mehmet Ali Şevki (1968a, p. 40) argues that the landowning *sipâhîs*, as a military category, were an aristocracy closed to themselves. If the arguments of Berkes, M. A. Şevki and Avcıoğlu are taken together, Avcıoğlu's thesis should be accepted as formally correct in line with the example given by M. A. Şevki and it should be determined that it shows a general class tendency, but the fact that Berkes underlines should not be ignored. In this framework, the tendency of class solidarity can be considered as a potential, and the phenomenon of disorganization can be accepted as an actual quality. It is possible to argue that during the establishment period when the *sipâhîs* were few in number, the forces and tendencies of class

⁶⁰¹ For example, İnalçık (2016a, p. 199) determines that the large land assignments made to Mihalogulları were in the hands of the children and grandchildren belonging to this family even in the 15th century, based on the *timar* registers of the central Sakarya region.

solidarity became more actual, but these characteristics disappeared in the process of territorial expansion and numerical increase and heterogeneity. For example, there is information in many primary sources that *timar* holders also took part in the Şahkulu Revolt (1511) that emerged during the reign of Bayezid II.⁶⁰² This example shows that *sipâhîs* can act within the framework of their own class interests, but this situation cannot go beyond the local borders. In this case, the fear of not losing the economic privileges they hold may have been effective. At the beginning of the 14th century, when the portrait of the fief holders was painted in the famous poem named *Kelimât-ı Barak Baba*, which is attributed to Barak Baba, there is a criticism that reveals how effective the small privileges of this group were in their political articulation: “Espahi iken bek oldum/ Günde bir kaz yedüm/ Sultana hıyanet eyledüm”.⁶⁰³ It took the 17th century for small *timar* owners to deteriorate their economic situation and *de facto* lose their privileges, and the policy of raising *sipâhîs* was already abandoned. Although this decision could improve the economic situation of the *sipâhîs*, it completely eliminated their military power.

The timariot *sipâhîs* disappeared from the scene of history, perhaps precisely because they could not organize a general uprising at the beginning of the 17th century, when they had to defend their own interests as a class. On the other hand, this fact does not show that the timariot *sipâhîs* lacked political representatives. It can be thought that especially the large raider families of Rumelia and the local families who hold their lands in the status of *mülk/ mâlikâne* in Anatolia, represented the *timar* holders, or rather led the way as role models and vision-builders. Because there are two main ways and methods that *timar* holders can be involved in in order to increase their social status within the ruling classes and to institutionalize their class privileges. The first of these can be considered as rising in the political hierarchy, that is, to become the holder of a *zeâmet* and commander of a timariot units -to become a *beylerbeyi* or *sanjakkbeyi*, and the second to expand their economic privileges and powers, that is, to turn their lands into *waqfs* or *mülk* and increase the area of the lands they rule. In this framework, it is

⁶⁰² For example, in the Krautel chronicle (1997, p. 49), there is information that *sipâhîs* were also involved in the Şahkulu revolt and that one of them was a *timar* holder, Ustacoglu. But at this point it is necessary to take into account some nuances. For example (Reidl, 2014, p. 205), one of the people who participated in the revolt, Subaşı Ustacıoğlu, is a former *sipâhî* who was dismissed from civil service by Karagöz Pasha and whose *timar* was taken from him, and it is not clear whether this example represents a general trend.

⁶⁰³ When I was a mounted soldier, I became a beg/ I ate a goose a day/ I did not betray the sultan.

clear that the paths leading to the office of *beylerbeyi* or the establish a local dynasty are not necessarily separate from each other and that, in the final analysis, the class vision of the timariot *sipâhîs* also constitutes a unity.

Continuing, it should be noted that the inner class solidarity between the Janissaries and the ulama stratum is quite high, as indicated in the above quote. There is no need to represent the same topic here, as the issue of class characteristics related to the ulama stratum is adequately illustrated in the first chapter. Sakin (2011, p. 50) rightly states that the feelings of ‘unity and solidarity’ developed due to the fact that the Janissaries lived together, were affiliated with the Bektashi order, and had common education and uniforms. Oyan (2016, p. 101) argues that the Janissaries, as long as they had economic opportunities and political power, formed the “leading exploitative class [tm]” of the system over time. Considering that the Janissaries of the Murat II and Mehmet II periods rose as a social stratum and took a decisive place in the class schema, it becomes necessary to allocate a certain place to this social group as of this period.

The origin of the Janissary corps, as stated earlier, is the one-fifth share of prisoners of war. Palmer (2019, p. 376) draws attention to the examples in the history of Âşikpaşazâde, and states that there was no reference to the devshirme method in the establishment of the Janissary corps in the first place. According to Sakin (2011, p. 45), firstly, prisoners of war were assigned as Janissaries with two *akçes* of daily wages after a short training, and in the next policy, the prisoners were accepted into the Janissaries after they are worked on ships for five to ten years. In the continuation of these policies, in accordance with the need have been noticed, and as in Âşikpaşazâde, the policy of giving the captives to Turkish farmer families started. Although it is stated in the 17th century text called *Mebde-i Kavanin-i Yeniceriyan* (Sakin, 2011, p. 177) that this practice was put into effect during the reign of Mehmet II, the record in Âşikpaşazâde makes it possible to think that the practice was rearranged, although it has an older origin. I think that this practice would form the basis of the practice of forcible recruitment of Christian children as Palmer (2019, p. 495) indicated, which would later be called the devshirme system. Because the success of the assimilation of the captives by giving them to Muslim families must have made it possible to carry out the same practice in a more developed way by directly using young children. Moreover, it is also important in terms of maintaining class order that a part of the male population who can fight in each new generation of Christians can be seized before they participate in

possible resistance events and are made into an entourage by the local lords. Moreover, as Wittek underlined (1955, p. 274), this practice is also a solution to the problem of the urgent need for soldiers after the Timurid invasion. However, the fact that this practice is found in the Seljuk state and in some of the other Islamic countries, including the *ghulam* recruitment, also makes it necessary to evaluate it as a political strategy. Yazıcızâde ‘Ali, an important political figure of the Murat II period, explains in his work *Selçuknâme* that why Tugrul Beg appointed his servants to the head of the army as follows (Bakır, 2008, p. 114):

Pes şol begler ki fi-l-cümle serkeşlik iderlerdi, cemi’ te’enni-y-ile ve istimalet-ile ele götürüp ortadan götürdi. Ve her birinüñ yirine kendü kulların kodı. Şöyle ki leşkerde altmış sancak kendü kulları çekerdi ve her bir nahiyet ısmarlamış-ıdı. Ya’ni ki kendünden soñra oğlanlarına vefa ideler ve mu’avenet kılup düşmenlerine galebe ideler.⁶⁰⁴

Yazıcızâde’s narrative is quite clear and surprising. The author, indicating firstly the indiscipline of the feudal lords, and secondly that it is easier for the subjects to be subordinate to the sons of the ruler. Thus, he legitimizes this policy in the final analysis in order to prevent feudal disintegration and to establish the procedure of inheritance of the reign. In this framework, it is possible to think that the Ottomans also considered such benefits in addition to the reasons listed above. Because, for example, in the travelogue of Caterino Zeno, Uzun Hasan is often criticized in comparison with the Ottoman Janissaries as he could not gather his army whenever he wanted and after Uzun Hasan, the army came under the influence of different governors and commanders.

Two issues that should be particularly focused on while trying to reveal the social position of the Janissaries are (i) the factors behind the emergence of this military section as a social power and (ii) the privileges of this section and the use of privileges. If we take a look at the first title, it is seen how the Janissaries have become a key actor in the preservation of the class order from being a mere guard corps, especially in the role they played after the Timurid invasion. It is certain that the Janissaries, whose number increased to five thousand during the reign of Bayezid I, turned into a group that every class actor tried to articulate in the re-establishment of the order. However,

⁶⁰⁴ The beg there used to be disorderly, he took them all slowly and peacefully and sent them from there. And in the place of each of them he placed his own servants. In fact, only his servants formed sixty banners among his soldiers, and he gave each of them a territory. That is, let them leave those places to their sons after themselves and defeat their enemies by helping each other.

these developments do not oblige the Janissary to play a decisive role in the social class schema. The main determinant factor is the economic and military developments in the period of Murat II. İnalçık (2018a, p. 28) drew attention to the dimensions of the economic development during the Murat II period and evaluated the increase in trade volume and the growth of cities such as Bursa and Edirne in this context. Traveler/spy Bertrandon de le Broquière, who observed the situation in the same period, states that the Ottoman income increased to two and a half million gold ducats in 1432 and that “If Murat used the resources he had, he could easily invade Europe” (as cited in İnalçık, 2018a, p. 28). In this development, especially the capture of silver mines in Eastern Europe and the persistent effort to dominate these mining basins had an impact. Pamuk (2003, pp. 31, 41) states that the Ottomans captured the leading silver mines in Macedonia, Serbia and Bosnia from 1390 to 1460, and that Broquière reported that two hundred thousand gold ducats were generated from the Novo Brodo mine alone, and that in the 15th century Serbia and Bosnian silver mines total annual production is not less than ten tons.

In addition to these developments, it is necessary to mention the economic developments that depend on the acquisition of new lands. In the period of Murat II, the intensification of the Ottoman advance in Hungary and Serbia brought along both the increase in the tribute lands and the increase in the returns in terms of captive and booty. The most enthusiastic depictions of booty in Âşıkpaşazâde’s *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân* belong to history of this period. To give a few examples, he used the following expressions for the first expedition to Hungary (Apzd, 2017, p. 124): “It was a lot of loot. They choked on tremendous loot. They took so many captives that they would say that the captive is more than the raider. Even the coins were such that one or two thousand gold coin came into the hands of a person. The captive was extraordinarily many [tm]”. For the second Hungarian expedition, he states that the number of booty is so great that no one but God can know (Apzd, 2017, p. 125). He gives a broader description of the Belgrade expedition (Apzd, 2017, p. 127):

Ghazis came with their loot so that they would give a beautiful concubine for a boot, which is good for a hug. I was there too. I bought a six-seven-year-old good boy for a hundred and a half akça. But they would sell the captive who could serve the horse for one hundred and fifty akça. At that time, seven slaves and concubines were left my share from the raiders. It so happened that if the soldier walked, the crowd of prisoners was more than the soldiers. In short, it was

explained that since the emergence of Islam, the ghazis had gone to ghaza, they said that something like this did not happen. [tm]

A similar description was made about the invasion of Morea (Apzd, 2017, pp. 130-31):

Finally, they took captives and took booty. There were such spoils that even there they were selling very beautiful concubines for three hundred akça. Male captives were not in demand. Their number was unknown. Gold, silver trays, valuable pitchers and mugs were not counted and measured in the hands of the ghazis. In short, the ghazis had such property that they would not take a valuable fabric. They said it was heavy to carry. They were lazy to take it. They had taken so much gold, silver and coins that God knew its limits. [tm]

Among these narratives, there is one that stands out in particular. When the *ghazis* killed too many people in one of the expeditions on the Serbian country, their commander İshak Beg warned his soldiers and had them take them prisoner. He describes the event as follows (Apzd, 2017, p. 129):

(...) They killed their foot soldier under horses. There was such a massacre that the horses of the ghazis would walk on the dead of the infidels. A horse could not find a place to set foot. Isaac Beg shouted: 'Hey ghazis! You killed enough. From now on, take the unbelievers captive' he said. I swear to Allah, I took five of them captive, except that I killed. I brought it to Skopje and sold the five captives for nine hundred akças at that time [tm].

After these brutal descriptions, I think it should be considered natural that the stock of slaves under the Ottoman state's control expanded, and the number of those who rose from slavery to Janissaries was increased. Moreover, as Kitsikis (1996, p. 53) states, the fact that the Hungarian nobility is Catholic, and the villagers were Orthodox made it easier for the captives captured from this area to be promoted to the military class and fight against the ruling classes of the same region. As it is mentioned before, the second point that completes this development is the development of monetary relations. Veinstein (2013, p. 127) states that it is not possible to feed a paid army without reaching a sufficient level of monetization, and for this reason, such a salary system was not encountered in the slave armies that were created before. On the other hand, the development of monetary relations makes the child levy system possible. Goodwin (2013, p. 49) states that this system cannot be sustained simply with looting, and what is necessary is "tax sources had to be allocated and the money accounted".

Exactly for this reason, it becomes easier to explain a series of financial and political implementations made during the reign of Mehmet II in order to expand the cash treasury of the empire. As it will be discussed later, it is crucial to focus on registration systematics in order to confiscate *waqf* revenues, minting new *akçes*, and financial discipline.

When the origin of the devshirme policy is examined, it is first encountered in the letter dated August 20, 1397, written by Colluccio Salutati at the end of the 14th century, with the expression “they kidnap boys of ten or twelve years old [tm]” (as cited in Karamuk, 2019, p. 559). We can think that this expression refers to a practice similar to recruitment rather than slaves obtained in war.⁶⁰⁵ Since the middle of the 15th century, the development of the devshirme system can be clearly observed. As Palmer stated (2019, pp. 495-96), the first systematic information about the emergence of devshirme system is obtained from the *Epistole de Crudelitate Turcarum* of the Franciscan Brother Barthomaeus de Juno and the *Tractatus de moribus, condicionibus et nequicia Turcorum* of the Dominican Brother Georgius. The fact that Barthelomeus’ letter contains the events of 1438 and that one-tenth of the Christian boys from the age of ten to the age of twenty is taken as a recent (*nuper*) incident reveals that, as Palmer points out (2019, p. 496), the devshirme system was first tried in the first half of the 15th century. Georgius’s 1458 dated article pointing to children tribute reveals that this practice gained continuity in the same century (Palmer, 2019, p. 498). The Devshirme Law, dated to the reign of Bayezid II (Radushev, 2008, p. 447), shows that the practice gained an institutional form at least at the end of the 15th century.

Palmer’s emphasis on the use of ‘force’ while describing the devshirme system should not be accepted as a valid phenomenon in every example. Because, as it will be evaluated later, the social status of the devshirmes is higher than other military and administrative elements. İdrîs-i Bitlisî mentioned in his work named *Hes̄t Behîst*, that families who see the reward and progress achieved by the devshirmes have become willing to deliver their children to officials (Palmer, 2019, p. 503). But there is good reason to think that this statement does not cover the whole truth. For example, Vryonis Jr. (2019, p. 544) considers that places such as Yanya, Galata, Mora, Chios demand

⁶⁰⁵ Dimitriadis (2000, p. 31) explains this situation with the feudal rights that lie at the root of the devshirme practice. According to him, Evrenosogulları collects children from the surrounding villages for their own services. In this case, according to him the practice is based on the centralization of the practice of feudal lords by the Ottoman dynasty. But there is no emphasis on a military activity in the first form of this practice as Dimitriadis asserted.

exemption from child levy as a condition of surrender as a proof of Christians' untrust with this method. Similarly, tactics such as desertions during the devshirme gathering, showing Muslim children and death row prisoners suitable for devshirme in exchange for money are mentioned by Vryonis Jr. (2019) and Veinstein (2013). The sad picture drawn by the Metropolitan of Thessaloniki, Isidore Glabas, who wrote especially on this subject, in the face of taking children and changing their customs, clothing style and speech, shows that the child levy practice was not welcomed by the people of the region (Barkey, 2013, p. 167). As a matter of fact, a negative view of the practice is also reflected in the folk song published by Todorov (1979, p. 47) written by a young man who refused to give his brother to the Turks despite the torture and loss of his limbs. If it is necessary to establish a close relationship between the devshirme and the *ghulam* system, an example of this similarity can be found in the travel book of Caterino Zeno. Caterino Zeno states that the reason for Uzun Hasan's rebellion against Cihan Shah and gathering the people around him was that he refused the demand to give three hundred children a year and called for an armed resistance against the enslavement of the people (Gündüz, 2016, p. 13).⁶⁰⁶ In this context, we clearly see that the practice of taking children from their families and giving them to the ruler is not easy to accept and it can quickly move into the field of social struggles.

A distinction must be made at this point. It is unclear whether these resistance tactics are due to the social status of the recruits. Moreover, associating the emergence of such resistances with status would mean simply reproducing the widespread orientalist perspective and the theory of 'Asian despotism', which can be summarized as 'the Janissary corps are the slaves of the sultan' (Veinstein, 2013, p. 116). It is more plausible that these tactics might have been made with religious motives against assimilation. It should be accepted that there are differences in terms of the experience of devshirme policy as a phenomenon and an image by different social classes. Exactly for this reason, the Ottoman literature, which opposed the appointment of bureaucrats of devshirme origin to high state positions, was uneasy about the recruitment of the high aristocracy, as it is evaluated especially in the examples of Rum Mehmed Pasha, Mesih Pasha and etc. On the other hand, it is seen that they did not react to the child levy

⁶⁰⁶ Zeno relates that Uzun Hasan called out to Cihan Shah (2016, p. 13): "Or, have I considered the children under my control to be subject to my own order, that I should give them to Cihan Shah as tax or should I count them as my own sons? If Cihan Shah wants to take them from their father and mother by the sword, I will not be satisfied with this job. In fact, if I knew I was going to give my life for resistance, I would still put my life on the line [tm]".

practices aimed to recruit Christian lower classes at the same rate. In this context, İdrîs-i Bitlisî's argument cannot be considered completely falsified, it is sufficient that it is not considered convincing in all cases. On the other hand, the privileges and social status provided by the Janissary are still undeniable. For example, Georgius interprets the fact that the Janissaries wear a white cloak or headdress as a sign of their status, by saying that "no one would dare to do so unless they were from the palace of the ruler [tm]" (as cited in Palmer, 2019, p. 498). Sakin (2011, p. 49) lists the meaning of Janissary corps in terms of social stratification in a few points as follows:

(...) acceptance to the Janissary corps meant joining a circle of concession. First of all, being close to the sultan and being directly dependent on him gave them an important reputation. (...) Janissaries had reputation in all parts of society, received a fairly high and regular salary compared to all Mediterranean and European countries, and had guarantee about disability situations and retirement opportunities. In addition, thanks to their solidarity fund so-called 'middle chest', the Janissary profession remained an attractive profession for a wide range of people. As a matter of fact, in many uprisings, the desire to expand this circle of privilege and financial means has been the motivating factor. [tm]

The definitive proof of the social status outlined above can be found in the fact that Muslim Bosniacs have the right to be recruited "as a sign of special grace" (Karamuk, 2019, p. 563). As a result, the devshirme method should be evaluated as a vertical mobilization systematic in Ottoman context. Radushev (2008, p. 448) describes the promotion of the devshirme into the military class as a real 'opportunity' that provides various financial comfort and economic advantages, and names the motives of this process as a 'social conversion' that cannot be reduced to mere conversion. But it is not necessary to think that this systematic is directly part of the function of social consent production. In terms of class schema, being accepted and promoted to the *Kapıkulu* status means being included in a privileged group, as Karamuk stated (2019, p. 563). Veinstein (2013, p. 121) associates the extraordinary status of the Janissary group, that even the simplest orders were communicated to them by the sultan, not with an ordinary edict, but with the *Hatt-ı Hümayun*. In this context, it would be wrong to consider the Janissaries simply as slave-soldiers. In fact, the presence of Muslim elements among the *Kapıkulu* groups in general, and the Janissaries in particular, renders this slavery argument null, because enslavement of Muslims was not seen in

Ottoman legal practice. Wittek (1955, p. 275) and Beydilli (2019a, pp. 132-33) draw attention to the incompatibility between Sharia and devshirme practice. According to this thesis, the origin of this practice is the custom and necessity (*'ada* and *darura*), which is used to suspend the religious provisions. As Karamuk (2019, p. 565) especially draws attention, the Ottoman reform literature, which strongly criticizes the entry of urbanites and vagrants into the Janissary corps, does not mention the breaking the Sharia when talking about the admission of Muslims by born to the corps. Considering that it is forbidden to enslave Muslims in Islamic law, the absence of this criticism shows that the connection between the problem and slavery was weak in the first place. In this context, it would be more accurate to consider the *Kapıkulu* members not simply as slaves/freed slaves, but as a social group that can take a collective stand in pursuit of their own interests. The most organized pressure organ of this social group is the Janissaries naturally, because of having armed power.

So, when did the Janissaries become a social stratum that was conscious of its own interests? Sakin (2011, p. 66) evaluates the Janissary revolts before the 16th century as “a manifestation of identifying their own interests with the interests of the state represented in the person of the sultan [tm]” and explains the attempts only after the 16th century by the Janissaries following their own specific interests. However, Sakin’s proposition in the last analysis follows the paradigm of ‘Ottoman decline’ and idealizes the Janissary group living in the classical period. Thus, as a result of the ‘degeneration’ of the Janissaries, an ahistorical narrative emerges as if they started to pursue their own interests. However, based on the information indicated by Veinstein (2013, pp. 118-19), considering the increase in the number of Janissaries to thirteen thousand during the Bayezid II period and the creation of the Agha divisions, it is certain that this group has already reached the power and organization to maintain its relative autonomy. An important detail at this point is that the military power of the timariot *sipâhîs* reached its natural limits at a very early date. The timariot *sipâhîs* and even the raiders were ineffective against the Hungarian infantry and Hussid battle tactics (*Wagenburg*) as early as the 15th century, and moreover, they were unsuccessful against the Aq Qoyunlu cavalry. In the memoirs of Janissary Constantine (Beydilli, 2019b, p. 89), he expresses the claim that Uzun Hasan made the following assessment after he was defeated by the Ottomans: “I did not know that Ottomans was inferior to me in terms of his cavalry. But as for the foot soldiers, they were superior to me, especially in the mountains [tm]”. The ineffectiveness of the Ottoman cavalry against the nomadic

tribal cavalry and disciplined infantry units, which made war a way of life, is a factor that increased the need for Janissaries both on the Balkan front and on the Eastern front. The fact that the Janissary units became decisive on the battlefield and increased in number must also have increased their influence in political life. In addition, the fact that the side chosen by the Janissaries was closer to seizing the throne in the dual-power situations that emerged during and after the interregnum period must have increased their political decisiveness. Janissary Constantine (Beydilli, 2019b, p. 102) states that in cases where two princes emerged with a claim on the throne, the person who first acquired the Janissaries also obtained the throne, and the Janissaries did not hand over the treasury to anyone unless an owner of the throne emerged. In the chronicle of Kreutel (1997, p. 64), the fact that Janissaries taking the treasure from Bayezid II by force and giving it to Prince Selim and forcing the ruler to surrender by saying “the treasure already belongs to us [tm]” summarizes the power of this group that can lead to a change the ruler.

It is possible to observe the position of the *Kapıkulus* in political thought. Yazıcızâde ‘Ali, in his work titled *Selçuknâme*, which he presented to Murat II, clearly states that if the servants are not treated well, they will become rebels and warns about this issue from the beginning (Bakır, 2008, p. 114). As a matter of fact, the Janissaries gave the signs of this in the Buçuk-Tepe revolt that took place in the first half of the 14th century, and Murat II’s re-accession to the throne was only possible by asking the Janissaries for their opinion and receiving their allegiance (İnalçık, 1954, p. 101). Moreover, as İnalçık (2018b, p. 206) pointed out, the development of an opinion among the ulama that the office of vizier was reserved for the only sultan’s servants during the reign of Mehmet II is one of the manifestations of this high status. The weakness of Sakin’s (2011, p. 66) argument is that he assumes that the Janissary organization and its boundaries can be drawn precisely based on a journal such as *Kavanin-i Yeniceriyan* written in the 17th century. However, it is a fact that the Janissaries developed social relations beyond the limits specified in *Kavanin-i Yeniceriyan* and they pursued their own interests. Kafadar (2017b, p. 33) reveals that, contrary to what this document shows, the Janissaries developed commercial relations and rented various shops, based on the records of the *waqf* of Hagia Sophia during the reign of Bayezid II. Even more interestingly, Kafadar (2017b, pp. 34-35) has identified a provision in an *ahkâm* book of the first half of the 16th century; In this recording, Janissary Mehmed, who applied to the *qadi* of Zihen, made the following complaint: “There is a farm inherited from my

father in the above-mentioned region. My brother Mustafa used the farm. Since Mustafa often came to see me, the governor of the region said that my brother had died, so he added the farm to the treasury and sold it with the animals and goods in it [tm]”. The verdict of the *qadi* was to investigate the incident and to return the farm if it belongs to these brothers (Kafadar, 2017b, p. 34). Kafadar’s inference based on this document is that a Janissary can inherit a farm and that this right is recognized by the state, revealing how a situation that seems quite extraordinary in the classical period paradigm was accepted as usual in legal documents. Moreover, Radushev (2008, p. 450) underlines that there are many ‘peasant Janissary’ records exist in the Balkan region. In any case, the fact that the Janissaries were involved in agricultural and commercial activities and could defend their own interests should be considered as a historical process. Behind this process, there were social struggles and articulation strategies covering long centuries, and thus power relations determine the emergence of phenomena that show the political influence of the *Kapıkulus*. For example, the operation of the middle chest, which was established in order to provide solidarity among the Janissaries, with the help of capital-owner money changers/usurers in the 17th century (Sakin, 2011, p. 70), should be read as the fruit of the century-long struggle of this power to impose and realize its own interests. During this period, the Janissaries obtained the right to marry and the opportunity to register their sons into their guild with the status of ‘*kulogullari*’, which is the clearest indicator of this struggle. In another example of the 17th century, the Janissaries who summoned Murad IV made requests that no one would be unjustly dismissed from their offices, and that the excessive taxes imposed on the people would be reduced (Sakin, 2011, p. 73). Similarly, this showed how they followed an active strategy of articulation and power seizure by being the spokespersons of different social segments. Furthermore, as a late example, the continuation of the influence and power of the Janissaries in modern Algeria even after the abolition of their guilds (Shuval, 2000, p. 328) is a proof of how effective relations they could develop in terms of power strategies. It should not be denied that this and similar strategies may be in effect for a long time.

Finally, it is necessary to take a look at the debates on the legitimacy of the power of Janissaries. In the 15th century, it can be followed between the lines of the works of the period that the status of the Janissaries against other military elements such as raiders and *sipâhîs* was not always clearly declared, or at least that different elements saw their privileged social position above the Janissaries. Since a more detailed analysis on this

topic will be made in the following subsections on discipline and army, it would be more appropriate to deal with the main references in the works of the period on the social legitimacy of the Janissaries. Discussions on the legitimacy of the Janissary army, one of the works of the period, proceed on a clear outline. The subject of this line is the Janissaries wearing white *börk* and the possible reasons of this tradition. Gölpınarlı, as a historian who studies the *Ahi* ‘şed’ tiding procedures and *Ahi* cones, argues that the Janissary *üsküf* (cap, *turban*) was modeled similar to the *Ahi* cone (2020b, p. 136). According to the same author, there is a certain affinity between Bektashism and *futuwwa* tradition, even Bektashis adopt the motto of *futuwwa* (Gölpınarlı, 2011, p. 59). In this context, it is clear that there is a necessary affinity between the Janissaries-*Ahis*-Bektashis. However, it is not clear enough from which channel the element of *börk* was derived and adopted by others. In the anonymous chronicle of Çimen (2006, p. 12), there is the following comment about why the Janissaries wore white bork: “Sâniyen âdet-i selâtîn üzere leşkere kisve vü libâs ta’yîn oluna ki, asker-i sultânî hem re’âyâdan mümtâz ve hem vakt-i harbde husamâ leşkerinden alem-i ifrâz imtiyâz olalar”.⁶⁰⁷ Similarly, İdrîs-i Bitlisî (2019, p. 188) grounds this practice by stating that wearing a common attire and adopting common principles will create closeness among the soldiers and that the ruler’s servants are distinguished from ordinary people.

Although this interpretation shows the objective meaning of the issue, the controversial part of the issue is shaped in the hands of two main views. The first of these argues that the Janissaries wearing white *börk* is a tradition realized with the patronage of Hacı Bektâş-ı Velî and tries to give the Janissary corps a divine legitimacy ground through the Bektashi order. The second pole of the debate -as it is seen especially in Âşıkpaşazâde - is based on the outright rejection of the legend about Hacı Bektâş-ı Velî and deprives the Janissaries of this divine source of legitimacy, or at least devalues this legend (Sariyannis, 2019, p. 37). The first approach can be exemplified in the history of Oruç Beg. According to Oruç Beg (2011, p. 32), dressing the Janissaries in white *börk* started in the time of Orhan Beg, and the first to suggest this practice was Orhan Beg’s brother Ali Pasha. Ali Pasha recommends that Orhan Beg’s soldier wear a white *börk* as a sign. Thus, while the other soldiers of Orhan Beg wore a red *börk*, the ruler and the Janissary would have a different status from other soldiers by wearing a

⁶⁰⁷ Secondly, a certain guises and dress should be determined for the soldiers, as is the custom of the rulers, so that the sultan’s soldier can both appear separate from the *reâyâ* and be clearly distinguishable from the enemy soldier in wartime.

white *börk*. According to Oruç Beg (2011, p. 32), Orhan Beg accepted this offer and sent a messenger to Hacı Bektâş and brought a white *börk* with his permission, first wearing it himself and then putting it on his ‘servants’. In the history of Neşrî (1949, p. 155), there is information that Orhan Beg went to Amasya, got permission from Hacı Bektâş and first wore it himself, then dressed it for the soldiers. In the anonymous chronicles of Öztürk, Çan and İğci, the details of the story are conveyed somewhat differently. According to these anonymous chronicels (Giese, 1992, p. 16; Öztürk, 2000, p. 18; Çan, 2006, p. 62; İğci, 2011, p. 7) Orhan Beg took the *börk* with the permission of repentance (*dest-i tövbe*) from the sons of “Hacı Bektaş-i Sultan” (only from “Hacı Bektaş Hünkar” in Giese anonymous), he personally wore the white *börk* and thus the tradition began. The fact that Hacı Bektâş is mentioned with greater praise in this version of the story (the word *sultan* is used) and that, for the sake of chronological consistency, it is not he who wears the *börk*, but his successors leading the order⁶⁰⁸, shows that this is a more elaborated version.⁶⁰⁹ In the work of the *Selâtinname*, the story of the white *börk* and the Bektashi order is narrated as if it had happened directly in the era of Osman Beg. In this version of the story (Öztürk, 2001, p. 41), Hacı Bektâş came to Osman Beg, and Osman Beg honored this white-cone dervish and saw his miracle, and thereupon, it is told that Hacı Bektâş prayed for Osman Beg to continue his reign as long as the world stood still, and put a ‘*tac*’ (special type of turban of a particular *sûfi* order) on him. Osman Beg wears the guise of Hacı Bektâş, and the white *börk* of the Janissaries is considered to be Hacı Bektâş’s clothing (Öztürk, 2001, p. 429).⁶¹⁰

In both versions of the story, the fact that the white bork was first worn by the ruler shows the superiority of this status symbol, and for this reason, there is a claim that the Janissaries had a higher status than the other soldiers. In the memoirs of Janissary Constantine (Beydilli, 2019b, pp. 35-36) he states that it was decided to wear

⁶⁰⁸ Primary sources of this period, especially the *velâyetname* of Hacı Bektâş-ı Velî, do not contain any information about whether Hacı Bektâş got married and had children (Özlü, 2015, p. 503). In this case, it is highly probable that the son in question is a member of the *tariqa* lineage.

⁶⁰⁹ In the İdrîs-i Bitlisî version of the story (2019, p. 177), the figure of Hacı Bektâş does not appear. Instead, it is claimed that the white cap was put on the soldier in accordance with the hadith ‘The best of clothes is the whitest one’. In this version, too, the Islamization of the practice is in question, but he censored Bektashi order and brought a more orthodox interpretation in his own way. Similarly, Hacı Bektâş is not mentioned in Hadîdî’s history (1991, p. 60).

⁶¹⁰ Another version of this story exist in the *menâkıbnâme* of Seyyid Ali Sultan. According to him of the *menâkıbnâme* the headdress of the saints coming from Khorasan is white and Bayezid I saw and accepted this cap from here (Yıldırım, 2007, p. 163).

a white headdress for the foot soldiers who would later become the Janissaries and adds that no one else would dare to wear such a thing on their heads. İdris-i Bitlisî (2019, p. 176) also shows the necessity of arranging the situation of every part of the ruling class (*berâyâ*) as the reason for this decision, that is, it points to the symbolic order of the status relations between the dominant strata. Considering that the Ottoman rulers were registered as the number one member of the Janissary corps, it becomes clear that this symbolic relationship between the ruler and the Janissary was a clear status relationship. Secondly, the reason why Hacı Bektâş's permission to wear the white *börk* was obtained is not clear in this story. It is certain that the story is a fabrication, since it is not possible to reasonably explain why Orhan Beg, as a ruler, felt the need to go to Hacı Bektâş on this matter, which was within his jurisdiction, and moreover, it was not possible for such an event to occur chronologically. However, in the second version of the story, this chronology error was skillfully corrected. Thus, the story becomes an origin narrative that serves to justify the superior status of the janissaries and exhibits a mythical characteristic. In the final analysis, the story that the origin of the white *börk* is based on Hacı Bektâş, consecrates the Janissaries in the eyes of the raiding Turkmen groups and invites a symbolic reconciliation. Oruç Beg's mention of Hacı Bektâş as 'Hacı Bektâş from Horasan' must be related to the popularity of this saint figure in the myth among Turkmen groups. The use of this figure elevates the status of the Janissary corps above other groups in real terms, while trying to legitimize this status difference in the common memory with the help of a figure that Turkmen groups also respect symbolically. For example, in the *velâyetnâme* of Otman Baba, it is strongly argued that the white *börk* is the guise of Hacı Bektâş (Yalçın, 2008, p. 242).

Âşıkpaşazâde, on the other hand, narrates this story in a completely different way. According to his narrative (Apzd, 2017, p. 48), Orhan Beg's brother, Aladdin Pasha, suggested wearing a white *börk* to make a difference because the begs around were wearing red *börk*, and Orhan Beg accepted this suggestion and was produced white *börks* in Bilecik then dressed his soldiers with them. He asserts that the story of the Janissaries wearing white *börk* with the permission of Hacı Bektâş is a lie made up by the Bektashis (Apzd, 2017, p. 203). Even Âşıkpaşazâde reverses the story. According to him, Abdal Musa, one of the dervishes of Hacı Bektâş, came to the *ghaza* during the time of Orhan Beg and was among the Janissaries, bought an old *börk* from them, and was very proud of it when he returned to his hometown. Over time, this white *börk* became a Bektashi headdress by taking the name "*bükme elif tac*" (Apzd, 2017, p. 204).

Not only does the author imply that this claim was made up by the Bektashis to lure the Janissaries into their ranks, but he also goes further and claims that Hacı Bektâş did not establish a *sûfî* order and he was not a sheik (he was a *meczub*, naive saint), and there were ‘absurd’ and ‘satanic customs’ among Bektashis (Apzd, 2017, p. 204). In addition, Âşıkpaşazâde adds to his narrative that no one from the Ottoman dynasty could have spoken to Hacı Bektâş and that the person who said this was lying (Apzd, 2017, p. 204). As a result, Âşıkpaşazâde not only does not accept the Hacı Bektâş motif in the white *börk* story, but also questions the Islamic legitimacy of Bektashi order.

Behind this debate lies the legacy of the power alliance between warriors and dervish groups, whose roots could be seen in *Saltuknâme* and *Danişmendnâme* and even in Âşık Paşa’s *Garibnâme*. In these works, wandering warriors who act under the patronage of the *sûfî* orders or saints are the narrative subjects, and while the saints give religious legitimacy to the raiding/looting activities of the warriors, the warriors offer the guarding shadow of their weapons to the dervish circles. In this mutualistic relationship, dervishes represent religious authority and warriors represent *de facto* ruling power. The establishment of the Janissary corps under the authority of the state and its power to suppress other military elements undermines the social prestige of the dervish-raider relationship. In particular, the fact that the ruler wore a white bork with ‘*dest-i tövbe*’ is a discourse created to give the impression that he became a follower of the Bektashi order. It is highly probable that there are more sophisticated examples of this expression in anonymous chronicles, indicating the ruler’s affiliation to the Bektashi order circulated in verbal culture among the people. Especially during the reign of Bayezid II, Balım Sultan was brought from lodge of Kızıl Deli in Dimetoka as the Sheik of the Hacı Bektâş order in Sulucakarahöyük, and in a way, the establishment of an official Bektashi order in this way (Demir, 2017, p. 68) prepares a ground that can provoke such rumors. In this context, dervish circles such as *Vefâîs*, who were pushed into the background, opposed the Janissaries being presented with a source of divine legitimacy, and moreover, they had difficulty to accept that a group that can be an alternative to them -the Bektashis- seized a share of the social authority (and of course rentier grants) in this way. Moreover, due to their closeness with the *ghazi* circles, it is noticed that they did not take kindly to Janissaries’ attaining such a social status, at least in the case of Âşıkpaşazâde. On the other hand, as it was analyzed in the dream myth and the story of Geyikli Baba, the *Vefâîs* evaluated that it is a more correct strategy to dedicate the functions of providing divine legitimacy directly to the Ottoman family

itself. It should be noted that this strategy is not unique to *Vefâîs* only. The story in *Selâtinname* (Öztürk, 2001, pp. 41-42) that Hacı Bektâş grant a reign to the Ottoman dynasty after Osman Beg showed respect to Hacı Bektâş, the Edebâli figure was replaced with Hacı Bektâş, presents a similar narrative example.

VI.II.II. Political Regime and General Political Tendencies

It is seen that the contradictions between *timar* holders, Janissaries and *ghazis*/declassé warriors became visible during the Murat II period and this conflict had serious repercussions at the level of the vizierate. While one side of this conflict manifests itself with the change of viziers, the second shows itself in policies that go back and forth between war and peace. For example, Oruç Beg frequently states that Murat II often lived in the palace in Edirne, did not go on expeditions or went to highlands.⁶¹¹ In this period, Mehmet Agha, Saruca Pasha and Çandarlı İbrahim Pasha came to the fore as the viziers of Murat II. It can be thought that Çandarlı İbrahim and Saruca Pasha were included in the peace party, while Mehmet Agha was the representative of the Janissaries. Oruç Beg informs the reader in a critical tone that there were very few expeditions in this period, especially during the six years (833-840) under the command of Murat II. In this context, for example, Saruca Pasha hid an incident that may cause the war, the rebuilding of the Semendire Castle by the Serbian ruler, from Murat II. It is necessary to interpret this incident in terms of the interests of the peace party, because it is understood that the same Saruca Pasha also mediated the peace negotiations, from the fact that he led the delegation that brought daughter of Vilak the King of Serbia to Murat II as a bride (Oruç, 2011, p. 69). However, at the end of this process, it is seen that Murat II dismissed all viziers (Halil Pasha and Saruca Pasha) included in the peace party together with Mehmet Agha and replaced them with Fazlullah. İnalçık (2020) describes the treasurer Fazlullah as a “relentless supporter of conquest and war [tm]”. If we recall once again that Âşıkpaşazâde asserted the fact of money shortness emerged from time to time during the reign of Murat II and that

⁶¹¹ There are frequent references in the sources of the period that Murat II was busy with drinking and entertainment meetings. For example, Oruç Beg (2011, p. 78) said for Murat II that: “He enthroned his son Sultan Mehmed and made him an independent sultan. He entrusted the throne to him, and he arrived in Manisa again and spent time with entertainment and drinking [tm]”. For the description of these meetings, see: The introduction to the work *Gazavât-ı Sultan Murad bin Muhammed Han* by Zaifi (Çelebioğlu, 2018, p. 354 ff.). In Lâmi’î Çelebi’s *Letâifnâme* (2015, p. 113), there is information that Murat II established a drinking and dance meeting, the oud was played and whirling, and his summer house was shaken by entertainment.

Fazlullah suggested forcible collection of *zakat* from the people for the solution of this, it is possible to think that one of the origins of the ‘relentless conquest and war’ policy is at least the pursuit of increasing state revenues (Apzd, 2017, p. 199). In this case, it is clear that war and peace cycles may also have a financial basis, at least hypothetically. So, it is possible to argue that the war party formed a political bloc together with the extremists and the *ghazis*, and that this bloc developed legitimacy relations through increasing and redistribution of state revenue. On the other hand, it can be thought that the members of the peace party prioritized their own commercial interests (for example, the Çandarlı family) and focus on preserving the existing class balance rather than operating the redistribution function. Because it is seen that after Fazlullah became a vizier, a great war mobilization started and this party was led by frontier lords, timariot soldiers and raiders. Oruç Beg writes his most pompous lines about the period on this event (2011, p. 70):

The infidel Lord of Wallachia, Dracula, walked ahead. Karaman, Anatolia, Kastamonu soldiers, azaps of Anatolia and Rumelia reached twenty thousand people. İshak Beg Ghazi, Turahan Beg Ghazi and Evrenus Beg’s son Ali Beg, the ghazis of frontier begs, those who washed their hands and faces with the blood of infidels, came with thirty forty thousand raiders. Thirty thousand raiders rushed to each of them. They were seventy eighty or thousand people. The remaining soldiers of Sultan Murat, azaps and Janissaries were ready. [tm]

It should be noted that the Janissaries were counted last in these lines and no sign of appreciation was found about them. However, in the following period, the status of the frontier lords declined in the face of the *Kapıkulus* due to a series of failures of the raiders. Eroğlu (2016a, pp. 88-89) points out that no one of the Turahanogulları, Evrenosogulları and Mihalogulları was appointed as a governor or a vizier in this new context. The ineffectiveness of the light cavalry units used by the raiders against the battalion tactics used by Hunyadi János’ army is one of the main factors of this decline. In addition, Veinstein (2013, p. 117) states that Janissaries are needed for castle sieges and the use of firearms. There are two crucial examples in this regard in the history of Oruç Beg. In the first example, during the raid of the frontier lord Mezid Beg to Hungary, he both lost his life and many people, even the *tovcas* with to him, died, and that raid ended in failure and the army was disbanded against János’ soldiers (Oruç, 2011, p. 72). The second example occurred between Turahan Beg and Rumelia raiders

during the incident when Hunyadi János came in front of the Izladi Pass. According to Oruç Beg (2011, pp. 73-74), Turahan Beg talked to the raiders and invited them to battle, saying that the enemy was few in number, but the raiders and *tovcas* did not enter the battle. As a result, the forces of Kasım Pasha, who were left alone, were defeated and many begs died. Oruç Beg's narrative shows that the raiders hesitated to fight the army of Hunyadi János and fled. Another example, close to both examples, took place during the march of the Ottoman army under the command of Şehabeddin Pasha to Hungary. Oruç Beg (2011, p. 72) mentions that Şehabeddin Pasha dispersed the raiders during the advance and, carried out the campaign with the Janissary army in addition to frontier lords under his command. Oruç Beg (2011, pp. 72-73) states that Şehabeddin Pasha was defeated, fifteen begs were killed during the battle, the Pasha escaped and meanwhile the Janissaries were busy with plundering. While Âşıkpaşazâde gives information about the same incident, he focuses especially on the attitudes of Şehabeddin Pasha (Kulaca Şahin). According to him, Şehabeddin Pasha was busy with eating and drinking, acted like a drunk and a coward rather than a warrior, and fled without looking back during the battle (Apzd, 2017, p. 131). In the background of both interpretations, there is an immanent criticism that Şehabeddin Pasha was of *Kapıkulu* origin.⁶¹² The fact that the dynasty, which did not trust the raiders, tried to carry out these expeditions especially by the soldiers of *Kapıkulu* origin, was the subject of criticism by Oruç Beg and Âşıkpaşazâde who were the representatives of the *ghazi* and frontier circles. Oruç Beg's criticism includes information that is seen for the first time in the chronicles, such as the indiscipline of the Janissaries. These three examples clearly show that the frontier lords had difficulties in managing the *ghazis* and that the contradictions between the Janissaries and the *ghazis* came to the fore. In this contradiction schema, while Âşıkpaşazâde bases his criticism on the moral weaknesses of the *Kapıkulus*, Oruç Beg recognizes the inadequacy of the raiders and shows the Janissaries and Şehabeddin Pasha as responsible for the tragedy that resulted in the death of the great lords. However, as İnalçık pointed out (1954, p. 57), the begs of the *sipâhî* army, the sanjak begs and the frontier lords such as Turahan Beg, often deserted, fearing to enter the battle. Based on the anonymous work *Gazavât-ı Sultan Murat b. Mehemed Han*, İnalçık (1954, p. 58) states that Murat II did not favor any of these begs, did not honor them, and stated that he could not rely on them.

⁶¹² See: Emecen (2019b).

Another example in which this struggle has become visible is manifested in the fact that the status of the *timar* holders has degraded compared to the past. Losing status relative to the status of the dynasty, in the final analysis, means losing status in the face of the main allies of the dynasty, the *Kapıkulu* members. It can be followed this status change through a few examples. The first example emerges as a result of the Serbian King Vilak's sending his daughter to Murat II as a bride. Murat II neither held a wedding nor accepted the dowry by saying "There is no need for a wedding even for the daughter of an infidel cavalry [tm]" (Apzd, 2017, p. 124). Although the enmity between King Vilak and the Karamanids and Hungarians were effective in the emergence of this event, marriage should be considered as a sign of peace. The detail pointing to the anomaly is that peace is re-established at the expense of the status relationship becoming more asymmetrical than before. Another example emerges in the case of the request for amnesty and the rejection of the Ban of Czechia, which was seized by the Ottoman troops during the Battle of Kosovo. The Ban of Czechia offers to be a vassal to Murat II, promises to participate in wars with five thousand soldiers every year, to give ten fortresses with precious metals on their lands, to have an Ottoman tribute collector come in his country and to accept the Ottoman Law, and to pay a ransom of one hundred thousand gold coins for himself (Apzd, 2017, p. 140). On the other hand, Murat II had him executed by saying 'I don't need the things you offered, neither his property, nor your castle, nor his soldiers' (Apzd, 2017, p. 140). This example shows that the Ottoman military power and wealth, when compared to both its vassals and neighboring states, developed to such an extent that it was unnecessary to make alliances with them and reached the level to dominate its environment for the first time. Another example in which the status of vassals became visible occurred during the inspection by Murat II of the soldiers who joined the army before the Battle of Kosovo. Murat II did not like the appearance and equipment of the incoming soldier, and insulted the Karamanid commander Akçaylıoğlu and his troops as follows (Apzd, 2017, p. 139): "In the grace of God, though, I do not need his help. But for some reason it was fine that he sent them. The only thing my soldier lacked was a jester. It was sent for him. I don't need anything from him and I don't ask for help [tm]". As can be seen in these examples, it is quite natural that the increase in power and wealth brings along new phases of alienation. Moreover, the military force that Murat II relied on compared to the local soldiers and vassal armies is the Janissaries.

An example is found in chronicles in this context is particularly striking. During the reign of Murat II, an unprecedented method of domination was applied over the vassals. After the simultaneous advance of the Karamanids with the Hungarians, Murat II used the terror method to discipline the Karamanids. Âşıkpaşazâde did not hesitate to express the first use of this method, even if it was implicit (Apzd, 2017, p. 123): “Sual: Ya Konya’nın ve Larende’nin zulmünü kim etti? Cevap: Sebep ne olduğunu ve hem ne zamanda olduğunu işitesin diye sana haber vereyim. Sultan Murad’ın Karaman’a ilk seferinin tarihi hicretin 839’unda [1436] vaki oldu.”⁶¹³

It is quite interesting that Âşıkpaşazâde uses the term ‘*zulm*’. It is natural that the concept of ‘*zulm*’ brings to mind examples such as looting, rape and murder. In an Ottoman historical calendar of 856 Hijri (1452/53), there is information that the cities and provinces of Konya and Larende were destroyed and looted (Atsız, 2019, p. 211). In this context, another example mentioned by Âşıkpaşazâde clearly reveals that the content of the concept should be understood exactly in this way (Apzd, 2017, p. 132):

(...) hünkar dahi gazaba gelip İslam askerini topladı ve Rumeli’nin kendisine tabi ne kadar kafir askeri varsa onları dahi beraber alıp yürüdü; Konya’ya çıktı. Yağma buyurdu. Karaman ülkesini şöyle vurdular ki şehirlerini ve köylerini elek elek ettiler. Harab eylediler. Karamanoğlu kaçıp Taşeli’ne girdi. O yıl nice erkek ve kız çocukları doğdu. Soyları soyları bilinmedi.⁶¹⁴

Âşıkpaşazâde defines these actions as persecution again and says that “Karamanoğlu İbrahim Beg was the reason why the Ottomans attacked the country and persecuted Islam [tm]” (Apzd, 2017, p. 133). But this explanation is not enough to cover up the crime of persecution. Moreover, Âşıkpaşazâde does not deny that persecution was committed. İncılık (1954, p. 56) states that the advent operation in the campaign against Karamanids was carried out by Murat II’s son, who was alive at that time, and that he may be responsible for the atrocities in question. Another example occurs when the people helped the Hungarian forces after the city of Sofia was captured by Hunyadi

⁶¹³ Question: Who persecuted Konya and Larende? Answer: Let me tell you so you can hear what the cause is and when it happened. The date of Sultan Murad's first expedition to Karaman took place eight hundred and thirty-nine years after the Hegira [1436].

⁶¹⁴ Even the sultan got angry and gathered the Islamic soldiers and took all the infidel soldiers in Rumelia who were subordinate to him and marched together; He went to Konya. He ordered plunder. They struck the land of Karaman in such a way that they sifted through their cities and villages. They ruined it. Karamanoğlu escaped and entered Taşeli. Many boys and girls were born that year. Their ancestry is unknown.

János, and Murat II ordered that everyone who brought grain to Hunyadi János should be killed and their property, wives and sons captured. In the anonymous *gazavâtnâme* (İnalçık & Oğuz, 1989, p. 17), this incident is narrated as follows:

Kaçan kim başları Padişah gördü, bildi kim, cümle re'aya küffara taptı. Padişah ol saat ferman eyledi kim, her kimin gönlünde var ise varsınlar ve küffara zahire götürenlerden her kimi tutarlarsa eğer voynuk ve eğer re'aya başlarını kesüp ve mallarını alsınlar ve 'avretlerin oğlanların esir eylesinler (...) [askerler] her kangı karyeye varırlarsa erlerini kırup ve 'avretlerin oğlanların esir eylediler ve anbarlarında zehayiri yağma ve emval erzaklarını alurlardı.⁶¹⁵

The events in the Ottoman history in which men were killed and women and children were captured are mostly signifies the invasion during the Mogol invasion and are cited as an obvious example of persecution. For example, in a historical calendar of Hijri 858 (Gregorian 1454), there is a narrative of persecution that Cengiz and Hülagu devastated the provinces of Iraq, Iran and Turan, they plundered, people in there destroyed, boys, girls and women were captured (Atsız, 2019, p. 143). In this framework, it would be appropriate to evaluate the said practices as persecution even within the Ottoman political discourse, and to formulate this systematic persecution as a method of terror.

As a result, this policy continued without any change during the reign of Mehmet II. In İdris-i Bitlisi's *Heşt Behişt*, there is information that the complaints were conveyed to Murat II that Mehmet II made harsh attacks against his vassals and neighboring countries and treated vassals such as Karamanoglu and Kastamonu ruler at the level of servants (as cited in İnalçık, 1954, p. 89) shows the continuity of this policy. In the previous sections, while quoting the lines of Şeyhoğlu Mustafa advising the ruler to behave in accordance with the title of '*kahhar*' (devastater), it was stated that the threat of terror on the Christian subjects included an emphasis on continuity, and therefore constituted a power strategy in itself. At the current stage, it is seen that this threat is

⁶¹⁵ When the sultan saw their leaders, he knew that all the people were serving the unbeliever. At that hour, the sultan decreed that whoever had this in their heart should go and cut off their heads, take their property, and make captives of their women and boys, regardless of whether they were *voynuk* or *re'aya*, whoever took that unbeliever to grains (...). [the soldiers] killed their men and made captives of men and women in any village they reached, and took their loot of grain and supplies of property in their warehouses.

not only valid for Christian subjects, and the imperial order can apply the same method to Muslim subjects.

VI.II.III. 'Resignation' of the Ruler and Reorientation of the Politics

It is clear that the strategical vision during the reign of Murat II was closer to the peace party. İnalçık (1954, p. 82) considers this tendency as one and the same thing with Çandarlı Halil Pasha's policies. Murat II's general course of action can be read as not disturbing the current balance, unless he is faced with an insurrection from the vassal states or an invasion such as Hunyadi János's military advance. This situation can be read as one of the leading strategies created to protect the current power of the Ottoman state, and as Eroğlu (2016a, p. 90) states, it can be formulated as an administrative understanding that aims to maintain political *status-quo*. Oruç Beg (2011, p. 71) states that even after the raids motivated by the vizier Fazlullah, Murat II did not go on a military expedition and did not move from his place. Furthermore, Oruç Beg (2011, p. 72) states that Murat II himself did not move in 844 Hijri (1440-1441) and he gave permission to the frontier lords to attack Hungary and he stayed in the plateau for the summer season. These statements are strikingly similar to the criticisms written for Emir Süleyman. Murat II would relinquish the reign completely and hand over the throne to his son Mehmet, after he won the success against Hunyadi János, Serbian Kingdom and Karamanid threat and re-established the *status-quo* (Oruç, 2011, p. 74). Âşıkpaşazâde explains the event as follows: "(...) Even Sultan Murad Han came to Edirne. Said to Halil Pasha: 'I will ascend my son on the throne. I have made many ghaza expeditions. Now even my son, let me see in my life, what kind of a sultan he will become [tm].'" Still, we have some clues that tense political relations may have developed over time between Murat II and Mehmet II. The following expressions in Murat II's testament can be read as trying to put a distance between him and his son (Uzunçarşılı, 1958, p. 3): "(...) sonra evlâdumdan ve ensabumdan filcümle soyumdan sopumdan herkim ki ölicecek olursa benüm yanumda komıyalar ve katuma getürmeyeler."⁶¹⁶

There are two different interpretations of the resign of the ruler together with the testament. The first interpretation is based on Küçük's proposition mentioned above, pointing to the contradiction between the war and peace parties, while the second interpretation belongs to İnalçık (1954, p. 69; 2018, p. 27) and he makes a suggestion

⁶¹⁶ Then whoever of my children, members of my lineage and relatives dies, let them not bury me next to me or bring them to me.

that Murat II made such a move in order to ensure that his son would be reign in case the Byzantine Emperor would place Orhan, the grandson of Bayezid I, on the Ottoman throne. Both propositions are partially true. If we interpret Küçük's argument, the abdication of Murat II can be interpreted as avoiding war, since a junior ruler cannot be the commander-in-chief of the army. İnalçık's proposition can be considered valid if the interests of the peace party are at stake. The reason for this is that Murat II, as a vizier alongside Mehmet II, appointed Halil Pasha who can be considered the head of the peace party, and Mevlânâ Hüsrev to the office of *qadiasker*. On the other hand, he imprisoned Turahan Beg, who was indicated by Âşıkpaşazâde (2017, p. 134) as caused to fight the infidels. In this context, it was crucial that Murat II's crowning his son, who is under his supervision, for the institutionalization of the peace policy. Thus, it is clear that if Prince Orhan, who was held by Byzantium, comes to power, he will follow a similar policy and be more or less accepted by the peace party.

On the other hand, it is not as easy to understand the fact that Murat II was called to the head of the army and his re-enthronement is as easy as understanding his descent from the throne. Âşıkpaşazâde sees the call of the 'people of the country' as the cause of this incident. When Hunyadi János passed through Belgrade and marched on Varna, the 'people of the country' said to Murat II, "My Sultan! What do you stand? The infidels attacked and marched on. They are coming. The country was devastated. Muslims were defeated [tm]" (Apzd, 2017, p. 135), and they persuade him. In his other evaluations on the subject, Âşıkpaşazâde insists that this offer came from the 'people'. But Oruç Beg (2011, p. 75) is of the opinion that there is some kind of conspiracy behind this event: "On the one hand, they sent news to Sultan Murad. Cebe Ali arrived and showed all kinds of evidence and removed Sultan Murad from his place. Brought him [tm]". The narratives of both Âşıkpaşazâde and Oruç Beg can be interpreted in a way that essentially creates a whole. If the demand from the 'people' is understood not as a call from the '*reâyâ*', but as an expectation that emerges from the *sipâhîs* and city dwellers, who form the largest part of the ruling class, a unity would be established between the two sources. If we explain the content of the narrative, Cebe/Cübbe Ali is the Sancak Beg of Bursa and uncle of Tursun Beg (Tulum, 2013, p. xii). Tursun Beg (1977, pp. 34-35) states that it was Çandarlı Halil Pasha who sent Cebe Ali to the Murad

II.⁶¹⁷ In this framework, it can be thought that Cebe Ali represents the interests of the *timar* holders and the settled classes, while Tursun Beg's criticisms of the Mehmet II period are also based on this class pattern, as will be examined later. For example, Tursun Beg (1977, p. 35) states that Çandarlı Halil Pasha's biggest supporter in his attempt to restore Murat II to the throne were 'beg's: "Because Halil Pasha (...) was the grand vizier, the center of power, he made the begs subordinate to him (...) sent messages that this was the opinion of the begs (...) and made the begs say words in line with his own opinion (...) [tm]"

If we focus on Tursun Beg's narrative, it is possible to place why this event took place within the framework of the power struggle. Tursun Beg cites Halil Pasha's effort to prevent the possibility of Mehmet II making 'excessive demands' and 'being independent' as the reason for inviting Murat II to the throne again. Since these lines contain very interesting and difficult to analyze references, it would be more accurate to quote them as they are (Tursun, 1977, p. 34):

Halil Pâşâ (...) fikrin itti ki, pâdişâh-zâde henûz şükûfe-i nâ-şüküftedür, ve gonca-i tâzedür; âlem-i tufûliyyet temâşâgâhlarından ferâğ görmemiştir, ve lezzet-i emmâret -ki müskir-i ukul-i fuhûldür- dimâğında karâr bulmamıştır; mebâdâ, mürûr-ı eyyâm ile tenâvül-i müşkirat-ı emmâretten dimâğına heva-yı istiklâl mütesâ'id ola, (...) Bir memlekette fitne olur iki pâdişâh diye; dahı tazarrur u ızrâr âsârı zuhura gele, tarafeyne nisbet vahâmet-i âkıbet ola diyü, gice gündüz saltanat yine Sultân Murâd'a avdet itmesinün tedbîrinde idi.⁶¹⁸

Moving on to the interpretation of this paragraph, there are three crucial points to consider. The first of these focuses on 'youthness/inexperience', the second on 'dizzying desires', and the third on the existence of 'two sultans in one country'. First of all, it is seen the emphasis on Mehmet II's being young and inexperienced in the first lines of the excerpt. However, if we pay attention, these descriptions of youth do not

⁶¹⁷ İnalçık mentions this name as Kassabzâde Mahmud Beg (1954, p. 70). On the other hand, the Ottoman chronicle written by Yusuf b. Abdullah (1997, p. 144) during the reign of Bayezid II mentions the names of both Cebe Ali Beg and Kassabzâde Mehmed Beg.

⁶¹⁸ Halil Pasha (...) thought that the sultan's son is an unopened flower, a new bud; he could not get rid of the interests and inclinations of his childhood, and the taste of excessive desires that dazzled the notables has not yet been balanced in his mind; it is possible that as the days pass the desire to be independent rises in him by drinking alcoholic substances, and because the two sultans will cause disorder in a country, the consequences of loss will occur, and there may be detrimental consequences for both parties, he was always striving for the sultanate to return to Sultan Murad.

specifically indicate an inexperience in state administration. Although Eroğlu's (2016a, p. 90) comment on these lines mostly focuses on the lack of reigning experience, this is an overly optimistic interpretation. The emphasis in these lines is mostly on the possibility of falling into dizzying desires due to childhood aspirations. So, what are these dizzying aspirations and desires? If we list the information indicated above, it is understood that these desires may be related to youth interests, tendencies or drives. Secondly, it is implied in the text that Mehmet II is not yet old enough to control such drives. I think it is possible to interpret these emphases as signs of lack of self-control (or barely lack of control), ambition and aggression. If a historical over-interpretation of these two points is made, it is possible to think that Halil Pasha was afraid that Mehmet II would disrupt the current balance by joining the war party due to his youth and inexperience. İnalçık interprets this passage (1954, pp. 90-91) as Mehmet II's desire to conquer Constantinople. The argument presented in Tursun Beg's history seems to use a balance-extremity dichotomy model frequently used in Islamic and mystical discourse. In this model, excessive desires, desires and passions are considered as demonic factors that are feared to disrupt both the spiritual balance of the individual and the social balance. At this point, it would be more appropriate to evaluate Halil Pasha's political vision and practice within the vision of the peace party. The third point that Tursun Beg emphasizes is based on the argument that there should not be two sultans on one throne. This proposition is essentially absurd because there is only one ruler since Mehmet II was already on the throne. In this case, when talking about the two rulers, is the possibility of Murat II's re-claiming of reign being mentioned? It is quite difficult to find sufficient reason to think so. The emphasis in the paragraph was quoted points to Mehmet II as the person who is likely to have passions. In that case, it is necessary to consider that Halil Pasha already saw Mehmet II as the legitimate ruler and claimed that the possibility of Mehmet II pursuing the idea of 'independence' and acting on his own would reveal the conflictual situation named 'two sultans on one throne'. İnalçık (1954, p. 80) interprets these lines as an expression of confusion as to which of Murat II, residing in Manisa, and Mehmet II, residing in Edirne, was the sultan -or both ruled separately in Rumelia and Anatolia. But I do not agree with this argument. I think that the emphasis in the quoted text is not due to confusion, but to the search for a position against the possibility of emergence of the state of 'two sultans'. In this context, it is clear that they base the legitimacy of the political system in which Halil Pasha and his circle are in the center, on Murat II, and they expect Mehmet II to act only and only

within this framework. The danger for Halil Pasha is that Mehmet II does not act in accordance with this role and fosters tendencies such as breaking the *status-quo* and belligerence, which can be defined as ‘excessive demands’, and in the final analysis, fulfill his mission without strengthening the hand of the war party. For this very reason, Murad II was enthroned again and the power to take initiative in case of war was tried to be kept in the hands of the peace party as a position. In the anonymous *gazavâtnâme* (İnalcık & Oğuz, 1989, pp. 49-50), it is stated that then the prince Mehmet also demanded to join the war, but this request was not conveyed to Murad II by Halil Pasha, and finally Murad II’s left the prince Mehmet behind the battle front. İnalcık (1954, p. 80) states in the light of this information, that there is a struggle about who will go to the Battle of Varna as the commander-in-chief, while Zaganoz, Şehabeddin and İbrahim Pashas were trying to take Mehmet II as a commander, Çandarlı Halil put forward and support Murad II. After the Battle of Varna was won, the release of Turahan Beg, one of the notables of the frontier lords, at the request of Azap Beg (Apzd, 2017, p. 136), shows that the war party also tried to gain ground, but it is likely that the same Azap Beg was the ambassador to Egypt after the war. It is a sign that it has been taken out of sight for a while. On the other hand, Murad II’s promises to various social groups in order to increase the participation in the Battle of Varna must have strengthened the position of the ruler and provided the support of various social strata. In the anonymous *gazavâtnâme* (İnalcık & Oğuz, 1989, p. 14), it is stated that Murad II made the following promises:

(...) sefere varanların her ne müraca’atleri var ise, katımda makbul-i hümayunumdur, eğer timar isteyene ve eğer ze’amet isteyene ve eğer yeniçerilik isteyene ve eğer sipahilik isteyene ve eğer yörüklükten çıkmak isteyene her birinin maksudları makbulümdür deyü fermanlar yazılıb ve taraf be-taraf etraf ve eknafa perakende olunup (...).⁶¹⁹

How these political relations and contradictions evolved after the Battle of Varna is also a matter of debate. Yusuf b. Abdullah (1997, p. 161) states that Murad II returned directly to Manisa. Oruç Beg (2011, p. 78) notes that after the Battle of Varna, Murad II

⁶¹⁹ Edicts were written and distributed all over the place saying that whatever demands the participants of the military expedition have, they will be accepted by me, the demands of those who demand a *timar*, those who want to get a *zeâmet*, those who want to enter the Janissary corps, those who want to become cavalymen, and those who want to settle down will be accepted.

left the throne and went to Manisa and started to spend his days with entertainment and drinking. He claims that when Mehmet II had minted coins for his own name and became the ruler, as a result of the Janissaries' revolt in Buçuktepe and the pillaging of Şehabeddin Pasha's house, the viziers gathered among them and put Murat II on the throne again (Oruç, 2011, p. 78), and that the Battle of Kosovo took place after that date. On the contrary, Âşıkpaşazâde states that Mehmet II was sent to Manisa after the Battle of Varna and Murat II ascended the throne (Apzd, 2017, p. 136). Tursun Beg does not make a special comment on this subject and dates Mehmet II's accession to the throne after Murat II's death. Sakaoğlu (2017, p. 84) records that after the Battle of Varna, *fetihnâmes* were sent to Muslim states in the name of Mehmet II. Based on this information, it can be thought that Mehmet II was officially on the throne until the Buçuktepe incident, and Murat II was brought to the position of military dictatorship to manage the emergency situation. The incident of the Janissaries rising up and raiding Şehabeddin Pasha's house in the Buçuktepe incident is considered as Halil Pasha's attempt to eliminate his opponent (İnalçık, 1954, p. 93). Nevertheless, we can understand through this event that the Janissaries became an undeniable force in the establishment of class order. The information given by Oruç Beg (2011, p. 79) about the structure of the army in the Battle of Kosovo that took place after this event shows that the Janissaries, whose number was determined as eight thousand, became superior to the *akıncı*, *azap* and *cerchor* units. According to Chalkokondyles, an attempt similar to the Buçuktepe incident broke out in Edirne when Mehmet II took action to take the throne after the death of his father, Janissaries gathered to plunder the city, but they were stopped thanks to Halil Pasha's attempts (İnalçık, 1954, p. 110). Although it is hypothetically possible to consider this second attempt as a play orchestrated by Halil Pasha to impose his influence and authority on the new sultan, there is not enough information on the subject. But both events can be counted as milestones in the rise of the Janissaries.

In the final analysis, the fact that Mehmet II left his father's viziers in office after he came to the throne last time (İnalçık, 1954, p. 111), and that he followed a policy in the orbit of Halil Pasha in the first place shows us that the balance of power in question did not change easily and that Halil Pasha's measures were successful. Oruç Beg (2011, p. 85) states that the new sultan appointed his viziers as Halil Pasha, Saruca Pasha, Şehabeddin Pasha and Ishak Pasha. After Mehmet II's accession to the throne, it is seen that the influence of the 'administration of pashas' continued. However, it is certain that

Mehmet II also waged a limited positional war. İsa Beg the *Beylerbeyi* of Anatolia was dismissed and the vizier İshak Pasha was demoted (İnalcık, 1954, p. 112). Âşıkpaşazâde mentions two examples in this regard. The first example is Karamanoglu İbrahim Beg's bribery to be forgiven in the face of İshak Pasha's advance on the Karaman Campaign, and the officials and advisors around Mehmet II stopping the campaign in return for bribery (Apzd, 2017, p. 144). Another important factor that influenced Mehmet II to make this decision could be the unrest caused by the Janissaries' demand for *cülûs* during the campaign. As a result of this event, Mehmet II's punishment and exile of Kurtcu Doğan, who was Halil Pasha's ally among the Janissaries, and his dismissal of the Janissary foot soldier leaders (*yayabaşıs*) who participated in the movement, are part of his efforts to discipline the Janissary corps (İnalcık, 1954, p. 117).

The second example emerges when Mehmet II was making preparations for an expedition to Constantinople. The meetings between the Byzantine ambassadors and Halil Pasha, which constitute the central event of this example, are interpreted in two different ways in the sources. According to the Byzantine sources used by Runciman (2018, p. 75), Constantinos sent a group of envoys to Bursa and implied that the money agreed to be given in exchange for the care of Prince Orhan was not sent, and that Prince Orhan could claim a right on the Ottoman throne. Halil Pasha, who welcomed the envoy group, was very angry at the attitude of Byzantine Emperor, and according to Runciman's comment (2018, p. 75), as a result of the endangerment of the peace policy, he lost his composure and spoke to the ambassadors in a very harsh language. The first comment is important in terms of showing how Halil Pasha had a strong motivation to preserve the existing structural relations. The second interpretation is argued in the history of Âşıkpaşazâde. According to him, the Byzantine Emperor tried to stop Mehmet II's siege preparations by bribing Halil Pasha, and Halil Pasha supported this policy in return for the gold (Apzd, 2017, p. 145). In the footnote of this section, Atsız (2011, p. 145) claims that the incident in question is a rumor of people, like the bribery incident that took place during the Karamanid expedition that is mentioned above. However, as both İnalcık (1954, p. 114) and Sakaoğlu (2017, p. 85) point out, the concessions made to the surrounding countries in the early periods of Mehmet II's reign (Alacahisar to be left to the Serbs, the annual tribute given to Byzantine Empire to keep Prince Orhan in prison), as well as the execution of Halil Pasha after the capture of Constantinople (Apzd, 2017, p. 146), show us that such monetary relations exist beyond

mere rumor.⁶²⁰ The fact that Halil Pasha expressed his opinion in the war council in Edirne, which convened before the siege of Constantinople, that there should be no siege (Sakaoğlu, 2017, p. 85) constitutes the basis of this opinion. Doukas (1975, p. 202) explains why Halil Pasha was against the siege of Constantinople as follows:

When Halil heard this, he became terrified because he had always protected the Romans, and the Romans considered him their agent and they would fill his right hand with gifts. He was known to everyone as *gavur ortagi*, that is, the companion or helper of the infidels.

The fact that we come across the information in the history of Kritovulos (2018, p. 104) that Halil Pasha developed close relations with Byzantium and that he disclosed state secrets and worked against the sultan strengthens this opinion. However, with the capture of Constantinople, the execution of Halil Pasha as the first thing and the liquidation of the leading cadres of the war party (Şehabeddin Pasha, Zaganos Pasha) in the following process (İnalçık, 1954, pp. 134-35) reminds that a new order is being established. Mumcu (2017, p. 57) interprets the dismissal of Çandarlı Halil Pasha's enemies after his execution as a 'concession made to the public' against possible reactions. However, this explanation does not sufficiently shed light on the nature of the imperial regime. In particular, the fact that Mehmet II often does not tell even his close circle of the places he will expedition makes visible the concentration of power in the new order in terms of showing his determination not to share the leadership of the war party with anyone. People like Mahmud Pasha and Gedik Ahmed Pasha, who emerged in this framework, will always feel the cold breath of death on their necks in the historical moments when they reach the peak of their power.

In conclusion, As the literature of Ottoman historiography unanimously states, in this new period, the *Kapıkulu* members took dominant positions, the institutional foundations of the new regime were formed with a series of legal and administrative reforms, and the period of 'administration of pashas' disappeared for a while. However, the fact that a series of administrators, especially Mahmud Pasha, was promoted to the image of 'sainthood' until the end of the Bayezid II period shows that social opposition and interest groups can still find representatives in the presence of high state administrators and that they can be an important part of the struggle for power.

⁶²⁰ Halil Pasha was detained with both his sons and his assistants (Apzd, 2017, p. 146). İnalçık (1954, p. 133) underlines that the property of Halil Pasha was confiscated.

CHAPTER VII

IMPERIAL REGIME AND POLITICAL THOUGHT

While Imber (2016, p. 261) underlines that from the period of Mehmet II to Mehmet III (1453-1603) the basic functions of the government, institutions and state offices remained largely the same in the Ottoman state, he makes an important inference about the continuity and institutionality of the imperial regime. Imber's inference is supported by the following statements written by Tursun Beg for Mehmet II (1977, p. 37): "Feten hecere'l-kerâ hatte's-takarrat/ Revâsı'l-mülki hâlen ba'de hâl".⁶²¹ Hassan (2002, p. 192) draws attention to the fact that the *Kanunnâme* of Mehmet II was put into practice with the phrase "ebed'ül abad ma'mulun bih"⁶²², that is, it contains a projection and claim that it will also be valid after Mehmet II. It is necessary to read this sign as a clear expression of the vision of institutionalization of the imperial regime in general, and the codification of customary law, which is one of the main pillars of the imperial regime in particular.

Babinger (2003, p. 369) uses the concept of "military theocracy" especially for the Ottoman regime under the rule of Mehmet II. This term emphasizes both the military dictatorship and its theocratic character (in legal and ideological structure). Ortaylı (2004b, p. 61) uses the term "despotic militarism" to express the general character of this period. Considering the slave status of the Janissaries, this term makes a phenomenal description of political relations because the word *despotiké*, in its etymological origin, indicates slave ownership and patriarchic power relations. However, if the phenomenal description is direct, it is not sufficient to reveal the essential nature of social relations. It is more appropriate to use the term "bureaucratic autocracy" instead of the term "despotic militarism" since Ortaylı's terminology indicates a personal and temporary tendency limited to Mehmet II rather than a structural feature in terms of state theory, and highlighting despotism as the character of militarism does not make an appropriate distinction. Werner (2019a, p. 377) states that the cavalry units and auxiliary units like *Azaps* are located outside the *devshirme/kul* system as an important source of military power, and therefore, it would be more

⁶²¹ He is such a valiant that he did not sleep in the course of the ongoing events / Until the foundations of the state were settled.

⁶²² Let it rule forever.

accurate to call the regime in the reign of Mehmet II as “military feudalism” rather than despotic absolutism or militarism.⁶²³ But this term also has its own dilemmas. First of all, there is no feudal order without a military character - if we exclude the discussion and some misconceptions on the hierarchy of the church. Because originally feudalism finds its historical origins in the expansion policy based on semi-autonomous military forces or in the *vis-a-vis* articulation of nomads and settled people. Secondly, whether the Ottoman state, as the organizer of the feudal social formation, was ‘military’ in character does not make a special contribution to the discussion, and it has the character of neologism, mostly made to avoid using the term ‘central’. In the Ottoman case, on the other hand, the answer of the problem lies in the direct connection between the military character, which is the decisive feature, and the phenomenon of centralization. Therefore, my proposition is in favor of the term I mentioned above, which emphasizes the predominance of the character of bureaucratic autarky in the organization of the state. Thus, the autarkic character of the administrative authority gathered in the center and the general bureaucratic formation can be separated from each other in a way that can make various articulations in concrete level. Thus, the role of Mehmet II as ‘emperor’ in this regime had structural basis which actualized by the emperor’s authority in concrete decision-making process. According to Babinger (2003, p. 358), Mehmet II took important decisions on domestic and foreign policy issues concerning the state, did not open his decision-making position to the advice of military and civilian administrators, but only partially considered the position of the Janissaries. This situation, on the one hand, indicates the tendency of the emperor not to share his policy-making authority, and on the other hand, the strong position of the military organization in this structure.

It is possible to follow the forementioned character of the regime in the primary historical sources of this period. In particular, the rewriting attempts made in this period on how the image of the ruler was created and how it was associated with the groups under his rule, reflects the search for an autocracy crystallized in the person of the ruler with all its dimensions. To quote an anecdote, there is a discussion about the Mamluks in the palace in an anonymous policy document presented to the emperor by an unknown courtesan of Mehmet II at the beginning of the Bayezid II era. As Kavak (2019a, pp. 195-96) summarizes, during this discussion, it was emphasized that a game like

⁶²³ Similarly, İvanov (2013, p. 27) uses the concepts of “eastern feudalism” and “military theocracy”.

gambling was widespread in the Mamluks and long explanations were made on whether it was possible to prevent this. During these discussions, although Mehmet II claimed that he could prevent gambling by taking drastic punitive measures, the anonymous text writer stated that the Egyptian ruler was not "independent" (*müstakil*) and therefore implied that he could not take drastic punitive measures. This comment was very pleasing to Mehmet II, and according to the anonymous author, he used the term "canumsuz" (my precious) many times. As Kavak (2019a, p. 196) points out, the expression 'independent' in this anecdote can be read as having an independent authority. I think that the issue of having independent authority or autocratic power, especially over various social strata, is one of the most basic principles of the imperial regime. This principle has found its clearest and most striking expression in Ali Kuşçu's work entitled *Şerhu't-Tecrîd*. Ali Kuşçu uses the term "*sultanun kahirun*" (overwhelming ruler) to describe the ruler's independent authority over other social segments (Fazlıoğlu, 2003, p. 397).

In this context, as was discussed in detail in the previous chapters that the imperial regime was a bureaucratic autarky with a distinctive military character, a tendency to centralize resources and decision-making processes, and complex ideological reproduction mechanisms. With Mehmet II's capture of Constantinople, it is possible to determine that such an imperial regime was established *de facto* and began to capillary in the process. As İnalçık (2017a, p. 36) points out, since the sections in which taxes, land regime and relations with the *reâyâ* were regulated in the *Kanunnâme* of *Reâyâ* of the Mehmet II period were developed in the same systematic as the sanjak laws and census records, it is obvious that a union between economic infrastructure and legal superstructure was tried to be established in accordance with the imperial regime. Road signs in the institutionalization of this new regime can be listed as reform in the legal system (Laws of the Mehmet II) the definitive subordination of the *ulama* stratum under the *ilmiye* organization, the expansion of the Janissary organization and its becoming the primary power in the administration, and the redistribution of the land. All these developments are of the nature of a pre-modern class struggle. The reform made in the legal system and the organization of the *ilmiye* limited the ability of the *ilmiye* stratum to act in line with their own interests in the final analysis, the change of the status of the land ownership and the reorganization of the *reâyâ-sipâhî* relations in the *Kanunnâme* of *Reâyâ* broke the power of the *timar* holders. The provisions of the *Kanunnâme* on the fratricidal law prevented or at least hardened local alliances to be

formed between princes and the opposition groups, and all this took place under the horrifying shadow of the armed force composed of the *Kapikulu* origin.

It is understood from the existence of a number of original and translated works that political thought also revived during this period. As Darling pointed out (2014, p. 58), works such as *Kalila wa-Dimna*, Nizam'ül-Mülk's *Siyâsetnâme*, *Kabusname*, *Marzubannâme*, Nizami's *Hamse* and Sadi's *Bostan*, are the works known in the palace circles of Anatolian Principalities and they have been influential in the shaping of political thought that have been translated for the Ottoman palace. During the reign of Murat II, Firdevsi's *Shahnameh*, Ghazali's *Nasihatü'l Muluk*, Necmeddîn-i Râzî's *Mirsadü'l-Ibad*, Ahmed-i Dâî's *Vasıyyet-i Nûşirevân-ı Âdil be-Pusereş Hürmuz-i Tâcdâr* (Testament of Anushirvan), and Ibn Bibi's *Selçuknâme* are the translated works of the genre of *siyâsetnâme-pendname* (Darling, 2014, p. 62). In addition, the works named *Tuhfetü'l-vüzerâ*, *Tuhfetü's-selatin* and *Tuhfe-i Mahmudiye*, which Musannifek wrote in Persian, should also be mentioned in this context. In addition, as it will be given below, it is clear that a series of works such as chronicles, *âdâb* books and *siyâsetnâmes* also contributed to this intellectual revival.⁶²⁴ It is possible to observe the lines of class struggle in depth in the examples of political thought that emerged during this period. The idea of social order in general and special interests, different social segments and the general scheme of class domination become elements that are tried to be reconciled or taken a position within this framework in the focus of political thought. At the same time, as of the last quarter of the 15th century, the translation of class ideologies into the language of cultural politics accelerated and reached its most developed form in the middle of the 16th century. As Ocak (2015b, p. 59) states, both the official Ottoman ideology will be codified in the XV. and XVI. Centuries, and the two major ideological systems opposed to it (Qizilbash/Shiism and Mutezili-Sunnism led by *Qadizadelis*) will constitute resistance points that make their influence felt in the successive centuries of the Ottoman Empire.

As a result, it is seen that decisive steps were taken in order to establish the institutional and theoretical structure of the imperial ideology during the reign of

⁶²⁴ For example, a remarkable work published by Kavak (2019a) is the anonymous *siyâsetnâme* which written in Arabic presented to Bayezid II. Although the author of this *siyâsetnâme* is unknown, it is claimed by Kavak that he may be a Syrian or Egyptian physician, or Molla Gürânî. Yılmaz (2018b, p. 38) draws attention to the fact that this work is the first political work written in the Arabic-Mamluk style. I also make the necessary citations on this work based on the detailed analysis by Kavak (2019a) which includes the translations of significant parts.

Mehmet II. As it will be examined in the following sections, the establishment of *Sahn-ı Semaniye* madrasahs, the proliferation of translated works, the establishment of advanced patronage relations, the construction of the manipulated image of the ruler, and finally the foundation of customary law and codification laid the base for the leap that the imperial ideology would take during the 16th century. Ocak (2015b, pp. 62-65) draws a meaningful framework when he argues that the Ottoman official ideology reflected a great “development and transformation” phase after 1453 in relation to the Ottoman centralization and the establishment of the imperial regime, the scientific foundations of the imperial ideology were laid in madrasahs, and that the ‘*padişah*’ as a typology of political representation was created during this period.

VII. II. Main Themes of Political Thought in the Imperial Period

The structure of political thought that emerged in this period has a very close connection with the political structure of the imperial regime. While the political thought of the period contributed to the problem of institutionalization of this new regime on the one hand, they reflected social contradictions brought by the development and execution of the political regime on the other. For this reason, although the works of political thought of the period have their own differences in emphasis, it is seen that they developed their thoughts around common themes and patterns. For example, the description of the military activities and the images representing the ruler’s authority develop in parallel with the social position of the writers and create differences in emphasis. While Sinan Pasha and Yazıcıoğlu Ahmed Bîcan’s approaches focus on religious-moral consistency, Kivâmî places the ideal of *ghaza* at the center of his narrative because he finds it appropriate to take an ideological form. Beyond all these differences in emphasis, there are two main themes shared by the political discourse written in this period. The first of these themes focuses on the problem of the politico-ideological establishment of the empire. In this framework, we see that the examples of political thought have embarked on a series of ideological constructions in order to support and justify the Ottoman class domination in the political context. The main themes of these ideological constructions can be considered as the transcendence of the ruler in terms of his image, his relationship with other rulers, and his position relative to his subjects. The second main theme focuses on the problem of the secular administration of the empire and elaborates the disciplinary mechanisms, the reproduction schemes of power and the problem of justice.

A remarkable point in the political thought of this period is that the traces of the *Meşşâî* school became visible. In general, it can be argued that the thoughts within the framework of the *Meşşâî* school of philosophy left various traces in the 15th century Ottoman political thought. The first of these traces is the possible Avicenna and Averroes effect in the uprisings of Sheikh Bedreddin and Börklüce Mustafa in terms of political discourse. The appearance of some Aristotelian models in Hüsameddin Amâsî's thought during the same period can be explained largely by the influence of al-Farabi and his successors. Finally, by the end of the 15th century, these effects become observable with clear references and emerge in the works of Sinan Pasha and Tursun Beg, especially through the mediation of Nasîrüddin Tûsî's theo-political arguments. It is seen that the discussions on *Meşşâî* philosophy gained actuality again during the reign of Mehmet II. It is thought that this actuality does not only have a 'spontaneous' development, but on the contrary, it was encouraged by Mehmet II himself. Arslan (1999, p. 242-43) summarizes the general intellectual revival in this period as follows:

As it turns out, Fatih Sultan Mehmet, who wanted to realize a renaissance in Ottoman-Islamic culture, thought that re-evaluating the famous debate between Ghazali and philosophy would be a good start for this. The scholars of the period Hocaşâde (...) and Alaaddin Tusi obeyed this order (...) and each wrote a piece to make a judgment in the discussion between Ghazali and the people who continued the tradition of philosophy in the Greek style in Islam -whose main representatives were al-Farabi, Avicenna and Averroes (...). Among these, the work written by Hocaşâde and bearing the same name as Ghazali's was preferred to *Kitab al-Zuhr* or *Kitab al-Zahira* written by Alaaddin Tusi and its author was specially rewarded. All these works that we are talking about now, namely Ghazali's *Tahafut ai-Falasifa*, Hocaşâde's *Tahafut al-Falasifa*, Alaaddin Tusi's *Kitab al-Zahira* and finally Kemalpaşazâde's *Tehafut* annotation are part of the same tradition. [tm]

It is possible to directly connect this discussion to the emergence of the Ottoman imperial regime and the need for reason in the management of different ethnic and religious groups. Naturally, when this need is combined with the centralized power of Mehmet II, the customary law (*örf-i sultani*) emerges as an element that regulates the political sphere and goes into a realistic articulation with the secular pattern of the aforementioned political themes. On the other hand, the approach of the *Meşşâî* school

which integrates reason, religion and law in the presence of a sovereign ruler, is used in the political thoughts put forward in this period, occasionally distorted and used as an intellectual ground for the construction of a transcendent ruler image in the ideological level.

VII. II.I. The Origin of the Sultanate and the Status of Ruler: The Problem of the Politico-Ideological Construction of the Empire

Kortepeter (1991b, p. 56) puts the functions that he sees as a legislator and the symbol of the Islamic state (due to coins, Friday sermons, donations to the Mecca and Medina, etc.) at the top of the list while making an inventory of the functions undertaken by the ruler in the Ottoman state. In this framework, the internal connection of both functions is knotted in the problem of how to relate the power and legitimacy of the ruler and how it can be reproduced structurally. The solution to this problem has been tried to be realized primarily based on the political and ideological construction of the imperial regime around the ruler. Baudrillard (2016, p. 88) analyzes the specific structure of the orders of sign in archaic and feudal societies with a tight hierarchical organization, that they are not constructed without reason, on the contrary, because they are limited in number and not open to everyone's use, they refer to obligations between different castes/clans/persons. This framework functions in terms of the construction of political signs, the legitimization of the authority of the Ottoman rulers as a distinctive part of political thought and discourse, the institutionalization of the status differences between different components of the society and the ruling class, and the representation/reproduction of the social order on the ideological context.

During this period, a series of ideas were developed in connection such as on the social status of the ruler, the origin of the sultanate and the transfer/inheritance of the right to rule. First of all, the ruler was described as a transcendent figure in the thought of the period, and this tendency also shows itself in the views on the rulership and decision-making mechanisms. It have stated that a significant part of the views on rulership, which were discussed in the previous sections, functioned in a 'disenchanted' world as of the interregnum period. In other words, it was stated that the Ottoman rulers' search for divine grace and transcendence of his rulership failed with the defeat to Timurid advancement, and the discourse of divine grant was interrupted. In the period that will be discussed, this discourse has become valid again with the capture of Constantinople and has begun to be elaborated and developed. As Darling (2014, p. 68)

stated, the political thought literature that developed in this period should also be evaluated within the formulation of “both reflected and addressed the changes in its identity and self concept”.

The institutionalization of class relations in Ottoman society and the fact that the ruling position became a place where power was also accumulated necessitated a reconsideration of power in terms of authority and force. In this context, it is necessary to distinguish between the two essential aspects of the concept of asymmetrical power relations. Asymmetrical power relations are established in two interrelated ways: Material and moral dominance over social elements and relations, which are the subject of power. The articulation of these two concepts at the factual level is as follows. First of all, in cases where the institutional power structure does not exist, the use of authority and force can occur independently of each other in variable and daily relations. However, the institutionalization of power makes authority and force related to each other. In this new plane, the establishment of authority is based on a certain ‘economy’ or ‘thrift’ of force, and the indirect regulation of the authority replaces the direct use of force for the operation of social power relations. In this new framework, the force is becoming visible in terms of authority symbols and gaining new connotations integrates with the grounding of authority and ensures that power gains legitimacy in general. While the concrete appearance of legitimacy becomes the manifestations of force (magnificent monuments, clothes, ceremonies, etc.), its abstract appearance becomes intellectual products (ideologies, cultural products, discourses, etc.) on which authority is based. Arendt (1977, p. 122) underlines that, to the extent that we discuss the concept of authority in the traditional sense, we should consider it not as something current, unlike *potestas*, but as something rooted in the past. In this context, two main tendencies stand out in terms of the establishment of authority in the period will be discussed. The first can be evaluated as the tendency to locating the establishment of authority out of history. To use a more explicit formulation, it is the content of this tendency to attribute the signs of authority and the development of the rulership to a purely divine determination. As Şeker underlines (2013, p. 166), it is clear that this tendency ascribes a divine nature to the state and administrators. Şeker (2013, p. 166, footnote 236) considers Âşıkpaşazâde’s verse “kuruldu devleti çetri ezelden”⁶²⁵, in this context, as a highly representative example of the form of discourse in which the state is deified - and I think at the same time dehistoricised. The second, consists in locating the

⁶²⁵ His state tent was established from the eternal time.

genealogical authority of the dynasty as far into the past and tradition as possible. This form of genetic construction similarly places the history of the dynasty in a mythical origin and endows it with a symbolic history. I will try to deal with the political discourse that emerged in this period under five main headings in which both tendencies are embodied. These titles can be listed as follows: (a) the ruler as the manifestation of divine signs, (b) construction of *a priori taxis* between rulers, (c) the expansion of the *a priori* frame about subjects of the ruler, (d) construction of dynastic genealogies (e) the concept of honor of sultan (will, majesty and ostentatiousness).

Levinas (2017, p. 172) considers the birth of the concept of the ‘people’ and the formation of “groups of people, each of whom believes that they are in the middle of the world [tm]”, as two simultaneous phenomena. According to him “this is why these groups want to dominate and assume all responsibility [tm]” (Levinas, 2017, p. 172). Although Levinas tries to interpret the relationship between the historical birth of the Jewish people and the formation of the *Sanhedrin*, the assembly where they judge, the author’s evaluations provide a significant clue to think about the ideological structure of the imperial regimes that were also transferred to the Jewish people through the examples of Egypt and Rome. The ideological background and popular discourse of the imperial regime develop along with a class vision/pattern that puts itself at the center of the world. In this respect, the development of the power mechanisms that depend on the vision in question, on the other hand, progresses in parallel with the development of the concept of the people - and the popular imagination, common cultural elements and mental structures. It is not seen the definitive realization of this vision in early Jewish history which interrupted by Babylonian and Roman intervention. The contradiction between Judaism’s claim to universal validity and its preservation of a closed community structure as an ethnic religion stem from its original history, which is itself shaped by oscillations between practical defense needs and universalist ideologies. On the other hand, for example, we encounter an Iran-centered description of earth in the introductions to Ferdowsi’s *Shahnameh* (presumably from 10th or 11th century), who reconsidered and wrote down the epics in the Iranian ancient tradition (Ritter, 2011, p. 166), or the placement of the Chinese people and culture at the center of the world in the imperial narratives written by Chinese geographers and historians offers a clear concept of the political power and authority patterns placed in the center of the world. For example, during the Zhou dynasty, a formal concept of ‘border’ was not developed due to the belief that all the countries of the world were subject to the religious authority

of the Chinese emperor (Eberhard, 1995, p. 41). Various examples of this type of imagination could be seen in the history of Ottoman political thought. The examples of political thought that will be discussed put the Ottoman dynasty and its political power at the center of divine grace, hierarchy among other rulers, relations of subordination and historical genealogy. As a result of this discursive construction, it is expected that the vision had to be adopted by the rulers and the commitment of the subjects to this vision will reach a new ideological and political level.

VII.III. The Ruler as the Manifestation of Divine Signs

“If the Shah names you brother, you name him Allah;
If he lifts you higher, you bow more to him and exalt him [tm]”.

Ibn al-Mukaffa (as cited in Nasreddin Tusi, 2005, p. 239)

“O Mehmed (...) everything you do in this world

The whole world thinks that it was made by Allah.”

Francesco Filelfo's eulogy to Mehmet II (Mirmiroğlu, 1999, pp. 247-49)

In the sources of this period, the status of the ruler is established based on divine reference. However, this positioning goes beyond being a reflection of a search for legitimacy, as it is seen in previous periods, and becomes a representation of the search for absolute power, in which the ruler is positioned above other social class, strata and rivals. The establishment of this representation can also be read as a historical necessity rather than an arbitrary development. Because, as underlined by Emecen (2019a, p. 135), popular Byzantine and Islamic myths, statements in various popular medieval histories, and the beliefs of dervish circles, which preached that the conquer of Constantinople was a sign of the apocalypse, saw this as a sign of “bad luck and destruction [tm]”.⁶²⁶ According to Yerasimos (1993, p. 196-200), these legends and myths appear in Christian sources around the 4th and 5th centuries, and from there they spread primarily to the Byzantine lands and from there to the source of Islamic apocalyptic narratives. In this case, it is possible to think that the origins of these narratives are the political upheavals in the late Roman Empire and the border struggles

⁶²⁶ For Islamic prophecies that accept the taking of Constantinople as a sign of the apocalypse and Christian predictions that find their starting point in Daniel's visions, see: Pertusi (1988, pp. 25-34, 40-111).

with the invaders. Emecen (2003, p. 197) underlines that the belief that portents of the apocalypse would emerge after the fall of Constantinople also had a place in the Ottoman intellectual context. For example, Karamânî Mehmed Pasha mentions the beliefs that Constantinople cannot be taken until the Day of Judgment and that trying to conquer it is like “hoping for good from the devil [tm]” (Çiftçioğlu, 1949, p. 352). Moreover, in the anonymous chronicle published by Giese (1992, p. 114), after the rumor that Constantinople would be conquered with the sword before the appearance of the Antichrist, it is stated that this was the conquest of Mehmet II. Detailed information on the signs seen before the siege of Constantinople in the history of Kritovulos (2018, p. 41-42) shows how strong popular opinions were in this context:

(...) there were unusually strange earthquakes, landslides, sudden flashes of lightning and thunder in the sky, terrible lightning, violent flashes in the sky, storms, devastating rains and floods. There were even stars appearing irregularly, following no particular orbit, and suddenly disappearing, or smoking for a long time without moving in their place. (...) Icons, pillars and statues of saints in the churches were sweating, men and women were going crazy, voices were heard from the unknown, and events that could not be considered good omens were taking place. [tm]

As Kritovulos (2018, p. 42) points out with horror, the words of the soothsayers who interpreted these omens and revived and whispered the ancient prophecies were all over the place. Scogaamillo (1993, p. 63) mentions how numerous these prophecies are. The Venetian nobleman Nicolo Barboro (1953, p. 50), who also joined the defense of the city, explains why an Ottoman raid on the palace walls did not succeed, with a prophecy attributed to Constantine, the founder of the city:

But our forgiving lord, Jesus Christ, did not want this city to be lost so miserably tonight, and God wanted the prophecies to come true. This prophecy was made by the holy Constantine, who was the first emperor to be the owner of Constantinople, who said that there was no possibility of losing the city that night unless it was in darkness, that is, only half of the moon was visible while the moon was full. [tm]

This example is significant in that it shows that various prophecies and omens were also widely interpreted and effective by the people of the city. There is no doubt

that this prophecy was known by the Ottomans and was used operationally. Barboro (1953, p. 57) states that after the moon turned into a full moon, an anxiety spread on the Byzantine side and a great festival was held on the other side of the walls. In the anonymous chronicle, it is stated that a talisman must be broken, and three portents must be fulfilled in order for Constantinople to be taken, and their fulfillment by the Ottomans was explained at length (Köklü, 2004, pp. 27 and 33). In the *menâkıbnâme* of Mahmud Pasha, there is information that Christian clergy believed that Constantinople could not be taken “unless the ships walked by land [tm]” and that’s why the ships were pulled on land to the Golden Horn (Aslan & Dogan, 2012, p. 57). It is clear that these are various rumors circulating among the people, or correspond to mystical reversals of certain events during the siege. The atmosphere of terror that emerged with the capture of the city, with all its mythological envelope, probably passed over the Balkan Christians and crossed Europe in a few weeks. Moreover, the circulation of all these popular myths and gossip took place before the revolts of 1416, which had a messianic character, for forty years, that is, not even a generation had passed.⁶²⁷ The response of the Ottoman administrators against this ‘danger’ that could shake social formation, consisted of building various administrative and ideological mechanisms to protect the class order. According to Emecen (2003, pp. 202-203), while the hadiths that heralded the conquer of Constantinople were included in the *fetihnâmes* sent to the sultans of Memluk and the Qara Qoyunlu states after the conquer of Constantinople, the fact that the parts related to the apocalypse in these hadiths were carefully excluded, and actually that detail strengthens our thesis. Thus, the extraordinary character of the conquest may evolve towards ordinary power mechanisms that will strengthen the foundations of the social order, not an extraordinarily ‘dangerous’ revolutionary/messianic movement in the socio-political context. In this case, making the image of the ruler transcendent enough to overcome popular opinion/whispers and prophecies, and its reshaping of popular discourse was very significant in terms of taking away the utopian/apocalyptic political visions of the masses who could resist the pressure brought by the imperial regime. It is seen that this is of equal importance in terms of both breaking the popular resistance of the ‘not yet conquered’ peoples and disciplining the Christian and Muslim

⁶²⁷ There are also some signs that this vision is still alive in places. For example, a *Hayderî* dervish tried to assassinate Bayezid II in the vicinity of Bitola by claiming that he is the Mahdi (Giese, 1992, p. 130).

subjects who already have been made subordinated.⁶²⁸ In this framework, the transcendentalizing discourse has two main moments. While the first moment is tied to the discussion of the origin and reproduction of the sultanate, the second one deals with the placement of the ruler in a kind of infallibility armor, in which he is equipped with divine qualities.

The first moment of this debate is shaped on the problems of the origin and succession of the sultanate. Considering the enormous power accumulation of the imperial regime, how the succession of the sultanate should be resolved becomes more important in this period than in the past. Interestingly, while the discussions about the source of the sultanate are made within an idealist framework, the discussions about the succession proceed in a very realistic way. For this reason, while the problem of the origin of the sultanate will be evaluated in this chapter, the problem of its devolution will be mentioned in the chapter that follows. In this period, a very intense discourse about the divine origin of the right to rule was built. Especially in the last quarter of the 15th century, It can be detected that such discourses reached their final shape and showed many variations from the image of the ruler to his genealogy and title. First, Kivâmî accepts divine determination as the source of the sultanate in a definitive and comprehensive way. In this respect, the sultanate is not an object obtained by practice (labour/'say') or science. On the contrary, who will reign is determined not by struggle, but by God's judgment before the world was created. In this context, Kivâmî formulates his thoughts as follows (2018, p. 561):

Saltanat didükleri Hakk'un mahza lutfından bir burani tacdur. Kankı başa ki ezel güninde layık gördi-y-ise anundur. Bu devlet kesbi degüldür, belki keşfidür. Devlet odur ki, gişi ciger kanun içmedin hasıl ola. Bu devlet sa'y-ıla veya 'ilm-ile ele gelür degüldür.⁶²⁹

⁶²⁸ Some common Islamic prophecies can be given as examples (Turan, 2003, p. 269): "The Prophet gives the good news: 'The Doomsday will not come until the city of the Kaiser is conquered and the adhan is read there'. One day, the Prophet Muhammad asked his companions: 'Have you heard of a city surrounded by land on one side and the sea on the other?' When the Companions answered, 'Yes, O Messenger of Allah', they replied, 'The Hour will not come until this city is conquered with the sound of 70,000 ghazis takbirs and the takbirs of Allahu akbar, la ilaha illallahu va'llahu akbar.' [tm] etc.

⁶²⁹ What they call sultanate is a luminous crown from the grace of God Himself, it belongs to whichever head he deems worthy in the eternal day. This state (fortune, blessing) is not achieved by effort, on the contrary, it comes from Allah. The state is such that it can be obtained (without suffering) without drinking liver blood; This state cannot be attained by study/working or knowledge.

Kıvâmî uses the twenty-sixth verse of the Surah Al-Imran to support his proposition. In this verse, it is stated that God will give the property to whom he wants and take from what he wants, exalt the person he wants and humiliate the person he wants, and that he is the sole ruler in these changes.⁶³⁰ Tursun Beg's views on the origin of the sultanate do not contradict Kıvâmî's point of view and are based on a similar interpretation of another part of the same surah. The thirteenth verse of the chapter of Al-Imran, which is the religious basis of Tursun Beg's argument, states that God will help and support the person he wants.⁶³¹ A part of this verse says that, as stated in the footnote, two armies, believers and unbelievers, are in conflict with each other, but God determines the victory of the side he wishes. This part of the verse is not included in Tursun Beg's narrative. In this case, it can be mentioned that Tursun Beg made a selective grounding on the origin of the sultanate from religious sources, or that avoided giving a definite judgment on this issue because Mehmet II was also at war with Muslim countries. My interpretation is that both options can be valid. On the other hand, I will try to explain on the examples that I will give later that this quotation is not a simple abbreviation, but rather serves to ground another hierarchy in which Mehmet II is shown above the other rulers, and for this reason, a selective method is used. Tursun Beg quotes the verse (Quran, 3:26) that Kıvâmî also uses, but incorrectly states that it is a hadith. Due to this small mistake, it can be deduced that Tursun Beg's religious knowledge is limited, because even if there is a similar hadith, it is more correct to use the verse first. The opinions about the source and the transfer of the sultanate in Sinan Pasha's *Maârifnâme* are in this context, the interpretation of the relevant verses of the Surah Al-Imran that Kıvâmî and Tursun Beg also used. Sinan Pasha's view into prose can be translated as follows (2013, p. 501):

The shah, who has the insignia of the rulership on his forehead, and the sultan, who has been presented with the reins of power, knows this: The kingship is such

⁶³⁰ Qur'an (3:26) (Dawood, 1999, p. 45): "Say, 'Lord, Sovereign of all sovereignty, You bestow sovereignty on whom You will and take it away from whom You please; You exalt whomever You will and abase whomever You please. In Your hand lies all that is good; You have power over all things.'"

⁶³¹ Qur'an (3:13) (Dawood, 1999, p. 43): "Indeed, there was a sign for you in the two armies which met on the battlefield. One was fighting for the cause of God, the other being a host of unbelievers. The faithful saw with their very eyes that were twice their own number But God strengthens with His aid whom He will."

a garment that the Right (...) is dressed as his own donation, if he wishes, he can still take it today if he wishes. And the state is such a great tree that God (...) has his body planted in his garden, and if he wants, he will immediately uproot it. In fact, he gave the power to rule, he takes it, a person who knows it for some reason is considered ignorant. [tm]

It is clear that Sinan Pasha's view is based on Sharia and is of a general nature. However, it is especially worth discussing whether Kivâmî and Tursun Beg's views on the origin of the sultanate are general or particular. Kivâmî's lines are in the last part of his work, and therefore the author prefers to develop such a narrative following Bayezid II's accession to the throne. It should be noted that Tursun Beg also wrote his work in the same period. According to Fodor (1986, p. 223) Tursun Beg was under the influence of the power struggle between Bayezid II and Prince Cem while writing his thoughts that could be interpreted with reference to his own period. In this context, İnalçık (1977, p. 66) finds the main theme of *Târîh-i Ebü'l-Feth* in the narratives developed within the framework of the thesis that there must be a single ruler in order for the society and the state to have a good order. So, Tursun Beg's emphasis on the divine origin of the sultanate, on the one hand, aims to transcend the ruler ideologically, while on the other hand, it is a reflection of Bayezid II's quest to consolidate his position, who acted before Prince Cem and took the throne. It is also clear that this interpretation can also be valid for Kivâmî. This search can be observed in two ways in particular. Although Tursun Beg uses the Aristotle and al-Farabi's political model, which will be examined in detail, in the passages of Tursun Beg in which he refers to the functions of the ruler, it is an example that he considers it necessary to reconsider the position of the existing ruler within the framework of religious references. Secondly, the fact that Kivâmî, while explaining his thoughts on the origin of the sultanate, repeatedly mentions the 'unfortunate ones' who are trying to obtain the sultanate, supports our conclusion. The view that the sultanate cannot be achieved by effort is exemplified by the Prince Cem incident in Kivâmî:

When Sultan Muhammed Ghazi (...) migrated from the field of mortality to the rose garden of eternity, the sun of the state rose on one of the two remaining princes. One fell into the sea of sorrow in the night of distress and disappeared. Many times, he too tried to rise from the east of the state, but bad luck sank from the west. This is how God's grace came about. [tm]

The fact that Prince Cem raised the flag against Bayezid II and was defeated, but could not be captured and eliminated, worried Bayezid II for a long time and left his reigning authority in suspense. For this reason, the fact that the enthroned ruler's need to defend the throne against other heirs necessitates the interpretation of the divine determination in this direction. Despite the cautious attitude of the sources of the period, it is seen that this problem first emerged as a theological problem. Because, although the idea that the ruler ascended the throne with divine grace was accepted before this period, the problem of how the imperial order would be preserved in the event of the emergence of more than one sultanate belonging to the same family in the same region could not be explained definitively. This question will be addressed in the chapter on social reproduction, where the idea of fratricide is discussed. On the other hand, it is possible to find strong indications in the sources of the period that the divine determination was accepted as valid for the entire Ottoman lineage. For example, in *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân*, written in Arabic by Karamânî Mehmed Pasha, there is an interesting story that touches on this subject and is not included in other sources. According to him, Ertugrul Beg came across the Qur'an in the house of an Islamic jurist (*faqih*), whom he visited as a guest, and was warned by the jurist not to turn his back on it. Ertugrul Beg, who took ablution after everyone in the house went to sleep, waited in a standing position with his hands on his stomach until the morning in front of this book, and the following words were inspired to him by God in the morning (Çiftçioğlu, 1949, p. 344): "You showed great respect to our word. You didn't leave it behind. And we glorify you, your followers and your children [tm]". As stated by Imber (2015, p. 188), while the dream narratives as were examined in the previous chapters deal with the "popular belief that God speaks directly to people in dreams" in symbolic form and contain them in terms of the legitimacy of the Ottoman domination, the version written by Karamânî Mehmed Pasha is irrelevant to the symbolic forms of divine inspiration. Thus, he directly addresses Ertugrul Beg with the word of God. It is clear that this story constitutes an important mystical genealogy narrative for the Ottoman lineage. Thus, the ruler is both directly distinguished by a divine sign and has the right to pass on this privilege to his children, which necessitates the institutional acceptance of a suprapersonal scheme of domination.

The second moment emerges in the discourses about the ruler's share of divinity. As can be seen in the political thoughts that we will discuss, the image of the ruler is raised to an almost divine level. For example, Tursun Beg (2013, p. 16) states that the

sultan has a common reign with God, and the difference can only be found in the fact that the sultanate is temporary, and the God is permanent. Because, according to him, the attributes of the ruler should be accepted as a reflection of the divine attributes. Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 229) also states that the sultan is the shadow of God and that rebelling against him is considered rebellion against God. Kivâmî (2018, p. 61) describes the ruler as “the place where the grace of the eternal God is seen (...) the guide of the righteous path (...) the source of purity and righteousness [tm]”, and glorifies him by almost making him an essential part of God. Sinan Pasha, on the other hand, carries the idea of divinity attributed to the sultan to a further dimension by comparing the punishment and praise of the ruler to the punishment and praise of God, and the reverence of the state officials next to the ruler to the honor shown by God to the prophets. Sinan Pasha constructs this discourse as follows (2013, p. 229):

Sometimes, punishments and tortures of sultans for a minor crime point to the sudden wrath of Allah. And sometimes immeasurable donations and rewards for an insignificant service signify the breadth of His mercifulness. The rank of the prophets and apostles in the presence of God can be understood from the respect shown by the viziers in the presence of the sultans. The rank of the glorious saints in the presence of Allah can be understood from the closeness of friends in their assembly. [tm]

As can be understood from these examples, the ruler is represented as a theomorphic image and is portrayed as a person who takes a share from the divine nature. As Öztürk points out (2017, p. 301), the ruler, who is described as the shadow of God, is attributed the competence of ruling among people with a political power similar to God's theological-cosmic political power. The tendency to envision the real head of state as Allah, which is one of the original characteristics of the Islamic political thought, has also visualized the ruler who will rule the state in this context as a manifestation of Allah (Bağdatlı, 2018, p. 225). The model of legitimacy, in which the ruler acquires a god-like image, is a very familiar model for ancient societies. This imagination style, which is frequently seen in Mesopotamian, Babylonian, Indian and ancient Chinese societies, continued its influence in late antiquity and medieval societies. For example, the transition of Rome to the imperial regime around the 1st century also brought about the acceptance of Caesar and Augustus as gods. Moreover, as Brubaker (2017, p. 85) points out, Helios, the sun-god figure of ancient Greece around the 6th century, and the images of the Byzantine emperor and Jesus were

intertwined. Ritter (2011, p. 116) states that the great Greek heroes ascribe their lineage to gods, and this pattern is also seen in the eastern versions of the Alexander stories. For example, the stories in which *Zeus* (Zeus) is seen as the father of Alexander the Great and Olympus as his mother varied from *Zeus-Amun* appearing as the father figure in the Egyptian versions to the transformation of *Dara* (*Darius*) into the father figure in the Iranian versions. (Ritter, 2011, pp. 116-17). Darling (2013, p. 52) underlines that during the Umayyad period, the Islamic rulers became figures of divine eminence, like the Babylonian or Assyrian kings, who were expected to bring rain. Similarly, the story of Alexander's birth was applied to Genghis Khan, who conquered Iran, and Genghis' grandfather Buduntchar's mother, Alagova (argued by Herzfeld that it might be a corrupted form of the word *Olympus*⁶³²) was disguised as a god (Ritter, 2011, p. 116). In the ancient Turkish inscriptions, there are statements that the rulers were god-like (*tengri-tag*), deserved to be called gods (*tengrim*), and were appointed by a god (Roux, 2017, pp. 128-29).

A similar search for deification is also valid for 15th century Ottoman political thought. For example, Âşikpaşazâde (Kala, 2013, p. 270) likens praising Mehmet II to praising God: "Zihi sultan ki hükmüne musahhar oldu alemler/ Cemi meddahı anın melek, rıdvan, ademler."⁶³³ As it can be seen in this example, the term theomorphic image reveals a way of thinking that approximates the image of the ruler with the traditional imagery of God, and consequently turns the image of the monarch into an analogy of the image of God - *imitation Dei*. From this point of view, an analogy is established between the divine order and the order of the world.⁶³⁴ Interestingly, the fact that this analogy was detected -even criticized- by the Janissary Constantine reveals that this imitation was noticed in the period in question, and even the existence of a less obvious undercurrent that tended to reject it. According to Constantine (Beydilli, 2019b, p. 126): "Some call himself the Padishah, that is, the one who is above all adjectives. However, this name does not suit him, but only God. Because they call Allah 'the Sultan who created the heaven and earth' [tm]". There is some ambiguity in these lines of Constantine. For example, the term 'padishah' does not mean 'one who is superior to all adjectives'. On the other hand, it can be thought that Constantine actually used the

⁶³² *Der Islam*, VI/316-327, Alangua article, cited by Ritter (2011, p. 116).

⁶³³ He is the sultan, the worlds were subject to his rule / Angels, Ridvan the keeper of the gate of heaven, and all the people praised him.

⁶³⁴ For example, the term 'army of god' (*cund-Allah*) was used for the army of Mehmet II (Turan, 2003, p. 286).

word ‘padishah’ instead of another term he could not remember (for example, ‘*zillullah*’ or ‘*caliph*’), and that this or another term had a specific meaning in the popular imagination. Moreover, the author’s criticism that it would be more correct to use this term for God can be read as a reflection of a thought shared by the dervish circles, rather than being his idea directly. It is possible to read this expression as because they call God ‘the Sultan who created the heaven and earth’ as a critical interpretation of another source that explained the content of this term to Constantine.

We can now focus on the examples of the concrete appearances of the theomorphic monarch image in the works of the period. We can determine from the sources that Mehmet II tried to act in a way that would confirm or support the theomorphic image claim. İnalçık (2018a, p. 31) states that there is no evidence that Mehmet II acted within a predetermined plan for his military expeditions. It is possible to extract the clearest examples of this view from Kivâmî’s lines. For example, he clearly states that the expedition plan is not known to the military circles (Kivâmî, 2018, p. 519): “But the soldier did not know to which realm the expedition of the sultan of the world was. All kinds of news were circulating in the mouths, but it was not clear which news was true. In the end, everyone was helpless [tm]”.⁶³⁵ Moreover, Kivâmî develops a narrative that connects Mehmet II’s decision on expeditions to divine signs and inspirations. For example, he describes Mehmet II’s decision on the expedition on Hungary as follows (Kivâmî, 2018, p. 201): “An inspiration reached his heart again, blessings and grants came from God with grace. He ordered his soldiers to gather, and sent word to their lords to come [tm]” Similarly, the beginning of preparations of the Belgrade expedition is explained in Kivâmî by being connected to a divine inspiration (2018, p. 227): “His idea was always busy with ghaza; and suddenly an inspiration came to his heart. He got up at dawn and gathered the *Diwan*, and sat on his throne with joy. Again, he ordered the soldiers to gather and all the lords to come with their weapons [tm]”. Another example in similar manner can be mentioned. In an anonymous chronical written in the same period (Çimen, 2006, p. 117), it is mentioned that Mehmet II had a dream in which he was struggling with Uzun Hasan. In the dream, Mehmet II beat his claws and defeated Uzun Hasan, but the sultan was saddened when he was indecisive about whether this dream meant victory or defeat. For this reason, the dream

⁶³⁵ In addition, we see that not giving information about the expedition route is also considered as a political tactic. In the anonymous Arabic *siyâsetnâme* summarized by Kavak (2019a, p. 206), it is seen that the ruler is especially advised to be secretive before going on a campaign.

was told to the scholars, and the sultan's distress came to an end after they made the abjad calculation and stated that the verse '*yensurake'llâhu nasran azîzen*' was apparent in the dream.⁶³⁶ In the short commentary of Molla Lütî's (Arslan, 2012, pp. 101-2) *Er-Risâle Fi'l-Ulûmi's-Şer'iyye Ve'l-Arabîyye*, he states that he was inspired to recite the 3rd verse of the Surah al-Fatah⁶³⁷, then he translated this Surah to the abjad account and told Mehmet II the date of victory. In the face of this news, Mehmet II showered Molla Lütî with gifts. Molla Lütî, claiming that this verse gave good news of victory for both the prophet Muhammad and Mehmet II, established a divine partnership that will cover both (Arslan, 2012, p. 102): "The strange thing about this incident is that each of our prophet and sultan, who is addressed in the above verse, both of their names are Mohammed. It was as if this evangelion of triumph made to the Prophet was also made to the sultan [tm]".

Mehmet II's tendency to dominate all decision-making mechanisms in the autarky regime can be seen as the reason for this style of action, as well as the effect of his belief in astrology. There are narratives exist in the chronicles that articulate the birth or accession of Mehmet II with astrological combinations. For example, Kivâmî (2018, p. 71) states that when Mehmet II ascended the throne, astrologers saw the ruler's star in the sign of happiness and said that he would rule the world like Alexander the Great. Moreover, in Kâşîfi's work *Gazânâme-i Rûm*, the astrologer who looked at Mehmet II's horoscope when he was born and said, "This prince will take the world from beginning to end until the border between China and Bahter. His name will be remembered with great people like Cem, one of the sultans of the past, and he will be wise like his ancestors [tm]" (Esmail, 2005, pp. 14-15; also see Öztürk, 2012b, p. 53). It is unclear how many of these anecdotes actually appeared simultaneously with the birth of Mehmet II. Considering Mehmet II's personal interest in astrology, it is clear that such rhetoric may have been put forward to please Mehmet II, or to reinforce his authority by himself. However, the record by Tursun Beg (1977, p. 44) that the astrologers had decided the time to start the construction of the Rumelia Fortress reveals, as Hagen pointed out (2016, p. 503), that astrology experts were present in Mehmet II's entourage from a very early date. Babinger (2003, p. 364) states that Mehmet II's interest in astrology also influenced his military decisions, so he hired Iranian astrologers and had

⁶³⁶ Qur'an (48/3) (Dawood, 1999, p. 359): "We have given you a glorious victory". See Ali (2000, p. 438): "Verily We have granted thee a manifest Victory".

⁶³⁷ Qur'an (48/3), (Dawood, 1999, p. 359): "We have given you a glorious victory". See Ali (2000, p. 438): "Verily We have granted thee a manifest Victory".

horoscopes drawn. In the *velâyetnâme* of Otman Baba, there is a parodic scene in which Mehmet II, who is horrified by the strange supernatural events that Otman Baba has uncovered, consults with the astrologers. Otman Baba hits the ground with his stick and creates a great flood, the flood that enters the houses in Istanbul and spreads fear. Lightning strikes the corner of Mehmet II's palace, the city is shaken by earthquakes, the '*sahn-ı çemen*' mansion falls to the ground (this expression may refer to *sahn-ı seman* madrasas). Meanwhile, Mehmet II is going back and forth in his palace. The ruler immediately gathers his astrologers and scholars (Yalçın, 2008, p. 248): "ne kadar 'ilm-i hey'et ü müneccim ve 'ulemâ-i fużalâ var ise cem' eyledi. dañı 'akl ü firâsetleri irdükçe 'ilm-i hey'ete ve usturlâba nażar şalup eyitdiler ki zihi 'ibret ve zihi kuvvet ve zihi heybet didiler. dañı hāmūş olup biraz tefekküre vardılar."⁶³⁸ In the same period, it can be seen that astrology aroused interest in the Iranian palace, and astrologers, who created a livelihood to exploit the rulers' greed for dominance and fears, were effective. As Caterino Zeno reports in his travelog (Gündüz, 2016, p. 51), a monk who looks at the stars and foretells the future, prophesies that Shah Ismail will be the ruler of Asia in the future and enters his service, thus becoming a mirror of the ruler's self-reflection of class-based ambitions and mentality.

In the final analysis, the role played by astrology stems from its ability to be articulated with an understanding that transcends the image of ruler. If a brief look at the history of astrology is taken, it is seen that they were received with interest by imperial regimes at certain stages of development. The fortune-telling and divination culture has somehow functioned in social life in almost all known periods of human history. However, with the development of class-based societies, a distinct differentiation emerges between the popular fortune-telling and divination culture of the lower classes and the fortune-telling and divination culture of the ruling classes.⁶³⁹ Despite the daily life-focused interest of folk fortune-telling, it is seen that for many centuries astrology was synonymous with the 'destiny' of the ruling classes, the passion for glory and fame. Because in contrast with prophecies made by looking at the internal organs of animals, palmistry or shamanic fortune-telling, the discipline of astrology requires a serious knowledge of astronomy and mathematics and an education that can synthesis the astronomy knowledge of different cultures. The training and employment

⁶³⁸ How many astronomers, astrologers and virtuous scholars were gathered together. They dealt with astronomy and astrolabe to the extent of their intellect and intuition, and said lesson, strength, majesty. Then they remain silent and contemplate.

⁶³⁹ For examples of the subject, see: Roux (1994, pp. 65-78).

of astrologers therefore necessitated a class division in which surplus-product could be concentrated. In this framework, Yoke (2003, p. 3) states that the development of Chinese astrology between the 8th and 5th centuries B.C. developed a special reading systematic that focused on the fortune and fate of the emperors and feudal lords by alienating the strata of the people from the prophetic approach. According to Yoke (2003, p. 139):

Chinese astrologers found correlation between the stars in the heavens and the bureaucrats on earth as well as between celestial regions visible to them and geographical places known to them. Since astrologers were generally in the employment of the emperor or were aspirants for a grant of royal audience, it is not surprising that Chinese astrology evolved round the emperor and personalities and affairs directly connected with him.

It is possible to see a line of development similar to Chinese astrology in Western astrology. Although the history of astrological interpretations in the Western world goes back a long way, their becoming a consistent system and their adaptation to social events emerged in the 1st century during the reign of the first Roman Emperor Augustus, and reached its most developed form around the 4th century. This is closely related to the spread of the Babylonian star-cult to Rome and the renewal of the Roman calendar according to the Babylonian system (Cronin, 1981, pp. 44-45). The golden age of his astrological studies in the Islamic world was started with Ebu Ma'sher, the author of *al-Medhalü'l-kebir ila ilmi ahkami'n-nucum* and *Kitabu'l-kıranat* during the Abbasid Empire.⁶⁴⁰ Ebu Ma'sher established a relationship between astrological calculations and the historical course of the rulership and social institutions (Whitfield, 2012, p. 60), predicted the rise and fall of the Abbasid state, thus laying the astrological foundations of the cyclical understanding of history that is also seen in Ibn Khaldun. Astrological research, which developed from an animistic basis, built two decisive models to the extent that they brought the concepts of human behavior and divine destiny closer. The first of these established a cosmic relationship between the planets, which are accepted

⁶⁴⁰ Gutas argues that astrological chronicles were written during the Abbasid period and their main function was ideological. According to the author (Gutas, 2003, pp. 53-4), these dates astrologically emphasize the impossibility of the Abbasid dynasty's ascension ("cycle of dominance") just beginning and the successful conclusion of opposition movements according to the divine destiny written in the stars, as well as associating the Abbasids with astrological cycles, the sole heir of the ancient Mesopotamian empires of the Sassanids.

as divine beings, and the rulers, who are also considered as divine beings, and the second, within the framework of a more externalized understanding of celestial divinity, they revealed a model for the common destiny of beings in the heavens and on the earth. In both models, the understanding of the unity of the macro and micro cosmos necessarily predominates. It is clear that this understanding can have specific meanings especially for the members of the ruling class and the rulers. The manifestations of this mentality are also seen in Ottoman political thought. For example, Kıvâmî, while talking about the reign of Mehmet II, establishes an imaginary relationship between his majesty and the sky (2018, p. 60): “Husreva ol şahsın kim kadrüne mesken için/ Başı üzerine kurdu gerdün barigah-ı Kibriya/ Tak-ı eyvan-ı celalündür muhalli asuman/ Hak-i dergah-ı refi’ndür havass-ı kimya”.⁶⁴¹ It can be find the unification of the micro and macro cosmos in the person of the ruler in the history of Karamânî Mehmed Pasha as follows (1949, p. 361); “(...) his [Mehmet II's] blessed existence is enough for him to do incredible great works and the extraordinary and sun-like things that are attributed to him. Because ‘it is not difficult for God to gather the whole world in one person’ [tm]”. As it can be understood from these examples, it is far from exhausting the whole phenomenon to evaluate astrological readings simply as an entertainment or as a negative factor that prevents the rulers from thinking rationally. The astrological relationship established between the macrocosmos and the microcosmos reconstructs the rulers with a divine image and, in the final analysis, reconstructs the theme of alienation and class relations in the cultural context.

Finally, the ideology, which was constructed within the framework of the idea that the rulers were equipped with divine signs and privileges, took a definite form during the reign of Bayezid II. The increase in the works written - even printed⁶⁴² - during the reign of Bayezid II must have had a great influence on the construction of the divine image of the ruler. The interest in astrology observed during the reign of Mehmet II reached its highest form during the reign of Bayezid II. Hagen (2016, pp. 502-3) states that many astronomers came into contact with the Ottoman palace during

⁶⁴¹ O sultan! You are such a sultan that your majesty abode/ The heavens established the peace of God on your head/ The place of your greatness is the sky; The highest chemistry/ Substances can be (only) the soil of your supreme convent. Translated from the simplified version that; see Kıvâmî (2018, p. 61): “Ey padişah! Sen öyle bir padişahsın ki senin kadrine mesken/ Olması için gökler, başının üzerine tanrı huzurunu kurdu/ Senin ululuğunun takının yeri gökyüzüdür; en üstün kimya/ Maddeleri, senin yüce dergahının (ancak) toprağı olabilir”.

⁶⁴² Akgündüz (1999, p. 50) states that the cover of nineteen books published by Ottoman minorities includes the phrase that they were published under the auspices of Bayezid II.

the reign of Bayezid II and they dedicated about thirty works to the ruler, and documents the existence of six astrologers who were paid a salary in the palace. Moreover, according to Hagen (2016, p. 503) almost half of the astronomy works belonging to the Ottoman period, which are dedicated to any member of the Ottoman dynasty, are dedicated to Bayezid II. In the light of these indicators, it is clear that the interest in astrology showed its effect during the reign of Bayezid II.

Secondly, the story of a legendary sword that was found in the Danube during the reign of Bayezid II and was given to the ruler is interpreted as a divine sign and mentioned in anonymous chronicles (Öztürk, 2000, pp. 99-101; İğci, 2011, pp. 44-46). The origin of the sword is attributed to Şeddat bin Ad, the son of the ruler of the Yemeni tribe of Ad (Kırca, 1988) whose name is mentioned in the Qur'an. This sword has been considered lost for centuries after a ruler named *Buzantin*, who is considered one of the founders of Constantinople, dropped it into the Danube on his way to the province of Hungary (İğci, 2011, p. 44). One day, fishermen come across an object caught in their nets in the river mud, and when they remove it, they realize that it is a fifteen-inch rotten sword with three blades (İğci, 2011, p. 45). The fishermen sell this sword to a merchant, and the ambassador of the ruler, who went to Hungary in the year Bayezid II came to the throne, asked permission from the King of Hungary to buy this sword. The information that the King of Hungary saw this sword and even brought monks from every sects and tried to read the inscription on this sword is included in the anonymous chronicle (İğci, 2011, p. 45). When the sword was handed over to Bayezid II, it was revealed that the inscription on it was in Syriac and that it belonged to Şeddat bin Ad (İğci, 2011, p. 45). The anonymous chronicler states that Bayezid II considered this sword a divine sign for the conquest of the Hungary (İğci, 2011, p. 45). The origin of the sword legend in question is quite old. Most likely, the sword in this legend refers to the legendary object believed to belong to God of war (Mars) and heralds an irresistible superiority in wars. An early version of this legend can be found in the history of Priscus, written around the 5th century. In this version, a herder who grazes animals finds the sword of Mars and takes it to Attila the Hun, and Attila decides that he will win all the wars and rule the world alone based on this sign (Priscus, 2020, p. 151).⁶⁴³

A third and more significant title is the theomorphic image of the ruler, which formed with Mehmet II, attaining a competent Islamic form during the reign of Bayezid

⁶⁴³ For other examples where legendary swords are used as symbols of domination, see: Magemizoğlu (2021, p. 81), Roux (2020, pp. 246-48), Karadeniz (2008, p. 159).

II. In the sources of the period, it is seen that the power of sainthood is attributed to Bayezid II. Although some references to this ideological construction are implicitly included in various works written around the Ottoman palace, it is striking that the works in which the subject is covered in depth and supported by various anecdotes are anonymous chronicles written especially for ordinary people and simple soldiers to read or listen. For example, in the anonymous chronicle published by Köklü (2004, p. 59), Bayezid II is described as a person who started studying science at the age of four and had the scientific competence to give a *fatwa* when he was fifteen, was made a superior Islamic scholar by God, and spent his days in worship. This narrative shows a significant similarity with the stories told about the childhood of Mahmud Pasha, a vizier and a popular figure among Ottoman subjects.⁶⁴⁴ Moreover, in the same work (Köklü, 2004, pp. 66-67), two interesting anecdotes are shared about Bayezid II's 'miracles'. The first of these is an anecdote that mentions that a person who has not abandoned the sunnah of the afternoon and night prayers, ordered him to go in front of the community and lead the prayer, and became an imam after it was understood that he was the only one with this qualification in the community. According to this anecdote, Bayezid II, who led the prayer, made an obvious mistake and uttered takbir three times.⁶⁴⁵ In fact, when asked by the people around him the reason for Bayezid II's mistake about the pillars of prayer, which refuted his claim to piety, his answer was as follows (Köklü, 2004, p. 66): "Efendiler, imamet kati müşkil şey imiş ve imamlar gayet büyük ademler imiş, evvel tekbirde Ka'be-i şerifi görürler. Ben üç def'a tekbir aldım güçile Ka'be-i şerifi gördüm".⁶⁴⁶ In the face of this answer, those who were with him decided that he was a saint (Köklü, 2004, p. 66): "Ulema, vüzera: 'bu padişah velidür' didiler".⁶⁴⁷ Another miracle attributed to Bayezid II is that he cursed the King of Hungaria and blinded him. How this event affected the people of Istanbul is described in the anonymous chronicle as follows: "Bu havadis İslambol'a geldikde Sultan Bayezid'[in], veli olduğuna

⁶⁴⁴ Actually, there is a version of this story written for Mehmet II. In the work titled *Gazânâme-i Rûm*, written by Kâşifî at the beginning of the second half of the 15th century, Mehmet II started speaking Arabic at the age of one and a half years, gained success in the fields of reading, calligraphy, poetry, and was an expert in medicine, astronomy and rhetoric at the age of ten, when he enters adolescence, he is portrayed as a ruler with superior skill in martial arts (Esmail, 2005, p. 15-16).

⁶⁴⁵ For the version of the same story attributed to Murad I, see: *Selâtinname*, 28b, couplet no: 719 (Öztürk, 2001, p. 63).

⁶⁴⁶ Sirs, being an imam is definitely a difficult thing and imams are very honorable people, they see the Kaaba in the first takbir. I uttered takbir three times, I hardly saw the Kaaba.

⁶⁴⁷ The ulama and viziers said, 'This ruler is a saint'.

kimsenin şüphesi kalmadı”. (Köklü, 2004, p. 67).⁶⁴⁸ This image was broken due to a series of natural disasters during the reign of Bayezid II. The plague epidemic and large and small earthquakes, fires, famine, heavy rains and storms that lasted for months in Istanbul and its surroundings caused Bayezid II to be considered an “ominous sultan” (Sakaoğlu, 2017, pp. 107-8). It can be said that especially after the natural disasters that took place at the end of the 15th century, the legitimacy and image of the ruler were damaged, and this paved the way for his dethronement with a *coup d'etat* organized by Selim I.

The power of creating miracles attributed to Bayezid II was also used for other rulers as an effective form of discourse in the following years, and was even taken back to Osman Beg. As it was mentioned before, we encounter one of the first examples that ascribes holiness to Osman Beg in the later introductory part of the *velâyetnâme* named *Menâkıb-ı Tâcü'l-ârifîn Ebü'l-Vefâ*, which was translated at the request of Âşıkpaşazâde's son-in-law, *Vefâî* sheik Seyyid Velâyet: “Osman Han, Şeyh'in [Edebâli] yüce dergahında ilahi lütfa mazhar olmak suretiyle sultanlık tahtına ve velilik tacına erişti” (as cited in İnalçık, 2019e, p. 143).⁶⁴⁹ For example, in the work called *Târîh-i Sâf*, written by an ulama member Bostanzâde Yâhya (2016, p. 26), at the beginning of the 17th century, it is claimed that most of the sultans from the Ottoman lineage were saints and it is mentioned that Osman Beg showed miracles first. According to him, the famous dream, which was discussed as a ‘dream myth’ in previous chapters, is the pure example of a miracle. Bostanzâde Yâhya tells similar sainthood stories for Orhan Beg, Murat I, Mehmet Çelebi and other rulers. In this context, it is clear that the discourse of sainthood has gained an extent that will encompass the Ottoman rulers from the beginning and therefore sanctify the state. On the other hand, some sources, in which the first historical examples that could be the subject of sainthood claims, were seen, were not as willing as Bostanzâde Yâhya to maintain such an interpretation. For example, the incident of ‘the castle that God destroyed’ (*tanrı yıktığı kalesi*), which is seen in Âşıkpaşazâde, anonymous chronicles published by Giese and Öztürk and other works of the period, is expressed without the need to embellish with a clear sainthood legend. According to the story, when Murat I could not take the *Bulanya* fortress with a siege, he was extraordinarily upset and sighed,

⁶⁴⁸ When this news came to Istanbul, no one doubted that Sultan Bayezid was a saint.

⁶⁴⁹ Osman Khan reached the sultanate throne and the crown of sainthood by receiving divine favor in the Sheikh's [Ede-Balı] honourous lodge.

saying, “May God destroy this place [tm]” (Giese, 1992, p. 27; Öztürk, 2000, p. 31). While Murat I was sitting with his back to a tree -that would later be called “devletlü” or “kademlü” rough tree- news came that one side of the fortress had been destroyed (as a result of an earthquake).⁶⁵⁰ This event is interpreted as the acceptance of Murat I's prayer and no miracle claims are expressed. We see that the tree in this story was later sanctified by the people of the surrounding area. Boratav (2016, pp. 30-32) states that there is a tree cult in Turkish culture and that the figure of great tree is accepted as “a sacred entity that brings strength and well-being to its owner [tm]”. In the story attributed to Murat I, there is no information about whether this tree was sacred before the Turks came. However, it may be possible to re-sanctify a tree, which is considered sacred for the Greeks of the region, for propaganda purposes. If this possibility is true, it is possible that animist traditions and beliefs, which were seen before the Ottoman Empire and sometimes gained connotations related to Christianity, are reintroduced into the field of discourse for the theomorphic image of the Ottoman ruler.

It can also be mentioned the criticisms directed by the dervish circles against the view of the rulers as the manifestation of divine signs and the establishment of the image of them in a way that gains theomorphic projections. While some of these criticisms are against the transcendent image of the ruler and the establishment of the legitimacy of power with direct reference to divine grace, some of them prefer to provide social status to their groups by making this relationship indirect and to be articulated with the central power. Both approaches can overlap occasionally. For example, while dervish groups accept the legitimacy of the principle of divine privilege and the right to rule, they reformulate this as the privilege of deciding on the accession of a particular ruler and may attribute a supernatural power to themselves. On the other hand, to the extent that the political importance of the dervish groups has decreased relatively, the fact that the rulers are directly shown as members of a certain dervish group or attributed to them as a saint bypasses the dervishes who act as a mediator between God and the ruler in the foundation of power and reconstructs relationship between God and ruler directly.

⁶⁵⁰ The motif of sitting with one's back to a great tree is a typical element presented in *menâkıbnâmes*. *Menâkıbnâmes* of Şuca'eddin Veli and the Koyun Baba include examples of this motif. Although this image is a part of rural daily life practices, it can be considered as a symbolic figuration of the idea of the greatness of sainthood in these uses. Moreover, it is possible to think that the pagane tree cults were also included as a subtext in the construction of this narrative.

First, let's exemplify the approach that accepts saints, not rulers, as representatives of divine power. Since we encounter this approach frequently in 14th century *sûfi* poetry and various hagiography, it would not be wrong to suggest that it was also transmitted to 15th century political thought through the same channel. The examples of this thought could be found in Abdal Musa's *Pendnâme* that Abdal Musa told his followers: "Zahir padişahına karip olma, dünyalık için ehl-i mansıba varma; meğer irşad ola" (Çiftçi, 1991, p. 10).⁶⁵¹ A story told in the *menâkibnâme* of Kaygusuz Abdal reveals the breadth of Abdal Musa's rule as a 'secret sultan' in this context. According to the author of the *menâkibnâme*, Abdal Musa would send his black stick to *Frengistan*, the Europeans would put their valuables and gifts in the sack on this stick, thus Abdal Musa would have received "bac u harac" (Güzel, 1999, p. 133). Considering that *bac* (tax) and *harac* (tribute) are the main signs of rentier exploitation, it can be more clearly understood that the story in question evaluates Abdal Musa in a similar rank to Ottoman rulers.

There is a prayer in the form mentioned is included in his *menâkib* of Eşrefoğlu Rûmî (1976, p. 60), that as such "expel us from the hearts of the rulers and the rulers from our hearts [tm]". The meaning of these expressions will be examined in terms of articulations between dervish circles and subordinated classes in the following sections. If it is interpreted within the framework of this section, the meaning of these expressions is that certain dervish circles regard themselves as morally pure and divinely higher than the ruler and do not want to share their power and social prestige with him. According to the interpretation in the *velâyetnâme* of Otman Baba, after the prophet Muhammad, his grandchildren Hasan and Huseyn became the manifestations of prophethood and *welayah* (sainthood) (Yalçın, 2008, p. 52). After them, the saints became the 'shepherds' of the prophethood on earth and were assigned to provide the world order with justice, to come to the help of those in distress, to provide protection against troubles, and to give strength to the believers internally (Yalçın, 2008, pp. 52-53).

According to Küçük Abdal (Yalçın, 2008, p. 53), the author of the *velâyetnâme* of Otman Baba, prophecy helps the saints in the inner way, and the sainthood (*welayah*) in the apparent way, because prophecy is entrusted to the saints. In fact, the author of *velâyetnâme* claimed that the one who denies the sainthood denies the prophecy, and the one who denies the prophecy denies God (Yalçın, 2008, p. 55). In this context,

⁶⁵¹ Do not be close to the visible ruler of the world, do not go to the door of the administrators for worldly wealth even for spiritual education.

Küçük Abdal states that the saints have a domination on all existing beings. Some elements in these expressions contain common projections with the notion of the esoteric pole (*qutb*). According to Ocak (2015b, p. 53), the concept of *qutb* means that a religious elder, on whom all of the attributes of God are directly manifested, represents “prophecy and sainthood” in his own personality, and that he is made “caliph and hakeem” by God in order to manage the affairs on earth with truth and justice, and it almost includes being a descent of God himself to the earth.

The forementioned assertion is such a mystical version of the *plenatido potestatis* claim of the Catholic Church and is heavily influenced by the Shiite *welayah* theory. These statements are quite similar to the political discourse in which the ulama stratum formulates its own social function as the ‘pillar of religion and state’. However, while the claim of the ulama stratum is mostly based on *fiqh*, dogmas and catechistic sciences, the claim of the dervish circles is formulated in a mystical characteristic that directly reference miracles.⁶⁵² The main thesis of the *velâyetnâme* of Otman Baba asserts the saints as the pillars of the external and internal religion.⁶⁵³ The theoretical formulation of this idea is contained in Akşemseddin’s work called *Mâkâmat-ı Evliya*. In the relevant part of this work, the famous *sûfî* deals with the ruling groups in the world and describe them by two categories. According to Akşemseddin, there are two types of rulers exist in the world. The first of these is the sultans and their provisions are outwardly valid. The second one is saints, and their ruling is esoteric (*batınî*) and they rule the seven climates of the world and seven stars (Aliyeva & Hasanov, 2013, p. 139). While Akşemseddin accepts the material power of the rulers, he argues that the power of the saints (and therefore the circles of dervishes) includes and exceeds the power of the rulers. In a story in the *velâyetnâme* of Otman Baba, Mehmet II said to Otman Baba, “You are the sultan and you are the secret of God, and I am inferior and weak next to you my father” (Yalçın, 2008, p. 85), then Otman Baba replied, “Well, know that I am the sultan, not you” refers to a similar imaginative power relationship. Moreover, the fact that Akşemseddin, a member of *Bayramî* order, was with Mehmet II

⁶⁵² Although it is seen that in the first centuries when *sûfîsm* was born in Islam, *sûfîs* were mentioned with some signs of rulership, it is striking that this situation was not based on an active claim to rule (see: Başer, 2021, pp. 23-37). Therefore, it would be appropriate to think that the Shiite imamate theories and the expectation of the Mahdi had an impact on the integration of *sûfîsm* with the claim to worldly power.

⁶⁵³ Within the framework of these propositions, it can be better understood that there are sections in Sinan Pasha’s *Tazarrunâme* that describe the life of saints after God, prophets and four caliphs.

during the capture of Constantinople, this order strengthened and its claim to share in divine determination became clear. In Öztürk anonymous (2000, p. 86), it is claimed that Constantinople was taken with the patronage and blessing of the White Sheikh (*Ak Şeyh/ Akşemseddin*). In the *velâyetnâme* of Otman Baba, the conquest of Constantinople is attributed to this saint as a success (Yalçın, 2008, p. 73)⁶⁵⁴: “(...) ol kân-ı velâyet İstanbul karşıusunda bir depe üzere kırk gün bir yanınıñ üzerine yatup eyitdi kim ben bu şehri almağa geldim dimiş idi. Zirâ bu işiñ žâhir i nübüvvet, bâtıñı velâyetdür”.⁶⁵⁵ In the *menâkibnâme* of Mahmud Pasha (Aslan & Doğan, 2012, p. 56), the lines claiming that Mehmet II came to *Iznik* after deciding to besiege Istanbul, paid allegiance to Eşrefoğlu Rûmî and received permission from Hacı Bayrâm-ı Velî, indicate as a sub-text that these saints were effective.⁶⁵⁶ In these examples, it is clear that circles of dervishes are mentined as having priority over the rulers in terms of representing divine power. For this reason, it is natural for *sûfi* circles that adopt this political attitude to create stories in which the founding saints and cult leaders, not the rulers, have a theomorphic image. Examples of these stories would be listed as such Hacı Bektâş-ı Velî’s taking the form of a pigeon and animating a wall, Abdal Musa’s whirling with the mountains, Hacı Bayrâm’s bringing his disciplines from hundreds of kilometers away by force of chains, Eşrefoğlu Rûmî’s resurrection after his death and making his disciplines repent, Yunus Emre’s granted by God with a table descending from the sky, Otman Baba’s mounting a cloud and whipping with a lightning etc. (Yalçın, 2008, p. 65).

On the other hand, it is seen that *sûfi* circles do not always directly object to the image of the ruler as the manifestation of divine signs, and that they can be articulated with such propaganda in accordance with the political conjuncture. According to the story in the *Selatinnâme* (Öztürk, 2001, p. 41), Hacı Bektâş-ı Velî is a guest in Osman Beg’s guesthouse and Osman Beg shows him even more respect after the saint performs

⁶⁵⁴ The relationship between Otman Baba and Mehmet II, which led to the capture of Constantinople, is likened to the relationship between God and its servant: “Senüñ Allâhü Ekber nutquñ ile Žafer buldı o sultân lutfuñ ile” (Yalçın, 2008, p. 74). According to the author of the *velâyetnâme*, the word of the real caliph is effective on earth and in the sky (Yalçın, 2008, p. 92). Also indicated in this text that dervishes who fear the lords of the world are not worthy of the caliphate and their paths do not reach salvation (Yalçın, 2008, p. 93).

⁶⁵⁵ He lay down on one side of him for forty days on a hill opposite to Istanbul, and said, ‘I came to take this city’. Because the visible side of this incident is prophethood, and the hidden side is sainthood.

⁶⁵⁶ Considering the year 1430, which is the date of the death of Hacı Bayrâm-ı Velî, it can be thought that this legend is not true, but indirectly related to Akşemseddin.

miracles. Upon this, Hacı Bektâş-ı Velî turned to Osman Beg and said the following words:

Sonun gür olsun iy şah-ı ser-efraz/ Bu sözleri bize çün iydeün saz
Bu düşmiş gönlümüzi iyle aldun/ Muhabbet şevkını gönlüme saldun
Ki ma'lum oldu sende var keramet/ Kılursun Hak yoluna istikamet
Ki senden razı olsun dayim Allah/ Bizi lutfunla topladun iy şah
Sana virdük düşen bu yirde o han/ Adun tursun cihan durdukça Osman
Bu iller hep senün destünde olsun/ Ki dostun şad olup düşmanun ölsün
Cihan durdukça var ol sen cihanda/ Nice şehirler hem olsun sana bende
Geydürür Hacı Bekdaş ana bir tac/ Didi olsun cihan hükmüne muhtaç⁶⁵⁷

Secondly, in a story mentioned in the anonymous chronicle of Öztürk (2000, p. 68), Emir Sultan discovered spiritually that the rulership had been given to Prince Mustafa during the rebellion of false (*Düzme*) Mustafa, and thereupon, he met with the prophet Muhammad three times and kissed his feet with the request until he took the reign to Murat II.⁶⁵⁸ This can be mentioned as a legend in which the figures of the saints mediated the taking of the rulership from the divine source. Factually, it would be appropriate not to overstate this role, because the Ottoman administration was also often wary of *sûfi* claims that could claim transcendence to the ruler's authority.⁶⁵⁹ The rejection of Emir Sultan's request to reside in Edirne during the reign of Murat II on the grounds that "there can't be two sultans in one city, if the people obey the Emir won't respect you [tm]" and that the famous *sûfi* was sent to Bursa is a clear example in this context (Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî, 1990, p. 265).

⁶⁵⁷ May your end be well, O supreme king of the highest/ Because you have spoken these words to us

You won this broken heart/ You placed the desire for love in my heart

It has been known to us that you have a miracle/ You turn to the way of God

God bless you always/ You brought us together with your grace

We gave you a khanate in this place that fell to you / Let your name be called Osman as long as the world exists.

May these countries always be under your rule/ So that your friend laughs and your enemy dies

As long as the world exists, be in the world/ Many sheikhs will be your servants

Hacı Bektaş made him wear a crown/ He wished that the whole world would need his rule.

⁶⁵⁸ See also: The *menâkıbnâme* of Emir Sultan (Kahraman, 2009, pp. 199-200). For another version see: Gökbilgin (2021, p. 34).

⁶⁵⁹ In the *Saltuknâme*, it is seen directly that Sarı Saltuk prayed for Osman Beg and gave the good news that his descendants were given rulership (Ebü'l-Hayr-ı Rûmî, 1988, p. 186). This example can be evaluated in the same context.

Although the ruler is not imagined as a saint in the narratives of the first type, he gets his share of divine privilege as a person assisted by the saints. A similar example of Mehmet II's accession to the throne is in the *menâkıbnâme* of Otman Baba. According to the author of this *text* (Yalçın, 2008, p. 63), one day Prince Mehmet residing in Manisa, dreams of Otman Baba, and saint tells him "I came to make you a sultan to the Rûm [tm]" and adds "I will show myself to you when you turn forty years old, which you should know me at that moment, if you do not recognize me, you will be wasted [tm]". In this narrative, it is understood that a dervish evaluates and showed himself as the person who placed the ruler on his throne. The continuation of the rule depends on the recognition of the dervish's reputation by the ruler, that is, the acceptance of his mystical authority. This narrative constitutes another example of the dream myth that was discussed in the previous chapters, which has not been revised by the discourse mechanisms of the state authority. Another example is found in the *menâkıbnâme* of Eşrefoğlu Rûmî. The writer of this *text*, Bursalı Mehmed Velüyiddin Efendi, cites an anecdote describing how the succession of the throne after Bayezid II was decided in a council led by the prophet Muhammad. According to Bursalı (1976, pp. 73-75) after Eşrefoğlu Rûmî's death, Bayezid II's mother took his daughter Züleyha to the palace and took care of her, and when she reached the age of marriage, she let her be married Eşrefoğlu Rûmî's caliph Sheikh Abdurrahim Tirsî and sent her to Iznik. Before Züleyha went to Iznik, Prince Korkud's mother requested Sheikh Tirsî to pray for her son Korkud to reign after Bayezid II. One night, Züleyha sees in her dream that the person who will take the Ottoman throne has been decided in a council including Sheikh Tirsî established in the presence of the prophet (Bursalı Mehmed Velüyiddin Efendi, 1976, p. 74):

Bir şeb rüyamda gördüm ki bir meclis-i ali, bir divan vaz' olunmuş ve bir taht-ı ali kurulmuş ve üzerinde Sultan-ı kevnenyn ve Resülü's-sakaleyn Hazret-i Muhammed'ül-Mustafa (...) cülus etmişler ve cihar-yar-ı güzin (...) ve ulema-i kiram ve evliya-i kamilin (...) hazır olmuşlar. Abdurrahim Tirsi Hazretleri dahi Sultan'ül-enbiya Hazret-i Muhammed'ül-Mustafa (...) huzur-ı alilerinde mürakaben dururlar, müşavere ederler ve şehzadelerin hangisi geçsin tahta diye Sultan-ı Ebiyadan tayin talep ederler. Sultan'ül-enbiya buyurdular ki: 'Rumun kara oğlanının muradı Sultan Selim'dir!'. Buyururlar ki: 'Murad Abdurrahim Tirsi'dir!' Hemen Sultan'ül Enbiyanın mübarek lisan-ı saadetlerinden bu kelam

sadır olacak, gayri şehzadelerin başlarından devletlerin alırlar ve ol meclisten kaldırırlar.⁶⁶⁰

Upon this dream, Züleyha cries out and asks Sheikh Tirsî why he said Selim's name instead of Prince Korkud. Sheikh Abdürrahim Tirsî states that Korkud will not have children, that if he becomes the ruler, the lineage of the Ottoman dynasty will be cut off, and this is against the will of God. The author of the *menâkıbnâme*, Bursalı Mehmed Velüyiddin Efendi (1976, p. 75), gives the main idea of the text on this dialogue: “Malum oldu ki, evliyaullah muradullah ile amel ederlermiş”.⁶⁶¹ The story conveyed in this narrative is that the Ottoman ruler was elected by the vote of Abdurrahim Tirsî in a parliament where the prophet, four caliphs, and great saints and scholars were present. However, the author of the *menâkıbnâme* states that Sheikh Tirsî’s wish is in line with God’s will and cannot deviate from it. In this *mise-en-scène*, the legitimacy of the Ottoman ruler is ensured with the help of the founding figures of Islam, his authority is strengthened by the will of God, and at the same time, a transcendent image about the symbolic status of a certain *sûfi* order (the *Qadiris*, led by Sheikh Tirsî) is articulated to the state authority. To remember, Selim I came to power by a *coup d’état* against his father, Bayezid II, and this is not a legitimate way of enthronement. Rebelling against the father or patricide is considered taboo in all rentier social formations.⁶⁶² Precisely for this reason, the transcendental discourse produced about Selim I’s power hides the

⁶⁶⁰ One night, I dreamed that a supreme council, a *Diwan* was established, and a supreme throne was established, and the sultan of both worlds and the prophet of humans and jinns, Hazrat Muhammad al-Mustafa (...) sat on the throne, and the four caliphs (...) and great scholars and great saints (...) were there. Even Abdurrahim Tirsî stood in front of Hazrat Muhammad-ul-Mustafa (...), the sultan of the prophets, consulted, and demanded an appointment from the sultan of the prophets to see which of the princes should reign. The sultan of the prophets said: ‘The wish of the black boy of the Rum region is Sultan Selim!’. They say: ‘Abdurrahim Tirsî is the one who wishes!’ As these words were said from the blessed mouth of the sultan of the prophets, they take their fortunes from the heads of other princes and remove them from that council.

⁶⁶¹ It is known that the saints of God used to act in accordance with the purpose of God.

⁶⁶² In Greek mythology, Zeus’ seizure of power by killing his father, Kronos, was discussed as a ‘scandal’ in ancient societies. In ancient Rome, people who killed their father were put in a sack with animals such as dogs, snakes and cats and thrown into the Tiber River. In Christian belief, God is symbolized by the figure of ‘father’. In both the Torah and Islamic law, the legal status of a son who killed his father and committed adultery with his mother (and drank wine from his father’s skull) was discussed considering that he would represent ‘the most despicable person who could exist’. The Ottoman rulers were seen as the ‘father’ of the *reâyâ*, etc. Obedience to parents is considered a religious order in Islamic thought. Also, on the death of the father and the symbolic establishment of his authority in primitive societies, see: S. Freud, Totem and Taboo.

real political and moral qualities of his accession to the throne, and includes all high-level religious figures, from God to prophet, in the narrative to legitimize this incident.⁶⁶³

While the attributing powers of sainthood and miracle to the rulers in general reached its most inclusive form with the history of Bostanzâde Yâhya, there are indications in the sources of the period that suggest that this form of discourse is also a part of a war of position that should indirectly enter the history of social struggles. Various *sûfi* circles make an effort to evaluate and manifest the rulers as obedient to their own orders, both in order to articulate with the state and to raise their status compared to other orders. The derivation of the Ottoman lineage from the marriage of the daughter of Sheikh Edebâli and Osman Beg (dream myth)⁶⁶⁴, the myth that the sheikhs and ulama of Konya, especially Mevlânâ Celâleddîn, enthroned Orhan Beg (Köklü, 2004, p. 5). These narratives, which can be seen in early examples such as the relationship between Murat I and Postinpuş Baba (Demir, 2017, p. 56), and the kinship relationship between Emir Sultan and Bayezid I, have been the subject of popular narratives in the successive historical era. The fact that Âşıkpaşazâde (2017, p. 54) embraced Geyikli Baba as a *Vefâî* dervish and the story of Orhan Beg, which Geyikli Baba planting a poplar tree at the courtyard door and praying, for his own *sûfi* order, documents how significant it seems to be articulated with the state in this order. Moreover, for example, Âşıkpaşazâde claims that members of the Bektashi order try to establish a connection between them by likening their headgear to the Janissary bork, which can be considered as an example of state-*sûfi* order articulation whether or not this accusation is true (Apzd, 2017, pp. 203-4). It can be thought that this practice indicates an articulation with the state, since after Hacı Bayrâm's exile to Edirne, he met with Murat II and was forgiven, as the members of the *Bayramiyye* order similarly turned their red crowns into white (Bayramoğlu & Azamat, 1992). In the memoirs of Janissary Constantine, it is claimed that Murat II joined an unnamed dervish order after he left the throne to his son (Beydilli, 2019b, p. 56). Bayezid II's relationship with Cemal-i Halvetî, whom he met in Amasya and helped to come to Istanbul after he

⁶⁶³ However, it could be detected from historical sources that there were negative views on the power of Selim I among the *sûfi* circles. For example, it is rumored that Âşıkpaşazâde's son-in-law, Seyyit Velayet, said to Selim I that "you will be a sultan soon, but your life will not be long [tm]" and that he resisted his appeals (Öngören, 2003, p. 128).

⁶⁶⁴ Contrary to what this myth states, see: Şahin (2022c, pp. 98-99) for historical findings that Orhan Beg's mother was not Sheikh Edebâli's daughter.

became ruler, exhibits a similar characteristic (Tayşî, 1993). Bayezid II allocated the Koca Mustafa Pasha complex in Istanbul to Cemal-i Halvetî and visited him from time to time (Demir, 2017, pp. 59-60). Bayezid II also made donations to the *Nakshibendis*, *Mevlevis*, *Kadirîs* and *Bayramîs*, and even joined the communities of the Bayramî Sheikhs Muhyiddin Yavsî and Baba Yusuf (Demir, 2017, pp. 63-4). It would be striking to think that these and similar relations were effective in spreading the sainthood claim of Bayezid II.⁶⁶⁵

As a result, the political affinity of the rulers with the *sûfî* circles also influenced the popular legends circulating about them, and gaining the respect of the *sûfî* circles became an element that nurtured the image of the ruler ‘as the manifestation of divine signs’. Thus, the class domination, which placed the theomorphic ruler image in the center, could be transcended in the eyes of the subordinated people. There is also a significant detail about the mode of political articulation of the ruler and *sûfî* circles in such discourses. Anecdotes, in which *sûfî* circles insist that they consider themselves authorized to enthrone the rulers and that they express these claims in popular forms as legends, can also be evaluated as expressions of a social reality in a symbolic form. Since *sûfî* circles are social segments involved in the daily life of the people, closer to large segments of the population including peasants and nomads -in contrary than the ruler’s tax collectors, soldiers, *timar* holders and ulama- thus their discursive support becomes an indispensable element for the ruler to stay on the throne. The reputation of the *sûfî* circles in the eyes of the subordinated classes and their competence in reaching them, making them to obey their words, reproducing the supernatural form of thinking, and having their authority accepted make them the sole support of the state authority among the subordinated classes. Especially during the grand viziership of Mahmud Pasha and the period of Bayezid II, the function of this circles was adequately appreciated and the *sûfî* circles were tried to be a political apparatus of the central state. The fact that this relationship between the state/ruler and sects can be handled realistically in the sources of the period shows that this is a conscious choice and is important in terms of maintaining the social class schema. For example, the famous sheikh al-Islam of the 15th century, Kemalpaşazâde, in his work called *Risalatü'l-munire*, clearly stated that “the state officials of this period protected the sheikhs so that

⁶⁶⁵ On the other hand, the criticisms written by Prince Korkud against the activities of *sûfî* circles and especially the *Melâmîs* in the same period (Al-Tikriti, 2004, pp. 228-34) show that there were different approaches within the Ottoman dynasty.

they would pray for the continuation of their worldly positions, and the sheikhs did not leave from their circle to take advantage of reaching wealth [tm]” (as cited in Öngören, 2000, p. 238).

VII.II.II. Construction of *a priori Taxis* Between Rulers

“Βασιλεύς Βασιλέων Βασιλέων Βασιλέουσι”⁶⁶⁶

(Eyice, 2021, p. 1114)

“Zulmet-i küfrü hep bozar Osmanlı/ Hak Teala bunları etti ihsanlı
Hak Teala bunları rahmete mazhar etti/ Eşiğinde kul oluptur sultanı”⁶⁶⁷

Âşıkpaşazâde (Kala, 2013, p. 221).

In Islamic political thought, rulers are often described as ‘the sky of the state and beloved of the people’, ‘sultan of four continents’, ‘sultan of seven climates’, ‘shelter of the world’, ‘guard of religion’, ‘sultan of the sea and land’ who symbolized as a person which have the right of domination over the world (Bağdatlı, 2018, p. 169). These expressions reflect a specific form of mentality and the corresponding global dominance-themed political statements, as they reflect that the rulers have an *a priori* claim on the rulers and peoples of other countries, including the areas they do not actually rule, and that they see other rulers hierarchically (*taxis*) below of a ‘unique master of the world’. This discourse expresses the claim of a god-like universal domination in connection with the ruler’s gaining a divine image to a large extent. For example, the understanding that takes place in the political discourse of the Mongol and Ilkhanate aristocracy, which considers the Khan of Mongols to be the ruler of the whole earth and assigned by God, is worth mentioning because it is included in the Turkish-Mongol tradition (Özgüdenli, 2020b, p. 276). The foundations of this understanding can be found in the reigning myths originating from the Middle East, and can be traced back to the development of the idea of universal empire in political culture of the Zhou dynasty in China (Bodde, 1965, p. 68). In general, it is possible to think that this idea emerged in way of an uneven and combined development of imperial regimes.

In this context, it is possible to determine the existence of the claim that the ruler, who is equipped with divine exclusivity, has the right to dominate the whole world

⁶⁶⁶ Ideogram meaning ‘ruler of rulers who rule over rulers’. There is an example in many Byzantine buildings in Constantinople.

⁶⁶⁷ Ottomans always break the darkness of denying religion/ Almighty God bestowed them/ Almighty God had mercy on them/ Rulers became servants in front of them.

in Ottoman political thought. Within the Ottoman political thought, the purely rhetorical aspects of this claim can be seen in the intellectual tradition, as well as it is seen that it is put forward as a real political vision or historical position. For example, Ahmedî gives place to the couplet “Oldur ol şâh-ı cüvân-ı Devlet ki bî-şek can-karîb / Tâbi ü tabic îrân-ıla Tûrân aña”⁶⁶⁸ for Emir Suleyman in his *Diwan*. It is clear that this expression manifests the desire to dominate the world in a rhetorical nature, which is considered the common desire of the rulers, on Emir Suleyman and places him in a similar imaginary position with the rulers mentioned in Ferdowsi’s *Shahname* or Alexander the Great. On the other hand, it is possible to see that this view was also adopted by the rulers and became a self-reflexion in the following expressions in Mehmet II’s *diwan*, which he wrote under the pen name Avnî: “N’ola oldı ise ‘Avnî cihan sultanları hanı”⁶⁶⁹. In this context, it is necessary to start the emergence of the representation of the Ottoman rulers over other rulers as a real political vision with the imperial period, and also to deal with the theological-ideological bases of this vision.

In the background of the belief in divine exclusivity in the Ottoman political thought, Mehmet II was seen as a ruler who realized a divine prophecy with the capture of Constantinople and thus gained the position of the leader of the Islamic world. The word attributed to the prophet Muhammad that the commander who conquered Constantinople was a blessed commander, in this sense, becomes the divine basis of Mehmet II’s claim to transcendent authority. It is stated in the work titled *Cam-ı Cem-Ayin* by Hasan the son of Bayatlı Mahmud (Çiftçioğlu, 1949, p. 396), who wrote in the same period, that Mehmet II had the happiness of obeying the relevant hadith. Kivâmî (2018, p. 173) continues the mystification of the conquest by expressing that there were many jihads over Constantinople before Mehmet II, but that God gave this conquest to Mehmet II. One of the Mehmet II’s contemporary, Giacomo de Languschi, reported the words of the ruler as such: “The world empire should be one, with one religion and one ruler. There is no better place than Istanbul to realize this union” (as cited in İnalçık, 2018a, p. 62). These words show us that the discourse of divine exclusivity was also shared by Mehmet II in the framework mentioned above. In this context, it could be followed from the sources that Mehmet II was held superior to the other rulers in the region. For example, Âşıkpaşazâde (Kala, 2013, p. 242) notes in the following lines that

⁶⁶⁸ Akdoğan (22, VI/29). He is the young ruler of the state to which the soul is undoubtedly close / Iran and Turan are subject to him.

⁶⁶⁹ Avnî became the ruler of the world rulers and what did he get. See: Avnî, *gazel* no: 64, couplet no: 6, p. 29.

Mehmet II had authority over other parts of the world as well: “Arap, Acem, Bulgar u Hinde/ Vara hükmü tiz gelin divane”.⁶⁷⁰

Kıvâmî (2018, p. 63) argues that no ruler in the world can be compared to Mehmet II, that there is no equal aspect of ‘*keya*’ and ‘*giya*’, that is, the greatest ruler with the grass that grows from the ground. Kıvâmî’s couplet could be translated as follows: Although in spelling, *keya* and *kiya* are the same, but it is not possible for *kiya* to come from *kiyakar*. Uygur (2018, p. 63, footnote 2) states that the words ‘*keya*’ and ‘*kiya*’ are spelled the same. The word ‘*keya*’ is derived from the term ‘*key*’ meaning the great sultan, while ‘*kiya*’ means ‘*glue*’, or ‘*mouth*’. But the word with another meaning, ‘*kiya*’ with the same spelling read as ‘*giya*’ means ordinary grass. In this respect, it is possible that the poet compared all the other rulers to the objects that his feet tread before the sultan. In another couplet supporting these statements, Kıvâmî (2018, p. 225) completes the above-mentioned framework by arguing that the Sultan of Egypt said to Mehmet II, “I am your servant, a helpless and worthless servant at your door [tm]”, and that the Iranian rulers bowed down on the sultan's doorstep and offered respect with all their soldiers.

Tursun Beg makes a syllogism that is open to interpretation by using a verse, a *qudsi* hadith and a *merfu* hadith in the relevant section that we will quote below. Tursun Beg’s polysyllogism is as follows (1977, p. 15):

Hak Ta’âlâ hâme-i himmetini ‘ve yü’eyyidü bi-nasrihi men yeşâ’ ikliî ile mükellel kıldı ve kadd-i kadr ü kudretini hil’at-i müfâharet-i ‘men rafa’n âhü iftefa’a ve men veza’nâhü itteza’a’ birle müşerref ü mu’azzez itti; ve teşrîf-i izâfe-i ‘es-sultânü zıllu’llâhi fi’l-arz’ vâsıtasıyle tâ’at ü mütâba’atini ekâsî vü edânî üzre farz-ı ayn itti; tâ hâk-i atebe-i Keyvân-rütbesi, bûse-cây-i mülûk-i zaman, ve bisât-ı felek-sâyebânı, secde-gâh-ı selâtin-i zemîn oldı (...).⁶⁷¹

Three political elements are particularly striking in this narrative. The first was expressed in terms of ‘crown’, the second ‘*hil’at/caftan*’, and the third ‘devotion’.

⁶⁷⁰ “To Arab, Persian, Bulgarian and Indian/ His order arrives, ‘come immediately to *diwan*’.

⁶⁷¹ Because Allah the Almighty has truly crowned the pen of the patronage of our Sultan (...) with the crown “(Allah) supports whomever He wills with His help” (Qur’an, 3:13), the height of his worth and power “Whoever we raise, he will rise; Whoever we humiliate, he will be humiliated” for honoring and glorifying with the pride of the *qudsi* hadith. And because He honored him with the judgment set forth in the hadith “The Sultan is the shadow of Allah on earth”, and his servitude and devotion to those who are near and far away is an inevitable duty to be fulfilled, the land of the high-ranking threshold of Keyvan became the place where the rulers of the time kissed and where the sultans of the earth put their head.

Quotations from the religious literature are placed with the Quranic verse at the top, *qudsi* hadith in the middle and *merfu* hadith at the end, allowing them to interpret each other from the bottom up. However, the interpretation in question here is not of a general nature, but of a particular nature. In other words, an interpretation was made not to reveal the universal meaning of the verses and hadiths, but to show how the meanings of these texts were manifested on Mehmet II. In addition, each chapter also interprets itself. Each image is paired with a concept, and the meaning of the image and concept gains concrete content from top to bottom. The ‘crown’ image on the top step is given together with the verse/concept stating that God chose the ruler according to his own will. As stated in the previous section, the use of only a part of the relevant verse (Qur’an, 3:13) aims to prevent the ruler’s role from being understood as being limited to religious warfare, and thus facilitate his ability to claim rights over other Muslim rulers. In the second quotation, the image of the ‘caftan’ and the *qudsi* hadith, which includes the concept of value, are used together. In the symbology of hierarchy, ‘to put on a *hil’at*/caftan’ means to assign a degree and rank or to raise a rank. Repeated examples of this are frequently encountered in the history of Âşikpaşazâde. The hadith, which is used together with the analogy of putting a *hil’at* on a ruler by God, has a dual expression as ‘God elevates some of his servants and lowers others’. The image of ‘to be put on a *hil’at*’ and the concept of ‘to be raised’ have semantic integrity. What should be understood from these lines is that the ruler is above the other rulers, because the upper step indicates divine selection, while the lower step determines the position of Mehmet II relative to the other rulers. In the last dual usage, the image that the sultan is the shadow of God and the concept of ‘loyalty of the distant rulers’ were used together. Tursun Beg uses the term ‘*sultan*’ in this context, simply taking it out of the meaning of ruler and meaning the sovereign above all rulers. Because, as it is seen in Kivâmî, the term ‘*Keyvan*’ is used for sultan and this expression means the ruler above all rulers.

It is not a coincidence that the three elements we try to interpret in the excerpt are presented in a three-step hierarchy of sanctification taken from the religious literature, and in all three steps, images and concepts are matched within this religious framework. Images were chosen from secular sources in the first two steps, and concepts were given using religious source. For example, while the terms ‘crown’ and ‘*hil’at*/caftan’ refer to images of secular power, the concepts of divine ‘help/support’ and ‘value/rank’ organize the general approach that explains these images. However, in the last part of the quotation, it is seen that the image and the concept have changed

places. The image of a 'shadow' comes from religious literature, and the concept of devotion comes from secular origins. As the reason for this change, it can be shown that the examples in the first two steps include the power relations that were already valid in the Ottoman rule, but the last element also refers to the power relations that have not yet been realized. In the final analysis, if we interpret all three elements together, it can be stated that the first two elements strive for the transcendence of the already existing situation, that is, the ruler in power, and the last element is an embodiment of the scope and purpose of this transcending tendency. What is concretely demanded or desired can be read through this last element as the world-wide dominance of a transcendent ruler in the ideological sense.

It is seen that the vision of 'being the ruler of the whole earth', which was settled during the reign of Mehmet II, gained continuity during the reign of Bayezid II. According to Kavak (2019a, p. 200), the following statements in the dedication section of the work *Ferâ'idü'd-dürer and şerhu Levâmi'i'l-ğurer* presented to Bayezid II by Molla Gürânî reveals the continuation of this vision: "Ce'altühü tuhfeten li-mütâlaati Seyyidi'l-mülûk, melceü'l-hâifi ve's- su'lûk Hân b. Hân es-Sultân Bâyezîd b. Muhammed Hân b. Osman mellekehüllâhü besîte'l-arzi ve mekkenehû fi't-tûli ve'l-'arz".⁶⁷² Moreover, Kemal (Öztürk, 2001, p. 11), one of the historians of this period, defines Bayezid II as the greatest ruler of the period (*şah-ı devran*) in his work called *Selâtinname* and claims that the rulers of Iran and Turan can only be servants to him. It is possible to follow from his poems written under the pseudonym *Âdlî*, that Bayezid II personally shared this vision and saw himself as a person chosen by God and placed in a position above other ruler. In one of his poems, Bayezid II (2018, p. 179) expresses that he is at a level even higher than the level of calling other rulers as servants with the following couplet: "Şol şehinşehliği erzani kılıpdur bize hak/ Ki cihan şeylerine bende demek 'ar oldu".⁶⁷³

⁶⁷² I made this book as a gift for the opinion of Bayezid Han, Han son of Han son of Mehmed Han son of Sultan Osman, is the master of the rulers, the protector of the fearful and the poor. May Allah make him the ruler of the wide earth and make the whole earth one of his estates! Also see Kavak (2019a, p. 200).

⁶⁷³ God has deemed worthy of us to be the rulers of these rulers / That's why it has become custom to call the rulers of the world as servants.

VII.II.III. The Expansion of the *a priori* Frame About Subjects of the Ruler

“Bu han ki fazl-ı Hakkı yoldaş edindi/ Kamu halk anı baş edindi
Bu hana düşman olan alem içre/ Bela vü zehr-i marı aş edindi”⁶⁷⁴
Âşıkpaşazâde (Kala, 2013, p. 249)

In the period which is considered, another title in which the ruler is described with a transcending discourse is observed in the examples in which the relationship between the ruler and the social segments that are subject to him. Essentially, this way of thinking repeats a certain pattern in which imperial regimes reproduce themselves. As it is tried to be shown in the previous two titles, the monarch’s authority gaining a theomorphic representation, the portrayal of a particular country/administration at the center of the world/world history, and the expansion of the ruler’s ‘natural’ subjects to the world scale are considered as a whole. It is possible to encounter this way of thinking in the history of China, the Roman Empire or ancient Egypt. For example, in China, the ruler is considered the son of the sky and all the countries of the world are dependent on the Emperor of China, and all the peoples are considered his natural subjects (Eberhard, 1995, p. 41). A monarch is, as *a fortiori*, the ruler of those currently under his rule, but preconceptions about which peoples a ruler could potentially have authority over reveal his political, economic and cultural vision. In this respect, the abstractions about the social groups/people that are expected to recognize the authority of the ruler *a priori* also construct an image of a transcendent power that goes beyond the power relations in practice attributed to the ruler. In the period that is considered, political thoughts construct this *a priori* understanding by coding the Ottoman ruler as the natural ruler of the Islamic world and the ruler of the people of the world.

It is possible to come across this conceptualization first in Kivâmî’s poetry. Kivâmî (2018, p. 61) describes Mehmet II as “the lofty mountain where the ummahs take shelter [tm]” and names him as the sultan of the world. These expressions place Mehmet II above his contemporary rulers (“*Şah-ı azam*”), and place him in a position to claim rights over their subjects primarily through religious articulations (*ummah*). In another couplet, Kivâmî prays as follows (2018, p. 216): “Dahı din ‘askerine yüce Süphan/Kimi eyledi-se şimdi sultan. Onarsun işini her yirde anun/ Muti olsun ana halkı

⁶⁷⁴ This ruler took the virtue of God as a comrade/ All the people accepted him as their leader/
The enemy of this ruler in this realm/ He made trouble and snake poison his food.

cihanun.”⁶⁷⁵ The point to be emphasized in these statements is that the ruler is not seen as the sultan of the property and the country as it is mentioned in the previous phases, but as the natural ruler of the world and ummah far beyond him. These expressions in Kıvâmî indicate a significant change in political scale. In this context, it is stated in the history that Bayezid II defined himself as the shepherd of the ummah and sent some gold to the Sheikh of Bayramî order, Baba Yusuf, in accordance with the title to buy oil for burning in the oil lamps of the Masjid an-Nabawi (as cited in Öngören, 2000, p. 258).

Similar naming patterns have been developing since the first half of the 15th century in the Ottoman sultans title list compiled by Lowry (2003, pp. 150-51): In the inscriptions of Bursa Green Mosque and Muradiye Mosque written in the name of Murat II, the sultan is called the ruler of the Orient and the West, Arab and Persian. However, the emphasis in these examples is that the lands under the ruler’s domination already bear parts of the Oriental and Western regions and Arab and Persian countries. For example, in his work named *Selçuknâme*, Yazıcızâde ‘Ali (2008, p. 34) as the author of the Murat II era, shows Murat II as the successor of “*selâtin-i Rûm*” (rulers of the *Rûm* region), which does not signify a claim for global domination. While he has an implicit perspective that he is the natural ruler of other countries, it does not carry an explicit implication. As it is seen in the previous chapters, it is possible to discover the reflections of traits such as the ruler’s dominance over the world in works such as Ahmedî’s *İskendernâme*. However, it is a new phenomenon that these characteristics are accepted as an expression of an already-existing situation in the sense of a divinely endowed right. For example, in his couplets, while Kıvâmî (2018, p. 341) expressing his desire for the ruler to conquer the whole world like Alexander the Great and for every object to be a servant at his door (“Kulı olsun kapusunda cümle eşya”), he speaks within the same desire for universal domination.

VII.II.IV. The Construction of Dynastic Genealogies

“Fazıl neseb ile olmaz, ona haseb gerek
Ve ululuk kuru yerden olmaz, ona sebep gerek”⁶⁷⁶
Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 492)

⁶⁷⁵ Now the supreme God to the soldier of religion/ Whoever has appointed the ruler now/ May He glorify his deeds everywhere/ May all the people of the world submit to him.

⁶⁷⁶ A virtuous person is not by lineage, he needs righteous actions/ And greatness doesn't come in vain, it needs reason.

The great Romanian intellectual Dimitri Kantemir (1979, p. 3), in his work *Historia incrementorum atque decrementorum Aulae Othomanicae*, which he completed in 1717, states that the discussions on the origin of the Ottoman dynasty were either tried to be made in the light of incomplete information that deviated from reality, or they were mistaken based on various stories -possibly the stories that were formed by the dynasty. What this interpretation lacks are that the question of historical sources is only one facet of the origin debate. On the other side of the coin is the distinctive political problem of building the authority of the dynasty and establishing lineage ties to fit the order of political necessities. Fazlıoğlu (2004, p. 4) draws attention to the fact that a significant dimension in the formation of political power depends on the ability to find a place for itself in the ‘mental climate’ of the societies under its rule, “activating a world of imagination formed by a set of values with historical roots [tm]”. Öztürk (2017, p. 492) lists the elements of this ‘mental climate’ as historical, religious and epic codes and the world of memory, consciousness and imagination. Another area where relevant codes and narratives gain functionality is the genetic constructions, in which dynastic lineages and ancestral stories are turned into a cultural and political basis of legitimacy. The fact that both the genealogy of the great rulers and the genealogies of the founders of certain tribes in ancient Turkish culture have a meaning within the cult of ancestors (Roux, 2017, p. 36) causes the genealogic constructions to function as a cultural-political element. The fact that various genealogies about the origin of the Ottoman family were produced during this period is important in terms of showing how the patriarchal authority discourse and religious and tribal/ethnic authority patterns were reconstructed in the Ottoman family. Here, it will be mentioned specifically with the political discourse produced following the patriarchal authority model. Studies on the phenomenon of authority in the 20th century tend to accept father’s authority as a basic form of authority. For example, Kojève (2007, p. 21) states that father or parent authority is a primary type of authority, with variations in the form of gerontocratic, traditional, author-work relationship or the authority of the dead over the living. Arendt (1977, p. 92) evaluates the origin of authority structures as the development of family relations, the need for a guardian of the child. Bochenski (2015, p. 84) deals with the problem of delegation of authority forms, which he divides into epistemological and deontological, and states that delegation is only possible when deontological authority is in question. This means that the transfer of a certain authority from the past to the

present, or the articulation of a current power focus with past authority forms, presupposes that power relations can also absorb the historical traces. The right to command a certain social group (tribe/clan/ummah, etc.) is strengthened by the transfer of this right to the new ruler through tradition/inspiration/inheritance etc. by the people who used this right in the past. At this point, the integration of father's position with the physical power has revealed an authority model woven around the warrior/elite father and his heir son images. The representation of the right in question becomes visible in the institutional authority of the father and son. The patriarchal model assumes that the father is dominant over the household and society and transfers this right of domination to the sons who come after him. For example, Doukas (1975, p. 129) presents the replacement of Mehmet Çelebi by Murat II with these words: "deliver to Murad his paternal dominion by installing him as lord of his father's house [tm]".

The use of this ideological model in Ottoman political thought is realized by taking the dynasty back from the son to the father and thus constructing an ancient image of legitimacy for the dynasty. In the struggle of the Ottoman state with its regional rivals, this image functions as a political discourse model with both sides. To give an example, while Ottoman writers often claim that the Mamluks are 'degenerated/corrupt' (Genç, 2014, p. 642; Magemizoğlu, 2021, p. 103), a Karamanid historian can also make the same claim for the Ottoman dynasty (Şikarî, 2011, pp. 154, 211).

As can be seen from this short sample, the construction and dissemination of genealogical constructs can be of decisive importance for the establishment of political legitimacy and therefore authority. The first examples of the construction of this image can be found in the 15th century Ottoman chronicles. Although the content of the praise poems written to Emir Suleyman or Çelebi Mehmet in Ahmedî's *Diwan* includes only the descendants of the rulers ("sultan oğlu sultan") or their pedigrees from Osman/Orhan Beg, this origin is not traced back.⁶⁷⁷ Moreover, for example, there is no genealogy information in Ahmedî's *İskendernâme*, apart from a small note that there were Oghuzes in the entourage of Ertugrul Beg. In works such as Âşık Paşa's *Garibnâme*, which was written in the earlier period, this kind of fiction does not take place at all. There is sufficient reason to think that such genealogy information was in popular circulation among the public and state officials, especially in the second half of the 15th century, and thus assumed a political and discursive functions. As Imber points

⁶⁷⁷ For example, see: "Ol ki dirler Mir Sûlmân İbn-i Sultân Bâyezîd/ İbn-i Gâzî Han Murad İbn-i Melik Orhan aña" (Akdoğan, 21, VI/19).

out (2019c, p. 276), the fact that an Ottoman genealogy is given in the memoirs of Constantine Mikhailovich, who is thought to have served as a *Kapikulu* soldier between 1450 and 1463, shows the popular prevalence of such narratives among the soldiers.⁶⁷⁸ The narratives about the genealogy of the Ottoman dynasty are very seriously constructed by political circles close to the power, and although their slightly more vulgarized versions have been circulated among the people, their reception is not always as desired by the ruling class. For example, there is a genealogy information parodied in the imagination of the people in the *menâkıbnâme* of Otman Baba. In this *menâkıbnâme*, Otman Baba, in his encounters with Mehmet II, constantly tells the ruler that he is his father. In one of these anecdotes, it was quoted before, Mehmet II gets off his horse and kisses Otman Baba's hand and calls him 'father'. The author of the *velâyetnâme*, Küçük Abdal states that the reason for Otman Baba, whose real name is Hüssam, took the name 'Otman' is his meeting with Mehmet II (Yalçın, 2008, p. 88). Otman Baba, in an encounter with Mehmet II, said "Otman is me and you are my son [tm]" (Yalçın, 2008, p. 87). In fact, this interesting character calls many people 'Otmanoğlu' (son of Otman) (Yalçın, 2008, p. 88). The *velâyetnâme* of Otman Baba can be read as a text describing the extraordinary states and miracles of a *sûfî*, or it can also be read as a journal in which some funny and strange situations related to *sûfis* are told -like Nasreddin Hodja anecdotes. It is possible that in this journal, especially in the Balkan region, there are tales of *ghaza* expeditions, traces of religious imaginations of different beliefs and cultures dating back to pre-Islamic times, folk legends, fairy tales, jokes and legends of famous *sûfis*.⁶⁷⁹ This second reading provides us with a written

⁶⁷⁸ See also, Beydilli (2019b, pp. 33-34).

⁶⁷⁹ For example, the story of Otman Baba's struggle with the dragon is a story attributed to both St. George and Sarı Saltuk -which also has mythological roots (see: Yalçın, 2008, p. 167). It is unclear where Otman Baba lived throughout the *velâyetnâme*. While he settled in Istanbul for a while, he can be seen in the city of Vize, Prevedi, in the Caucasus or mountaintops for a while in the Balkans. Moreover, Otman is a pseudonym, and it is seen that the dervish uses other names other than his real name, Hüssam, throughout the *velâyetnâme*. Most stories about Otman Baba begin or end with his disappearance and reappearance in an unrelated place. In this respect, it is clear that the figure of Otman Baba is largely similar to the figure of Khidr. However, unlike the figure of Khidr, who is identified with wisdom, Otman Baba appears as a figure adorned with grotesque elements and loaded with anger and prank. It's almost like Bacchus versus Hermes. Otman Baba's frequent appearance to shepherds is one of his interesting similarities with Bacchus. For this reason, it is natural that the figure of Otman Baba, as one of the wandering dervish types, is quite open to parodying. In fact, Otman Baba's grotesque side and his stories that can gain humorous connotations constitute the strength of the character can be read in the *velâyetnâme*. Otman Baba's calling everyone as 'son', bodily elements such as excrement, phallus, and sexual references that appear throughout the text strengthen the element of humor.

parody of how the Ottoman dynasty was called ‘Osmanoğlu’ and from whom they were descended. It can be argued that Otman Baba presents an inverted image of Edebâli, although it is not possible to determine whether it is directly related. Thus, the alternative dream myth in the *menâkıbnâme* of Otman Baba and his claim to be the ‘father of the Ottomans’ become open to be read as a parody of the official discourse.

The first work in which genealogy is mentioned in detail is Yazıcızâde ‘Ali’s work called *Selçuknâme*. Yazıcızâde ‘Ali refers to two legendary ancestors to determine the origin of the Ottoman lineage. Firstly, he accepts the lineage from Adam to Noah as the common lineage of humanity, and secondly, Yazıcızâde ‘Ali (2008, p. 2) states that the children of Noah’s son Yafes settled in Turkestan. It is stated that Yafes (or one of the first ancestors from his generation) was called Abulca Han by the Turks and this person was a *yürük* -Turkish nomad (Yazıcızâde ‘Ali, 2008, p. 9).⁶⁸⁰ Yazıcızâde ‘Ali emphasizes that among the twenty-two Turkish tribes, those who were ‘allied’ with Oghuz Kagan knew ‘*tengri*’, while the others were infidels, and their names were Mongolian and Tatar. He states that some of those who were accepted as Mongolians later became Mongols and they should be accepted as Turks (2008, p. 6): “Ve bu Mogol, Türk tayifelerinden bir kavm idiler ve çün ‘inayet-i ezeli anlaruñ hakkında var-ıdı.” In particular, it is underlined by the author that Tamerlane was also from the Barlas tribe (Yazıcızâde ‘Ali, 2008, p. 7). Thus, it becomes symbolically possible for the tribes called Mongols or Tatars and Tamerlane, who was responsible for the trauma of the interregnum, to be tied to a common ancestor with the Ottomans, or rather to the authority, and even to be demoted under the Ottomans according to his lineage

If we had the oral fragments of the *velâyetnâme* instead of the written copy, I think it would have been possible to identify such elements more clearly. On the other hand, the parts of the *velâyetnâme* describing the events in which Otman Baba got into trouble with the judges, threatened the order in Edirne and tried to be brought to Istanbul are probably true incident. In this case, the author of the *velâyetnâme* may have built a narrative about his past, loaded with extraordinary events and parodies, by ascribing popular stories to Otman Baba before telling these incidents.

⁶⁸⁰ According to Yazıcızâde ‘Ali (2008, p. 9): “Abulca Han sahra-nişin ve göçgün idi, yani yaban yurdu ve yürük idi. Ve onun yaylağı Urtak Keytay Taglarında-ıdı”. Let us underline that the emphasis of nomadism is included in the Oghuz narrative. On the other hand, in the memoirs of Janissary Constantine, the image of Osman Beg is drawn as not a nomad but a settled farmer. According to Costantine (Beydilli, 2019b, p. 33-34) Osman Beg is the son of a farmer from the lower class. He declared the thirty plows his property and acquired a larger land, and was engaged in agriculture with many of his men, animals and employees. Le Goff (2019, p. 257) states that the image of peasant-king who provides food is used in the pedigrees of many legendary kings; Triptolemos, King of Eleusia, Cincinnatus of Rome, Przemysl, progenitor of Bohemian Przemysl, Piast, progenitor of Polish dynasty, and so on.

prestige.⁶⁸¹ In the last instance, family trees are concluded with the attachment of the Ottomans to the Kayı tribe⁶⁸², and Murad II becomes an element of political discourse with the claim that he is the equal or more honorable of most Turkish and Mongolian rulers due to these lineage ties. Yazıcızâde ‘Ali (2008, p. 23) presents his claim as follows:

(...) padişahımız Sultan Murad bin Mehemmed Han ki eşref-i al-i Osman’ dandır padişahlığa ensab ve elyaktır. Oğuz’un kalan hanları uruğundan belki Çingiz Hanları uruğundan, dahı mecmu’ından ulu asl ve ulu sünükdür, şer’-ile dahı ‘örf-ile dahı. Türk hanları dahı kapusına gelüp selam virmege ve hizmet itmege layıkdur. (...) Korkut Ata (...) eyitdi: ‘Ahir zamanda girü hanlık Kayı’na dege, dahı kimesne ellerinden almaya’ didügi Osman –rahmetü’lah- neslindendür.⁶⁸³

The focal point of Yazıcızâde ‘Ali’s narrative is his claim that the Ottoman lineage was more noble and religious than the other Turkmens and Mongols, and therefore should be considered the natural leader of the Oghuz tribes.⁶⁸⁴ Moreover, in order to support this patria-religious hierarchy claim, he gives a promise to Korkut Ata, a sage with a legendary personality among the Turkmen tribes. According to the advice written by Dede Korkut, the ‘khanate’ is considered the right of the Kayı tribe. It is seen that this narrative was repeated in the history of Rûhî at a later date (Yücel & Cengiz,

⁶⁸¹ I mentioned earlier that the tribal symbology is also used in Mongolian money stamps. In addition, it should be noted that other hierarchy symbols of steppe feudalism were still valid during the Seljuk state period. Another example is that "bow and arrow" symbolizes subordinate and dominant positions and is used in many areas from relations between rulers to hierarchy among Oghuz tribes. See: Turan (1945, pp. 310-11).

⁶⁸² The real origin of the legend of the Kayı tribe may be related to the fact that Hüsameddin Beg, the founder of the Çobanoğulları, to whom the Ottomans were subject during the establishment period, was also from the Kayı tribe (Demirtaş, 1948, p. 590). Thus, a real or legendary lineage bond formed for tribal solidarity in the early period is reconsidered a century and a half later and turns into a claim of superiority.

⁶⁸³ (...) our ruler is Sultan Murad, son of Muhammed Khan, descended from the high-honored Osman line, and is a member of the royal lineage and worthy of being reigned. The remaining khans of the Oghuz urug, perhaps the Genghis khans urug, which is of supreme origin and high rank, according to both Sharia and customs. He deserves that even Turkish khans to come to his door to greet him and serve him. Korkut Ata said, 'Being a khan in the End Times will be a fortune for the Kayı tribe and no one can take it away from them', this is what Osman’s - may Allah have mercy on him – descendants.

⁶⁸⁴ Another argument against this thesis is that the Ottomans were “simple/vulgar Mongols”. For the section in which this thesis is expressed in Esterâbâdî’s work with the name *Bezn ü Rezm*, see: Esterâbâdî (1990, p. 353).

1992, p. 369). The prehistory of this proposition is the discourse of world domination formulated during the emergence of the central Asian steppe states with series of variations. In the work called *Divân-ı Lügât it-Türk*, written in 1077, a fabricated hadith is mentioned that the Turks will dominate the world (as cited in Bilkan, 2018, p. 39): “Learn the Turkish language; for them there is a long reign”. Mahmud al-Kashgari states in the following lines in his work that Turks are generally burdened with the mission of class domination over the world, without making any distinction between tribes (as cited in Bilkan, 2018, p. 39):

I saw that God gave birth to the sun of the state in the Turkish signs and turned all the corners of the heavens on their houses. God named them Turks and made them rulers of the earth. He took out of them the khans of our time; gave the peoples of the world the reins of administration into their hands; made them superior to all; strengthened themselves in righteousness. He sanctified those who worked with them, who were on their side, and granted them all their wishes because of the Turks; He protected these people from the evil of the wicked. [tm]

While the views expressed by Mahmud al-Kashgari generally correspond to the development process of the Central Asian Turkish-Mongolian states, the hierarchy among these states and the debates about who has the right to be the leader in terms of genetics are discussed with the thoughts expressed in the *Oguznâmes*. It is seen that this idea passed to the Ottomans through the Seljuk historian Ibn Bibi, who presented his work *al-Evâmirü'l-‘Alâ’iyye* to an Ilkhanate statesman (Özaydın, 1999) and Yazıcızâde ‘Ali, who translated this work with additions. As a result, Yazıcızâde ‘Ali’s narrative shows the first use of Turkmen lineage as a symbol of authority establishing the tribal hierarchy by the Ottomans. Yazıcızâde ‘Ali’s genealogical narrative also influenced his contemporary Ottoman chroniclers.

In anonymous chronicles, it is often seen that the Ottoman dynasty is depicted as the descendant of Oghuz Khan (see: Giese, 1992, p. 8; Öztürk, 2000, p. 8; Çan, 2006, p. 57; İğci, 2011, p. 1).⁶⁸⁵ Similarly, some of the 15th century historians adopted this narrative and even elaborated it. It is seen that this lineage connection generally follows a pattern. One of the most advanced forms of this pattern can be found in Şükrullah.

⁶⁸⁵ How many generations the Ottoman dynasty was connected to Noah or Yafes is mentioned with different numbers and names in different sources. For example, *Selâtinname* author Kemal uses twenty-three names (Öztürk, 2001, p. 24), Karamânî Nişancı Pasha uses twenty-one names, Giese anonymous uses thirty-six names, Âşıkpaşazâde and Oruç Beg uses thirty-eight names, and Hadîdî uses forty-five names (Öztürk, 2001, p. 24; footnote 75).

Şükrullah (2011, p. 204) states that the Ottoman lineage is based on Gök Alp, the son of Oghuz Khan, and that there are forty-four generations between them, and he connects this lineage to Yafes, the son of Noah. The interesting detail in Şükrullah's (2011, p. 204) narrative is that when he went to Mirza Şahcihan as an ambassador, he claimed that a book written in Mongolian script (or Uyghur script) was read to him and that Mirza said, "Sultan Murad's lineage is higher than our lineage [tm]". Yıldız (2010) states that Şükrullah claimed "the priority and superiority of the Ottomans in the world monarchy hierarchy throughout history [tm]".⁶⁸⁶ The utterance of this claim by another ruler also provides empirical support for the narrative, possibly false. Kantemir (1979, p. LVII) draws attention to an important detail. After the Khans of Crimea were brought to the status of Ottoman vassals in the 15th century, the opinion that the Oghuz tribe was divided into two branches as the Ottomans and the Genghisids and that the Khans of Crimea were the last representatives of the Genghisid branch was settled. In this case, an opinion is put forward that in case the Ottoman dynasty ends, the right to rule will be transferred to the Genghisid branch to which the Crimean Khans belong. An interesting anecdote about this issue is mentioned in the *menâkıbnâme* of Mahmud Pasha and an anonymous chronicle published Köklü. According to the author of the *menâkıbnâme* (Aslan & Doğan, 2012, p. 55), after Murat II's death, within forty days following Mehmet II's accession to the throne, the Khan of Crimea came to Edirne with forty thousand soldiers and claimed right on the throne. In the chronicle of Köklü (2004, p. 21), there is information that the Tatar ruler came to Edirne and demanded Mehmet II to pay allegiance to him, and that Khan of Tatars would give the *mansib* he wanted in return. From these examples, it is understood that the Crimean Khanate, which is descended from Genghis, saw itself as the natural heir to the Ottoman throne. That is, the fact that the tribe to which the Ottomans belonged was considered more noble than the Genghisids has a significance in this regard in political thought. İnalçık (1944, p. 185) states that the subordination of the Khans of Crimea to the Ottomans was accepted as a "great glory and honor" for the sultans in the sense that the Genghis lineage, which had dominated the whole Asian continent for a long time, was subordinated. For

⁶⁸⁶ Tezcan (2013, p. 24) claims that before the 15th century, the Ottomans identified themselves with the Mongols, not with the Turkmen, but this approach was lost after the Timurid invasion, and the Ottoman genealogy was based on the Turkmen nobility. I find this claim largely unfounded, because there is no such description in the early sources, and in Ahmadi's *İskendernâme* written at the beginning of the 15th century, the Ottomans and Mongols are described as rivals from the very beginning.

example, Bayezid II proudly mentions this issue in the letter he wrote to the Aq Qoyunlu ruler Sultan Yakub after the conquer of Akkerman at 1484 (İnalçık, 1944, p. 185).

Oruç Beg (2011, p. 21) composes a genealogy of the Ottoman dynasty from father to son and connects this lineage to Yafes, the son of Prophet Noah, by counting thirty-eight names starting from Ertugrul Beg. Since most of the names mentioned by Oruç Beg are Turkish-Mongol names (Kızıl Buğa, Kaya Alp, Tugar, Temür, Tozak, etc.), it is clear that the claim for legitimacy was constructed in a way that would attract the attention of Turkmen groups. Âşıkpaşazâde (2017, p. 14-15) lists Turkish-Mongolian names similar to Oruç Beg, and the first eighteen names are mentioned the same in both authors except for minor nuances. Another example that includes a genealogical list, the work named *Cam-ı Cem-Ayin* (Çiftçioğlu, 1949, pp. 380-81), written by Hasan, son of Bayatlı Mahmud, takes the Ottoman lineage back to Yafes, son of Noah, and from there to Adam. Secondly, Hasan the son of Bayatlı Mahmud (Çiftçioğlu, 1949, p. 394) connects this lineage to Ertugrul Beg through the Kayı tribe, a descendant of the Oghuz begs. The interesting thing about this work is that, as we have seen before in Yazıcızâde and Şükrullah, it does not include an emphasis that it was written directly to justify the dominance of the Ottoman dynasty over other rulers. While such a justification is already indirectly inherent in the construction of the lineage, the main purpose of the Hasan (Çiftçioğlu, 1949, p. 379) is to present to Prince Cem an abbreviated document from the *Oghuznâmes* (as requested by Prince Cem) that the Ottomans and other Oghuz tribes were related. For this reason, it is understood that the work of Prince Cem was prepared in order to get the support of the Turkmen tribes against Bayezid II in the struggle for the throne. For example, in another work called *Saltuknâme*, in which Prince Cem commissioned Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî in the Balkans to compile, we see that the legends about Sarı Saltık circulating among the Turkmen were brought together and the Kayı tribe was praised (Bilkan, 2018, p. 53). In this framework, it can be seen that the compilation of the Oghuz/Turkmen oral tradition and its transformation into an ideological discourse emerged as both a general tendency and a strategic activity embodied in the personality of Prince Cem. Imber (2019b, p. 247) draws attention to a similarity between the approaches of Oruç Beg and Hasan. Both genealogies are attributed to the famous Turkish commander Abu Müslim al-Khorasani, who was influential in the establishment of the Ottoman dynasty and the Abbasids. Moreover, it is seen that this narrative has been adopted by various anonymous chronicles and tried to spread to the public. For example, the anonymous chronicle published by Öztürk

(2000, p. 8) after connecting Osman Beg's lineage to Noah with thirty six Turkish-Mongolian names, states that this lineage has been the sultan in Iran for centuries and claims that Abu Muslim is also member of this lineage. Similarly, in anonymous chronicles published by Çan (2006, p. 57) and İğci (2011, p. 2), the claim that Ottoman dynasty is the descendant of Persian sultans and that they are related to Abu Müslim. One of the reasons for the construction of this narrative may be that one of the most famous of the *gazavatnâmes* in popular circulation is about Abu Müslim. Moreover, it is possible to find intertextual references between the *gazavatnâme* of Abu Müslim and the *Danishmendnâme* and *Battalnâme*. Thus, Ottoman chroniclers were able to combine the popular *ghaza* discourse and the dynastic genetic link through a single figure. Especially the fact that this connection is included in the anonymous chronicle writers written to be read to the members of subordinated class and lower-strata soldiers shows that this warrior figure was used to exploit the popularity of the public imagination in favor of the class domination.

Interestingly, the only genealogical list for the Ottoman dynasty is not the Turkish-Mongolian one based on the Oghuz tribes. For example, Ibn Hajar shows the Arabs of Hijaz as the origin of the Ottoman dynasty and bases the lineage on a person named Iyad -who was a companion of prophet Muhammed (Imber, 2019c, p. 287). It is seen that this thesis was repeated by a number of historians from Ibn Hajar to es-Sehavi and Hüseyin el-'Uleyyeif, and that the lineage of the Ottoman dynasty was based on Osman bin Affan, the third caliph (Karadeniz, 2008, p. 157). Al-Makrizi and Ibn-i Tagriberdi also described Osman Beg as an Arab who migrated from the Hijaz to Konya (Karadeniz, 2008, p. 157). Similarly, in the work of Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî named *Saltuknâme* and in the history of Kemalpaşazâde, an alternative narrative based on the Ottoman lineage to Iys, son of the prophet Isaac, has been created. At the origin of this narrative, another version of the hadith, which suggests that Constantinople will be taken by the sons of Asfar, is trying to be valid for the Ottoman lineage by reevaluating it as in referred to sons of Isaac (Emecen, 2003, pp. 197-99). According to the story told at length in the history of the Rûhî, the prophet Isaac had two sons named Yakub and Iys, the first of them was given the good news of prophecy, and it was prophesied that the second son would produce sultans and gentlemen from his generation (Yücel &

Cengiz, 1992, p. 372).⁶⁸⁷ The fact that there is a record in the *Saltuknâme* that the Iys lineage was heralded as a ruler and that Osman Beg was shown as a member of this generation (Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî, 1988, p. 110) is a proof that the aforementioned discourse was spread to popular culture. According to this narrative, Iys is Kayı Han, whose name is mentioned in the *Oghuznâmes*, and this person is among the ancestors of Ertugrul Beg (Yücel & Cengiz, 1992, p. 375).

In another narrative, Enverî, who wrote his work in 1460, shows a person named Ayaz/Iyaz as the ancestor of the Ottoman lineage (Öztürk, 2012b, p. 6). According to Enverî, the soldiers who went on the Iranian campaign together with Sa'd-i Vakkas, the commander of the Islamic armies and captured the city of Medayin, then Islamic army and the Oghuz tribes affiliated to Tumen Khan met one day and developed peaceful relations (Öztürk, 2012b, pp. 5-6). There was a warrior from the Quraysh tribe named Ayaz/Iyaz/Iyad in the army of Sa'd-i Vakkas and Tümen Khan decides to marry this warrior to his daughter Turunc Hatun (Öztürk, 2012b, pp. 7-8). Although it is not known whether there is a historical personality that the Ayaz/Iyaz character refers to, Sa'd-i Vakkas is one of the important figures in the history of Islam, one of the first companions of Muhammed and known for his warrior abilities.⁶⁸⁸ He was brought to the command of the Iraqi front during the reign of Caliph Omar, defeated the Sassanid army in the Battle of Qadisiya and captured the city of Medayin (Hatiboğlu, 2008). On the eve of this marriage, a warrior named Ayaz/Iyaz sees a dream similar to the one was discussed in the 'dream myth' section, and by having Sa'd-i Vakkas interpret the dream, he learns that one of his sons will rule the world (Öztürk, 2012b, p. 8). Imber (2019b, p. 258) describes this interpretation of Enverî as "having the quality of combining the spiritual lineage of a friend of the prophet with the earthly power of the Turkestan khan". In this narrative, both the Oghuz lineage and the Quraysh lineage are combined, thus combining the Islamic legitimacy doctrine that 'the Caliph will emerge from the Quraysh tribe' and the Turkmen legitimacy narrative based on being a descendant of a ruler from the Oghuz tribe in a single genealogical narrative. In the final analysis, it is

⁶⁸⁷ Another notable element in this narrative is the symbolism of prophecy and rulership as twin brothers. We will consider examples of political thought constructed around this theme in Chapter VIII of our thesis.

⁶⁸⁸ Iyad ibn Ghanam was appointed as the governor of Syria during the reign of Caliph Omar (As-Sallabi, 2007, p. 100). Ahnaf bin Kays is a well-known commander who played an important role in the Arab conquests in Iran (Gibb, 2005, p. 29). It is not clear whether there is any real common ground between these historical figures and the character of Iys.

possible to argue that this discursive construct as an ethno-potestatic sign, which will be examined in detail in the last chapter.

In fact, we can encounter a similar theme of Islamization in the narrative constructed by Bayatlı Hasan. As Imber points out (2019b, pp. 260-61), Hasan's notes while constructing the genealogy of Ottoman dynasty ensure that his dynastic ancestors are shown as pious/right people who have believed in or been with David and Jesus, respectively, since the Prophet Abraham. In fact, it is possible to detect this emphasis on 'piousness since eternity' in a series of anonymous chronicles. For example, the expression which formulated about the ancestors of the Ottoman dynasty as such "Oğuz tayifesinden kim, i'tikadlu tayife idiler ve Hazret-i Risalet'e (...) itikadları var idi" are common to all anonymous chronicles with minor changes, such as Giese (1992, p. 8), Öztürk (2000, p. 8), Çan (2006, p. 57), İğci (2011, p. 1).⁶⁸⁹ Enverî felt the need to make a special emphasis on the morality of the Oghuzs around Tuman Khan: "Anlarun içinde perde yoğıdı/ Gerçi kim adab u erkan çoğıdı".⁶⁹⁰

From another point of view, the narrative in the anonymous chronicle published by Köklü (2004, p. 5) that they were the scholars of Konya, especially Mevlânâ, who proclaimed Osman Beg as ruler, and Orhan Beg was similarly declared sultan by the ulama members. It is clear that this narrative is related to the establishment of absolute dominance over the Karamanid dynasty, especially during the reign of Mehmet II, and their subsequent removal from the stage of history at the end of the 15th century. Thus, they can form a new basis of legitimacy based on the prominent figure of Konya, Mevlânâ and the ulama stratum. In addition, in the history of Karamânî Mehmed Pasha (Çiftçioğlu, 1949, pp. 343-344), it is stated that the Ottoman lineage was connected both to the legendary Oghuz Khan and from there to Adam, and that Ertugrul Beg stood all night in front of the Qur'an and there was a silent cry. It is seen that he was blessed with the help of the narrative in which he received the good news that his lineage was exalted. In this example too, lineage is reconstructed through both secular/patriarchal continuity and religious mystification, and more importantly, these two elements are synthesized. The source of this myth is the exact same story attributed to Dukak, the father of Selçuk, the founder of the Seljuk state (Turan, 2003, p. 103). From another perspective, taking the Ottoman lineage back to the first human, Adam, also means the Islamization of genealogies. In ancient Turkish mythology, the lineage of rulers is often attributed to an

⁶⁸⁹ They were a religious tribe among the Oghuz tribes, and they had faith in the Prophet.

⁶⁹⁰ There was no curtain in them/ But they had a lot of manners and rules.

animal considered sacred, and it is even possible to find traces of these primitive totems in *tamgas*. For example, while the animal from which the lineage is derived is expressed as the female wolf in the Ergenekon epic, the animist-totemist effect is more clearly expressed in the genealogies in which the lineage of Genghis Khan is based on a gray wolf (*börte-çino*) and a white female deer (*ho'ai maral*). In this context, genealogies based on Adam replace animist genealogy narratives with the Judeo-Islamic genealogy tradition.

Secondly, it is possible to come across an alternative approach, which bases the origins of the Ottoman dynasty on the ancient Hellenic and Persian history, among Greek thinkers. The fact that the said approach is also tried to be constructed by Greek thinkers provides a comparative proof that the genetic description in the Ottoman chronicles was built within the framework of political purposes. In this context, alternative conceptions of the history of Ottoman dynasty in the advice letter of the philosopher Plethon to Theodoros II and in the history of Doukas, and alternative genealogical constructions in the history of Kritovulos and Chalkokondyles stand out. In his letter of advice, which can be translated as 'Advice to Theodoros II regarding the Peloponnese', Plethon states that the Turks (Ottomans) are descended from the Paropamisadai people defeated by Alexander the Great on his way to India (Kaldellis, 2014, p. 129). He adds that these people came to get revenge from the Helens with the motivation coming from their past (Woodhouse, 1986, p. 93; Barker, 1995, p. 213). Considering that this work was written around the interregnum period (it is thought to have been written around 1415; See Barker, 1995, p. 10), it can be seen that Hellenistic thought still evaluated Turks and Greeks/ Rûms as two antagonistic forces that have historically faced each other and is based on traditional formula of the Barbarian-Hellenic duality.

On the other hand, Doukas's narrative, which he wrote at a later date, is based on Christian-Muslim religious antagonism, which may have a connection with the fact that he lived in the palace of the prince of Aydin, where the *ghaza* activities were intense (Shapiro, 2011, p. 16-17). However, Doukas (1975, pp. 127-28) emphasizes two important points while discussing the period when Murat II ascended the throne: Firstly, that Murat II was married with the daughter of Alexis Komnenos, and secondly, that the ruler fought against the Persians and created a buffer zone. As Jorga (2009b, p. 179) points out, Doukas establishes a connection between the Komnenos dynasty, which ruled the Byzantine Empire in the previous period, and the Ottoman dynasty, and

associates the Ottomans with the lineage of Greek aristocrats. The theme of ‘war against Persians’ inevitably maintains this emphasis. Doukas refers to Murat II’s reign as a period when Muslim and Christian people lived in prosperity and peace and respected the ruler (1975, p. 188): “I suppose, judged the man according to the good deeds he performed for the benefit of the common folk, and the sympathy he expressed for the indigent, not only for those of his own nation and impious faith but also for Christians.” On the other hand, it is seen that the author did not engage in an ideological construction that creates a positive image for the reign of Mehmet II. Moustakas (2015, p. 86) states that an alternative narrative in Greek and Italian histories from the 16th century, in which the origin of the Ottoman dynasty connects to the Komnenos dynasty, was created by Pseudo-Sphrantzes (Makarios Melissourgos), and this narrative is based on the distorted use of the *Chronicum Minus*, written by Doukas’ contemporary George Sphrantzes.⁶⁹¹ Runciman (2018, pp. 40-41) also points to the existence of a rumor that the theory that attributes the origin of the Ottoman family to a prince of the Komnenos dynasty, who migrated to Konya to become a Muslim and married a Seljuk princess, was supported by Mehmet II in order to influence the *Rûmî* people. The translated version of this legend into a more comprehensive historical narrative takes place in the histories of Phrantzes and Gheorghie Frantsi, and these authors show the origin of the Ottoman dynasty in connection with the Komnenos family (Karadeniz, 2008, pp. 166-67). Based on these examples, it is possible to think that systematic thoughts were developed on the idea of Byzantine origins of the Ottomans in the 15th century and later – which I think was due to the famous work of H. A. Gibbons, which was revised and re-presented at the beginning of the 20th century.

Shapiro (2011, p. 47) evaluates the histories of Kritovulos and Chalkokondyles, written after the capture of Constantinople, in a different category from those of Plethon and Doukas, whose examples were given above, and points out that they are loaded with discourses that legitimize Ottoman power in a ‘post-Byzantine’ context. While Plethon’s narrative invents a special way of coding the Ottomans as ‘enemy’ and Doukas’s narrative has a positive approach only in peacetime, post-Byzantine writers attempt to legitimize Ottoman advance. In this context, Kritovulos (2018, p. 13) signifies the origins of the Ottoman lineage with the following words:

⁶⁹¹ According to Runciman (2018, p. 198), it is highly probable that the *Chronicum Minus* was compiled entirely by Makarios Melissenos.

Ottoman lineage comes from the very ancient line of Perseus and Achaimenes, to which all the great rulers of Persia belonged. As Herodotus points out, there were other Persian lineages, common and vulgar, but the great rulers belonged to these two noble lineages, whose roots go down only to Achaemenes and Perseus. These ancestors were the Hellenes, the successors of Danaos and Lingeas. Originally from Egypt, they lived in the city of Hemmi in the Elos region of Egypt, and later settled in Hellas. In the following years, their successors, Achaemenids and Persids, moved to Asia and settled in Persia after a number of disasters, and after their death, the country inherited their names along with their lineage. [tm]

First, we should draw attention to the theme of ‘elitism’ in Kritovulos’ discourse. As Çokona (2018, p. 13), who translated the work into Turkish, states in footnote ten to this passage, it was a general tendency among Byzantine chroniclers to attribute Seljuk and Ottoman ancestry to Persians. But the point that makes the narrative of Kritovulos unique is that this lineage is placed in a distinguished place among the Persian lineages, based on Perseus and Achaimenes. Perseus is accepted as a demigod hero, the son of Zeus and the founder of the Mycenaean civilization (Roman & Roman, 2010, p. 392). Achaemenes, on the other hand, is a legendary personality considered the founder of the Persian Achaemenid dynasty, and as the son of Perseus, he shares both the same divine origin and Hellenic heritage. By adopting this path, he was able to emphasize the Hellenic origins of the Perseus and Achaimenes lineage. In this context, it can be mentioned that Kritovulos tried to ennoble the Ottoman dynasty with reference to Greek folk myths and culture, thus inventing a source of popular-consent. Çizakça (2016, p. 303) states that the people of Istanbul called Mehmet II “Sultan Basileus”, and the use of this expression shows that the legitimacy of the ruler was reshaped within the codes of local culture.

Interestingly, after the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans, the conquest of which, according to the Christian tradition, was considered a sign of the apocalypse, various myths emerged in Catholic sources regarding the ethnic origin and religious belief of Mehmet II. The spread of rumors that Mehmet II is a Christian and/or inherited the Christian faith from his mother through the Venetian reports should in the final analysis be considered as ideological distortions aimed at preventing the Christian world from stampeding in the face of the conquer. Apart from their political basis, these claims

have two factual origins.⁶⁹² The first is that Yakup Pasha (Iacopo of Gayeta), who was the doctor of Mehmet II, informed the Venetian Ballios that the sultan is a Christian (İnalçık, 2019a, p. 505), and the second was that in the letter of Pope Pius II dated 1461, calling Mehmet II to convert into Christianity and to be the legitimate ruler of the Eastern world (İnalçık, 2019l, p. 750). Based on Hammer-Purgstall, Akgündüz (1999, p. 55) points out that these allegations may have been spread by the Orthodox Patriarch appointed by Mehmet II, which indicates a strategically constructed legitimacy discourse. Similarly, as Runciman (2018, p. 174) points out, the rumors that emerged in the same period that the Turks were descended from the Trojans along with the founders of Rome, and that the capture of Constantinople in the final analysis was the revenge of Troy – even rumors supported by an imaginal letter allegedly written to Pope Nicolaus by Mehmet II- it has a similar purpose for the Latin world. Turan (2003, p. 222) also explains the spread of this discourse in the 15th century in reference to the anti-Byzantine discourse common among the Latins. Thus, the relative legitimacy or acceptance of the Ottoman advance among the Latins is possible. Similarly, the narrative of Kritovulos presents a significant thesis for the Greek world, about the legitimacy of the Ottoman dynasty.

Secondly, it must be considered the history of the Chalkokondyles. Chalkokondyles reports that there is more than one view about the origin of the Ottomans. He first expresses the interpretation that the ancient name of the Turks is Scythians (Chalkokondyles, 2014, p. 11) and according to Kaldellis (2014, p. 129), he most likely refers to the Mongols. But, as Kaldellis (2014, p. 134) points out that, the author thinks beyond the classical Barbarian-Hellen dichotomy as be seen in Plethon (Shapiro, 2011, p. 43):

Laonikos's Skythians (Mongols) are likewise but one people among many in the world, not Gog and Magog. He may have linked the Turks to the Skythians, but this does not mean that he saw them as essentially barbaric. So, too, he may agree

⁶⁹² Also, I think these views should be considered as a particular form of popular discourse. For example, there are fantasies about the Pope being a “secret Muslim” in the *Saltuknâme*, which was written down in the 15th century. Moreover, the myths derived from medieval Europe that the prophet Muhammad was a "rebel and disillusioned priest" (Schimmel, 2012, p. 14) can be given as an example of this form of discourse. Or, the legend that Genghis Khan was descended from a mysterious priest, Johannes, and helped Christians is worth mentioning (Schimmel, 2012, p. 42). While writing on the Genghis dynasty, Hayton of Korykos tries to give the reader the information about which princes had Christian mothers, and for example, he details the conversion of Möngke Khan to Christianity (2015, p. 101).

with the humanists on the facts of a Skythian origin, but he breaks with them when it comes to their interpretation.

Secondly, Chalkokondyles (2014, p. 13) expresses the claim that the Turks in Anatolia were Parthian communities by origin and that they migrated from Iran and started a nomadic life. Kantemir (1979, p. XLVII) believes that the source of this view is a misunderstanding created by the fact that the word 'Turk' is taken to mean nomad (*bedouin*). Another attribution of origin cited by Chalkokondyles states that a significant part of Turks came from Syria and Arabia alongside Caliph Omar (2014, p. 13-15). This second proposition refers either to the knowledge that Turkish groups rose again after descending around Aleppo, or directly to the Arab armies that came to Anatolia during the Omar period. Finally, Chalkokondyles states that the Turks are divided into various tribes and one of them is named after a noble named Oghuz, and connects Ertugrul Beg's lineage to Oghuz Khan (2014, p. 15-17). He cyclically brings the legacy of empires around the world up to the Roman/Byzantine Empire, and after this point moves on to write Ottoman history (Chalkokondyles, 2014, pp. 5-7):

While they were enjoying this good fortune in many places throughout the world, it was the Assyrians who first attained dominion over Asia. We have heard this by extending our inquiries into the most remote depths of human memory. After that, the Medes took their place under the leadership of Arbakes, who seized control from Sardanapalos, the Assyrian king. Later they too lost this hegemony to the Persians, who were led by Cyrus, the son of Cambyses. From this point on, the power of the Persians became great as is seen in many ways, but especially by their crossing over into Europe. Not many generations after that, Alexander, the son of Philip and king of the Macedonians, seized control from the Persians and conquered the Indians as well as a large portion of Africa, in addition to Europe. He left this kingdom to his successors. At that point the Romans attained the greatest realm in the world, because their virtue was in proportion to their fortune.

As Shapiro (2011, p. 45) points out, Chalkokondyles uses the term βασιλεύς for addressing to both Byzantine Emperors and Ottoman Sultans and equates both in terms of their claim to universal domination. This is a remarkable detail because, for example, while Doukas uses the term *basileus* for the Byzantine emperors, he uses the term

tyrannus directly for the Ottoman Sultans and closes the door to a transition of authority between them. In this framework, he develops an alternative genealogy by centering the concept of *translatio imperii* of Chalkokondyles. He has established a historical continuity between the states that claim to dominate the world and draws a framework on how the right to rule inherited. It is possible to find an Islamic version of this continuity in Yazıcıoğlu Ahmed Bîcan. Ahmed Bîcan (1999, p. 123) constructs a cyclical history of domination between successive rulers, and deals with this cycle in a divine plan in which the apocalypse will eventually take place. According to Yazıcıoğlu Ahmed Bîcan (1999, p. 123) while the devotion of the whole world, from Noah's son Sam to Nushirevan, was with the Persians, it later moved to Medina, from there to Khorasan, from there to Egypt/Cairo and finally to *Rûm (Konstantiniyye)*. From here on, non-Muslims will unite and conquer Constantinople and expel the Muslims as far as Aleppo. According to the author, after the recapture of Istanbul, the Antichrist will appear and there will be last times that will result in the apocalypse. Ahmed Bîcan presents the units of cycle of rulers as Sassanids/Iranians, Arabs/Islam, Seljuk/Turkish, Mamluks and Ottomans. Moreover, in this framework, he states that a Muslim state will hold Istanbul until the apocalypse- which we will see later as formulated as the '*devlet-i ebed muddet*' (state that lasts forever).

Summing up this subsection, it is tried to be examined a form of political discourse, which started in the middle of the period of Murat II and reached its most developed form in the Mehmet II period, as an example of the construction of imperial authority. The construction of genealogical discourses generally assumes the above-mentioned political and cultural functions in Ottoman political thought. However, the prevalence of this narrative form should not imply that it is accepted in the same way by all social segments. For example, Sinan Pasha (2013, pp. 492-96), as can be seen in the quotation we gave at the beginning of the chapter, not only did not find it appropriate to use a genealogical discourse in his works, but also openly criticized the importance of lineage opposite to religious and moral arguments. According to Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 492), virtue is not determined by lineage and it is not considered the right way to boast about the virtues of ancestors. Virtue, which is the religious and moral source of authority and prestige, is not dependent on relatives, wealth or tribal ties as an individually acquired quality (Sinan Pasha, 2013, p. 494). For this reason, the claim of being the superior of the people depends not on the lineage, but on the individual qualities, and the claims other than this are just empty boasting (Sinan Pasha, 2013, p.

494-96). Sinan Pasha's arguments can be accepted as a common criticism for both dynastic family trees and privileged ulama families. In any case, these criticisms constitute an exception in terms of Ottoman political thought. For example, Tursun Beg (1977, p. 17) attributes the reason why a person prides himself on his ancestry and tribe ("*neseb u kabile*") ancestry because there are virtuous people in his ancestors with this lineage and tribe. In fact, Tursun Beg (1977, p. 17) accepts that the virtue and value that existed in lineage ancestors can be passed on to future generations by sharing the verse of "Ve verdi'l-asli yesri fi'l-furu".⁶⁹³

On the other hand, as it is discussed above, genealogical constructions constitute a privileged part of Ottoman political thought. While the founding element of this form of discourse is the association of the Ottoman dynasty with the Oghuz tribes, the variations around this element and the political discourse suggest that the Ottomans were superior to other Turkish tribes and Mongols. All these examples of discourse present an essential integrity with the success of the Ottomans to establish dominance over the Anatolian Principalities during and after the reign of Murat II. As Gallotta (1999, pp. 45-46) states, the purpose of genealogical constructions cannot be separated from the political context of the 15th century, that is, to obtain the loyalty of the Turkmen tribes, to rise to an equally prestigious position against the Timurids and to gain superiority over the Anatolian Principalities should be considered as the main political objectives. Imber (2019b, p. 256) states that after Yazıcızâde 'Ali's work connecting the Oghuz genealogy and the Ottoman dynasty, Murat II also minting the symbol of the Kayı tribe on official coin. Lewis (2004, p. 82) draws attention to the traditional use of symbols and inscriptions on coins to claim sovereignty. Bakır (2008, p. XX) determines that the model of *tamga* used on coins and military equipment during the reign of Murat II was taken from the work of Yazıcızâde 'Ali.⁶⁹⁴ Based on this information, it is possible to argue that Kayı genealogy became an official genealogy and became operational at the policy level. The fact that Mehmet II named his son Cem following the Iranian tradition, and that Prince Cem's son was named Oghuz Khan, shows that this policy also influenced the naming of the members of the dynasty (Avcıoğlu, 2013, p. 126). In addition, the fact that Bayezid II named his son Ebü'l-Hayr

⁶⁹³ The feature found in the root also passes to the branches.

⁶⁹⁴ In the Mongol Empire clan stamps were also minted on the coins. Coins bearing the stamp of their founder Hulagu Khan are found among the Ilkhanates, but after Hulagu Khan, the clan stamps are replaced by the Mongolian script, that is, the state tends to build a common identity and culture beyond clan belonging (Nyamaa, 2005, pp. 70-71).

Mehmed Korkud is an important indicator in terms of using the name of Korkut Ata (Dede Korkut), a legendary figure among the Oghuz tribes. Boratav (2016, p. 8) reveals that legends of Dede Korkut remain alive in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, even among ethnic groups such as Kazakh and Bashkir Turks who are not from the Oghuz tribe, when 17th century travelers such as Evliya Çelebi and Adam Olearius visited the tomb of Dede Korkut located around the Caspian Lake, and they state that this place attracts visitors like a pilgrimage site. For this reason, it is highly probable that the name Korkud was coined to capture the aforementioned popular favor. The historical simultaneity between the creation of a knowledge that a ‘tribe’ was at the origin of the Ottoman lineage and the attribution of the Ottoman dynastic genealogy to the Turkmen tribes (Oghuz) suggests that this was part of a political project from the very first step. It is likely that the disappearance of the Timurids and the reunification of Turkmen tribes around Uzun Hasan must have brought the ‘Turkish issue’ to the political agenda of the 15th century as a decisive item of agenda. For example, in the 15th century writer Kemal’s work called *Selâtinname*, it is seen that being from the Oghuz tribe is presented as a prestigious value that deserves praise (Öztürk, 2001, p. 23). In the same work (Öztürk, 2001, p. 180), Uzun Hasan is referred to as “*Şah-i Turkmen*” (ruler of the Turkmens). However, it is unclear whether this value directly meant the glorification and adoption of Turkish origin for the Ottoman dynasty. Because, in a poem written by Bayezid II under the pseudonym *Adli* (2018, p. 101), he exacerbates this ambiguity as he exemplifies that Turks are seen as ‘uncomprehending’ (stupid, ignorant, rude, vulgar, worthless): “Degme Etrak ne bilsün gam-ı ‘ışkı ‘Adli/ Sır-ı ‘ışk anlamağa haylice idrak gerek”.⁶⁹⁵ Similarly, in his work *Harnâme*, Molla Lütfi uses the term “*Oğuz anlu*”⁶⁹⁶ in the satire he wrote to Molla Fenârî with the character of Mevlânâ Şucaüddin İlyas (Uslu Şuca), one of the leading scholars of the era (Gökyay, 1986, p. 161). Gökyay (1986, p. 161, footnote 61) draws attention to the fact that this term is used in a negative way to mean “little understanding, naive, stupid, fool”. Similarly, the lines “Ben eğer eblehim ve eğer ahmak/ Minnet Allaha ki olmadım Varsak” (Gökyay, 1986, p. 163) in the same work exemplifies a common form of negative view of Turkmen in Ottoman ruling

⁶⁹⁵ Even the most distinguished Turks cannot know the sadness of love Adli/ High cognition is needed to understand the secret of love. See: Adli (poem no: 63, couplet no: 7).

⁶⁹⁶ See: Gökyay (1986, p. 161); “Ben burda hazır dururken medreseyi bir gökçeklü Oğuz anlıya verip benimle anın arasında atlu eşeklü fark varken bana hiç iltifat etmemek, arada sen de ne eşekmişsin, sana dahı ne kuskun gümüldürük demektir”.

circles.⁶⁹⁷ In this context, it will be also discussed the Ottoman political thought's view of Turkmen and other ethnic groups and how it used this to develop dynastic identity in the VIII chapter of this thesis.

The expansion of Ottoman influence towards Karaman area and the Eastern Anatolia region brought with it the problems of articulation of the Turkmen population and tribes with the central power, and moreover, it made the ideological dimension of the articulation more decisive than the previous period. The emergence of Aq Qoyunlu ruler Uzun Hasan, who received the support of Turkmens in Eastern Anatolia and Iran, especially during the reign of Mehmet II, increased the necessity of the Ottomans to develop new ideological discourses in order to establish authority over Turkmen groups. İnalçık (2019k, p. 617) states that Uzun Hasan also compared himself to Tamerlane and claimed rulership over the Turks with a genealogy showing him from the Oghuz Khan lineage. On the other hand, the portrayal of Ertugrul Beg's father as a Turkmen ruler living in the vicinity of Tabriz in some anonymous chronicles such as (Köklü, 2004, p. 1) shows that the Ottomans gave more importance to alternative genealogical constructions against the Aq Qoyunlu and Safavid discourses of legitimacy. It can be thought that the emergence of the Qizilbash movement at the end of the 15th century and the beginning of the 16th century was especially influential in this fiction. Qizilbash order is based on a genealogical understanding of legitimacy that is passed from father to son in a way that is not seen in other *tariqas*, whether it is connected to Shah Ismail through the Ardebil lodge or to *Babaî / Vefâî* order through Sayyid Ebü'l-Vefâ. As Öz (2020a, p. 56) points out, a branch of the group of sayyids and sharifs, which is common in Anatolia, shows itself especially in the aristocracy called "*ocaklı*" or "*ocakzade*" of the Alevi-Qizilbash order. Yıldırım (2018, p. 159) especially emphasizes that the doctrine of genealogical elitism is the most distinctive characteristic of Alevi theology. The compulsory crossing point of this aristocracy's lineage extending to Sayyid Ebü'l-Vefâ (Ağuiçen, Dede Garkın and Zeynelabidin lodges) is Baba İlyas, one of the significant figures of the *Babaî* movement. In this context, it is possible that the Qizilbash order had an influence on the Turkmen and Kurdish groups in Anatolia, and that it was based on a legitimate sayyid lineage associated with an uprising movement, which prompted the Ottoman ruling class to take measures against it. While one form of this measure is to link the genealogy of Ottoman dynasty to figures such as Abu Müslim and Oghuz Khan who are popular among the Turkmen masses, the second way

⁶⁹⁷ If I'm stupid and if I'm an idiot/ Thank God I am not *Varsak*.

is to transfer the *Vefâî* genealogy inherited from Sayyid Ebü'l-Vefâ to Sheikh Edebâli and therefore to the foundation Ottoman dynasty, as Âşikpaşazâde stated in his dream myth. Thus, it is possible to construct a dual ground of legitimacy—and thus a point of articulation—based on tribal genealogy and religious authority in the popular sense. Finally, it should be noted that the Oghuz genealogy may have found an unexpected response not only to the Turkmen groups in Anatolia but also to the rulers of Eastern Europe. According to Emecen (2009b, p. 105-6), Mathias the King of Hungary claimed that they came from a common Scythian origin with Mehmet II and stated that he was related to the ruler. This example clearly shows that genealogical constructions can be considered not only as a discourse of legitimacy, but also as a channel of engagement that enables potential political articulations.

Secondly, as in the history of Kritovulos, the legitimation of the dynasty's origins by going back to the ancient Greek civilization exemplifies an interesting genealogical construction that was concocted to gain the consent of the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman rule. In fact, this form of discourse is the continuation of a legitimacy strategy used in previous centuries. It is seen that the new invaders fused with the settled culture and mythology of the old civilizations, or rather, they adapted some of the narratives of legitimacy of the old culture to themselves. It is possible to find examples of this in Akkadian and Babylonian myths that reinterpret Sumerian mythology, or in the figure of Alexander the Great, who entered Iranian myths as a ruler with a right to the throne -for example, in the *Shahname*, Alexander is shown as the half-brother of the last Achaemenid king (Curtis, 2010, p. 87). The same is true for the examples in which the Ottoman lineage is based on Noah's son Yafes. The fact that the Great Flood myth has a significant place in the Sumerian-Babylonian culture and then in the mythology of the Semitic peoples has led to an ideological determination that later affected the genealogy of these communities in the regions where they established political and cultural dominance. In this case, the military advance and Islamization of the Turkmen groups caused the Semitic myths to be recognized by these groups and turned into legends of origin. The popularity of these myths in Anatolia, one of the first sacred centers of Christianity, makes it reasonable that the Ottomans also built their genealogy on variations of the myth of Great Flood. It is possible to follow the prevalence of these myths in Anatolia and Iran through Armenian history. According to a common Armenian legend, a King of Persia, who rebelled against the Seleucids and gained independence, appoints his own brother as the Armenian ruler. Armenian king

Vagharsag asks his brother, the King of Persia, to allow a scholar named Mar Apas Katina to examine whether there is a record of Armenian history in the royal library in Nineveh. This scholar came across the history of the Armenians at a date translated from Chaldean language into Greek in the library of Nineveh. This historical work states that Noah's son Hapet (Yafes) is the ancestor of the Armenian people (Kerovpyan, 2012, pp. 11-14). As can be understood from this legend, the genealogies connected to Yafes/Hapet are widely used by the peoples of the region.

Considering the Semitic, Greek and Turkmen legends, in all three examples the Ottoman dynasty is drawn towards the center of an imaginary world history. The genealogies connected to Yafes connect the Ottomans with Semitic world history. In the examples based on the *Oghuznâmes*, based on religious and ethnic history, the beginning of world history and the Ottomans are drawn into a single line and the Ottoman dynasty is carefully placed among the history of Asian rulers.⁶⁹⁸ In the third example, a similar effort shows itself in the interpretations made within the framework of ancient Greek history. While Plethon and Doukas placed the Ottomans in an anti-Greek and anti-Christian position, within the framework of the history of Kritovulos and Chalkokondyles, the Ottomans began to be represented as a part of ancient Greek history and Byzantine imperial heritage. On the other hand, these ascriptions were also made for Karamanid dynasty. In the memoirs of Janissary Constantine (Beydilli, 2019b, p. 66), there is an expression stating that the Karamanids are descended from Darius the King of Persia, and it is stated that this is a more or less common rumor: "(...) he was an ancient and well-known ruler, some say that he was a descendant of King Darius [tm]". If it is remembered that Darius was the Achaemenid ruler defeated by Alexander the Great, in this way the Karamanids were drawn towards the center of the Hellenistic world history. The production of these and similar narratives for the Ottomans, in this respect, constitutes a natural example of the reproduction of popular legends in a way that supports class domination.

⁶⁹⁸ It should not be overlooked that the narrative about the lineage of Oghuz Khan also has certain limitations. Magemizoğlu (2021, p. 100) states that in the first version of Şükrullah's history, there was a proposition that there was a kinship bond between the Ottomans and the Qara Qoyunid dynasty, but this proposition was removed from the work during the reign of Mehmet II. In this context, it is understood that there are cases where imaginary kinship ties to be established with certain dynasties are considered a threat to the absolute authority of the monarch.

VII.II.V. Will, Majesty and Ostentatiousness or the Concept of Honor of Sultan

“Han ta çi kuni ki nevbet-i devlet-i tüst”⁶⁹⁹

(Tursun, 1977, p. 157)

This title covers phenomena related to the embodiment and self-reflexion of the first four titles mentioned above. Faroqhi (2009, p. 8) rightly states that the image of the ruler will be received differently by various social segments, and she points out that it will not have the same meaning and validity, for example, for Cretan or Karaman peasants and elites, or for Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. In this framework, it can be expected that the historiographical approach from below will reveal such distinctions in detail. However, it is also worth examining how the ruling classes establish a holistic symbology of domination despite all these differences.

New and transcendent presuppositions about the ruler’s authority, as a general characteristic of the imperial ideology, combine the power of the ruler’s will with the power of the authority to command. For this reason, the first topic that we will deal with below will be the discourses built on the ‘honor of the sultanate’ (*namus*) or ‘sense of dignity’ (*hamiyyet*) in which the will of the ruler becomes visible and transcendent. The expression ‘law of the sultanate’, which it was analyzed in the previous sections, turns into the expression of ‘honor of the sultanate’ in this period. There is no etymological difference between the two concepts. The word ‘law’ (*kanun*) comes from the Greek word ‘kanon’ (κάνων) and denotes ‘laws’. The word ‘honor’ (*namus*) comes from the Sanskrit root ‘*namas/nemos*’ (to show respect, to show submission) and turns into the Greek word ‘*nomos*’ and again means ‘law’. Although there is no etymological difference between these two terms, there is a difference in the historical phenomena they refer to. While the first use of the concept in Ottoman political thought indicates the power of the ruler and coincides with the first phase of the establishment of class relations, its second usage indicates the authority of the ruler and indicates the specific character of the imperial regime in which class relations were institutionalized. In this context, the content of the concept is determined as both securing the authority of the ruler with the divine sign and the pride of the ruler in the period which is considered. The first statement about the content of the concept is seen in Kivâmî’s poems. Kivâmî describes the main motivation that determined Mehmet II’s actions as follows (2018, p. 243): “Atup devlet toğanın almağa av/ Çıkarmaya cihan içinde ol çav/ Adın çınratmaga

⁶⁹⁹ What are you doing! For it is the time of your state/glory.

‘alemdede her-bar/ İderdi can u dilden dürlü efkar’.⁷⁰⁰ In these lines, it is seen that not just seizing land, but having a world-wide name and fame, that is, prestige and authority, come to the fore. This is clearly a new class vision and pattern and, in line with the other items were considered above, provides an important clue to the ruler’s motivation for domination. It will be discussed in the next section that this motivation also necessitates the method of political terror.

We come across the explicit use of the concept in Tursun Beg. The first mention of the term in *Târih-i Ebü'l-Feth* is due to the fact that Skender Beg marched on the Elbasan castle during the Albanian campaign of Mehmet II, the route of the expedition was diverted in that direction and Skender Beg was prohibited from attacking the castle (Tursun, 1977, p. 143): “Ve eğerçi kal’a anun gibi garimden zerrece rahne-pezir değüldür, ve sancak-bağı imdad itmek ile def’i mümkün idi, amma hamiiyet-i namus-ı padişahi muktezasınca himmet böyle oldu ki, kal’a üzerine dahı getürülmeye”.⁷⁰¹ If we isolate the part of military activity from these lines, it is necessary to think around the meaning of the word ‘*mukteza*’. The word ‘*mukteza*’ means necessity, exigence, binding imperative. This means that acting as required by the honor of the sultanate requires taking great precautions in the face of possibilities such as loss of territory or defeat, and preventing degradation of the authority. Here, it is also seen an approach that replaces the ‘rational’ solution and prioritizes the reproduction of authority. If so, it is seen that the focal point is the sanction power and validity/competence of the ruler’s will. A second interpretation of these lines can be made as Mehmet II’s taking the decisions about the progress of the army on his own and imposing his own ambition for domination instead of rational solutions. There are also other examples exist that will support this interpretation, especially in *Kıvâmî*, which I will also try to include in the section on the resistance of state officials. *Kıvâmî* uses a similar concept when describing an incident that took place during Mehmet II’s Belgrade campaign (2018, p. 210): While Mehmet II’s viziers demanded a tactical retreat in the face of the negative course of the war, this demand offended the ruler. It is understood that *Kıvâmî* provided an explanation for this situation. According to *Kıvâmî* (2018, p. 210); “Zira ki gazi

⁷⁰⁰ To fly the state hawk to catch prey/ To blind the eyes of the world/ To make his name spoken in the place of the world/ He thought wholeheartedly of various ideas.

⁷⁰¹ Although the castle was not damaged in the slightest by the debtor like him, and it was possible to defend it with the help of the Sanjakbeg; but due to the concern of protecting the sultan's honor, the final decision was not to let it even come close to the castle. See: Tursun (2013, p. 180).

padişahlara gayret galebe idicek muztaribu'l-hal olurlar, hususa gayret-i din ola.”⁷⁰² I am of the opinion that these lines express the damage to the honor and dignity of the sultan - that is, the damage to the image of authority regarding the competence of the ruler's will - without using these concepts directly.⁷⁰³

The second example emerges in the context of the Ottoman-Aq Qoyunlu struggle. After the Aq Qoyunlu forces of Uzun Hasan, together with the heirs of the Karamanids, plundered the city of Tokat, Tursun Beg wrote the following excerpt stating the responsibility that Mehmet II took (1977, p. 157):

Han ta çi kuni ki nevbet-i devlet-i tüst; avazesi hatif-i gaybdan sem'-i şerif-i padişaha yitişti. Pes, ikamet-i namus-ı cihanbani ve idamet-i hamiiyet-i sahib-kırani için, şer'an ve örfen ve aklen ve naklen vacib oldu ki, ser-pençe-i 'inne batşe rabbike le-şedid' vasıtası ile müsülmanlar üzerinden def-i zar ve kat'ı ser-i şerr idüp 'innema ceza'ü'llezine yuharibuna'llahe ve rasulehu' hükmini imza ede.⁷⁰⁴

The elements pointed out by Tursun Beg's narrative loaded with literary arts are as follows: The message 'it is the time of his fortune' reaches the ruler from his unknown realm, and the meaning of this message is to fulfill the honor of being the ruler of the world and his effort to be superior to all other rulers. The 'residence' of the ruler's honor, that is, its permanence, and the 'maintenance' of the ruler's dignity above other rulers, that is, its continuation, are considered religiously obligatory (*vacib*) in these lines. In this context, Uzun Hasan, the ruler on whom the expedition will be made, is also a Muslim, but the legitimation of this expedition is based on tradition, reason and

⁷⁰² Because, when the noble feeling arising from not being able to reach the holy purpose prevails over the ghazi sultans, they are extremely upset, especially when there is a sense of religion.

⁷⁰³ A similar statement can be found in Otman Baba's *velâyetnâme*. In the *velâyetnâme*, a story is told that Mehmet II and Mahmud Pasha came across Otman Baba at *Silivri Kapi* while they were walking, talking about organizing a military expedition on Belgrade after a hunting trip. Otman Baba warned Mehmet II not to go on an expedition (Yalçın, 2008, p. 84). The author of the *velâyetnâme* states that Mehmet II acted arrogantly and did not obey Otman Baba's word, and therefore his army was defeated in a humiliating way.

⁷⁰⁴ 'Oh what are you doing! For it is the time of your state'; The warning reached the honorable ear of the sultan from the voice of the unknown realm. Then, in order to keep the honor of being the ruler of the world and to continue his effort to be the sultan of sultans, as it is stated in the verse 'Indeed, the grasp of your Lord is very difficult' in the Sharia, custom, reason and tradition, It became an inevitable task to seize the Muslims, to wreak havoc on the Muslims, and to cut off the head of evil and sign the decree 'The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger (...)'.

religious narrations besides Sharia. In other words, in the final analysis, the honor of the ruler was evaluated as above all sources of legitimacy, and these sources were mobilized for him -or his autocratic prestige. However, the thing whose legitimacy is sought is not a religious element, but the 'honor and dignity of the sultanate', which constitutes the purpose of the expedition.

The second point will be addressed in this section is the 'majesty' and 'ostentatiousness' of the sultan, in which the honor of the sultanate becomes functional by gaining an image. Majesty and ostentatiousness function as writing-surfaces on which social prestige becomes visible. The main motivation of this function is to ensure that the authority of social strata and class actors is recognized as intra-class and inter-class, and to build social consent by creating an indirect presentation of power. This framework may seem somewhat paradoxical because it is difficult to explain why the visualization of majesty and wealth does not also bring about destructive social struggles/reactions. At this point, what can be said is that (i) supporting the said visualization with a natural or divinely based discourse of elitism, (ii) activating individual class advancement (upper mobilization) rather than general social struggles, will lead to the support of the social structure, not against it, to the extent that it meets the class-based expectations. For example, natural or divinely based discourse of elitism finds a context in which majesty can realize itself through visualization and where concept and empirical experience can become mutually overlapping. Thus, majesty also turns into a show of power, that is, the threat of the use of accumulated power. Let us recall Veblen's analysis of the 19th century bourgeoisie's use of a cane: The cane is not only a tool to occupy the hands of a leisure person, but also a real weapon (as cited in Galbraith, 1980, p. 60). When we apply the same form of analysis to the forms of majesty in the 15th century, the landscape we encounter consists of examples showing the majesty of the threat of class violence as well as using the unifying language of cultural-ideological representation.

Secondly, the visualization of priority brings with it individual struggles to achieve social priorities, and these struggles or pursuits often make it necessary to enter the service of the ruling classes and to take part in patronage relations -for the distribution of offices- in the final analysis. In addition to all these, to the extent that it is possible to make being subject to authority a culture and mentality structure, it is seen that the visibility of authority is also functional in reproducing the conditioning of this mentality. In the modern age, the most obvious example of this proposition is the

literature that has expanded around the ‘banal nationalism’ debates developed by Michael Billig. Billig’s thesis (2002, p. 114) is that symbols, surfaces and intermediaries (money, flags, ceremonies, media, naming, public buildings, etc.) that have become a part of daily life can also become a way for ideologies to become commonplace and affect consciousness. In my opinion, it is possible to extend this thesis to the pre-capitalist period as well. Likewise, ceremonies, public buildings and widespread political discourses produce the ideological supports of the power through the mediation of daily life and become a part of the consent production mechanism. In this framework, it can be seen how ostentation and majesty were turned into power mechanisms in terms of Ottoman political thought.

In this framework, Tursun Beg considers the phenomenon of majesty as one of the foundations of the sultanate (1977, p. 26): “(...) heybet-i saltanat ma la-büddendür”⁷⁰⁵. Thus, it is seen that this issue should not be evaluated as the majesty of the ruler alone, and in a more general context, the majesty embodied in the ruler and his living space is accepted as a structural element of his domination. In this context, Tursun Beg (1977, p. 26) defines the limit of the pursuit of majesty as not disturbing the security of the people, that is, not undermining the reproduction of the order. The most obvious example in which the subject of majesty and ostentation is discussed in more detail is in the work of Sinan Pasha named *Maârifnâme*. In this work, Sinan Pasha introduces some norms about the appearance, facial expression, residence and title of the ruler in order for the authority to be functional. Sinan Pasha formulates his thoughts on this subject as follows (2013, p. 675):

Her padişahın memleketinde bir nam-ı hası gerek/ Şöyle ki o namın ona ihtisası gerek.

Gerek Hüdavendigâr olsun gerek sultan/ Gerek han olsun gerek hakan.

Ta bununla halk arasında ziyade olur hürmeti/ Ve kulub-ı nasta kavi ola heybeti
Padişahların heybeti ziyade oldukça leşkeri kuvvet bulur/ Ve onlarda mehabet
artıkça reaya rahatte olur⁷⁰⁶

⁷⁰⁵ The majesty of the sultanate is one of the things that should be.

⁷⁰⁶ Every sultan needs a real reputation in his country/ Namely, that fame needs to be allocated to him/ Whether it’s a hudavendigâr, a sultan, a khan or a hakan/ With this, the respect he sees among the people increases / And his majesty in people's hearts is strengthened/ As the majesty of the sultans grows, their soldiers find strength / And as the love grows in them, the subject find peace.

First of all, there is a proposition formulated about the title of the ruler in these lines. In order for the ruler to be recognized among the people, there is a need for a naming that distinguishes him from the rulers of which he are his successors. At this point, both the personal name of the ruler and his title are significant together. Köprülü (2005d, p. 272) especially states that terms such as “sultan, melik, emir” cannot be used interchangeably and they have different legal meanings. The same is true for titles and names with various religious-cultural references (Muhammed/Mehmed, Mahmud, Orhan, Korkud, etc.), perhaps not legally, but in terms of symbolic authority relations. Especially the reason why Sinan Pasha suggested a special naming for the ruler was that it would provide respect among the people and create majesty in the “*kulub-ı nas*” (people’s hearts). Both terms need to be interpreted: People’s respect and domination over hearts, in the final analysis, indicate the coexistence of the mechanism of authority and consent. If we call this political search as the function of hegemony, it will be possible to evaluate all searches related to the consolidation of authority under this general concept. Secondly, in these lines, he points out that the increase in the majesty of the sultan means the increase in the decisiveness of his authority for both the soldiers and the people. While one side of this proposition draws attention to the development of the ceremonies attended by the monarch and the state protocol, the other side is the issue of developing the qualities visible to the public in accordance with the authority of the emperor. I will deal with the evaluation of protocol templates, especially in the next section, where discipline is mentioned. The point will be focused on in this section is the norms regarding the establishment of qualities that will be visible to the public.

Sinan Pasha deals with these norms under the headings of facial expression, clothing and housing. It is seen that all three titles are formally handled in a way that gains the meaning of elitism and authoritarianism. According to Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 675), the face of the sultan should have an appearance that not everyone dares to turn their eyes to.⁷⁰⁷ Secondly, Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 675) asserts that, “Padişah olanların kendilerine münasip ziynetleri gerek/ ve hüsn ü cemel verir kisvetleri gerek”.⁷⁰⁸ Considering that the word ‘*ziynet*’ means ornament and the word ‘*kisvet*’ means dress, it is suggested in these lines that the use of magnificent clothes and jewelry should represent the social status of the ruler. Finally, Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 674) gives a place

⁷⁰⁷ “Aziz-didar gerek ki her kişinin gözü yanıp ona cür’et etmeye” (Sinan Paşa, 2013, p. 674).

⁷⁰⁸ Those who are sultans need ornaments suitable for them/ And they need to have special clothes that look good.

to those who become sultans in a couplet such as “Makamları ali gerek/ Ve sarayları samî gerek”. In this couplet, the word ‘makam’ means ‘a place’ to live, according to Tulum’s transcription (Sinan Paşa, 2013, p. 675), and the other line is interpreted as the rise of the palace towards the sky. From this point of view, it can be deduced that the couplet quoted is about the palace architecture and the throne of the sultanate.

A similar view can be found in Tursun Beg and Kivâmî. Tursun Beg first explains why the Hagia Sophia Church was deemed worthy of being seen by Mehmet II after Constantinople was captured (1977, p. 63): “Ve ol bir bina-yı metin ve bünyan-ı hasindür ki, hadd-i vaz’ına nazar, felek-misal tetarruk-ı ihtilal vehminden hali olması vacib[tir] (...)”.⁷⁰⁹ Here reference is made to the duality of the celestial realm and the earth that prevailed throughout the Middle Ages. According to this idea, the celestial realm is free from creation and corruption. The world, on the other hand, is in formation and decay as the material realm.⁷¹⁰ In these lines, the author presents an approach regarding how the building is likened to the sky and depicted as a permanent-solid structure, as well as how the political regime represented by the ruler, who owns the building, is visualized. In this context, the significance of public structures in which class domination is visible emerges as a topic of political thought. Ibn Khaldun (2021, p. 402) draws attention to the fact that there is an essential link between the architectural structures (statues, monuments, palaces, etc.) built by the state and the power of the state and the dynasty. Kivâmî points to this problem especially in the talk of the buildings built after the capture of Constantinople. According to Kivâmî, after Mehmet II captured Constantinople, he ordered the construction of a great mosque in the city square, eight large madrasas around it, and two large *imarets* in front of the madrasahs (2018, p. 155). He states that the purpose of this construction activity is for the believers to worship “one god” and “pray for the continuation of the state of the sultan of the world” (Kivâmî, 2018, p. 155). As can be understood from this justification, the essence of the construction of public buildings lies in the search for making the authority of the ruler visible through religious mediation and for the operation of the popular consent mechanism. In this context, the convergence between the concept of ‘one God’ and the

⁷⁰⁹ It is such a strong and durable structure that when we look at the quality of its stance, it is almost certain that it will be free from the delusion of being damaged by being distorted and transformed, like the sky.

⁷¹⁰ The prosecution of the Church after Galileo determined that there were earth-like mountains on the lunar surface points to an important historical moment when the aforementioned medieval physics entered a crisis.

image of the ‘founding ruler’ mediates the establishment of the transcendent authority of the ruler. Interestingly, the symbolic link between the constructions of public interest and the legitimacy of power was established not only for the rulers, but also for the dervishes. In the *velâyetnâme* of Otman Baba, there is a story where Otman Baba built a bridge over a river on the Balkan Mountain (Yalçın, 2008, pp. 77-8). What is interesting is that it is claimed in the *velâyetnâme* that the reconstruction of Istanbul by Mehmet II was done upon the prayer/order (originally ‘*nefes*’) of Otman Baba. According to this part of the *velâyetnâme*, Otman Baba saw the devastated state of Constantinople after it was conquered and gave orders, saying, “Build houses on the ruins and desolations of this city and strengthened its fortress [tm]” (Yalçın, 2008, pp. 82-3).

The image-building for the establishment of the ruler’s authority is not limited to these examples. As Kıvılcımlı points out, the development of palace life is a point that should be especially addressed. Kıvılcımlı (2007, pp. 163-64) considers the ‘palace’ as a mechanism that determines how the ruler perceives other people, as well as how the ruler is perceived by the people -in the final analysis, alienating both from each other. According to Kıvâmî (2018, p. 155), Mehmet II wants “palaces, pavilions and all kinds of buildings, vineyards and gardens” to be built as his own residence, and a “big fortress” to be built around them. Tursun Beg (2013, p. 80-81) states that after Mehmet II captured Constantinople, he had “built a solid four-sided wall like the revolving sky”, he reserved a part of it for his *harem*, he had palaces and mansions built, and in some places he had a throne of the *Diwan* council. In this context, it is obvious by the confirming lines of Kıvâmî and Tursun Beg that a distinguished palace was established. Kıvılcımlı (2007, p. 126) mentions a distinctive connection between the formation of social classes and the state in the Ottoman Empire, and the institutionalization of the palace organization and the protocol templates and to emphasize this connection, he names the palace “a monument of the class struggle [tm]” in which the palace and the social class representation problem complement each other. Thus, the two aspects of ostentatious construction -the establishment of popular consent and the prestige of the ruler- are completed. It is seen that this mutual relationship basically constitutes a model of reproduction. There is a systematic search for transcendence in Kemal’s and Tursun Beg’s lines describing Mehmet II’s palace. Kemal narrates that Mehmet II’s palace was made of glass, like heaven on earth, and that even the sun got its radiance from him (Öztürk, 2001, pp. 169-69). Tursun Beg, on the other hand, compares the palace of

Mehmet II with the images of the universe and heaven. According to him, the palace of Mehmet II is described as follows (Tursun, 2013, p. 88):

Every mansion is a Chinese idol-house, every pavilion is a cause of envy for the high heaven; every courtyard is a pleasant space that resembles paradise; every roof is higher than the gaze of the wise, every floor is more ornate and decorated than the dome of fixed stars, bright-faced like the opinion of wise people, forgetful of sadness like friends; It was decorated with the decorations of the sultanate ritual and gained value with the added value of the verse ‘whoever enters there will be safe’. [tm]

On the other hand, it is possible to understand from the intense criticisms in the sources of the period that the construction activity undertaken during the reign of Mehmet II drew a great reaction from the public. The clearest criticism of the intense construction activities carried out during the reign of Mehmet II is found in the anonymous chronicles published by Giese and Öztürk. According to anonymous chroniclers (Giese, 1992, p. 102; Öztürk, 2000, p. 112), the monuments and palaces in question were built with cruelty (*zulm*), and it is possible to earn sins, not rewards, from them. Anonymous chroniclers express in a few articles why the construction activities are carried out ‘with cruelty’. These could be listed as follows (Giese, 1992, p. 102; Öztürk, 2000, p. 112): (i) the construction financing of the buildings is met with the money collected from provinces and cities, (ii) the labor-power required for construction is met by forcibly driven capstans from the provinces, “anda varanların biri dahı şakir olup gitmez”⁷¹¹, (iii) the building master and workers are given three months’ salary, but they are employed for five or six months, (iv) the salaries given are taken back from them again ‘with cruelty’, (v) building masters and workers are deported again ‘with cruelty’, (vi) they send inspectors to find unused goods after the construction is finished and put them in the treasury, and they interrogate the construction trustee and his accountant, (vii) they try to find a justification in the questioning of the trustee or the accountant and try to charge the cost of the building to them and to have the building free of charge, (viii) they try to discredit the building architect when they cannot gain any benefit through inspections.⁷¹² As a result, anonymous chroniclers end

⁷¹¹ All the people who come suffer.

⁷¹² A praise expressed in the opposite direction of these criticisms is included in the *menâkıbnâme* of Mahmud Pasha. According to the author of the *menâkıbnâme*, Mahmud Pasha got permission from the ruler to have a church demolished and rebuilt as a mosque. During the demolition

their reproach expressed in all these titles with a criticism that we have seen for the first time in the works of the period: Not only can you expect good deeds from these buildings, but also the reason why these works are done by deviating from cruelty are the ‘usurers and merchants’ benefiting at the sultan’s door (Öztürk, 2000, p. 112):

Bina ve akça il yanından ola. Hazineden bir habbe harç olmaya. İllere ödetmek istedikleri aceb nice mal. İki veyahut ol suret ile yapılan binadan sevab ummak dürüst midür? Anın sevabından geçmelidir. Eğer günahı dahı olmasa ve illa günahından gayrı nesi vardur. Padişahlar kapusunda ehl-i mu’amele ve bazirgan hükm olıcak bu kadar olduğuna dahı şükr itmek gerekdür.⁷¹³

In general, it can be understood from the criticisms and opinions of anonymous chroniclers that there is no social agreement on the provision of financial resources and the organization of the labor force, whether in the field of conspicuous consumption or in public projects such as mosques / madrasahs / kulliyes. Moreover, the construction of these works is shaped by the interests of merchants and usurers, and the process is managed as an investment in which profit is maximized. For this reason, it is necessary not to look at even large public projects as works that won the consent of the people living at the time they were made. It should be taken into account that such projects may have attracted the public reaction rather than approval due to the nature of the social relations in the construction process. It is probable that such works, which the next generations see as symbols of authority and contribute to reproducing the social formation, are seen as ‘documents of oppression’ by the subordinated classes living

of the church, two huge jars of gold were unearthed from the foundations. Thereupon, Mahmud Pasha gives the following grants to the trustees, carpenters and carpenters working in the construction of the mosque (Aslan & Doğan, 2012, p. 59): “Cami’-i şerifün harcında dahlim kalmadı; akçası kendü yerinden çıktı. Muradum budur ki: Madam ki bu zikr olınan kimesneler cami’de işleye; isterler uyhu uyuyalar ve dinleneler. Zinhar bir kimesneyi ‘Tur, yuharı gel ve işle’ diyü ta’ciz etmeyeler”. These lines are quite interesting. There is a kind of mystical reversal of the above criticisms in terms of the mosque ‘paying for itself’, and it also contains elements of a kind of utopian dream in which the forced labor of people working in construction is eliminated. Aslan & Doğan (2012, p. 90, footnote 33) draw attention to the fact that this legend is similar to an older Byzantine legend that describes the treasures found in Silivrikapı as a divine manifestation to complete the construction of Hagia Sophia. This myth is contained in most of the anonymous chronicles.

⁷¹³ Let the building and its financing be provided by the provincial sources. Do not make contribution even a coin from the state treasury. The cost to be paid to provincial resources corresponds to how much goods. Is it honest to expect good deeds from a building built in this way? No good can be expected from it. Either he has no sin, or he has no contribution other than his sin. It is even necessary to be thankful for what was done when usurers and merchants dominate the service of the rulers.

synchronously with the process of construction. Although there are not enough primary sources to hear the criticisms coming from the subordinated classes, it is possible to discover the reflections of some criticisms in the works written by the members of the dominant classes. For example, in Lâmi'î Çelebi's (2015, p. 204) work called *Letâifnâme*, there is a short anecdote in which a ruler who built a palace resembling 'heavenly mansions' was criticized by a pious person. According to this anecdote, the ruler asked that 'Is there a defect or visible lacking in this palace? Can it be found?' and, the scholars, judges and chiefs in the palace replied that the palace was worth the heavenly mansions and that it did not have any defect, while a pious one gave a different answer as follows: 'It has one big defect that its foundation is on non-existence and its building is not eternal. The grim reaper enters from all directions and the whirlwind of death penetrates its doors and walls'. The response of the pious person includes the reversal of the supremacy of the palace, which is essentially a symbol of power, and thus the denial of the symbolic network of power passing through the palace.

VII. III. Discipline, Reproduction, and Justice: The Problem of the Secular Administration of the Empire

VII. III. I. Discipline: Protocol, Appointment, Army and *Qadis*

It can be put forward the first of the issues of political thought that emerged within the framework of the secular administration of the empire as a problem of discipline. Ottoman political thought focused on a series of discipline mechanisms in this period. The focus of these mechanisms is on subjects such as prison sentences, court protocol, the wishes of the monarch, officialdom, relations with local people and dynasties, and the obedience of the army.

Foucault (2013, p. 13) states that disciplinary mechanisms are applied on multiplicity in line with a goal/purpose to be achieved and that they manage and regulate the multiplicity as seen in examples such as school discipline, military discipline, criminal discipline, workshop discipline. On the other hand, he accepts this "form of domination" as a specific form that developed after the 17th century, apart from "service", "slavery", "vassalage" and monastic asceticism (Foucault, 1995, p. 137). Foucault defines the concept of discipline as such (1995, p. 146): "Discipline is an art of rank, a technique for the transformation of arrangements. It individualizes bodies by a location that does not give them a fixed position, but distributes them and circulates them in a network of relations". Foucault's definition of discipline, with all its aspects,

does not comply with the examples and propositions of discipline in Ottoman *siyâsetnâmes*. However, it must be admitted from the outset that there is a certain gap/inconsistency between Foucault's theoretical evaluation and historical phenomena. For example, Sunesson (1984, p. 205) states that Foucault's understanding of discipline does not always mean organizational success in the interest of rulers, thus, the reason for this inadequacy to Foucault's establishment of his theory by centered on discourse. Moreover, the proposition that the phenomenon of discipline emerged in the 17th century is far from reflecting the whole truth. This proposition should at least be reinterpreted as 'discipline gained intensity in the 17th century and subsequently became one of the dominant forms of power in modernity'. Weber's assessment on the subject is remarkable in this context. According to Weber (1978, pp. 1148-149), the concept of discipline refers to the situation in which personal charisma -and therefore individual action- loses its effect, while the dominant element in the execution of an order becomes a methodical and rational configuration. On the other hand, Weber does not see the development of disciplinary systematics as absolutely contradictory with personal honor or charisma, and states that these two systematics can be integrated. The situation Weber points out is shaped by the replacement of personal relationships by a rational -or rationalized- power structure. In this respect, disciplinary relations play an important role in the establishment of bureaucratic autocracies. In pre-modern empires, disciplinary systematics develops within the framework of military and administrative authority relations that are added to the authority of the imperium and its mystification, and is structured within the traditions of ceremonies, protocols and warfare. These forms of relations gradually lose their mystical core in early modern states, while rational division of labor and hierarchies become dominant. The use of the term in the narrow sense of this definition allows to make some inferences about the development of palace protocol and hierarchy and the pursuit of military discipline. The general meaning of the concept of discipline can be formulated as "penitential chastisement, punishment for the sake of correction" ("Discipline", n.d.).⁷¹⁴ There is not much difference between the German (*disziplin*) and English (discipline) meanings of the word, and it generally means punishment (punish/*züchtigung*). But to the extent that the function to which the term discipline denotes is 'correction', the term must be associated not only with punishment but also with 'disciplinary reward'. In this respect, reward and punishment mechanism constitute two inseparable elements of systematic discipline activity. For

⁷¹⁴ For other meanings such as learning, order, doctrine etc. see Niermeyer (1976, p. 22)

example, Canetti (2014, p. 340) argues that the promotion mechanism corresponds to a kind of ‘hidden’ discipline systematic.

In this respect, the concept of discipline differs from the concept of oppression and can be considered as a unique form of social power relations. In particular, forms of punishment and reward open to the public—that is, the method of disciplining that take the form of ceremony—are worth examining in this respect. These qualities are clearly seen in the excerpt from the *Maârifnâme* given under the heading of the subsection below: ‘behaving in accordance with the *âdâb*’ and ‘treatment according to dignity’ complement each other. Moreover, as stated in the anonymous *siyâsetnâme* presented to Bayezid II, the ruler’s acting in accordance with his superior position, that is, developing a monarchy’s self-discipline, in this context, makes the two-way and asymmetrical establishment of the power relationship perfect. The ruler should “speak little and concisely, with majesty, dignity and an attitude appropriate to his position [tm]” (as cited in Kavak, 2019a, p. 206), so that his word is decisive, his image is impressive and can represent his social position, and he can operate the disciplinary mechanisms necessary to reproduce his class privileges.

VII. III. I. I. Discipline by Protocol Principles

“Meclislerinde mehabetleri gerek
Ve halkın onlardan mehleri gerek
Huzurlarında oturanlar edeblerini saklamak gerek
Ve meclislerinde gelenler vakarlarını gözetmek gerek”⁷¹⁵
(Sinan Paşa, 2013, p. 706)

The construction and change of protocol principles and protocol codes is one of the resources used by different disciplines of social sciences to observe the transformation of social life (İşli, 2020, p. 25). One of the examples in the Ottoman *siyâsetnâmes* where the discipline problem became a part of the imperial regime and reflected the social change emerges in this context in the determination of the palace protocol and the hierarchy of state authorities. The term ‘*teşrifat*’ (protocol) is the plural form of the word meaning ‘*teşrif*’ (to honor), which means the reception of state

⁷¹⁵ They need to arouse respect in their assemblies/ And the public should be afraid of them/ Those sitting in their assemblies need to stand hand in hand/ And those who come in their assemblies must observe their dignity.

dignitaries and senior guests. Alikılıç (2004, p. 26) evaluates the literal meaning of the word as follows: “(...) it is to supervise the ranks and classes of the statesmen on official days, receptions, holydays and when they appear before, the reception of ambassadors, the conferment of ranks and medals”. Interpretation of this term requires that the word be taken from both sides. In Islamic political thought, it was considered important to establish the codes of ordination and to teach them to both the ruler and the people who were subordinate to the ruler, and a specific *âdâb* literature developed in this regard. Interpretation of this term requires that the word be taken from both sides. The word ‘*teşrifat*’ gives the meaning of ‘coming to visit’ and ‘honoring’ on the one hand, and has the meaning of ‘coming to the presence of honorable people’ and ‘being honored’ on the other hand. In Islamic political thought, it was considered significant to create protocol codes and teach them to both the ruler and the people who were subject to the ruler, and a specific *âdâb* literature developed in this regard. One of the most well-known examples of this literature is Ebu Osman el-Cahız’s work called *Kitabü't-Tac fi ahlaki'l-müluk*, in this work, from the ways of entering the office of the ruler (2015, pp. 21-23), to the manners of eating with the ruler (2015, pp. 23- 27), from the characteristics of the ruler's dining and entertainment companions (2015, pp. 27-52) to the limits of drinking alcoholic beverages (2015, pp. 82-83). The fact that detailed regulations about meeting with the ruler, eating and drinking, giving gifts and giving *hilats* are included in this framework in Ottoman *siyâsetnâmes* and legal documents of the period shows that this issue became an issue in the Ottoman palace and *Diwan* of the 15th century. For example, the instructions in the *Kanunnâme* of Mehmet II on who can meet the ruler and kiss his hand on ceremonial days can be examined within this framework. As such, the term also points to a systematic about how and at what level a share in the honor of the ruler will be taken, and the disciplinary function comes into play especially at this point. The fact supports this opinion that the protocol principles were evaluated in the category of ‘science of politics’ (*ilm-i siyâset*) in the tradition of Ottoman political thought (Alikılıç, 2004, p. 27). For example, based on a Venetian document giving information about the reign of Mehmet II, Jorga (2009b, p. 193) points out that twenty-five thousand gold coins were allocated in the budget for the caftans to be distributed during the holydays, which is a material reflection of the importance given to the ceremony. The fact that protocol principles became the subject of miniature art as a reflection of political ideology in the field of aesthetics in the following periods

(Ertuğ-Tarım, 2010, p.251) shows the significance of this field in the Ottoman political thought.

Along with the development of the imperial regime, the qualitative and quantitative leap in the bureaucracy caused an increase in the demand for bureaucratic positions. Sinan Pasha expresses this situation as follows (2013, p. 146): “Mansib için beratlar almağa çalışırız/ Ve tımarlar için defterlere girmeğe dürüşürüz”.⁷¹⁶ In this case, it can be thought that the struggle to rise in bureaucratic positions and offices among the ruling class and officials has become tougher. Despite this tendency, it is seen that two opposing/balancing discourse forms have emerged in the sources of political thought. First, legislative efforts to establish hierarchy and promotion principles between various state offices have accelerated. In addition, the court ceremonial procedures determined by *Kanunnâme* of Mehmet II reveal the development of a disciplinary mechanism that determines the hierarchy between authorities. Secondly, a restraining discourse has emerged regarding the risks of appointing in an official duty. This restraining discourse was supported and put into effect through the examples of criticism and punishment of various statesmen in the 15th century chronicles. In this way, an advanced discipline system based on ‘carrot and stick’ emerged. The following lines of Sinan Pasha describe quite well how the people who were called to the ruler’s office were divided between feelings of anxiety and gratitude and struggled to comply with *âdâb* (2013, p. 148):

Eğer birisine padişaktan bir mektub gelse/ Veyahut bir çavuş gelip ‘Gel’ dese

Heybeti gönlünü tutar/ Ve rehbeti kendisini kaplar

Nefsini şöyle unuttur ki hilm ü sekinesi kalmaz/ Ve aklını şöyle dağıtır ki vakar u tumaninesi kalmaz

Ferahından vechi müstenir olur/ Ve tarabından kalbi müstetir olur

Ahir ki varmalı olur, hezar ta’zim ile varır/ Ve bin türlü edeb ile oturur.⁷¹⁷

There is a strange contradiction or bipolarity in Sinan Pasha’s lines. The person summoned to the presence of the ruler feels both fear and extraordinary pleasure. While his fear envelops his whole being, destroys his mind, loses his dignity and calmness, his

⁷¹⁶ We try to get a warrant for official duties/ And we try to get on the record to get a *tımar*.

⁷¹⁷ If someone receives a letter from the sultan/ Or a sergeant comes and says ‘Come’/ His majesty holds his heart/ And his fear covers him/ He forgets himself so that he loses his mind and calm / And he loses his mind like this that he has no dignity and self-confidence/ His face lights up when he’s free from worry/ And his heart relaxes from her euphoria.

If he has to go there, he goes with a thousand respects / And sits with a thousand manners (*âdâb*).

face brightens, and his heart expands in ecstasy (*vecd*). The contradiction (fear-ecstasy) in these expressions is a quality in the phenomenon itself, a discipline technique in itself. In the face of the threat and the greatness of the reward, he sits in front of the ruler with a thousand expressions of respect (the word *ta'zim* is derived from the same root as *azamet* and means respecting the greatness)⁷¹⁸ and *âdâb* (the rules of protocol and behavior). I think this example illustrates well the disciplinary mechanism that will be discussed in the issue of protocol rules.

There is information about the protocol systematic of the Mehmet II period could be found in the history of Âşıkpaşazâde. Âşıkpaşazâde (2017, pp. 153-54) reports that during the wedding ceremony where Mehmet II had married his sons Bayezid and Mustafa, he used a well-defined protocol method to receive the distinguished people of the country. According to the author, the wedding lasted for three days, and a distinguished social stratum was accepted each day in separated with others. The members of the ruling class and the people, who accepted the wedding invitation, were accepted into the presence of the ruler in layers after accepting the invitation and they were given gifts. Âşıkpaşazâde (2017, p. 154) states that first the ulama members was invited and Mehmet II placed Mevlânâ Fahreddin on one side, Mevlânâ Tûsî on the other, and Şükrullah and Hızır Beg Çelebi on the other side. It is also an interesting detail that Âşıkpaşazâde was invited to the first day despite sitting at a lower protocol level and being considered from the same class as Şükrullah. The reason for this is likely that the author was seen in the ulama member rather than a dervish. On the second day of the wedding, the '*fukara*' groups is invited. Atsız (2017, p. 154, footnote 94) states that the word '*fukara*' used here should be understood as dervishes and members of a *tariqa*. On the third day, begs (lords) were invited to the presence of Mehmet II.

Âşıkpaşazâde (2017, p. 154) uses the words 'talked', 'drank' when describing the meeting between the sultan and the begs. If what is meant is drinking and entertainment, it is better understood why the ulama and dervishes were invited separate from the begs. But in the final analysis, the last call of the begs is a sign that the ulama and dervishes are valued above them. Öztürk (2020, p. 185) asserts the 'high respects to scholars' by Mehmet II did as the reason why the ulama was first accepted into the meeting. This is a fairly general explanation, but the fact itself does not exclude explanations that focus on particularities. On the other hand, giving priority to these two social groups creates an interesting paradox. The interpretation of this paradox can be as follows: The ruler

⁷¹⁸ See: Ayverdi (2010, p. 1214).

places the members of the ulama, whom he appoints to state positions, in a higher status than dervishes and begs, as they are also representatives of the official religion. Thus, it gives the message that they can discipline secular administrators through religious provisions. The fact that dervishes, who can be considered as the representatives of the people, are superior to the begs can be attributed to their influence on popular consent mechanisms and their religious status above the secular status. However, holding a drink assembly with the lords also shows that the lords can be privileged by the ruler against the influence of the religious groups.

As a result, the wedding ceremony itself is used as a tool for the embodiment of power. Âşıkpaşazâde expressed this fact clearly (2017, p. 154): “(...) every sultan holds his meeting to show his own worth so that they can see his greatness. Even this sultan showed his greatness completely and completely [tm]”. However, the protocol order put into practice during the wedding includes another disciplinary dimension in terms of indicating the authority of the monarch, the social status and mutual position of the other classes. As well as ceremonies, especially those that can integrate and display the superior position of the ruler and the status of the participants, are examples of rewarding discipline systematics. Âşıkpaşazâde (2017, p. 154) states that during the wedding, Mehmet II made gifts, dressed *hil'ats*, gave many donations, and as a result, “the Law of Sultanate was made as it is [tm]”. Thus, the fulfillment of the ‘the Law of the Sultanate’ is instrumental in renewing the loyalty of those who are subject to the sultan, and thus turns into the reproduction of the rule of the sultanate as the principle of the power mechanism. At the same time, weddings allow subordinated strata to offer loyalty to the monarch and develop their own positions. Molla Lütî, the librarian of Mehmet II, refers to this possibility of upward mobility in his work called *Harnâme*. Molla Lütî expresses the rebuke of Mevlânâ Şucaüddin İlyas (Uslu Şüca) by the viziers, who wanted to report his situation to the ruler and get more *mansip* or become a professor at a large madrasah, as follows (Gökyay, 1986, p. 168): “(...) yeg at yemini kendi arturur. Hankara ne eser gösterdin ki bir eser gösterecek gün bey düğünü idi, anda dahı kuyruk sallamadın”.⁷¹⁹ Considering that the events discussed in the *Harnâme* are conveyed using analogy of donkey and thus a humorous discourse is developed, the expression ‘wagging the tail’ in the above quotation should also be understood as ‘to flatter, to praise’, as Gökyay (1986, p. 168, footnote 179) stated. On the other hand, it

⁷¹⁹ A good horse will increase its feed itself. What work did you show the ruler, which was the beg’s wedding when a work was to be shown, you didn't even wag a tail at the wedding.

is possible to observe through this example how decisive such public ceremonies are in intra-class mobilization and therefore constitute a disciplinary mechanism in itself.

The most valuable document showing the development of the state protocol during the reign of Mehmet II is the *Kanunnâme*. Especially Kıvılcımlı's early analysis, based on this document, reveals the alienation-class-development lines of the Ottoman administration. Although Kıvılcımlı (2007, p. 72) generally gives his analysis on this subject under the title of 'Ideological State Building: The Sultan's Becoming Taboo', my opinion is that such a formulation is more equivalent to the phenomena related to the politico-ideological establishment of the empire, which was discussed in the first chapter of this thesis. On the other hand, the existence of an essential connection between phenomena at both levels is undeniable. The politico-ideological setup emerges indirectly from a common class origin with the establishment of disciplinary mechanisms.

In the *Kanunnâme* of Mehmet II, which it will be considered in this context, the regulations introduced following the introduction are divided into three directly, and the majority of them consist of rules related to the protocol principles. The purpose and content of the *Kanunnâme* is expressed with the following lines (Özcan, 1981, p. 30): "Meratib-i a'yan u ekabir beyanındadır. Selatin-i izama lazım olan tertib ü ayin beyanındadır. Ahval-i cerayim ve her ehl-i mansıbın ayidleri beyanındadır".⁷²⁰ As it is seen in these lines, the hierarchy between the ruling strata, the organizational principles concerning the grandeur of the ceremonies attended by the ruler, and how the state officials would be punished and benefited were evaluated as a whole in terms of the discipline of the imperial administration. The provision that characterizes this whole organization in the *Kanunnâme* (Özcan, 1981, p. 41) is as follows: To put the issues of sultanate in order.⁷²¹ Although Ergin (2016, pp. 9-10) describes the relevant laws as regulations on the state organization, if attention is paid, it can be seen that this *Kanunnâme* is a regulation that focuses on ensuring the internal discipline of the state within a class hierarchy. Because it is interesting that the laws applied at the local level in the same period were taken over as the laws of the states or principalities that ruled before the Ottoman Empire, and there was no major change in them. As İnalçık points out (2017a, pp. 34-35), the Ottomans still ruled by Mamluk Kayıtbay laws, laws of Aq

⁷²⁰ Declares the issue of hierarchy between notables and state dignitaries. Declares the ceremonial arrangement which is necessary for the ruler. It's about punishments, and promotion of rank holders.

⁷²¹ To organize '*ahval-i saltanat*'.

Qoyunlu Uzun Hasan and Dulkadirid Alaüdevle law etc. In this respect, the purpose of the edict of *Kanunnâme* can be read as regulating the use of state power and disciplining those who use this power.

To summarize in general terms, the *Kanunnâme* of Mehmet II has two main titles. The first of these is the rules of superiority and hierarchy among the members of the *Diwan*, based on the establishment of the *diwan* and the submitting room. The main disciplinary principles contained in these provisions are: Order of *Diwan* (Özcan, 1981, p. 31), the hierarchy of the *Kapikulu*'s (Özcan, 1981, pp. 31-32), the rules of who sits and who stays outside at the *Diwan* (Özcan, 1981, p. 33), rules on who can kiss the sultan's hand on holy days and in what order (Özcan, 1981, p. 44), the hierarchical order of submissions to the sultan (Özcan, 1981, pp. 33-34), the rules of which authorities can eat with each other and to which subordinates the unfinished meals will be presented (Özcan, 1981, pp. 35 and 45), how to address which official authority and the arrangement of titles (Özcan, 1981, p. 49) and the dress code of the clerks (Özcan, 1981, p. 38).

The second significant topic dealt with in the *Kanunnâme* is the principles of promotion of administrative authorities, their privileges and the order of punishments and rewards. The distinctive sub-headings of this title can be listed as follows: Determination of the upper strata of the umera and the ulama members– grand vizierate and the office of Sheikh al-Islam- (Özcan, 1981, p. 30), the principles of being appointed as a *beylerbeyi* (Özcan, 1981, p. 34), the prerequisites for being a *nişancı* (Özcan, 1981, p. 34), the principles of the rise of the ulama members and the rank of *mevleviyet* (Özcan, 1981, p. 39), penalties for various crimes (Özcan, 1981, p. 46), payments to state officials and land assignments (*zeamets*) (Özcan, 1981, p. 48), pension principles (Özcan, 1981, p. 47-48), and most importantly, inheritance principles that ensure that children of the ruling class also receive office and *mansib* (Özcan, 1981, pp. 39-40).

It is necessary to make a general comment since it would exceed the subject and scope of our thesis to deal with all the articles that make up the *Kanunnâme* one by one. The law was first written in order to determine the hierarchy between the members of the *Diwan* and the state administrators, to fix the status of these people and to draw their frame of authority. The determination of an objective position and status above the individual and the demarcation of punishments and salaries for him not only reveals the principle of promotion according to a certain merit, but also creates the possibility of disciplining people based on the official hierarchy. In this context, the innovations

brought by the text of the *Kanunnâme* are obvious. First of all, a surveillance systematic is being developed in which the ruler takes place on the *Diwan* instead of presiding over it. In this new method, the ruler will be able to watch the meetings whenever he wants from a space above the *Diwan* room and subject the council members to a control that goes beyond personal relations. Secondly, the establishment of the chamber of submit makes the ruler a transcendent authority where suggestions and decisions are presented, not as a person who directly discusses state affairs. Thus, the members of the *Diwan* will be disciplined through the submitting protocol. Kıvılcımlı (2007, p. 74) points out that a culture of written submission is also forming at this point. Unfortunately, this issue has not been sufficiently studied. Based on the expression in *Kanunnâme* (Özcan, 1981, p. 34), it can be deduced that written submission emerges as a tool to replace face-to-face relationships and that this is a disciplinary medium that ensures the impersonalization of the administration.⁷²² In the *menâkıbnâme* of Mahmud Pasha, after it is stated that Ibrahim Pasha could meet with Mehmet II whenever he wanted and make a submission, the following statement is included (Aslan & Doğan, 2012, p. 60): “ol zamanda ise vüzaraya kapu baca yok idi, her ne vakt diler iseler padişaha buluşurdu, saray kapuları açılırdı”.⁷²³ From this critical statement, it is understood that the systematic of submitting has changed depending on the development of the imperial regime and the meeting with the ruler is restricted depending on the discipline of the protocol principles.

Another important issue is the determination of the principles of promotion in state posts. In this way, it is possible to structurally identify legitimate subordinates who may aspire to a given office, and the pressure on officers is increased. A detail that should not be overlooked at this point is that the *Kanunnâme* also controlled the principles of the promotion of the ulama members and established the office of Shaykh al-Islam above the ulama members.⁷²⁴ According to İnalçık (2017a, p. 26), through this codification, Mehmet II strengthened the law and customary principles and supported

⁷²² See: Özcan (1981, p. 34); “(...) name ile arz etmek götürü beylerbeyilerin ve ümeranın ve kuzatin yollarıdır. Bizzat arz etmek mertebesi alidir”. Submitting by letter is the way of beylerbeyis, emirs and qadis. A higher rank is required to submit in person.

⁷²³ At that time, there was no formality for the viziers. Whenever they wanted, they could meet the ruler, the palace gates would be opened to them.

⁷²⁴ Özcan (1981, p. 30) asserts that the provision regarding the establishment of the office of Shaykh al-Islam may have been added to the law later, or that this authority does not refer to the Sheikh al-Islam as the head of the ulama, although it refers to a person who has the authority to issue a fatwa.

the independence of secular law, while “bringing the ulama closer to the hierarchy of state-controlled departments [tm]”. This is a remarkable detail because by the 17th century, the ulama members would erode this structure and “mufti fatwas would limit the law-making power of *nişancis* [tm]” (İnalçık, 2017a, p. 27). It will be discussed the details of this issue in the next subsections.

VII. III. I. II. Appointment to the Offices: Desire, Benefit and Death

“Ümeranın afeti su-i sire olur/ Ve vüzeranın afeti hubs-i serire olur
Zuamanın afeti za’f-i siyaset olur/ Ve ulemanın afeti hudd-ı riyaset olur”⁷²⁵

(Sinan Paşa, 2013, p. 728)

Secondly, it is necessary to examine the discourse created about being appointed to state offices and the way it is operated. In the Ottoman political thought, which was written in the period that are considered, it is seen that a new discourse about coming to state offices, which has no example in the previous period, is developing. The origin of this discourse lies in the execution of two grand viziers by Mehmet II and the exile and imprisonment of the other two. Political ideas formulated in the light of these historical experiences also draw attention to the suprapersonal tendency of autarky, which is the general characteristic of the imperial regime. On the other hand, the fact that the principle of ‘administration of pashas’ constitutes one of the active dynamics of political struggles in this period puts the issue of appointment and promotion to state offices on the agenda of political thoughts. The fact that the grand vizier became the absolute deputy of the ruler during the reign of Mehmet II (Özcan, 1981, p. 11), who had an exceptional competence in terms of the use of autarkic power can be given as an example to this situation. As Hassan (2002, p. 208) underlined, this establishment, on one side, makes the grand vizier an absolute surrogate for state affairs, and on the other hand, it renders the ruler as ‘innocent’. Emecen (2009a, p. 28) states that the clear examples of the ‘strong vizier and weak sultan dilemma’, which is supposed to have started with the period of Köprülü family, can actually be seen in the reigns of Mehmet II and Bayezid II, and that he claims the decisive role of the bureaucracy, military and ilmiye elements to be effective under the ruler was also

⁷²⁵ The disaster of those who are high-level administrators is moral disorder / The disaster of the viziers is their bad intentions / The disaster of the landlords is the weakness of the administration (or to be keen to capital-punishment) / The disaster of the scholars is the love for administrative offices.

evident in this period. In this context, the development of both the institutional structure of the state and the autarkic power of the ruler does not constitute a paradox for the imperial regime, on the contrary, this situation should be considered as a characteristic feature. Thus, as discussed in the previous sections, the ideological transcendence of the sultan and the complexation of the actual state administration and its transfer to professional administrators occur together. Moreover, this political formation increases the role of viziers as the representatives of various social strata, but also institutionalizes the transcendence of the emperor as the ideological element of formal unity and the power to regulate oligarchic balances as its real function. The fulfillment of this administrative function does not necessarily mean that the relationship between the ruler and the members of the ruling class gains new dimensions. Mumcu (2017, p. 31) points out that although the authority of political execution (*katl*) of the ruler was used only for the subordinated class during the establishment period, this authority was also used against the members of the military class after the capture of Constantinople. It is clear that this situation refers to the establishment of an authority and power that regulates the oligarchy in accordance with the structure of empire.

The emergence of the first examples of the struggles that took place in this framework is realized as a result of the dismissal of Grand Vizier Mahmud Pasha and his demise of rank as the governor of Gallipoli and his exile in a way. Kivâmî's (2018, p. 394) evaluation of the incident is as follows:

Ne dir 'akıl işit bunda iy yar/ Bu işde ana göre sende yol var
Yarakı bulsa devlet şeh katında/ Mukarreb olman anun sohbetinde
Gey artur ihtiyarun eyle idrak/ Ki olur şeylerüm kurbı hatar-nak
Severken böyle ahir gör anı şah/ 'Abes yirde yog itdi gitdi na-gah
Kul olan dayıma korkmak gerekdür/ Kişide korku olmak yigirekdür⁷²⁶

When the background of the event is examined, it is seen that a contradiction has emerged between the authority of Mahmud Pasha and Mehmet II. Mahmud Pasha's influence in the state administration and his reputation with subordinated class members contradict the absolute authority of Mehmet II. In the history of Neşrî (1957, p. 743), the authority of Mahmud Pasha is described with the words "he had such power that the

⁷²⁶ O friend, now hear what the wise man says; According to him, there is a lesson for you in this work. If you have the opportunity at the level of the state and the sultan, do not be close to his fellowship. Be very cautious and understand that being close to sultans is dangerous. While the Sultan loved him [Mahmud Pasha] like that, finally see, he suddenly destroyed him for nothing. Those who are loyal to the sultan should always be afraid; It is very good to have fear in a person.

sultan had almost abdicated [tm]”. In the *menâkıbnâme* of Mahmud Pasha, there is information that Pasha managed four high-level offices from one hand, and these four are listed as the Office of Grand Vizier, the Office of *Kadiasker*, the Office of Kapudan Pasha and governorship of Rumelia (Aslan & Dogan, 2012, pp. 58-59). Kıvâmî (2018, p. 393) confirms this description, according to him “the sultan had entrusted himself to him [Mahmud Pasha]; he said, ‘Do as you wish’ [tm]”. A concrete example of Mahmud Pasha’s power in decision-making mechanisms is in the history of Âşıkpaşazâde. According to him (Apzd, 2017, p. 173), Mahmud Pasha made an agreement with the King of Bosnia during the expedition and took over his castle, but this situation disrupted the conquest plans of Mehmet II:

Kıral hisarı teslim etti. Bu kıral ile Mahmud Paşa’nın andlaşmasından gönül asla hoş olmadı. Padişah incindi. Zira padişahın muradı bu idi ki bu hisarın üzerine vardı ki kendisi zorla fethede idi. Bu kıralı da helak ede idi. (...) Padişahın Mahmud Paşa’ya ilk öfkesi ve kırgınlığı bu sebeptendi.⁷²⁷

On the other hand, when the sources of the period are examined, it is seen that Mahmud Pasha’s reputation among the people and the administrators was also quite high, and he had become an authority where opposition can be articulated against the reckless policies of Mehmet II. It is possible that the road to the execution of Mahmud Pasha took place for this reason, that is, because he became an alternative figure of authority in the frame of autarkic regime. Especially the fact that he was effective in the execution of the thought that he had a hand in the death of Prince Mustafa (Tekindağ, 2003) reveals his connection with the political opposition as at least a suspicion. In the anonymous chronicle (Köklü, 2004, p. 323-25), it is also mentioned that Mahmud Pasha’s receiving higher ranks than other statesmen was effective in a conspiracy against him.

Âşıkpaşazâde (2017, pp. 207-8) stated that Mahmud Pasha had constructed a Friday prayer chapel, an imaret, a madrasa, a bath and a large caravanserai in Istanbul, a madrasah in Hasköy, a mosque in Sofia, and a large caravanserai in Bursa, and endowed thousand florins to be paid to the poor of Medina every year. Compared to

⁷²⁷ The king surrendered the fortress. His heart was never satisfied with the agreement of this king and Mahmud Pasha. The king was offended. Because this was the sultan’s wish, that he reached this fortress, which he himself was forcibly conquered. He was going to destroy this king too. (...) The sultan's first anger and resentment towards Mahmud Pasha was due to this reason.

other grand viziers, why Mahmud Pasha was a more popular figure can be explained by his activities that were visible to the public. Moreover, Kırâmî (2018, p. 393) states that Mahmud Pasha loved writers and thinkers (that is, he patronized writers, poets, ulama and dervishes), and that he was accepted as an authority by notables.⁷²⁸ If the one of the anonymous chronicle (Köklü, 2004, pp. 17-19) is examined, it is seen that Mahmud Pasha was raised to the level of a Christian saint in the period before he entered the Ottoman service, and was considered a great scholar after converted to Islam. Similarly, in the *menâkıbnâme* of Mahmud Pasha's, there is information that Pasha solved a theological problem that Christian monks could not solve for a long time despite his young age, and that he was considered a 'great clergy', and that he was a saint who had the miracle of teleportation after he became a Muslim (Aslan & Doğan, 2012, pp. 51-53).⁷²⁹ Similarly, since it is mentioned Şükrullah's praises that made Mahmud Pasha almost to the level of a ruler in the previous section, we can only point out the lines that refer to his relationship with the subordinated people. Şükrullah describes Mahmud Pasha's generosity and his reputation among the people as follows (2011, p. 231): "the powerless, the poor, and the orphans in distress; If they arrive at its lofty door and seek security in its one and only benevolence, they will surely reach their wishes then come back [tm]". The history of Tursun Beg has the following verse about him (1977, p. 24): "Ger olmasa kitab u rüsül farza oladı/ Halkun nizam-ı haline ray-i rezini bes".⁷³⁰ In all these examples, the prestige that Mahmud Pasha gained before various social strata is clearly seen.

Although not to the extent of Mahmud Pasha, it is necessary to consider the thoughts of Sinan Pasha, who was understood to be a person respected by the ulama members and was dismissed and imprisoned during his short grand viziership, about being appointed to state offices. First of all, Sinan Pasha argues that being a servant of the door and high authorities means great difficulty and invites trouble (2013, p. 98): "ve hüddam u teba' bir taab olur ki ulular onu çekerler. Mansıb nusb u bela olur, ve

⁷²⁸ See: Kırâmî (2018, p. 393); "İşiginde sürerdi yüz hep a'yan".

⁷²⁹ There is a story in the Bible at the origin of the narratives with the theme of the chosen person who answered the questions of the clergy with his miraculous knowledge at a young age -which we also see in the example of Mahmud Pasha. According to this parable, the twelve-year-old boy disappears in Jerusalem at Pasah. His family and relatives who seek him find Jesus sitting among the Jewish rabbis in the Temple, asking them clever questions and giving them answers (Luke 2:41-52).

⁷³⁰ If it were not for the book and the messengers sent by Allah/ His sound vision would have been sufficient to improve the situation of the people.

kaza hod bir muhkem kaza olur. Saltanat sandığın bir ulu hizmettir; mübtela olan bilir ki ne zahmettir”.⁷³¹ In another couplet, Sinan Pasha re-expresses this idea more clearly (2013, p. 358): “eğer sana huzur gerekse, selatinden nesne isteme”.⁷³² Sinan Pasha has two different explanations that can interpret the concept of ‘*huzur*’ (peace) he used in this couplet. The opposite of the concept of peace, restlessness occurs in two forms. The first of these is to pay debts and toil, the other is to break away from religious values and tradition and commit a sin. In other words, restlessness manifests itself in the material and spiritual framework.

In this context, unrest in material sense is explained as follows in Sinan Pasha’s work (2013, p. 496): “Onu bilmez ki zeamet dediklerinin ahırını garmet olur/ Ve nedeme-i sultanın akıbeti nedamet olur. Vezaret ise haml-i evzar lazımdır”.⁷³³ Jorga (2009b, p. 191) states that especially before the expeditions, money was collected from the statesmen, and this amounted to two hundred thousand gold coins. For this reason, the examples in which statesmen act in their own interests and take bribes and sell their offices for money in order to pay off their debt reflect a general trend within this framework. Sinan Pasha, who makes the religious interpretation of ‘material troubles’ in the following lines, also develops a mystical criticism of the general tendency mentioned above. First of all, Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 289) states that the one who serves the sultan will be haunted by the devil, and the reason for this is that the viziers scrape the people’s property like a barber, while the administrators (*begs*) ‘persecute’ and ‘reprise’ the people (2013, p. 496). These lines are full of the heaviest expressions directed against the fact of class domination in Ottoman Empire. However, these statements should not be thought to simply reflect the view of subordinated classes. Although Sinan Pasha was a member of the *ulama stratum*, as it will be evaluated later, he also heavily criticizes the members of the *ulama* and idealizes only the members of *sûfî* orders. Based on the words of Sinan Pasha, the validity of this proposition can be determined (2013, p. 288): “Pelas-ı köhne giymekle ademin izzeti gitmez/ Ve libas-ı fahır edinmekle hem mertebesi artmaz. Beğler kapısına varmakla kişi ulu olmaz/ Ve o

⁷³¹ The affairs of the *Kapıkul*’s are such a hassle that the great ones attract it. High authority becomes calamity and trouble; Judgment is also a big accident. Reign is a greater service than it is thought, the one who is afflicted knows what a trouble it is.

⁷³² If you need peace, don't demand property/goods from sultans.

⁷³³ The end of what they call zeamet is to pay debts; The end of the sultan's table friends is regret. If you say what is viziership, carrying a load is like its twin, it will not let you go.

kapıya yol bulmakla Hak kapısına yol bulmaz”.⁷³⁴ These couplets of Sinan Pasha show that he repeated the saying of popular *sûfî* motto: ‘God has sultans wearing old clothes’. According to him, the fundamental rank is gained in the sight of God, and the way to this is not through the gates of the rulers, but through the gates of the poor dervishes. The justification of this view is through three arguments: (i) the world is temporary and worthless, (ii) man is the caliph of God and is valuable in his essence, (iii) the purpose of life is to reach the happiness of the next world, and in this process, it is necessary to endure worldly suffering. As a result, since the attitude of the *sûfî* circles affirms suffering within the framework of these three headings, it makes it necessary to at least theoretically avoid accepting the blessings of having power as an object of desire. The elements of Sinan Pasha’s syllogism in this context are as follows (2013, pp. 454-56):

- (i) “Dünya bir dar-ı bi-karardır, ko sen onu tullabına/ Ve cihan bir cife vü murdardır, terk ete onu kilabına” ve “Rızık için her kapıya yelmek leamet alametidir/ Ve her deniden dünya istemek denaet emaretidir”⁷³⁵,
- (ii) “Çün Allah’ın halifesisin, ne hizmet edersin sultana?/ Çün meleklerin mescudusun, ne kulluk edersin şeytana?”⁷³⁶,
- (iii) “N’ola cevî taamdan hali olursa/ Tek kalb hikmet ile mali olsun. Ne var Esvab ahlak u emsal olursa/ Tek giyende izz ü cemal olsun. Vech musaffer olursa ne noksan, sahibinde fer olsun/ Birkaç gün gam olursa ne ziyan, akıbetinde hayr olsun”⁷³⁷.

It should be noted that this viewpoint in general is compatible with the views of the *Halvetî* and *Vefâî* dervishes, because in these sects where Sinan Pasha was affiliated, avoidance from the material world and asceticism (staying alone and asceticism) are essential. According to Kenç (2019, p. 51), Sheikh Vefâ, who Sinan Pasha affiliated, refused to meet with Mehmet II and Bayezid II under the pretext of not disturbing his

⁷³⁴ A person's value does not decrease by wearing a patched cardigan, and his rank does not increase by acquiring expensive clothes. One does not become great by going to the Begs gate; By finding a way to that door, there is no way to the door of God.

⁷³⁵ The world is a temporary mansion, leave it to those who wish it / The world is a carrion and filth, leave it to those who eat it like a dog. Running to every door for sustenance is a sign of a despicable person/ It is a sign of vulgarity to ask worldly from every vulgar.

⁷³⁶ Since you are the caliph of Allah, what are you serving to the sultan? / Since the angels prostrated to you, what do you serve the devil?

⁷³⁷ What happens if your stomach is empty/ As long as the heart is full of wisdom. What’s wrong with clothes being shabby/ As long as there is value and beauty in the wearer. Is it a mistake to have a yellow face, to have a glow in your owner / What’s the harm in being sad for a few days, may the end be well.

seclusion (period of suffering and contemplation alone), despite being called by them many times. It is also known that Sheikh Vefâ was invited to his daughter's wedding by sending forty thousand dirhams by Bayezid II, but the sheikh rejected this invitation (Öngören, 2003, p. 141). Similarly, there is a story in his *menâkıbnâme* that Eşrefoğlu Rûmî did not respond to Mehmet II's call for a long time, and upon this he was ordered to be killed, but showed miracles and escaped execution (Bursalı, 1976, pp. 54-57). The interesting details in the story are that Mehmet II's soldiers came to the execution of Eşrefoğlu Rûmî in overalls filled with wine, drank some of this wine on the way, and chose to drown the sheikh in wine as a method of execution. It is clear that these details were designed to leave a negative image of the relationship of Mehmet II's rule with Islamic prohibitions in those who read or listen to the *menâkıbnâme*, and therefore correspond to a specific political discourse that characterizes the *sûfî* circles with Islamic purity. Moreover, after this event Eşrefoğlu Rûmî (1976, p. 60) prays like this: "Ey Bari Taala, senden muradım ba'de'l-yevm budur ki, bizi selatinin kalbinden ve selatini bizim kalbimizden ihraç eyle!"⁷³⁸ It can be thought that this prayer means both a puritanical separation of the relationship between the ruler/state and the *sûfî* sheikhs, and a kind of curse on the rulers. It is clear that this attitude exhibits a tendency to keep a distance from the dignitaries and to place the way of the *sûfîs* superior to the way of the rulers in terms of attaining divine grace. This attitude could be interpreted as a manifestation of the reactions of the lower classes stemming from class discrimination that developed within the framework of the concepts of rights and justice. But more generally, it is an attitude aimed at incorporating the consent of lower classes into *sûfî* circles (and ulama), and is not essentially antagonistic political opposition. Because in the *sûfî* literature, generally it is emphasized that the ruler should be just, but there is no statement that the rulership itself is illegitimate as a class rule. Moreover, this view also has connotations as a commentary on the class consciousness of the ulama stratum, as it is possible for the ulama stratum to defend their own specific interests and to maintain their position of relative autonomy from the power of the ruler. For example, Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 728) states that the disaster of the ulama is due to indulgence in politics, and warns as required by this class consciousness. In the final analysis, the criticisms of these social circles against the social order correspond to alternative ways of gaining privileged positions in the rentier social formation.

⁷³⁸ O God, after today, I wish you to expel us out of the hearts of the sultans, and expel sultans out of our hearts.

On the other hand, a series of concrete moral criticisms brought by *sûfî* circles about state administration can be mentioned. In particular, it is seen that these criticisms focus on the issues of ‘bribery’ and ‘immorality’. Âşıkpaşazâde (Kala, 2013, p. 310) bases his criticism on the bribery and moral corruption of pashas and *kapucus*: “Paşalar kamu kumaş flori/ Gözetirler kaçan ire o biri/ Ve ger mahbub durur cariye oğlan/ Hemandem biter onun mahfi siri/ Kapucular gelen elin gözedür/ Bulaşa ellerine dünya kiri”.⁷³⁹ In these lines, Âşıkpaşazâde especially emphasizes two points. The first is that Pashas pay particular attention to taking bribes in terms of valuable fabrics and money, and secondly, they establish intimacy/love relationships with concubines and boys and this situation is often not kept a secret. The words ‘cariye oğlan’ (concubine boy) in these lines must have been written like this because of a little game made to watch the meter in classical poetry, and for this reason, it can be read as “cariye vü oğlan” (concubine and boy). In general, it is more correct to use the word ‘*gilman*’ for male slaves who are subject to homosexual relations. On the other hand, since the word ‘oğlan’ is also used in ways such as ‘acemi oğlanları’, the author may have preferred a usage that could mean owning a concubine boy rather than being making love with boys. Similarly, in the anonymous published by Öztürk (2000, p. 38), it is seen that the pashas who are condemned to having boy-lovers are mentioned and this is associated with the devshirme system (child-levy). It shows that Âşıkpaşazâde may have similarly directed a sexual criticism towards the people of slave origin. In both cases, the author considers the examples given as objects of moral criticism.

Similarly, Sinan Pasha criticizes the bribery of state officials and considers it among the crimes that should not be forgiven. According to him, the possibility of giving and receiving bribes should be completely eliminated and people who give and receive bribes should be dismissed (Sinan Paşa, 2013, p. 714). Sinan Pasha states that there should be no room for pity in the punishment of bribery and presents this as an Islamic provision (2013, p. 714): “İki şin olur ki şeyn olur İslam’da/ Biri rüşvet, biri şefaah ahkamda. Rüşvet gibi nizamı bozar nesne olmaz/ Bir kapıda ki rüşvet ola, o kapı düzülmez”.⁷⁴⁰ Criticisms on these two issues are general criticisms and are not directed

⁷³⁹ Pashas wait for all the cloth and money/ so that they can have it/ They become lovers with concubines and young boys/ At that moment their secret is revealed/ Kapucus look at the incoming hand / Earthly dirt on their hands.

⁷⁴⁰ There are two faults that cause shame in Islam/ One is bribery, the other is forgiveness in judgment. Nothing disrupts order like bribery/ If there is a bribe in an office, that office will not be in order.

directly to concrete people. In addition, it is difficult to directly coincide with the view of a certain social segment. They can only be considered as criticisms from *sûfi* circles, and for this reason, they can be included in the category of moral criticism that references *taqwa*. Possibly, they may contain references to some famous events and people in the historical period in question, but these are not easy to analyze for today.

On the other hand, there is a second group of criticism directed directly at individuals and related to the intra-class struggle. In this period, we realize that the criticism and praise directed towards the viziers differed in intensity and level compared to the previous periods. Especially in this period, it is seen that the viziers were subjected to a double evaluation as ‘good vizier’ versus ‘bad vizier’ and that there was often no reasonable middle point between ‘glorification’ and ‘cursing’. For example, while Âşikpaşazâde (2017, p. 207-8) describes the execution of a politically supported pasha with the words “he was martyred because of slander [tm]”, he narrates the execution of another state official, who was his opponent, with the words “he was strangled like a dog [tm]”. The approach in question has two important dimensions in terms of disciplinary practices, firstly, most of these criticisms are expressed in a way to represent the interests of the timariot *sipâhîs*, and secondly, it places the threat of severe punishment on the viziers like the sword of Damocles.

Kıvâmî (2018, p. 81) defines the typology of ‘good viziers’ as foresighted (*nik-ray*), skilled and intelligent (*kar-azma-yi akıl*). The ideal type of vizier for Kıvâmî is identified with Mahmud Pasha. The author describes Mahmud Pasha as unique in viziership, following Nizam’ül-Mülk as an example, prudent, and “who does not do anything irrational” (Kıvâmî, 2018, p. 393). This discourse is quite similar to Tursun Beg’s naming of Mahmud Pasha as a “martyr” (2013, p. 125). In addition, it is seen that Kıvâmî also treated Davud Pasha and Çandarlı İbrahim Pasha in the status of ‘good viziers’. Davud Pasha, is evaluated by Kıvâmî (2018, p. 423) as “extremely capable, intelligent, sincerely loyal to the sultan of the world [tm]” and emphasizes his military competence as follows (2018, p. 609): “He is valiant, he breaks the enemy lines and he is smart (...) He knew the situation of the mounted soldiers well when he set out with the intention of war (...) he was very skilled in war and warfare [tm]”. It should be noted that the point where Davud Pasha is praised as a soldier is not only his knowledge and courage in military issues, but also his strong relations with the *sipâhîs*, a major social class, and his acceptance by them. Çandarlı İbrahim Pasha, whose father was executed during the reign of Mehmet II, is described as “the fortune of all scholars (...) a mature

virtue [tm]” and a person who fulfills all the wishes of the people (Kıvâmî, 2018, p. 609). The fact that Çandarlı İbrahim comes from a well-known ulama family is mentioned in these lines and his authority over other scholars is claimed. Secondly, it is underlined that he satisfies the demands of the people. While it is clear that both expressions are repetitive patterns in the political thought of the period, the choice of these two patterns is not accidental. Because what is in question is to reflect the image of the restoration of the previous order in the person whose father was executed during the reign of Mehmet II. For this reason, the themes of ‘respect to the clergy’ and ‘fulfilling the demands of the people’ reflect the hegemonic general characteristics of the Bayezid II period. In order to better understand the essence of all these affirmative judgments, it is necessary to make a comparison with the ‘bad vizier’ descriptions.

Kıvâmî lists the actions of Nişancı Pasha and Rûm Mehmet Pasha without naming them in order to portray the ‘evil vizier’. Nişancı Pasha takes place in the lines of Kıvâmî as follows (2018, p. 531); “There was a vizier who seized the sultan and took over the administration of the Ottoman country and frightened all the lords of Anatolia and Rumelia. How dare one of the state elders and minors to speak in the parliament where he was present! [tm]”. Âşıkpaşazâde (2017, p. 208) uses the following expressions for the same vizier: “He has coveted the property, blood and honor of Allah's servants. Wherever there are wrong and illegitimate works, it is his invention [tm]”. According to Âşıkpaşazâde, Rûm Mehmed Pasha is an ‘infidel’ (Kala, 2013, p. 246).

In another place, Kıvâmî (2018, p. 519) refers to the vizier Rûm Mehmet Pasha as a dishonest and a cheat, and states that what the Ottomans did to the Karamanids, he did to the Ottomans a hundredfold. In these lines, accusations are made according to a model that has been used before. Based on the fact that the vizier in question was from Karaman, Kıvâmî almost implied that he was trying to avenge his own origins. However, the main point of emphasis was expressed as cheating Ottoman begs, people of the country as it is seen above (Kıvâmî, 2018, p. 519). As for Âşıkpaşazâde Rûm Mehmed Pasha (2017, p. 208), he uses the expression “iyiliği men edici oldu” (forbidding to do goodness), which indirectly implies denying religion. Because the expression “Veltekun minkum ummetun yed’ûne ilel hayri wa ye'murune bil ma'rufi ve yenhevne anil munkeri (munkeri)”⁷⁴¹ in the 104th verse of Surah Al-Imran is generally

⁷⁴¹ Qur’an (3:104) (Dawood, 1999, p. 51): “Let there become of you a community that shall call for righteousness, enjoin justice, and forbid evil”.

considered as a religious dogma in Islamic thought. In this context, the expression of forbidding to do goodness as Âşıkpaşazâde said also means reversing and rejecting the order of religion. Of course, it is not difficult to see that this emphasis, at least on paper, is related to the confiscation of the land and revenues of *waqf* established for the purpose of ‘goodness’ and ‘cooperation’.

The origins of the criticisms directed at both pashas are either the granting *mukata'a*-rent of the houses in Istanbul (Reindl-Kiel, 2008) or the change of possession on *timar* lands and the confiscation of *waqf* properties during the reign of Mehmet II. For example, while Sinan Pasha argues that people who are in a decision-making position in such policies do evil by thinking that they are doing good, he argues that goodness provides a small benefit, but that evil should be sought in the deterioration of class balance and the disappearance of consent (2013, p. 650): “i’tikadı budur ki sana bir menfaat etti/ Veyahud senden bir ulu mazarrat def’ etti. Onu bilmez ki zararı kendine eder (...). Onun gibi dosttan akil düşman evla olur/ Ve onun zararından bunun zararı edna olur”.⁷⁴² In this respect, it is seen that the newly emerged disciplinary mechanism is tried to be placed on the state administrators by the owners of *mülk/waqf properties* and *timar* holders -that is, by the ruling classes and defending their interests. As the details of this event will be discussed in later chapters, I will consider the examples and threats of punishment directed at the viziers.

Öztürk (2020, p. 128) states that the prison sentences in the 15th century chronicles were mostly applied to *qadis*, *beylerbeyis* or viziers and adds that when a conflict arose during the reign of Mehmet II between the ruler and viziers, who took their power from the military, these people were first imprisoned and then executed. Öztürk (2020, p. 24) states that the legal basis followed in the imposition of these penalties is customary law, and that all penalties given to public officials are processed according to customary law. If the Öztürk’s (2010) article examined in which he compiled the relevant examples, it is possible to determine that prison sentences intensified during the Bayezid I period and were seen frequently after the Murat II period. In this context, it is clear that the prison sentences given during the reign of Mehmet II specifically targeted two groups as reflected in the chronicles: (i) state officers, (ii) vassals. Apart from these, there are also prison sentences applied to the

⁷⁴² It is his belief that he has benefited you. Or he protected you from great harm. He does not know that he has harmed himself (...). A wise enemy is better than a friend like him. And the harm from the wise enemy is less than that.

representatives and allies (rulers, dignitaries, etc.) of the countries that are in a state of war, but it is necessary to exclude them. Imber (2016, p. 267) stated that the executions of the grand vizier became almost continuous in the post-Mehmet II period: The execution of Çandarlı Halil, Mahmud and İshak Pasha during the reign of Mehmet II, Gedik Ahmed Pasha during the reign of Bayezid II, İbrahim Pasha during the reign of Suleyman I, and Satırcı Mehmed Pasha during the reign of Mehmed III indicate the existence of such a continuity.⁷⁴³

The first imprisonment we could detect during the reign of Mehmet II, as mentioned before, is the imprisonment of Çandarlı Halil Pasha after the capture of Constantinople and then his execution. This incident is the first example of a series of imprisonment of state officers and execution that will be seen later. Secondly, Öztürk (2010, p. 117) gives an example of the imprisonment and murder of architect and engineer Sinan (Sinan-ı Atik) mentioned in the anonymous chronicle. According to the anonymous chronicle (Öztürk, 2000, p. 112), for an unknown reason, Mimar Sinan-ı Atik was imprisoned and beaten to death. The third example is the imprisonment and execution of Mahmud Pasha (Neşrî, 1957, pp. 820-21). In another anonymous chronicle, it is mentioned that Koca İbrahim Pasha, who conspired against Mahmud Pasha to be killed, was imprisoned in the tower until he died (Köklü, 2004, p. 58). The fourth example is the imprisonment of Gedik Ahmed Pasha (Apzd, 2017, p. 196), who would be imprisoned again during the reign of Bayezid II and then executed. Âşıkpaşazâde uses the phrase “what he thought would happen for the sultan finally came to him [tm]” and affirms this execution (Apzd, 2017, p. 207). Moreover, the death of Karamânî Mehmet Pasha and Nişancı Pasha also takes place in the literature of this period. While Kivâmî uses the expression “First they cut off his head, put it on a bayonet and took him around Istanbul for a few days [tm]” (2018, p. 531) for Rûm Mehmet Pasha, Âşıkpaşazâde says “When he died, they buried him without a head” (Apzd, 2017, p. 209). As for Nişancı Pasha, Âşıkpaşazâde said, “Finally, what he thought about other viziers came to his own. They strangled him like a dog” (Apzd, 2017, p. 208) and expresses his hatred. Finally, to add more information, Öztürk (2010, p. 121) states that, according to a statement in the Paris copy of the history of Oruç Beg, Prince Cem imprisoned *Azap* sergeant Mahmud while he was fleeing to Karaman.

⁷⁴³ In the anonymous chronicle, it is claimed that Ishak Pasha was executed while he was the grand vizier (Köklü, 2004, p. 59).

There are several examples of prison sentences applied to vassals during the reign of Mehmet II could be found in the historical sources. The first example is Mehmet II's imprisonment of the Hungarian King for a few years (Oruç, 2011, p. 94). Even though this information in Atsız's publication is expressed in a way that can be understood as the King of Hungary imprisoning Voivoda the Impaler, Öztürk (2010, p. 117) gives the meaning to this section as above, based on the Paris copy of Oruç Beg's history. The second example is the arrest of Isfendiyarid Hasan Beg. Âşikpaşazâde relates the event with the following words (Apzd, 2017, p. 162): "The son of İsmail Beg, Hasan Beg, who came to Ankara, they immediately grabbed him and sent to the tent of *Kapicis* [tm]". Mumcu (2017, p. 66) underlines that during the reign of Mehmet II, a number of people were politically murdered among the groups that were subject to him. For example, Niccolo Gattilusio, who converted to Islam after the Ottoman conquest of Lesbos, and his nephew Luchine Gattlisio were executed. Although the Trabzon Greek Emperor David II surrendered and transferred the lands he had to Mehmet II, he was executed together with his four sons and a nephew after a while. Moreover, the King of Bosnia, Stjopon Tomasevic, was executed by obtaining a fatwa from Mevlânâ Sheikh Ali Bistamî, although Mahmud Pasha gave him a warrant (Apzd, 2017, p. 173).

The execution of two viziers during the reign of Mehmet II generally brought about the development of moral defense arguments against such punishments by state officials. Sinan Pasha developed a discourse in the *Maârifnâme* specifically to prevent the death sentences given by the sultans and tried to prevent this punishment from being given at least immediately. Sinan Pasha's first proposition (2013, p. 710) is for the rulers not to act hastily about punishment and says:

Fi'l cümle padişahlara lazım odur ki gazapları re'yelerine muvafık olmayınca amel
etmeyeler/ kanun-ı saltanatta tamam vacib olmayınca hiç kimseyi katl etmeyeler.
Taksir etmeyeler sabırda/ ve ta'cil etmeyeler kahrıda.
Eğer bir kişiyi isteseler ki öldürelər/ O saatte öldürmeyip habs ettireler
Bir zaman dahi onu fikr eyleyeler/ Ve ondan sonra nice bilirlerse işleyeler.⁷⁴⁴

⁷⁴⁴ As a result, what is required of the sultans is not to do anything unless their anger is in accordance with their views/not to take anyone's life unless it is absolutely necessary for the sake of maintaining order. It is being patient/not hasty in applying punishment. If they are on the way to kill someone, their thoughts/not immediately killing them but imprisoning them; to think for a while/then do whatever they want.

In these lines, it is advised that the sultan should first imprison a person to whom he has sentenced to death and reconsider his decision. The feeling of ‘wrath/anger’ is seen as the main motivation in the imposition of the death penalty, and it is emphasized that it should be harmonized with reason. Sinan Pasha imposes a serious religious prohibition to justify his advice. According to him, killing is the biggest crime after polytheism, and the ruler’s use of execution is only legitimate in the face of crimes that will disrupt the order of “property and religion” (Sinan Paşa, 2013, p. 706).

Secondly, another defense mechanism is the development of a criticism towards emphasizing merit and keeping the personal friends of a ruler away from the authority and responsibilities of the viziers. In particular, it can be thought that this problem is related to the development of palace life and the increase in the number of courtiers close to the ruler. For example, Bayezid II included the verse “Lazım degül mi hayl ü haşem cem'i beglere”⁷⁴⁵ in a poem he wrote under the pseudonym Adlı (2018, p. 130) and accepted it as a norm for the ruler to have “a large number of entourage like a herd of horses [tm]”.⁷⁴⁶ But the large entourage is at odds with the interests of the professional officials of the state apparatus, as it will also create a multitude of authorized-unauthorized persons who have the opportunity to intervene in state affairs.

The general approach of Sinan Pasha on this issue is to equip the viziers with as much authority as possible and recommend that the sultan obey their words. For example, Sinan Pasha claims as such (2013, p. 678): “Bir kişiyi vezir edicek sözün dinlemek gerek/ Ve eğer inanmazsa vezir edinmemek gerek. Vezire hüsn-ü i'tikad gerek/ Vezirin sözüne i'timad gerek”.⁷⁴⁷ In addition, Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 681) states that the work that should be done by the viziers should not be done by the courtiers, and if the sultan wants to do a favor to the courtiers, he should donate as much as he wants from the goods he owns, but should not appoint them to a state offices. In the anonymous *siyâsetnâme* submitted to Bayezid II, the use of insulting expressions while mentioning the courtiers of the Mehmet II period and the cursing of an unidentified courtier presents a remarkable example in this regard. The criticisms directed at this courtier in that anonymous text are listed as follows (as cited in Kavak, 2019a, p. 204):

⁷⁴⁵ Begg need a lot of fans and servants, don't they?

⁷⁴⁶ *Diwan of Adlı*, poem no: 130, couplet no: 4.

⁷⁴⁷ When you appoint a person as a vizier, it is necessary to listen to his word. And if he is a person whose word cannot be believed, it is necessary not to appoint him a vizier. It is necessary to believe in the vizier in good faith. It is necessary to rely on the words of the vizier.

O wise person, you think that you are one of the sultan's friends and in many cases you denigrate the people who are worthy of his service, you denigrate the wise people who benefit from them whenever they can. By Allah, you are not one of the sultan's loved ones. You are only the enemy of the sultan, his most treacherous soldier, the person who is very jealous of him. (...) Shame on the situation you're in, let the devil who led you to this situation be humiliated and stay away from us. May this road you follow your desires be miserable, shame on this road you take! What loyalty did you offer in the service of the sultan, while constantly chasing enmity and perversion? By Allah, you are an open enemy, a person who violates the rights of the poor and needy. You are working against Muslims. This shows that what you are doing is on a shameful path. Your presence on this path, O Satan, is a very dangerous and useless field of struggle. It is never appropriate for a devil and pimp like this to be a brother/friend of the ruler. He is an enemy in the full sense of the word. [tm]

As can be seen in this excerpt, the influence of courtiers on the ruler's decisions is seen as intolerable by professional officials. While this may have career-related reasons, it must also have something to do with social representation mechanisms. In this framework, we can see that the viziership emerged as a professional management position and was tried to be protected. Because while the principles of becoming a vizier were determined by a career line that required long years of experience in state offices, the fact that courtiers whose only privilege was to be the chat partner of the sultan were directly appointed to this position -even to achieve this with simple gossip and tricks-up, was considered as inappropriate by state officials who were the representatives of various social strata. In this regard, İdrîs-i Bitlisî's opinion is that the ruler's close circle should be composed of bureaucratic elites (as cited in Uğur, 2001, p. 101): "Sultans should only converse with two classes. With *sûffîs*, scholars and right people to benefit from religious knowledge; with scholars and soldiers for the country and army order (...) [tm]". He considers only sheikhs, ulama, bureaucrats and soldiers to be worthy of the ruler's close circle, thus placing him in the sphere of influence of the state elite. In the work called *Letâif-i Lâmi'î Çelebi* (2015, p. 207-8), two viziers, one of whom is Saruca Pasha, are criticized for not knowing enough the requirements of the religion of Islam, and it is presented as a great disaster for such people who are ignorant of religious concepts to be vizier. Sinan Pasha supports this idea -by criticizing the opposite situation- as follows (2013, p. 680): "Her vilayetin fesadı mesalih ehline düşmemekten

olmuştur/ Ve her memleket ki bozulmuştur, bu cihetten bozulmuştur. Her padişah ki istianet eder sığar-ı rical ile kibar-ı a'male muzayyı' olur ameli /Müstevcib olur halelini".⁷⁴⁸

This is information that gives an interesting clue about the Ottoman political system. Because objectively, the rulers can bring their table and chat friends directly to the administrative positions. The most well-known example of this in the following period is Ibrahim Pasha, who was promoted from a door keeper to a chief chamberlain during the reign of Suleyman I, and later became the grand vizier. On the other hand, this rapid rise is not seen as the ruler's appreciation at all and is criticized by the *de facto* representatives of various social segments. In this case, it should be accepted it as the 'norm' to come to an office by following career procedures or not, but precisely because of the interests of various social segments. On the other hand, rising from courtesy to administrative offices can be considered either as an 'out-of-the-ordinary' development line or as a way and method for the sultan to directly represent his own interests. In the final analysis, since frequent examples of both ways can be found, this field should be accepted as a field of political struggle. When we look again at the principles of promotion with this eye, when the autarkic rule of the sultan is left aside, a struggle arises especially in terms of the reflection of the power of the local rentier classes on the administration.

An crucial criterion stands out in Sinan Pasha's lines in which he evaluates the meritocracy procedures, thus, It is demanded that a person who has come to a high position already has a 'worth' (2013, p. 648): "Sen layık olmayınca vardığın mansıbdan sana kadr gelmez/ Adem odur ki mansıbına fahr vere, mansıb ademe fahr vermez".⁷⁴⁹ These lines can be interpreted as offices and positions in general do not add honor to the person, on the contrary, the honor of the person will give honor to that office. However, if we look at the mere wording of these words, it is possible to think that they are mostly a rhetorical scheme. In the following lines, Sinan Pasha fills this discourse with a unique content that can gain meaning if interpreted in the context of social

⁷⁴⁸ The corruption of every province has been because of giving the jobs to the unqualified / Every country that has been corrupt has been corrupted because of this. Every sultan who tries to do big things with small men will waste a lot of effort / He will have ruined his own work.

⁷⁴⁹ When you are not worthy, you will not be respected by the office you have been appointed to.

The honorable person gives honor to the office to which he is appointed, the office does not honor the person.

conflicts. Firstly, Sinan Pasha stipulates that those who will come to important positions should be humble and smiling by nature, and secondly, they should be noble. Sinan Pasha's statements are as follows (2013, p. 650); "Şu ki mansıbından galib olur, onun hilkatinde tevazu' u bişr olur/ Şu ki mansıb ona galib olur, onun hali tecebbür ü tekebbür olur. Bir kimsenin ki aslında denaet olur/ onun efalinde hıyanet olur".⁷⁵⁰

The word '*mansıb*' derives from the root '*nasb*', which means to plant, stab, raise, and refers to take a state office and to be appointed to a high place in rank/position (Ayverdi, 2010, p. 769). As Sinan Pasha used, the ability of a person to remain calm in the face of 'promotion' and be 'more valuable than a position' is related to his 'creational characteristics'. While this usage can be interpreted as having a divine gift in the religious-mystical sense, it can also be understood as being distinguished in the social context and 'having manners and status from the family' without losing first meaning.⁷⁵¹ İdris-i Bitlisî in his work named *Kanun-ı Şehinşahi* supports this meaning by emphasizing the argument of 'being distinguished'. He claims that old, mature and noble people should be assigned primarily in state affairs (Uğur, 2001, p. 101). If İdris-i Bitlisî's assertion is taken as a reference, Sinan Pasha's emphasis should be read in two ways. In this context, people are recommended to appoint who are both having religious morality and socially privileges and therefore able to maintain their modesty in the face of the aforementioned official ranks.

While describing the characteristics of these people, Sinan Pasha makes two important comparisons: The first comparison is between modesty and arrogance, and the second is between the concepts of nobility and debauchery. Let's start the discussion that focused on the concepts of humility and arrogance by recalling an example was given earlier. Kivâmî (2018, p. 531) was criticizing Rûm Mehmed Pasha as follows: "How dare one of the state elders and minors would speak in the meeting where he was present! [tm]". It can be seen that this expression is clearly related to arrogance. If examined carefully, Rûm Mehmed Pasha is a devshirme-based administrator (Reindl-Kiel, 2008), and Sinan Pasha also indirectly refers to this detail and states that if a person is 'despicable' in essence, 'treason' will emerge in his actions. As can be seen in

⁷⁵⁰ A person who dominates his office has humility and humor in his creation. A person whose office dominates him becomes violent and arrogant. If a person is despicable in his essence/his actions will be treason.

⁷⁵¹ In another part of his work titled *Maârifnâme*, Sinan Pasha argues that those who are noble in terms of lineage cannot necessarily be considered elite in terms of virtues (2013, pp. 492-96). For this reason, it is possible to predict that Sinan Pasha prioritized moral excellence.

Âşikpaşazâde, Rûm Mehmed Pasha is declared an ‘infidel’ in some of the historical sources. It is impossible to say that Sinan Pasha definitely meant Rûm Mehmed Pasha in these lines, but it cannot be denied that there is an inherent criticism in these lines that people from local families should be preferred over those of devshirme origin.⁷⁵² It is a rather shallow approach to treat this issue as a social conflict between Muslim and converted people or Turkish and devshirme origin administrators. When this conflict is evaluated from a wider perspective, it is clear that the *mülk* owners and *zeamet* holders and the ulama members, who already have social status and power, want to ensure the formal unity of the society adequate with their own interests. The fact that most of the devshirme-origin officers have no family privileges makes them much more motivated and daring to rise, and because they do not have as many social constraints and responsibilities as local families, they can implement much bolder policies that conflict with structural power relations. We can read this conflict more as a struggle between status-qua and anti status-qua tendencies -as well as rentier contradictions, and thus refers to how it articulates with the general tendency of war and peace parties concentrated at the state level.

At the end of the period as discussed, the executive cadres of state regained an undisciplined authority. It is seen that the military elites, whose relative autonomy increased especially in Bayezid II’s struggle with Prince Cem, became the sole arbiter of the country’s administration after Bayezid II could not get out of bed in his last years due to his gout. Already at the end of the process, the coup carried out by his son Selim I against Bayezid II can also be interpreted as a change of power carried out by the military elites of secondary importance, against the military elites close to Bayezid II. It is possible to follow the development of this political grouping, which could be called as the ‘administration of Pashas’, during the reign of Bayezid II. Two typical examples of this situation could be seen in anonymous chronical of Kreutel. In the first of these examples (Kreutel, 1997, pp. 6-7) Bayezid II sends Yahya Pasha to Sofia as the *Beylerbeyi* of Rumelia, giving him a warrant that gives him extraordinary authority against the threat of Prince Cem, but by using these powers, Yahya Pasha bestowed “ranks, mansibs, timars, estates, fields, and farms with their annual income [tm]” and confiscated the properties of some people. In the second example, according to the

⁷⁵² This line of conflict can also be found in the *Saltuknâme*. Ebü'l-Hayr-ı Rumî (1990, p. 145) asserts in the will of the Seljuk ruler Alaeddin that the viziers should be chosen among the ulama members and that it is inconvenient to be made vizier from the people of slave-origin.

anonymous chronicler (Kreutel, 1997, p. 34), at the end of the reign of Bayezid II, viziers, members of *Diwan* and sanjak begs “seized the income of the country [tm]”, “made violence to the people and prevented complaints from reaching the ruler [tm]”, and they governed “as they wished [tm]”. According to the author (Kreutel, 1992, p. 34), “three viziers with almost unlimited authority and power are: Ali Pasha, Hersekoğlu Ahmed Pasha and Yahya Pasha [tm]”. Yahya Pasha, whose name is mentioned in both anecdotes, is the same person. According to the biographical information given by Reindl (2014, p. 251), while Yahya Pasha was a palace servant of Albanian origin, he was promoted to state duties and became the son-in-law of Bayezid II. During the reign of Mehmet II, when he was the *Beylerbeyi* of Anatolian, he was dismissed from this duty for violating the rights of subjects. It is understood that Yahya Pasha was effective in the office of *Beylerbeyi* of Rumelia when Bayezid II ascended the throne. Hersekoğlu Ahmet Pasha, on the other hand, was originally a Venetian nobleman and had the chance to advance in state offices by accepting Islam while he was held hostage in Istanbul (Reidl, 2014, p. 110). It is understood that this person was close to Gedik Ahmed Pasha and played a role in the accession of Bayezid II to the throne, and later in his career, he became the *Beylerbeyi* of Anatolian and married Bayezid II's daughter (Reidl, 2014, pp. 111-12). Ali Pasha, on the other hand, is a devshirme of Bosnian origin and has been serving Bayezid II since he was a prince (Reidl, 2014, p. 123). It is known that Ali Pasha was in conflict with the Prince Korkud and was a supporter of the prince Ahmed (Reidl, 2014, p. 131). The fact that all three pashas were people of devshirme origin, who were in close contact with Bayezid II, shows that the administration of the pashas became identical with being the representative of the Janissaries in this period. Moreover, in this respect, the change of sides of the Janissaries and the end of Bayezid II's rule were synonymous. The re-discipline of this and similar military groups will be possible not with the usual state hierarchy and reward/punishment mechanisms, but with an elimination based on the merits of their success on the battlefields. It is possible to evaluate the war-discipline and uprising spiral in this framework during the reign of Selim I and the reign of Suleyman I.

In addition, it has become a decisive factor to consider the interests of the ulama stratum in appointment to official duties. In this respect, it is seen that the ulama members has formed a network of interests within itself, and appointment to official positions has become dependent on representing the interest of this network and therefore the authority of the notables. For example, in the work named *Letâif-i Lâmi'î*,

Kebelioğlu, who is stated to be Mehmet II's *qadiasker*, was requested to be dismissed by the notables and scholars because he did not show many compliments and attention, on the other hand, there is information that Mevlânâ Vildan's appointment to the office was viewed positively because he respected them (Lâmi'î Çelebi, 2015, p. 111). Lâmi'î Çelebi's comment on this anecdote is as follows (2015, p. 112): "Ey yar şöyle eyle mansıbdâ zindegani/ 'Azlûni işidenler virmeye mujdegani/ Ey devlet ehli bilsem dayim nedür gururun/ Tutacagun ki yokdur ahir ebed cihanı".⁷⁵³ He proposes as a moral postulate that those in office should benefit his entourage, and that if he is arrogant and does not share his achievements with his network, he will lose support. The same is true for other members of the *Diwan*. In another anecdote told by Lâmi'î Çelebi (2015, p. 202) Birâder Kasım criticized the status of the sanjak beg, *mufti*, *qadi* and inspectors in *Diwan*, *Diwan* members accused him of taking bribes to make these complaints. Thereupon, Birâder Kasım said, "Who am I to remember the elders with unjust accusations and slanders? Do not compare me to your statesmen by slandering the poor to take bribes [tm]" (Lâmi'î Çelebi, 2015, p. 202). If this response is examined closely, it is not difficult to see that just/unjust accusations are used to provide government office to different individuals or groups, even in exchange for bribes. Birâder Kasım, on the other hand, positions himself as a *sûfi* outside such relations, which is an extension of the moral purity claim of the *sûfi* circles.

VII. III. I. III. Army and Discipline

"Her kavimde bir yaramaz de'b ü ade olur
Ve cündün afeti dahi muhalefet-i kade olur"⁷⁵⁴
(Sinan Paşa, 2013, p. 728)

Although it is possible to define the period of Mehmet II as a military-based autarky, it is quite interesting that we rarely come across examples of political thought dealing with the discipline of the army. It is possible to explain this situation by the fact that the people who write in the field of political thought are very shy about making a direct criticism or suggestion about the army. Molla Lütüfi, the librarian of Mehmet II's,

⁷⁵³ O dear, state officials should be like this/ For those who heard about his dismissal not to give good news/ O state officials, what is your pride all the time/ It is not possible for you to have the world eternally.

⁷⁵⁴ There is a bad tradition and custom in every tribe/ The disaster that befalls a soldier is to oppose the commanders.

emphasized the significance of the subject by proposing the organization of military order and services as a science in itself, which he expressed as “*tertibü'l-asakir ve techizatıha*” (Maraş, 2003, p. 132). Although it is not discussed clearly in the primary sources whether these measures (*tedbîr*) will remain only in the field of internal-discipline or whether regulations regarding the class composition of the army are required, it is possible to trace the principle of “*tertibü'l-asakir*” (order of soldiers) in the sources of the period by looking at both the attitude taken against concrete events and the criticisms between the lines.

Mehmet II, upon his return from the Karaman Campaign, first gave *cülûs* to the Janissaries who asked for benefit, then had beaten Kurtçu Doğan the Janissary Aga and exiled him to Amasya, and such measures, as well as the placement of the palace guards in the Janissary corps, İnalçık (2019a, p. 157) describes this as a ‘fundamental reform’. But it is clear that both this statement and the fact itself suggest indecision as to whether the measures taken can qualify as a reform. Because the most fundamental problem is to explain how - or whether - the Janissaries were so easily subordinated to Mehmet II’s rule, and it could not be answered competently. In the memoirs of Constantine Mikhailovich, who was in Istanbul as a Janissary during the reign of Mehmet II, the description of Mehmet II as “his word is unreliable, he is not a conservative in religion, he does not show loyalty to anyone [tm]”, in this context, was evaluated by İnalçık (2019i, p. 519) as expressions reflecting how the ruler appeared among the Janissaries.⁷⁵⁵ In this description, the view of the Janissaries towards the ruler is not filled with fear or respect, but with a kind of suspicion, and in this respect, it does not present the image of a ruler who is overpowering and punishing. On the other hand, it is seen in the sources of this period that the soldiers showed a limited resistance against the ruler and made some attempts to defend their own interests. In general, the point pointed out by both cases is that, in accordance with the general characteristics of the regime, the power of the Janissaries in particular could not be limited, and in the final analysis, they began to reach a power that could impose their own interests. The most decisive reason for this situation is that Mehmet II tried to keep the Janissaries under control by rewarding them instead of limiting their power, as he tried to establish a definite dominance against the timariot *sipâhîs*. The dominant position of the ‘war party’ also reproduces this characteristic of the period structurally. The fact that the Janissary agas took place in front of the other military officers while the *Diwan* was

⁷⁵⁵ Also see: Beydilli (2019b, p. 99).

discussed in the first chapters of the *Kanunnâme* of Mehmet II's is an indicator of this situation. According to the *Kanunnâme* (Özcan, 1982, p. 31), first the viziers, then the *qadiaskers*, followed by the treasurers, and the fourth, the Janissary chiefs (*agas*). Considering that the *Diwan* in the reign of Mehmet II fulfilled the four main functions, it can be clearly seen that the Janissary agha was an advisory and decision-making authority. Hassan (2002, p. 212) likens this position of Janissary *agas* to the office of Commander of Land Forces. According to the *Kanunnâme* (Özcan, 1982, p. 36), the affairs related to the "umur-ı alem" are entrusted to the viziers, the financial affairs to the treasurers, and the legal matters to the *qadiaskers*. In this respect, the authority to discuss military matters is the Janissary *agas* after the rulers and viziers.

It is possible to follow the sources that some military unrest and micro-resistances emerged during this period. Some of them are resistances in feudal characteristics. For example, Âşıkpaşazâde describes in detail this kind of resistance that took place during Mehmed II's Belgrade campaign. According to Âşıkpaşazâde (2017, p. 152), the proposal of Dayı Karaca -who was the *Beylerbeyi* of Rumelia- to cross the Danube and march on Belgrade was not accepted by the lords of Rumelia: "Bu söz Rumeli'nin Beyleri razı olmadılar. Onun için ki: 'Belgrad fetholununca bize çift sürmek düşer' dediler. 'Zira gayrı yerde düşman kalmaz. Bu hisarı da alıp bir avuç kafiri dağıtacak olsak halimiz ne olur?' dediler".⁷⁵⁶ Moreover, it can be seen that the feudal powers resisted this military attempt (Apzd, 2017, p. 152): "Almamaya hiyleler ettiler. Beğlerin himmeti olmadı".⁷⁵⁷ Âşıkpaşazâde evaluates the "betrayal" and "escape" of Rumelian begs as the reason why Belgrade could not be conquered (Apzd, 2017, p. 153): "Ama hisarın alınamamasına Rumelililerin hıyaneti sebep oldu. Zira onlar cenk etmedi. Kaçtılar".⁷⁵⁸ Another example is the escaping of the enemies in a large group from a castle besieged by Mehmet II during the 1477 Shkodra campaign, which we will mention below. Kivâmî (2018, p. 468) uses the following expression: "Morava suyunun berü yakasındaki hisar ki Anadolu begleri ihata itmişdi, bir gece, içinden kafiri kaçdı, buz üstünden geldi, berü taraftaki hisara koyuldu".⁷⁵⁹ In this example, it is seen that the

⁷⁵⁶ The begs of Rumelia did not agree with this statement. That's why they said: 'When Belgrade is conquered, it's up to us to plow'. Because there is no enemy anywhere else'. They said, 'If we were to take this fortress and scatter a handful of infidels, we would not be well off'.

⁷⁵⁷ They cheated not to take it. The beg had no help.

⁷⁵⁸ But the treachery of the Rumelians caused the fortress not to be captured. Because they did not fight. They escaped.

⁷⁵⁹ The fortress on the side of the Morava River, which they had surrounded the Anatoli begs, one night, the infidels escaped from it, passed over the ice, entered the fortress on the other side.

sipâhîs coming from Anatolia did not pay much attention to the siege during the campaign they had already resisted from the beginning. One possibility is that they may have agreed with the castle guards and secretly allowed the enemy soldiers to pass to the other castle in order to facilitate their own interests. Because, the demand of these soldiers to surrender after passing to the other castle indicates that their first escape was within the knowledge of the Ottoman army.

Similarly, raiders of Rumelia tend to act within the framework of their own interests. In Enverî's work called *Düstûrnâme*, it is reported that the army commander called the soldiers of Rumelia as follows during the Yence expedition (1463-4) carried out during the period of Mehmet II (Öztürk, 2012b, p. 53): "Kıldı paşa Rum-ilini'ye nazar/ Dedi niçün harb kılmaz bu nefer/ Çağırup iy Rum-ilinli size ben/ Hasmı koyup kırayın kalman esen/ Neyiçün cenk eylemezsiz ok atup/ Şimdi size ben kırayın mı tutup/ Savaşa kılmadı kimse ihtimam/ Gördü fethi yok meded şah-ı enam".⁷⁶⁰ The reason why the soldier behaved in this way is probably because the Yence fortress is quite steep and therefore difficult to capture. In this context, it is seen that the soldiers of Rumelia (maybe raiders, *sipâhîs* and *cerahor* troops) did not show the necessary attention in the campaign and refrained from attacking. Another remarkable detail that can be found in the lines quoted by Enverî is that the army commander threatened to kill the Rumelian soldier wholesale, and the feeling of superiority given by relying on the Janissary infantry must be in the background of this threat. Secondly, according to the example cited by Tursun Beg (2013, p. 122-23), the news that "ten regiments of enemies had gathered" came to the raiders who were staying around the Dimitrofça castle on the banks of the Sava River, and in the face of this situation, the raiders were hesitant between attacking this army and looting. According to the example I cited earlier, although some of the raiders in the meeting suggested to fight first and then take the loot, the majority of the raiders preferred to collect the loot first and then fight to protect the loot 'if the enemy comes'. In the Kreutel chronicle, we encounter an example showing that the *sipâhîs* struggled due to their internal contradictions and therefore did not comply with the hierarchy envisaged by the Ottoman state. It is possible to detect in the Kreutel chronicle that Mihaloğlu Ali Beg resisted to join the war under the command of Malkoçoğlu Bali Beg, when the Karabogdan expedition was to be set out during the

⁷⁶⁰ Pasha looked at Rumelia/ He said why don't these soldiers fight?/ Let me call the Rumelians / Would I kill them instead of enemy until there is no one left/ Why don't you fight, shoot arrows/ Now, shall I catch you and kill you?/ Nobody paid attention to war/ He saw that there is no support for war, help is from god.

reign of Bayezid II. According to the author of the Kreutel chronicle (1997, p. 27), Mihaloğlu Ali Beg did not come under Malkoçoğlu's command due to his ambition for state office/rank, "could not be proud to fight for his honor [tm]", and delayed the gathering of the army by not sending his own soldiers to a campaign. The fact that this is a reflection of a status dispute between the feudal families of Rumelia does not prevent it from being perceived as a resistance to state authority. Because the objective result is to put pressure on the center indirectly through the delay of the campaign and the weakness of the army.

Secondly, it is necessary to mention the resistances originating from the *Kapikulu* members that emerged in the military apparatus. While the resistances of feudal subjects can be found more easily in the sources of the period -because it is politically easier to develop pejorative discourse about them, much more cautious information is given about the resistance of the *Kapikulus*, and the comments on the topic are indicated between the lines. The clearest allusion to this issue is as follows in Tursun Beg (2013, pp. 125-26): "One of the words of the late Mahmud Pasha, which was kept in the heart, is this: One day, some aghas and his soldiers showed that they were slightly disturbed by the Sultan's approval of so many military expeditions [tm]". Tursun Beg refrains from making any comments on this topic after this information, but the significance of the issue is revealed not after these lines, but because of the previous chapter. In the fourteenth chapter of his work, which comes before these lines, Tursun Beg discusses why Mahmud Pasha was killed, and then glorifies him. When we combine both information, the picture emerges as this: The notables and soldiers of the Janissary corps are trying to resist the sultan's expedition orders through Mahmud Pasha, and with the contribution of this, Mahmud Pasha may have been executed. Similarly, in *Kıvâmî* we find examples of soldiers resisting the ruler's war orders and viziers trying to mediate the both camps. While Mehmet II set out for the expedition on Hungary in harsh winter conditions, the grand vizier was worried about how the expedition would be conducted and needs to consult the lords of Anatolia and Rumelia. It is highly probable that the vizier, whose name was not given by *Kıvâmî*, was Gedik Ahmed Pasha, since the expedition was made in 1477. Reidl-Kiel (1996) states that Gedik Ahmed Pasha, by complying with the negative atmosphere prevailing in the army during the campaign to be organized in Shkodër in 1477, avoided taking office and as a result he was dismissed and imprisoned in the Fort of Rumelia. Âşıkpaşazâde (2017, p. 196) described this incident as "Ahmed neglected it. The Sultan held Ahmed. He

imprisoned him in his fort of Boğazkesen [tm]”. Since Kivâmî reported that the vizier went and examined the region and made his decision after that, it is clear that Gedik Ahmed Pasha reported the situation to the sultan after meeting with the begs and was imprisoned as a result. The vizier in Kivâmî’s narrative makes the following speech to the begs (Kivâmî, 2018, p. 461)⁷⁶¹:

’Ne dirsiz siz dahi begler?’ didi. Bu hisarlar benim gözüme gayetde solak (sulak?) ve düşvar göründi; devletlü padişahı ağır ve yıprak çerile bunda getürevüz. Hususa vaktün hali dahi şöyle kış kıyamet; el ayak dutmaz. Mazaba bir ad yavuzluğu olsa; sonra kış bize güç olur, didi. Cem’-i begler eyitdiler: ‘Var-ısa ray-ı savab budur ki söyledinüz’ didiler.⁷⁶²

The points emphasized in these lines are that the soldier is tired and worn out and that the grand vizier asks the begs for the postponement of the expedition. Which type of soldier is tired and worn out here? In fact, it is clear that the tired soldiers were both Janissaries and timariot *sipâhîs*, since it was about to set off again after a series of campaigns. As Le Goff underlines, military operations in the Middle Ages were strictly limited in time. The wartime starts with the spring and ends at the end of the summer, and the cavalry units in the armies play a major role in the emergence of this situation (Le Goff, 2019, p. 199). The horse’s need for large pastures is as decisive factor as well as the infantry’s need for heating, shelter, and food. In this respect, it is possible to think that the Ottoman cavalry firmly accepted a seasonal division in the organization of the war and showed resistance. In this context, it can be thought that since the people who are asked for support are the timariot *sipâhîs*, there is also an uneasiness especially for the Janissaries and forcing Gedik Ahmed Pasha to form alliances. Because, if the Janissaries did not have such unease, that is, if they did not show any resistance to the campaign, it would be easier to force the *sipâhîs*, and such an alliance would not be

⁷⁶¹ In the anonymous chronicle published by Öztürk (2000, p. 84), a very similar event with a different outcome is attributed to Murat II. According to the anonymous chronicler, during the siege of Akçahisar castle during Murat II’s Albania campaign, winter came, and the castle could not be taken. Although the begs suggested to attack the castle directly, Murat II said that if they attacked, many men would perish and that he would not change a single valiant for fifty castles like this, he lifted the siege and gave the order to return to Edirne.

⁷⁶² He said, 'What do you even want without arms?' These forts seemed to me very hard and formidable; We are bringing the supreme sultan here with a tired and worn soldier. In particular, the state of the time is that the winter is very harsh, you cannot feel hand and feed because of the cold. If something goes wrong, then winter presents us with great difficulties. All the begs said that you saw and said everything correctly.

necessary. In this framework, it can be made an inference that through the ‘vizier’ mentioned above, the soldiers of *Kapıkulu* were also resisting the military campaign forced by Mehmet II. The second example in Kivâmî appears during the siege of a fortress near the Morava River in the later stages of the same campaign. In the continuation of this example, the enemy soldiers who moved to the castle across the water as a result of the possible connivance of the begs of Anatolia, offered to surrender the castle in return for their lives being spared. The viziers resisted and persuaded him by force to the order of Mehmet II to reject this offer and kill all of them. Kivâmî describes this incident as follows (2018, p. 468): “Derhal vezirler geldiler, sultan-ı aleme haber verdiler. Sultan-ı alem razı olmadı (...). Vezirler sultan-ı aleme eyitdiler: ‘(...) Devlete maslahat oldur kim sa’adettü padişah, mürüvvet eyleye, ‘avf kıla, ‘askere güç olmaya’ didiler. Ahirü’l-emir, yalvarmag-ıla devletlü padişahı razı eylediler”.⁷⁶³ One side of the effort to not continue the war was the reluctance of the soldiers from Anatolia to continue the war, while the other side was the fear of a general lack of discipline among the army, probably because the Janissaries were of a similar disposition. For this reason, the statement ‘Let there be no difficulties for the soldiers’ is integrated with the proposition of ‘state interests’ or administrative principles.

The last example emerges when Mehmet II, entering the last years of his reign (1478), was eager to start the Belgrade campaign again and the viziers discouraged him. According to Kivâmî (2018, p. 481), in the face of this request of Mehmet II, the viziers consulted and persuaded the ruler to campaign to a smaller fortress in Albania instead of the Belgrade campaign: “Vüzeradan ba’zısı meşveret içinde, esna-yı kelamda söyledi. Ahir, devletlü ve sa’adettü padişah İskenderiyye kal’asını yad itdi. Birez daha anı söyleştiler”.⁷⁶⁴ In this example, it is understood that the *Kapıkulus* replaced the Belgrade expedition with an expedition to Albania. Although the names of the viziers who were in the *Diwan* at that time could not be determined exactly, the fact that Davud Pasha, who was assigned with the Albanian expedition, was actually a devshirme taken from Albania, suggests that there may be a political reason for this change of route. Although Babinger (2003, pp. 358-59) states that “there is no indication that there are

⁷⁶³ They immediately came to the vizier and informed the sultan of the world. The sultan of the world did not accept this. (...) The viziers said to the sultan of the world: ‘(...) the principle in state administration/interest is that the ruler should be generous, forgive, and not cause any difficulties to the soldiers’. Finally, they persuaded the supreme sultan.

⁷⁶⁴ Some of the viziers said in consultation and during the conversation. After that, the fortunate ruler remembered the fortress of Alexandria. They talked a little more about it.

conflicts between high-level state officials or commanders that endanger the security of the state [tm]”, the available data show the opposite. The appointment of Karamânî Mehmed Pasha as grand vizier, with whom Davud Pasha also had personal disagreements (Turan, 1994) at the time of the military campaign, makes one think that there are structural reasons for political factors. As it is known, Karamânî Mehmed Pasha is a grand vizier who was lynched and killed by the Janissaries after the death of Mehmet II, and his bare head was circulated in Istanbul for days. Changing the direction of the expedition from Belgrade to Albania means that the rise of Karamânî Mehmet Pasha, who will strengthen his authority thanks to the possible conquest of Belgrade, is prevented by the *Kapıkulu* group. Moreover, this incident enables Davud Pasha, a rising military commander, to become Mehmed Pasha’s rival thanks to the Albanian expedition, which is exactly why Davud Pasha was dismissed by Mehmed Pasha. İnalçık (2019a, pp. 273-74) stated that in Karamânî Mehmet Pasha struggle with devshirme origins, and he succeeded to put Rûm Mehmet Pasha to death, Gedik Ahmet Pasha to prison, Ishak Pasha to be demoted and Davud Pasha to be dismissed, in addition, he succeeded in appointing ulama members such as Faik Pasha and Manisazâde to the *Diwan* as viziers.

Especially, the intensification of these resistance examples towards the end of Mehmet II period coincides with the years when the ruler fell so ill that he could not lead the expeditions.⁷⁶⁵ In this case, it is possible to think that the ruler lost his influence on the military elite. Secondly, Mehmet II’s death and his replacement by Bayezid II, who can be regarded as the representative of the ‘peace party’ and therefore the *sipâhîs* and the ulama, suggest that this was a movement supported by the soldiers of *Kapıkulu* at the same time. In this context, the claims that Mehmet II’s death may have been an assassination also gain meaning. For example, for Âşıkpaşazâde’s allusions, see: “Tabibler hana çok taksirlik etti/ Budur doğru kavlı düşme gümana” (Kala, 2013, p. 335).⁷⁶⁶

It is seen that during the reign of Bayezid II, the *Kapıkulu* soldiers were able to impose their own specific interests and more openly resisted the orders of the ruler than in the previous period. The first example of this situation is that when Gedik Ahmet

⁷⁶⁵ It is possible that Mehmet II abandoned the Moldavia Campaign in 1475 due to his gout. In the anonymous chronicle, it is stated that Mehmet II was ill in the last three years and died due to this disease (Köklü, 2004, p. 61).

⁷⁶⁶ The physicians made a lot of mistakes to the ruler/ This is the right statement, don't be in doubt.

Pasha was detained and tortured by Bayezid II, the Janissaries gathered armed and stood at the door of the palace, openly insulting the ruler and forcibly opening the doors of the palace. Considering the chronicle published by Kreutel (1997, p. 10), it is understood that the Janissaries called Bayezid II immoral, drunk and junkie during the incident and threatened the ruler by saying that they would do evil things if Gedik Ahmet was not shown to them. Thereupon, Bayezid II had to hand over Gedik Ahmet Pasha to the Janissaries, which is enough to qualify the Janissaries' movement as a successful attempt. According to the Kreutel chronicle (1997, p. 58), Bayezid II gathered viziers, some *Diwan* members and other notables in the face of the *Kapikulu* Army's resistance against Prince Ahmed, and decided that Ahmed would come to Istanbul under armed protection and ascend to the throne.⁷⁶⁷ Hearing this, the Janissaries rose up in Istanbul and looted the houses of the *qadiasker*, grand vizier Hasan Pasha and other pashas, and they stood at the gates of the palace. After the palace gates were opened, the rebels who caught the ruler in the *harem* section, after criticizing the state administration for a long time, demanded a commander-in-chief from Bayezid II to stand by them and lead them to war (Kreutel, 1997, pp. 60-61). Essentially, the demand of the Janissaries is a demand for a change in state administration. To summarize in general terms, the grounds for this demand are as follows (Kreutel, 1997, p. 60): (i) the country is mismanaged, the people are under pressure, rights and justice are trampled underfoot, (ii) Janissaries are suppressed in the 'vilest way', (iii) the people are in a miserable state due to bad administration, (iv) there are no governors attached to justice and the state in the villages and sanjaks, (v) the state is robbed by the sanjak begs and pashas, (vii) the viziers rule the country arbitrarily, (viii) the ruler does not meet with anyone and cannot listen to the complaints, (ix) revenues of Anatolia and Rumelia are not sent to the state treasury and the treasury is empty. Although the addressee of these demands is Bayezid II, it is seen that they mainly cover all state administrators, such as members of the *Diwan*, and they also target administrators in the provincial organization of the center, such as the governors and begs. After these suggestions, the Janissaries demanded that Bayezid II appoint a chief commander, claiming that he could no longer participate in the expedition, and despite their insistence that the ruler could join the expedition or appoint Prince Ahmet or a vizier as a commander, they insisted on not accepting those names (Kreutel, 1997, pp. 61- 62). It is seen that the Janissaries clearly resisted to bring Prince Selim to power in this incident. Finally, Janissaries forced

⁷⁶⁷ This information is also included in the Giese anonymous (1992, p. 134).

Bayezid II to give the authority to use the treasury to Prince Selim. When the ruler insisted on this issue, the response of the rebels was as follows (Kreutel, 1997, p. 64): “Know that, O Sultan, this treasure we are fighting already belongs to us. Wherever the army is, the treasury must be kept so that salaries can be paid! You stop objecting to us and give us the money that already belongs to us voluntarily! [tm]”. In this example, it is clear that the Janissary rebels forcibly deprived the monarch of all his privileges, including the authority of the commander-in-chief and his treasury, thus realizing a *de facto* change of the crown.

In the sources of this period, examples of political thought that deal with the subject of military discipline and make suggestions in this field are very few. While some of them state the significance of military discipline in general, some of them briefly focus on the ways of providing this discipline. Sinan Pasha expresses the significance of military discipline as follows (2013, p. 700): “(...) leşkerini zapt edip adl ile siyaset etmek gerekir”.⁷⁶⁸ It is unclear whether the word ‘*adl*’ (justice) in this expression is used in terms of the rights of the soldiers or the administration of the country in general. If we take the expression as a whole, it is striking that there may be a connection between military discipline and ruling the country with justice. In other words, the military’s non-oppression is seen as a requirement for the country to be just. The second possible interpretation of the statement is to discipline the soldier by being fair to him. The fact that there is no interpretive line at the end of this line makes it difficult to interpret. On the other hand, it is possible to talk about the existence of a common denominator where both interpretations can be combined. In particular, the fact that Sinan Pasha tried to represent the interests of the timariot *sipâhîs* makes it easier to evaluate them as the segment that should be treated fairly in these lines, and therefore to understand that the provision of justice in the country is related to the interests of this segment. If what is meant by the military means the people of *Kapikulu* origin, the necessity of keeping them under control against the *sipâhîs* is one of the connotations given by the text.

While dealing with the management of the soldiers, Sinan Pasha attaches special significance to the protection of the interests and the protection of the honor of the timariot *sipâhîs*. Since the advice regarding the protection of the class interests of the *sipâhîs* will be evaluated in the next section, I will focus here on the sections related to social status in Sinan Pasha’s advice. According to Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 724), *sipâhîs*

⁷⁶⁸ The ruler must control his soldiers and treat them with justice.

are called the ‘adornment’ of the sultanate, the ‘greatness’ of the caliphate and they need to be protected and enriched. In this context, Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 724) gives two remarkable advice, (i) protecting the *sipâhîs*, (ii) increasing their power and welfare: “Cündünü gökçek sıyanet ede/ Ve askerini tamam himayet ede. (...) Padişah olan bunların zaiflerine kuvvet vermek gerek ki kuvvet tuta emri/ Ve bunların fakirlerini gani etmek gerek ki müşeyyed ola ezri”.⁷⁶⁹

In general, it is understood that these advices emphasize the points that are considered remarkable in order to keep the timariot *sipâhîs* within the framework of the circle of power. However, on the basis of these emphases, there is also a concern about the status of timariot *sipâhîs* being seen as lower than those of the *Kapikulu* soldiers, and a criticism of the ruler’s attitude. Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 726) argues that this social stratum is more decisive among the other soldiers, based on a comparison implying the Janissaries: “ve o kötülerle bunları bir tutmamak gerek/ ve o ednalarla beraber gözetmemek gerek (...) Çeri her ne kadar çok olursa, hemin ceri bunlardır/ Cenk gününde cümlesi meyyit olur, hemin diri bunlardır”.⁷⁷⁰ The identity of the ‘bad and mean’ group of soldiers in these statements cannot be determined by looking at the sections before and at the end of the lines. It is possible that he had previously removed the lines that more clearly implied the Janissaries from the work, and for this reason such a semantic gap may have arisen. However, the fact that he states that ‘true soldiers’ are *sipâhîs* no matter how many soldiers are, and that he uses the word ‘çeri’ directly instead of words like ‘asker’, ‘leşker’ or ‘ghazi’ in these lines strengthens the impression that he is comparing Janissaries and *sipâhîs*. Because he does not use the word ‘çeri’ while giving general advice on the subject, he prefers the words ‘asker’ or ‘leşker’ in order to give a more general meaning. To give an example, Sinan Pasha gives the following advice to the ruler to keep the soldiers under discipline (2013, p. 674): “(...) amma halvet-i dost dahi gerekmez ki asker ondan teneffür eyleyip nefret etmeye”.⁷⁷¹

The last quote was given above not only fulfills the purpose of comparing different statements of Sinan Pasha, but also constitutes a crucial advice about the

⁷⁶⁹ It is necessary to take care of the warriors enough / protect the soldiers enough. (...) The sultan should strengthen their weak ones so that his command will gain strength/ He should enrich their poor so that he can gain strength.

⁷⁷⁰ And they should not be equated with those bad people/ And they should not be evaluated together with those mean people (...) No matter how many soldiers there are, these are the true soldiers/ All of them die on the day of war, they are only alive.

⁷⁷¹ But there is no need for a private meeting with a friend so that the soldier does not hate him.

discipline of the soldiers. Sinan Pasha finds that the monarch's isolation from the military by spending too much time in entertainment gatherings (*'halvet-i dost'*) is objectionable in terms of military discipline and states that this will cause hatred in the soldiers. This proposition points to the existence of a model in terms of discipline and consent mechanisms. The ruler must act as one of them in order to gain the trust of the people under his subordination. For example, the rulers' organizing ulama meetings and having the ulama discuss in their presence and make questions and comments enable them to establish their own image in a way close to the ulama stratum and to establish an articulation. In military terms, the construction of the image of the *'ghazi ruler'* assumes a very decisive function within the said discipline mechanism. An anecdote in Kıvâmî (2018, pp. 211-14) illustrates this mechanism quite well. During Mehmet II's Belgrade expedition, the army, which was in trouble, made a tactical retreat and as a result, the soldiers of the castle under siege started a breakthrough operation in order to disrupt the siege forces. In this new situation that emerged, Mehmet II's forces failed to stop the breakthrough operation and the soldiers defending the Belgrade fortress advanced to the Ottoman headquarter. In this case, instead of retreating, Mehmet II enters the war with his personal guards. Kıvâmî describes Mehmet II's entry into the war and its effect on the commanders under his rule with the following words (2018, p. 214):

Dönüp at depdi tıǵı kıldı 'uryan/ Girüp meydana hem-çün şir-i garran (...)
Girüp meydana kıldı pehlevanlık/ Ki gösterdi o dem sahib-kıranlık
Niçesin katl idüp a'da-yı dinün/ Kesüben başların çok müşrikinün (...)
Görüben cümle begler oldu hayran/ Didiler aferin olsun zi sultan
Dönüben her taraftan saldılar at/ 'Aduyı eylediler gey katı mat⁷⁷²

In the expressions in these lines that can be translated as "when they saw him, all the lords were amazed / They said well done, that sultan", it is clear that the soldiers congratulated the ruler as if they were their equals because they saw that he was fighting, that is, one of their own. As it was analyzed in the previous chapters, the image of a sultan and his glorification has almost turned into the elder lords saying 'well done' to a teenager. However, this unique discourse that emerged once throughout the sources

⁷⁷² He turned and rode, unsheathing the skewer/ Entering the battlefield like a roaring lion/ (...)/ He entered the battlefield and became a wrestler/ At that time, he showed a warlike act that killed kings/ He killed many people from the enemies of religion/ He cut off the heads of many pagans/ When they saw him, all the lords were amazed / They said well done, o sultan/They turned and started riding from all sides/ They completely defeated the enemy.

of the period has to do with the fact that the commanders saw the ruler as a member of their own social stratum and showed solidarity with him. In this context, we have seen an extreme example where the advice of Sinan Pasha ‘do not stay isolated from the military’ is applied.

Apart from this example, there were three more political advice, albeit in fragments, referring to military discipline in the sources of the period. As was analyzed before that Sinan Pasha gave central importance to the timariot *sipâhîs* in the military sense. However, it becomes a necessity to discipline this group in direct proportion to its power and military value (2018, p. 728): “Eğerçi bu cündiler bir hoş taife olur/ Ve memleket nizamı bunlarınla bulunur. Amma bunların dahi zabtı hayli kar olur”.⁷⁷³ As can be understood, keeping this group, which plays a significance role in the establishment of order in the country, under dominance also means establishing a class order in the country itself. To put it more clearly, a class order led by the ruler can become reality on the condition that the class order, in which the *sipâhî* group is at the center, is governed and controlled. In this context, Sinan Pasha proposes the use of various discipline tactics to balance the power of the timariot *sipâhîs*. The strategic premise that forms the basis of these tactics is to prevent the timariot *sipâhîs* from uniting among themselves (Sinan Paşa, 2018, p. 728): “Ta ki ittifak edip padişaha cür’et edemeyeler/ Ve icma’ eyleyip bir ulu şenaat edemeyeler”.⁷⁷⁴ The aim of this strategy, as can be understood, was formulated not so that the *sipâhîs* fight well, maintain public order or fulfill their obligations, but do not act directly against the ruler, that is, do not disrupt the hierarchy of the class order in line with their own interests. The benefit seen in the successful implementation of this strategy is expressed in the following words (Sinan Paşa, 2018, p. 728): “Öyle olacak her taife aharı ile zebun olurlar/ Ve reaya dahi bunlardan me’mun olurlar”.⁷⁷⁵ What is especially emphasized here is that the feudal *sipâhîs* did not attain absolute freedom, that is, they did not have direct control over the *reâyâ* and did not have the power to challenge the ruler. Absolute unification (alliance) and absolute separation (decentralization) possibilities of feudal groups seem quite threatening for the ruler. It is clear that this is a strategy centered on class hierarchy. In

⁷⁷³ These military units are a different group of people/ And the country's order is established thanks to this group. But even these are very difficult to control.

⁷⁷⁴ Not having the courage to concede and face the ruler/ And not be able to gather together and do a great evil.

⁷⁷⁵ When this is done, each group will be powerless because of the other / And the people will be safe from what they could do.

line with this strategy, Sinan Pasha proposes a series of tactics with a common essence aimed at preventing the *sipâhîs* from uniting (2018, p. 728): “Sa’y etmek gerek ki bunlar ecnas-ı müteferrika ola/ Ve tavaif-i mütehalife ola/ Aralarında itbak olmaya/ Ve içlerinde ittifak olmaya/ Ba’zı ba’zına havale kılına/ Bir bölüğünün şenaati bir bölük ile def oluna”.⁷⁷⁶

The first tactic is to prevent the *sipâhîs* from uniting among themselves. It is possible to understand this as preventing the timariot *sipâhîs* from gaining a developed political class identity. The term ‘*ecnas-ı muteferrika*’ indicates that *timar* holders should be separate social segments, and it means that they are formed from segments of different ethnic/religious origin and status. The term ‘*tavaif-i muhalifa*’ reinforces the proposition I mentioned above because it underlines the need for *sipâhî* units to be incompatible/in conflict with each other. In fact, this narrative can be understood by referring to the *ghulam* institution in the Sassanid and Seljuk political system. Within the tradition of political thought, the *ghulam* institution aims to bring in soldiers from different ethnic origins in order to balance the power of regional armies, and thus reduce the possibility of communication and solidarity among the soldiers. Sinan Pasha’s advice should certainly be understood from this aspect as well, but he does not make any specific references to this meaning as he specifically avoids emphasizing the functional significance of *devshirme* institution. Finally, he concludes his advice by stating that military forces from different origins and isolated from each other can be deployed on each other, considering the conflict and rebellion situations. Interestingly, Âşıkpaşazâde also uses the term ‘Sunni *ghazîs*’ for the first time when discussing this period. He uses the term “about seventy thousand Sunni ghazi [tm]” when describing the soldiers in the naval force that set out to capture Kefe under the command of Gedik Ahmed Pasha (Apzd, 2017, p. 190). This statement, which I have avoided to specifically elaborate and comment on, since this phrase is not encountered in the publications of Yavuz & Saraç (2003, p. 266) and Kala (2013, p. 294), is important in that it shows that the military group that took part in naval wars was also organized by the state for the first time. In particular, the ethnic and religious heterogeneity of the naval warrior group is thus tried to be made manageable. In this respect, it is necessary to mention religious formation as a decisive aspect of military discipline among the strategies applied.

⁷⁷⁶ It is necessary to strive for the division of these groups into separate genera/ And they must strive to be groups in conflict with each other/ They should be attacked on each other/ By a one group's despicable act another group should be intimidated.

Finally, the proposed reward mechanism for disciplining soldiers can be examined. The writers of this period inherited and uttered the advice of 'generosity to the soldier', which their predecessors mentioned as a decisive political practice. When taken literally, the discourse in the period of Mehmet II, which cannot be separated from the advice given in the previous period, gains some specific meanings compared to the past in terms of its historical context. The increase in the uneasiness of the timariot *sipâhîs* brings along rewarding proposals for this group. On the other hand, as it is known, the number of *Kapıkulu* army increased in the Murat II period and afterwards, and their influence in the army became stronger compared to the previous decades. One of the important indicators of the increase in political influence is the fact that the writers of the period began to frequently include evaluations about the 'indiscipline' of the *Kapıkulus*/Janissaries in their works. The fact that the articulation of the Janissaries with various power fractions and cliques has become a necessary element in the shaping of political power brings the Janissary group to impose its own interests. The examples of 'indiscipline' seen in the works of this period should be evaluated within this framework.⁷⁷⁷ It is possible to see this situation in the Buçuktepe revolt, in which Mehmet II was deposed, and in the unrest of the Janissaries upon his return from the Karaman campaign after Mehmet II came to the throne for the second time (Emecen, 2019a, p. 133). Another example is the looting of Istanbul by the Janissaries after the death of Mehmet II and the fact that the Janissaries did not participate in the war for an unknown reason in the war with the Mamluks during the reign of Bayezid II (Öztürk, 2000, p. 134). Based on these examples, it is observed that the rewarding mechanism is operated especially for Janissaries and *Kapıkulu* army. For this reason, it would be more accurate to read both the *cülûs* and the extraordinary material rewards obtained by the Janissaries as a share of class power as a specific discipline mechanism. As the Janissary Constantine recounts in his memoirs, the Buçuktepe revolt constitutes a turning point

⁷⁷⁷ Conservative historiography evaluates the 'indiscipline' of the Janissaries within the patriarchal and discriminatory nature of the conservative worldview. The 'arbitrary' behavior of the Janissaries cannot be understood in an ideological formation in which subordination to the rulers is affirmed and integrated with modern forms of authoritarianism. In this context, the fact that the Janissary units are composed of children of Christian origin, who are claimed to have not been assimilated 'enough', serves to explain the 'arbitrary' behavior as a vague subtext in conservative literature. Similarly, the nationalist historiography emphasizes the ethnic origin of the *Kapıkulus* and emphasizes the essential 'defects' in their identification with the 'state interest'. Both approaches are problematic in that they ignore the capacity of a particular social stratum to impose their specific interests, or rather see this capacity as ethnically and religiously illegitimate.

in this context, in which the Janissaries ‘remind’ themselves as a social group that needs to be systematically satisfied. According to Constantine (Beydilli, 2019b, p. 57), the Janissaries revolted and plundered the houses of the richest and most high-ranking *Diwan* members, since the quarterly salary given to *Kapıkulu* members was not paid for six months during the period when Mehmet II came to the throne for a short time. After the Janissaries looted the tents of all the advisers next to Mehmet II, who was at a hunting party at that time, they imposed a change of ruler on the ruler by saying “we do not accept you as a ruler as long as your father is alive [tm]” (Beydilli, 2019b, p. 57). In another example from the opposing perspective that supports this argument, the information indicates that Bayezid II distributed a lot of money to the soldiers in order to stay on the throne in the face of the threat of Prince Cem is important in that it shows that the rewarding mechanism can also be used only to consolidate his position (Kreutel, 1997, p. 7).

It is possible to find the military discipline argument, which was expressed in this period and shared by writers from various sectors, in the following formulation of the poet Kıvâmî (2018, p. 190): “Sehavet eylese şeh, ‘askerine/ Sadakatler kılurlar hep yoluna”.⁷⁷⁸ This formula seems to be based on a discipline model that manifests itself in particular loyalty: Generosity and devotion in return. İdrîs-i Bitlisî, especially within the framework of this model, put forward the desire for obtaining goods and benefits as a psychological factor in order to secure the obedience of the ‘subjects to the ruler’ and ‘the weak to the strong’ (Öztürk, 2017, p. 360), and he recommends its use as a political tactic. When this tactic is considered in the Ottoman context, it is seen that this relationship is based on redistributive power mechanisms: The redistribution of some of the war revenues and booty in a way that indicates status and the distribution/redivision of the lands. Werner (2019a, p. 401) calls this tactic as the financial concessions to maintain military discipline. Nicholae Jorga (2009, pp. 192-93) lists examples of the first mechanism in the context of Janissary soldiers as follows: In 1451, the sultan paid all the debts of the rebellious Janissaries and repeated this in 1473. During the Anatolian expeditions in 1461, a camel loaded with gold fell and although it was ordered not to touch the fifty thousand gold it was carrying, the Janissaries divided this loot among themselves, which fell so easily in their hands. During their crossing of the Danube in 1462, the Janissaries were again given thirty thousand gold coins. When Sultan Mehmed went on the Bosnian Campaign, he paid the

⁷⁷⁸ If the ruler is generous to his soldiers/ Soldiers will also be loyal to the ruler.

Janissaries a year's salary in advance. Before the campaign against Uzun Hasan, Grand Vizier Mahmud Pasha increased the daily wages of the Janissaries according to the service they provided, and the Janissaries were receiving between two and ten akçes in proportion to their success. [tm]

From all these examples, it is understood that the Janissary group was systematically rewarded, and their unrest was tolerated, ensuring their loyalty to the ruler and sending them to the battlefield. As the Janissary Constantine stated, Mehmet II donated fifty thousand gold to the Janissaries in the Trabzon campaign and doubled the salary of the Janissary captains, and as Werner (2019a, p. 401) stated, nineteen thousand akçes distributed to the Janissaries during the preparations of the 1472 expedition should also be added to this table. In the Wallachian campaign, Mehmet II both donated three hundred thousand gold to the Janissaries and granted all Janissaries the right to “donate their possessions after their death to whomever they want [tm]” (that is, the right of inheritance) (Beydilli, 2019b, p. 93).⁷⁷⁹ With the acquisition of the right to inheritance, the class position of the Janissaries was consolidated. In this context, as seen in the French document published by Ünver (1952) and other chronicles witnesses of the period are certain that the Janissaries will cause unrest after Mehmet II’s death, and it does not seem possible to prevent this. Because the Janissaries seize power to ensure their own interests. The fact that they did not hand over the treasury to anyone until the new ruler took the throne and that they liquidated their political opponents reveals that the new ruler must compromise with the interests of the Janissaries in order to ascend to the throne. For example, because he did not report the death of Mehmet II and tried to prevent them from entering Istanbul, the Janissaries killed Grand Vizier Karamânî Mehmed Pasha, plundered Istanbul, and demanded and received thirty thousand *akçes* in order not to kill Mustafa Pasha (Ünver, 1952, p. 9). It would be more accurate to understand this situation not simply as a problem of ‘discipline’, but as the power to impose its own interests. In the *Lâmi’î Çelebi’s Letâifnâme* (2015, p. 205-6), it is stated that Ishak Pasha calmed the unrest that emerged after the death of Mehmet II and that he placed Prince Korkud on the throne representing Prince Bayezid, and after that, how the Janissaries shared power with various political criticisms and demands is revealed. According to *Lâmi’î Çelebi* (2015, p. 206), the Janissaries come to the *Diwan* and list their criticism and demands as follows:

⁷⁷⁹ It would be more correct to think that the payments, which the Janissary Constantine stated as gold coins, were in *akçes*.

This plundering and looting we have done and our damage to the homes of the dignitaries is not for property, but to improve the situation of the country. The fugitives [*çift-bozan*] in each region and the urban dwellers of each country held all the high offices of the state. The law of the Ottoman Empire and the tradition of the Khan were broken. From now on, the heads, aghas, sanjak begs and pashas of this road must all be from us. [tm]

It is clear that what is meant by the term ‘urban dwellers’ here is the ulama stratum. It is seen that these demands, which will be accepted by Ishak Pasha even for a short time, are aimed at eliminating the ulama stratum from the administrative offices. Lâmi’î Çelebi (2015, pp. 206-7) also draws a portrait of *sûfî* defending the ulama members against the Janissaries, stating that the administration should not fall into the hands of the ignorant in order to protect the country from turmoil and corruption.

In the anonymous chronicle of *Haniwaldanus* published by Kreutel, Bayezid II’s attempt to abolish the Janissary corps reveals that this social stratum was also seen as a group that could not be ‘disciplined’ by the ruler. In the relevant chronicle (Kreutel, 1997, p. 12), there is information that Bayezid II planned to have the Janissaries killed to the last man and gathered his raiders for this purpose.⁷⁸⁰ This proposal of Bayezid II was opposed by Mihaloğlu Ali and İskender Begs. While these people stated that the Janissaries would revolt against this plan, the central administration would lose its power over the castles and the state would suffer, they also stated that the Janissaries were armed and would “know how to defend themselves [tm]” (Kreutel, 1997, p. 13). Moreover, at the exit of one of the meetings where the aforementioned plans of Bayezid II were discussed, the Janissaries attacked and insulted Mihaloğlu Ali Beg and made the accusation that he wanted to have them killed. Upon this accusation, Ali Beg had to give assurances on his life that he would never have such a purpose (Kreutel, 1997, p. 13). In the light of these incidents, Bayezid II’s plan has failed, and both the power of the Janissaries and their strategic position among the ruling factions should have been riveted. After Bayezid II shelved the plan to destroy the Janissaries, he decided to go on

⁷⁸⁰ Another example in which the Ottoman ruler threatened his own army with death is the Yence campaign (1463-4), which was carried out during the reign of Mehmet II. In the Enveri’s work called *Düstûrnâme*, it is narrated that the army commander addressed the Rumelian soldier as follows during this expedition (Öztürk, 2012b, p. 53): “Kıldı paşa Rum-ilini’ye nazar/ Dedi niçün harb kılmaz bu nefer/ Çağırup iy Rum-ilinli size ben/ Hasmı koyup kırayın kalman esen/ Neyiçün cenk eylemezsiz ok atup/ Şimdi size ben kırayın mı tutup/ Savaşa kılmadı kimse ihtimam/ Gördü fethe yok meded şah-ı enam”. Since this example has been examined above, it will not be discussed a second time.

an expedition to Moldavia to disperse the uncanny atmosphere. During the campaign, the Janissaries using their own initiative to switch to a separate arm order, refusing to take the ruler to the center of the army and waving their weapons against Bayezid II show that the unrest continues (Kreutel, 1997, p. 14). In the face of this event, Bayezid II had to give assurances to the Janissaries and *Diwan* members acted as mediators between the ruler and the Janissaries (Kreutel, 1997, p. 14).

Secondly, it is necessary to mention the rewarding mechanisms established for timariot *sipâhîs*. Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 728) states that he formulated the principle of discipline for the *sipâhîs* in order to increase the demand for service to the sultan and to make it easier for them to sacrifice their lives for the sake of state.⁷⁸¹ In this regard, Sinan Pasha considers it essential for the *sipâhî* stratum to have a security that will enable them to survive when they become disabled or retired, and to be able to leave their *timars* to their families after they die, in order to ensure their loyalty to the ruler. Sinan Pasha's suggestions are as follows (2013, p. 726):

Eğer bunların birine cenk gününde bir halet olsa/ Ta ki bir uzvuna tamam hasaret olsa

Şöyle ki ayırık amelden kalsa/ Ve ölünce işe yaramaz olsa

Yine mahv etmemek gerek defterden ismini/ Ve yine men' etmemek gerek aasını ve resmini

Eğer şehid olursa önünde/ Ve eğer katil olursa askerinde

A'kabını hoş tutmak gerek/ Ve evladını iyi riayet etmek gerek.

These recommendations normatively reveal the policy that should be executed by the state in the event that the cavalryman is incapacitated to work and in the event that he dies in battle or in an argument within his military unit. In these cases, it is presented as a necessity not to delete the name of the *sipâhî* from the *timar* registry and to protect his honor, and it is recommended to do what is necessary so that the *timar* lands is left to his children and his heirs do not lose their social status/class position. Thus, the loyalty of timariot *sipâhîs* are ensured by transferring their personal and family privileges in a way that protects their status and interests, regardless of the current status of the *sipâhîs* (martyr, died as a result of a crime, disabled). Thus, the personal and family-based continuity of these privileges is protected as the principle of class loyalty of the *sipâhîs*.

⁷⁸¹ Sinan Paşa (2013, p. 728): “Ki bunların dahi rağbetleri ziyade ola padişahın hizmetinde/ Ruhlarını bezl etmek asan ola devletin nusratında”.

VII. III. I. IV. *Qadis* and the Imperial Discipline

“Kuzatın [afeti] şiddet-i tama’ olur”

Sinan Paşa (2013, p. 728)⁷⁸²

In this period, it seems that the *qadis* emerged as the most autonomous group in realizing their own social interests. Uzunçarşılı (1988, p. 83) lists the social functions of *qadis* as follows:

In the Sharia courts in the Ottoman state, all Shar’i and legal issues were resolved and regulated according to the Hanafi sect. There were no other courts other than these Shar’i courts. At the same time, they were entrusted with the municipal affairs of cities and towns (...), the assignment of powers of attorney, and the arrangement of purchase and sale agreements. The implementation of the edicts sent by the government regarding any local duty would be done through these *qadis*. [tm]

In the examples of the history of Ottoman political thought, the increase and hardening of the criticisms against the *qadis* incomparably with the previous period is closely related to the development of the imperial regime. Because, under the conditions of the regime in question, *qadis*, especially as a social segment that needs to be disciplined, catch the focus of political thoughts. Hoexter (2002, p. 123) argues that, as a structural feature of Islamic societies, there may be a secret struggle between the members of the *ulama stratum* and the rulers to represent the interests and rights of the *ummah*. In this respect, the pains of the transition to the imperial regime in the Ottoman state also correspond to a moment when this secret struggle intensified, and the parties tried to control each other.

Compared to the example in which Bayezid I threatened to lock the *qadis* in a room and burn them in the previous sections, it is seen that there were more complex ways to control the *ulama* members in general and the *qadis* in particular in this period. For example, in the *menâkıbnâme* of Mahmud Pasha (Aslan & Doğan, 2012, p. 50), there is information that Murat II sent spies to every place of *qadi* jurisdiction and had them checked so that the *qadis*’ decisions could be known by the center (“adalet ve zulmleri ma’lum olmağ-ıçun”). Thus, the disciplinary mechanism based on the simple threat of violence turns into a form of continuous surveillance and thus indicates the existence of a more developed state capacity. Another example is about the regulation

⁷⁸² The disaster of the *qadis* is from severe covetousness.

of the status difference between the ulama stratum by the state. In this way, the rivalry among the members of the ulama stratum and the patronage relations with the high officials can be controlled and the contradictions between the ruler and the ulama members can be managed. The establishment of the *Sahn-ı Semaniye* madrasahs during the reign of Mehmet II and the establishment of a hierarchical distinction between various madrasahs also make the policy to discipline and control these contradictions visible. Veinstein (2016, p. 404) states that the hierarchy among the ulama members was institutionalized during the reign of Mehmet II and their official position was started to be determined according to the rank of the institution which they officially affiliated. The establishment of such a hierarchy among the madrasahs also caused the Ottoman administration to become a regulator in the struggle of the intra-class struggle of the ulama stratum. For example, in Molla Lütüfî's *Harnâme*, the struggle between Mevlânâ Şücaüddin İlyas and Şemsüddin Fenâri to be a member of a high madrasah or an administrator is humorously described (Gökyay, 1986, p. 162), and the desire to have a high office and dignity (Gökyay, 1986, pp. 163-64) are reported to cause conflicts. In the resolution of these contradictions, engagement with a certain group of viziers (Gökyay, 1986, pp. 166-67) or favoring by the ruler (Gökyay, 1986, pp. 168-69) is decisive. On the other hand, this situation also feeds the criticisms developed by the *sûfî* circles about the ulama stratum. For example, most of the jokes in *Letâif-i Lâmi'î*, which are thought to be written at the beginning of the 16th century, criticize the participation of the ulama members in the decision-making mechanisms despite their moral unreliability. For example, while one of the jokes compiled by Lâmi'î Çelebi deals with an arrogant *qadiasker* who "almost claims to be a god [tm]" (2015, pp. 231-2), and another *muderris*, who is completely ignorant, tries to find a place for himself in high madrasahs (2015, pp. 225 and 229) by using his personal connections. Similarly, anecdotes about wine-addicted scholars and *danishmends* (2015, pp. 213-14), opium-addicted preachers (2015, pp. 221 and 246), greedy scholars (2015, p. 240), homosexual devotees (2015, p. 224) are the subjects of the Lam'î Çelebi's work. In this framework, it is observed that the moral criticisms of the *sûfî* circles are strengthened as the principles of promotion within the ulama stratum become dependent on patronage relations. This situation also creates new justifications for the control of the ulama members by the imperial state. The salary principles in the *waqfiye* inscription showing the foundation principles of the *Sahn* madrasahs, the establishment of duties such as *mu'id*, *danışmend* and *hafızülkütüb*, the details about the hierarchical differences with

Tetimme madrasas (İhsanoğlu, 2019c, p. 282) provide information on the internal structure of the discipline mechanism. Moreover, as Emecen (2019a, p. 177) points out, the administrative powers of the grand vizier were increased in this period, the administrative powers of the ulama and the *qadiasker* were limited, and their influence on politics narrowed; For example, Molla Gürânî was forced to resign because he made appointments in the hierarchy of the ulama without consulting the grand vizier. In the final analysis, it is possible that the specific consequences of this discipline policy have also emerged. Yılmaz and Gündoğdu (2013, p. 67) draw attention to these results in terms of the ulama stratum:

Mehmed the Conqueror made the ulama a part of the ruling class who were also paid by the state treasury. By this way he guaranteed, in a sense, the approval of his policies by the ulama class, unfortunately paving the way for the erosion of a sort of classical Islamic checks and balance system that relied on ‘civilian’ autonomous and independent ulama, which was the case in the first centuries of Islam.

During the reign of Mehmet II, the expansion of the lands and the increase in the population as well as the increase in the need for an expert in Islamic Law, the emergence of customary law, and the attempt to bring the ulama stratum under state control led to remarkable results. Likewise, developments such as the Orthodox patriarchate being placed under the protection of the ruler and the decrease in the power of the *qadis* over the Orthodox community revealed political contradictions at an unprecedented level between the imperial administration and the *ilmiye* organization and especially the *qadis*. To these contradictions, it should be added that the constant tension brought about by the fact that the cities and the surrounding *sûfi* lodges were controlled by *qadis* (Ortaylı, 2019, p. 52) emerged due to the financial reforms related to land use during the reign of Mehmet II. These contradictions were also included in the form of criticism about *qadis* in the political thought. On the one hand, this situation constitutes a great tragedy as we could not obtain examples of the defense of the *qadis* or their criticism on the imperial state, on the other hand, it allows us to consider one-sided narratives and examples directly as a disciplinary discourse.⁷⁸³

⁷⁸³ It is possible to reach more data on this subject towards the middle of the 16th century. For example, among the various fatwa demands conveyed to Sheikh-ul-Islam Ebussud from the provinces, the insistence of the people to consume an alcoholic beverage, such as whether bitter or sour *boza* is halal or not, whether it is permissible to buy sweet *boza* and drink it with the

It is interesting that the common point of the criticisms about the *qadis* is that their judges go beyond the religious rules and even they do not apply the religious prohibitions in their own lives. This argument basically criticizes the *qadis* about the Islamic way of life and rulings and attacks their social legitimacy. We can follow from the heated criticisms and discussions of the representatives of different social segments on the *qadis* that subordinating the *qadis* is of great importance in terms of power relations. In this framework, three main criticism types/approaches can be mentioned. The first approach, as could be seen in Sinan Pasha, is that *qadis* take bribes and make judgments in line with the interests of wealthy people in contrary to religious provisions. This type of criticism develops in line with the general interests and tendencies of the ulama stratum because it implies that the prestige of Sharia in general is damaged in line with the personal interests of the *qadis* and thus harms the general class legitimacy of the ulama stratum. The second approach, represented by Yazıcıoğlu Ahmed Bican, develops a critique that reflects the reaction of the *sûfi* circles regarding the general legitimacy of the ulama stratum, as pointed out by the first approach. Ahmed Bican criticizes not only the *qadis* but also the lifestyle of the ulama members in general. The last approach is written by Kivâmî and reflects the view of the state bureaucracy. The point that Kivâmî emphasizes combines the criticism of the *qadis* with the threat of punishment of the state and in this way brings the disciplinary mechanism to the fore. The reason for this situation is that the issues of criticism are handled in religious-moral terminology, religious and *fiqh* terminology and class-based bureaucratic terminology, and therefore it conflicts with the interests of three important social segments (*sûfis*, ulama and dynasty/central bureaucracy) that impose their own style of codification in the provision of social order.

Let us first consider the religious-moral critique. The subject of this criticism is the contradictions between the moral vision of the *sûfi* circles and the practices of the

family instead of drinking it in *boza* houses, is a reflection of the insistence of the people to consume this alcoholic beverage. It shows that *qadis* also tried to make it legitimate. This subject was also included in the *Saltuknâme* written at the end of the 15th century. Ebü'l-Hayr-ı Rumî (1990, pp. 89-90) wrote an anecdote from Sarı Saltuk stating that it is not right to drink *boza* and implying that it is a haram drink. The example of Sarı Saltuk taking a sip of sweet - that is, unfermented - *boza* and regretting it contains a reference from the mouth of a popular saint that this drink is haram or makruh. In these examples, we can see a certain dilemma between the decisions of the state and the tendencies of the local people and the hidden resistance of the *qadis*. However, these examples are far from revealing the hidden aspects of the contradictions between the imperial state and *qadis* competently.

qadis. Notions such as the presentation of the ‘soft face’ of religion to the public, namely cooperation and justice which is decisive for the social legitimacy of the *sûfi* groups, are violated by the practices of the *qadis*. Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 480) expresses his criticism about these practices as follows: “Ferah olup düşün sayar bir mü’minin matemini/ Resm diye elinden alır bir yetimin mat’amını /Bir öksüz üşüyüp soğuktan buyar/ Bu onun gömleğini alıp sanduka koyar/ Bir yetim açlığından durmadan ağlar/ Bu onun buğdayını anbarda saklar”.⁷⁸⁴

The central theme in this narrative is the virtue/immorality dilemma, and it specifically deals with the unjust distribution of goods. In this context, Sinan Pasha wrote a long subsection titled “*Zemmu Kuzati'z-Zaman*” in *Maârifnâme* and criticized the corruption of the *qadis* in religious and moral terms. The points that should be especially emphasized in this section are as follows. According to Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 478), most of the *qadis* are not virtuous, their intestines are full of bribes, they are full of filth, their bellies are swollen with haram, their hearts are darkened by iniquity, their pen are a hell-chip, his assistants are jug thieves, his court is a nest of mischief, his judgments are ignorant, they are insensitive to the righteous and the poor. Similar criticisms are also found in the *Letâif-i Lâmi’î*. Lâmi’î Çelebi compiles jokes in his work is the subject of *qadis* who wear silk (2015, p. 307), think about nothing but food and drink (2015, p. 115), commit adultery (2015, p. 115), take bribes (2015, pp. 199, 217-18), thus gives a rather negative portrait of *qadis* as a social type. Yazıcıoğlu Ahmed Bîcan, continuing the critical theme as can be found in Sinan Pasha, shifts his criticisms to the ulama members of this period and argues that the moral values have deteriorated due to their practices. According to Ahmed Bîcan (1999, p. 92):

Bu şimdiki zamanın uleması mansıb korkusundan dilsiz ve gözsüz oldular. Beyler hod kendi havasına tabi olup hak canibine gözleri kör olmuştur. Ol ecilden alem fesad ile dolmuştur. Zina ve livata ve hamr içmek aşikare olmuştur. Ribahorluk hod insaftan geçmiştir. (...) kahrolmaya müstahak olmuştuzdur. Eğer taun, eğer kıtlık, eğer düşman havalesi vaki olur. Hadden tecavüz olunca amma, vay ol zamanın uleması ve ümerası başına!.⁷⁸⁵

⁷⁸⁴ He is never affected by the sadness of a believer/ Takes away the food of an orphan called tax
An orphan gets cold and freezes/ This person takes his shirt and puts it in the chest
An orphan cries incessantly because of hunger/ This person takes his wheat and stores it in the barn.

⁷⁸⁵ The ulama of this present time are dumb and eyeless for fear of official duties and pay. Beggars are now slaves to their own desires and blind to the righteous. The world is filled with corruption

Ahmed Bîcan's criticisms bring together two themes. The first theme is that the begs engage in practices that will protect their own interests, and the second is that the ulama/*qadis* do nothing to rein in these behaviors of the begs, that is, they turn a blind eye to what is happening. He evaluates that the reason why the ulama do not object to this structure is that they prioritize getting official duties and salaries, that is, promotion and enrichment in the hierarchy of the ulama. Thus, moral critique becomes a political critique placed on a more general context. Because the organization of the hierarchy of the ulama during the reign of Mehmet II and the systematization of the principles of promotion from the office of *qadi* to *mudarris* and their duty areas bring a disciplinary systematic in the final analysis. If so, it is necessary to consider that the criticism expressed by Ahmed Bîcan was put forward due to the secondary effects of this disciplinary systematic. Considering that the term 'beg's used in Ahmed Bîcan's critique was met with the word '*ümera*' mentioned in later usage, it refers to the sanjak begs/administrators who were centrally appointed from the people of *Kapıkulu* origin during the reign of Mehmet II. Because there is a similar criticism of the begs exist in Sinan Pasha's works as directed against the provincial governors (*valis*), which will be mentioned in more detail in the next section. Ahmed Bîcan's criticism argues that the ulama and especially the *qadis* developed a new articulation strategy, that the local administrators appointed from the center turned a blind eye to their actions due to career concerns, and therefore immorality spread in the social sphere. A similar type of criticism also takes place in the *Letâif-i Lâmi'î*. In an anecdote cited by Lâmi'î Çelebi (2015, pp. 214-15) from Molla Hızır Beg, in a conversation on the status of the *qadi* profession, a person who participated in the conversation said, "The profession of *qadi* is difficult when one of the two relatives is from a greater office [tm]". Upon this statement, Molla Hızır Beg said, "No, what is the difficulty in that case? Obviously, you decide for the fear of office in favor of the higher offices. The main difficulty is when both parties are from the higher offices" (Lâmi'î Çelebi, 2015, p. 215). In this criticism, it is possible to clearly see that the *qadis* had to take decisions in favor of the administrators due to their professional concerns. More interestingly, Lâmi'î Çelebi (or Abdullah Çelebi), who wrote his own commentary under the aforementioned paragraph,

from these evils. Adultery, sodomy, and wine drinking have become blatantly obvious. Usury has lost its mercy. (...) we deserve to be devastated. Either plague, famine, or enemy attack will occur. If the transgression of legitimate boundaries has taken place, woe to the ulama and rulers of that time!

argues that if the *sûfîs*' claimant is dignitaries, the *qadis* will definitely prove *sûfîs* wrong, and for this reason, *sûfîs* should avoid appealing to the *qadi* court (2015, p. 215): "Ekabirden durur hasmun çü derviş/ Sakın kadı kapusun anma zinhar/ Mukadderdür seni suçlu çıkarur/ Ya vaz geç ya düşüp payına yalvar".⁷⁸⁶

The criticisms of Ahmet Bîcan and Lâmi'î Çelebi are noteworthy in that they show that the Islamic Law applied in the hands of *qadis* is open to interpretation in accordance with particular interests and that these interpretations are widely used in favor of the ruling classes. If we interpret the criticisms in this way, it can be thought that with the influence of the administrators who derive their power from the monopoly of violence (and of course priority of appropriating rent income) and therefore from the customary law, some gaps have arisen in the implementation of the rules of Shar'î Law and that the *qadis* used these gaps for their own particular interests. Moreover, one point that Ahmed Bîcan draws attention to is the increase in interest (and usury) and the connivance of the judges, and there is a connection between this criticism about the decisions of *qadis* for the 'favor of the rich' seen in Kivâmî, regarding the early stages of the development of local riches, money lenders and probably the tax farming method. Similarly, Kivâmî (2018, p. 438) refers to a common phenomenon with Ahmed Bîcan by stating that the ruler knew the practices of the *qadis*, muftis and emirs while starting his criticisms about *qadis*: "Eger kadı, eger müfti, eger mir/ Bilürdü hallerini cümle bir bir".⁷⁸⁷

There is a similar criticism of Ahmed Bîcan's in the *Diwan* of Abdurrahim Tirsî, the Sheikh of the Qadiri *tariqa*. Tirsî criticizes the ulama members in general and the *qadis* in particular, within the framework of the moral purity claim of the *sûfî* circles. According to Tirsî (Yüce, 2010, pp. 134-35):

Okuyan 'ilmine uymaz ganiler malına kıymaz/ Fakirler halini bilmez ahiret unudılmışdur
Münafık müttetik oldı çoğı halkun ana uydı/ Hakkı seven garib oldı key adı yavuz olmışdur
Göresin bir münafıkı düzer tezvir-i nifakı/ Üşüşür başına halkı bir ulu kimse olmışdur

⁷⁸⁶ If your enemy is from the dignitaries, O dervish/ Don't think about the qadi court, never/ It is destiny that makes this you guilty/ Either give up on your case, or beg for your own right.

⁷⁸⁷ Both the qadi, the mufti and the local administrator/ He knew what they were doing one by one.

‘Alimler ‘ilmini tutmaz tevekkül idüp oturmaz/ O fani kapudan gitmez hor zelil
olmuşdur

‘İmine kılmadı rağbet bulunmadı pak i’tikad/ Anın-çün bulmadı rağbet şöyle
hayretde kalmışdur

Kaziler hakkı gözlemez haramdan ihtiraz etmez/ Ahir n’olasını sanmaz zulümleri
çoğalmışdur

Kitab Kur’an hükmi kaldı hile tezvir cihan toldı/ Şeyatin fırsatın buldı İslam key
za’if olmuşdur.⁷⁸⁸

The word ‘*münafik*’ (hypocrite) is used in the sense of two-faced, someone who pretends to believe even though he does not believe (Ayverdi, 2010, p. 877). The term hypocrite in Sheikh Tirsî’s criticism has been used in the general context in the sense indicated above, but it is possible to think that it refers to a particular social group. One of these possible groups -as Ahmed Bîcan means- can be understood as a reference to the centrally appointed local administrators of *Kapıkulu* origin. In addition to this possibility, it is possible to think that some scholars and *sûfis* who advocate the views of various Islamic sects are also meant in this context, because the following line of Sheikh Tirsî can be interpreted in terms of both *sûfis* and scholars (Yüce, 2010, p. 135): “Göresin bir münafıkı düzer tezvir-i nifakı/ Üşüşür başına halkı bir ulu kimse olmuşdur”. The expression ‘o fani kapudan gitmez’ that Sheikh Tirsî used to criticize ulama members indicates the tendency of this social group to have wealth and political power. It is typical for the one of two different social segments competing for the monopoly of producing religious discourse and representing the dominant approach in religious epistemology to accuse each other to not representing religious purity. A unique aspect

⁷⁸⁸ Educated people do not act in accordance with their knowledge, the rich cannot leave their property/ They cannot know the situation of the poor, the hereafter has been forgotten
Hypocrites became allies, most of the people were subject to them/ Those who loved God (the truth) became poor, their names became cruel
Look, a hypocrite makes up rumors of strife/ The people go to him and he is accepted as a great person
Scholars do not act in accordance with their knowledge, do not trust in God and do not leave the door of those who give worldly goods, they have become despicable
He did not demand his knowledge, did not find a clean belief / Therefore, he was not respected, he was bewildering for this.
Qadis do not protect rights, do not shy avoid from harams/ Do not think about what will happen in the End Times, their cruelty has increased
The provisions of the Qur'an were abandoned, the world was filled with deceit and lies / Devils took the opportunity, Islam became weak.

of this argument, of which had repeatedly analyzed different examples throughout this thesis, when it comes to *sûfis* is to underline the articulation pattern of the ulama with different social segments. According to this pattern, *sûfis* evaluate the people who are fond of worldly wealth as a whole, and in this context, they mention groups such as ulama/state administrators/merchants. Sheikh Tirsî's dichotomy, 'okuyan 'ilmine uymaz ganiler malına kıymaz', strengthens the impression that he criticizes two separate groups in his criticisms, taking into account the interests of each other. In this context, it is possible to think that Sheikh Tirsî criticizes all three groups. The second point on which the Sheikh intensified his criticism is that the ulama members did not favor knowledge and did not take actions in accordance with their knowledge. This general criticism has been made specific as that the *qadis* did not make just decisions, did not avoid haram, and therefore increased their persecution. Sheikh Tirsî repeats a statement that could be seen in Âşıkpaşazâde and in various anonymous chronicles in this context (Yüce, 2010, p. 135): "Kitab Kur'an hükmi kaldı hile tezvîr cihan toldı". This expression is similar to the criticism that "takvayı koyup, fetvaya yürüdiler" (Öztürk, 2000, p. 31).⁷⁸⁹ As a result, Sheikh Tirsî's criticisms accuse the ulama members of being corrupt in the religious sense, both in terms of their political connections and moral characteristics. In the first line has been quoted, it is seen that the *sûfi*, who brought the poor people against the rich and the members of the ulama, showed his own *sûfi* circle as the representative of the poor people and assumed the moral leadership of the society. However, it is clear that this function was not directly opened to political practice, but remained at the level of complaint or rhetoric, because as have been discussed in the previous sections, the opportunity to articulate between the Qadiri order and the state was positively evaluated during the mystical leadership of Sheikh Tirsî.

In this framework, a separate field of discussion is opened on whether the practices of the *qadis* are also legitimate in terms of Islamic Law. Let's start by presenting the views of Sinan Pasha in the first place, to represent this discussion. Sinan Pasha's criticisms of *qadis* focus on three points as such (i) to take bribes, (i) to create arbitrary taxes, and (iii) to ignore the measures social justice in their decisions. Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 362) states that the *qadis* fondness for bribery is as deep-rooted as the sinfulness of a great sinner, and it is accepted by the *qadis*: "Kazide o mikdar amel eder

⁷⁸⁹ They abandoned religious purity and righteousness and acted according to false fatwas.

ki rişve/ Ki şaribde o kadar eylemez neşve”.⁷⁹⁰ Secondly, Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 364) uses the expression “Resm-i kazi/ Hemin semm-i kazi olur”.⁷⁹¹ The situation in question here is that *qadis* invent taxes/fees that are not included in the laws for their legal transactions and take them from the public. Uzunçarşılı (1988, p. 85) lists the legal taxes as follows:

In the Kanunnâme of Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror, it became law for the judges to receive seven akçes from the registry, thirty-two from the document, twelve from the registry copy, twelve from the signature, twenty-two from the inheritance, thirty-two from the marriage of a virgin, and fifteen or twelve from the marriage of widow. [tm]

In addition to these, it is undeniable that there are also taxes that do not have a legal basis or are collected unfairly in accordance with the law. It is seen that the criticisms directed by Sinan Pasha are of an extraordinarily heavy nature. The reason for this is that due to the moral and legal illegitimacy of the practices of the *qadis*, it harms the general interests of the ulama stratum, that is, it creates a dangerous rift between the individual and particular interests of the *qadis* and the general interests of the ulama and its legitimate social ground. The criticism of ulama members and *qadis* and the threats that see the reform of this stratum as necessity emerge precisely because of this rift and within the political environment it makes possible.

Kıvâmî bases his criticism of the *qadis* on favoring the wealthy and taking decisions against the Sharia and constructs his entire narrative with the aim of threatening the *qadis*. It is clear that the threats in question are designed to create a disciplinary mechanism on their own. Firstly, Kıvâmî begins by directly warning the judges of his time, and therefore the ruler, whom he considers responsible for providing immediate discipline over them (2018, p. 440): “Veli bu şimdigi kadılarun ah/ (...?)⁷⁹² ellerinden tak u dergah. Bularun dad elinden, dad elinden/ Neler var kim ider feryad, elinden. Bileydi bunların halini sultan/ Bu halkun derdine iderdi derman”.⁷⁹³

⁷⁹⁰ Bribery is so effective in qadi/ Even wine does not have such a joyful effect in a person who drinks wine.

⁷⁹¹ The tax that the qadi receives, know/ It's nothing but a deadly poison.

⁷⁹² This word could not be read by Uygur, who made the transcription and simplification, because it was faint in the text. This word can be interpreted as ‘burned’, it would not be wrong to accept this interpretation following Uygur (2018, p.441).

⁷⁹³ Enough of these current qadis/ Because of them, the arch and the lodge were burned. From the righteousness of their hands/ What would happen, people would cry/ If the ruler had known about their situation/ He would have found a cure for the people's problems.

The reason why *qadis* are subject to this warning is that they are servants of wealthier begs ('Veli baylara kul'), as will be given below. At this point, although K1vâmî expresses his thoughts in a rhetoric based on classical distinctions such as rich/poor, powerful/orphan, words such as "*Veli bay*" (great rich people), "*gani*" (wealthy) in these lines indicate real historical facts. K1vâmî lists his criticisms as follows (2018, p. 440):

Neler görür bunlardan ah(1) yogsul/ Veli baylara olurlar kamu kul
Ne iş bunlara emr itse ganiler/ Bitürür işlerini bu deniler
Eger bir bay da'vi itse tezvîr/ Gelüben bunlara eylese takrir
Onarurlar hatasını düzerler/ Heman ana hüccetler yazarlar
Veli hakkın taleb eylese yogsul/ Degüldür katlarında sözü makbul.⁷⁹⁴

Do these expressions refer to local military elements such as timariot *sipâhîs*, or do they refer to officials sent from the center such as governors/sanjak begs, or local wealthy/dignitaries and merchants? Or are we dealing with a discourse of injustice in general? It is very difficult to give a clear answer to these questions. Considering that K1vâmî generally supported the steps taken towards the restoration of the old order during the reign of Bayezid II and found it an example of justice, it can be thought that the subjects criticized here are the governors appointed from the center and the wealthy gentry articulated with them, similar to the narrative of Sinan Pasha. In other words, both the rentier class and the salaried administrators who take a cash share of the rent and merchants can be the subject of this critical discourse. On the other hand, it is not clear whether K1vâmî wrote these lines during the reign of Mehmet II and for the period of Mehmet II, or during the reign of Bayezid II and the period of Bayezid II. In the poems in this section, he first gives the information that Mehmet II 'was aware of the state of the *qadis*', then underlines to the anecdote in which Bayezid I threatened to burn and execute the judges, and finally lists the lines given above, in which the people 'wailing at the hands of the *qadis* of the period'. Based on this style of presentation, it is clear that K1vâmî may be talking about the period of Mehmed II or Bayezid II. If that two contradictory propositions interpreted (first, the ruler knows the acts of the *qadis*,

⁷⁹⁴ What sufferings the poor suffer because of these / They all become slaves to the great rich.
Rich people no matter what job they give them/ These despicable get things done
If a rich claimant slanders/ Comes and complains to them
They find faults for it/ They immediately construct proofs for it
If the poor demand a great right/ Their word will not be heard in their sight.

and second, the proposition that ruler will punish if he knows the state of the *qadis*), it will be more adequate that these lines refer to the period of Bayezid II and the injustices brought about by the local notables who have become stronger again. In the final analysis, whatever level the criticism is taken as a presentation of different particular orientations or a general framework, it is clear that in the final analysis this criticism is practically placed on a general plan that calls for the disciplinary intervention of the state. Kivâmî argues that Mehmet II knew the plight of the *qadis* and that if they violated any rights, they were punished in the harshest way (2018, p. 438): “Keserdi başların ber-dar iderdi/ Bu hali dayıma tekrar iderdi”.⁷⁹⁵ Similarly, he states that these punishments were also applied during the reign of Bayezid I and were the most effective discipline method (Kivâmî, 2018, p. 440): “Kimin ‘azl eylemiş kimini ber-dar/ Girü kalanı olmuşlar haber-dar. Nizam-ı şer’i icra eylemişler/ Birisi dahı rişvet yimemişler”.⁷⁹⁶ It have been discussed in the previous sections that the mentioned anecdote about the period of Bayezid I is mentioned in the 15th century sources, albeit in different forms. However, the information that the *qadis* were beheaded or executed by hanging during the reign of Mehmet II is inaccurate. Ortaylı (2001) states that the death penalty is not applied to *qadis* and this rule is still valid with one or two exceptions. According to Ortaylı (2001), although the threats such as ‘they will be beaten in mortar to death’ by the judges who do not fulfill their duties are mentioned in the *adâletnâmes*, this has no meaning other than being a traditional-rhetorical threat. I think that Kivâmî’s statements should be evaluated within this framework.

To sum up, the point that differs from others in Kivâmî’s critique is that he finds the actions of the *qadis* inappropriate in the frame of Islamic Law and emphasizes this point. He uses the following terms (Kivâmî, 2018, pp. 438-440): “Hilaf-ı şer’i bir hükm itşelerdi/ Koyup şer’i muhalif gitselerdi” and “Müsülmanları bu resme yakalar/ Nizam-ı şer’i bozalar yıkalar”.⁷⁹⁷ It is clear in these statements that making judgments outside of the Sharia was evaluated as an opposition to the Sharia, and imposing taxes outside the Sharia was considered as an act that hurts Muslims, and as an act that disrupts and destroys the Sharia order. To put it more clearly, these were coded as acts that disrupt

⁷⁹⁵ He would cut off their heads, they would be executed by hanging/ He would always repeat this practice.

⁷⁹⁶ He dismissed some of them, executed some by hanging/ Thus, the remaining ones became aware of the situation/ They practiced the Shariah order/ Not even one of them took a bribe.

⁷⁹⁷ If they had given a verdict contrary to the Sharia/ If they had abandoned the Sharia and opposed it/ They harm Muslims with this tax/ They disrupt and destroy the Sharia order.

the state order and cause apostasy, and it was deemed permissible to impose the heaviest punishments on their perpetrators. What is at issue here is not a mismatch between the general interests of the ulama stratum and the particular interests of the *qadis*, but the corrosive effect of the *qadi* practices against the general structure of the class order in terms of attracting the unrest of the people. For this reason, the threat of punishment is certain and harsh. It is also noteworthy that Kivâmî, who represents the state with the power of sanction, focused on the subject in voicing this threat of punishment. Because, another writer, Ahmed Bîcan, who criticizes the *qadis* and the ulama members in general for leaving the religion, also emphasizes the possibility of punishment, but states that the authority to impose sanctions will be God who sends disasters. The fact that the *sûfi* circles do not have the power to impose a punishment that will be deemed appropriate, results in the fact that the perpetrator who will apply the punishment cannot be concretized. Expressing almost exactly the same criticisms as Ahmed Bîcan, Âşik Ahmed's *masnavi* named *Camiü'l-Ahbar*, which is estimated to have been written in the 1430s, is also evaluated the plague as a response of God sent to social problems (Bilkan, 2018, p. 271). Sinan Pasha, on the other hand, could not make any suggestions, although he expressed the heaviest moral criticisms. At the root of this situation, it can be seen that he was a person who also personally suffered from the threat of punishment and death against the ulama members. For this reason, although Sinan Pasha saw the contradiction between the general interests of the ulama stratum and the particular nature of the *qadi* practices and perceived this as a problem that needs to be corrected in favor of the general interests. In the final analysis, it is possible to formulate his proposal as a moral improvement proposal with a general and mystical aspect.

Who will protect the lower classes against the unfair practices of the *qadis*, and how these practices will be punished/prevented is a crucial topic of discussion in this context. As was analyzed in the previous sections, redressing the injustices committed by the *qadis* is generally part of the function of justice and is expected to be fulfilled by the ruler. For example, in the works of thinkers such as Necmeddîn-i Dâye and Şeyhoğlu Mustafa, it is considered as an inseparable part of the monarch's 'shepherd' function to protect the people from the hands of the judges, who are defined as 'horned rams'. Various examples of the same political metaphor could be found in popular imagination. For example, the anecdotes in which the figure of Otman Baba defended the people against the *qadis* shows that he could find a place in the public imagination as an example of popular resistance in which the function of the ruler was undertaken by the

antinomian *sûfi* groups.⁷⁹⁸ It is possible to show a few of such stories in the *velâyetnâme* of Otman Baba. In one of these stories, while Otman Baba was passing through a garden near the city of Varna with the *abdals* with him, he ordered them to cut down the trees in the garden and burn them. After the trees were burned, the garden owners complained about this situation to the *qadi* and declared that Otman Baba had their gardens burned by “bir bölük bi’dat hızsuzlarına” (Yalçın, 2008, p. 171).⁷⁹⁹ The *qadi* wrote a letter to the Isa Beg the governor of that sanjak, informing him that the thieves had the trees of a garden cut down and burned. According to the author of the *velâyetnâme*, Isa Beg (Yalçın, 2008, p. 170), whom Otman Baba had beaten before and allowed him to join *ghaza* (Yalçın, 2008, p. 170), did not consider the *qadi*’s request and rejected the *qadi*’s application, saying that we could not prevent the saints. There is no detail in the story of why Otman Baba burned the garden. It is possible to think that this incident refers to a conflict between settled people and nomads, as nomads are seen gathering around Otman Baba and antinomian dervishes similar to him in similar anecdotal narratives. In this incident, Otman Baba most likely avenges the injustice suffered by the nomads in Rumelia and protects the people around him from the *qadi*’s threat of punishment. In another story, it is seen that shepherds of Rumelia gathered around Otman Baba. The shepherds who were followers of Otman Baba brought many sheep and a bag of *akçe* with them, but because Otman Baba said, “tiz şol bokları neylersenüz eyleyün kim kokusundan incindim”, they destroy them through the ‘mill of power’ and give up on holding worldly wealth (Yalçın, 2008, p. 172).⁸⁰⁰ The author of the *velâyetnâme* states that some of these followers came to the city of Varna and the *qadi* of the city threatened them by saying, “sakınun artık bu şehre gelüp bu nev’ ile harekat ve te’sirat eylemen yohsa hep sizi zindana döküp ger-gah-ı mu’allaya bildürürem” (Yalçın , 2008, p. 172).⁸⁰¹ Before moving on to the continuation of the story, let’s briefly examine the elements here. The shepherds gathered around Otman Baba are most likely nomadic Turkmens, and the fact that they stopped caring for their flocks and gave up their money can be interpreted as leaving production activities – or starting to beg- and therefore

⁷⁹⁸ For example, Otman Baba claims that spiritually mature people (kamil), virtuous people, administrators and commanders, judges and defectors, all “ulama and fuzela” are “bitakat and bi-iradet” (weak and weak-willed) in front of him (Yalçın, 2008, p. 175).

⁷⁹⁹ A group of heterodox thieves.

⁸⁰⁰ Hurry up and get rid of that shit cause I'm sick of their smell.

⁸⁰¹ Now I forbid you to come to this city and act in this way and influence people, otherwise I will imprison you and report you to the capital.

they give up paying taxes. In this respect, the social typology of *kaçgun* (fugitive) is seen in both the *velâyetnâme* of Eşrefoğlu Rûmî, poems of Abdurrahim Tirsî and the *velâyetnâme* of Otman Baba is similar to the shepherd-dervish typology drawn above. The frequent occurrence of the typology of *kaçgun* (fugitive) in the *velâyetnâmes* of this period (for example, Yalçın, 2008, pp. 64 and 81) shows that in this period captives/slaves, peasants and even nomadic shepherds abandoned production activities and fled. In this context, the people in the above-mentioned story also abandoned shepherding and turned into wandering dervishes and were threatened by the *qadi*. Otman Baba stated that the *abdals* should not be afraid in the face of this attitude of *qadi*, and that he said that he is the one who “boynuzlu koyundan boynuzsuz koyunun hakkın aluvirici dest-i kudret ve sırr-ı Muhammed” (Yalçın, 2008, p. 173).⁸⁰² In the following days, a rose tree grows in the place of Otman Baba’s fireplace and three roses bloom on it. A person who has a business with the *qadi* is very surprised that these roses have opened at the time of threshing, he collects them and gives them as a gift. When the *qadi* smells these roses, his mouth and nose become ugly, disgraced, and he is dismissed from the *qadi*’s office a week later (Yalçın, 2008, p. 173). In a similar story (Yalçın, 2008, p. 229), the figure of Otman Baba is replaced by the figure of the ruler, and after the *qadis* complained about him, he haunts the dream of Mehmet II, whom he came across, and said, “kime ve kimün koyun ve kuzusına değersin şimdi şol arada emri Haqq birle cânun alayın mı?”, thus he puts himself in a position to judge to the ruler as the ‘shepherd’ of the people.⁸⁰³

Another criticism of the state officials and the ruling class and strata of the country, which is referred to by the term ‘horned rams’, is contained in the work called the *Letâif-i Lâmi’î*. In one of the jokes in this work (Lâmi’î Çelebi, 2015, p. 142), the city administrator (*muhtesib*), *qadi*, aga (*kethüda*) and municipal police chief (*subaşı*) come to the house of a former ulama who has lost his mind and is called “*aşık*”.⁸⁰⁴ The host asks the guests for permission, goes out for a short time, goes to the back of the house and sets fire to his own house. People who asked what he was doing, he replies as “What should I do? From now on, this house has become a partner in deception, a bed of stooges, it is filled with darkness. Blessings and mercy escaped from here. Now

⁸⁰² The hand of power and the secret of Muhammad, who will take the right of the hornless sheep from the horned sheep.

⁸⁰³ To whom and whose sheep and lamb do you harm, shall I now take your life by the order of God?

⁸⁰⁴ Compare authorities for identification; Lâmi’îzâde Abdullah Celebi (1994, p. 131).

the best and only remedy is to burn it [tm]” (Lâmi’î Çelebi, 2015, p. 142). The fact that the person who criticizes the members of the ulama and the administrators radically in this paragraph is referred to as ‘crazy’ or ‘aşık’ shows that he left the being a member of ulama stratum and joined the *sûfi* circles. When the items of criticism are evaluated, it is preached that the people who take a part in the city administration are shown as partners in oppression and deception, and that ‘benevolence’ can be achieved by eliminating them all. In this case, the thought expressed in the text is quite radical as a kind of discourse of a mystagogue and points to a violence-centered solution. Although the writer of the joke Lâmi’î Çelebi expressed this thought, he tried to translate the political meaning of this joke into humor by saying that the old ulama was ‘crazy’.

VII.III.II. Reproduction of the Social Formation: Composition of Classes, Methods and Models

VII.III.II.I. Subjects of Reproduction: Social Stratification and the State

Political thoughts had been developed in the era of Mehmed II, were focused on the social strata and class relations as a significant element of domination over subjects, and so, as an object/aim of reproduction of the social formation. For example, the *Kanunnâme* of Mehmet II has a comprehensive section about inheritance of class privileges as such (Özcan, 1981, pp. 39-40):

Veziri a'zam oğulları altmış akçe ile müteferrika olalar ve sair vüzera oğulları elli akçe ile müteferrika olalar. Ve nişancı oğulları dahi kezalik kırkbeş akçe ile müteferrika olalar. Ve beğlerbeği oğulları dahi kırkbeş akçe müteferrika olalar. Ve sancak beği oğulları otuz bin akçe ze'amet ala. Ve çavuş oğullarına on bin akçe timar verile. Ve ebnay-ı mealli-i izamdan mufti efendi ve hoca efendi oğulları altmışar akçe şehir eminden ulüfeye mutasarrıf olalar. Ve kadıasker oğulları kırkbeşer akçe ulüfeye mutasarrıf olalar. Vetaht kadı[sı] oğulları otuz akçe ulüfeye mutasarrıf olalar. Ve şahzade hocası oğlu dahi otuz akçe ulüfeye mutasarrıf olalar. Ve sahn mollası oğulları yirmi akçeye mutasarrıf ola.⁸⁰⁵

⁸⁰⁵ Let the sons of grand viziers appointed as *müteferrika* with sixty akçes salary, and let the sons of other viziers are appointed as *mutaferrika* with fifty akçes. And the sons of the *nişancı*s can also be appointed as *müteferrika* with forty-five akçes. And beğlerbegi sons become *müteferrika* with a salary of forty-five akces. And the sons of the sanjak beg will receive *zeamet* worth thirty thousand akçes. And let the çavuş sons be given a *timar* worth ten thousand akçes. And let the sons of high-ranking mufti efendi and hodja efendi take the salary of sixty akçes from the city administrator. And let the sons of qadiaskers receive a salary of forty-five akçes. Let the sons of the qadi of the capital get a salary of thirty akçe. And even the sons of Shahzade teachers should

As can be seen from this example, class distinctions and their transfer to new generations as criteria of privileges have become so systematic and detailed in the period that are considered. Similar to this level of detail, it is seen that political thoughts focus on class distinctions and indirectly refer to intra-class struggles.

In order to make a comparison between the main works which evaluated social stratification in this era, the first example of this issue in the 15th century should be mentioned and presented. The *Selçuknâme* of Yazıcızâde ‘Ali was the first work that exactly mentioned the problem of class schema and ways of upward mobilization in this era. The main argument of the writer could be formulated as such: The origin of the class structure was the establishment of the ancient mythical father of the Turks, Oghuz Khan. Because of the fact that, the responsibility to reproduce the class formation is also presented as the legacy of Oghuz Khan and his laws. The narrative that Yazıcızâde ‘Ali had been structured, does not refer to a concrete structure of a state although it includes specific elements of the state formation. This characteristic would be evaluated as a narrative that incorporates elements of the state without having a brief and abstract concept of the state. The main reason of construction of this narration with its complicated historical references is, not only to inherit ancient nomadic tradition but also reformulating the contemporary political structure. For this reason, the narrative of Yazıcızâde ‘Ali contains both the elements of early state formation and mature state organization which commonly stand on the given ground of class-based domination of a ruler. According to Yazıcızâde ‘Ali, the primeval social structure exist till his days had been established by Oghuz Khan who categorized all people into three sections (Bakır, 2008, p. 24): “Oguz buyurdu mecmu’ halkı üç bölük itdiler”.⁸⁰⁶ The first section is composed of wise men and bookkeepers with the mission and right to accumulate and arrogate goods and domesticated animals. This stratum was assigned by Oghuz Khan as to stewardship, viziership and scribal service. According to Yazıcızâde ‘Ali, the second stratum was composed of gallant-men who were appointed for the position as the chiefs of soldiers (Bakır, 2008, p. 24). The third stratum was composed of tribe elites and shepherds which were divided into two groups such as ‘energetic ones’ and ‘silly ones’. Oghuz Khan appointed the energetic ones (*‘celed ü çalak’*) as the leader of tribes and send them to the horse-shieling. Then he appointed the silly ones (*‘ebleh ve bön’*)

receive a salary of thirty akçe. And the sons of the mullahs of the sahn madrasah should receive a salary of twenty akçe.

⁸⁰⁶ Oghuz Khan ordered, they divided all the people into three groups.

as a shepherd to care for camels, cows, and sheep. It is obvious that Oghuz Khan's class division, as reinvented in Yazıçızade Ali's work, stands on a tripartite structure that refers to statesmen, warriors, and nomad laborers. It should be underlined that his class division also includes a dichotomy about the nomadic laborer class thus separated the horse-breeders and shepherds. The classification that Yazıçızâde 'Ali formulate, exactly reproduces the classical Persian tradition of the tree-layered society imagination, which is composed of the strata such as (i) ulama, (ii) *sipâhî*, and (iii) *reâyâ*. Thus, the insertion or commentary of the writer heavily reflects the contemporary political thought in the 15th century. Because, although the triple distinction of social classes in Orkhon inscriptions exist, Yazıçızâde 'Ali's interpretation contains serious gaps compared to the original view. Ülken (2017, p. 50) states that there are three social 'ranks' in the Orkhon Inscriptions, and these are (i) *Tarhkans*, which are the "acquired nobility class that maintains its status for up to nine generations [tm]", and (ii) high state officials/vizier are called as '*Buyruk*'s, and (iii) '*Şatpit*'s, the chiefs and elders of the Oghuz tribes.⁸⁰⁷ In my opinion, it is wrong to regard these classes as a mere 'ranks', but they should be regarded as strata of the ruling class. It is striking that this scheme does not fully comply with the statesman-warrior-subject scheme formulated by Yazıçızâde. The difference here is that Yazıçızâde 'Ali does not propose abstract social privileges, although he grants privileges to the descendants of warriors, and the social position that the author constructs for the ulama members is not directly the same as the '*buyruk*' category. Finally, while it seems that this class distinction was made by whom it was made is uncertain and spontaneously established in this way traditionally in the Orkhon Inscriptions, it is made by Oghuz Khan in Yazıçızâde's division.⁸⁰⁸ It is doubtful to what extent this division can be credited historically. Because, as Barthold (1977, p. 67) states, Reşid-üd-din, a contemporary of Yazıçızâde, does not hesitate to directly attribute the advice attributed to Genghis Khan to Oghuz Khan in his history. In other words, with the losing power of Mongols, this kind of political historiography also 'updated' itself according to new political situation.

On the other hand, there are several genuine elements that exist in his narrative such as a sub-division of subjects (*reâyâ*) into two pieces such as horse breeders and

⁸⁰⁷ They can also be thought of as tribes. However, it is certain that the word "şadapıt" means a person with a high title and the word "buyruk" means commander (Tekin, 1998, pp. 101 and 109).

⁸⁰⁸ See, Bilge Kagan inscription north face (K1) and Kül Tigin stone south face first paragraph (G1) (Tekin, 1998, pp. 37, 57)

shepherds. The origin of this classification would be found in the recruitment mechanisms of armies of nomadic feudalism. The significance of this sub-division could be explained in such a way that horse breeders could easily replace and recruit ordinary cavalry soldiers. Thus, recruitment schema is also compatible with the general schema of the military promotion systematic. For example, according to orders of Oghuz Khan if a lieutenant or captain of fifty men become die without a proper son could replace him, a warrior who is adept at riding and horse-caring and being fearsome among his equals would replace a commander (Bakır, 2008, p. 24). Also, Yazıcızâde ‘Ali added that, if this warrior also knows setting up a bow, he could be appointed higher position such as group leader and so on. According to the original text, it is underlined that these examples are not formal customs, but solutions for casual situations. On the other hand, the normal way of recruitment formulated by Yazıcızâde as such (Bakır, 2008, pp. 24-25): Hereditary succeeding of positions from a father to a son. This could be evaluated as a technique of class enclosure on the ruling positions in an army. Furthermore, the position of ruler and significance of scribal service in this class schema which belongs to mainly a nomadic society also should be questioned. The contradiction between nomadic social formation and register services is an obvious problem that should be explained as well as the undetermined position of the ruler/monarch. Although Yazıcızâde tried to formulate the aim and function of scribal service and wise men, this formulation cannot give a competent justification for the existence of treasurer and other scribes. His advice is a repetition of a well-known object of traditional political-advice literature. Yazıcızâde’s assertion is such a clear that rulers should assign significant tasks to the experienced staff in scribal service (Bakır, 2008, p. 28): “Padişah ulu işleri ve defter ve divani işleri hünermend ve işler sınamış kişilere ismarlamak gerek”.⁸⁰⁹ On the other hand, he cannot explain which financial or executive functions have to be undertaken by these staff. This gap between the formal presentation of offices and their substantial content should be evaluated as rewrite of tradition in the Ottoman context of the 15th century by Yazıcızâde ‘Ali.

Moreover, the position of the ruler also did not define well in this narrative. Hypothetically, it could be assumed that a ruler is defined as a leader of all these social strata, and a chief of a particular tribe such as *Kayı* (Bakır, 2008, p. 25). Yazıcızâde ‘Ali defines the main elements of rulership as commanders (*nöker*), domain (*il*) and subjects

⁸⁰⁹ “The sultan's great works, and the registration and high administration affairs, should be assigned to those who are skilled and tested.

(*reâyâ*) -of course with the help of wise men (Bakır, 2008, p. 28). In this frame, the main rights and responsibilities of a ruler are shaped: Leading to commanders, protecting a domain, and providing justice for the subjects. In order to fulfill these functions, Oghuz Khan advised a ruler that to behave well to commanders, to protect the domain from raids, and to give inherited goods/animals to orphans (Bakır, 2008, p. 28-29). The last part of this advice was justified by an argument related to the reproduction of the class domination (Bakır, 2008, p. 29): “Ve dahı eyitmiş ki: Za’if ve güçsüz kişileri katı incitmeyeler ve zahmet virmeyeler ki karıncalar ittifak-ile kagan arslanı ‘aciz ü dermande kılurlar”.⁸¹⁰ Thus, refers to preventing the unification of subjects to secure the dominant position of the ruler.

Secondly, in contrast with Yazıcızâde ‘Ali, Kıvâmî makes a different type of class distinction which he justifies it by a religious discourse. As would be seen above, Yazıcızâde ‘Ali’s class distinction originated the trifold social stratification by the reference to Oghuz Khan’s orders or arrangements in the context of secular/worldly power relations. On the contrary, Kıvâmî’s formulation of the class division in society in general is justified by neither a secular arrangement nor a historical origin, but by the creation/will of God. According to Kıvâmî (2018, p. 36) social figures such as the elite, ordinary person, master, slave, ruler, and pauper are created by the wish of God as much the same as what should be: “Kimini has eyledün, kimini ‘am/ Kimini Mevla vü kimini gulam. Kimini taht üzere kıldum padişah/ Kimini bir nana muhtac ider ah”.⁸¹¹ To conclude this rhetoric by a general formulation, Kıvâmî asserted that it is God’s will that put human beings into two distinct positions such as honorable and inferior (2018, p. 36): “Kimini hor u kimin kıldun ‘aziz/ Kimini pak ü kimini bi-temiz”.⁸¹²

The dichotomic evaluation of the social subjects in the sense of class division justified by religious means, reveals itself repeatedly in the work of Kıvâmî in various contexts. Although this theme is repeated across the work, it is not a random iteration of a simple cliché, but an organized discourse follows a hierarchical pattern of social strata. For example, the pattern of the narrative structure in the first citation given above could be analyzed as such: Firstly, he presents the higher social position (such as elite,

⁸¹⁰ And he also said that they should never hurt and torture the weak and powerless, because if the ants make an alliance, they will make the lion-king helpless and powerless.

⁸¹¹ You created some as elite, some ordinary/ Some you made master, some slave/ Some you made an enthroned ruler/ Some in need of a bread, o.

⁸¹² You made some people vile, some people dignified/ You made some people clean, some people dirty.

master, and ruler), and secondly, he completes it with the lower social position (such as an ordinary person, slave, and pauper) and also the narrative still retains its dichotomic structure. Kivâmî adapted this schema to several different historical contexts such as Mehmet II's campaign over Karaman or the conquest of Constantinople. In both of those narratives he uses the distinction made between two social strata such as prosperous ones and pauper ones or elites and ordinary people (Kivâmî, 2018, pp. 84, 162): “*bay u miskin*” or “*has-ıla ‘am*”. It is obvious that he does not overturn the places of two poles of social strata, thus he places the idea of the decisiveness of the order of these two although it is not so easy to arrange the rime and meter of the poetry.

Thirdly, the theme of the dichotomic arrangement of social strata also is found in Sinan Pasha's *Maârifnâme*. Although Sinan Pasha ideally divided society into two main groups as well as his contemporaries, his manner of approach is quite different from the Kivâmî. In accordance with his social origins which had rooted in ulama stratum and *sûfî* circles, Sinan Pasha makes the main categorical analyze of society regarding neither prosperous and pauper, nor ruler and subjected, but between the common people and virtuous ones. His formulation of this distinction is quite striking (Sinan Paşa, 2013, p. 354): “Eşedd-i nevazil devlet-i erazil olur/ Ve a’zam-ı mesaib helak-i efazıl olur”.⁸¹³ This formulation originates the base of social hierarchy regarding the moral qualities/virtues adopted by different social segments. Thus, the formulation reflects the worldview of the ulama members and *sûfî* circles together that the significance of moral/religious competence indicates the main distinction between common people and themselves. In addition to that, Sinan Pasha intensifies the meaning of this distinction by a classical negation of common people's moral inclination (2013, p. 354): “Dört nesne olur dünyada ki akıl ona tama’ etmek olmaz/ Ve alemde tecrübe ehli onun vukuun ummaz. (...) Ve tagayyür-i hulk/ Ve irza-yı halk”.⁸¹⁴ The term ‘*irza-yı halk*’, or consent/approval of the people, should be commented as spoilt moral tendencies and ordinary beliefs or admirations of the people. Although this term could be over-commented on politically that disregarding the legitimacy and consent mechanisms, this would not be a proper commentary because Sinan Pasha had already underlined the

⁸¹³ The most violent events become the glory of the lowly/ The great calamities are the destruction of the virtuous people.

⁸¹⁴ There are four things in the world that those with intelligence do not aspire to/ And those who are experienced in the world do not want them to appear (...) And the corruption of the inherent essence/ And the consent of the people.

significance of popular consent for the reproduction of relations of domination among society (2013, p. 744) as it will be mentioned sub-chapter below.

The main point Sinan Pasha stressed is the relation between the moral constitution of the society and formal rights as the essence of social cohesion thus also the necessity of stratification. According to him the order of the world essentially includes three points of articulation between human interactions; (i) rights, (ii) dependency relations, (iii) mutualization. This model of society obviously has origins in the political theory of Aristotle and al-Farabi. According to Sinan Pasha's formulation (2013, p. 368):

Cihanın nizamı böyle olur/ Ve alem intizamı bununla bulunur.

Ki nasın aralarında olan hukuk riayet ola/ Ta ki daima birinden birine himayet
ola

Efrad-ı insan ba'zı ba'zına mevsul olur/ Ba'zının emri ba'zına mevkul olur.

Her vakit üstlerine lazımdır ki ödünçleşmeler menafi'ü maunatı/ Birbirinden
men' eylemeyeler ellerinde olan maunatı.⁸¹⁵

Sinan Pasha underlines that patronage or protection relations established from upper segments of society to below, and dependency between higher and lower segments of society, are mainly constitutive characteristics of a society with the integration of rights engaged with this structure and with the help of mutualist/solidaristic type of relations. This schema obviously reflects a social stratification structure and asymmetrical power relations within the various segments of society. The emphasis on rights in these arguments is refined by the presentation of the judges in a certain position in a social hierarchy, and the idea of the moral constitution of the society as an underlined problem of this text is revealed by the locating sheiks on the top of the social hierarchy as it will be mentioned.

In parallel with this schematization, Sinan Pasha gives a broader presentation of class division in further parts of his work. According to him parts of a social structure could be mentioned as such (Sinan Paşa, 2013, pp. 368-370): “Gerek dihan ola, gerek cüllah/ Gerek vezir ola, gerek padişah/ Gerek kaza, gerek tedris ola elinde/ Gerek

⁸¹⁵ This is how the order of the world is realized/ And this is how the order of the universe is achieved

As long as people abide by their law/ And as long as they protect each other
Individuals of people meet each other/ The orders of some represent another
Beneficial cooperation through borrowing is always necessary for them.
Let them not prevent each other from helping each other.

mürşid ola şeyhlik yolunda”.⁸¹⁶ His evaluation of the parts of society stands on a well-known three-part segregation of society with certain variances/nuances. Furthermore, he uses the horizontal classification of the parts of the social strata as well as Kivâmî does. The first part as could be seen has been composed of workers such as weavers (*cüllah*) and landowners (*dihkan*). Sinan Pasha presents the category of farmers first, and weavers in a secondary place thus he makes a horizontal valuation between rural and urban producers that underlies the significance and honor of the latter one. In the second verse, Sinan Pasha locates ruling segment (*vezir* and *padişah*) directly above the producers and local landowners and he also keeps the horizontal order of honor between viziers and rulers. Thirdly he mentions the ulama stratum which is composed of Islamic judges and madrasa scholars with a function of adjudication (*kaza*) and education (*tedris*). Then lastly Sinan Pasha presents the *sûfi* order leaders (*şeyh*) above all sects of society within a function of guidance. Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 694) put forward this advice by deeming it necessary for the ruler to be a member of a *sûfi* order and to make progress (*süluk*) there. In this context, he advocates that the ruler becomes a person directly subject to the power relationship established within a *sûfi* order, and in this context, he considers it among duties of a ruler to show respect to the ulama and to reward and help the dervishes. For example, the following statement quite well reflects Sinan Pasha’s vision of subordinating the ruler to *sûfi* orders (2013, p. 694): “Dünyada padişah dirilenler onlara kul olmak gerek ki alemde şah olalar/ Ve alemde sultanım diyenler onlara geda olmak gerek ki cihana padişah olalar”.⁸¹⁷ It is not a coincidence that a similar vision is also seen in the works of Yazıcıoğlu Ahmed Bîcan. Ahmed Bîcan (1973, pp. 243-44), in his work *Envâru'l-Âşıkîn*, claims that God made the saints dignified and exalted, and whoever despises them will be deemed to have fought with God, and says the following words from God’s mouth: “Mâdem ki benim sultanlığım bâkîdir, öyle ise sultandan korkmayın”.⁸¹⁸ These words should not be taken as a call for disobedience against the rulers. In the background of these lines lies the attribution of the social hierarchy to the divine origin and making the spiritual closeness with God the

⁸¹⁶ Be a landowner, a weaver/ Be a vizier, a sultan/ Decide in court, lecture in madrasah/ Or as an enlightener, as a sheikh.

⁸¹⁷ Those who are rulers in the world must be servants to the *sûfi* leaders so that they become kings in the universe / And those who say they are rulers in the universe must be beggars to the *sûfi* leaders so that they become rulers of the world.

⁸¹⁸ Since your reign is permanent, then do not be afraid of the sultan.

legitimate principle of ascending in the said hierarchy. Thus, the divine power and eminence of the saints are evaluated essentially superior to the worldly power of a ruler.

Furthermore, Sinan Pasha tries to construct a moral formula for the inheritance of prestige from father to son of members of the ulama stratum and *sûfi* orders. According to him, a wise and elegant person should obey to provisions of ulama members and *sûfi* leaders as well as his father (Sinan Paşa, 2013, p. 368): “Fi’l-cümle kişi üstadını şu atasını riayet eder gibi etmek gerek/ Onunla nice muamele ederse, bununla dahi öyle etmek gerek”.⁸¹⁹ The practice of homage or respect/obey is formulated regarding the patriarchal model of authority which was widely admitted in the 15th century. Thus, accreditation of authority to the members of the ulama and sheiks as well as ‘fathers’ which have to be ‘obeyed’. Moreover, Sinan Pasha extended this formula of authority which binding not only particular ulama/*sûfi* members but also their descendants (2013, p. 368): “Belki üstadı oğlu ile dahi öyle dirilmek gerek/ Bir efendisi oğlu farz etmek gerek”.⁸²⁰

To continue, it is seen that the distinctions and hierarchies within the ruling class often appear as an example of political thought in the works of this period. For example, Kivâmî’s approach places the timariot *sipâhîs* above the *Kapıkulus* in the hierarchical division within the ruling class. Kivâmî makes a list before discussing the expedition plan or a general assessment about the war (2018, p. 166): “Diyem Sultan Muhammed padişahun/ Gazada n’itdügin mir ü sipahun”.⁸²¹ While the term ‘*sipah*’ in these expressions can be understood as an army or soldier, it is also possible to think that the poet divided the word ‘*sipâhî*’ to match the verse to the meter. In another example, Kivâmî (2018, p. 208) states that the ruler gave orders to the begs of Anatolia and Rumelia and their people during the siege of Belgrade. Before this incident, the author characterizes these three groups as follows without breaking the sequence (Kivâmî, 2018, p. 206): “Anadolu pehlevanları ve Rum ili gazileri ve kapu halkı”.⁸²² The fact that the order in both statements is the same gives the impression that there is a sort of protocol order here, and priority is given to the timariot *sipâhîs* of Anatolia and Rumelia in this protocol. Reidl (2014, p. 170) states that the protocol rules were strictly followed

⁸¹⁹ All people must obey their master's orders as they obey their father's orders/ He should treat his master as he treated his father.

⁸²⁰ Maybe even his master's son should be treated like this/ It should be accepted as his master's son.

⁸²¹ Let me tell you what the sultan Muhammed, the amirs and the cavalry did during the war.

⁸²² Anatolian wrestlers and ghazis of Rumelia and servants of the ruler.

in the Ottoman official documents - although Kivâmî's work is not an official document, it formally complies with the ordering procedure made by referring to the honors of social groups and authorities. On the other hand, the rule that the *beylerbeyi* of Rumelia is superior to Anatolian one in the protocol was not used in this work and mostly the Anatolian military was kept in the foreground. It is clear that this is a political choice which signifies relations organized around the social status. The fact that the begs of both groups are mentioned requires that the signifier be interpreted not as the *beylerbeyi* but as the *timar* holders who joined the army with the cavalry units. Moreover, although both groups are praised as '*pehlivan*' and '*ghazi*', the *Kapıkulus* are both at the bottom and not worthy of any praise. It is possible to deduce the reason for this style of presentation mainly from the propositions of Sinan Pasha that reflect some of his general political tendencies. Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 660) states that although there is no difference in terms of the purpose they serve, there is a difference between the sections that helped the rulers, namely the begs, the *Kapıkulu* servants and the gate keepers in terms of their social status: "Eğer imaret sultan kulluğu ise seyislik dahi kimin hizmetidir/ Ve eğer vezaret o yolun ululuğu ise, çavuşluk dahi çavuşların izzetidir/ Padişahlara hadem-i ecnas gerek olur/ Hem vezir gerek olur, hem kennas gerek olur/ Beylik hizmetinde ikisi dahi gerek olur/ Her hangisi olmazsa saltanat bozuktur".⁸²³ Sinan Pasha identifies the begs and the sultans regarding the right and necessity to use servants, and states that the vizier and the servant/cleaner group are needed by both. In this respect, he considers the *devshirme-Kapıkulu* group to be the lowest level servants and equates the begs and the sultan in terms of dominating them. If we apply this framework to the verses of Kivâmî, which was discussed above, it is clear that the *Kapıkulus* are mentioned as a slave group that does not have any status and social prestige. In another example, Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 680) lists the members of the ruling class with military qualifications as sultan-governors-landlords.

Another striking aspect of Kivâmî's class schema is that the author, unlike Sinan Pasha, does not attach special emphasis to religious groups. Kivâmî generally describes the Ottoman army under the *ghaza* discourse, and in this context, he directly mentions the ruler and the *sipâhîs* together as the *ghazis*. When we include the viziers, who can

⁸²³ If being an administrator is being a servant to the ruler, even a groom is a service to whom/ And if being a vizier is a supreme part of that path, even a sergeant is the glory of the sergeants. Rulers need all sorts of helpers/ Need both a vizier and a sweeper
These two are necessary in the service of the reign/ If one of these fails, the reign order will be broken.

resist the greed of the ruler in favor of the *sipâhîs*, to this imagination, the class picture Kivâmî has constructed regarding the social order is largely completed. However, there is a large gap in the place of *sûfî* orders and ulama in this picture. It should add to this table to criticisms Kivâmî about the ulama members (especially focusing on the *qadis*). On the other hand, it is seen that there was a wave of criticism targeting the *sûfî* orders in this period. Babinger draws attention to this point (2003, pp. 353-54):

(...) Mehmed was intolerant about one issue. The reason for this was apparently political rather than religious. He was openly hostile to *sûfî* movements. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, these movements spread to the Ottoman regions, Rumelia and even Albania. They had great public support and undoubtedly had significant political influence.

It is thought that Mehmet II had a problem with *sûfî* circles, especially with *Halvetî* groups. İbrahim, the son of Çandarlı Halil, who was executed by the Sultan, also wore dervish clothes for a while, and six hundred dervishes were given daily food in his palace. When Mehmet II gave İbrahim Pasha the right to be appointed wherever he wanted in the *Diwan*, İbrahim Pasha chose to go to Amasya instead of taking an official position in the state, and settled next to Bayezid II (Babinger, 2003, p. 356).⁸²⁴ This singular anecdote has a rather interesting plot: The representative of a famed family of ulama becomes a wandering dervish, becomes the patron of the dervishes, rejects high state positions and settles in with a prince, who is regarded as the representative of the popular opposition of *timar* holders and *waqf* trustees. The similarity between this anecdote and Sinan Pasha's advice to *sûfîs* as 'stay away from the state', which was discussed in the section on discipline, is immediately striking, and the semantic connection turns into a real affirmation. At the same time, it cannot be denied that this is a kind of political warning.

The quest to take a position against the criticisms of the *sûfî* circles is seen especially in *Maârifnâme* among the works have discussed. In his work, Sinan Pasha tries to answer a very basic question: What is the function of dervishes practically? Another figure who has asked this question before was discussed in previous sections. Amâsî (2016, p. 349), who wrote his work at the beginning of the 15th century, accused the dervishes who lived separately from the society and retreated to the mountain tops

⁸²⁴ But there are some gaps in this story. As Reindl (2014, pp. 170-71) stated, it can be thought that Çandarlı İbrahim served as the *qadiasker* of Rumelia around 1468 and was appointed as the teacher of Bayezid II around 1468-1469.

of being in “*zulm*” and “*cevr*”, means darkness, oppression, sadness and injustice. It is clear that this interpretation of Amâsî emerged in interaction with Tûsî’s political philosophy. Tûsî evaluated the society as a unity based on the division of labor formed to achieve material and spiritual perfection, and he mentioned the behavior of those who retreated to the tops of the mountains, living away from the people and calling it ‘*zuhd*’, ‘to abandon the world’, contrary to the founding principle of the society. Tûsî (2005, p. 192) argues that such people are parasites who live off the labor of others and that gaining virtue in this way is a crude dream. In fact, the ‘abandonment of the world’ debate is a phenomenon that manifests itself in many different cultures and is mentioned as a social trend that ‘needs to be regulated’ by the ruling classes. For example, in the development of Brahmanism in India, especially the management of the tendencies of the people that preach isolation from society, refuse to establish a family and strive for prosperity has been an important element. As Störing (2015, p. 49) states, the *Sannyasi* phase, which constitutes the last level in the spiritual development teaching of Brahmanism and preaches that one becomes a wandering beggar by leaving all his wealth, family and land, was left open only to the Brahmin caste, and thus the asceticism trend in Indian communities was tried to be regulated. A similar search can be observed in the Ottoman state, which envisaged restraining the wandering dervishes and keeping the direct producers away from ascetic tendencies. The reason for this is that it is predictable that the growth of the masses that do not establish a family and are not tied to a certain land will both reduce tax revenues and become a pressure factor that can lead to the redistribution of land rent if this population exceeds a certain critical point. In this case, the continuation of class domination depends on both the function of the *sûfi* orders as a means of articulation between the ruling classes and the direct producers, and the fact that the *sûfi* orders do not reach a level that will eliminate the production and exploitation.

Returning to the example of the Ottoman state, Amâsî advocated a similar view - a little bit by rasping its sharp ends. Amâsî’s approach is very meaningful in this period when the social power of the ulama strata increased, and they entered into a struggle with the settled *sûfi* circles about distribution of wealth. On the other hand, half a century later, Sinan Pasha’s approach to the same problem is in the opposite direction. Sinan Pasha formulates this question with all its clarity and reflects the debate of his time in his work as it was (2013, p. 370): “Eğer dersen ki: ‘Şu halktan uzlet edenlerin nizam-ı alemde ne hizmetleri olur/ Şu dağ başına çıkıp halvet edenlerin cihan halkına ne

menfaatleri olur?”⁸²⁵ He answers this fundamental realist question with an idealist approach. According to him (Sinan Paşa, 2013, p. 370), there is a greater benefit to the behavior of these dervishes than other people, because thanks to their benevolence, the order of the world is protected from being disturbed, and with their prayers, the people are kept away from troubles. This answer was built with a purely negative approach. In other words, a criticism based on the search for real benefit is answered not according to real benefit examples, but in accordance with a discursive strategy that focuses on the fears of the people. Yazıcıoğlu Ahmed Bîcan (1999, p. 93) uses a similar strategy of fear: The author’s criticisms about the corruption of contemporary society and non-compliance with religious orders and the section he brings ends with threats of doomsday and natural disaster/divine revenge. Thus, in order to ensure the dominance of religious morality, people and administrators are tried to be frightened by imagining the fear of divine punishment. Although Hagen (2016, p. 498) states that these chapters aim at inculcating moral righteousness in the final analysis, this orientation cannot be considered apart from power struggles. Boratav (2016, p. 68) states that the evaluations in this category also express the moral criticisms of the author about his own age. The moral critiques developed by the *sûfî* circles about their own time cannot be separated from their claims of dealing with the moral leadership of the society at the same time. It is clear that this discourse, which is constructed with the tools of criticism or intimidation, is one of the main strategies used by dervish circles to protect their class privileges. The fact that Sinan Pasha resorted to this threat to protect his *sûfî* circles is remarkable in that, when compared to Amâsî, it shows that the ulama members became more open to alliance with the *sûfî* circles in terms of getting a share of the power.

VII.III.II.II. Objects of Reproduction: Economic and Political

Methodology

In this section, the characteristics of political ideas that center the methodology of reproduction will be briefly discussed. These proposals can be grouped under two main headings: (i) measures of economic reproduction, (ii) measures of political reproduction. It is seen that the reproduction proposals put forward on the economic basis especially focus on the issues related to the state treasury, the welfare of the people

⁸²⁵ If you say: 'What are the benefits in the world order of those who run away from the people and retreat alone? What are the benefits to the people of the world, those who go out and seclude themselves on the top of the mountain?'

and the sources of state income. Secondly, it is seen that the proposals on political reproduction models and mechanisms have chosen a wide range of topics from the experience and methods of art of politics to the conflicts between Sharia and customary law. Political considerations under both headings necessarily refer to the context of class distinctions and intra-class and inter-class conflicts. This situation reveals a crucial feature of the nature of the phenomenon of ‘reproduction’: It is not possible to consider the problem of reproduction of class domination separately from the specific perspectives and articulations of different social strata and classes.

VII.III.II.II.I. Economic Advices on Reproduction: Treasury, Welfare and Confiscation

“Bu mülkler ve bu vakıflar Hazreti Muhammed şeriatı üzerine olmuştur. Tanrı’nın ayetleriyle ve kesin nas olmuştur. Şimdi neden lağvediyorsun? (...)’ dedim. Bana dedi ki: ‘Senin neyini aldılar ki bize bunun gibi sual edersin? Bu sualden vazgeç’”.⁸²⁶

The debate between Âşıkpaşazâde and Karamânî Mehmed Pasha
(Apzd, 2017, p. 209).

Şevket Pamuk (2003, p. 10) states that the economic issues that most of the premodern states dealt with from the 14th to the 19th centuries were similar, and in the last instance, he groups the economic activities organized by the states as “to protect their own existence” under the following headings: “Providing supplies for the capital, the army and other cities, collecting taxes, promoting and controlling long-distance trade, stabilizing the money supply [tm]”. It must added the continuation of agricultural production and thus of the relations of rentier exploitation. Taken as a whole, these items are shaped within a certain logic of political economy, which deals with concrete economic problems but practically tries to resolve them within the normative context of the political order.⁸²⁷ In this respect, it will be possible to talk about a common context that oscillates between tradition and innovation from ancient empires to states of the 15th century.

⁸²⁶ ‘These properties and these waqfs were built on the Sharia of the Prophet Muhammad. It was established by God’s verses and became the definitive dogma. Why are you canceling now? (...)’ I said. He said to me: ‘What did they take from you so that you can question us like this? Quit this question’.

⁸²⁷ For the normative economic logic in the Ottoman state, see Sayar (2000 61, ff.).

In this period, the examples of political thought centered on the economic reproduction of class domination brought together the examples of ‘old’ and ‘new’ school of political thought on this subject and formed an eclectic medium. Examples of ‘old school’ thoughts on the subject are the repetition of the classic rentier production model, which can be summarized as keeping the economic situation of the producer class well, and thus ensuring the continuity of the surplus-product flow by keeping their consent. In this context, the redistribution of booty and tribute income constitutes a leading political topic. In Molla Lütfi’s *Mevzûâtü’l-Ulûm*, the distribution of booty is accepted as a science in itself (Maraş, 2003, p. 132), el-Kafiyeci and et-Tarsûsî present detailed schemes about the distribution of *fey* revenues, and finally the fact that Prince Korkud criticizes the Ottoman financial practice regarding the distribution of slaves obtained as booty in his work *Hallu İşkali’l-Efkar Fi Hilli Emvali’l-Kuffar* reveals the significance of this title. Since there will be made a detailed evaluation on this subject in the subsection where the subsection that discussion of justice is analyzed, let’s be content with mentioning it for now.

The examples of ‘new’ thought, on the other hand, are ‘new’ in terms of institutional expression in terms of the Ottoman state, rather than being historically new, and for this reason, they are important in terms of understanding the political struggles of this period. At the center of this ‘breakthrough’ is the search for increasing state revenues and expanding the treasury, even if the results are against other ruling classes. Genç (2014b, p. 41) identified three main headings as the principles of the Ottoman economic view: (i) provisionism, (ii) traditionalism, and (iii) fiscalism. Provisionism means paying special attention to the level of goods supplied to the market in general to meet the needs of the people - more precisely, the adoption of this as an important function for the reproduction of the class dominance. Scott (1998, p. 29) evaluates the meaning of the provision principle in terms of social class relations in a broad historical context as follows: “Food supply was the Achilles heel of the early modern state; short of religious war, nothing so menaced the state as food shortages and the resulting social upheavals”.

In this context, returning to the Ottoman example, the *qadis* were responsible for the inspecting providence of the sufficient level of goods in the market and the order in the transportation of water resources to the city. In this framework, services such as providing the city’s water needs and *imaret* and *dârüşşifa* are complementary to the provision principle. İnalçık (2018b, p. 50) argues that the notion of provision is

frequently discussed by Islamic jurists and that the principle of using economic resources for the benefit of the Islamic community is recognized by Islamic Law, but in the final analysis he states that there is no direct engagement between the real practice and the ideal legal form. It is possible to observe this incompatibility in the *narh* practice. The fact that the fixed price application (*narh*), which means the determination of the ceiling prices of the products by the *Diwan* and/or *qadis*, is not implemented at the local level brings along political criticisms. For example, an anecdote in the work called *Letâif-i Lâmi'î* shows that the *narh* policy in Bursa was broken, and the difficulty in accessing the consumables as a result of this was criticized. According to the anecdote (Lâmi'î Çelebi, 2015, p. 198), Birâder Kasım, who came to the *Diwan* meeting, told the members of the *Diwan*, who conveyed the information that the price limit was not respected in Bursa, “Hay Sultanım, narh dediğiniz büyükler için bir rüsumdur fukara kullarınız onu bilmezler ve bir şey bulduktan sonra onun ölçü ve tartısına bağlı kalmazlar ve boş yere çekişmezler”⁸²⁸

Continuing, the second principle is the principle of traditionalism. Genç (2014b, p. 44) defines the principle of traditionalism as follows: “Traditionalism is the will to preserve the balances and tendencies that are gradually formed in social and economic relations as much as possible and to prevent the tendency to change, and to eliminate the change in order to return to the old balance if any change occurs (...)”. The repetition of the principle of traditionalism in later centuries often appears in references to the ‘*Kanun-ı Kadim*’. In this respect, the principle of traditionalism should be evaluated as a whole in terms of economy and political culture.

Finally, the principle of fiscalism is defined as “trying to raise the revenues of the treasury as high as possible and preventing it from falling below the level reached” (Genç, 2014b, p. 46). İnalçık (2018b, p. 67) sees the imperial bureaucracy trying to fill the central treasury with as much precious metal as possible as an example of policy of fiscalism. Barkey (2013, p. 133), on the other hand, considers the principle of fiscalism as the basic principle of a centralized bureaucratic imperial regime. In the considered period, it is possible to find an obvious effects of the principle of traditionalism and a hidden provisionalism principle in terms of providing public works. I will consider the idea of reproduction where these principles are combined, while analyzing propositions

⁸²⁸ My dear Sultan, it is a tax on dignitaries that you call *narh*; your poor servants do not know it, and after they find something, they do not follow its measure and weight and do not argue for trivial.

with a traditional approach. On the other hand, the principle of fiscalism took a significant place in reproduction models, and a tense discussion emerged around this principle as an extension of social struggles. For example, Lâmi'î Çelebi (2015, p. 198) criticizes the dominant character of fiscalism, while complaining that the *narh* and *iẖtisab* practices, which are the extensions of the principles of traditionalism and provisionalism, lost their reality in the face of the ruler's ambition to accumulate treasure: "Bi-müsemma ismdür alemde narh u ihtisab/ Şahçün manası zer cem' eylemekdür bi-hisab".⁸²⁹ This aspect of the principle of fiscalism, on the other hand, is the 'new' elements of the reproduction model.

First, let's consider how the traditionalist approach is reflected in the examples of political thought written in this period. The main argument of the traditionalist approach is based on the view that public works and general economic welfare increase are also effective in reproducing the power of the monarch, as could be seen in the circle of justice model. For example, in this context, in the anonymous Arabic *siyâsetnâme*, issues such as "protection of farmers", "protection of main passageways" and "to support drovers and traders" are highlighted (Kavak, 2019a, p. 208). Similarly, the inclusion of *iẖtisab* practices as a branch of science in Molla Lütfi's work titled *Mevzûâtü'l-Ulûm* (Maraş, 2003, p. 132) indicates the decisiveness of the state's competent and conscious undertaking of these functions for the reproduction of class dominance. When the way in which various *siyâsetnâmes* treat and reflect this general view are examined more closely, it is seen that different social strata and classes are highlighted in different order of importance within the framework of their shares and roles in the general public works and welfare increase. Thus, the argument of general welfare is presented in terms of and through the lens of particular class relations. In this framework, two styles of presentation exist in which general welfare and particular class interests are synthesized. The first of these is the model in which a privileged position is given to the ulama stratum, which is expressed with a series of propositions in Sinan Pasha's *Maârifnâme*, and the second is the model in Tursun Beg's *Târîh-i Ebü'l-Feth* and especially principles of general happiness of people and practice of trade come to the fore in this second approach.

Tursun Beg's example is a simple repetition of the rhetoric of justice rather than a comprehensive political model. Accordingly, as the country prospered, the people

⁸²⁹ *Narh* and *iẖtisab* practices do not match the meaning of their names in this world/ Their meaning for the ruler is to accumulate gold without reckoning.

would be more willing to be under the domination of the ruler (1977, p. 30): “(...) bezl-i mal ile celb-i kulub ve adl-ü fazl ile ta’mir-i memleket kıla, yakındur ki devletün dest-i eseriğ damen-i ubuda çeng irgüre”.⁸³⁰ On the other hand, to be more specific, according to him, with the accession of Bayezid II to the throne and the elimination of the threat of Prince Cem, justice prevailed, thus increasing the general welfare and happiness of the ‘high and ordinary’ people. It shows that he repeats a pattern known to be encountered in Ahmedî, almost exactly the same expression (2018, p. 602): “The principality is that you may be a person of justice/ May everyone, noble and ordinary, be satisfied with you [tm]”.⁸³¹ Tursun Beg (1977, p. 198) states that within this general framework, especially with the abolition of some practices during the Mehmet II period, the power of Bayezid II became stronger than his predecessor. Thus, the bond of justice and reproduction is reestablished in political discourse. If we focus on to the repercussions of this situation in the economic plan, Tursun Beg gives the idea of happiness of the people with two images, the first is eating and drinking, the second is the liveliness of the market and people from all social strata benefit from it (1977, p. 197): “(...) kemal-i inbisat ile sahn-ı hal-i halk üzre bisat-ı neşat döşetti ve her tarafta ve her kuşede yimekler ü içmekler ve revayiş-i bazar ve ravnak u arayış-i kar-ı sigar u kibar ke-ma hüve’l-matlub müyesser oldu”⁸³². In Tursun Beg’s example, it is not possible to find any specific class references other than the emphasis on the market and commercial transactions. However, the emphasis on provisionalism is also included in his work. Tursun Beg (2013, p. 84, 87) praises that Mehmet II brought all kinds of food to the city by land and sea, repaired aqueducts and enriched them with new resources, and even built a *dârüşşifa* and a large *imarethane* to provide health services and charity.

Sinan Pasha’s thought masterfully synthesizes the general and particular aspects in this regard. Sinan Pasha begins his syllogism on reproduction by articulating the concepts of justice-power-law-welfare to each other in a way that reminds us of the circle of justice model. According to him (Sinan Paşa, 2013, p. 666), justice is a thing that strengthens the state and is the spreader/helper of its authority, and it is the basis of the ruler’s dominance and the protector of his property. In this framework, the content

⁸³⁰ By distributing goods, he gains the consent of the hearts and makes the country prosperous with a just and virtuous administration, so that the hands of his servants cling to his lofty skirt.

⁸³¹ Ahmedî (2018, p. 602); couplet no: 8023.

⁸³² With full openness of heart, he had the carpet of delight and joy laid in the courtyard of the people’s market, food and drinks, the liveliness of the market, beauty in everyone’s work, noble and ordinary, came out as desired.

attributed to the notion of justice focuses specifically on ensuring the general welfare of the people and defending the interests and status of prominent social figures. Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 668) asserts that a country will be prosperous if a ruler provides security and comfort to the people. At this point, Sinan Pasha gives two concrete examples that he thinks will lead to an increase in welfare (2013, p. 670); “Şehirler emin ola sürrek u lüstan/ Ve hiçbir hanede teşviş olmaya o husustan/ Memlekette haramilere yer kalmaya/ Ve hiçbir dağda tagiler durmaya”.⁸³³

There is no significant difference between these general security/peace-centered propositions and the examples that were discussed before. However, it is seen that Sinan Pasha shifted the emphasis to the particular interests of various social segments by means of specific lines beyond these general propositions. Because Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 666) argues that in order for a country to achieve prosperity, the members of ulama and the *süfi* orders must first be in peace and adds that these people must ‘own property and be prosperous’. Sinan Pasha’s lines are as follows (2013, p. 666): “Eyyam-ı devletinde cümlesi gani olup emvale yetişe/ Ve a’vam-ı saadetinde her birisi bir mansibu menale yetişe”.⁸³⁴ In this framework, while Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 666) says “müfsidler her bucakta matrud u makhur olalar/ Ve hasudlar her köşede zelili hor olalar”⁸³⁵, he also proposes to operate the security and peace mechanism against those who disturb the ulama members. In these lines, it is tried to gain assurance against the dismissal of the members of the ulama who came to high bureaucracy positions as a result of various gossip and conspiracies. Thus, in the first step, with the aim of maintaining the general production level and increasing the welfare of the people, increasing and securing the incomes of the ulama members who became state officials became the main axis of the reproduction model proposed by Sinan Pasha. Thus, the general welfare increases and the religious-legal support of the ulama become a reproduction model with the redistribution of surplus product in a way that the ulama take priority.

Secondly, in this period, we are faced with a reproduction model variant that can be considered as ‘new’ in terms of Ottoman political thought. With the 15th century,

⁸³³ Cities are safe from thieves and theft/ No house is worried about it/ There will be no place for bandits in the land/ And bandits will not stand on any mountain.

⁸³⁴ May all be rich and own property in the days of your reign/ And in your fortunate years each be placed in a wealthy office.

⁸³⁵ May the corrupters be expelled and persecuted on every side/ And let the envious ones be scoundrels who are despised in every corner.

it is seen that it became important for the Ottoman state to seize the mining basins, to accumulate precious metals and to expand the cash revenue. For example, in Tursun Beg (1977, p. 128), it is seen that a domination model consisting of four items, two of which is political and two of which is economic, first is to appoint a sanjak beg and *qadi*, and second, seize the mines and receive the *jizya* tax.⁸³⁶ It is seen that especially the seizure and operation of mines - mostly by tax farming method, gained importance and prevalence in this period. For example, in the lapidaire named *Cevhernâme* written by Yazıcıoğlu Ahmed Bîcan in this period, the properties of precious stones and metals such as gold, ruby, diamond, emerald, pirouette, agate, coral, amber are described. Moreover, although the thirteenth chapter of *Dürr-i Meknun* is similarly about precious stones and metals, it is mostly devoted to speculations about their healing properties. Kutlar (2002, pp. 61-62) states that in the thirty-two and thirty-third chapters of the same author's book named *Acayibü'l-Mahlukat*, similarly, information about various mines is given. Another work written in the same period, dedicated to Murat II, is Mustafa b. Seydi's *Cevhernâme-i Sultan Muradî*. He wrote this work for the treasures of Murat II (Murad, 2019, p. 29). The fact that Murat II had a ruby ring that he bought for ninety-five thousand *akçes* and that it was sold after he died and given to those who read the Qur'an in his grave (Uzunçarşılı, 1958, p. 2) gives an idea about the economic dimension of the interest in precious stones.

Demir and Kılıç (2003, p. 17) state that al-Tifaşî's *cevahirnâme*, *Ezhar el-Efkar fi Cevahir el-Ahcar* was adapted into Turkish and put into use twice by el-Şirvam in the 15th century. Similarly, Muhammad ibn Mansur al-Şirazi's *cevahirnâme* was translated into Turkish in this century (Demir & Kılıç, 2003, p. 19). These works both provide a preliminary information about the types of mines that can be exploited in the newly conquered regions, facilitate the identification of precious metals and stones for traders, and produce pseudoscientific information about the usage areas of precious stones (for example, information about diseases, spiritual moods, etc.) and thus it can be said to increase the sales opportunities in the domestic market. El-Şirvam states in the introduction of his work *Ezharül'l-Efkar* that the demand for jewels has increased, and the people demand to learn about this commodity, sometimes for medical reasons, sometimes for ornament or boasting, and sometimes for commercial purposes (Bilkan, 2018, p. 334). Interestingly, in the *Tuhfe-i Muradî*, which was presented to Murat II,

⁸³⁶ See: Tursun Beg (1977, p. 128): “(...) sancak-beği ve kâdılar nasb idüp, ma'âdinleri üzerine emînler konulup re'âyâyâ cizye-i şer'î vaz' olundı”.

possession of jewels is considered essential for the rulers, and even as was mentioned before, a new circle of justice is defined based on the accumulation of ‘incorruptible’ goods (Bilkan, 2018, pp. 334-35). In this framework, it is not difficult to guess that the widespread political opinion about saving property or money is also changing, and that this is a phenomenon directly related to the institutionalization of class relations. In this respect fiscalism as the tendency to increase treasury revenues, gained a dominant character in this period. For example, in the memoirs of Janissary Constantine, an anecdote about Mehmet II’s assignment of Defterdar Sinan to count all treasury and properties, and his attempt to find out how many men he could pay for an army (Beydilli, 2019b, p. 100) reveals to the relationship between fiscalism tendencies and the structure of social formation. The tendencies towards the expansion of the state treasury and the establishment of an accumulation regime in Ottoman administration was originated in previous periods. However, the distinguishing feature of the fiscalism trend that emerged in the second half of the 15th century is that it is applied to the detriment of the current class balance, and therefore has the potential to trigger significant changes in the social formation within a century. İnalçık (2018b, p. 12) deals with the fact that this trend has become a historical phenomenon as follows:

Mehmet II also resorted to a series of new and drastic fiscal measures in order to overcome the most important problem of all pre-industrial empires, the establishment of a central treasury large enough to finance imperial policies. These fiscal policies were at the root of the widespread, even severe, discontent at the end of Mehmed's reign. [tm]

Ahmedî, who wrote his work about half a century before this period, criticizes the ruler’s ambition to collect goods as follows (2018, p. 692): “Is it to be a ruler to be fond of treasures and goods/ To take away from people what one cannot give? [tm]”. On the other hand, within half a century, it is seen that this view is riddled with commentaries, exceptions and finally practices. It is necessary to determine that this change is not a simple historical change, but a class-based change in itself. The negative point of view on hoarding treasures in anonymous chronicles written to be read to the lower-class people and soldiers still exists even at the beginning of the 16th century, with an emphasis very similar to that of Ahmedî. For example, in the anonymous chronicle of Giese (1992, p. 103) it is seen that collecting treasure is presented as a kind of ‘misfortune’: “Çünkü ele gire genç ü zer ü sim/ Devlet anun ki adını kıla kerim/ Ola

bedbaht ol ki dünyalık bula/ Anı saklayıp adın nakes kıla/ (...) / Şimdi oldur kim ululuk direler/ Ne yayalar ne kişiye vireler”.⁸³⁷ On the other hand, the idea of ‘positive aspects’ of collecting goods and having a treasury also developed in the works of bureaucrats and scholars of the period gradually. For example, Tursun Beg expressed parallel political ideas with Ahmedî on this issue, but he is far from expressing a similar certainty in the face of the verses which was quoted on the subject of property accumulation. This shows that both authors used the same couplet in accordance with their social positions.⁸³⁸ For example, it is found in the lines of Tursun Beg that the ruler’s mighty prosperity of mines and cellars is something to be proud of (1977, p. 22): “Bununla, emva ü hazayin-i devletinün yümn, kifayeti il şol kadar müyesser oldı ki, mezahin-i bahr ü ma’adin-i berr ile da’vi-i tekasür ider”.⁸³⁹

Tursun Beg draws a three-element syllogism about treasury: (i) the majesty of the ruler is essential, (ii) collecting treasure is a good and necessary practice, (iii) the treasury should be spent in a way that pleases the soldier. Tursun Beg clearly states that collecting treasury and property cannot be condemned (1977, p. 26): “Ve tarik-i şer’ ve kanun-ı örf üzere zabt-ı emval ve cem’i hazayin pesendidedür, amma hak ile”.⁸⁴⁰ The point that should be underlined in these lines is that an absolute compliance of Islamic Law is not seen as decisive, and the door is not closed to the collection of treasures through customary law. On the other hand, it is seen that Tursun Beg (1977, p. 27) suggested that soldiers, especially the *nökers*, should be privileged in the spending of the treasury, similar to the circle of justice model. Thus, it is clear that collecting treasure is not denied, but a limited use is given to it. On the other hand, the formulation of

⁸³⁷ Because the treasure, gold and silver were appropriated/ The person who distributed them found a fortune/ The one who had worldly riches became miserable/ He hid them and named them stingy/ (...) Those who ascribe the title of majesty to themselves these days/ They neither distribute wealth nor give it to anyone.

⁸³⁸ In fact, Ahmed’s praising the wealth of Suleyman Çelebi in his *diwan*, while criticizing the collection of treasures in his *İskendernâme*, suggests that these two texts may have been fictionalized for reader groups belonging to different social classes. This difference emerges since the expressions in the *diwan* were written for Suleyman Çelebi to read, and *İskendernâme* is a work that mostly deals with the typology of ‘ideal ruler’ and can be read/listened by various types of people belonging lower classes. The representation of the rulers for the public is knitted around a moderate and moral ruler figure who does not have the ambition to ‘accumulate property’.

⁸³⁹ Even so, it was also so possible for the sake of the sufficiency of state property and treasury that it lays claim to surplus with sea-cellars and land mines.

⁸⁴⁰ And acquiring property and accumulating treasures in accordance with Shariah and customary law is a privilege, but it must be done in a legitimate way.

positive correlation between majesty and treasury pointed by Tursun Beg is also proposed in Kivâmî's work. Kivâmî (2018, p. 344) equates possession of property and treasury with the possession of a crown and weapons among the supreme qualities of the ruler: "Anundı taht u tac u 'izz ü hürmet/ Anundı baht u raht u milk-i devlet. Anundı mal u esbab u hazine/ Geçerdi hükmi anun kamusına".⁸⁴¹ The one who would take this view to the last level would be Sinan Pasha, according to him, the ruler's collection of goods is a kind of supreme worship (2013, p. 630): "Eğer mal cem' edersen, ki daima halka nef'in ere, bu dahi bir ulu taattir".⁸⁴² Let us also note that after Sinan Pasha sanctified the accumulation of wealth, there was an annotation advising the ruler to use the wealth he had accumulated for the general welfare of the society. But in the final analysis, it is not difficult to deduce from these examples that the accumulation of goods is not generally denied and is accepted as a necessity. In fact, in the last year of Mehmet II's reign, the fact that there were two and a half million gold coins and forty-eight million *akçes* in the treasury shows that such an accumulation was actually being made (İnalçık, 2019a, p. 275). On the other hand, it is not overlooked that fiscalism is tried to be placed within a certain moral cover. Because, in this period, when the monetary economy did not develop as in modern societies, having money is perceived as an indicator that makes the class hierarchy visible. For example, Karamânî Mehmed Pasha describes at length the Ottoman Empire's right to take tribute from the Venetian State and their commitment to give one hundred thousand coins annually as a sign of Mehmet II's superiority, but ultimately considers it necessary to integrate this whole narrative with a moral interpretation. Karamânî Mehmed Pasha tries to legitimize his own narrative as follows (Çiftçioğlu, 1949, p. 360):

The purpose of me mentioning this gold and silver money transaction here is not to describe the fame and reputation of this supreme esteemed sultan, which reached the degree of the sun at midday. Because this money is lighter and lower than a salty and ordinary drop compared to the sweet waters of the great seas, besides his dedication to great works. The purpose of my mentioning this is to say that the Franks must bow to him, that the oppressors and the merciless bow before his greatness, and that the caesars and the husrews should be afraid of his assertiveness. [tm]

⁸⁴¹ The throne and the crown and the dignity and the honor belonged to him/ The fortune and the state property belong to him/ The goods and clothes and the treasure was him/ His law ruled over all of these.

⁸⁴² If you collect goods, which you can always help the people, this is also a great worship.

In the lines of Karamânî Mehmed Pasha, it is possible to clearly observe a very interesting dilemma that, in my opinion, reflects the general trend of the ruling classes of the age. Weber (1950, p. 237) underlines the specific use of money as a sign of class distinction: “(...) money was not a means of exchange but merely an object of class possession; one who possessed it kept it only on grounds of prestige and for nourishing his social self-esteem.” Similarly, in the statements of Karamânî Mehmed Pasha above, a connection is established between money and class status. On the other hand, it is unclear whether this relationship is legitimate as a sign of authority by the directly subordinate classes. In this context, a dilemma arises indirectly. While one side of this dilemma is recognizing the charm and promises of financial power and being subject to it, the other side is trying to legitimize social status by means of moral codes or virtues belonging to military and religious ethos such as ‘belief’, ‘greatness’, ‘courage’ etc. The fact that there is not yet an absolute harmony or transition between these two, or rather a certain contradiction between the material and ideological bases of power, condemns the need and praise of the ruling classes for wealth to an embarrassing tone and moral explanations. This contradiction will be tried to be suppressed for a long time until the victory of private property and liberalism in Western Europe and it will not be able to take a perfect ideological form.

In all the examples discussed, the tendency of the ruler to accumulate wealth and its legitimacy were not denied, on the contrary, religious or customary legitimacy grounds were sought. On the other hand, it should be underlined that all the writers whose opinions were quoted above, without exception, were against the seizure of *waqf* revenues by Mehmet II and the redistribution of *mülk* lands by the state. At this point, it becomes clear that there is a decisive contradiction between the fiscalism model of the ruler and his entourage to reproduce the class positions of the *Kapıkulu* members, and the traditionalist reproduction model of the authors whose thoughts were quoted. It is seen that Mehmet II’s fiscalism policy is concentrated at three points in this respect. These are (i) new taxes, (ii) *mukata’a* and resettlement of houses in Istanbul, (iii) confiscation of *waqf* incomes and redistribution of *mülk* lands. It is clear that all three elements were opposed by the authors of the period as a whole.

When the history of Âşıkpaşazâde is examined, it is seen that for the first time, Mehmet II increased tax of farm (*çift akçesi*) due to the Peloponnese expedition and financed the long-distance expedition in this way. Âşıkpaşazâde expressed this

information as follows (Apzd, 2017, pp. 156-57): “Until then, twenty-two akçes were collected from *reâyâ*. Being away that time, the sultan said to the sipahis, ‘Take thirty-two each.’ He said so. This is now thirty-two tax from at that time [tm]”. According to this calculation, it is seen that the farm tax has increased by about forty-five percent as a substantial rate. He notes that Mehmet II gave a lot of money to the begs of Anatolia upon the news that the Hungarian army started to advance over Belgrade during this expedition (Apzd, 2017, p. 156). This statement explains why there was a need for cash savings. Another detail can be added to this picture that during the reign of Mehmet II, new coins were put into circulation five times and old ones were withdrawn from circulation, and that the amount of silver was changed in each new coin release and indirect tax was levied on monetary wealth (İnalçık, 2019a, p. 271). In addition, Pamuk (2003, p. 46) states that “state monopolies in goods such as salt, soap and candles and their sale to private merchants were created [tm]” and thus financial centralization was promoted.

Secondly, there are criticisms about levying *mukata'a* on houses in Istanbul in the history of Âşıkpaşazâde. It is understood that Mehmet II first gave the houses under the status of private property after Constantinople was captured. Âşıkpaşazâde stated that Istanbul did not prosper (*mamur*) in this first phase, and therefore, by the order of Mehmet II, settlers were forcibly brought from every province and “the city was about to be prosper [tm]” (Apzd, 2017, p. 147). Right at this stage, that is, in the period when the population of Istanbul increased and economically developed, it is seen that Mehmet II decided to levy *mukata'a* tax on the houses in the city and take a share of rent from this development. Tursun Beg (2013, p. 82) similarly states that when human communities multiply and settle in there, the *mukata'a* tax is levied. It is clear that this is an example of fiscalist policy. İnalçık (2019a, p. 269) shows the need for financial resources due to the struggle that started with Uzun Hasan as the reason for the second time *mukata'a* was imposed on the houses in Istanbul. According to Tursun Beg’s (2013, p. 82) statement, “two thousand barrels of annual income of fifty thousand each [tm]”, is envisaged from the *mukata'a* imposed to the houses in Istanbul. The testimony of Tursun Beg on this subject should be accepted as the most valuable primary source because, according to him (2013, p. 82), he traveled all over Istanbul and recorded “house by house, room by room, big and small, gardens and vineyards [tm]” in order to levy the *mukata'a* in a systematic way. Similar to other examples, it is seen that this practice causes unrest among the people and triggers the incompatibility between

alternative reproduction mechanisms. For example, there are historical sources where the people who were brought through exile criticized as follows (Apzd, 2017, p. 147): “You expelled us from our property, you brought us here. Did you bring them to rent these houses of infidels? [tm]”.

According to Âşıkpaşazâde, the old vizier named Kula Şahin opposed this policy, and he ensured that this policy was abolished by stating that there was no *mukata'a* in the previously captured countries (Apzd, 2017, p. 147). On the other hand, after Rûm Mehmed Pasha became a vizier, *mukata'a* tax was again imposed on the houses in the city, and Âşıkpaşazâde claims that this development was due to the manipulation of Rûm Mehmet Pasha who belongs the elite circles of Istanbul, including his father. A similar narrative takes place in the history of Neşrî (1957, p. 711) and it is claimed that Rûm Mehmet Pasha was a “child of Istanbul [tm]” and could not tolerate the fact that houses were owned by Muslims. According to Âşıkpaşazâde, the reason for the return of the imposition of *mukata'a* is as follows (Apzd, 2017, p. 148):

Then a vizier came to the sultan, who was the son of an infidel. He was very close to the ruler. The old infidels of Istanbul were friends of this vizier's father. They walked up to him: ‘Hey! What are you doing? These Turks again prospered this city. What is your effort? They took your father's land and our land. They are using these places to show off. Now you are close to the sultan. Work so that these people can withdraw from the reconstruction of this city and again, the city remains in our hands as before. Even the vizier said that mukata'a that they had put before, let's impose it again. Even these people refrain from acquiring property. This city is about to be ruined again in the future with that tax. In the end, it will remains in the hands of our group. [tm]

When discussing Âşıkpaşazâde’s allegations two points should be draw attention. The first is a lack of legitimacy for the nobility of the old regime who came to administrative positions in the imperial administration, and the second is a contradiction between reproduction models. If examined carefully, it is striking that Âşıkpaşazâde’s critique establishes a necessary relationship between the general notion of public welfare and prosperity and the reproduction of the Ottoman rule. The author’s view ascribed to the old families of Constantinople is that *mukata'a* tax would disrupt the rebuilding activity and thus the Ottoman administration might weaken and disappear. For this reason, bringing the fiscalist approach to the forefront as an element of

reproduction is criticized and the continuation of the ‘conventional order’, that is, the traditionalist approach, is suggested. The following words of Kula Şahin while opposing the imposition of *mukata’a*, first of all, is mentioned in Âşıkpaşazâde’s work as a reflection of this traditionalist approach (Apzd, 2017, p. 147): “Hey devletli sultanım! Baban, deden bunca memleketler fethettiler. Hiçbirinde mukataa koymadılar. Sultanıma dahi layık budur ki yapmaya”.⁸⁴³ Tursun Beg also draws attention to the contradiction between Mehmet II’s decision on taxation and then cancellation of it, and the fact that the houses that everyone enters are first considered their own property and then the changes in ownership pattern and tries to interpret this on a legitimate basis. Tursun Beg (2013, p. 83) tells the story from the mouth of the ruler that Mehmet II’s purpose in imposing *mukata’a* tax was not to accumulate wealth, but to “order the affairs of the people, to improve the property and situation of the people of pride and covetousness [tm]”. As a justification for this, he argues that the city’s reconstruction will be delayed, as the new settlers in the city will settle in houses that do not match their financial situation and their maintenance will not be possible (Tursun, 2013, p. 84). Thus, the imposition of *mukata’a* tax is tried to be justified in two ways: Firstly, in terms of general welfare and reconstruction of the city, and secondly, in terms of the redistribution of houses in accordance with real income, that is, the pattern of social stratification. If Tursun Beg’s search for legitimation is recommended in reverse way, it is seen that the traditional reproduction model, which is based on the achievement of general welfare within the framework of particular class privileges, takes place in the sub-text. A similar form of legitimation is also present in the history of Kemalpaşazâde. Kemalpaşazâde explains the reason why *mukata’a* was imposed on the houses in Istanbul from the words of Mehmet II (Turan, 1991, p. 98): “Muradım, emval tahsil eylemek değildi, belki ol halka üleşülen emlaki tahsisde ve mellak arasında tahsisde ta’dil etmekdi. İştüdüm ki, deni kimseler ‘ali saraylara girmişler, sonra gelen ganiler fakirane evlerde kalmışlar, maksudum onları tebdil etmekdi”.⁸⁴⁴ The explanation given by Kemalpaşazâde is that the houses were not distributed according to the wealth of the

⁸⁴³ Hey my great sultan! Your father and grandfather conquered so many lands. They did not impose mukata’a in any of them. This is what is worthy of even my sultan so that he does not do it.

⁸⁴⁴ The purpose of my decision was not to collect goods, but to correct the arrangement of the properties divided among those people and their allocation among the property owners. I heard that the lowly people got the lofty palaces, the rich people who came after them got the poor houses, my aim was to change them.

people. The author argues that imposition of the *mukata'a* tax was 'successful', that the poor fled and settled in smaller houses, and the rich bought palaces suitable for their esteem (Turan, 1991, p. 98).

On the other hand, with the *mukata'a* tax being imposed on the houses in Istanbul, a second policy that we can consider is the resettlement of Istanbul and the expulsion of settlers from various provinces. İnalçık (2019a, p. 242-43) notes that many families from Serbia, Peloponnese, Zanta, Kefelonia, Hagia Mavra island, Thassos, Samotraki, Konya, Larende, Aksaray, Ereğli, Eğriboz, Kefe, Mengüp, Niksar, Ladik, Bafra, Osmancık, Çorumlu, Tokat, and Samsun and many other places were settled in Istanbul. Murphey (2000, p. 157) argues that the policy of resettlement in Istanbul from different provinces should be read as a part of economic centralization in the final analysis. We can find some expressions supporting this opinion in the history of Tursun Beg. According to Tursun Beg (2013, p. 81), the reason why the houses in Istanbul were given as property in the first place was to attract wealthy traders to the city. However, when this did not happen, compulsory resettlement policy was applied (Tursun, 2013, p. 81):

Rich traders (...) did not choose to leave their homes; but since they were the main target of this policy, the command to which the world bowed was executed, a certain number of famous tradesmen came from every city and country (...) and large covered bazaars, bazaars and market places were built for them, as well as large caravanserais for passengers. [tm]

On the other hand, it can be followed from the anonymous chronicles and the lines of Âşıkpaşazâde that this policy drew great reaction. In the anonymous chronicle published by Giese (1992, p. 85), it is explained how the city of Constantinople was populated in ancient times, and an indirect criticism of the settlement policy in the period of Mehmet II is made. Anonymous chronicler (Giese, 1992, p. 85) states that in ancient times families were brought to Istanbul from the Greek provinces, Arabs, Persians, and Hungary by oppression, that's why many cities were devastated, and that the people they brought to the city were groaning and that's why they cursed a lot, and then presents the story that these curses caused the city to be devastated. It is understood that this story and main idea do not only narrate an incident that took place in the past, but on the contrary, took a stand against the Mehmet II's policy of reconstructing Istanbul and therefore settlement, because this policy and the resistances/complaints against it are a very current political issue in that time. As İnalçık (2019a, p. 242) points

out, the first decree of deportation, which envisaged the resettlement of around five thousand families in Istanbul until September 1453, may not have been implemented sufficiently as a result of the resistance of the people. In this context, Âşıkpaşazâde deals with the exiles from regions such as Larende, Konya and Aksaray in his work, but he strongly criticizes the deportation of wealthy persons, especially by Rûm Mehmet Pasha. According to him, Rûm Mehmet Pasha did not find the deportations made by Mahmud Pasha from Larende and Aksaray sufficient, and because they were poor people, he deported the rich people of the region with the order of the ruler. Meanwhile, it is understood that Ahmed Çelebi, a descendant of Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî, was also deported from Konya. We can guess that this example disturbed Âşıkpaşazâde extraordinarily, because at the last point of this policy, it would be possible for other wealthy and influential *sûfî* leaders to be deported or their privileges usurped from their hands. It is precisely for this reason that Âşıkpaşazâde insists that this policy is made to harm Muslims in the final analysis, because only in this way will the privileges of the *sûfî* circles be combined with the possibility of general resistance. According to him (Apzd, 2017, p. 178): “This Rûm vizier was so eager to avenge Istanbul that to hurt Muslims. This time he got the chance. In short, the aim of the Rûm vizier in sending more people from Larende and Konya was to have the houses of the Muslims demolished and disrupt their sustenance and order [tm]”.

Thus, the criticism focused on the collapse of the general welfare and the threat of usurping the particular privileges of the settled *sûfî* circles come together and become the defense of the traditional economic and social order against fiscalism. In addition, it is understood from these lines that wealthy Muslim families are seen as natural representatives and legitimate parts of society in the eyes of particular *sûfî* circles.

Finally, the issue of confiscation of various properties and households during the reign of Mehmet II should be mentioned. This issue constitutes a subject that is frequently emphasized in the Ottoman historical literature. In the sources of political thought of the 15th century this subject has been insistently emphasized and critical comments have mostly focused on this subject. First, should be started by explaining the historical phenomenon itself. It is learned from the history of Tursun Beg that various *mülk* lands and *waqfs* were confiscated by the state during the reign of Mehmet II, and that this change of ownership pattern corresponds to a very large amount of landed property. Tursun Beg gratefully states that some of these properties were returned to their previous owners during the reign of Bayezid II, and gives first-hand

information about the magnitude of the change. Tursun Beg (1977, p. 22) describes this incident as: “(...) yigirmi bin artuk kurâ vü mezâri’ var ola ki ashâb-ı emlâk ü evkâf tasarrufundan intizâ’ olmuştu (...)”⁸⁴⁵. In another part of his work, he mentions the same incident again as follows (Tursun, 1977, p. 197): (...) on binden ziyâde kurâ vü merazi’ sâhib-i emlâk u evkâf elinden intizâ’ olunmuş idi, ve zulmet-i tîh-i tahayyürde ol dervîşlerin cerâğları bî-pîh kalmış idi”⁸⁴⁶. There are certain differences between the two expressions. It is not certain in these statements whether the *mülks* and *waqfs* confiscated by the state were twenty thousand or ten thousand. In addition to this quantitative difference, there are also some qualitative uncertainties. For example, in the continuation of the lines as were quoted first (Tursun, 1977, p. 22), the fact that especially the landowners and local lords are meant, and in the second citation (Tursun, 1977, p. 197) the focus is on the *sûfi* circles, which raises some questions about the nature of the incident. While it is certain that between ten and twenty thousand confiscations took place in total, it can be thought that ten thousand of them belong to religious foundations from the emphasis of the author. It is not possible to determine whether this proposition is absolutely true or not based on the available documents. However, if it is accepted that thinking in this way can be useful at least in terms of hypothesis, it can be understood why the reform made during the reign of Mehmet II faced a great reaction from religious circles.

When the secondary literature is examined, there are two main approaches that deal with the reform program in terms of its purpose. While the first of these approaches considers the issue as a problem of political centralization, the second approach analyzes it more as a decision taken due to economic necessities. Both approaches accept the tendency of centralization, but the first considers it as an extension of a political vision, and the second as a result of financial decisions. In this framework, it is clear that the first approach puts an ‘active’ attitude focusing on the expansion and capillarization of the dominance of the ruling class, while the second approach evaluates this practice as a part of a ‘proactive’ policy, which the ruling class necessarily prefers in order to reproduce its own dominance.

⁸⁴⁵ There were more than twenty thousand villages and hamlets taken from mülk and waqf owners.

⁸⁴⁶ More than ten thousand villages and hamlets had been snatched from the owners of mülk and waqfs, and the lamps of those dervishes, that is, the poor, were left without oil in the darkness of the desert of bewilderment.

To summarize the first approach, Moutafchieva (1981b, p. 235; 1988, p. 136) is of the opinion that Mehmet II carried out this reform in favor of the petty military nobility (*sipâhîs*) in order to consolidate the central state power, improve the military power and suppress the separatist feudal aristocracy. Pamuk (1999, p. 30) states that this policy has a centralist character and is the appearance of a struggle between the local elites trying to protect their private property in the countryside and the central state. In the background of Pamuk's (1999, p. 22) proposition lies the model of local feudalism versus central tributary state struggle, which he believes characterized the founding period of the Ottoman Empire. Werner's (2019a, pp. 361-62) statement is that within this framework, the ruler, who did not want to meet the demands of the local property owners, "militarized the country for the benefit of the state [tm]". Werner, in particular, considers the increase in the number of *sipâhîs* in proportion to the need for them in the military field, as the reason for transforming *mülk* and *waqf* lands into *timars*. Similarly, Bilge (2015, p. 80) argues that "land aristocracy is evaluated as dangerous for the central state [tm]" and that's why *waqf* lands are turned into *mîrî* land status. Some general historical trends that can support Bilge's proposition can be identified in primary sources. For example, Âşıkpaşazâde affirmatively states that Mehmet II uprooted the local "khans" and "begs" from their homeland with all their family lineage in Anatolia and makes the contradiction between the local ruling classes and the central state visible (Apzd, 2017, p. 190). However, we do not have any data that the local ruling classes were engaged in a significant resistance movement during this period when Uzun Hasan, the ruler of Aq Qoyunlu, and his Karamanid allies were defeated. For this reason, the aforementioned interpretation of 'feudal threat' remains too general and does not directly explain the particular nature of the reform program. In addition, the defeat of the Aq Qoyunlu army during the reign of Mehmet II must have greatly discouraged the separatist movements on the eastern border of the empire. A reasonable interpretation that can be made in this context is that the Ottoman state, which benefited from the loss of power of the separatist movements due to the lack of a strong rival state on its eastern border, may have implemented its centralization plans. Moreover, the fact that Mehmed II's last campaign, which was interrupted due to his death in Gebze, would be made to the east, can be considered as evidence that he wanted to reorganize this region and establish new military bases for the eastern expeditions by

forming new *timar* units on the eastern borders of the empire.⁸⁴⁷ In any case, it is not possible to give a definite explanation within this scheme.

The second approach states that this reform was made with a financial motivation in the last analysis and its main purpose is to increase government revenues. For example, Heyd (1973, pp. 12-13) admitted that the implementation was done with the aim of increasing public revenues, but underlined that this was essentially a reorganization of the feudal system and, in the final analysis, a political move that strengthened the feudal system. If we turn to the primary sources, Âşikpaşazâde (2017, pp. 208-9), while mentioning this issue, or rather making it the target of the arrows of criticism, especially emphasizes that after the *mülks* and *waqf* deteriorated, their revenues were transferred to the ‘sultan’s treasury’. Handling the issue in this way reveals strong evidence that the issue was understood by the witnesses of the period from a financial perspective. The reasons for this are particularly worth explaining. İnalçık (2019a, p. 438) argues that resources should be collected in the central treasury in order to finance the intense military expeditions during the reign of Mehmed II, and for this reason, *mülks* and *waqfs* were tried to be concentrated in the hands of the state. Özel (1999, p. 243) argues that the target of Mehmet II’s reform was the revenues from *mülks* and *waqfs* distributed to religious groups, not local aristocrats, and places the motivation of the reform in the financial sphere. F. Köprülü’s thesis laid the foundations of this approach. According to Köprülü (2005, p. 330), the confiscation of *waqf* lands should be interpreted as “one of the measures taken against financial crises and a means of balancing against the unnecessary proliferation of *waqfs* [tm]”. However, since Köprülü did not explain the term ‘financial crises’ sufficiently, more detailed research is needed on this issue. In addition, the proposition of ‘unnecessary proliferation of *waqfs*’ -if the term ‘unnecessary’ is accepted as a base for the Ottoman administration, not Köprülü- can be read as a political and financial damage to the interests of the central government. Pamuk (2003, p. 51) argues that severe silver shortages, as well as centralism, were influential on the basis of interventionist economic policies during the reign of Mehmet II. Due to the shortage of silver, it caused Mehmet II to restrict the transportation, processing and circulation of silver in the empire (Pamuk, 2003, pp. 49-50), and moreover, resources were transferred to the central treasury through

⁸⁴⁷ An expression in Tursun Beg indicates that the last expedition may be to Egypt. According to him (Tursun, 2013, p. 229), Mehmet II got sick when he crossed to the Anatolian side for a campaign, and Mehmed Pasha said, “I hope you will become the sultan of Egypt [tm]” to give morale to the ruler.

adulteration of coins in order to meet the needs of the expanding army and bureaucracy (Pamuk, 2003, p. 56). In this context, it is possible to conclude that the increase in quantity of state officials and the insufficient amount of silver in circulation are two important factors that cause the ‘financial crisis’. However, it has not been fully explained within this framework why *mülks* and *waqf* lands were converted into *timars* that did not directly generate cash income during the financial crisis. İnalçık’s (2019a, p. 437) criticism of Özel that the subject of the reform is land, not financial income, makes sense in this respect. The fact that Âşıkpaşazâde (2017, p. 209) used the expression “he grant some as timars [tm]” while addressing this issue can be considered as important evidence in this regard. Moreover, Kıvâmî (2018, p. 544), while addressing the issue, states that some Muslim *waqfs* in the country have been transferred to the status of *timars* because of malicious and mindless viziers and highlights this aspect of the phenomenon.

Emecen (2019a, pp. 174-75) states that this practice is related to the search to establish more *timar* lands to increase military power, and therefore, certain lands were converted into *timars* by making the mentioned reform. If this interpretation is taken to be correct, the reform attempt should either be considered as an extension of Mehmet II’s possible eastern expedition against the Mamluks, as was pointed in the first approach, or an essential connection between fiscalism tendencies and *timar* endowments should be explored further. In this framework, there are two different aspects of fiscalism could be mentioned about financial resources: (i) maximization by increasing incomes corresponds to tax farming, (ii) maximization by reducing expenditures corresponds to *timar* entrustment. In addition to these, the sale of lands as *mülks* and mansions seen in the Seljuks constitutes another example of practices aimed at increasing incomes. If the second option is considered, the redistribution of *mülk* and *waqf* lands as *timar* lands can be considered as part of an attempt to reduce the cash expenditures of the state in the final analysis. Reidl (2014, p. 51) states that the state mechanism that Mehmet II handed over cannot be considered very bright financially. Even if it is understood that a significant amount of cash was collected in the treasury during the reign of Mehmet II, it can be thought that it was collected for precautionary purposes in the face of financial problems. If the reduction in the number of Janissaries in the last years of Mehmed II’s reign is interpreted as a response to the shortage of silver, it becomes clear that increasing the number of timariot *sipâhîs* and entrusting land to statesmen rather than paying them directly may have been taken as a financial

measure. It should also be taken into account that this measure may have had a positive effect on military power.

In this context, there is another interesting aspect of the phenomenon that emerges in primary sources. Thus, as some of the *iqta* lands were sold as property in order to generate income for the central treasury in the Seljuks under the rule of Ilkhanate, Mehmed II's reform may have enabled *mülk* lands to be bought and sold for money. Âşıkpaşazâde expresses and criticizes this aspect of the reform quite clearly (Apzd, 2017, p. 209): "Tebaanın elinde Osman Gazi'nin zamanında verilmiş yerler vardı. Tasarruf edegelmişlerdi. Bu nişancı o kanunu bozdu. Tekrar bunlardan tapu aldı. Çok para verene verdi. Nice yoksulların yerceğizleri ellerinden gitti".⁸⁴⁸ Âşıkpaşazâde's statements can be interpreted in two ways: Firstly, that Karamânî Mehmed Pasha gave these lands back to those who paid the most bribes, and secondly, that these lands were sold as property. The statement 'He bought title deeds from them again' shows that some people, at least theoretically, were able to re-register their old lands for money. Moreover, the statement was presented above that 'some lands' were given as *timar* supports the proposition that not all lands were turned into *timars* and a significant part of them was redistributed in exchange for money. On the other hand, as İnalçık (2019a, p. 439) points out, the strengthening of Karamânî Mehmed Pasha against the viziers and commanders of *Kapıkulu* origin turns the *timar* endowments into a movement to change the balance of power in the military structure or a power struggle within the state. Although it can be thought that Karamânî Mehmed Pasha formed a timariot *sipâhî* group affiliated to him, the opposition of the provincial ruling class and religious groups who were harmed by this policy, in the final analysis, prevented this movement from being a broad-based social opposition and condemned it to a palace intrigue. Heyd (1973, pp. 11-12) states that this reformation was made for fiscalist purposes, but draws attention to the fact that it can be considered as a reorganization of the feudal system in general. The fact that the penal code, which was put into practice during the reign of Mehmet II, was supplemented with penalties that could bring extra income to *timar* owners and state officials is interpreted in this way by the author (Heyd, 1973, p. 12).

The ideological and political aspects of this reform carried out during the reign of Mehmed II should also be mentioned. The reform in question was legally grounded

⁸⁴⁸ In the hands of the subjects, there were places given during the reign of Osman Beg. They have been used to this day. This nişancı [pointing Karamânî Mehmed Pasha] broke that law. He took the title deed from them again. He gave these places to those who gave more money. Lots of poor people lost their places.

and tried to be made legitimate by the Ottoman administration. As Köprülü (2005, p. 329) points out, the argument that the abuses of *waqfs* increase have been accepted as the main legitimacy basis and it has been argued that *waqfs* cannot fulfill the services they are obliged to, and therefore they are converted to the status of *mîrî* land. According to İnalçık (2019a, p. 437), based on the edict placed at the introduction of an old Karamanid *waqf* register, it is claimed that “the original purpose of the waqf has disappeared [tm]” due to the destruction of buildings such as mosques and lodges owned by the waqf. According to İnalçık (2019a, p. 437): “Such mülks and waqfs have been abrogated. The state did not accept this as a confiscation, it abolished the waqfs that had no function, and claimed that the current status was abolished [tm]”. In the history of Âşıkpaşazâde, it is seen that exactly this reason was shown as the basis for the reform program, and Karamânî Mehmed Pasha said about the *waqfs*, “These are null, they have been abolished [tm]” (Apzd, 2017, p. 209). However, Âşıkpaşazâde does not find this argument valid and considers the exchange of *waqf* properties as a policy in contrary to the Sharia.

In the history of Âşıkpaşazâde, there are emphasis and criticisms that there was a violent struggle especially over the *imaret waqfs*. If these criticisms are not fiction and correspond to historical facts, such examples may have been seen by the rulers of the period as a basis for the acquisition of *waqf* goods to generate income for the state treasury. Âşıkpaşazâde claims that there was constant struggle/fight in the *imarets* of the Ottoman dynasty. According to him, some of those who manage the *imarets* act according to their own interests, not according to the principles of *waqfiyya*, and the inspectors sent to solve this problem also deviate the *imaret* from its essential purpose by disrupting the order of the endowment and trying to generate income for the state treasury (Apzd, 2017, pp. 210-11):

Gelen misafirin bazısına yemek verir, bazısına vermez. Bazısını da misafir etmez. Bahaneleri bu ki: ‘Mansıb sahibisin’ derler. Yahut: ‘Bu şehirde bir başka imarete misafir olmuşsun’ derler. Elhasıl onu misafir etmezler. Böyle olunca hayır sahiplerinin hayırına mâni olmuş olurlar. Bazen bu hali vezirler öğrenir. Padişahın emriyle ilim ehlinden bir müfettiş gönderirler ki gitsin, hayır sahibinin hayrını yerine koysun. O dahi gidip misafirin yemeğinden keser, ocağın külünü satar,

imaretin ekmeğini küçüldür. Oradaki hüddamların nafakasını keser. Tebaadan fazla nesne alır. Akçalar artırır, gelir, padişahın hazinesine koyar.⁸⁴⁹

This passage presents two types of example cases. The first example shows that the officials sent from the center undertake the management of the *waqf* with a fiscalist approach, that is, the *waqf* revenues that they increase through various ways are directed directly to the treasury. This is significant in terms of showing the general tendency of the officials of central government. The second example reveals that due to this fiscalism policy, the state officials evaluate that *waqf* revenues can be much higher than what is seen in official documents, and that it is possible to use them as a direct resource in times of shortage. It should be noted that Âşıkpaşazâde's statements also contain criticisms of corruption regarding the functioning of *waqfs*, as underlined by Köprülü and İnalçık. However, it is also noteworthy that the author directed his criticisms directly to the royal *waqfs* and did not mention any negative examples targeting other reformed *waqfs*. In this context, it is necessary to think that the criticisms directed at the *waqfs* were primarily recourse to the *waqfs* belonging to the royal family and that this was constructed as a discourse of resistance. Thus, it is seen that the traditionalist reproduction model was brought to the forefront against the fiscalist reproduction model and the criticism that the *waqfs* should fulfill their traditional functions was directed directly at the royal *waqfs*. Moreover, the intervention of the central state is shown as one of the factors that prevent *waqfs* from fulfilling their traditional functions.

Finally, it is necessary to address the criticisms developed on this subject. Let's start by examining the status of *waqf* properties and their meaning in terms of social class relations. Günay (2012) states that the word '*waqf*' means 'to stop', 'to cease', and 'to detain' and that this word should be understood as "the permanent allocation of a property by the owner for a religious, social and charity purpose [tm]" as a legal term. Although the origins of the *waqf* institution are controversial, the fact that the *ribats*, which served as a kind of military control point established during the expansion period

⁸⁴⁹ "Some of the guests are given food, some are not. It does not host some. This is their excuse: They say, 'You have a salary from the state'. Or they say, 'You have been a guest in another imaret in this city'. In short, they do not host him. When this happens, they hinder the good of the benefactors. Sometimes the viziers learn this situation. By the order of the sultan, they send an inspector from the scholars so that he can go and restore the good of the benefactor. Even he goes and saves the guest's food, sells the ashes of the stove, and reduces the bread of the imaret. It cuts the salary of the servants there. It takes more taxes from the subjects. He saves money, comes and puts it in the sultan's treasury.

of Islam, became units for religious service where *sūfīs* and people discussing religious sciences gathered over time (Köprülü, 2005, p. 286).⁸⁵⁰ In this context, it is frequently seen that buildings and services such as “masjid, tomb, ribat, dervish lodge, madrasa, school, bridge, irrigation canal, waterway, caravanserai, hospital [tm]” (Sırım, 2017, p. 177), and fountains and *imarets* also gain *waqf* status (Yediyıldız, 2012).

Köprülü (2005, p. 311) explains the advanced development of the *waqf* institution during the Umayyad period by referring to the emergence of a prosperous social stratum in the old Islamic cities and the rise of the military aristocracy in the newly conquered regions. The development of new class strata caused a major change in the typical structure of the *waqf* institution dedicated to charity or Islamic sciences, and led to the emergence of ordinary (*âdî*) *waqfs* whose incomes were passed on to the appointed heirs. The legal conditions for this new type of *waqf* were provided by the fatwas written by Abu Yusuf, who, in the words of Köprülü (2005, p. 311), “taking into account the necessities of the time and the interests of the rich classes [tm]” during the Abbasid period, and *waqfs* became a means for inheriting private property. In particular, *waqfs* have acquired a function that ‘to insure’ privileges of distinguished families in order to avoid a threat of confiscation, or in case one dynasty/state collapses and country is dominated by another (Köprülü, 2005, p. 312). It is clear that this method in particular was used for the perpetuation of class privileges, as the principle that under the Islamic provisions the rulers could not interfere with the *waqf* income and property had widespread popular support.

If the problem is evaluated from the other side, putting the economic privileges of the members of the ruling class in the form of *waqf* provides them with a legal and popular/ideological guarantee. In fact, this principle also applicable to *waqfs* which allocated to public services. First of all, it is strictly forbidden for the lower classes (farmers, nomads, etc.) to transfer the lands they cultivate to *waqf* status. In this respect, the act of endowment emerges as a privilege of the members of the rentier class who own property or money. Secondly, while the subject of reproduction in ordinary *waqfs* is the transfer of class privileges belonging to individuals or families to future generations, in *waqfs* allocated to public service, the legitimacy of the ruling classes and their supporting public images are integrated with consent mechanisms. Providing

⁸⁵⁰ While there are views that regard *waqfs* as Islamic institutions (Sırım, 2017), there are also views that find their origins in pre-Islamic Turkish traditions or in the Hittite institutions (Ertem, 2011, p. 32).

public services does not abolish the rent appropriation mechanism that feeds the *waqfs*, but also strengthens the power of the ruling classes. In addition, since there is no collective decision-making or supervisory mechanism in the provision of public services, the public does not have any decision-making authority regarding the content of these services. For this very reason, whether the *waqfs* are of an ordinary or public category, they are not an element of pure social welfare system as Taşkesen (2017, p. 60) argues, or “an example of the characteristic of Islam which prevents the development social class difference [tm]” as Sirim (2017, p. 176) argues. On the contrary the search for the reproduction of class power that lies at its core - that is, the class pattern - should not be overlooked. For example, Ertem (2011) indirectly accepts such a function. According to the Ertem (2011, p. 44), *waqfs* provide social order by supporting the development of middle class, thus, “the middle class, which represents the reason and calmness that provides the relationship and communication between the proud high class and the envious lower class, It acts as a balance between the lower and upper classes [tm]”. It is clear that this model fulfills the function of reproduction of class dominion. In this context, Köç (2009, pp. 180-181) evaluates the *waqfs* established by state officials as icons of imperial legitimacy and adds: “(...) the Ottoman officials, who established *waqfs* in Anatolia and Arab/Middle East cities as the symbol of the ruler and the state in his person, of domination and legitimacy, reminded its people to obey the sultan and the state institutions in his presence [tm]”. In this framework, Hoaxter (2002, pp. 120-121) analyzes *waqfs* both as institutions in which the public sphere is formed and the notion of ummah embodies as a principle of social order, and, as a result of the use of this institution as a medium, he also considers it as an opportunity for the ruling classes to demonstrate their commitment to the values of the community based on the notion of ummah.

The emergence of Ottoman money-*waqfs*, especially in the 15th century, added a new function to the functions of obtaining the consent of the lower classes and transferring the privileges of the ruling classes to new generations, and created a medium that made material-financial solidarity between the ruling classes possible. Moreover, money-*waqfs* that lend money in return for interest emerged and gained a legitimate status from the 15th century onwards and a permissible status according to Sharia by the 16th century (Pamuk, 2003, p. 88-89). Furthermore, for example, the *icrateyn* method, which started to become institutionalized with the 16th century, made it possible for *waqf* properties to be rented out by third parties and thus enabled to

develop an alternative source of income (Genç, 2014a, p. 17). With the *mukata'a* method, *waqf* lands were transferred to third parties for an annual payment for a certain fee (Sirim, 2017, p. 178). This method gives tenants all kinds of usage rights that are subject to private property (Ertem, 2011, p. 51). Moreover, for example, with the *gedik* method that emerged in the 16th century, *waqfs* were given a person to engage in trade and crafts (Ertem, 2011, p. 51). The method of *istibdâl* (Akgündüz, 2001), which started to be discussed in the 15th century and adhered to a definite principle in the second half of the 16th century, created a kind of Sharia-fraud (*hile-i şeriyye*) opportunity for the transfer of assets by enabling the exchange of *waqf* immovables with private properties. If we examine the figures given by Yediyıldız (2012) for the first half of the 16th century, it can be seen that the share of *waqfs* in the Ottoman economy was substantial:

(...) 17% of the total income (79.784.960 akçe) of the Anatolian province between the years 1530-1540 belonged to the *waqfs*. This ratio was 14% in Karaman province, 15.7% in Rum province, 14% in Aleppo and Damascus provinces, 5% in Dulkadriye and 5.4-32% in Rumelia. These were the incomes from the agricultural areas of the *waqfs*, the incomes of the city *waqfs* are not included in these. According to the calculations, the general budget of the *waqfs* in the Ottoman Empire, which had close to 1000 *waqfs* in each of the 300 administrative units called *sanjaks*, reached one third of the state budget.

On the other hand, Divitçioğlu (1981, p. 61) evaluates the *waqfs* as an accidental element in terms of the Ottoman economic system and states that they did not shake the economic foundations of the *mîrî* land regime. This proposition is true in half. Let's start with the wrong in half point first. *Waqfs*, properties and manors are essential, not accidental, elements in the *mîrî* land system because certain private property elements and class privileges were guaranteed by the Ottoman administration, making it possible to keep the ruling classes under state control, supervision, and obtain their consent. This is exactly why such structures could be found in the Abbasids and Seljuks. In addition, the acceleration of the development of *waqf* in the Ottoman state was during the period of Bayezid I, which is considered the beginning of the centralist tendencies (Werner, 2019a, p. 361). On the other hand, it is true that the unregulated spread of these structures would destroy the *mîrî* land order and thus the authority of the Ottoman dynasty, and the prevalence of these structures had in principle to be kept at a level that would not 'to shake the economic foundations' of the social order, and often was so.

As a result, all of the above-mentioned forms of evaluation of *waqfs* cannot be considered merely as examples of classical process of ‘corruption’ or ‘malicious’ use, or exceptional/accidental development. In these examples, more general class tendencies and their operation on *waqfs* become visible. The usage patterns of *waqfs* that have developed over the course of history also constitute a reference point for their early period examples. This reference point necessitates the examination of the class interests and social struggles of the subjects who benefit from the *waqfs*.

When the secondary literature commenting on the subject is examined, there is a consensus that the social strata that suffered from and reacted to the reform in the reign of Mehmet II were those that benefited from *waqfs* due to their class interests. İnalçık (2019a, p. 436) draws attention to the fact that *waqfs* are generally established under the category of *evladiye* and one-tenth of the *waqf* income is allocated to the children of their founders as *waqf* trustees, and states that trustees earn income from the rental of estates such as shops, inns and baths from *waqf* properties. According to the İnalçık (2019a, p. 436), an ‘aristocratic class’ was formed in the Ottoman Empire, which was called *Çelebi* and was fed by *waqf* revenues. Köprülü (2005, p. 329) states that the lands that have been transferred to the status of *timar* may belong to *waqfs* who are tax exempt and tend to preserve the family wealth. According to Köprülü (2005, p. 330), some of these social groups can be identified as statesmen and dignitaries. İnalçık (2019a, p. 438) further elaborates on this proposition of Köprülü and states that the groups in question are “beks, pashas, ulama, dervishes who own *zawiya* and pre-Ottoman aristocratic families [tm]”, also he underlines that the most affected and the most numerous part of the reform was the community of sheikhs and dervishes affiliated to *zawiyas* organized around small *waqfs*. Emecen (2019a, p. 175) similarly thinks that these reforms affected the ulama class, sheikhs and old Turkish-Muslim families. Özel (1999, p. 227) states that there was a great discontent with the land reform among the ulama, *sûfi* circles and dervishes, and this was also shared by the local noble families. The problem of the origin of the property of the noble families is worth examining in this context. Some of the pre-Ottoman aristocratic families in Anatolia were part of frontier principalities during the Seljuk period, and they dominated the lands they held by conquest. The fact that these lands taken from the Christians were recognized by the ruler of the period as property by official certificates strengthens the property claim of those families. An anecdote from anonymous histories exemplifies the ideological relationship between *ghaza* and landowning in question. In the anonymous chronicle

published by Köklü (2004, p. 41), it is told that a shepherd who conquered a place with a sword lived on this land that Mehmet II chose to have Fatih Mosque built, and that he made a barn and settled here. Mehmet II persuaded the shepherd to ‘grant’ the land to him in exchange for a thousand gold coins and some conditions. Considering that the protagonists of this anecdote are a ruler and a poor shepherd, it is understood that they symbolize a property relationship that is expected to be valid in any case. According to this, the pieces of land that are owned by the individual through the *ghaza* are not directly used by the ruler without the consent of the owner, even for the public benefit. Another example could be found in a later-dated story about how the ulama stratum defended the properties in question. According to Kafadar (2019, p. 164), the anecdote in Taşköprülüzâde is as follows; Orhan Beg promised to Lala Şahin Pasha that he would not want booty from the wars he led, but when Lala Şahin Pasha was successful in the war, Orhan Beg reneged on this promise. Tâcüddin-i Kürdî’s opinion was sought for the solution of this issue and the fatwa was given against Orhan Beg in the form of staying faithful to the previous agreement. In other words, a decision was made in favor of a *ghazi*, which, although it may be a fabricated anecdote, is important in terms of showing a certain idealized attitude. In other words, there is a hidden thought that the members of the ulama, who derive their power from the Islamic provisions, can also be above the ruler, and we can place a point of view that limits the role of the ruler to only applying the Sharia provisions in the background of this view. But secondarily, the underlying issue of this anecdote touches on the problem of how to limit the tendency of rulers to accumulate wealth and money at the expense of the ruling classes.

It cannot be assumed that all *sûfî* circles were equally disturbed by these developments. As Küçükdağ (2006, pp. 28-29) points out although Karamânî Mehmed Pasha, whose father was a Mevlevî Sheikh, influenced Sheikh Vefâ and the *sûfis* of Konya, he was not supported by the Halvetî and Bayramî circles. In fact, the fact that Hâfız Halîl, the grandson of Sheikh Bedreddin, who was a follower of Sheikh Akşemseddin, criticizes the confiscation of *waqf* properties even in an irrelevant work such as the *menâkıbnâme* of Sheikh Bedreddin shows how burning the issue is among the followers of Bayramî circles.⁸⁵¹ Moreover, it is noteworthy that there is an anecdote against the rulers who confiscated the *waqf* properties in the *menâkıbnâme* of Seyyid

⁸⁵¹ Hâfız Halîl describes the situation of Sheikh Bedreddin, who was forced to live in Iznik after the death of Musa Çelebi (2015, p. 162): “Vakıf malına el uzatmamıştı/ El uzatmadığı için çok sıkıntı çekti/ Çünkü çok perhizkar biriydi/ Hakk’ ünsiyetle özü uyanıktı/ Vakıf malından çok sakınırdı/ Daima ‘Kalbi kararır’ derdi”.

Abul Vefâ written by Vâsî'î (2011, pp. 130-31). In this respect, it could be asserted that the reform in question may have an aim such as reducing the number of *sûfi* circles and putting them under state control. Moreover, it is clear that grand vizier executed the confiscation policy, although who originated from the madrasa education was not supported by the ulama stratum. The fact that Karamânî Mehmed Pasha had young and old scholars arguing in Fatih Madrasahs reduced his support for the ulama, and even there were rumors that he used this method “to put the scholars who he was jealous of in a plight [tm]” (Küçükdağ, 2006, p. 31).

It can be seen that discontent has become a general trend within the ruling classes, given the relations between the ulama stratum, some of the state officials, and local noble families in general. For example, it is seen that the family properties of Çandarlı İbrahim Pasha (Reindl, 2014, p. 169), İshak Pasha (Reindl, 2014, p. 178, 222) and Hamzabeyoğlu Kara Mehmed Pasha were also transformed to *timars*. The first of these examples belonged to a famous ulama families, and the other two belonged to the influential families of Anatolia and had family members who assumed high positions in the state such as *qadi*, treasurer, vizier and *beylerbeyi*. Moreover, it can be thought that these high-level state officials also earn high incomes from their personal *waqfs*. As Köç (2009, pp. 188-89) states, it is quite surprising that Ishak Pasha earned an annual income of sixty thousand *akçe* from the public bath belongs to *waqf* property in Ankara and Mahmud Pasha, similarly, owned thirty five percent of the total *waqf* shops in Ankara. In the anonymous chronicle (Köklü, 2004, p. 59), the grand vizier İshak Pasha's being seen as hateful and greedy and being criticized for persecuting the poor also raises a question mark about how these properties were acquired.

It can be claimed that the champions of the traditionalist tendency were the dervish circles and the owners of the *mülk* lands and that these groups were directly defended by the notables of the ulama stratum. In the example of the discussion between Âşıkpaşazâde and Karamânî Mehmed Pasha, which was given in the sub heading of this part, although Âşıkpaşazâde, who is a member of dervish circles, claimed that the reform was against the Shar'a, Karamânî's answer as ‘Which of your property was confiscated, you ask questions’, thus shows the main opposition axis focusing general social interests and religious provisions. While Mehmet II's close circle claims that the reform is abrogation (*nesih*) in accordance with the general interests and the Sharia, the oppositional front argues that the reform is harmful to social solidarity, that is, contrary to general social interests and is religiously invalid. In this context, the central

government criticizes the opposition for acting with the motivation to protect their personal interests, while the opposition criticizes the central government for its ambition to accumulate wealth.

While the criticisms leveled in this framework defend private property or religious services on the one hand, they also contain serious criticisms of the behavior of *qadis* and governors on the other hand. As Werner points out (2019a, pp. 361-62), the fact that the *qadis* and sanjak-begs were held responsible for the implementation of the reform with an edict that Mehmet II might have published between 1478-81 explains why the reaction was directed against these two groups in addition to the ruler. On the other hand, it can be better understood why the criticisms directed at the *qadis*, which was discussed in the previous section, have become a discipline mechanism and that such a duality has emerged within the ulama stratum. Because there is a two-way engagement of a group belonging to the higher strata of the ulama stratum to the class privileges obtained through *waqfs*. First of all, they are directly involved in such relationships due to their affiliation with local notable families with such *waqfs*. Secondly, the members of the ulama indirectly owe a significant part of their social legitimacy to the guarantee of these relations, as the local notables protect their class privileges by applying the provisions of Islamic Law on private property and *waqfs*. It is sufficient to look at these foundations, while investigating why a political discourse in the direction of the re-emergence of the Shar'i order during the land reform was considered obsolete during the reign of Bayezid II. For example, the following lines by Âşikpaşazâde (Kala, 2013, p. 309) are the clearest example of such a discourse: "Ümiddir Han Bayezid eyyamında/ Bula hem bu alem şer'ün nizamın".⁸⁵² This issue will be discussed in detailed in the following sections.

In addition, it is necessary to examine the criticisms in the economic context. As was discussed above, a series of criticisms have been developed by Âşikpaşazâde, Tursun Beg and Kivâmî, and most of them either focus on individuals or are expressed in a general discourse of justice. For example, Âşikpaşazâde's criticisms/insults about Karamânî Mehmed Pasha, whom he thought to have contributed to this reform, such as his lineage being false, abolishing religious provisions and being 'buried without a head', are of a personal nature in the final analysis (Apzd, 2017, p. 208-209). On the other hand, it is seen that the most detailed theoretical criticisms on this subject were formulated by Sinan Pasha. The fact that Sinan Pasha was considered one of the greatest

⁸⁵² It is hoped that in the time of Khan Bayezid / This world will have the order of Sharia.

scholars of the time, served as the grand vizier and also belonged to the *sûfî* circles explains why the criticisms in question were so fundamental. Since Sinan Pasha's criticisms focus on both the general principles and the implementers of the fiscalist policies in this framework, he has the quality of being a direct representative of those who were negatively affected by the reform.

Let first consider Sinan Pasha's criticisms of the general principles of fiscalist policies. According to him, cruel rulers see the people as a sheep to be milked, but it is not the right approach to milk until their udders dry up and neither their offspring nor the ruler/shepherd can benefit (Sinan Paşa, 2013, p. 688): "Şu söz ki zaleme arasında meşhurdur denilir/ 'Reaya bir koyun gibidir, durmadan sağılır'/ Onun ma'nası o değildir ki şöyle sağasın ki emcikleri kuruyup gide/ Ne kuzusuna sütü kala ve ne sana faide ede".⁸⁵³ Sinan Pasha rejects the unlimited increase in state revenues and argues that social order can only be achieved by respecting the property of the people. In this context, he puts a traditionalist reproduction model against fiscalist practices and recommends that the general tendencies be respected within the framework of Sharia. According to Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 688); "Alem halkının nizamı ellerinde olan emvali ile olur/ Ve reaya-yı mülkün intizamı riayet-i ahvali ile olur".⁸⁵⁴ Here, the articulation of the terms social order ('*nizam*') and situations ('*ahval*') can be read as an affirmation of the traditional system of accumulation and protection of property. Because, in the continuation of these lines, the author advises the ruler not to go out of the Sharia rules in the administration of the property and thus stipulates that the forms of ownership such as *waqfs* and *mülk* lands protected by Sharia law should not be interfered with. Sinan Pasha's proposition on this subject is as follows (2013, p. 688): "Padişah olan daima tedbir-i mülkte tekasül etmemek gerek/ Ve hiçbir vakit emr-i şer'de tesahül etmemek gerek".⁸⁵⁵ Considering that the term 'takâsul' in these lines means 'indifference' or 'impassiveness' and the term 'tesâhül' means 'tolerance', it can be understood from the assertion that the provisions on private properties and *waqfs* should not be left to the arbitrariness of customary law, combined with the emphasis that this

⁸⁵³ It is said that there is a world is famous among the oppressors / 'Reâyâ is like a sheep, she is milked incessantly'

Its meaning is not that it should milk so that its breasts dry up/ Neither lamb will have milk left nor will it benefit you.

⁸⁵⁴ The order of the people of the world is with the goods in their hands / And the order of the subjects of the administration is by following their situation.

⁸⁵⁵ It is not befitting for the rulers to be lax in their prudentia/ And it is never lax in obeying Sharia orders.

is a requirement of rulership that to obey Sharia provisions. Sinan Pasha (2013, pp. 680-82) argues that the rights of administrators and landowners should be documented and those who act right should not be interfered with by the ruler. In another couplet, Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 678) mentions one of the duties of the ruler to carry out the affairs of his elite and ordinary people and to improve their situation: “Şah olanların himmetleri mesalih-i enama gerek/ Ve padişah olanların azimetleri ıslah-ı havass u avama gerek”.⁸⁵⁶ In these lines, it is clear that the establishment of general welfare relations and economic structure for the benefit of those subordinated is considered essential. Thus, the general economic reproduction formula is indirectly shifted to the Sharia-centered functioning of the traditional economic and political units against the fiscalist policies of the center.

Sinan Pasha completes this general criticism with specific criticisms targeting concrete social segments. Particularly the target of his criticism is the governors.⁸⁵⁷ Sinan Pasha accuses the governors of confiscating the people’s property, using force and acting with unilateral anger against those under his rule. Since Werner (2019a, pp. 361-62) specifically stated the duty of the governors in the implementation of land reform, it is clear that these criticisms may have been written largely for this reason. Sinan Pasha sums up his criticisms of the governors in three points. First, the governors try to use the economic power of the people under their rule on their own account. Sinan Pasha criticizes this situation as follows (2013, p. 498): “Ne i’tibar şu valiye ki gaşım ola/ eğerçi Al-i Haşım ola (...) Bazıhsıfat uğradığın çalar/ Yine ömrü nüşura ermek umar”.⁸⁵⁸ It is not clear who the governor of Hashemite lineage referred to in these lines is. Although the claim that Karamânî Mehmed Pasha, who carried out the reform, was related to Abu Bakr, one of the Islamic Caliphs, is known (Küçükdağ, 2001), it is unlikely that he was meant. The ancestry of Abu Bakr is generally referred to as the Siddiqis, and the Taym tribe to which he is a member has a very distant line of origin with the Hashemite tribes, only being included in the Quraysh tribe (Fayda, 1994). Thus, the reference to the Hashemites is likely to be a rhetoric expression referring to

⁸⁵⁶ The intentions of those who are Shah should be to run the affairs of the people / The direction of those who become sultan should be to improve the situation of the elite and ordinary people.

⁸⁵⁷ In the *menâkıbnâme* of Mahmud Pasha, the term ‘vali’ is used to mean ‘governor’ (Aslan & Doğan, 2012, p. 59). It is possible that Sinan Pasha used this term not only for those who were governors, but also for the sanjak begs under their command.

⁸⁵⁸ Does the governor who is wronged have any value?/ What if he was descended from the Hashemites? (...) He robs anyone who stands in his way like a swindler/ Still hopes that his life will last long.

belonging to a distinguished lineage. On the other hand, it is clearly understood that Sinan Pasha stated that the governors confiscated the property of those under his rule and committed unjust acts. Because, in another verse that deals with the same issue, Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 678) uses the expressions as such: “Padişah adil olduğu nedir, amilleri zalim olucak/ Ve sultanda kıst mı olur, valileri gaşım olucak”.⁸⁵⁹ In these lines, we come across the word ‘*gaşım*’/‘*gaşum*’, which means ‘stubborn’ and ‘cruel’. Both lines have the meaning of oppressive confiscation of people’s property. It is also stated that the ruler and therefore the regime itself cannot be exempted from these practices of the governors. Secondly, Sinan Pasha argues that governors should protect rights of people and not act for personal interests: “Vali olan gerektir ki anud olmaya, mitva’ ola/ Kendi hakkına muti’ gerek ki kendi dahi muta’ ola”.⁸⁶⁰ Although the problem expressed in these lines is a general political problem, the problem of the governors’ violance of the people’s rights is also indirectly related to the abrogation of *mülks* and *waqfs*. Moreover, as was shown above, the fact that some of the governors established very rentable *waqfs* in cities and earned high income from them indicates to a dark point about how these *waqfs* were obtained.⁸⁶¹

In addition, Sinan Pasha also states that the way the governors treat the public is also a problem of mentality. With the establishment of the imperial regime, the power of the administrators appointed from the center over the local ruling classes also shows itself as this type of problem. The alienation between governors and those under their rule is embodied in a ‘look’ of governor: “Ahmaktır o vali ki ma-dununa nazar-ı şerzi olur/ Onu bilmez ki her meddin elbette bir cezri olur” (Sinan Paşa, 2013, p. 500).⁸⁶² Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 630) adds that the property and life of those who adhere to Sharia and sunnah are haram for the rulers and it is not right to tease them. Both arguments point out that, in the final analysis, local economic and political relations can affect the macro reproduction scheme. Lâmi’î Çelebi (2015, pp. 199-202) similarly criticizes that the sanjak begs were not interested in the problems of the people and people could not open their mouths because of the threat of the night watchmens (*ases*), he states that the

⁸⁵⁹ What does it mean for the sultan to be just, after his officials are cruel/ And what happens if the sultan does not do injustice, after the governors have been unjust.

⁸⁶⁰ A governor should not be cruel, he should protect everyone's rights/ If he wants to protect his own rights, he should be content with his own rights.

⁸⁶¹ For example, Ishak Pasha's purchase of *mülk* lands in Edirne from a person named Şarabdar Zağanos (Reidl, 2014, p. 178) can be an example of using political influence in this regard.

⁸⁶² He is a fool, that governor who looks at his subaltern with anger/ He does not know that every ebb will naturally have a flow.

governors of the provinces (*mirliva*) and *subaşı*s are in league with gangs and thieves, and that the *muftis* are not interested in this situation, but are busy increasing their own earnings, and that the inspectors in charge of investigating this situation completely be cruel to people.

When the examples of political thought written in this period are examined, it is noticed that most of the social segments categorized above were indeed affected by this process and expressed their reactions. While a significant part of these reactions was expressed in the political models of reproduction mechanisms, it is not surprising that a limited number of them were directly put forward within the framework of the discussion of economic reproduction. There are also two main axes in the discussion of economic reproduction. The first of these is traditionalism, which reflects the views of the *ulama stratum* and the local ruling classes, while the other is fiscalism, which reflects the military tendencies of Mehmet II's and his entourage. In this context, it is self-evident that the relevant trends are related to the re-formation of peace and war parties within the general political economy of the imperial regime. Moreover, in this framework, the fact that the *timar* grants is under the authority of the sanjak-begs constitutes the other side of the contradiction. Although determining the *waqf* and *mülk* lands to be abrogated falls under the responsibility of the *qadis*, the implementation of the abrogation policy and the distribution of the abrogated lands to certain people as *timar* fall under the jurisdiction of the sanjak begs. In this case, it should not be overlooked that the sanjak begs could act against the interests of private property owners and *waqf* trustees in order to distribute more *timars* to their cavalrymen. The increase in the number of sanjak-begs appointed from among the *Kapıkulus*, especially during the reign of Mehmet II, turns this contradiction into a struggle between the *devshirmes* and the local ruling classes. On the other hand, this contradiction is not insurmountable. The fact that the practices of the sanjak begs and provincial governors, which Sinan Pasha frequently emphasized, could be restrained without causing the reaction of the timariot *sipâhîs*, was achieved through the granting of class privileges to the sanjak begs. Kivâmî expresses this political tactic quite clearly. According to Kivâmî (2018, p. 545), during the reign of Bayezid II, sanjak begs of Anatolia and Rumelia were given “a property, a village where he liked [tm]” and various grants, and the right to buy and sell them and transform them into *waqf* status. Administrators and *sipâhîs* with lower degrees than sanjak begs were treated similarly and their requests were fulfilled whatever it is (Kivâmî, 2018, p. 545). On the grave of Karamânî Mehmed Pasha, who

was the father of the reform in question and whose head was cut off, a tombstone was placed by Sheikh Vefâ with the inscription as “he was murdered because of his detachment from society [tm]” (Küçükdağ, 2006, p. 27). This tombstone embodies how the architect of the reform was viewed by the new class consensus that emerged in response to it—that is, it makes it a ‘law engraved in stone’ which class factions dominate. On the other hand, the new class reconciliation does not mean the elimination of the fiscalist tendency of the imperial regime, on the contrary, it deepens this need because the expenditures required to satisfy the old or new ruling groups and the grants of *mülks* and *timars* have increased compared to the previous period. In the anonymous chronicles, traces of the conflict between the people of *Kapıkulu* origin and new ruling groups coming from outside can be found in this period. According to the anonymous chronicler (Giese, 1992, p. 102; Öztürk, 2000, p. 112): “İlerü Sultan Murad zamanında padişah kulu ve padişah kul-oğlı olmayana kapudan ulufe ve timar itmezlerdi. Şimdili zamanda kuldun kapuda yuvalar ziyadedür. Yabandan gelenün rağbeti ziyadedür”.⁸⁶³ The people whom the author describes as ‘*yaban*’ (outsiders) or ‘*yuva*’ (homes) in these statements must have been the new groups who were engaged in the palace circles and were not of servile origin. Because the author (Öztürk, 2000, p. 112) regretfully states in his previous lines that the rule of “*ehl-i mu'amale*” (usurers/bankers) and “*bazirgan*” (merchants) are effective at the gate of the sultan.

Karamursal (1989, p. 4) states that Bayezid II spent a great deal of his expenses due to both making high allocations to the *Diwan* members, the annual tribute for the imprisonment of Prince Cem, and spending too much money on charity and donations. To these expenditures, the financing problem of bridges, mosques, minarets, waterways and fortresses, which need to be renewed as a result of the great earthquakes and disasters in the Bayezid II period, should be added. Sakaoğlu (2017, p. 108) states that Topkapı Palace, Istanbul walls, Galata tower and walls, the Maiden’s Tower, Çekmece bridges, fortresses of Rumelia and Anatolia and great mosques were repaired, and many buildings were repaired or build all over again, and he reports that seventy-seven thousand workers and three thousand masters were gathered in Istanbul for this job. This information reveals the size of the financial need of the Ottoman state at the beginning of the 16th century. It is clear that these expenditures are deemed necessary

⁸⁶³ During the reign of Sultan Murad, people who were not the sultan's servant and the son of the sultan's servant were not given a salary and a *timar*. In the present time there are more homes than servants. Outsiders have more prestige.

in order to reproduce the class domination. The fact that the new class reconciliation became very costly in the final analysis led Bayezid II to customary taxes, and a *hudusu avariz* tax was collected from Istanbul and major cities in order to meet the war expenses (Karamursal, 1989, p. 4). From the anonymous chronicle published by Öztürk (2000, p. 139), the *azap* and *avariz* taxes were collected from the people of Istanbul, which they were not obliged to pay before, during the Lesbos expedition. Moreover, new coins were issued and put into circulation during the reign of Bayezid II (Karamursal, 1989, p. 20). While both the financial crisis and the drought and plague epidemic that emerged between 1494-1503 forced Bayezid II in the economic field, a *coup d'etat* organized by his son Selim I brought the end of his rule.

VII.III.II.II.II. Political Advices on Reproduction: Law, Tactics and Terror in Justice

In this section, the political advice given to reproduce the Ottoman class order, the practices in the sources and the discussions on these will be examined. In this framework, firstly, philosophical grounding and political models about the reproduction of the class order, secondly, the suggestions developed by political thinkers in the context of economic reproduction, thirdly, political strategies and tactics that reflect reproduction practices, and finally, the concept of justice in Ottoman thought as a political strategy and its applications will be discussed.

VII.III.II.II.II.I. On Politics and Reproduction

In this section, the abstract and general political models formulated in Ottoman political thought at the end of the 15th century will be considered. It is seen that these models especially take the political philosophy of Aristotle and al-Farabi as an example and include the concept of 'multitude' and participate in the discussions on the customary law and the absoluteness of the ruler's power to rule. Under the reign of Mehmet II, when the Ottoman monarchy attained its most developed form in the early period, and despite a serious discursive construction ideologically that the ruler was imagined as 'the one and transcendent', it remains to be explained why these writers used the concept of 'multitude'. In this context, our general thesis is that the expansion of the Ottoman land and population resulted in the gathering of people with very different ethnic, religious and cultural characteristics. The centralization of the administrative structure of the Ottoman state necessitated a significant change in the

political mentality of the imperial regime in order to manage all this difference. In this context, theoretical and practical searches have been opened in order to reproduce the central state and to make the increasing social differentiation manageable. These pursuits would gain a legal-ideological and administrative integrity only in the second half of the 16th century, that is, at the highest point of the Ottoman ‘classical age’. On the other hand, the emergence of the first cores of various theoretical and practical advancement during the reign of Mehmet II is not a coincidence, but a general tendency that became reality due to the nature of the imperial regime itself. In this context, I will try to deal with two examples of the crystallization of this advancement, namely the ‘*millet system*’ and the interpretations of Aristotle and al-Farabi’s system in political thought, in this subsection.

A subject that does not go unnoticed in the secondary literature discussing the unique characteristics of the Ottoman state is the ‘*millet system*’ (Runciman, 2018, p. 161-62). The term ‘*milla*’ was used by al-Farabi to mean “to imply religion in the broad sense as a system of beliefs, and also as a policy governed by the laws of a given religion” (Lahoud, 2005, p. 92), that inspires the ‘*millet system*’ in which various *millas* coexists. Al-Farabi develops for a triple scaling in the form of small, medium and large when dealing with advanced (*kâmil*) human societies. He states that small societies contain a small part of a certain *milla*, medium-sized societies contain all of a certain *milla*, and large societies contain more than one *milla* (Farabi, 2001, p. 79-80). What is meant by this term in the Ottoman political order in particular is the representation of various Orthodox (Greek, Armenian) churches (Protestants were added to this in later centuries) and the Jewish community in the Ottoman state by a ‘head of the *milla*’ (*etnarch*), being free to apply their own religious laws for their community and it is the mediation of the *etnarch* as an official in the collection of taxes. The binding of different religious communities to the state in this way – and also the appointment of a Sheikh-ul-Islam for Muslims, in general, leads to the emergence of a dual-law and multicultural socio-political structure in which religious minorities dominate. This segregation strategy (Adıyeke, 2014, p. 2), as a way of making different ethnic communities and beliefs under the imperial regime manageable, should also be evaluated as a political consent mechanism since different religious groups gain partial autonomy in legal practices. After the capture of Constantinople, the appointment of the priest Genannidus, one of the clergies of the Orthodox Greek Church, known for his anti-Latin character, to the patriarchate (Ware, 1975, p. 97) constitutes the first example of the

practice. Moreover, the metropolitan Hovakim, who was brought to Istanbul from Bursa during the reign of Mehmet II, was appointed as the patriarch of the Armenian church in 1461 (Ortaylı, 2020b), and Rabbi Moses Capsali became the religious representative of the Jewish people -whether it was for the city of Istanbul or with a mission covering the entire Ottoman lands is debatable- (Yaman, 2015, p. 17) proves that the systematic character of this politics became visible in the middle of the 15th century. However, definitive legal documents on these early examples are not available today. In this context, Eser (2010, p. 208) states that the concessions given to the Greek patriarch may have been verbal since no document dating from the 15th century could be found. In the historical sources of political thoughts that were discussed on this subject, a systematic framework is not drawn, and there is not even an indirect reference. It is a contradiction that should be emphasized that there is no information in the 15th century sources about such a distinctive policy that shaped several centuries of the history of the Ottoman state. This contradiction can be explained in two ways. First of all, since the legal systematization and institutional continuity of this practice may have taken place from the 16th century, it is probably not necessary to carry out an in-depth discussion on this issue at the end of the 15th century. However, the fact that both the orthodox Greek patriarch and the Armenian patriarch were appointed by the ruler during the reign of Mehmet II constitutes evidence that this practice became systematic at least at the end of the 15th century. On the other hand, the fact that Mehmet II played a dominant role in the decision-making processes and that such significant decisions were often not taken through negotiation may have prevented the thinkers from focusing on the subject. If this is the case, it can be mentioned that the thinkers of the period had a negative view on this issue and hesitated to express it. A final possibility is that the granting of privileges to Christian people and members of churches/monasteries through *emannâmes* was considered both a traditional Islamic practice and frequently applied in practice during the development of the Ottoman state, so this issue may have been considered an ordinary policy and may not have encountered any negative reactions. Nevertheless, in the latter case, it is normal to expect this subject to somehow find a place in political thought as a matter of boasting, or rather as an example of subordination relations. At this point, it is necessary to make sense of the fact that the primary sources have not taken a direct stance on the development of the ‘millet system’ and are silent, by addressing indirect discussions.

In this framework, it is inevitable to consider the emergence of the customary law debate in Ottoman political thought as a discussion that also has references to the ‘*millet system*’. Yaman (2015, p. 15) states that this practice is within the norms of traditional Islamic law and since the time of Muhammad, non-Muslims have been given wide freedom, especially in the field of private law (family law and property/inheritance rights). On the other hand, as Eser (2010) states, the emergence of these practices at the level of personal dependency relations shows that they may have been determined by customary rule in the Ottoman context. Because the fact that the names assigned to the heads of religious communities -who will be referred to as *milletbaşı/etnarch* in the following centuries- have gained the status of state officials indicates the existence of a secular-administrative dimension besides the Islamic bases of the practice. For example, Barkey (2013, pp. 186-87) states that the appointment of Moshe Capsali as head of the Jewish community contradicts the traditional Jewish practice not accustomed to a chief rabbi. Adıyeke (2014, p. 7) states that if this aspect of the practice is taken into account, it should be considered as an administrative and political organization rather than an institution based on Sharia. Interestingly, during the reign of Mehmet II, an edict was issued to accept the *Diwan* as the decision-making authority in the cases between the Jewish and Christian communities and to refer these cases to the *Diwan* from the *qadi* courts, and this edict was later renewed (Barkey, 2013, p. 201). Barkey (2013, p. 201) states that *qadis* try to keep their issues related to inter-communal conflicts within their jurisdiction. In the final analysis, we see that the problem has turned into a covert struggle between the Sharia and customary law authorities. In this respect, it would not be wrong to argue that the establishment of the ‘*millet system*’ in the imperial regime corresponds to a secular reproduction model at the factual level and that it is tried to be monopolized by the central power. The main principle of this reproduction model is the systematic engagement of the subjects with the central power as multitude, which we mentioned in the introduction of our thesis. Adıyeke (2014, p. 3) places this model in the general development path of the imperial regime as follows: “The systematization of laws, the absolutization of state institutions and the balancing of systematized multiplicities are one of the characteristics of the period of Mehmet the Conqueror [tm]”. In this manner, the focus of this sub-section will be the cores of the reproduction mechanism, which was formulated by Adıyeke (2014, p. 3) as “balancing the systematized multiplicities [tm]”, in the Ottoman political thought.

VII.III.II.II.II.I. A Prologue on the Development of the Idea of Customary Rule in Islamic Philosophy

“People must be dependent on either the Sharia
or the judgment of reason, so that the order of the world can be completed [tm]”
(Ībn Sina, 2004, p. 34)

How the qualitative and quantitative expansion of human societies affects the economic, political and moral life of human beings has been a subject that has been discussed since ancient Greek philosophy. The transition of societies from family or village/neighborhood life to city and state life draws attention to how complex relationships and contradictions in their material and mental lives can be understood and managed. The set of concepts that emerged in this framework and has been at the center of political thoughts for a long time consists of ‘multiplicity’ (*plethos*), ‘character/temperament’ (*ethos*), ‘purpose’ (*telos*) and ‘form of administration/state’ (*politeia*). Although these elements of political thinking were derived within the ancient Greek philosophy, they gained new features and connotations in different historical contexts, so they could survive. If this set of concepts, which can be transferred to the new age with the contribution of Thomas Aquinas to political thought in the 13th century, has succeeded in formulating a rational balance in the power struggle between the church, sects, princes and the kingdom, the influence of Muslim philosophers who lived between the 10th and 12th centuries dealing with a similar problem is undeniable. In this period, the increasing political and cultural contradictions in the Islamic world also moved to the ideological dimension and turned into a social struggle between the ideas of the construction of a new Islamic tradition and the revival of what is assumed to be traditional. The revival of the idea of multitude and keeping society together by reasoning -partly by filing religious and sectarian distinctions- in the pen of 10th and 12th century Muslim thinkers should be evaluated within its historical context. Al-Farabi, who was the first to express this idea, formulated his thoughts in an Islamic world divided between Shiite and Sunni dynasties, Avicenna’s thinking in an Iran divided between different ethnicities, sects and princes, and Averroes who was greatly influenced by cosmopolitanism of Cordoba and the pragmatism of the Muwahids (Wohlman, 2010, p. 103) reveals the historical context in this respect. For example, the use of the concept of ‘*imam*’ by al-Farabi and Averroes in addition to concepts such as philosopher, legislator, and prophet directly refers to the imams of the Ahl al-Bayt, who

are considered infallible due to Shiite political thought, but more precisely, all this plurality of 'lawmakers' it indirectly affirms that nothing can be common in it except the reason. It is necessary to mention al-Ghazali along with these names in search in accordance with the context of the age. As Mitha (2001, p. 27) puts it, al-Ghazali's intellectual career is also in a unique historical context, as it was shaped by the Seljuk Sultanate, the Abbasid Caliphate, and the Shiite-Sunni conflict. It is necessary to add to this framework the ethnic and religious diversity of the period. It is known that the Great Seljuk State had a large Christian population, Shaman, Buddhist and Manichaeen minorities could be encountered in the Iranian geography, and there were a significant number of Jewish settlers in the cities of Isfahan, Hamadan, Samarkand and Rey (Karadaş, 2004, p. 24).

Such new interpretations and searches are directly related to the alienation process of primitive Islam, which carries the traditional tribal religion cores, into a universal religion. The emergence of dozens of different interpretations of Islam and Islamic lifestyle - and criticisms - in a wide region from Cordoba to Bukhara and in communities integrated with different customs, the third step of the alienation of Islam, which turned from a semi-tribal religion to a state religion (Umayyad and Fatimid interpretations), namely brought about universalization. Moreover, the thought of al-Ghazali, for example, represents the second pole of the dialectical struggle in the moment of universalization -as Arslan (2017, p. 263) states, in terms of constituting the anti-thesis that became dominant in this period of the philosophy-revelation debate.⁸⁶⁴ Thus, the historical context of the first sources of religion is completely transcended intellectually, and a new and alien level – even if it claims orthodoxy – emerges. The reinterpretations of Aristotle's philosophy in this historical context by Islamic thinkers also affected the way of establishing a relationship between social multiplicity, religious law and reason in the last analysis and laid the groundwork for the understanding of

⁸⁶⁴ As Aydın points out (2012, p. 17), the essence of Islam in the years of its birth is determined by the answers given to the social problems in Mecca, where the nomadic lifestyle has just been abandoned and the commercial aristocracy has begun to take root. For this reason, religion, which has developed within the "phenomenon-culture dialectic" for twenty-three years, has not formed a systematic theoretical framework to a large extent. With the development of the Umayyad reign, this first period is followed by the second phase, in which Islam absorbs the cultural and theoretical knowledge in the newly conquered geographies and codifies its own belief-thought and law. At the center of the theoretical discussions of this second period is the Mu'tazila-Ash'ari split (Arslan, 2017, p. 263). Finally, in the third period, we see that the Islamic world was divided into different sectarian structures and states and new theoretical searches emerged.

secular politics. While the works of the aforementioned *Meşşâî* philosophers are based on providing a philosophical basis for *kalam* (theology) studies, it is seen that even the more conservative thinkers al-Mawardi and al-Ghazali, who reject this tendency, had to open a door on the legitimacy of secular politics in the final analysis (Yılmaz & Gündoğdu, 2013, p. 61).⁸⁶⁵ On the other hand, the Aristotelian reason-happiness-virtue schema was tried to be translated into the sunnah-virtue-happiness scheme, contrary to *Meşşâî* philosophers, and an ‘official’ theology was substituted for philosophical interpretation, for example, in the commentary on morality written by al-Ghazali (1983), *Al-maksadü’l esna şerh-u esmaillahil’husna*.

When Ottoman political thought is examined, it is seen that a similar debate has made itself felt especially since the second half of the 15th century. In the two Ottoman historical calendars (Atsız, 2019, pp. 37-38, 101) dated 824 and 843 Hijri (1421 and 1439/40), the ten people whose death dates are given in the chapters titled “History of great scholars and philosophers” include Socrates, Plato and the fact that al-Farabi, Avicenna and Nasireddin Tûsî are mentioned with praise along with Aristotle. This is an important sign that the traces of the *Meşşâî* tradition have not disappeared yet. In fact, it is seen that the *tefahüt* (refusal) tradition which started as a result of al-Ghazali’s work named *Tehâfütü’l-Felâsife* and Averroes’ response to it with his work named *Tahafut et-Tehâfut el-Felâsife*, was revived during the reign of Mehmet II.

As Dölek (2010, p. 204) states, Mehmet II ordered Mustafa Müslihiddin Bursavî (Hocazâde) (1420-1488) and Ali Tûsî (d. 1482) to each write a *tehafut*, and the discussion of these two was also appreciated by other scholars of the time. It is known that Kemalpaşazâde, the first sheikh al-Islam of the 16th century, wrote an annotation called *Haşiye’ala Tehafütü’l Felâsife* for Hocazâde’s *Tehafüt*, and Karabakh wrote a short commentary named *Ta’lika’ala Tehafütü’l- Felâsife li-Hocazâde* (Dölek, 2010, p. 206). Although Demir (2020, p. 26) states that the discussions referring to the tradition of *tehafut* generally ignore Averroes and focus on writing annotations and

⁸⁶⁵ An interesting example of the search for the grounding of secular politics is found in the work *Letaifu’l-Alaiyye fi’l-Fedaili’s-Seniyye*, which was presented to the Seljuk ruler Alâeddin Keykubat. In the work, which was written by Abdi’s-Samed el-Osmani ez-Zenjani in the first half of the 13th century, a religious basis is made on the separation of religion and world affairs. As Kanar (2019a, p. 299) states, the author constructs a representative narrative that Adam assigned Şit for religious affairs and Keyvumert for worldly affairs. While Kanar (2019a, pp. 299-300) states that this interpretation does not open the door to a Western-style Cartesian laicism, he notes that it is largely similar to the distinction between the offices of Sheikh al-Islam and the grand vizier in the Ottoman state.

commentaries directly to al-Ghazali, it is highly likely that Mehmet II's librarian Molla Lütî approaches the problem from within the *Meşşâî* tradition. Because the criticisms directed at Molla Lütî in the work of Molla Ahaveyn entitled *Risale fi Ahkamı 'z-Zındık* reveal that he was a thinker who was influenced by Avicenna and in related to the *Meşşâî* tradition. Maraş (2003, p. 129) states that Lütî follows to the Fakhr al-Din al-Razi school. According to Molla Ahaveyn (Demir, 2020, p. 60), Molla Lütî was someone who “knows some sciences well [tm]”, who benefits from Avicenna’s work called *al-Kanun ve eş-Şifa*, who “denies prophecy as much as possible [tm]”, and he “began to attack the precepts of Sharia and to believe in the fallacies of the philosophers [tm]”. In the *Şakayık-ı Numaniye*, Taşköprülüzâde states that Molla Lütî was accused of denying prayer (as cited in Maraş, 2003, p. 127). Considering the example of Molla Lütî, it is necessary to accept that people from both views expressed their opinions within the tradition of *tehafüt*. The revival of the *tehafüt* debate during the reign of Mehmet II has reasons related to the discussion of reason-divine law-secular law and political formation, and it has had a significant impact on Tursun Beg’s work named *Târih-i Ebû'l-Feth*, especially by reflecting the thought of Nasîrüddin Tûsî in this work.

In this context, three important reasons can be mentioned. The first reason is that with the establishment of the imperial regime, the ruler was equipped with absolute worldly powers and continued to use the privilege of making customary laws besides Sharia with great authority. The second reason is the proliferation of different religious, sectarian and ethnic groups under the rule as a result of the expansion of the imperial lands, and the emergence of political structures such as the ‘*millet system*’. It is possible to add to these reasons the sectarian distinctions brought about by the Ottoman versus the Safavid political dilemma. In this respect, both the content of the ‘multiplicity’ and the forms of ‘unity’ become issues of reproduction that require thought. The concept of multitude enters Ottoman political thought especially through the customary law/secular politics debate summarized in the context as was discussed above, and this debate has a highly developed background that refers to common origins with the political needs of Ottoman rule. First of all, a material link is established between the concept of multitude and the structural features of political units, then the discussion of multitude, law and mass pedagogy comes into play when it comes to managing a multitude is defined as a political problem of the imperial regime. Within this general framework, the theoretical background of the 15th century Ottoman political thought is tried to be presented as much as possible.

First, let's start by explaining the concept of 'multitude'. This concept gained a remarkable place in contemporary political philosophy with Hardt and Negri's *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (2004). Hardt and Negri have developed this concept especially against the concept of sovereignty rooted in the theses of J. Bodin and J. J. Rousseau, which is a dominant notion in modern nation-state structuring. Against the concept of sovereignty that sees people as a monolithic social entity from which a general and binding political will emerges, Hardt and Negri criticize the reductive essence of this concept as such (2004, p. 99): "The population, of course, is composed of numerous different individuals. and classes, but the people synthesizes or reduces these social differences into one identity". On the other hand, the concept of 'multitude' they propose suggests that the population consists of a series of singularities that are irreducible and incomparable. There are two main themes lying behind Hardt and Negri's concept of 'multitude'. The first theme includes the philosophy of B. Spinoza, the individualist sociology of Gabriel de Tarde, and the post-structuralist political theory contributed by G. Deleuze and M. Foucault, in terms of dealing with singular-individual qualities. The second theme, as I use it in the interpretation of Ottoman politics, is the theme of ancient political thought that is more related to this analysis. In this context, Aristotle's *Peri Politika* and its interpretations by al-Farabi, Avarroes and Thomas Aquinas -without forgetting that they also influenced Hobbes' *Leviathan* and Machiavelli's *Discorsii* in the early modern period- reveal the ancient origins of the concept of 'multitude' should be considered as the second main theme of this line. While the first of these themes focuses on the specificities of each element that makes up the multitude and the potential for social freedom, the second theme focuses on the specificity and management of the multitude as a whole, which also causes it to be historically essential. In this context, the concept of multitude is handled by two main approaches in political thought, in which multitude is (i) affirmed or (ii) tried to be managed in unity. The entry of this concept into Ottoman political thought is due to the interpretation of Aristotle by *Meşşâî* philosophy. The theoretical approaches of al-Farabi and Averroes on the subject gain practical aspects by passing through the mediation of morality in Nasîrûddin Tûsî's work called *Ahlak-ı Nâsirî*.

Secondly, it is necessary to examine the emergence of this concept. The purpose of use of this concept in Aristotle is to develop a different interpretation of the management of the multitude from Socrates and Plato within the framework of the theory of development and teleology. The second book of Aristotle's *Peri Politika* is

devoted to the discussion of ideal models of the state in general. The second part of the second book is devoted to the critique of communist ideas in Plato's *Politeia* and includes the critique of the idea of 'unity' between citizens crystallized in 'common hold on women and children'. Aristotle (1977, p. 40) first criticizes Socrates' idea that everything should be as 'one' as possible in a political unit (the police), and hence the idea that women, children, and property should be common among citizens. The premise of this criticism of Aristotle's (1977, p. 41) is that the polis is different from households, military alliances and tribes as a political unit, and that while 'unity' is considered the founding principle in them, 'difference' is considered the founding principle of the polis. On the other hand, Aristotle states that the polis is not a unity but a multitude, and if it is transformed into 'one', it will lose its character and turn into a household and gradually become a single person - that is, the social formation will dissolve (1977, pp. 40-41):

A polis by its nature is some sort of aggregation: [i.e. it has the quality of including a large number of members] If it becomes more of a unit, it will first become a household instead of a polis, and then an individual instead of a household; for we should all call the household more of a unit than the polis, and the individual more of a unit than the household. It follows that, even if we could, we ought not to achieve this object: it would be the destruction of the polis. There is a further objection. Not only is the polis composed of a number of men: it is also composed of different kinds of men, for similars cannot bring it into existence.

The term used by Aristotle (1887, p. 23) to characterize the constitutive character of the polis in these statements is *πληθος*/plethos and translated as 'multitude' in Reeve's translation (1998, p. 27) and Rackham's translation (1959, p. 71), 'plurality' in Saunders's translation (2002 p. 23), 'aggregation' in Barker's (1977, p. 40) translation, and 'çokluk' in Orhan's translation (2018, p. 195). Saunders (Aristotle, 2002, p. 108) argues that this term refers to the reciprocal services between large numbers of people necessary for the development of the state. Newman (Aristotle, 1887, p. 230), on the other hand, is of the opinion that this concept refers to the specific value of individuals against the inclusiveness of the state and brings an individual critique of Plato's theory of the state. Although these interpretations are partially correct, they do not explain the thought emphasized by Aristotle well enough. If we adopt a Hegelian interpretation,

Aristotle points out two facts in these lines: The first is that in the line of development of the individual-family-village-city, there is a move from singularity to plurality, and within the general Aristotelian perspective, this can be attributed to a *telos*, which means the development of essence from the individual to the state. The second important point is that the multitude of the constituents of the polis is an essential phenomenon and that it also means the domination of the individual over his household (*oikos*) and property. In other words, the dissolution and inclusion of these particular power relations directly by a general political power relation means for Aristotle, in the final analysis, the disappearance of the reason for the existence of the polis. For this reason, the destruction of these principles, which are the founding elements of the polis, is equivalent to the disappearance of the division of labor, particular power relations, the common good and, in the last analysis, the polis. At this point, Aristotle (1977, p. 41) argues that it is not unity that creates cities, but difference and a proportional justice based on it. Thus, different social positions (shoemaker, carpenter, or noble landowner) will also receive a share of the economic benefits and administrative responsibilities of the polis, depending on their social status. In this context, it is revealed that the concept of multiplicity is used in the sense of social division of labor and stratification based on it. It is seen that the commentators of Aristotle in the Middle Ages especially emphasized this point. Thomas Aquinas' (2007, p. 84) interpretation of the second book of Aristotle's *Peri Politika* on multiplicity and difference is -partially- as follows:

And so we find that every complete whole in things of nature is composed of parts different in kind (e.g., human beings of flesh, bones, and nerves). But every whole composed of parts of the same kind (e.g., air, water, and other purely material substances) is incomplete in the way of nature. And so it is clear that a political community, since it is a complete whole, needs to consist of parts dissimilar in kind.

Based on this interpretation, Thomas Aquinas argues that punishments and shame should also change proportionally according to social status (higher and lower dignity).⁸⁶⁶ Thus, the concept of the multitude is given content in terms of the right to rule, the relations of ownership and 'dignity', and it also places the notion of relative justice as the principle of the social order. Consistent with this notion, Aristotle

⁸⁶⁶ See: Aquinas (2007, p. 84): "For example, the less important the one who caused an injury is, the proportionally greater the punishment he should receive, since striking a person of higher dignity is more blameworthy than striking a person of lower dignity".

concludes that just as cities are composed of the multitude, good regimes are aristocratic regimes run by a select few. For he argues that monarchical rule can only be good if the king is superior in virtue [1284b25], whereas in aristocratic regimes there is less chance of corruption because of the presence of more than one equal.⁸⁶⁷ On the other hand, Thomas Aquinas (2002, p. 16), in his book *De Regime Principium*, compares the aristocracy with the rule of one person and argues that if the latter, the monarchy degenerates, less evil will emerge than the oligarchy, and therefore it is more preferable. The point that Thomas Aquinas emphasizes while putting this forward is that the multiplicity necessarily rests on a governing principle (2002, p. 8) and therefore arises from unity (2002, p. 11). He formulates the essential bond he assumes between multiplicity and unity in a way that legitimizes the principle of monarchical government (Thomas Aquinas, 2002, pp. 40-41):

The final end of a multitude united in society, therefore, will not be to live according to virtue, but through virtuous living to attain to the enjoyment of the Divine. Now if it were possible to achieve this end through natural human virtue alone, it would necessarily belong to the king's duty to guide men to this end; for, as we suppose, it is to the king that the supreme ruling power in human affairs is entrusted, and government is of a higher order according to the finality of the end to which it is directed.

But even more strikingly, in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, a unity was established between the divine law (*lex divina*) and the human mind (*ratio humana*), including the universal hierarchy with its divine and political meanings. Thomas Aquinas states that human law (*lex humana*) is a part of the eternal law (*lex aeterna*), though not perfect, and emphasizes the necessity of the religious law (*lex divina*) that guides between these two in order for man to proceed on the right path. Thus, material ends regulated by natural law (*lex naturalis*) and human law (*lex humana*) can be regulated under the rule of immaterial ends such as *virtue*.⁸⁶⁸ The extraordinary aspect of this formulation is not only that it posits that human societies can also use secular administration to achieve divine purposes, but that it establishes an immanent and essential unity based on reason between secular administration, religious authority and divine plan, and makes this the only principle of political unity. The extraordinary aspect of this formulation is not only that it posits that human societies can also use secular administration to achieve divine

⁸⁶⁷ See: *Peri Politika* [1284b25-1286a24]

⁸⁶⁸ See Thomas Aquinas (2004, pp. 84-90).

purposes, but that it establishes an immanent and essential unity based on reason between secular administration, religious authority and divine plan, and makes this the only principle of political unity.⁸⁶⁹ In the establishment of this unity, the *lex divine* gives the ideological unity, the *lex aeterna* (and its realization within the *lex naturalis*) the ontological unity, the *lex humana* the practical unity, while the *lex naturalis* allows an empirical and secular unity to all of these. Since the principle at the core of Aristotle's understanding of nature is the development of nature according to a teleological formal reason, the development principle of nature also gains rationality. In this respect, the development of human societies is considered open to a rational development due to its connection with the nature of the individuals who compose them, and it is thus argued that the regulation of laws by humans may not necessarily contradict either eternal or divine law.

This formulation of Thomas Aquinas as a 13th century thinker, inspired by Aristotle, is essentially in connection with the 12th century thinker Averroes and his intellectual roots going back to al-Farabi. Al-Farabi tried to synthesize the secular and idealistic elements in his political theory *-cum grano salis*. On the one hand, he dealt with the organization of the material world as peacefully and justly as possible, on the other hand, he advocated an order that goes beyond material necessities as the main goal of humanity and aims at moral and rational competence. Al-Farabi's thesis that he defends the 'unity of truth' can be accepted as a postulate, in other words, that the aspects of the universal mind, whether they come from religious or philosophical sources, have a common content despite some formal differences (Cevizci, 2016, p. 215).⁸⁷⁰ In the final analysis, this postulate opens the door to the revision of both

⁸⁶⁹ In this respect, Eco (2016, p. 230) sees political theory of Aquinas not as a supporter of the old regime, but as a revolutionary pioneer of the new order to emerge. In fact, the fact that political theory of Thomas Aquinas is considered to be contrary to the *plenitudo potestatis* claim of the Catholic church, and that it was first denied by the Paris Council and then ignored for a century after his death, shows the accuracy of Eco's thesis.

⁸⁷⁰ I think that this postulate is not a purely rational derivation. It is seen that the original texts that have taken place in ancient Greek philosophy and literature, and many fragments, large and small, in the Qur'an and in *Kutub-i Sitte*, an important hadith compilation, match with each other. Islamic philosophers must have seen the original unity that goes beyond a similarity between the two. However, it is quite difficult to openly interpret this original unity as Islamic texts inspired by ancient Greek thought, given the conditions of the period. However, the fact that they placed reason above revelation contains such a criticism, albeit implicitly. My personal opinion is that the similarity between ancient philosophical texts and Islamic fragments has its roots in the interesting struggle between Muhammad and Abu Jahl. As it is known, the pre-Islamic nickname of Abu Jahl is Ebu'l-Hakem, which means the father of wisdom. The word 'hkm' is widely used

religious practices and the secular order by reasoning. As Gardet and Anawati (2015, pp. 165-66) point out, this kind of theology, in which the mind is put at the forefront, drew the reaction of al-Ghazali and kept the content of theology limited to the Qur'an and hadith by separating theology and philosophy from each other. He directed philosophical justifications to characterize them as *bid'ah*. We can see from this discussion that rational interpretation has the potential to indirectly cause a change in the self-referential/dogmatic structure of religion, and this is exactly why al-Farabi's approach becomes the target of conservatives.

Referring to Strauss' (2016, pp. 215, 221) studies on al-Farabi's reading of Plato's *Nomoi* text, it is clear that al-Farabi sometimes hides his own views behind Plato while he could rewrite the ancient philosophical tradition entirely within an Islamic framework, and even it is seen that ignores the original religious arguments of Plato and brings secular or rational interpretations to the fore. In this context, it is seen that al-Farabi did not directly aim to legitimize the 10th century Islamic society and power relations, on the contrary, he subjected them to a formal criticism based on reason.⁸⁷¹ For example, there is no model in al-Farabi (1987, p. 40) that allows rulers to make people of their 'instrument' and reproduce their power for purposes such as glory, honor, wealth and greatness. As Bloch (2017) points out, it is possible that this framework inevitably feeds the leftist tendencies that echoed in Avicenna and Averroes. On the other hand, al-Farabi envisions the formation of the political order largely as a dictatorship of intellectuals and does not give up the teleological meanings he attributes to it. The most important reason for this persistence stems from the fact that the ideal harmony between multiplicity and unity can only be realized through reason and therefore intellectuals.

In *Kitab al-Milla*, al-Farabi defines social units consisting of different people as '*milla*' based on their unification around a common culture, administration and

in Arabic in the sense of philosophy. It is likely that Abu'l-Hakam had a certain knowledge of ancient Greek philosophy, and he shared and bragged about it in public. It is possible that some hadith and Qur'anic expressions were adopted by Muhammad after this interaction. Moreover, the rejection of this origin of the religious texts and the creation of an Islamic-specific history developed simultaneously with the transformation of the person with the title of the father of wisdom into 'Abu Jahl', which means the father of ignorance.

⁸⁷¹ For example, in the *Nomoi* commentary on chapter four, Plato talks about 'god's rule and luck', while al-Farabi refers only to chance. Moreover, while summarizing *Nomoi* 71 6a, al-Farabi does not include propositions such as 'God is the beginning, end and center of all being' and 'God is the measure of all things' (Strauss, 2016, p. 221).

purposes, and he establishes the bond between multiplicity and unity over this point. The concept of '*milla*' is defined by al-Farabi as follows (as cited in Lahoud, 2005, p. 96): "The *milla* is determined opinions and deeds, tied to conditions which have been drawn up for a group by their first leader, and through which he seeks to obtain a goal which he has in them, or which is limited to them. The group may be a clan, a city or a region, and it may be a great nation, or it may be many nations." It is clear that the people of the city, nomads, different social layers, tribes and similar units can form a '*milla*' around religious and cultural partnership. Al-Farabi points out that the words nation (*al-mille*) and religion (*ed-din*) are synonymous and draws attention to the religious side of the element that makes *milla* a whole (Bağdatlı, 2018, p. 227). In this respect, the term *milla* presents natural and customary difference together with religious integrity. On the other hand, al-Farabi does not deny the traditional social elements as a whole, and refers to their virtuous origins by stating that some of them are taken from the ideas of older generations (Farabi, 2001, p. 99). As a rationalist thinker, al-Farabi attributes an extraordinary legitimacy to custom both because it includes some virtuous behaviors and because of its functional significance in transferring the knowledge of rational laws to different *millas*. However, in the final analysis, he states that a virtuous community will not fall into conflict despite all differences, since virtue appears as the only legitimate aim (Farabi, 1987, p. 76). In addition, best social regime envisioned in al-Farabi's thought that is as a formal unity in universal scale in which there are many *millas* included and they differ in appearance, character and language. According to Abouzeid (1987, p. 143): "(...) this universal association is not 'one' body but rather a 'unified' body which consists of number of distinct nations, and (...) these nations differ from each other by nature and each has its distinct natural character and its own language. Put in another way, al-Farabi is recognizing the differences between nations of the inhabited world as inevitable."

This formulation of al-Farabi refers to the link between the rational unity of being and the rational integration of the segments of society, which necessarily also exists in Thomas Aquinas. It is possible to read this link as the link of immanent secularity. A secondary reading is embedded in the external domination schema. Although Abouzeid (1987, p. 143) states that al-Farabi does not have an ideal of universal empire in these lines, it is seen that al-Farabi's thoughts were used as a basis for an imperial ideology in particular for Ottoman political thought. In general, al-Farabi does not find it right for people to employ each other like slaves with a purely material impulse. However,

he formulates this view to defend the idea that the order of all nature and society is/should be rational and divine, against the currents of thought that predict a chaotic situation in which the stronger ones dominate (Farabi, 2001, p. 106). In the final analysis, Farabi also considers the war of virtuous regimes against the unrighteous, that is *jihad* for him, as legitimate (Crone, 2004, p. 382).

Al-Farabi's view of cosmology and society assumes that both are hierarchically and rationally ordered. This thesis has two meanings. Al-Farabi, who argues that the universe firstly emerges from primary principles to secondary and tertiary principles and that this tends to evolve teleologically, accepts that the social order is also formed in a hierarchical structure from leaders to secondary and tertiary leaders and simple people and tends towards happiness through evolution (Farabi, 2018, p. 15). This immanent teleology is necessarily supplemented by an extrinsic genealogy. In this case, as second-best regimes may develop in the future to lead to the first, being like the first-ones should be their aim. It is precisely for this reason that al-Farabi's political thought requires a universal state -or the establishment of universal virtuous relations - in order to achieve perfect social order, that is, it allows jihadist expansion, and that is why he counts jihad among the functions that the best second-order rulers should fulfill. Thus, makes them a steppingstone towards to ascend best state. Thus, although this idea is not found in al-Farabi directly, an ideological formation can be established that states that this is a development for the general good, while 'less virtuous nations' are brought under the rule of 'more virtuous' ones, thus it implies an idea of imperial expansion.

In al-Farabi's thought, another content included in the concept of multiplicity, along with the requirements of social layers and different historical contexts, is that people have different intellectual levels. In this regard, in order for people to be led to happiness and virtue, teachers will be needed to convey the laws of the eternal reason to them. They teach the common people by 'imitating' the universal laws, that is, recreating the universal reason in symbolic images (Abouzeid, 1987, p. 120). In this context, al-Farabi (2018, p. 44) states that religion and its representatives, unlike philosophers, give information based on imagination - and therefore rhetoric - and "convince [the people] (...) about everything that philosophy proves". Fulfilling this function requires paying attention to the differences in the customary character because, although virtuous, the examples that ordinary people can experience and understand differ according to the traditions (Farabi, 2001, p. 102). The way al-Farabi places these customary elements in the general theory of virtues are as follows (Farabi, 1987, pp. 31-

32): Moral virtues and moral disorders are formed as a result of repetition of certain acts for a long time, becoming a custom and settling in the soul. In this context, the function of the clergy can be interpreted as supporting good customs and eliminating bad ones. In this manner, it can be thought that al-Farabi has prepared an implicit intellectual ground for secular law. Firstly, unlike Plato's denial of simple folk culture and convictions, al-Farabi adopted Aristotle's pragmatic approach and attributed a pedagogical function to customary elements.⁸⁷² Secondly, it has made it possible to imagine a custom based on reason, as the philosophers see their laws above the Shar'ia. Since this custom cannot be reduced to the will of the rulers or to the traditions, it cannot be categorically considered an example of customary law, but cannot be directly reduced to a version of Shar'ia, since it has a formal superiority over it.

Al-Farabi places philosophers in a privileged position in terms of understanding the eternal truth, considers philosophers worthy of the rulership, and imposes the mission of *imitation Dei* ("being righteous and holy and wise like God"), as Rosenthal (1962, pp. 122-23) argues. For this reason, philosophy is a source on which the Sharia is also grounded and made understandable in al-Farabi's thought (Rosenthal, 1962, p. 123). In this respect, philosophers preach the law (*nomos/namus*) based on the eternal reason and the unity of truth. The real inaccessibility of the ideal state and its ruler, which al-Farabi saw as the unity of philosopher-lawmaker and imam, caused the thinker to revise this ideal with the help of a secular premise in the topic of second-best administration. Al-Farabi's model for the second-best government is the aristocracy. According to the author (Farabi, 1987, p. 50):

The second situation is this: there is no person in him who fulfills all of these conditions; but these conditions are found separately in the persons who make up a community, that is, one of them gives the goal, the second gives what leads to that goal; thirdly, he has the excellence of persuading others and producing an imaginary effect; the other has the power to make jihad. At that time, this community, together, takes the place of the sultan. They are called the best chiefs and virtuous people. Their system of administration is also called the administration of the most virtuous. [tm]

⁸⁷² For the clearest reflections of the discussion of custom between Plato and Aristotle, the text of the *Poietica* can be mentioned. In this text, Aristotle criticizes Plato's views on art and assigns a function to it that engages philosophy, as it has a share of universal concepts in works of art. Thus, it reveals that it is an important element for mass pedagogy.

This model is the mixed administration of philosophers, bureaucrats, clergy and soldiers. According to the third best version of government, the virtuous, if not the best, ruler is formulated as someone who can deduct from religious law in order to find solutions to particular problems that the first legislator could not foresee, is knowledgeable in the art of government and military service, and can make judgments in the "interest of the state". Rosenthal, 1962, p. 133). At this point, as a result of the introduction of historical particularities, a certain secularization emerges in al-Farabi's political philosophy, since both the Sharia law gaining new variations through '*istinbât*' and providing concrete answers to the current problems of the people will be seen as the source of virtue and happiness. The second-best ruler, formulated by al-Farabi as '*ra'is*' or '*malik al-sunna*', is necessarily equipped with the authority to make '*istinbât*' and '*istinmât*', competence to know *fiqh* enough and to lead jihad (Farabi, 2001, p. 89). It is clear that competence in '*istinbât*' and '*istinmât*' does not mean theoretical *ijtihād*, but it is inevitable that they function as practical *ijtihads*. Based on the assumption that this ruler will follow the rulers who came before him (Crone, 2004, p. 179), it will be necessary to operate the religious and morally appropriate customs in order for this ruler to carry out his function. Since al-Farabi's general metaphysical and cosmological views, with the influence of neo-Platonism, characterize the universe as a harmonious and rational being, thus, the second-best state will necessarily contain a piece of the rational essence of the universe. Here is the point of articulation of knowledge of Sharia with the eternal divine reason. Because cities that are governed solely by the will of the ruler are described as ignorant cities by al-Farabi (2001, p. 92). On the other hand, according to al-Farabi (1987, p. 38), the subject of political art is not the realization of a ruler's own wishes, but the aim of providing real happiness -in accordance with Aristotle's mid-point theory- by considering the different components and the whole of the city and the best practices in morals and actions in a moderate way. But in the final analysis, this is not a customary rule, on the contrary, it is a rational government. But in political practice, there is an understanding of authority that necessarily adds customary elements to the extent that they are rational.

The relationship established between reason and divine law, which was seen in al-Farabi, becomes even more evident in Avicenna. In particular, the author, who keeps the reason in the forefront in matters such as the political examination of the purpose of worship, the explanation of the foundation of society and legal jurisprudence with secular/rational references, has succeeded in combining it with religious dogmas both

epistemologically and ontologically, and even made it superior to them. The philosophy of Avicenna generally differs from Platonic epistemology in that it does not accept the ideas found in the mind (Gutas, 2004b, p. 39). The most important result of this denial is that intelligible elements become actual depending on the relationship with the world. In other words, here, contrary to the Platonic model of remembrance, there is a type of knowledge whose relationship with the universal mind (active reason) is integrated thanks to the evolution of worldly understanding. In this respect, the operation of the material mind constitutes the first step of the evolution of consciousness. According to Avicenna, although the learning process of the prophets requires a strong intuition and imagination, it is ultimately fed from the same source as ordinary people: It is based on obtaining the middle terms that the active reason contains. Moreover, according to Gutas (2004b, p. 44): “In this system, the agent of reasoning (human mind), the process of reasoning (discovering the middle term), the method of reasoning (logic) and the objects of reasoning (intelligibles) come together in a relationship that is interdependent and explains each other.” Also, Gutas (2004b, p. 41) points that: “Therefore, the prophet’s understanding of intelligibles bestows upon him the content of revelation, which turns out to be identical with the content of philosophy”.

In this context, it is possible to encounter political references to the formation of worldly law in various works of Avicenna. In his autobiography, Avicenna (Gohman, 1974, p. 21) states that he received his first philosophical education from Abu Abdullah al-Natili and that he easily learned the methods of questioning and refutation used by the jurists. Ibn Sina (Gohman, 1974, p. 23) points out that this person had no idea about the complex issues of logic and could only teach “simple parts”. The term translated as “simple parts” in the Gohman edition of the autobiography (1974, p. 23) is translated as “introductory chapters” in the translation of Açıkgenç and Kırbaçoğlu (2004, p. 12). However, Gutas (2014, p. 15), who wrote an authoritative monograph on Avicenna and his works, translates the term used here, giving it the meaning as “literal”. According to Gutas, the use of this term, which means apparent (*zahiri*), superficial, simple, has different connotations that can be easily understood in the era when the work was written and should be emphasized. Gutas (2014, p. 15, footnote 16) states that a contemporary school of jurisprudence is referred to by Avicenna as *Zahiriyya* (literalists) because it advocates inferring laws only from the literal text of the Qur’an, and Avicenna criticized this school about its uncritical superficial approach to religious texts. As a basis for this claim, he shows the following criticisms directed at literalists

in a memoir, probably written by Avicenna's friend, Ibn Zayla (Gutas, 2014, p. 15): "(...) never having suffered the pains of analyzing the details of problems so that they may gain a syllogistic habit (...) and as paying too much attention to the form of the syllogism rather than its contents".⁸⁷³ Similarly, Avicenna's citing an anecdote about the logical answer of the question of "what is?" as an example of the criticism of "literal minded logicians" without naming it (Gutas, 2014, p. 14, footnote 14), shows that there is a certain consistency in the author's use of this concept. As it is understood from here, Avicenna states that he has a critical method while describing his method of logic, and he does this by placing it against a school of *fiqh* called *Zahiriyya*, which advocates extracting the rules of law from purely religious texts. At this point, Avicenna's critique necessitates the analysis of the contextual features of syllogism in *Organon* studies, and based on this point, he criticizes the *Zahiriyya* approach as formalism.

This criticism, which also focuses on the understanding and operation of Sharia with a 'literary' approach, refers to the function of reason, which cannot be reduced to mere form, in the interpretation of Sharia. The use of reason on the content of law necessitates bringing together the essential principle of law regarding human life and the existential principle of reason. Only in this way is it possible to talk about a logical inference and interpretation of the worldly content of human life, not a formal comparison of religious texts. However, in this framework, the knowledge of theoretical reason is limited to a limited social environment. In particular, Avicenna states that those who have theoretical wisdom and operate it with justice have attained happiness, gained prophetic features that made themselves human-gods, and made worshipping themselves a worship of God (2005, p. 378): "He is indeed the world's earthly king and God's deputy in it".⁸⁷⁴ The example in Avicenna's mind when writing this statement is probably figures such as Nuşirevan (Khosrow I) or Alexander the Great, who are frequently used as an example in the history of Islamic political thought. The special

⁸⁷³ "Memoirs of a Disciple (Ibn-Zayla?) Writing from Rayy", for a more detailed information see: Gutas (2014, p. 59).

⁸⁷⁴ Essentially, the motto "you will be like the gods" is found in the Old Testament (*Genesis*, 3:22-23): "eritis sicut dei". This phrase was told by the devil to Adam and Eve to eat the fruit of the tree of wisdom: "You will be like the gods, they know good and evil". In this parable, both the sharing of the divine essence through knowing and original sin and falling into the world are together. We encounter the same expression in Boethius' *Philosophiae Consolatio*. In this work, however, happiness is prioritized, not "knowing right and wrong". Since God is accepted as absolute good and happiness can only have arisen from good, good people have divine happiness and thus "become a god" (Boethius, 2015, p. 194). In both examples, "knowledge", "happiness" and "reaching the divine essence" can be considered as a whole.

concession to these figures needs explanation. In the philosophy of Avicenna, particulars carry the trace of God as beings to whom God expresses his truth (Avicenna, 2005, p. 362). In this respect, the understanding of particulars prevents the emergence of the demonic, as it brings the truth to shine in particulars. Because the existence itself is based on the divine emanation, the production of knowledge emerges as a share from the divine to the extent that it follows this emanation and produces an epistemological teleology. In this theological view, there is a side that makes *ijtihad* possible in that particulars are understood in the development of the material world and become the rational content of religious law. Avicenna argues that all useful things (for example, organs in animals and plants) emerge based on divine providence, not natural causation, and claims this is accepted by most people (Avicenna, 2005, p. 362). In this regard, as a variant of the emanation theory, the idea that perfection disappears as one descends from God to matter is thus balanced by attributing the appreciation of useful things to divine origin and vice versa to the devil and the corruption of matter.

Gutas (2004b, p. 35) states that Avicenna did not write a serious work on practical philosophy, apart from the appendix in the last chapter of *Kitab al-Shifa* on theology and his two short treatises on morality and politics. In the second part of Book X of *Kitab al-Shifa*, Avicenna begins to explain his political theory. Avicenna (2004, p. 93) locates political philosophy in the field of practical philosophy and defines its usefulness as follows: “The benefit of political philosophy is to learn the quality of cooperation between individuals so that they can cooperate in matters that are beneficial for the continuation of the human species and personal life [tm]”. This is a very secular definition and defines politics with the aim of providing welfare to the human community on the material context. In accordance with this purpose, Avicenna (2005, pp. 370-71) ordered the city’s legislator (*al-sa’nni*) to divide the people under his rule into three classes as administrators, artisans and protectors in the first place, giving everyone a task/job and to the works done for the common good, he theoretically obliges the city to establish a common fund from which its revenues are collected for the benefit of the sick and the needy, and the guardians. In this context, Avicenna (2005, pp. 377-78) states that the legislator can enact laws based on morality and custom based on justice, and he approves that these laws can be put in accordance with practical wisdom for (i) cleansing the soul and (ii) for worldly purposes.

In addition, another point that can be considered under the category of general good is the continuity of state authority. On this subject, Avicenna (2005, p. 374) makes

a suggestion that the legislator should make it a duty to be subordinate to whoever succeeds him, and the method of transfer of authority should be determined either by himself or by consensus. The ideal procedure proposed by Avicenna in appointing and removing the caliph as head of state is quite remarkable. Avicenna (2005, p. 374) proposes that a virtuous person who is knowledgeable about religious laws should openly be a candidate on the community and be elected and appointed without fighting and instead, he characterizes the situations where the matter is brought to a fight as committing the crime of disbelief in God. More interestingly, Avicenna (2005, p. 374) claims that it is obligatory for the citizens to kill a person who claims to be the caliphate through power and wealth, and even those who did not help the murder of this tyrant candidate even though he had the power, otherwise, the crime of disbelief in God would be committed. On the other hand, Avicenna (2005, p. 374) recommends that a caliph, who is not suitable for his office and has imperfections, should be followed if he has excellence and superior intelligence in political management. If this condition cannot be met, it is more appropriate for one more knowledgeable person to join the ruler and to rule by two people.

Avicenna theoretically establishes all this legislative activity and the necessity for the formation of political power on the basis of material relations. According to Avicenna (2005, p. 364), the existence of the human species depends on establishing partnerships, that is, mutual transactions and this requires the existence of commercial relations. Transactions, on the other hand, necessitates law, justice, and therefore the legislator and the distributor of justice. According to Avicenna (2005, p. 364), right after the creation of man, laws were sent down with God's permission for the works of people, and the majority heard and obeyed these laws from the mouth of the prophets. According to Avicenna, these laws consist of the recognition of (i) the creator of God, (ii) his unity, (iii) his omnipotence, and beyond that the prophets are not tasked with answering the doctrine disputes about divine truth. It should be noted that Avicenna first classified the laws brought by the prophets as creeds and isolated the rest of the regulations from their theoretical framework. Thus, to say that the prophets, as lawgivers, did not need to make the theory/doctrine of these laws - which they did not do anyway - means to delegate the privilege of constructing this theory through reason to philosophers.

According to Avicenna (2005, p. 367), prophets are not born in every age, and for this reason, although they carefully regulate the laws and rules necessary for the

welfare of people, some of them succeed and some of them disappear. In this context, Avicenna (2005, p. 367) states that the legislators who ordered the repetition of the laws on people within certain limits succeeded, so that some acts became a kind of custom in the memory of the people and became valid until the laws were renewed. He argues that the custom, which consists of this repetition/shell, is acceptable if it reminds of God and the afterlife. And he states that such acts—especially worship—must be equipped with useful articulations (for example, pilgrimage, jihad, mosques, etc.) to remind the divine law and for the worldly welfare of people. In this respect, Avicenna (2005, p. 368) proposes to establish a religious custom and to link it symbolically with worldly custom:

This is prayer. [The legislator] should therefore prescribe for the worshipper in preparation for prayer those [postures] people customarily adopt when they present themselves to human kings, such as purification and cleanliness (indeed, he must pre- scribe fully in these two things). He should [also] prescribe for [the worshipper] the behavior one customarily requires of himself when meeting kings: reverence, calm, the lowering of the eyes, the contracting of the hands and feet, the avoidance of turning around or of restiveness. Likewise, he must prescribe for each time of prayer praiseworthy manners and customs. These acts will benefit the common people by way of instilling in them remembrance of God and the resurrection. Because of this, their adherence to statutes and the laws will continue. For, if they did not have such reminders, they would forget all of this with the passing of a century or two. [tm]

If Avicenna had been a materialist of the 19th century, we might have thought that he made an analysis of how ancient religions emerged or wrote a satire on the mentality of the clergy. But the issue is the opposite. Avicenna reveals the customary and therefore the empirical side of religion and reveals its position in the hierarchy in related to the divine mind. Thus, he reduces religious practices -not creeds- to a customary function that will make the divine law memorable among people. This function, in the last analysis, is valid for the ‘sensible’ side of worship.

On the other hand, Avicenna attributes a special function to worship in terms of cleansing the soul, that is, in terms of its ‘reasonable’ aspect. In this framework, in *On Rational Soul*, which is thought to be one of the late works of Avicenna, the integrity of the reason and religious law is discussed, and how the material mind/spirit, which is in a potential state, is purified and matured as follows (Gutas, 2014, p. 71):

The bliss [of the rational soul] comes about when its substance is rendered perfect, and this is accomplished when it is purified through knowledge of God and works for God. Its purification through works for God consists of (a) its being purged of vile and wicked qualities of character, (b) its being far removed from blameworthy attributes and evil and offensive habits by following reason and religious law, and (c) its being adorned with good habits, praiseworthy qualities of character, and excellent and pleasing traits by following reason and religious law. [tm]

In this excerpt, it is seen that the knowledge of God and religious orders are intertwined, but the reason is presented as the knowledge of God, and religious law is shown as religious orders. It is clear that reason was held above the religious law. Secondly, if the content of the term ‘works for God’ is examined, it is seen that it has both theoretical and practical aspects. While the theoretical aspect is to use the reason, the practical aspect is to improve habits through worship and similar religious rituals. Avicenna’s definition of moral philosophy in *Kitab al-Shifa* indicates precisely to this point: Purification of the soul through virtues and protection from evil is the practical benefit of moral philosophy (İbn Sina, 2004, p. 93). In other words, moral philosophy, besides providing a mental and theoretical benefit due to providing a philosophical knowledge, also provides the unity of practice and theory due to the protection and purification of the soul. However, it cannot be said that this union has an identical formal configuration for all social segments.

On the other hand, Avicenna does not find it appropriate to hide information from the public. On the contrary, he emphasizes the necessity of expressing the three knowledges of the prophet in a way that people can understand, the greatness and uniqueness of God, the reality of reckoning and resurrection after death, and the invisible-inaudible nature of god. The idea that Averroes is referring to here is Plato’s theory of ‘functional lies’ (2005, p. 366):

Know that God, exalted be He, knows that the good lies in [such a state of affairs]. It follows, then, that which God knows to be the good must exist in the way that [He knows it], as you have known [from our preceding discussion]. But there is no harm if the legislator's words contain symbols and signs that might call forth those naturally disposed toward theoretical reflection to pursue philosophic investigations.

In this context, Avicenna predicts that traditional philosophical jargon and approaches that operate at a high symbolic level in order to convey philosophical truths

to the public will either react, or will not be understood by the public at all, and will destroy the customs that hold the society together and harm the society (Gutas, 2014, p. 266). For this reason, Avicenna advises that philosophical teachings should develop their own religious and cultural conventions in order to be taught to the “ignorant and stupid multitude” and that the transmission of information containing philosophical truths should be carried out in secrecy (Gutas, 2014, p. 266). In this context, it is possible to determine in the thought of Avicenna that the custom has gained a pedagogical function and that worldly interests constitute a significance reference point for legislative and executive activities. At this point, it is seen that a certain closeness of meaning has been established between custom and Sharia. Ülken (1981, p. 71-72) states that Avicenna attributed the Sharia to the aim of correcting the world and purifying the soul, and within this framework, two basic functions were attributed to it, both political and psychological. In this respect, the definition of Sharia almost completely agrees with term ‘conventions’. Perhaps in this respect, the question of how far philosophers should abide by existing conventions in Avicenna is left open, as Arslan (2017, p. 263) points out. If the philosopher is a person who can "reach God by his own means" (Arslan, 2017, p. 263), it will not be necessary to show absolute devotion to worship and prohibitions, whose function is simply to remind the public of divine principles. Al-Ghazali also criticizes al-Farabi and Avicenna from this point of view. According to al-Ghazali’s statement in his work *El-munkizü min-eddalâl* (Wolhman, 2010, p. 34):

The fifth person was also saying: Why should I follow the orders of religion by imitating someone else? I am an enlightened person. I studied the science of philosophy and realized the truth of Prophethood. Its truth is based on wisdoms, interests and benefits. The purpose of worship is to capture the ignorant part of the people, to prevent them from killing each other, quarreling and self-desires. I am not one of the ignorant people, so why should I be under the command of religion? I am wise and I follow wisdom. I see the truth with wisdom. In this regard, I do not need to follow the Prophet in imitation. Such is the belief of those who read the books of theologian philosophers or learn from the books of Avicenna and al-Fârâbî.

It does not seem possible to read these statements as mere slander or distortion.⁸⁷⁵ As it was seen above, some of the indirect consequences of *Meşşâî* philosophy in religious practice are clearly in this way. Although there is a serious opinion in the secondary literature that al-Ghazali distorts their theses while criticizing the *Meşşâî* thought, it is necessary to make a systematic distinction at this point. Al-Ghazali criticizes both *Meşşâî* philosophy, which is a theoretical critique, and some new social types attached to philosophical circles, which has empirical foundations.

Finally, let us consider Averroes's political thought. In general, Averroes uses the Aristotelian concepts of multitude-happiness-reason-virtue and combines natural tendencies and religious provisions in social laws under the mediation of reason. The Aristotelian background of this set of concepts is clear, but Averroes' use of these concepts does not directly reproduce Aristotelian thought. Although it is generally accepted that Renan (1866, p. 54) describes Averroes as a "fanatic" and a "superstitious" Aristotelian fan, the tendency to hide his own thoughts behind Aristotle or Plato, which is also seen in other *Meşşâî* philosophers, shows itself in Averroes as Sunar states (1967, p. 145). But I do not think that this tendency is a direct literary tactic (as Strauss has argued for al-Farabi). The main issue is a product of the effort to synthesize Plato and Aristotle, seen in *Meşşâî* philosophers, and the philosophical interpretations/inferences/derivations made while doing this and their theological and jurisprudential projections create a form of philosophical discourse in which fragments of ancient philosophy and original thoughts can often not be easily separated from each other. For example, in Averroes' (1969, p. 153) commentary on *Politeia*, it is stated that Plato's ideas in this work are valid for all other states, as they are based on universals, and the author makes some inferences about his own time. The fact that this philosophy tradition accepts the unity of existence and attributes divine truth to universals and does not accept a genuine separation between philosophers because it sees philosophical effort as the comprehension of these universals is another factor that facilitates the presentation of both Plato's and Aristotle's proposals and their own interpretations together.

⁸⁷⁵ For example, Nasîrüddin Tûsî's *Ahlak-ı Nâsîrî* (2005, p. 198) similarly shows the gathering of people and establishing intimacy (intimacy) among them as the purpose of the daily prayers and Friday prayers. There is no divine or mystical reference in this interpretation, on the contrary, a secular interpretation of the prayers is being developed. If this interpretation did not have a teleological background that refers to the material and spiritual evolution of man, it could be claimed to be a strictly materialist interpretation.

Averroes' (1969, p. 111) definition of political science begins by postulating that the realization of the subject of this science encompasses what depends on people's free will, and is therefore separated from the theoretical sciences. In this framework, he states that political science is divided into two parts, the first of which deals with acquired habits, voluntary actions and behaviors, and the second part examines the relationship between habits and spirit, and tries to ensure coordination between the results of actions and desired habits (Averroes, 1969, p. 112). The first part of political science is practically integrated with the art of politics. The realization of useful social relations, moral codes and actions in practice is the common point of political art and science (Averroes, 1969, p. 177). Averroes mostly uses al-Farabi's city-happiness-virtue concept set in his work *Telhîsu's-Siyâse li Eflâtûn* as shown by Şulul (2009, p. 69). As Sunar states (1967, p. 158), he accepts the principles of social life and cooperation underlying the Aristotelian notion of multitude, in opposite of the views of Ibn Bacce and Ibn Tufayl that recommend seclusion, unity and being alone. According to Averroes (1969, p. 113), human beings are political beings by nature because they need many people with different natural tendencies to live together in order to meet their vital needs (food, clothing, shelter, etc.) and to be virtuous. The element that holds this multitude of tendencies and activities together for the benefit of all is common purpose (Averroes, 1969, p. 114). Averroes claims that the parts of the society, which are divided into different tendencies and functions, and the parts of the soul are parallel to each other (1969, p. 114), so that while the material factor that establishes the society is the common material benefit, the common moral benefit is high morality, and both are united in the rationale.

According to Averroes (1969, p. 137), in an ideal state established in this way, there would be no need for laws or doctors, as there would be a moral culture and tradition, because people will carry out both their physical and political affairs in a balanced/harmonious way. The opposite situation is described by the author as follows (Averroes, 1969, p. 137):

Absence of discipline in music, and stark revelry in food and drink, if they increase in the State, bring necessarily with the need of two arts: law and medicine. Nothing indicates more clearly the bad qualities and objectionable opinions of the citizens than that they should be in need of judges and physicians.

In this case, judges are responsible for restoring the political 'body' by performing a similar function as doctors. The tool for this is justice, the basis of justice

is based on the principled unity between multiplicity and unity.⁸⁷⁶ According to Averroes (1969, p. 160), a healthy state can be said to the extent that the multitude of individuals, occupations and strata in the society depends on the principled unity of the relationship and hierarchy between them. He states that the law that gives this principle of unity, whether religious or secular, has a common basis (Averroes, 1969, p. 185):

If you investigate the laws, this knowledge is divided into abstract knowledge alone - such as our religious law commands regarding the perception of God- and into practice, such as the ethical virtues it enjoins. Its intention as regards this purpose is identically the same as that of philosophy in respect of class [in the sense of kind] and purpose.

The reason for this partnership is clear. The theology of Averroes, which was influenced by neo-Platonism—and which would later influence Ibn Arabi, who would build the most sophisticated form of this theory in *sūfism*—was that God’s will and expression prevailed over all things (the principle that God cannot have a finite nature), and he argues that there is a piece of divine will not only in the implementation of religious laws, but also in the orientation of everything that exists to useful, beautiful and good (Averroes, 1969, p. 186). Since finding useful, beautiful and good requires experience and wisdom, the assumption of this function by philosophers causes reason to come to the fore in the final analysis. In this context, turning to useful, good and beautiful has a common feature in terms of material-worldly practices, customary laws and religious laws. How these three will be kept together and brought to perfection is expressed as follows in Averroes (1969, p. 180):

The answer is that it is possible for men to grow up with these natural qualities, by which we have described them, and at the same time to develop by choosing the general (common) law, the adoption of which no nation can escape. In addition, their own particular (religious) law should not be far from the human laws. Philosophy should already be perfected in their time.

In this respect, Averroes argues that it is not possible for philosophical thought to say anything contrary to divine laws, as a thinking that reveals divine laws (İbn Rüşd, 2016, p. 64). If the knowledge of the truth expressed by philosophy is not included in religious provisions, he states that there is no contradiction, and if there is a contradiction, the religious laws, which are the visible laws of truth, must be interpreted in favor of philosophy (İbn Rüşd, 2016, p. 64). The model in which the author describes this relationship is the relationship between the jurist (*faqih*) and religious law. Just as

⁸⁷⁶ See Averroes (1969, p. 160) for Rosenthal’s footnotes 5 and 6.

jurists make inferences from religious laws about particular situations, philosophers can express their opinions by searching the truth about both the meaning of religious law and theological issues that are not foreseen in religious law. The interesting point here is that the relationship between the jurists' adherence to religious laws and the interpretation of religious law is necessarily mediated by philosophers, that is, the philosopher who determines the meaning of the religious law can indirectly affect its *fiqh* implementation. In fact, al-Ghazali's criticism of philosophy in general is of this nature. In the preamble of al-Ghazali's (2000, p. 2) *Tehâfutü'l-Felâsife*, while criticizing the circles of philosophy, he accused them to reject the revealed laws, religious confessions and the details of religious teachings, and assuming all these are man-made laws and even "embellished tricks". This interpretation of al-Ghazali should be accepted as theoretically correct. Thus, the interpretations of philosophers constitute a basis for *ijtihad*, and the rational ground of interpretation becomes an element that can ground the secular content of *ijtihad*. Wollman (2010, p. 103) also underlines that the permissibility of the legal interpretation of religious texts in the light of reason in Averroes goes beyond the determination of the interpretation by general practices.

It is inevitable that this grounding will also affect the ethical and political analysis of political regimes. Influencing Thomas Aquinas as well, Averroes argues that the elements that make up the multitude are separated from each other by both character/temperament and wishes and desires, and therefore there is a need for a head of state (*al-malik*) to put them in order (Şulul, 2009, p. 183). Contrary to the specific importance that Aristotle attributes to the concept of multitude, Averroes (1969, p. 226) follows the tradition of Socrates-Plato and sees private property and the passions based on it as the root cause of social problems. However, from this point of view, he does not consider the acceptable the idea that each member of the society can apply their own laws or for the poor to unite against the rich and establish an egalitarian legal order, as it will prevent the evolution of separate natural distinctions, tendencies and functions (Averroes, 1969, p. 229).

For this reason, Averroes (1969, p. 177) evaluates the ideal social order as a kingdom, and uses the terms philosopher-king-lawgiver and *imam* in a semantic integrity in this context. At this point, the author's criterion is that the mental and moral qualities of the monarch should be superior and that he should be competent in practical matters (Averroes, 1969, p. 177). Averroes (Şulul, 2009, p. 190) describes the ideal ruler as a philosopher-king together, as a person who can make *ijtihad* about the laws laid

down by the second-best ruler and the lawgiver (*malik es-sunna*). In addition, he develops the notion of dual government that could be seen in Avicenna. Şulul (2009, p. 190) compares this intellectual element with al-Farabi's works and puts it in its historical context as follows:

In his peculiar way, Averroes combines the idea of dual rule in al-Madinah and the idea of joint rule of a group in Fusulu'l-Madani, transforming it into the dual rule of the legal scholar and the jihadist. However, it is possible for these two qualities not to be found in a single person, but in a person who has the capacity to make jihad and in a fiqh expert. But both of them will have to join the administration. These thoughts of Averroes are important. Because he points to a situation similar to that of many Muslim kings of his time, and reveals the Islamic nature of such governments with one or two people. [tm]

The point Şulul points out is that Averroes made an important inference about the dual structure of customary and Shar'i administration, as will be discussed later. The basis of this inference is Aristotle's interpretation of the origin and use of reason. Averroes' interpretation of Aristotle is as follows (Sunar, 1967, pp. 152-53): According to Aristotle, the active mind is eternal and divine, separate from human, separate from matter. The individual mind, on the other hand, is the mind that is first in human beings, and it is available to receive individual, mortal and external influences. It is also in the passive mind that the active mind can act, and the passive mind cannot be conceived without the influence of the active mind. [tm]

Thus, the philosopher essentially connects the divine mind with the human mind. Thus, he combined the theory of the continuous creation of the world (*hudus*) with the compatibility of this creation with divine reason, and by deriving the divine mind and human mind from the common essence, he gave the rational human action the quality of conformity with the divine will. He proposed to grasp the knowledge of this existence through philosophy. Averroes (2016, p. 66) considered it legitimate to make interpretations when philosophical knowledge conflicts with religious knowledge, and even he did not evaluate the differences in interpretations as a deviation from reality and religion. Thus, he revealed that the consensus on practical matters is based on conjectures (*doxa*) and therefore may be sufficient, whereas the difference of opinion on divine matters is an essential part of the search for truth. One possibility lies in the background of this thought, as we have seen in al-Farabi and Avicenna, a thesis that

religious texts are full of illusions aimed at influencing the multitude in the final analysis, and that the essence of these texts that refer to the truth is rational. Although the imago-ratio duality, which could be found in al-Farabi, is not directly included in Averroes' political texts, this view is unmistakably found in his commentary on *Peri Poetika*. In his commentary on *Peri Poetika*, Averroes (1977, p. 84) states that the art of poetry offers a significant imaginative tool that can be used to direct the spirit of the multitude to belief or disbelief, and their actions to habit or abandonment, and that it represents particular things as completely as possible. In this context, the fact that the imaginary already has an apparent and temporary nature necessitates the correct interpretation to surpass the image and therefore the imaginary side of religion in terms of reason.

Finally, I will briefly examine Nasîrûddin Tûsî (1200-1273) and his political thought formation in his work called *Ahlak-ı Nâsirî*. Tûsî is a name that is directly related to the *Meşşâî* philosophers and al-Ghazali. The city of Tus, his birthplace, is also the homeland of al-Ghazali, and is connected to Avicenna's famous student Bahmanyar due to the fellowship of Farid al-Din Damad, from whom Tûsî learned logical sciences (*ma'arif-i'aqliyah*) (Hairi, 1968, pp. 18-20). As Kanar (2019a, p. 301) states, Tûsî's interest in Avicenna's works at an early age, especially *al-Isarat ve't-tanbihat*, strengthens this intellectual connection. It is particularly noteworthy that Tûsî wrote *Hall Mushkilat al-Israhat* to defend Avicenna against Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (Wickens, 1964, p. 13). When the various commentaries written by Tûsî on Averroes' works are considered, it is seen that this intellectual relationship does not remain only on the superficial level. Şirinov (2012) states that Tûsî can be mentioned as the first thinker who combines *Meşşâî* philosophy and *kalam* (theology) and establishes a coherent intellectual structure. A similar continuity can be found in the field of political thought. For example, because of Tûsî's definition of practical philosophy and his emphasis on the concept of human will, it contains reason contains a clear reference to al-Farabi and Averroes' in the context of his political thought (Tusi, 2005, p. 39).

First, let's look at the definitions of the concept of 'multitude' in Tûsî's thought. In Tûsî's political thought, the concept of multitude is mentioned on a scale that extends from the material world to individual character and tribal characteristics. First of all, according to Tûsî, differentiation in complex items consisting of the combination of different accidents is an essential quality, and even when these items are tried to be combined, it is natural that they separate over time (Tusi, 2005, p. 197). In this respect,

there is a tendency to disperse and create multitude in an essential part of the existing. Secondly, the human soul, which is a substantial being, has an individual being, and in this respect, the qualities that can be attributed to him, such as reason, comprehension and will, differ from person to person -in this respect, they also form a multitude. Tûsî states that people have innate differences in terms of speech and cognition, and some of them are far from philosophical competence based on pure reason (Tusi, 2005, pp. 210-11). In this framework, according to Tûsî, people exist in the world as beings based on individual will, with different natural characteristics and different purposes of action (Tusi, 2005, p. 188).

Human communities are also separated from each other around similar principles and form a multitude. People who are divided into different professions and specialties in accordance with their natural tendencies due to the division of labor in the social context also constitute a multiplicity in this respect. Different *millas* are in conflict with each other in terms of customs and imagination (Tusi, 2005, p. 212). Tûsî thus treats the fact of multitude as both a natural and socially constructed phenomenon, for example, the assortment of human personalities (temperament/ethos) is related to their different creation in nature and different upbringing in terms of customs in his theory (Tusi, 2005, p. 81).

In this framework, the author deals with the possible situations arising from the multitude and examines their positive and negative tendencies. Firstly, according to him, the fact that people are different in terms of their nature and purpose of action may cause social conflict and disrupt the division of labor due to motivations such as seizing property (Tusi, 2005, p. 188). Secondly, Tûsî gives the example of the ‘plurality of freedom’ for the negative determination of the multitude. He uses the concept of ‘consensus of freedom’, which corresponds to the democratic regime among the state forms, and in this state, everyone acts according to their own wishes and desires and lives freely. Tûsî (2005, p. 211) states that in this state there are many disagreements, various diseases, different wishes, and various aims, and that there is no common point between them apart from the ‘plurality of freedom’. On the other hand, Tûsî argues that multiplicity can be used to obtain the good, beneficial and beautiful for people based on both its natural and artificial origins. He even cites the words of philosophers who preceded him as ‘the sameness of people is their destruction’ (Tusi, 2005, p. 188). The basis of this proposition is the search for the division of labor and affirmation of social hierarchy. According to Tûsî, the order of the world depends on the order of subsistence

and therefore on labor. Cooperation is necessary for the existence and subsistence of the human species, and labor does not occur without cooperation, and cooperation does not occur separately from society (Tusi, 2005, p. 188). In this framework, people with low or high qualifications by nature create a common good by dealing with different arts (Tusi, 1964, p. 189):

However, since some are distinguished by correct management and others by superior strength, one group by great dignity of manner and another by abundant capability (while some, devoid of discrimination and intelligence, are virtually tools and instruments for men so endowed), all tasks are determined in the manner as observed; and from each undertaking his own important duty, the ordering of the universe and the organization of Man's daily life becomes act.⁸⁷⁷

Thus, the author puts forward two important principles in order to make the multitude the source of the common social good. These are faith and partnership and unity of labor (Tusi, 2005, pp. 209-10). Tûsî formulates the principle of belief partnership with a definition that allows more possibilities for interpretation and different contents; (i) acceptance of creation, (ii) *mead* (life after death) (iii) man's creed between birth and death (Tusi, 2005, p. 210). Partnership or unity in labor is defined as follows: to work in the same way in perfecting, to establish the work done on the right relations that are well thought and well-arranged, to comply with the laws of justice and political conditions, to make the last purpose of labor unified and for the benefit of the whole society (Tusi, 2005, p. 210).

Tûsî asserts that if the members of the society are virtuous, the above-mentioned principles will be provided automatically because there will be a natural affiliation (*muhabbet*⁸⁷⁸) between the members of the society. He treats the phenomenon of love as a natural impulse that comes from the essence of human beings and causes social cohesion, and formulates it as a natural tendency compared to perfection that arises from union, albeit to varying degrees in individuals (Tusi, 2005, p. 194). On the other hand, he states that in societies where there is no love, unity [as artificial love] will be achieved

⁸⁷⁷ Wickens translated the term '*tedbir*', as 'correct management'. I prefer to denominate this term as 'prudentia' in theoretical context, and 'measure' in practical sense in order to indicate its relationship with Ottoman political thought.

⁸⁷⁸ This term corresponds to the concept of *philia* (friendship) found in Plato and Aristotle. The word *muhabbet*, which comes from the Arabic root *hubb*, means love/friendship/closeness. Wickens (Tusi, 1964, p. 195) translated the concept as 'love' and partially met the meaning of 'brotherly love' which is also meant in Ancient Greek sources.

through justice (Tusi, 2005, p. 194). It will be noticed that the concept of love is based on the pursuit of perfection and thus has a meaning of *telos* that shapes human actions. Perfection, on the other hand, means that what is at a low level rises to a higher level, in which it shows a tendency and commitment to the higher level. When this idea is applied to the social context, it means that ‘low-level’ simple laborers are subject to ‘high-level’ wisdom and moral principles. For this very reason, justice, which is the artificially constructed form of love, refers to the notion of protecting the ‘high’ and ‘low’ levels, or rather social strata, and ensuring the division of labor between them.

In this context, the author lays the foundations of his political philosophy. Tûsî formulates the subject of political practice, which he categorizes as practical philosophy, as the administration of people’s voluntary actions in accordance with their purpose (Tusi, 2005, p. 39). The purpose of human actions is the perfection of the soul towards goodness and happiness (Tusi, 2005, p. 67). In this framework, good deeds are general and happiness is individual. Moreover, good deeds can be finite or infinite in terms of increasing. For example, the benefits brought by science, knowledge, prudentia and labor can increase indefinitely. Happiness, on the other hand, is a finite and complete form of charity, and it does not need to be increased after it is achieved (Tusi, 2005, p. 69). In addition to these, material benefits are also mentioned by Tûsî. There are two types of measures (*tedbîr*) aimed at regulating and developing human thoughts and behaviors for these purposes (Tusi, 2005, p. 188): (i) natural measures based on reason and experience, (ii) measures of enactments such as society’s decision, tradition/custom and the rules (Sharia) brought by great men (Tusi, 2005, p. 189; 1964, p. 191). In the final analysis, the means by which both types of measures are synthesized and implemented is politics, and Tûsî defines politics as follows (Tusi, 1964, pp. 190-91):

Necessarily, therefore, one requires some type of management to render each one content with the station which he deserves and bring him to his due, to restrain each man’s hand from depredation and from infringement of the rights of others, and to concern itself with the task for which it is responsible among the matters pertaining to co-operation. Such a management is called ‘government’.⁸⁷⁹

Thus, Tûsî has drawn a general framework about the subject, purpose and procedure of politics. Based on this framework, it is possible to discuss the author’s views on forms of politics and administrators. Tusi (1964, p. 191; 2005, p. 189) divides

⁸⁷⁹ As it will be analyzed in the next section, this definition was directly adopted by Tursun Beg.

the forms of politics into four. These can be listed as (i) government of king (*ülke siyâseti*), (ii) government of domination (*galebe siyâseti*), (iii) government of nobility (*karamat siyâseti*), (iv) government of community (*cemaat siyâseti*). The English equivalents that fit the Aristotelian schema given by Wickens do not fully meet Tûsî's meaning. For example, the concept of country politics (*ülke siyâseti*) refers to the rule of a certain country on the basis of virtue, isolated from religious codes, not the kingdom. Therefore, community politics (*cemaat siyâseti*) is the realization of good governance within the framework of a certain religious group and the divine laws it believes in, that is, it is a specific variation of the country politics on a small scale. On the basis of this distinction lies the fusion of ancient Iranian political thought tradition and Islamic political thought. Because such theoretical fusion took place before Tûsî, some of the pre-Islamic Iranian rulers, such as Nushirevan or even Alexander the Great, were described as just.⁸⁸⁰ A similar situation was accepted for Negus Ashame, the Christian king of Abyssinia -who was later thought to be a Muslim- in the years of the birth of Islam.⁸⁸¹ The concept of *karamat* politics in Tûsî also refers to the art of earning, whose ancient Greek is *kharmastike*, not to nobility, and it is meant that the rulers establish an administration to increase their earnings due to their business and arts. The concept of the politics of conquest fits the term domination, but Tûsî's explanation suggests that this politics emerged due to low and stingy people, that is, he tries to provide an economic-political explanation by combining oligarchy or tyranny.

Tûsî relates the content of the concepts of country politics and community politics to each other. According to the his scheme (Tusi, 2005, p. 189), first of all, rulers should know what the conditions require and should be able to interpret it. Thus, they can have the competence to fulfill the requirements of both the mental and the decisive politics required by politics. According to the thinker, the provisions of Sharia, which are at the center of *karamat* politics, are declared by divinely inspired supreme persons and are

⁸⁸⁰ It is seen that the notion of justice took the form of widespread public prestige, especially in Iran of the Saasanid period. The reason for this can be shown as the development of a justice culture in Saasani, where people over the age of fifty can serve as judicial authorities and are equipped with the authority to make free decisions (Balci, 2016, p. 381). It is possible to consider this culture as an interesting remnant of the late Hellenistic period. Due to the importance of the idea of justice in the ancient political thought of Iran, Caliph Omar, who was in power at the time Iran was captured by the Muslim Arab armies, may have been nicknamed 'just'. Thus, it was possible, or at least hoped, to establish an ideological affinity with the subjects of the newly conquered geography.

⁸⁸¹ See: Öztürk (2006).

called divine laws (*namus*). Tûsî states that the term divine laws *namus* is the concept of “ancient scholars”, and Islamic scholars call it Sharia (Tusi, 2005, pp. 189-90). Thus, Tûsî, as could be seen in the *Meşşâî* philosophical tradition, equates the concepts of prophet and philosopher in terms of the declaration of divine laws. Secondly, he states that there is a personality that is different and superior to other people, who will give rational judgments, that this person was called the absolute judge by ancient thinkers, and he was called the Islamic Imam (Tusi, 2005, p. 190). He specifically states that these people are wise people who organize the world, as well as mentioned by Plato and Aristotle (Tusi, 1964, p. 192; 2005, p. 190). He even mentions the view that those who bring divine laws (*namus*) or Sharia are *natık* (speakers) of the truth and absolute judges or imams are the foundation (Tusi, 1964, p. 192; 2005, p. 190). It is understood that the person depicted here corresponds theoretically to the Shiite Imams. Thus, it is stated that general laws come from a divine source and the world is regulated by the rational judgments of imams in accordance with divine law. In this context, it is necessary to take a closer look at the relationship between religious law, imamate, administration and social needs.

Hairi (1968, p. 24) evaluates Tûsî’s political philosophy as a clear extension of Shiite doctrine. According to him, the existence of an idea of infallible Imam appointed by God, who heads the virtuous state, largely reflects the Shiite political doctrine. The fact that Tûsî was under the patronage of an Ismâîlî governor at the time of writing *Ahlak-ı Nâsirî* suggests that the imamate view in the work may have been organized according to the Ismâîlî sect, Hairi (1968, p. 51) underlines that there are criticisms of Ismaili-Shiism in the work. Gafarov’s recent work (2009, pp. 11-12, 15) clarifies this issue and states that Tûsî changed the Ismâîlî-influenced expressions in the first edition of the work and rewrote the prologue - in line with his accepted Twelver view. In the final analysis, if we consider that the imamate issue occupies a very small place in the work, the fact that this issue is included remains the only context of the relationship with the Shiite political doctrine. More precisely, the value of this mention does not correspond to generality at the philosophical level, since Tûsî’s thought largely falls outside the framework of sectarian engagement. This proposition is also valid in terms of the irreducibility of the Shar’i/Islamic doctrine of Tûsî’s views on ethics and politics in general. Gafarov (2009, p. 29) underlines that Tûsî created a philosophical understanding of morality by including ancient Greek and Iranian intellectual tradition in the sources of the Qur’an and hadith.

Even if the origin of the connection in question is divine honor, imamate or virtuous rulership, it is because they are united and largely secular in their purpose. Tûsî states that the purpose of the prophets is to rule earthly affairs in succeeded periods, to bring happiness to people, to set their livelihoods and lives on the right path, to educate children and to show them to be guided to the right path (Tusi 2005, p. 54). Similarly, Tûsî considers the practical reason to be related to the purpose of separating objects, good and harmful acts, regulating works and arts, and living (Tusi, 2005, p. 51). In this respect, he unites the prophets, philosophers, imams, guides, trainers and teachers around a common goal as people who lead people to the truth by breeding and educating them (Tusi, 2005, p. 56). It is especially worth discussing why the administrative staff, which is not so broad in al-Farabi, Avicenna and Averroes, is ranked this way in Tûsî. Tûsî, as the continuation of *Meşşâî* philosophical tradition, evaluates all these social roles as equivalent in terms of the unity of the worldly function of customs and manners. He states that customs are practices that are “previously thought out, responsibly arranged, established with long experiences and multiple repetitions [tm]” (Tusi, 2005, p. 82), and connects the origin of good customs to the divine source (Tusi, 2005, p. 70). Thus, he legitimizes the order of good customs by attributing it to a rational source as well as the other sources of the *Meşşâî* philosophy did. In fact, he mentions traditional politics as legitimate in the manner of the best government, and states that in this type of politics, rulers are people who know which of the past practices are good and which are bad, and keep some of them and eliminate some according to them (Tusi, 2005, p. 214).

This discussion naturally reminds the view in *Meşşâî* philosophy that religious worship is also a tradition and should be interpreted according to its worldly meaning. Although Tûsî does not make such a direct reference, other thinkers who criticize him especially focus on this point. As Kanar (2019a, p. 302) states, thinkers such as Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Cezviyya stated that Tûsî did not comply with the Sharia rules, did not perform prayers, and that he called the Qur’an “the Qur’an of the common people” and Avicenna's *al-Isarat* as “the Qur’an of the elites”. Although this criticism does not differ much from the ones directed to Peripatetic thinkers in general, the emphasis on the distinction between the Qur’an of ‘common’ and ‘elite’ people has a reference to the understanding of Twelver Shiism. As Gafarov underlines (2009, p. 14; footnote 14): “(...) Although Imamiye calls himself ‘elite’ in Imami sources, they used the concept of ‘common’ for Ahl al-Sunnah in the sense of sect of both the general and

the common people [tm]”. However, it is clear that this reference is related to the view that, for *Meşşâî* philosophy, those who share the divine reason can understand the essence of the revelation based on imaginations. While other *Meşşâî* thinkers based this issue theologically on the emanation argument, Tûsî focused more on the secular meaning of customs and interpreted them within the Aristotelian approach.

In this context, Tûsî opens the door to secular political practice and law (Tusi, 2005, p. 70). Because the above-mentioned lawmakers and practitioners unite are mainly beneficence and happiness, and since these will be achieved through cooperation, the spread of good traditions and good deeds, and the development of science, in the final analysis, they depend on the steps to be taken in the worldly context. Accordingly, the important thing is to know what the conditions for the realization of common goals require and to act accordingly. In this respect, according to Tûsî, there is no need for rulers to enact divine law or rational provisions in every era (Tusi, 2005, p. 190). It is sufficient to have the measures taken to maintain order among the people. Those who take these precautions should try to protect the order and law, invite the people to order and for this purpose they should be able to make the necessary changes in the laws in accordance with the requirements of the contemporary context (Tusi, 2005, p. 190). In the passage following these statements, Tûsî defines his political philosophy in the relevant secular plan and thus shows the way to reach the intellectual, worldly and theoretically correct source from which the prudent rulers can take their principles of action. According to him (Tusi, 1964, p. 192):

From this it is evident that Politics (which is the science embraced in this Discourse) is the study of universal laws producing the best interest of the generality inasmuch as they are directed, through co-operation, to true perfection. The object of this science is the form of a community, resulting by virtue of combination and becoming the source of the members' actions in the most perfect manner.

Wickens (1964, p. 11) argues that Tûsî tries to harmonize the new forms of legislation and authority that emerged as a result of social development, with the inclusiveness of revelation, which is thought to bind all times, and tries to combine *de jure* and *de facto* forms between the lines. Tûsî does not see a difference in nature between (i) the politics of wisdom, (ii) the virtuous politics, (iii) the traditional politics and (iv) the politics of lawmen, and only detects differences in degree in the talk of good

governance, thus he unites those concepts in terms of goals and values (Tusi, 2005, p. 214). In the final analysis, having wisdom, intelligence, understanding and imagination, the concentration of jihad forces in a single ruler or a few people, or the existence of someone who can follow old practices even though none of them can be seen in one person, is sufficient for a legitimate political administration for Tûsî.

Finally, it is necessary to mention the effects of Tûsî's works on Ottoman political thought. One of the basic books taught in Ottoman madrasa education is Tûsî's work called *Tecridü'l-i'tikad* (also known as *Tecridü'l-kelam*), furthermore its annotation by Şemseddin el-İsfahanî and another annotation written by Cürcânî about the Şemseddin el-İsfahanî's work were included among the basic texts of madrasah education (Bilkan, 2018, p. 152). Tûsî's work called *Ahlak-ı Nâsırî* also had a significant impact on Ottoman moral philosophy and political thought. This effect, which we can detect for the first time in Hüsameddin Amasî's *Mirâtu'l-Mülûk*, is also seen in Tursun Beg's *Târîh-i Ebü'l-Feth* and partially in Sinan Pasha's *Maârifnâme*. In addition, Gafarov (2009, p. 31) claims that series of works are an imitation of *Ahlak-ı Nâsırî* such as Taşköprüzâde's *Şerhi Ahlâk-ı Adudiyye*, Kınalızâde Ali Efendi's *Ahlâk-ı Alaî*, Celâleddin Devvânî's *Ahlâk-ı Celâlî* and Muhyî-i Gülşenî's *Ahlâk-ı Kiram*. Although it is unlikely that these works are imitations in the absolute sense, the fact that such a similarity can be established reveals the deep influence of Tûsî. Moreover, the fact that only some of Tûsî's arguments have been used in various works is significant in terms of showing that these arguments are received and used by different social layers in accordance with their own interests. It will be briefly considered three of these works in succeeding subsection.

VII.III.II.II.II.II. Amâsî -Sinan Pasha-Tursun Beg: The Problem of Grounding Secular Politics

It is seen that the connection between the notions of multitude, administrative prudentia and customary law first developed in the Ottoman thought in the early 15th century due to the influence of Tûsî in the context of imperial regime. In Hüsameddin Amâsî's work *Mirâtu'l-Mülûk*, it can be followed a formal realization of this effect to a large extent. Amâsî generally follows the argumentation line of Ibn Miskeveyn and Tûsî in his work *Mirâtu'l-Mülûk*. In this framework, he first uses the concept of multitude in the field of '*tedbîr-i menzil*', that is, in the field of economy, and states that the things necessary for a person's life and livelihood are based on establishing partnerships with

beings of his own kind. The fact that this partnership corresponds to spouse, children and helpers develops the community, thus the problem of management and education of the multitude arises (Yılmaz, 1998, pp. 116-17). Secondly, Amâsî states that in order for a person to reach perfection, he needs to cooperate with beings of his own kind and therefore he needs ‘*temeddun*’ (*polis/city*). Thus, the division of labor will emerge, the need for clothing, food production, the need for shelter, the need for defense or weapons will be treated as separate arts, cooperation will emerge, and the society will develop (Yılmaz, 1998, pp. 127-28). In this new scale, the concept of multitude indicates both the multiplicity of the arts and the multiplicity of the social purposes of the members of the society. Within this framework, Amâsî considers measures (*tedbîrs*) aimed at both the protection of *menzils* (professional division of labor) and the prevention of social conflict arising from different desires, as politics (Yılmaz, 1998, p. 128): “Pes bi’z-zarure bir tedbir gerek ki herbirisin kendü menziline ve mertebesine ve hakkına kani kıla ve her birinün birisi üzerine ta’addisin ve zulmün def ide ve tedbire siyaset dirler”.⁸⁸²

In these lines, Amâsî follows Tûsî’s *Ahlak-ı Nâsirî* directly and inherits his theoretical perspective on the purpose and scope of different forms of politics directly from him. According to Amâsî, there are two types of politics. The first one is “*siyâset-i ilahi*” (divine politics), the second one is “*siyâset-i melik*” (politics of ruler), also called “*tedbir-i cema’at*” (*measures of community/ community politics*), and both aim to realize “*nizam-ı umur*” (public order) (Yılmaz, 1998, pp. 128-29). According to Amâsî, the ancient thinkers called the first of them *namus-u ilahi* (*divine law*), while the hadith and *fiqh* scholars referred to it as Sharia. The implementer of the second policy is the person who differs from the common ones with the “*teyid-i ilahiye*” (divine confirmation) and is referred to as “*malik-i ale’l-itlak*” (general ruler) and the decrees brought by him are called “*sanat-i melik*” (art of rule), hadith scholars and faqihs call this person “*imam*” and the type of administration as “*imamet*” (Yılmaz, 1998, p. 129). Amâsî states that there is a need for prudent persons in every era, and they have authority over all particulars (*cem-i cuz’iyat*) and are engaged in making the requirements of *nomos* a custom and obligation (Yılmaz, 1998, p. 129). In this framework, Amâsî argues that virtuous politics is community politics and its purpose is to unite the people (*tekmil-i halk*) and achieve happiness (Yılmaz, 1998, p. 130). There is nothing original in terms

⁸⁸² In this case, the measures that to consent different social segments to their professions, ranks and rights and prevent them from doing evil and cruelty against each other are called politics.

of content in these views, which are largely based on the abbreviated presentation of the arguments of Ibn Miskawayn and Tûsî. Nevertheless, they are of great significance as they are at the center of Amâsî's political theory and are a special element. Finally, it is discussed in previous sections that Amâsî used the three-level justice model of Tûsî. In short, Tûsî states that for the establishment of justice, there is a need for a ruler, money and law, and this view is also shared by Amâsî (2016, pp. 239-41). The use of this view was probably due to the fact that Amâsî came from a locally powerful family in a developed commercial city. Moreover, consistent with Tûsî's opinion, Amâsî also seems to accuse the *sûfîs* of not playing a socially beneficial role, which clearly shows that a ulama like Amâsî, who comes from a locally powerful family, is rather reluctant to share religious authority with *sûfî* circles.

On the other hand, Tûsî thought is not an essential element in Sinan Pasha's *Maârifnâme*. For example, arguments about the criticism of *sûfî* circles in Amâsî or the function of money (*adil-i samit*) as a means of providing justice are not encountered in Sinan Pasha's argumentation. Similar to Amâsî, Sinan Pasha, who transferred Tûsî's Aristotelian state scheme to his own thought, does not consider himself to be tightly bound to this scheme in his comments on this subject, and even criticizes it. It is seen that Sinan Pasha's adherence to the *Zeyniyye* order was effective in this critical attitude. Because the *Zeyniyye* order has an origin that goes back to es-Suhrawardi, who is considered the founder of Ishraqî mysticism, and es-Suhrawardi is a mystic philosopher who has a competence on Platonic philosophy and tries to overcome *Meşşâî* philosophic tradition with a method based on mysticism and intuition. In this respect, the fact that there is both a common origin and a motivation to contain and transcend between mystical systematics of *Zeyniyye* order and *Meşşâî* philosophy also shows itself in Sinan Pasha's propositions.

It is necessary to examine this relationship more closely. First of all, Sinan Pasha states that living in accordance with the Aristotelian scheme is a necessity of reason. The title of the section in which he deals with the subject is meaningful in this respect (Sinan Paşa, 2013, p. 368): "Beyanu Enne'l-Akile Yenbağî en Yes'a fi en Yekune Lehu Menfeatün fi Nizami'l-Alem".⁸⁸³ Under this heading, he touches on two points. The first of these is that everyone contributes to the world order within a certain profession that suits their ability, that is, sharing and increasing goodness and beauty through farming, weaving, viziership, sultanate, qadî, mudarris or sheikh (Sinan Paşa,

⁸⁸³ About the appropriateness of an intelligent person to strive to benefit the world order.

2013, pp. 368-70). Sinan Pasha, without referring to the principle of the virtuous unity of the multitude for the common purpose seen in Tûsî, emphasizes patronage relations directly as a reproduction model. According to Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 368): “Cihannın nizami böyle olur/ Ve alem intizamını bununla bulur. Ki nasın aralarında olan hukuk riayet ola/ Ta ki daima birinden birine himayet ola/ Efrad-ı insan ba’zı ba’zısına mevsul olur/ Ve ba’zının emri ba’zısına mevkul olur”.⁸⁸⁴ It is interesting that the concepts of law and protection are brought to the fore in these lines. Because Tûsî formulates law and qadis as secondary measures for the unity of society, more precisely as measures needed for the absence of affection. Sinan Pasha, on the other hand, places both the law and the social stratification displayed by this law directly under the concept of world order. Moreover, although he states that multitude is realized for the common good and benevolence in the visible plan, he does not formulate the immanent purpose (*telos*) of society as reaching happiness, as it is seen in Tûsî’s argumentation. Another notion that can be mentioned to be in contrary of *Meşşâî* tradition, which identifies real happiness with divine knowledge, that is, the motif of worship promoted instead of the happiness. According to Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 370), the meaning of the professions listed above is service and servitude to God. Thus, he mystifies the Aristotelian secular model of society and places worship of God as the *telos* of society instead of material wealth and moral evolution. There are some understandable reasons for this interpretation, which it will be discussed below.

Sinan Pasha realized that professions such as a sheikh of a *sûfî* order, which do not provide material benefits in the social division of labor, should also be grounded in terms of social relations, and for this reason, he felt the need to connect him to a common origin in all other professions. Exactly in this context, it is seen that Sinan Pasha denied the criticism which is developed about the isolated lives of the *sûfîs* in the arguments of Tûsî. The juxtaposition of the *temeddun*/urbanization theory and the criticism of the isolated *sûfîs* in Sinan Pasha’s work shows that this chapter is a response to Tûsî and to thinkers like Amâsî who repeat this theory. As was shown in the relevant subsection, Sinan Pasha argues that the world order remains in place for the sake of the great *sûfîs*. The mystical basis on which this thought is based is the concept of *qutb*. Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 372) defines the *qutb* as “the person who is the most perfected person in the

⁸⁸⁴ This is how the order of the world becomes/ And the world finds its order in this. The law between the people will be obeyed/ So that there will always be protection from one to the other/ Some of the individuals help some/ And the order of some becomes a representative for some.

century he lived in [tm]” and whose order of the universe, the rotation of the spheres, and the existence of the world depend on him. According to Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 372): “Cem-i kainattan maksud insandır/ Ve insandan dahi maksud birkaç müslümandır/ Canı-i dünyanın durduğu onların vücudu iledir/ Ve her taatın kabulü onların sücudu iledir”.⁸⁸⁵ In these lines, Sinan Pasha establishes the connection between the world order and worship, while claiming that the purpose of the creation of the universe was that of a few distinguished believers, and that all worship was accepted by their worship. Thus, above all professions, there is another profession, *sûfis*, which share the same purpose with them but constitutes the effective reason for their results. Moreover, in line with this argument, since the order of the world is seen as a protection regime, the *qutb* is accepted as the supreme protector. As a result, the role assigned to the philosophers in the *Meşşâî* tradition was reserved for the sheikhs in Sinan Pasha, and the element of reason gradually left its place to worship.

Finally, let us consider the influence of Tûsî on Tursun Beg’s political views. Tursun Beg follows a dual path while grounding the necessity of political regimes. Firstly, it presents the existence of these regimes as a theological necessity, and secondly, it grounds this theological necessity from a philosophical point of view. These two theoretical paths formally support each other and focus on a single central term. This term is ‘*nizam-ı alem*’ (order of the world). Tursun Beg (1977, p. 1) advances his arguments as follows; First of all, God favors a person of high honor and superiority from the human species for “baka-yi nizam-i alem” (permanence of the order of the world) and sets him a barrier to “ye’cuc-ı fitne-i ruzgar” (strife of Gog). Thus, in every era when the rule of “inni ca’ilün fi’l-arzı caliph” (Qur’an, 2:30)⁸⁸⁶, a glorious sultan emerges (Tursun, 1977, p. 1). The points emphasized in these lines are that the reason why God appoints a superior person to be the caliph is to ensure the ‘order of the world’, that is, to ensure the social order, that is, this can be achieved by blocking the social conflict and separation. As can be seen, while the legitimacy of the ruler/caliph is grounded, the fulfillment of the divine decree (Qur’an, 2:30) constitutes a theological reference point, but it does not function as a self-referred category in this religious discourse. On the contrary, the provision of worldly order is presented as the material basis of the existence of the ruler and is idealized again through the fulfillment

⁸⁸⁵ The purpose of the whole universe is man himself/ And what is meant by man himself is a few Muslims/ The continuation of life in the world depends on their body/ And the acceptance of every worship is due to their prostration.

⁸⁸⁶ Surely I will create a caliph on earth.

of this function. According to Tursun Beg (1977, p. 10), the evils arising from the enmity between the human species are prevented by the *tedbîr* of the sultan, and for this reason, the material existence of the ruler is a blessing (*ni'met*) that those who are subject to should be grateful for. Thus, the ruler is formulated as an authority that should be considered a material blessing as he fulfills material duties, but the material necessity of his existence and subjection to him is considered a divine necessity. In this context, the concept of the multitude (*mütennevi*) has a special significance in political articulation. The order of the material world appears as a divine necessity in Tursun Beg in terms of its relationship with the phenomenon of multitude. Tursun Beg argues that God makes people 'civilized' in terms of creation, that is, people who live in cities, villages or camps, and make them a community in their "emr-i inti'aş" and "ahkam-ı ma'aş"⁸⁸⁷ (Tursun, 1977, p. 12). In other words, people are in need of urbanization and cooperation, and this is a divine decree.⁸⁸⁸ In this respect, multitude is necessary in the first place for different people to live together and to continue their economic activities and help each other. Secondly, people are different from each other as a divine necessity by nature. He formulates this second feature of the multiplicity as follows (Tursun, 1977, p. 12):

Ve insan eğerçi ünsten müştaktur dimişler, amma deva'i-i ef'ali ve meratib-i ahvali muhtelif ve mütennevi'dür. La-cerem bu ihtilaf ü tebayün ve tefahüt ü temayüzden -ki anasır-ı beşeriyette mecbudur- lazım geldi ki metalib-i tavayif-i ehl-i alem ve me'arib-i tabakat-ı evlad-ı beni-adem muhtelif ü mütefavit ola.⁸⁸⁹

As can be seen in these lines, it is claimed that the multitude of people is necessary in terms of cooperation/division of labor, but an accidental quality in terms of reproducing the social order. An obvious problem arises at this point. If the phenomenon of multitude is divinely created and equally natural in terms of both division of labor and different wants/interests of people, why are the two incompatibles?

⁸⁸⁷ Social life and livelihoods.

⁸⁸⁸ Since Tursun Beg's contemporary Molla Lütüfi started his text *er-Risâle fi'l-Ulûmi'sh-Şer'iyye ve'l-Arabîyye* with this argument, it is possible to argue that this view has a central importance in the political thought of Mehmet II period. The statement of Molla Lütüfi is as follows (Arslan, 2012, p. 58): "Because of being civilized by nature, man needs to be in harmony with his fellow man in order to maintain his life".

⁸⁸⁹ It is said that the word human (*nas*) is derived from the word 'uns' (closeness), but the directors of his deeds and actions and the degrees of their states are different and diverse. Undoubtedly, because of this difference and separation, this dissimilarity and distinction inherent in the elements of humanity, the wishes of the human communities living in the world and the wishes of the strata of the sons of Adam must be different and separate.

Why do people who are part of the natural division of labor become the actors of the danger of disrupting the social order due to their natural needs and desires? It is not possible to find direct answers to these questions in the sources of the period because in the last analysis, the political theory, which sees the division of labor among people as a natural necessity, sees an asymmetrical power relationship, that is, social strata and classes, equally natural in the distribution of wealth. The contradiction intensifies at this point, because the theoretical thought, which does not easily accept the idea that social contradictions arise because asymmetrical power relations are not natural, insists on constructing the phenomenon of politics as a means of harmonization between the natural division of labor and the class domination in which interests' conflict. It is necessary to wait until the development of the political thought of 19th century to determine the duality underlying the social conflict, namely the natural division of labor and the artificial chain of relations of distribution that are not suitable for it.

In this context, it would be appropriate to examine Tursun Beg's definition of politics. Tursun Beg first makes a general definition of politics and tries to determine the position of customary law by formulating two possible ways of applying this definition. Tursun Beg's definition of politics directly formulates the function of reproduction of class relations. In order to explain this view, we first need to quote and analyze the author's statements. According to Tursun Beg (1977, p. 12):

Pes eğer tabi'atleri muktezasınca konulurlarsa, aralarında şol kadar tenazü'ü temanü' ve husumet ü tedafü' vakı' ola kim asl-i ictima'dan maksud olan te'avün ve yardımlaşmak hasıl olmaz; belki birbirin ifsad ü ifna eder. Zaruri nev'-i tedbirden gerekli oldı ki her birini müstahakk olduğu menzilde koya; kendü hakkına kani' idüp dest-i tasarrufını hukuk-ı gayrdan kutah kıla. Ve beni nev' arasında umur-ı te'avüni mütekeffil şüğl ne ise ana meşgul eyleye. Ve bunun gibi tedbire siyaset dirler.⁸⁹⁰

Tursun Beg's definition repeats the economic and rational definition based on the society's Peripatetic and *Meşşâî* philosophy tradition. According to him, society is founded on division of labor/cooperation and its continuation is the main aim of politics.

⁸⁹⁰ Thus, if [society/people] are left in the way they were created, so much conflict and disagreement, conflict and enmity will occur among them that the cooperation desired to be achieved by being together cannot be achieved, perhaps they corrupt and destroy each other. Inevitably, as a precaution, it was necessary to leave each of them in the rank they deserved, to ensure that he was satisfied with his own right and to prevent his hand from reaching out to the rights of others, and to ensure that he dealt with whatever he had to do among the affairs of helping people. They call a measure like this politics.

But the reproduction of this general scheme is regarded as essentially defective. The reason for this is that the possibility of dissension of the social order – the division of labor and deprivation of its benefits – is always present, as people are 'by nature' to be in conflict and hostility. In this respect, political practice tends towards three main goals: (i) ensuring the continuity of the division of labor ('umur-ı te'avüni mütekeffil şıđl ne ise ana meşgul eyleye'), (ii) asymmetrical continuation of the status of members of the community ('her birini müstahıkk olduđı menzilde koya'), (iii) to obtain consent to distribution relations as a requirement of the division of labor and social status, and to prevent the occurrence of the opposite situations ('kendü hakkına kani' idüp dest-i tasarrufını hukuk-ı gayrdan kutah kıla'). If we summarize these three titles, the role that Tursun Beg assigned to politics in his reproduction model is the regulation of (i) relations of production (ii) social stratification/power and (iii) relations of distribution.

Oktay (2017a, p. 34) considers the definition of politics within the framework of the concept of '*tedbîr*' in Tursun Beg as a part of an old tradition of political thought that goes back to Ibnu'l Mukaffa, but cannot fully explain the intended meaning. As we have seen above, Tûsî uses the concept of '*tedbîr*' to characterize political practice, and Amâsî and Sinan Pasha, who benefit from the same source, continue to use the concept in a similar way. On the other hand, in order to understand how the word '*tedbîr*' gained the relevant term, it is necessary to mention the sources of *Meşşâî* philosophy.⁸⁹¹ When the work of al-Farabi named *İhsâü'l-ulûm* is examined, we see that this term is classified as a branch of science that deals with the methods to be followed in order to adapt the theoretical knowledge to the concrete material. According to al-Farabi (2019, p. 37), when theoretical knowledge wants to be applied to real beings, these beings show a certain resistance, therefore "(...) natural bodies need to be brought into a state where they can accept what is wanted to be applied to them and the things that prevent this can be removed". Al-Farabi's definition formulates a type of sub-knowledge for establishing the practical link between theoretical knowledge-application-product. Al-Farabi's definition of politics directly follows the model he put forward in his definition of '*tedbîr*'. According to him (Farabi, 2019, p. 49), politics explores how volitional acts and volitional lifestyles should be regulated in order to exist in human beings as they should exist in adequate form, and how to protect them.

⁸⁹¹ For an alternative use of the concept of '*tedbir*' in sûfi thought, see the concept of "*ehl-i temkin*" in Devîş Külhenî's book titled *Sırrı-Kalbî* (Özdemir, 2015, p. 183).

Ritter (2011, pp. 106-7) states that the term ‘ilm-i tedbîr-i menzil’ is used in the sense of domestic management (*oikonomia*) in thinkers like Süheylî and Tûsî, who were influenced by ancient Greek philosophy. Indeed, there is a special section devoted to this subject in Tûsî’s work *Ahlak-ı Nâsirî*. However, the expression ‘her birini müstahıkk olduđı menzilde koya’ in Tursun Beg points to the social positions determined by the economic division of labor and brings a macro-level interpretation. The decisive aspect of this interpretation is that it is largely formed from an organismic view of society and shows a certain affinity with medical terminology. Öztürk (2017, p. 348) points out that the term of ‘*tedbîr*’ is another common usage that expresses medical treatment processes through terms like ‘*tedbîru’l-beden*’ or ‘*tedbîru’l-ceset*’. In this respect, the term ‘*tedbîr*’ acquires secondary meanings that aim at making the social body healthy at the macro level. As stated before, the division of labor and relations of distribution in Tursun Beg correspond to a stratified social structure, causing social positions to be formed in an asymmetrical manner. This expression should therefore be interpreted in the context of the reproduction of social positions and asymmetrical statuses based on the economy. Thus, the meaning of the term gains a content within the discipline of political economy. The main source from which Tursun Beg inherited this view is Tûsî’s *Ahlak-ı Nâsirî*, and the definition is clearer in this work. Tûsî (2005, p. 189) defines it as follows: “To keep each one in its own place, to give own share of every people and prevent them to infringe on the rights of others, and in the social labor process it is necessary to take measures to force the person to fulfill the job given to him. They called this measure politics [tm]”. The use of the concept in Tursun Beg does not differ in principle. A theoretical template about what the purpose of society and people is, is tied to a normative template loaded with political practice and a class-based vision of how society should be. Both visions follow the general marks of social formations shaped within the framework of the rentier mode of production. In this respect, political practice is a series of ‘*tedbîr*’s applied to realize the relationship between what exists and what ought to be. The relationship between what is and what ought to be is in need of the mediation of ‘*tedbîr*’ because matter resists the realization of theoretical knowledge. When this definition of al-Farabi is applied to Tursun Beg’s political theory, the definition of politics as a ‘*tedbîr*’ places the practices that will be

applied to social resistance and keep it subject and regular in order to fulfill the three decisive social functions mentioned above.⁸⁹²

Within this framework, he underlines the possibility of practicing politics in two different ways. Tursun Beg sees the first form of politics as a divine politics that ensures the evolution of people, is suitable for the path of wisdom and brings happiness in both worlds, and sees the prophets as the guardians of this. Tursun Beg's formulation is as follows (1977, p. 12):

Ve eğer şöyle ki bu tedbir ber-vefk-ı vücub ve ka'ide-i hikmet olursa -ki mü'ddi ola bir kemale ki bi'l-kuvve beni-nev'ün eşhasında konulmuştur ki ol kuvvet iktisab-ı sa'adetyndür -ana ehl-i hikmet siyaset-i İlahi dirler, ve vazı'ına namus dirler. Ve ehl-i şer' ana şeri'at dirler, ve vaz'ına şari' ıtlak iderler ki, peygamberdür.⁸⁹³

In this formulation, it is clear that Tursun Beg tried to combine the ancient political philosophy with the Islamic tradition. The term '*ehl-i hikmet*' is used in the Islamic tradition to describe either ancient Greek or *Meşşâî* philosophers. The idea that people have the potential to develop in their essence and that politics should reveal this potential and realize it in a way that will bring happiness to people belongs to the Peripatetic school. Tursun Beg calls this view divine politics and states that it is protected by '*namus*'. The term '*namus*' used here refers to the concept of '*nomos/namastei*', the etymology of which we have presented before, and means 'law'.⁸⁹⁴ While Islamizing this concept, Tursun Beg replaced the philosophers with the prophets as the subject declaring *nomos*, and he replaced the term *nomos* with the concept of Sharia. Thus, it sends the origin of the laws, which are both suggested in the philosophical discussion and believed to be based on revelation, to the divine source as a whole. And yet, he connects both of them to a common *telos*, that is, to reach happiness

⁸⁹² It is possible to come across a very similar concept of politics in Ali Kuşçu's work called *Şerhu't-Tecrid*. Ali Kuşçu argues that the prohibitions of the ruler are more than the prohibitions of the Qur'an, and that social life cannot continue unless there is "a sultan with absolute authority who fights against evil, protects benevolent earnings, eliminates situations where different temperaments compete and different ambitions struggle" (Fazlıoğlu, 2003, p. 397). Ali Kuşçu grounds this argument by arguing that animals in nature (for example, bees) also apply to an authority in order to live in unity (Fazlıoğlu, 2003, p. 397).

⁸⁹³ And if this *tedbir* is properly and in accordance with the path of wisdom, it will cause such maturity that this maturity is potentially inscribed in human personalities, and that power brings the happiness of the two worlds, the people of wisdom call it divine politics, and its guardian *namus*. Sharia men call him Sharia and call his protector as Shari, which means he is a prophet.

⁸⁹⁴ This term has another connotation that means patriarchal law and honor.

in both worlds so that they do not negate each other. Al-Farabi's arguments are in the background of this line of thought. Adapting Aristotle's connection between *telos-polis-nomos-eudaimonia* to Islamic culture, al-Farabi in his *Kitab-ün fî mebâdî arâ-i ehl-il Medînet-il-fâzıla*, *Kitâb-ül-siyâset-il-madaniye* and *Tahsilu's-Sa'ada* constructs the relation of city-Shar'i law-perfection-happiness as a whole.

VII.III.II.II.II.II. Islamic Law versus *Örf-i Sultânî* (Customary Law of Ruler)

The second debate, which prevailed in this period, is carried out on the relationship/contradiction of Sharia and customary law, and also it is related to the autarkic character of the imperial regime. Tezcan (2010, pp. 18-19, 35) states that the struggle and transformations between the customary law and the Sharia are also a continuation of the transformations in the social structure and that the dominance of the latter should be evaluated together with the dissolution of the feudal structures. While this discussion is a reaction to the confiscation of *mülk* and *waqf* lands, it also deals with the determination of the succession procedure of the power and the establishment of a justice practice in which class privileges are secured. The word '*örf*' is the name given to traditional practices that are based on repetition and adopted by the people, similar to the terms custom or tradition. Dönmez (2007) notes that the Arabic origin of this word is '*urf*' and denotes "certain social behavior patterns and established uses in the language". In this respect, it is clear that '*örf*' can correspond to social norms and thus to widespread power relations without neglecting their cultural dimensions. As such, the term '*örf*' refers to traditionally inherited forms of social power through the plural term '*ma'rûf*'. In this sense, the concept of custom (*örf*) is a distinctive topic of discussion in Islamic law. On the other hand, to the extent that this term is expressed under the concept of 'customary law', it refers to the authority of the rulers to ban ('*yasak*'), that is, to enact laws, within the Turkish-Mongolian tradition. If considered within this tradition, the term 'customary law' corresponds to the "authority of the sultan to rule and execute policies [tm]" as formulated by Akman (2007). If Hassan's (2002, pp. 81-84) studies on this subject are examined, he argues that the state-building process in the Turks took place in the form of a transition from local tribal '*töre*' (customs) to '*yasag*' (ban) belonging to the federation of tribes, and finally to '*örf-i sultani*' (customary law of sultan) belonging to the state level development. In this respect, it is clear that the custom (*örf*) determined or accepted by the ruler can be called *kanun* (law) as a form that constitutes the last stage of this development in the final analysis. Another

local nomenclature of the term *kanun* in the 15th century gives the impression that it derives from the primitive legal forms of kinship societies, and in this respect its ties to secular authority can be more clearly understood. Heyd (1973, p. 167-68) listed some of these nomenclatures as follows: (i) The Persian term *dastur* is used in the sense of *kanun*, and this term continues to be used in the eastern borders of the Ottoman Empire, especially in the regions conquered from Uzun Hasan, (ii) the term *âdet* is the term for *kanun* and mentioned in some of Uzun Hasan's laws, (iii) in Diyarbakir, Urfa, Mardin, Kemah, Ergani and Arapkir regions, the word *yasa/yasaha* is used instead of the term *kanun*. Heyd (1973, p. 168) finds that the term '*nizam*' was also used instead of the term *kanun* in later centuries, which corresponds to the early modern period.

In Islamic law, this issue is discussed on two points. The first focuses on the problem of whether customs and traditions that are not inherited from Islamic origin should be tolerated or forced to be changed under an Islamic rule, and the second focuses on the extent to which a ruler has autonomous legislative power in a state where Islamic law (*fiqh*) is applied, or within which limits such authority can be used. If the first point is evaluated, the discussion about the extent to which pre-Islamic practices were acceptable in the early periods of Islam, that is, the problem of *ma'rûf*, makes itself felt as a problem of reproduction of the Islamic order with its religious-cultural dimension. The acceptance of *ijma* and *qiyas* as legitimate techniques in the *fiqh* methodology and the application of the principles of *istihsan-istishab-istislah* allowed the *ma'rûf* to be accepted as legitimate unless it clearly contradicts the provisions of Sharia and is generally considered beneficial (Karaoğlu, 2019, p. 11-13).⁸⁹⁵ Gardet and Anawati (2015, p. 586) point out that there is an underlying '*vox populi*' in the practice of *ijma*, although it is theoretically far from incorporate it altogether. It is stated by the same authors that *ijma* in Shiite thought is considered as a living practice that can be re-determined by the ulama of every era, while jurists who adhere to the Hanbali doctrine try to present *ijma* as an ossified structure belonging to the period of the *sahabe* and *tabein* (Gardet & Anawati, 2015, p. 588). The violent attack of the traditionalists against approaches such as the Jahmiyya, which stemmed from the cultural interaction of the newly converted peoples and military and cultural expansionism, revealed new theological tendencies in this framework. This led to the emergence of Ibn Taymiyyah

⁸⁹⁵ Istihsan: "Exempting a particular provision from a general principle or general rule based on a special evidence", Istishab: "continuing a judgment based on evidence in the past until a new evidence emerges", Istilah: "maslahat (...), to obtain what is beneficial, to eliminate what is harmful". See: Karaoğlu (2019, p. 13).

or Salafi reactive approaches, depending on Hanbali jurisprudence, in which *ma'rūf* was generally limited to Arab-Islamic cultural codes and their reflection in early Islamic practices (for example, Medina customs). In this context, it is possible to follow directly how cultural politics take place in hegemony strategies through Islamic culture and *icma* discussions.

Focusing on the second point, the problem of the distinction between secular and religious authority is also discussed theologically and legally (*fiqh*). It is thought that the emergence of this problem corresponds to a specific historical moment. According to İnalçık (1987, p. 5), the conditions for the emergence of this debate must have matured especially in the 11th century and later. The emergence of the powerful oppositions of Shia sect and the beginning of the Crusades in the 11th century paved the way for the emergence and acceptance of secular authorities supporting the caliphate in order to reproduce Sunni Islam (İnalçık, 1987, p. 5). The state structures and their rulers that emerged in this framework also gained the quality of legislators independent of the caliph. The inability of the Sharia authorities to respond to the newly emerging public law and policy problems, and the fact that the sultanates were deemed necessary in terms of Sharia to reproduce the social order gave rise to the secular “*kanun/dawabit*” literature (İnalçık, 1987, p. 5). İnalçık (1987, p. 6) also underlines that this general tendency deepened during the reigns of Buyids and Seljuks, because on the one hand, it was integrated with the Sassanid state traditions in which the ruler was made the absolute decision-maker, and on the other hand, with the Turkish-Mongol state traditions based on the unity of Khaganate and tribal custom. The contributions made by al-Mawardi and Abu Mansur to the *fiqh* theory in this framework can be considered as a reflection of this general tendency, with their qualities that, in the final analysis, accept the existence of a secular power besides a Shar’i authority (İnalçık, 1987, p. 6). It is clear that the works of Diya’al-Din Barni and Nizam’ül-Mülk in the form of *siyâsetnâme* can be seen as the most significant works written in this period on the formation and use of secular authority in this context (İnalçık, 1987, p. 7). On the other hand, the concept of secular authority, which Ibn Taymiyya put forward as ‘*al-‘ada al-sultaniya*’, in this context, revealed an approach in which the customary rule was criticized in terms of being contradictory with ‘*hukm al-sharia*’ (Heyd, 1973, p. 169). However, it can be argued that Ibn Taymiyya’s removal of the caliphate from the subject of discussion in the macro-political context indirectly legitimizes the *de facto* political situation in the Mongolian occupation period and thus constitutes the other side of the

coin (Rosenthal, 1962, p. 52). Köse (2009, pp. 9-10) states that Ibn Taymiyya tried to prevent the implementation of the law of Genghis in the final analysis and accepted the actual situation dominated by the local rulers/emirates in order to apply the Sharia.

It can be mentioned that there is a well-developed discussion in the secondary literature on the mutual relationship of Sharia and customary law in the Ottoman state. The focus of this discussion especially on the second half of the 15th century is due to the fact that there was a widespread codification movement during the reign of Mehmet II (Özcan, 1995, p. 153) and the difficulties in categorizing the provisions in both the general law codes (*Kanunnâmes*) and the sanjak codes in terms of both customary and Sharia. Moreover, the widespread use of the ideological postulate on the validity of Sharia in the sources of the period—in a way, the dominant form of Islamic ideology—makes it difficult to determine the legal situation in the Ottoman state at factual and ideal levels. Contrary to this determination, in the works of Prince Korkud and in the passages in the *siyâsetnâmes* and chronicles of the period where the *qadis* are criticized, there are serious indications that the Sharia is *de facto* invalidated in the real situation. Moreover, the fact that researchers working on the code of laws clearly observed the standardization process of customary law in the periods of Mehmet II and Bayezid II (Koç, 2005, p. 138), which certainly reveals the traces of such a *de facto* situation.

As Karaoğlu (2019) summarizes, opinions on this subject are presented in three main approaches. The first approach argues that the practices in the Ottoman state are absolutely in line with Sharia, the second approach argues that there is a secular law separate from the Sharia in the Ottoman state, and the third approach adopts the view that there is a synthetic consensus between them. Okumuş (2005, pp. 80-85) can be taken as an example of the first approach. According to him, there is no separation of religion and state in the Ottoman administrative practice, and it is not possible to come across a concept that corresponds to this in the Ottoman mentality (Okumuş, 2005, p. 80). Based on this view, Okumuş argues that customary law and Sharia cannot be separated from each other in the Ottoman state, on the contrary, customary Law and the absolute authority of the sultan remain within the boundaries of Sharia (2005, p. 85). Beriş (2008, p. 263), on the other hand, states that customary law only grants the right to enact laws based on the will of the monarch in matters that are not within the scope of Sharia. Akgündüz (1999 and 2010) repeats this point in his various works and represents the most advanced form of this argument in academic terms.

Ö. L. Barkan and C. Üçok could be accepted as the representatives of the second approach. A series of articles published by Üçok (for example 1946, 1947) in the second half of the 1940s can be considered the founding texts of this approach. Continuing this approach, Mumcu (2017, pp. 27-28) argues that the ulama adapted the customary law to the Sharia and that the Sharia itself is a factor that develops the customary law. İnalçık (2019c, p. 57) draws attention to the nature of customary law that 'transcends' Sharia and states that Ottoman rulers had the authority to legislate in areas not covered by Sharia. Heyd (1973, p. 180) argues that customary and Sharia are in struggle in the criminal law, and he is stating that customary law was in a stronger position that regulates public law, therefore government, justice system, army and feudal institutions, and individual-state relations. Moreover, although Faroqhi (2009, p. 14) states that Sharia generally has a transcendent position over the ruler's orders and local customs, he draws attention to the fact that the rulers never completely abandoned their customary rule, and she regards the separation between these two as certain.

Finally, it is necessary to briefly discuss the approaches that suggest that the forms of Sharia and customary law are in a synthetic integrity. Karaoğlu (2019, p. 77) states that there is no clear distinction between religion and state under the Ottoman rule and they should be considered complementary to each other. Based on this proposition, he argues that not all practices of the Ottoman administration can be considered within the framework of Sharia, but a formal principle of Sharia is always taken into account in general (Karaoğlu, 2019, p. 79). On the other hand, he rejects the thesis that customary law is in a position that transcends Sharia (Karaoğlu, 2019, p. 78). Karaoğlu's thesis is that, in general terms, the Ottoman state was governed by Sharia, but these practices could not be evaluated according to a fixed Sharia rule since they were organized according to the Hanafi *ijtihadi* systematic, which changed according to the era, and he argues that the areas in which have emerged that the Sharia was sometimes stretched quite a bit and executed only in a formal manner. Thus, the author's theory of synthetic unity between Sharia and customary law refers to a model in which Sharia largely covers customary law, but in which the state can make legislation in accordance with the new social needs and developments. Akgündüz (2010, p. 243) similarly states that when the Ottoman legal records are examined, eighty-five percent of them were made based on Islamic rules and the remaining fifteen percent could not have been created without taking into account the Sharia. Akgündüz (2010, p. 243) underlines that it is not possible to declare the fifteen percent part as secular or

customary law categorically. On the other hand, Koç (2009, p. 119) argues that the relationship between these two legal forms should be established historically and argues that the law form before and after the second half of the 16th century was separate from each other. In this framework, Koç (2009, p. 125) deals with the early period legal texts as documents with intense customary quality, and the classical-late period texts as documents with intense Sharia quality, thus pointing to the change in legal formation. In this context, Burak's (2015a, pp. 207-8) detailed study reveals that the post-16th century Ottoman legal formation could not simply be described as Sharia, on the contrary, a new interpretation based on Hanafi *fiqh* was developed within the framework of the imperial regime's requirements.^{896 897}

When the sources in the field of political thought written during the reign of Mehmet II are examined, it is seen that a debate between customary law and Sharia constitutes a significant topic. This discussion shows that customary law and Sharia practices constitute two separate research topics in terms of ideological and factual aspects. It is seen that the approaches about the relationship between customary law and Sharia practices in the Ottoman state, which were tried to be summarize above, mostly try to give a general judgment without distinguishing the factual and ideological relationship between these two. The reason for this general methodological tendency stems from the habit of seeing the Ottoman state as a monolithic structure built in terms of general good and social order, not as a strategically and relationally structured organization by the relations/contradictions and struggles of different social classes and strata. On the other hand, it is necessary to distinguish between the real and ideological aspects of customary law and Sharia because, in the final analysis, they reflect the interests and visions of different social strata. If it is evaluated at the real stage, it is

⁸⁹⁶ Burak also details the ways of articulation of customary and Sharia law in the post-Mongol world in a series of articles he wrote based on his PhD thesis, and affirms the reformation of Sharia law determined above for the Ottoman state, also for the reign of Timurid Shahruh and the Uzbek Khanate. See: Burak (2013a, 2013b, 2015b).

⁸⁹⁷ An alternative theory can be put up against these approaches, namely that practices based on customary law are dominant and that Sharia law strategically determines the reproduction of class privileges - it derives legitimacy from it. However, in order to support this alternative theory, it is necessary to reveal the 'non-Shar'i' origins of Sharia, that is, to carry out a political, economic and cultural critique of Islam. Only in this way will it be possible to reveal that conformity with Sharia means conformity to a worldly legislative activity to a large extent, and that the traditionalist or innovative struggle over Sharia can only be a traditionalist and innovative struggle that takes place in the material world. We have to put this discussion, which goes beyond the limits of our thesis, on the shelf for now.

noticed that the Ottoman dynasty did not give up its privilege regarding the codification and implementation of customary law. On the other hand, considering the general tendencies of the ulama stratum, it is clear that they will not be willing to compromise on the principle of Sharia and practices. On the other hand, it is a fact that both forms of law exist together and are intertwined. In this context, it is clear that both the Ottoman dynasty and the ulama stratum tried to preserve their semi-autonomous areas of dominance in order to reproduce their class privileges. Above these particular class-based tendencies, preserving the integrity of the valid legal and ideological formation has been accepted by both class subjects as a general necessity of class domination. For this reason, the customary practices and the transcendent position of the ruler were tried to be placed in the Sharia-based discourse by the ulama stratum, while the autonomy of the customary administration was tried to be limited in favor of Sharia. At the factual level, the struggle between these two takes the form of a war of position that varies locally and historically. On the other hand, at the ideological level, the relationship between customary law and practices and Sharia is legitimized on the basis of Islamic foundations as a whole, and it is prevented from turning into an open conflict or struggle in line with the general interests of the ruling classes. Thus, while ideological unity is achieved in line with the general interests of the ruling classes, a struggle for subordination continues at the factual level.

It could be observed the dual character (factual and ideological) of the customary rule-Sharia relationship through the discussions in the primary sources. In this discussion, Sinan Pasha's position is on the front, which stipulates that the rulers should act strictly within the Sharia. According to Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 676):
Padişahlara evvel vacib olan odur ki hudud-ı dini tamam riayet ede/ Ve meharim-i şer'i gökçek himayet ede.

Şeriate muhalefet etmeye; her ne kadar kendine nef'i müstevcib olursa/ Ve hükm-i şer'den çıkmaya, eğerçi bir mal-i azime sebeb olursa.

O zahirde, nef' gözüdür, amma ondan ulu zarar olmaz/ Mümkün değildir, onun ziyanı assısı ile beraber olmaz.⁸⁹⁸

⁸⁹⁸ The first thing the sultans should do is to stay within the borders drawn by the religion/ Pay attention to the things prohibited by religion and not do it/ Not to oppose the laws of Allah, even if there is a situation that will benefit him/ And not to go beyond the rule of the Sharia, whatever even though it causes a loss of valuable property/ It looks beneficial when viewed from the outside, but there is great harm from it/ It is not possible, its damage is not equal to its benefit.

In these lines of Sinan Pasha, there are several crucial points that draw attention and need to be understood within the political context. First of all, Sinan Pasha places the limits of the ruler's action within the framework of Sharia. The opinion about the ruler's fulfilling the religious provisions and obeying the prohibitions is discussed in these lines within the integrity of the individual and administrative identity of the monarch. In fact, the fact that no clear distinction has been made at this point is nothing but the strategic practice of the ideological superiority of the ulama stratum. Because the primary way of Islamizing the image of rulership and political practices is that the ruler is also a religious person, so that the administrative practices that are affected by his personal decisions can also be Islamized to some extent. On the other hand, since the compatibility of personal religiosity and class interests does not always and at all scales have a non-contradictory unity, it is necessary to make some interpretations and rescalings at this point. First of all, Sinan Pasha, at this point, tries to connect the ruler's judgment about the benefits and harms to be obtained in ways that contradict the Sharia to an objective criterion. For this reason, he draws attention to the contrast between appearance and essence, and claims that interests contrary to Sharia are only apparently beneficial, while harms arising from the application of Sharia are only apparently harmful. According to him, in both cases, it is essentially beneficial to act only and only in accordance with the Sharia. For this reason, he determines the conformity of the ruler's actions with the Sharia as the principle of reproduction of power and grounds this in both secular and otherworldly contexts. Sinan Pasha exemplifies the secular reproduction mechanism by showing that a fortress taken with a deception (by a false *emannâme*) will damage the reputation of the ruler as well (2013, pp. 676-78). In this framework, he articulates the elements of reputation-Sharia-contract as a principle of reproduction. According to Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 678): "Onların bir babda gadrları erkan-ı alemden bir rüknü yıkmak olur/ Ve onların o kısımda mekrleri saray-ı kev ü fesadın bir tarafını bozmak olur".⁸⁹⁹ The expressions of the collapse of a pillar of the world and the disruption of the cycle of becoming-decay symbolically mean the disruption of the '*nizam-ı alem*' (order of the world). This proposition of Sinan Pasha needs interpretation.

⁸⁹⁹ If they break their promise on a subject, it means destroying one of the pillars on which the world sits/ If they deceive in that matter, it means destroying one side of this palace of becoming and decay.

According to Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 676): “Padişahlar eymanını bozmak olmaz/ Ve uhudunu simak olmaz/ Nizam-ı alem onların uhuduna merbuttur/ Ve intizam-ı beniadem onların ukudu ile ma’kuddur”.⁹⁰⁰ It is not clear how the terms of promise and contract (*uhud/ukud/akid*) in these expressions should be interpreted. These terms can be directly interpreted in the terminology of Sharia, or they can be evaluated as belonging to the secular field of action of the ruler. While Sinan Pasha was advising the rulers to keep their promises, he did so without any direct reference to Sharia, and the fact that he formulated his thought more within the framework of the concept of *nizam-ı âlem*, indicates the relative autonomy of the sultan’s customary rule from the Sharia. On the other hand, it should not be ignored that the author presents the concepts of reputation-Sharia-contract/promise in this part of his work as a whole. If the above statements are interpreted within this framework, the characterization of the ‘*nizam-ı âlem*’ as being dependent on the word/promise of the ruler indicates that a meaning is attributed to the concept of ‘*nizam-ı âlem*’ within religious ontology. Because the concepts of ‘*erkân-ı âlem*’ and ‘*kevn ü fesâd*’ make us think that there is a reference to the divine order of the world. On the other hand, the view that the ruler’s contract provides ‘*intizam-ı beni-adem*’ draws the discussion ground towards a secular framework by referring to the order among people. In general, the idea of establishing a religious unity between the order of the world and the order of people constitutes the shar’i norm of the bond established between the divine and social order. In this respect, it can be accepted that the terms/contracts mentioned in Sinan Pasha’s statements also include legally valid contracts in terms of Sharia. On the other hand, the concept of ‘*intizam-ı beni-adem*’ clearly grounds that the ruler undertakes a secular function. However, he especially underlines that this function does not allow unlimited freedom of action to the ruler. According to Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 698), to the extent that a ruler makes ‘inappropriate’ actions and demands, he becomes ‘worthless’, and his order becomes ‘null and void’. In this respect, the ruler’s ability to reproduce his power depends on making legitimate actions and demands within the religious framework, according to Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 698): “Bir kişi ‘Melik oldum’ diye mülkünde ne gerekse etmek olmaz/ Ve bir kişi ‘Sultanım’ diye diline her ne gelse demek olmaz/ Akıl bir sultandır ki ondan ulu sultan olmaz/ Her sultan ona itaat etmeye, sultanlığı durmaz/

⁹⁰⁰ Sultans should not break their oaths/ And they should keep their promises / The order of the world depends on their words / And the orderly life of humanity is knotted with their contracts.

O dahi Allah'ın emrinden bir zerre tecavüz edemez/ O dahi onun fermanından bir kadem taşra çıkamaz".⁹⁰¹

Sinan Pasha establishes a certain identity between the divine order and reason in terms of the reproduction of power. First of all, he attributes the ability of the ruler to reproduce his power, not having absolute authority, but acting reasonably, and sealing the limit of reason with divine law. It is quite interesting that the author makes a direct reference to reason in this section where he discusses Sharia and customary practices. It does not seem possible to explain the theoretical origins of this insufficiently grounded leap based on the statements given above. To speak hypothetically, it can be said that this emphasis means that the ruler reasonably restricts his actions in favor of Sharia and approaches the possibilities of customary law within this framework. Although Sinan Pasha's general emphasis is on keeping the actions of the ruler within the limits of the Sharia, he boldly admits that real power relations also include the rules of customary law. At this point, it is seen that Sinan Pasha suggested that the ruler adopt a pragmatic attitude towards the current customary law and practices. According to Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 684):

Her memlekette bir örf olur ki onun nizamı olunla olur/ O örfü gözetip ondan tecavüz etmemek gerek

Ve her vilayette bir kanun olur ki mesalihi onunla düzülür/ O kanunu riayet edip ondan taşra çıkmamak gerek

Şöyle ki o örfü ve kanunu riayet eylemek, o yerin abadanlığı alameti olur/ Ve ondan artırıp tecavüz etmek, o memleketin viranlığı emareti olur.⁹⁰²

Sinan Pasha makes a critical distinction between the country and the province in these lines. If we accept that Sinan Pasha mentioned the important/transcendent/valuable/great/positive/holistic element at the beginning, and the secondary/insignificant/insignificant/partial/minor element later on, as in other

⁹⁰¹ A person cannot do whatever he wants in his property by saying 'I have become a king'/ And a person cannot say whatever comes to his tongue by saying 'I am the Sultan'/ Reason is the sultan, there is no greater sultan than him / The sultan who does not obey him will not continue to rule/ Even he cannot deviate even a little from Allah's command / He cannot even go a step beyond his edict.

⁹⁰² There is a custom in every country that its order is ensured by that custom / It is necessary to accept that custom and not go out of it/ And there is a law in every province so that the affairs of the province are carried out/ It is necessary to obey that law and not go out of it/ That is, obeying that custom and law becomes a sign of the welfare of that place/ And going out of it and exceeding its borders will be a sign of the devastation of that country.

writers of this period, it can be seen that the term of country in these lines indicates an administrative unit that is more comprehensive than a province. For this reason, it would be appropriate to think that Sinan Pasha refers to the entire area dominated by the state as the administrative unit to which customary law is valid, and for this reason, it is *örf-i sultani* which indicated in these lines. However, this reference should not be interpreted as Sinan Pasha's direct acceptance of the authority of customary law. If the hierarchical ordering principle is applied to the thoughts expressed by Sinan Pasha in this chapter, it turns out that he considers the Sharia essential and ontological, and the customary law and its practices as accidental. Although the author has observed the concrete situation by accepting that the customary law is functional at the local level, he advises the ruler to adopt a pragmatic attitude in the face of this situation. The envisaged pragmatic behavior pattern has two reference points. While the first of these is general welfare and the reproduction of power in connection with it, the second is presented as its conformity to religious rules.

First of all, Sinan Pasha openly accepts that customs play a material role in the reproduction of social order and the provision of welfare, and he clearly states that directly attacking their existence will pose a danger to the ruler. On the other hand, he is not in favor of the direct acceptance of custom. On the contrary, Sinan Pasha evaluates the custom in the category of religiously inappropriate innovations (*bi'dah*). According to Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 684):

Her padişah ki 'Alemde adlim ziyade olsun' diye/ Ve her sultan ki 'Zikr'i
hasenim cihanı tutsun' diye
Cehd eylemek gerek kim o memleketin kendinden öndün olan bida'ı
mu'tebesinden bir paresini ekse
Ve sa'y eylemek gerek ki o yerin kendiye gelince olan mezalim-i
mukarreresinden bir miarın kese.⁹⁰³

In these statements, it is not possible to reach a clear formulation of how they are conceived, since the author does not make a theoretical assessment of the customs that he sees as harmful or cruel, or does not give a concrete example. However, the fact that he has generally put the concept of justice against harmful customs indicates that

⁹⁰³ Every sultan who wants his justice to get further in the world / Every sultan who says that the glory of my good deeds should be heard all over the world/ It is necessary to be determined so that he will reduce a part of the bi'dah that was valid before him in that country/ And it is necessary to make an effort so that he removes some of the oppression of that region that has been repeated before him.

practices that are in conflict with the Sharia are generally considered in this status. Moreover, there is no valid reason to think that the fight against *bid'ah* is against the general framework of Sharia, since he evaluates it as positive in both senses of the word (both struggle and jihad). Because, in the same part of his work, Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 682) advises the ruler to put aside his own wishes and act in accordance with the 'benefit of the country', and while doing this, he stipulates that the Sharia should be strictly followed and that the ulama should be consulted for the provisions of Sharia. In the final analysis, it is clear that this view emphasizes the social function of the ulama stratum and is compatible with their class interests. On the other hand, he does not completely reject the customary rule of the sultan, but tries to limit it by giving it a mission within the Sharia. In response to Sinan Pasha's efforts to limit the customary rule of the sultanate by putting the Sharia at the center, Tursun Beg accepted the legitimacy of the customary rule of the sultan by extending it to a wide legal field and was supported by Sharia arguments.

Secondly, it is necessary to examine Tursun Beg's arguments on the subject. Tursun Beg had ideas that grounded the customary rule theoretically, and his statements on this subject found wide coverage in the secondary literature on the history of Ottoman political thought. For example, Öz (2017, p. 174) considers Tursun Beg's reference to Genghis Khan while using the concept of '*yasağ-ı padişahi*' as evidence that "shows that he is aware that customary law is based on secular sources". Tursun Beg defines customary law and examines its relationship with Sharia. He evaluates the customary law both as a worldly necessity and deduces its roots from the concept of reason. Tursun Beg's formulation is as follows (1977, p. 12):

Ve eğer şöyle ki bu tedbir ber-vefk-ı vücub ve ka'ide-i hikmet olursa -ki mü'ddi ola bir kemale ki bi'l-kuvve beni-nev'ün eşhasında konulmuştur ki ol kuvvet iktisab-ı sa'adeteyndür -ana ehl-i hikmet siyaset-i İlahi dirler, ve vazı'ına namus dirler. Ve ehl-i şer' ana şeri'at dirler, ve vaz'ına şari' ıtlak iderler ki, peygamberdür. Ve illa, ya'ni bu tedbir ol mertebede olmazsa belki mücerred tavr-ı akl üzre nizam-ı alem-i zahir için, mesela tavr-ı Cengiz Han gibi olursa, sebebine izafet ederler, siyaset-i sultani ve yasağ-ı padişahi dirler ki, örfümüzce ana örf dirler.⁹⁰⁴

⁹⁰⁴ And if this *tedbir* is properly and in accordance with the path of wisdom, it will cause such maturity that this maturity is potentially inscribed in human personalities, and that power brings the happiness of the two worlds, the people of wisdom call it divine politics, and its guardian *namus*. Islamic jurists call it Sharia and call its protector Shari, which means he is a prophet.

This is an interesting interpretation because the author, using the concepts of ancient Greek philosophy, presents the *nomos* as divine law, as it is seen above. Whereas, if he had used the original conceptualization of Greek philosophy, he should have derived the laws from *logos*.⁹⁰⁵ However, as cited in the Sinan Pasha, Tursun Beg gives the reason a status below divine orders, or at least avoids equating reason with divine orders. It can be thought that this preference emerged due to the mystical influences that dominated the spirit of the period, because the inspired origin of divine laws and manifestations is considered more important than rational knowledge in this period. *Meşşâî* philosophy, which tried to equate reason and divine law in the history of Islamic philosophy, was subjected to intense criticism in a short time, especially in al-Ghazali's *Tehafüt al-Felasife*, and al-Ghazali's interpretation that synthesized Sharia and mysticism was more widely accepted.⁹⁰⁶ For this reason, it is very difficult for the author to attempt such a claim again. Nevertheless, Tursun Beg went for a refined definition in these lines and used the term '*mücerred tavr-ı akıl*' (reason in abstract manner). When the abstract use of reason and the apparent order of the world (*nizam-ı alem-i zahir*) are presented in a whole, combined with the argument that divine law provides the visible and invisible order in the final analysis, it is possible to put it on the agenda of the commentator that a non-material reason may be held responsible for the invisible order of the world. As Gutas (2014, p. 5) stated, the term 'material intellect' is also used in the philosophy of Avicenna, and it is claimed that there is divine inspiration and philosophical demonstration in its origin. But in the final analysis, this term does

Otherwise, that is, if this measure is not of that level, maybe for the order of this apparent world as a pure way of reason, for example, if it is the type of Genghis Khan, they associate it with the cause, they say, politics of sultan and ban of sultan, in our tradition they call it custom.

⁹⁰⁵ Such distorted versions of the thought of Socrates-Plato and Aristotle can often be found in Islamic philosophy. For example, in *Milel and Nihal*, written by Şehristani (2016, p. 39) in the 11th century, Empedocles took lessons from Prophet David and the legendary Lokman (Şehristani, 2016, p. 23), Pythagoras lived in the time of Prophet Solomon and "got his wisdom from the source of prophecy" (Şehristani, 2016, p. 29) or that Socrates was poisoned to death because he forbade "the state dignitaries of his time from associating partners with Allah and worshipping idols". These interpretations exemplify the typical Islamization attitude of Islamic thinkers in the face of the high level of abstraction of ancient Greek philosophy and the difficulty of rejecting it. The distortions of these views, which reject the origins of ancient Greek philosophy based on experience and speculation and try to connect it directly to the source of revelation, are obvious.

⁹⁰⁶ For the criticisms of Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî against the view that divine knowledge can be known through reason, see: Bilkan (2018, p. 79).

not describe a developed reason, but a potential mind that is open to development, similar to matter.

Although it is not possible to solve this problem definitively with the available data, it can be argued that the non-material mind-divine law connection exists as a potentiality in Tursun Beg's system of thought. Because, in al-Farabi's work *Tahsilu's-Sa'ada* (2018, p. 44) it is proposed that philosophy provides information about the ultimate principles grasped by the mind and the essences of intangible (abstract) principles, whereas religion provides imaginary information through similarities derived from concrete principles. Tursun Beg does not dare to put religious law and knowledge under philosophical knowledge, but at least he sees philosophy and religion as equivalent. Moreover, al-Farabi (2018, p. 46-47) goes to such a synthesis while stating that the same thing is expressed practically with the terminology of imam-philosopher-lawgiver. Tursun Beg, on the other hand, combines the philosopher and the imam under the title of divine law, and considers the legislator as the enforcer of customary law.

Secondly, the expression used by Tursun Beg as 'sebebine izafet ederler' to indicate the general nature of the customary law needs further interpretation. The divine law is evaluated as essential because it provides the order of the visible and invisible worlds, while the customary law is accidental because it only provides the order of the visible world. In this context, while the existence and validity of the divine law does not need to show a concrete reason, the customary law is based on material reasons. The theoretical origins of this expression can be found in al-Farabi's theses. Inspiring Tursun Beg, al-Farabi (2019, p. 50) divides the political leadership into virtuous (*riyasa fadila*) and ignorant (*riyasa jahiliya*). While al-Farabi argues that the first of them aims at the happiness of the afterworld, he states that the second one is divided into many parts according to the purpose it aims and wants to achieve, that is, the reason (Farabi, 2019, p. 50). Thus, the accidental nature of the latter is revealed in al-Farabi's thought. However, in his other works, al-Farabi (2018, p. 1) uses the concept of 'happiness in two worlds', thus accepting the existence of two types of happiness, genuine and accidental. On the other hand, al-Farabi (2018, p. 19) states that the accidents necessary for the realization of things such as chastity and wealth can change over time, for example, they will vary from hour to hour, month to month or over centuries, based on this, there should be a time-dependent virtue in the knowledge of the ruler and changes in his decisions.

In parallel with this idea, Tursun Beg does not limit the essential divine law to the life span of the prophet who declared the laws, while he argues that the customary law based on material reasons has validity both during the existence of these reasons and the material existence of the legislator. Tursun Beg reveals this point by noting that the physical body of a prophet is not needed for the Sharia to be valid until the Day of Judgment, but the physical body of a sultan himself is needed for the customary law based on material conditions to be applied. Tursun Beg's formulation is as follows (1977, p. 12-13):

Hattâ şöyledür ki, her rûzgârda vücûd-ı şâri' hâcet deĝöldür; zîrâ ber-vaz'ı İlâhî, meselâ dîn-i İslâm (...) nizâm-ı âlem-i zâhir ü bâtın için, illa yevmi'l-kıyâm kâffe-i enâm üzre kâfidür, bir peygamber dahı hâcet deĝöldür, ammâ her rûzgârda bir pâdişâhun vücûdı hâcettür ki anun tasarruf-ı cüz'iyâta, ber-haseb-i maslahat, her karn u her rûzgâr vilâyet-i kâmilî vardur. Ve eĝer anun tedbîri munkatı' olsa, bakâ-yı eşhâs ber-vech-i ekmel sûret bulmaz; belki bi'l-küllî fenâ olur.⁹⁰⁷

Tursun Beg, in the lines quoted above and, in their continuation, bases the existence of the monarch on the necessity of maintaining both the divine law and the worldly order. His assertion that the existence of the ruler is a necessity for both religion and the world, after the lines in which he put forward the accidental nature of the customary law despite the essentiality of Sharia, presents a typical ideological leap. The theme of this leap is presented in a much more complete way in al-Farabi's works. al-Farabi (2018, p. 23) likens the knowledge of the common good, that is the accidental, which is valid for different peoples in the world in short periods of time, to the legislative authority. In this respect, the ruler, who has the knowledge of accidental things, as a legislator, has "the superiority of knowledge about the conditions of practical reasonables, the ability to discover them and to make them exist in millas and cities [tm]" (Farabi, 2018, p. 46). Mehmet II's librarian Molla Lütfi in his work *Şerhu Mevzûât* defines politics of reason with reference to exactly this point, and describes the caliph as a ruler legitimated by reasonable politics, that is, the necessity of developing practices according to variable

⁹⁰⁷ In fact, the presence of a legislator is not always necessary; for, with its divine aspect, for example, the religion of Islam (...) is sufficient for all people until the Day of Judgment for the order of the visible and invisible worlds, one more prophet is not necessary; but the presence of a sultan is necessary at all times, because he has important duties to follow and direct all kinds of important and unimportant events, and therefore he has attained maturity in every century and every time. If the measures taken by him come to an end, the people's protection of their situation will not be realized to the desired extent; perhaps their order will be destroyed altogether.

particulars. As the practitioner of the ‘*ilm-i muhtasib*’ (science of governing), the caliph is a figure obliged to comply with the changing world conditions and to have the appropriate qualifications. According to Molla Lütfi (as cited in Maraş, 2003, p. 133): This science is one of the most refined sciences. A person who can comprehend this knowledge must have a keen understanding and an accurate intuition. Because persons, times and events do not emerge in a single process. Each person, event, and time requires a specific policy. This policy is constantly changing for others as well. Appealing it is one of the hardest things to do. In fact, only people who have divine intuition and are free from whims are worthy of this.⁹⁰⁸

This is the connection that Tursun Beg had a hard time establishing. The theoretical universals offered by philosophy and particular abstractions offered by Sharia become reality with the virtuous policies developed by the ruler, who is aware of them, according to the conditions of the historical context. However, the reason why Tursun Beg had difficulty in establishing this relationship was that he could not distinguish between philosophy and religion with the courage of al-Farabi, and he could not criticize and see that in reality it is not always possible for customary law to necessarily show integrity with philosophical universals. In this framework, Tursun Beg tries to present religious dogmas to the reader instead of philosophical universals and attempts to derive the half of the function of the legislator from here. According to Tursun Beg (1977, p. 13), the existence of the ruler is necessary for order, which means “people and jinns worshipping God [tm]”. It can be understood from these lines that the concept of the order of the world is used both in the apparent and esoteric sense. In *sûfi* interpretations of Ottoman political thought, the right to influence apparent and esoteric realities is distinguished from each other. It should be taken into account that the first of these is called the policy of property (*siyâset-i mülk*), and the second is accepted as a dominance at the level of the angelic realm, which includes both in terms of the superiority of the esoteric to the apparent (Öztürk, 2017, pp. 122-23). It turns out that

⁹⁰⁸ See: *Şerhu Mevzûât*, Nurosmaniye 4391, vr. 147 (b)-148 (a), in cited and translated from Maraş (2003, p. 133). Also, in Molla Lütfi’s work named *Er- Risâle Fi’l-Ulûmi’s-Şer’iyye Ve’l-Arabiyye*, this subject is mentioned as follows (as cited in Arslan, 2012, p. 110): “This is the most difficult of sciences and it is a science that not everyone can understand. Because individuals, times and situations are variable, there is a political understanding peculiar to each of them and customs-traditions that are applied. Therefore, the person who will occupy the post of ihtisab must be a prudent person who can restrain his wishes and desires. As a matter of fact, Omar was such a person that he was almost identified with this science [tm]”.

the meaning of Tursun Beg's expressions attributed to the ruler an influence of the external or apparent material realm. In that case, Tursun Beg evaluates the ruler as naturally both the owner of the secular law-making right and the enforcer of the divine law, which creates an ideological unity without contradiction with the notion that this ruler is seen as the 'shadow of god'. If we take a closer look at these lines, he claims that the ruler had the '*vilayet-i kamil*', that is, a competent sainthood or protectorate, and legitimizes the right to apply the divine law for this very reason. But this position not only points to a legal application of religious law, but also requires an esoteric power of influence. Thus, the reproduction of the power of the ruler is made dependent on the function of the reproduction of social relations in the material world, and a theological legitimacy ground is opened by considering the religion to remain in force.

Thirdly, in Tursun Beg's views, which we quoted above, formulating and enacting laws through reason is likened to the law of Genghis Khan. When we compare the thoughts of al-Farabi and Tursun Beg on the definition and implementation of politics, determining whether there is a parallelism between them or at what points they conflict will illuminate the author's view on the law of Genghis Khan. First of all, al-Farabi (2019, p. 49) argues that real happiness can only be possible in the hereafter and states that politics aiming at things like pleasure/honor/wealth cannot lead to real happiness/highest happiness. In this context, he finds the politics that does not lead to the hereafter to be ignorant (Farabi, 2109, p. 50). If it is assumed that Tursun Beg followed this scheme, it should be considered that the characterization of law of Genghis Khan is not a grounding or legitimizing customary law, on the contrary, he developed a limited criticism of it. When the sources of this period are examined, it is understood that law of Genghis Khan is not a positive example of enactment compared to other customary law practices. Burak (2015b, pp. 16-17) shows with various examples that after the Mamluk lands were captured by the Ottomans in the 16th century, a certain relationship was established between the law of Genghis Khan and the laws of the Ottoman customary rules, '*yasağ*'s and that it was criticized by the religious authorities. Although Tursun Beg uses the terms '*tavr-ı Cengiz Han*' and '*yasağ-ı padişahi*' as synonyms, he does not directly attribute a positive meaning to them. Moreover, if al-Farabi's arguments are reconsidered in the background of the Tursun Beg's text, it can be mentioned that he has a critical distance from the customary law that has not determined by philosophy or religion.

On the other hand, al-Farabi's use of the concept of 'happiness in the two worlds' necessitates a coherence between philosophical knowledge-religious knowledge-practical political knowledge. Similarly, Tursun Beg uses the term '*sa'adeteyn*' instead of 'true happiness', which indicates that one can be happy both in this world and in the hereafter. This formulation brings an interpretation to the concept of happiness in which worldly happiness is not openly humiliated - and therefore measures of reason aimed at worldly happiness are not denied either. On the other hand, in Tursun Beg's work, there are various statements that happiness in this world is not as important as in the hereafter, which reveals the ambivalent attitude of the author on this issue. Because there are also mystical influences in Tursun Beg's work and he cannot directly establish a connection between political philosophy and customary law. At this very point, Tursun Beg succeeded in bypassing religious arguments indirectly by introducing the Aristotelian theory on the management of human communities, which was summarized in the previous subsection. Thus, he makes sense of the customary law applied by the Ottoman rulers in terms of ensuring general good and social order, implicitly expressing that it is a virtuous political practice, not arbitrary. In this context, it would be correct to argue that although Tursun Beg did not criticize the customary law directly, he categorically despised it when compared with the Sharia, but that he partly legitimized the customary rule by considering the existence of the monarch as necessary. As we tried to explain above, Tursun Beg's arguments provide a 'reasonable' theoretical existence ground for the customary law phenomenon, by considering the existence of the ruler as necessary and legitimate within the Sharia, rather than positioning the customary law above the Sharia in the Ottoman Empire. The way to this is through the triple function, which he adds to the general idea of the good, namely (i) production (ii) social stratification/power and (iii) regulation of distribution relations. It has been pointed out in the previous sections that these principles, in the final analysis, are not indicate the general good, but indicate the particular class interest that puts the reproduction of the class order in the foreground.

VII.III.II.II.II.III. Issues of Political Strategy and Tactical Practice

Another element of Ottoman political thought in the considered period is the political strategy and tactical proposals that focus on the reproduction of class domination. While strategic elements generally consist of general political models aiming at the reproduction, deepening and development of class domination, tactical

elements are elements that focus on a specific plan of political relations and aim to regulate the composition of power in a single plan without ignoring the class-based principle. In this respect, strategic elements deal with the part-and-whole relationship in a mereological model according to the principle of class power, while tactical elements deal with the part-and-part relationship in particular contexts where class relations crystallize. In this framework, it is seen that the strategic elements were shaped depending on the Ottoman conquest model. On the other hand, tactical elements mostly deal with the issues of state administration and succession to the throne. Finally, an important question remains whether the notion of justice in Ottoman political thought a strategic element or a tactical element is, that I will try to answer this question in the next section.

Let first consider the strategic thinking that developed around the Ottoman model of conquest. The examples of political thought that emerged with the institutionalization pains of the imperial regime at the end of the 15th century contain a series of class-based strategic elements knitted around the Ottoman conquest model. First of all, it would be appropriate to examine the reflection of the Ottoman conquest model in primary sources. A general trend mentioned in the previous chapters also comes into play when discussing the Ottoman conquest model, which emerges as a direct non-reciprocity between historical fact and ideological formulation. Considering this tendency, although it is seen that the Ottoman conquest model was mentioned in the frame of as '*ghaza*' or 'jihad' discourse, for example, in Tursun Beg's work, there is also the representation of material relations and worldly aims exist at the undercurrent of such references.

While Tursun Beg narrates the Bosnian campaign of Mehmet II, he makes visible a significant model of the general architecture of power and the establishment of the imperial regime. The material elements made visible by Tursun Beg (1977, p. 128 et al.) are as follows: (i) sanjak beg and *qadi* are appointed to the captured regions, (ii) mines are captured and trustees are appointed to their management, (iii) *cizye* tax is imposed on subjects, (iv) the booty is captured, and army returns to Istanbul, the center of the reign. These titles describe a strategic model systematized to reproduce Ottoman class domination. The first element of this model aims to link the political administration of the captured regions directly to the center through the sanjak begs and indirectly through the *qadis*. The second and third elements put forward the transfer of tax revenues -or in another words, rents- from mines and subjects to the center. The last

element refers to the attention paid to loot to finance the short-term needs and patronage relations of the central treasury. Finally, it symbolizes the asymmetrical power architecture between the central power and the conquered regions, pointing to the return of the central army to the capitol of the reign. In this context, it is revealed that political, economic and symbolic centralization is a strategic model that is mostly valid in the second half of the 15th century.

Considering the concrete contexts in which the strategic vision in question crystallizes in particular plans, some elements concentrated in the center-periphery conflict line become the subject of political thoughts. Tactical approaches towards these elements both reflect the line of positional warfare against local resistance centers, which constitute possible obstacles for the reproduction of the general class model, and also make suggestions for practices that can make the symbolic acceptance of class domination possible.

VII.III.II.II.IV. Succession to the Throne as a Political Problem

“Saltanat gavgasıdur ‘Adli seni til-teng iden”

Adlî (2018, p. 111)

The fact that Bayezid II included couplets in his *diwan*, which he wrote under the pen name of *Adlî*, complained about the fights for the reign, reveals that the succession problem of the sultanate was an effective item of agenda in the Ottoman political life.⁹⁰⁹ If the history of the Ottoman Empire is examined in general terms, it is seen that the succession problem of the reign has been practically solved for a long time by the method of fratricide. Apart from the rumors about Osman Beg killing his brother Dündar, the application of this method could be exemplified as such incidents that Murat I’s killing of his two brothers, in Bayezid I’s strangulating his brother Yakub Çelebi when his father died in the Kosovo War, princes’ killing each other in the Interregnum period, and Murat II had his brother Mustafa killed. It is thought that this practice became a law during the reign of Mehmet II.⁹¹⁰ After the capture of Constantinople, Mehmet II had Prince Orhan executed and had his brother Ahmet strangled (İnalçık, 2018a, p. 31). It is thought that the following expressions in

⁹⁰⁹ For example, see this verse: “Saltanat ‘unvanının gavgaları çokdur beli” (Adlî, 2018, p. 46). This verse could be translated as such: The quarrels around the title of reign are obviously many.

⁹¹⁰ For more details that may be included in this list, see: Akman (1997) and Öztürk (2020, pp. 131-38).

Kanunnâme of Mehmet II are *de jure* formulations of the law of fratricide (Özcan, 1981, p. 46): “Ve her kimesneye evladımdan saltanat müyesser ola, karındaşların nizam-ı alem için katl etmek münasıptır. Ekser ulama dahi tecviz itmiştir. Anında amil olalar”.⁹¹¹

But it is interesting that there is no direct information about the ‘law of fratricide’ in the chronicles and *siyâsetnâmes* of the period. Imber (2016, p. 265) rightly draws attention to the fact that the above-quoted section of the *Kanunnâme* may have been constructed as a basis of legitimacy that Mehmet III (1566-1603) killed his nineteen brothers after he came to the power, and this caused reaction from the public. On the other hand, the fact that in almost all the chronicles there is a statement that fratricide is a tradition from the period of Bayezid I, which reveals that the issue is seen as an item on the political agenda. It is possible to come across various statements in anonymous chronicles stating that fratricide is not considered appropriate by the customs. For example, in the Öztürk chronicle (2000, p. 18), the anonymous author states that the rulers consulted with their brothers until Bayezid I, they were united, and they did not kill each other, and he attributes the origin of the practice of fratricide to Bayezid I, saying, “The killing of brother by brother is from the time of Yıldırım Khan [tm]”. In the anonymous chronicle published by Çan (2006, p. 62), this issue is addressed with the following expression: “Begler bu zamana gelince kardaslariyila tanisik idüp belice tanusurlardi. Birbirini öldürmezler idi, ta Yıldırım zamanına gelince. Yıldırım Han zamanından kaldı kardas kardasi öldürmek”.⁹¹² Similar statements are also found in the anonymous chronicles of Giese (1992, pp. 16-17) and İğci (2011, p. 13). In the history of Rûhî, there is a statement that Yakup Çelebi was summoned and killed “while he was still fighting with unbelievers [tm]”, but there is no moral interpretation beyond this in this chronic (Yücel & Cengiz, 1992, p. 392). Although there is no moral judgment in the narrative, this incident is also discussed in Ahmadi’s *gazavâtnâme*, that there is a common theme it has with other chronicles (İnalçık, 2021a, p. 345): Yakub Çelebi was killed unjustly and by cheating. Understanding the event around the concept of ‘cheating’ suggests the existence of a certain moral judgment in the sub-text. For this reason, in Enveri’s *Düstûrnâme* and in the history of Rûhî, a detail

⁹¹¹ Whichever of my sons reigns, it is incumbent upon him to kill his brothers for the order of the world. Even most of the scholars allowed this situation. Do it this way.

⁹¹² Until this time, Begs consulted with their brothers and consulted them thoroughly. They wouldn't kill each other, until the Yıldırım period. The brother's killing of his brother remained from the Yıldırım Khan period.

was written that Murat I ordered Prince Bayezid to be a ruler on his deathbed in order to legitimize the incident of Bayezid I's killing his brother Yakup Çelebi on the battlefield (Yücel & Cengiz, 1992, p. 392; Öztürk, 2012b, pp. 29-30).

In this case, it is clear that there is a contradiction between the *de facto* and *de jure* aspects of fratricide. Because this practice is considered as a *de facto* necessity for the Ottoman dynasty, but it is not easy to justify it theoretically and legally. Moreover, this practice has no legitimacy within the traditions, and the repeated statements in anonymous chronicles show that this practice is not morally approved. In terms of tradition, Tamerlane's son Shahruh, in his letter addressed to Mehmet Çelebi after the Interregnum, states that he finds fratricide strange and does not see it as legitimate, with the following words: "We received the news that you were fighting with Suleyman Beg and İsa Beg and that you removed them from this mortal world as per Ottoman customs. But among the brothers, this method is not suitable for the Ilkhanate tradition [tm]" (as cited in Turan, 2003, p. 244). It is understood that similar expressions were used in the name of the legitimacy of the rebellion in the Şahkulu revolt that developed during the reign of Bayezid II. In the anonymous chronicle published by Kretuel (1997, p. 49), one of the decisive elements of Şahkulu's propaganda in Anatolia is the enmity of the sons of Bayezid II against each other, contrary to the tradition of 'brotherly love'. For this reason, it is of great importance for the political power to establish a legitimate basis for the practice of fratricide.

It can be mentioned that the writers of the period tried to justify this practice, which was overlooked by Imber. Kemal (Öztürk, 2001, p. 123), the author of *Selâtinname*, argues that fratricide became a 'custom' after the murder of Musa Çelebi by Mehmet Çelebi: "Kalupdur işbu 'adet ol zamandan/ Kıya Osmanlı biribirine andan".⁹¹³ The second grounding attempt belongs to Âşıkpaşazâde. Âşıkpaşazâde explains the reason why Murat II handed over his younger brother Mustafa to the executioner, in the words of Şarabdar İlyas as such (2017, p. 105):

Question: To Şarabdar İlyas: Wasn't Mustafa your lord's son that you caught, gave him to kill? they said. Answer: He said: It seems that I have become a sinner. However, if these two were in this country, the damage would be great. And one more thing is that I did not do bad things to this lord's son. That's why I made him a martyr before he got involved in the filth of this world. The whole world was at ease. Those who came before us established this law. [tm]

⁹¹³ This custom has remained from that time / That's why the Ottomans slaughter each other.

Âşıkpaşazâde's narrative includes two elements that we see in *Kanunnâme* of Mehmet II: (i) the maintenance of the order of the world, (ii) the arguments that this practice is reasonable according to Sharia and is fixed by tradition. The practice of fratricide, firstly, prevents 'two rulers from being in one country' and reproduces the social order and hierarchy (*nizam-ı âlem*), and secondly, it contains 'sin in appearance' but actually contains benevolence for both social order and victim. In the *fiqh* discipline, some prohibitions are permissible in case of necessity and are considered reasonable by the Sharia. For this reason, showing fratricide as a necessity provides a certain basis for it to be grounded in Sharia. The direct use of this terminology in the chronicle written by Karamânî Mehmed Pasha, who is thought to have written the law, definitely shows that the issue was conceived in this way in terms of Sharia. According to Karamânî (Çiftçioğlu, 1949, p. 347) Bayezid I's killing his brother Yakub on the battlefield is a legitimate act, because "necessity makes things that cannot be done [tm]". As such, it is undeniable that the work, which was written during the reign of Mehmet II, might have produced a retrospective response to current debates. Moreover, there is an implicit criticism of this practice in Âşıkpaşazâde. The following couplets written by Âşıkpaşazâde (Kala, 2013, p. 158) are in the nature of criticism of the fratricide: "Kadimden töredir kardeşe kıymak/ Atayı anayı gussalı komak/ Kabil kim Habil'e kıydı ezelden/ Adet oldu ki hanlar buna uymak /İsa'ya Musa ve Emir Süleyman/ İşitin bu töre ehlidir ahmak".⁹¹⁴ Here is the Âşıkpaşazâde's contradiction: He evaluates the practice of fratricide both as a custom and implicitly accepts that it is legitimate with reference to its accustomed temporal continuity, but he is not convinced of its religious and reasonable validity. As Kılıçbay (1999, p. 72) underlines, since the practice of fratricide has no basis in the Qur'an and Sunnah, it cannot be based on purely religious sources. This is a significant determination because it shows the contradiction between customary and Sharia law, and it also makes visible the fact that the *sûfi* circles could not easily take a position in this division in term of ethical and mystical reference points.

VII.III.II.II.II.V. Political Tactics

"I don't use a stick where a whip is enough,
and a sword where a stick is enough"

⁹¹⁴ It is an ancient custom to kill a brother/ Leave the father and mother to grief/ Who is Cain, who killed Abel in the old days/ It has been customary for the khans to abide by it/ To İsa, Musa and Emir Suleyman/ Hear, it is the fool who accepts this tradition.

In the Ottoman political advice written at the end of the 15th century, it is seen that the political tactics focused on a few points. These consist of a few titles about the abstract principles that the ruler will adopt while taking political action, how to determine the situations of war and peace, and how to gain the loyalty of those under his rule. The common denominator of all these titles is the establishment of a strategic balance between administration/leadership (*riyâset*) and politics. In this respect, the holding of power is understood not by a one-sided set of political tactics, but by the unity of versatile practices based on a common principle. For this reason, it is considered legitimate for the administration to engage in tactical practices by deviating from the general legitimacy bases or idealized discourses, and the importance of these practices for the reproduction of political power is touched upon by mentioning them as “*esrâr-ı saltanat*”⁹¹⁵ (Tursun, 1977, p. 206). For example, Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 646) evaluates political actions as a part of leadership and ruling practice (*riyâset*) both tactically and in terms of capital punishment/violence, and legitimize this manner of politics by a couplet in this context as such: “Bir kimse ki eksik eder siyaseti/ Mümkün değildir tamam ede riyaseti”.⁹¹⁶ Thus, the aspect of political thought, which is shaped around general morality, devotion to religion, virtue and divine grace, opens up to the network of secular relations in a way that complements the ideological discourse contained in all these titles. Thus, within the ideology-carrot-stick triptych, a way of thinking specifically tending to hold power comes into being. Sinan Pasha’s propositions on this subject are as follows (2013, p. 670):

Ehline efv ederse, yerinde siyaset ede/ Ahyara lutf ederse, eşirraya ukubet ede
Padişahlara hem rahım gerek, hem celadet gerek/ Ve selatine hem şefkat gerek,
hem salabet gerek
Eğer siyaset olmaya, riyaset olmaz/ Ve eğer şefakat olmaya, raiyyet dirilmez
Padişahlara hem kahır, hem inayet gerek/ Ve selatine din ü diyanet gerek.⁹¹⁷

⁹¹⁵ This term refers to secret knowledge of ruling and refined tactical knowledge of reigning.

⁹¹⁶ A person who does not do politics (or death penalty) / It is not possible for this person to be a complete leader.

⁹¹⁷ He forgives the deserving one, he punishes when necessary/ If he does good to the good ones, he will overcome the bad ones/ Sultans need both gentleness and assertiveness/ Sultans need both pity and hardness/ If the criminals are left unpunished, the administration will not be successful/ If there is no mercy, the governed cannot be exalted/ Sultans must both use force and help/ Sultans must be faithful and pious.

These verses need to be annotated. The functions that are recommended to the ruler to reproduce his power and that seem to be determined by the upper concept of religiosity are formulated based on the dual structure of coercion and consent mechanisms. These dualities can be listed as follows, forgiveness and punishment, mercy and violence, and their accompanying faith and power. It is clear that this structure is largely based on holding power and using it wisely, or simply the principle of power. While seizing power and maintaining class privileges form the basis of the rulers' strategic orientations, how this will be done is framed by the tactical determinations in different plans. In this context, in the *Maârifnâme* of Sinan Pasha, the tactics that the rulers should use while taking political action emerge within the framework of the principle of power. First of all, Sinan Pasha stipulates that the rulers should protect the weak people ,and that the powerful people should be dominated by politics (2013, p. 646): “Şu kişiler ki zuafadır, onlara hüsn-i hiraset gerek/ Ve şu kimseler ki akviyadır, onlara hükm-i siyaset gerek”.⁹¹⁸ The meaning of this proposition is not entirely clear. With a superficial reading, it can be thought that Sinan Pasha advised the ruler to favor weak people and to kill powerful people. Some expressions that will strengthen this assumption are encountered in the text before these verses. For example, Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 646) clearly states that with the term ‘*hükm-i siyâset*’ he directly means to inflict the death penalty, by using the expressions “Esirgenmeyecek kişiye rahmet mani’ olur mahalline rahmete/ Ve öldürülecek kimseye mağfîret, sebep olur helak-ı ümmete”.⁹¹⁹ However, it is not correct to think that the author’s purpose was not to advise monarchs to violently eliminate all other power holders. Because, as Tulum points out (2013, p. 647), the term ‘*helak-ı ümmet*’ has a connotation of disruption of social order.

The author elaborates on the tactical determinations of a model that allows class power to be articulated to different social segments and reproduced itself. If there was a dual class structure consisting of only the ruler and the *reâyâ* in the Ottoman society, it would be possible to consider these thoughts as suggestions for the destruction of the semi-powerful intermediate strata. However, considering the multi-layered structure of Ottoman society, it would be more appropriate to interpret these expressions in relation to the role of intermediate strata in power relations as middle terms. From this

⁹¹⁸ Weak people need protection from a good way/ And those who are strong, they need to be ruled by politics (or need to be executed).

⁹¹⁹ Showing mercy to the person who is not worthy of protection prevents mercy to the one who deserves it / And to forgive the person who deserves to be killed causes the destruction of the ummah.

perspective, Sinan Pasha's proposition is as follows: The lower classes should be protected against the middle strata and thus their consent should be gained, and the class structure should be preserved by eliminating those who are too powerful from the members of middle strata. The elimination of those who are overpowered from the middle strata will both lead to the production of consent by the lower classes and will conduce to the discipline of the middle strata in general. In this framework, it is recommended to implement the '*hük-m-i siyâset*' in order to intimidate the middle strata. Sinan Pasha formulates this carrot and stick policy as follows (2013, p. 646): "Eğer ahıyarı münkad etmek istersen/ Tul-i rağbe ile olur/ Ve eğer eşrarı münkad etmek istersen/ Tul-i rehbe ile olur".⁹²⁰ Achieving the purpose of subjugation mentioned in these lines obviously depends on the fulfillment of both the 'caring' and 'intimidating' functions. In this regard, '*hük-m-i siyâset*' is an intimidation tactic, and it is recommended not to apply to all the powerful, but to apply them in a way that will keep them under the domination of the ruler.

In the works named *Maârifnâme* and *Târîh-i Ebü'l-Feth*, there are also examples of political tactics in terms of different political scales. First of all, Sinan Pasha deals with the symbolic importance of the '*hük-m-i siyâset*' in terms of the authority of the ruler and emphasizes its consequences in terms of the indirect reproduction of power relations. According to him (Sinan Paşa, 2013, p. 646): "Siyaset olmayıcak az'af-ı a'da kavi olur/ Ve cür'et olmayıcak ecben-i a'da ceri olur".⁹²¹ Strengthening the weak enemy and emboldening the cowardly enemy refer specifically to a symbolic political relationship. It is understood from these expressions that the scope of the term '*hük-m-i siyâset*' extends to the relations between countries. Thus, internal adversaries turn into external enemies. In this context, the term politics gains content, including the phenomenon of war. Sinan Pasha advises to be more cautious in this new scale compared to domestic politics. In this new scale, it is seen that the principle of power is in effect. For example, Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 646) argues that the strength of the relations with the allies cannot be trusted without testing, that the principle of attacking an enemy is to have power first, that it is not wise to persist in hostility in terms of causing war, that the ties of alliance should not be broken if you will be harmed as a result, and that the doors that may be needed should not be closed. Thus, keeping the

⁹²⁰ If you want to subjugate good people, it is by caring them/ And if you try to subdue evil people, it is by intimidation.

⁹²¹ Without politics (execution), the weakest enemy becomes stronger / Without assertiveness, the most cowardly enemy becomes valiant.

material power and not harming the alliance relations in the symbolic plan are presented as an important reproduction principle. At the same time, these statements are some advice for the ruler to avoid personal enmity and to conduct the war in line with strategic objectives.

Interestingly, the embodiment of these ideas is also seen in Tursun Beg's history. Tursun Beg (1977, p. 205) writes an anecdote which states that after the capture of Kili castle during the reign of Bayezid II, this issue was brought up in a meeting where the council of war gathered, and that the sultan was praised for crossing the Danube River and opening a way for Islamic conquests, thus winning both the world and the hereafter. Tursun Beg (1977, p. 206) states that an inexperienced, naive young man in this meeting arrogantly criticized the ruler as follows: "Dürişse şahumuz ol yola dilden/ Olurdu dünya vü ahraya malik/ Ne tercih ile gayrı yola düştü? Ne için olmadı bu yola salık".⁹²² Tursun Beg (1977, p. 206) gives this question such a meaning that "since the road to ghaza has been opened, why did our sultan not make efforts on this road, he dealt with secondary works instead of this road with a certain priority? [tm]". A wise elder in the meeting reprimanded the young man as follows (Tursun, 1977, p. 206): This question is true for innocent prophets, but not for the secrets of the sultanate (*esrâr-ı saltanat*), the heart of sultans is in the hands of God, to oppose him is to oppose God. The concrete historical context of this debate should be sought in Bayezid II's inability to conquer territory for a long time due to the uprising of Prince Cem, and when Prince Cem was eventually transferred to Rhodes and from there to Rome, he embarked on a campaign towards northeastern Europe based on these alliance relations. Bayezid II stopped the military expeditions to Europe until the Prince Cem incident gained a certain status, and he acted very cautiously until Prince Cem was poisoned to death. In any case, Bayezid II's next expedition will be against the Mamluks, who previously supported Prince Cem but did not have this political tool now, so that he would not only carry out territorial expansion away from European lands, but also inflict a certain intimidation on his enemies.

Finally, within this framework, two more specific tactical applications could be determined in which the principle of power appears in primary sources. The first of these is the demolition of some castles in the regions under the rule of the Ottoman state, and the second is the acts of terror on the population. The power principle, which focuses on act of intimidation and authority-structuring, thus inspires a political tactic

⁹²² If our ruler had devoted himself to that path and tried hard/ He would have the world and the hereafter/ Why did he take another path/ Why did he not follow this path.

that leaves local powers vulnerable through spatial regulation, and acts of violence aimed at forcing local people to recognize state authority. Thus, a spatial war of position is waged against the local ruling classes - and the fortresses are eliminated as the tactical elements of this war, and a direct representation of power is provided by creating a terrible image of power in the eyes of the people through terror.

Let the first consider how the destruction of castles was used as a political tactic. In this context, the phenomenon of the destruction of enemy castles is included in Kivâmî's work called *Fetihnâme*, due to the expedition of Mehmet II on the castles of Sirvice and Amul in Rumelia. After stating that these castles are very steep and their defenses are strong, Kivâmî states that cannons were set up to take these castles and they were destroyed with cannon shots (Kivâmî, 2018, p. 182): "Bir niçe gün afet daşları-la dögdiler, a'da-yı dini zebun itdiler. Ahirü'l-emir, yıkdılar, anı dahı yire beraber itdiler".⁹²³ In Kivâmî's violent depiction, there are traces of this event not only covering the siege, but also following a method aiming at the elimination of such a position beyond the siege. On the other hand, in order to reveal the tactical features of this method, it is necessary to refer to the history of Kritovulos. Kritovulos (2018, pp. 173-74) states that when Mehmet II besieged the Castrion castle on the skirts of the mountain of Sparta, the people of this place surrendered unconditionally after a short resistance, but the castle was destroyed after the castle guards were killed and women and children captured. The same fate befell the people living in a steep castle called Gardikion, located near Mount Zigos, in Sparti. Despite the unconditional surrender of these people, Mehmet II had them all killed, and the castle demolished (Kritovulos, 2018, pp. 174-75). İnalçık interprets these examples as part of an anti-feudal policy. According to İnalçık (2019a, p. 238), these defense positions, which are points of resistance that Mehmet II local principalities can benefit from, are being demolished with a centralist orientation, and a similar struggle is experienced by the central monarchies against the feudals in European history. The fact that *Düstûrnâme* contains information that two hundred and ninety-two of the three hundred castles were destroyed in Mora shows that this phenomenon is undoubtedly valid for the region of Greece at least (Öztürk, 2012b, p. 48).

The fact that the destruction of the castles is followed by a local terror movement, although not always, is worth considering separately. As it was mentioned before, the

⁹²³ For many days, they beat them with disaster stones and made the enemies of religion weak. After that, they demolished it, even razed it to the ground.

Ottoman rule was not alien to the method of terror. In this context, it is seen that the practice of terror was used as a political tactic, especially in the period of Mehmet II, and it was found in the sources with a more remarkable frequency compared to the previous periods. İnalçık (2019a, p. 237) defines the examples in which this method is seen as intimidation methods taken to “provide obedience and order or give a lesson of warning [tm]”. This very careful definition, as Werner states (2019a, p. 340), in essence points to nothing but the policy of terror. Werner (2019a, p. 340) is of the opinion that Mehmet II benefited from the terror method, such as Genghis Khan and Tamerlane, against the castles and cities that resisted. Kritovulos (2018, p. 175) explains why the peoples killed and enslaved by Mehmet II despite his assurances suffered this fate, in accordance with the content of the concept of terror: “(...) he wanted to frighten and intimidate everyone, to cause them as much fear and anxiety as possible so that they would not dare to resist and rebel again, but to submit to him of their own accord in order to live in safety; That’s what happened [tm]”.

In this context, we can take a brief look at the prominent examples in the Ottoman chronicles. The first terror method applied during the reign of Mehmet II was encountered during the Lesvos Island expedition in 1457/58. According to the history of Kritovulos, Mehmet II commissioned the navy commander İsmail Pasha to seize the island of Lesvos. Kritovulos is of the opinion that the purpose of this expedition was to “invade the whole island, plunder and completely destroy it [tm]” (2018, p. 155). Although the Ottoman navy’s initial plan was likely to capture the island, it is final that İsmail Pasha failed after a ten-day siege and therefore returned by “burning down houses outside the city [tm]”, “burning down villages [tm]”, looting and “gathering as much loot as he could [tm]”, thus confirms Kritovulos (2018, p. 156). Kritovulos (2018, p. 156) states that in the face of this terror, the people of Lesvos became wiser “like beaten children [tm]” and sent envoys to Mehmet II, begging for forgiveness and agreeing to pay taxes. As a result, this tactic brought success to the Ottoman attack. In the same year, the destruction of Castrion and Gardikion castles and the enslavement of their people is an example of a similar terror, and it again resulted in success about the spread of rentier relations. The information that a similar event took place in the Peloponnese expedition in 1458 can be found in the memories of Janissary Constantine. According to Constantine (Beydilli, 2019b, p. 82):

[Mehmet II] (...) took action to fight Demetrios. When he entered the territory of the despot, he seized the castle, began to kill and break the bones of people. The

rabid Turkish dog had done this and other cruelties at that time. He was doing this so that those in the castles would not dare to resist them.

A third example was expressed by Tursun Beg. While Tursun Beg (1977, p. 146) reported that Mehmet II sent troops back to Karaman region in 1469/70, he draws attention to the fact that the aim of this advanced operation was not to acquire land, on the contrary, they aimed to ‘overturn’ Karaman region. Tursun Beg’s statements are as follows (1977, p. 146): “Karaman’a, merreten ba’de uhrâ asker-i cerrâr gönderdi. Bakıyye-i ehl-i temerrüdden ne buldılar ise, hânedânın ‘âleynâ sâfilehâ’ kibelinden kıldılar”.⁹²⁴ The phrase “Asker-i cerrar” in these lines can be interpreted in two ways. The first one is ‘*cerrar*’, meaning the soldier who collects money or goods by force (Ayverdi, 2010, p. 192), the second, as the phrase ‘*leşker-i cerrar*’ indicates, means “a crowded army with lots of provisions and ammunition [tm]” (Ayverdi, 2010, p. 741). It is clear that Tursun Beg may have used the expression in both senses. Because there is both a large army and the looting of Karaman region. There is more detailed information about the content of this incident exist in the history of Âşıkpaşazâde. Âşıkpaşazâde (2017, p. 180) states that during the campaign under the command of vizier Rum Mehmet Pasha on the Karaman region, the mosques and madrasas of Larende were demolished and devastated, the women and boys of the city were stripped naked, and the province and villages of Ereğli were devastated. During this expedition, the people of Ereğli came to Rum Mehmet Pasha and said, “This is the waqf of the Messenger of Allah. Now you ruined it like this. What if the poor of Madinah do not receive alimony from here, we believed and approved it on the Day of Judgment tomorrow, what will you answer when you come to the presence of the Messenger of Allah? [tm]” they asked, in return, the vizier had all of them killed (Apzd, 2017, p. 180). Âşıkpaşazâde also states that the loot collected in this expedition was not kept, but poured into the region of Uyuz Beg and used by the Vergik tribes (Apzd, 2017, p. 180). Thus, the dark picture of the method of terror is completed. Âşıkpaşazâde's narrative reveals that the main purpose of the military operation was directly to create intimidation in the people, by stating that Rum Mehmet Pasha made a great looting beyond the limits of the Sharia (the bare stripping of women and boys and the destruction of foundations) and he threw

⁹²⁴ He sent looting soldiers to Karaman again. Whatever remains of the obstinate ones they found, they made their home and shelter similar to the situation mentioned in the Quranic verse, get top to down.

it away like garbage. Because an act of violence and looting, which considers material gains of secondary importance, can only be explained by the method of terror.

Finally, two incidents were presented in the anonymous chronicles indicated that the terror method was also applied during the reign of Bayezid II. The first of these incidents occurs in the massacres carried out by Bayezid II on the occasion of the Yuvan expedition, and the second in some extraordinary measures taken due to the Şahkulu Revolt. It would be appropriate to briefly touch upon the Yuvan expedition first. The Yuvan region in Albania is known for its steep geography and is a very difficult place to capture. In the Öztürk chronicle (2000, p. 137), the people of this region, which is defined as a place where “the devil cannot walk with a stick [tm]”, refuse pay tribute. Thereupon, Bayezid II, who ordered an expedition, “stabbed these people with the sword and made captives of their women and boys [tm]”, and “set fire and destroyed villages and agriculture [tm]” (Köklü, 2000, p. 137). This incident is also included in the Giesse chronicle (1992, pp. 129-130) with exactly the same expressions. Moreover, the Kreutel chronicle (1997, p. 15) gives further details about the event. In the anonymous chronicle published by Kreutel (1997, p. 15), it is stated that, in addition to the information that the Ottoman army “burned down some villages and regions [tm]” in Albania, the Janissaries “looted the property of those who paid their normal taxes, apart from the enemy [tm]” due to the lack of booty to be collected due to this expedition. I think that this attitude of the Janissaries goes beyond the use of the terror method as a political tactic. There is a difference between using violence to intimidate the local population and using violence that can destroy the loyalty of the subjects. For example, according to İnalçık (2019a, p. 237), despite Mehmet II uses the intimidation method on the Albanians, he dismissed Zağanos Pasha, who behaved harshly enough to lead the people in Mora to a hopeless resistance.

In this context, it is clear that the terror method was used to ‘facilitate’ the people’s political convictions, that is, to provide a violent reason not to choose the other side in a possible power struggle between the Ottoman rule and other ruling groups. The clearest example of this situation is identified in the policy of repression that emerged on the eve of the Şahkulu revolt. Bayezid II’s attitude towards this revolt shifts from a general terror practice to specific violence, thus he tends to avoid the effects of terror that might trigger a general revolt. According to the information in Kreutel anonymous (1997, p. 45), on the eve of the Şahkulu revolt, the Turkmen groups in Anatolia turned towards Iran to join Shah Ismail, and this tendency was perceived as a serious threat by

the Ottoman administration. In this case, Bayezid II sent orders to the sanjak begs and *qadis* and ordered that everyone who wanted to join Shah Ismail to be killed, and the officials who followed this order put guards on the roads and killed many nomads (Kreutel, 1997, p. 45). On the other hand, the inconvenience of this policy will have emerged due to the increasing social unrest and the inability to prevent participation in Shah Ismail, so that specific violence has been applied instead of general terror. The second policy of Bayezid II in this regard was the execution of all those who wore red caps and “to exile, together with their wives, children and supporters, of those who are undecided and do not seem to have openly accepted the sect of the *sûfis* [tm]” (Kreutel, 1997, p. 45). As a result, these measures would not have been sufficient, as Sheikh Şahkulu, who was visited by Prince Korkud and tried to bind Bayezid II to him by sending gifts, did not hesitate to revolt when the conjuncture was appropriate (Kreutel, 1997, p. 48). A similar policy was applied to Otman Baba, who caused discomfort in the imperial capital. As could be learned from the *velâyetnâme*, Mehmet II promised to have Otman Baba built a palace-like dervish lodge, to establish *waqfs* and to give salary and donations when he could not take the risk of hanging Otman Baba (Yalçın, 2008, p. 264). This should be written in Ottoman political tactics as a kind of pacification method. From these examples, it is seen how the Ottoman administration could use the tactics of terror, violence and political articulation together. In this context, it can be evaluated that the ruler’s generous donations to bind religious groups to itself as a political tactic. As Gölpınarlı (2020b, p. 38) states the ruling class, because the people show interest in the *sûfi* circles and accept their authority, they saw the establishment of *sûfi* lodges for the members of various *sûfi* groups and attaching *waqfs* to these *sûfi* lodges as a useful tactic in order to engage the members of the *sûfis* in their own power.

In this context, members of Ottoman dynasty and state dignitaries donated “fields, inns, public baths, shops [tm]” to religious sect foundations, and they built dervish rooms, *semâhâne/mukabeleh ne*, *tawhidhâne*, harem room, greeting room, *matbah*, dining hall, guest house, fountain, mosque, tomb, and cemetery, thus they have turned them into complex establishments (Gölpınarlı, 2020b, p. 118). Various aspects of this tactic have been exemplified in earlier chapters. For example, it is possible to evaluate Bayezid II’s donations to different *sûfi* circles, the assignment of land to *sûfi* groups and the establishment of *waqfs* within this framework. In this subsection, I will share a few examples of how the said political tactic was resisted by the *sûfi* circles. Three anecdotes in Eşrefoğlu Rumî and Otman Baba’s *menâkıbnâmes* show that the *sûfi*

circles were against receiving monetary donations from the ruler personally and resisted it, either openly or secretly. In the story that Eşrefoğlu Rumî was summoned by Mehmet II and, as it is discussed in the previous section, he went to the emperor after various hardships and healed Mehmet II's mother, some details in this anecdote including the idea of not receiving donations support our view. As reported in the *menâkıbnâme* of Eşrefoğlu Rumî, the famous *sûfî*, after curing some illness, was leaving the palace with great respect, while Mehmet II wanted to present him with a large amount of silver and gold. Eşrefoğlu Rumî did not accept even one of these gifts and said, "My Sultan, give silver and gold to your servants and act ghaza; this poor man does not need it! [tm]" (Bursalı, 1976, p. 59). Mehmet II is upset by this answer, so Eşrefoğlu agrees to take some coins, but gives them to the guards at the palace gate and to a poor person at the ship's pier, leaving Istanbul without any of them (Bursalı, 1976, p. 59). Afterwards, the famous *sûfî* prays to God, saying, hold us from the hearts of the sultans and the sultans from our hearts. This anecdote in the *menâkıbnâme* has two meanings, the first meaning is clear and indicates that the *sûfîs* do not care about money, the second meaning is closed and it is implied in the sub-text that there may be an inconvenience in accepting the precious metals and money that the ruler has accumulated because they may be mixed with 'haram' goods. It could be seen that both meanings have found a place in the understanding of asceticism of the *sûfî* circles since the early periods of Islam (Başer, 2021, pp. 45-46). On the other hand, the political meaning of this anecdote is that the *sûfî* circles did not accept to fall into a position like the servants of the ruler in exchange for money and resisted to preserve their relative autonomy. Nevertheless, Eşrefoğlu's acceptance of some money in order not to offend the ruler, and the fact that he distributed them after they were out of sight of the ruler, is remarkable in that it shows that the dervish circles were wary of the ruler's anger and avoided direct opposition to him. In the continuation of this anecdote, it is claimed that Mehmet II changed his clothes in order not to be recognized, came to Eşrefoğlu and demanded that he be accepted as a dervish and gave up his reign. Eşrefoğlu, on the other hand, tells the sultan to act justly in the face of this demand, and if he behaves in this way, he will win the favor of the prophets and saints and sends him back (Bursalı, 1976, p. 60). In this story, there is a typical parable with the main idea of realizing that the true rulership belongs to the dervishes as a result of the ruler being a servant of the dervish, a similar one exists in the *menâkıbnâme* of Otman Baba. However, these stories do not result in the ruler

being a dervish, as in the famous story of İbrahim Edhem.⁹²⁵ On the contrary, the domain of power of the ruler and *sûfis* is separated and the *sûfis* provide symbolic support to the ruler in return for justice. In the *velâyetnâme* of Otman Baba, there is another and bolder version of this story. Mehmet II, who accepted that Otman Baba was a real saint, got off his horse and kissed his hand and said, “you are the real sultan [tm]”, sends coins to the famous *sûfi* with a servant (Yalçın, 2008, p. 86). Otman Baba, who sees coins, answers angrily, “Get away quickly, don’t bring that shit on me, take it away [tm]” (Yalçın, 2008, p. 86). In the second story attributed to Otman Baba, after another encounter, Otman Baba hit a purse sent by Mehmet II with the log and broke it into pieces, and the people plundered it (Yalçın, 2008, p. 87). Meanwhile, Otman Baba’s words are quite interesting, and Otman Baba, who looks at the money bag, uses the phrase “Look, you can’t put spell on me with this ugly one [tm]” (Yalçın, 2008, p. 87). In this context, Otman Baba both implies that money is a religiously repugnant thing, and also states that the ruler cannot ‘bind’ himself spiritually by sending money. Although there are two *sûfis* who do not accept money in both stories, the first one submits to the will of the ruler, and the other does not hesitate to categorically reject it. Considering that Otman Baba represents the wandering and antinomian dervishes, and Eşrefoğlu was a sheik of the settled *Qadiri* order, it can be more easily understood that the difference between the reactions to Mehmet II is the representation of a socio-political difference.

As can be understood from various examples, it was significant for the Ottoman administration to try to connect the *sûfi* groups to the center with various political articulation methods, and to eliminate the independent political existence of these groups with methods that varying from donations to terror. In this context, another example is seen in the *velâyetnâme* of Otman Baba most likely reveals a typical political technique in general terms (see: *Bab-ı Siyun Ameden-i Derviş Be-Nazari an Kan-ı Velayet ve ‘Alamet-i Fitneha-yı U*). Another dervish figure who struggles with Otman Baba’s influence is frequently mentioned in the *velâyetnâme* of Otman Baba. It is seen that this person, called Mü’min Derviş, had a close relationship with the central authority and tried to connect the followers of Otman Baba to his own circle. It is

⁹²⁵ This story tells the self-sacrifice and spiritual journey of İbrahim Ethem, who left the reign and became a wandering dervish. The general structure of the story is similar to the life story of Mahatma Gautama (Buddha). It can be thought that the story of İbrahim Ethem is a reproduction of the legend of Buddha with Islamic elements. In addition, the city of Balkh, where this story takes place, is a developed center of Buddhism.

possible to think that this name is a prototype of dervish articulated with the central power in general, and that the name was chosen consciously to reflect the duality of 'believer and denier' (*mü'min* and *münkir*) in this sense. It is possible that Mü'min Derviş may be affiliated with the Bektashi order, like Mahmud Çelebi, whom Otman Baba criticizes. According to the *velâyetnâme*, when the shepherds started to gather around Otman Baba with their flocks of sheep and the money they had, and the "*abdâl leşkeri*" (soldiers of wandering dervishes) increased, the Mü'min Derviş got the idea to articulate them around his own and to govern them (Yalçın, 2008, p. 179). For this reason, Mü'min Derviş, who first went to Otman Baba and gave the appearance that he was subordinate to him and sacrifice an animal for him, then sent the following message to the dervishes around Otman Baba: "biz dahı Sultan Baba'ya tapşurup anun bendeleri olduk (...) öyle olsa gelün imdi siz dahı bizim kisvetimize girip erkan-ı kava'idümüz içre olun" (Yalçın, 2008, p. 181).⁹²⁶ Otman Baba then says that Mü'min Derviş wants to enchant his dervishes, and it would be better for dervishes to see and envy/adopt their own crown/headpiece and sackcloth (Yalçın, 2008, p. 182). Before moving on to the succeeding part of the story, it is necessary to pay attention to a few details. The figure of the Mü'min Derviş tries to include the dervishes around Otman Baba into his circle by making them envy his own clothes. It is known that elements such as crown, turban, cardigan, shawl were arranged as trademarks in *sûfi* groups and constitute the symbolic identity of a certain group. The fact that the figure of the Mü'min Derviş creates a dress-code unique to his circle shows that he may be connected with one the established *sûfi* order. In the continuation of the story, it is seen that the people of Mü'min Derviş decided to complain about Otman Baba to the sanjak beg and, according to this information, the sanjak beg ordered the *qadi* of Prevadi to investigate this case. The fellows of the Mü'min Derviş go to the sancak beg with the following thought (Yalçın, 2008, p. 182): "(...) sancak beğine varup her nev' ile anladavuz ki bir bölük çoban ve hırsız bir yire cem olmuşlar ve Otman Baba'ya Huda dirler diyu cevab idelüm ve bu bab ile bunlara yol bulup kimin asdıralum ve kimin dağıdalum ve kimin zat idüp emrimize muti' idelüm".⁹²⁷ In the succeeding part of the story, Otman Baba devises a

⁹²⁶ Even we were subject to Sultan Baba and became his servants (...) so come on now, wear our clothes and be subject to our principles.

⁹²⁷ Let's go to the sanjak beg and explain it in every detail so that a group of shepherds and thieves gathered in a place, and we can answer that they call Otman Baba the God. In this way, let's find the opportunity and have some of these people hanged, some of them dispersed, and some of them subject to our own order.

trick to escape from the trap of Mü'min Derviş. Otman Baba makes Mü'min Derviş similar to his dervishes, has his body hair shaved off and is assigned to wait for his own banner, and he beats the guards of the banner at night and ensures that the dervishes escape before the *qadi* arrives (Yalçın, 2008, p. 184). In the subtext of the story, it is seen that a dervish group first applies some symbolic articulation tactics in order to seize the members of the other, and then resorts to the Ottoman administrative authorities and tries to eliminate by force to the other group that can be considered as 'ibâhî' or 'apostate'. Although the text gives the impression that this event resulted from the rivalry between the two dervish groups, it is likely that it was a systematic articulation of the state. The fact that the circle of Mü'min Derviş can reach the sanjak beg without fear suggests that they may be a dervish group that has closer relations with the representatives of the central government and is seen as legitimate/safe/docile.

In the following story in the *velâyetnâme* of Otman Baba (see: *Bab-ı Si vü Yeküm Amadan-i An-Kazi Be-vasıta-i Mü'min Derviş Ez-bera-yı İmtihan*), *qadis* of Prevađi and Suriçi and dignitaries of the city come to the scene. Mü'min Derviş greets these people, places them in a house with great respect, offers them food, and says, "dahı safa geldünüz ve çirkin yüzüm ayağınız toprağı" (Yalçın, 2008, p. 186).⁹²⁸ Upon this welcome, the *qadi* of Prevađi asks Mü'min Derviş as such a question "kanı dervişlerdür kim Otman Baba'ya sırr-ı Yezdan dirler imiş ve sana teslim olmazlar imiş" (Yalçın, 2008, p. 186).⁹²⁹ It is understood from this dialogue that the plan of the central administration from the very beginning was to connect dervish groups like Otman Baba circle, who were not under their control, to the state through the help of Mü'min Derviş and to exercise power over them. It is not difficult to deduce from the dialogue that took place during the reception that the Mü'min Derviş was also aware of this and that he was only used as an apparatus. In addition, the fact that Otman Baba's self-identification as "sir-ı Yezdan"⁹³⁰ was considered unacceptable by the *qadi* shows that this group was defined as 'deviant' from the very beginning and that the measures taken were a part of the domination strategy of the central government. Deli Umur, one of the followers of Otman Baba, who was summoned to the presence of *qadi*, confirms these claims and gives them theological justification, and the *qadi* of Suriçi gives the following verdict (Yalçın, 2008, p. 188): "Otman Baba diyüp i'tikad itdikleri ta'yin ve mu'ayyendür ki

⁹²⁸ Welcome, my ugly face is worthy of the soil of your feet.

⁹²⁹ Who are the dervishes who call Otman Baba the secret of God and do not surrender to you?

⁹³⁰ This expression was later interpreted as Otman Baba being a god (Yalçın, 2008, p. 254).

Rahmani degüldür ve buna i'tikad idenler mülhid ve küfr ehlidür".⁹³¹ Thereupon, it was decided to imprison Deli Umur and the five *abdals* with him in Prevadi dungeon. Mü'min Dervish states that these *abdals* were imprisoned to be "destroyed with (...) sword of Sharia" and he asserts that he divided the gathered *abdals* according to the orders of the sheikhs and reverse them to the clothes he belonged to. According to this, Mü'min Derviş distributed the followers of Otman Baba to the existing established *sûfi* orders and dressed some of them in his own sect. On the other hand, Otman Baba was preparing for active resistance, the sky was covered with flood and smoke, a dragon was seen in the sky, invisible soldiers flew in the air and gathered to the side of Niğbolu (Yalçın, 2008, pp. 189-90). It is clear that these symbols mean an epic rebellion supported by the god. The fact that Otman Baba is constantly seen with a sword in many subsequent stories shows that the motif of rebellion and war is in circulation at a symbolic level. The author of the *velâyetnâme* cites a legend about how Otman Baba helped Mehmet II in his war against Uzun Hasan after this incident. It is reported that Otman Baba contributed to the victory of this war with a kind of magic or prayer from afar and said to Uzun Hasan that "the sultans of the seven climates would cry at my hand, you ignorant person, wouldn't you hear the executioner's call" (Yalçın, 2008, p. 194-95). This legend has a rhetorical nature. In the *velâyetnâme*, Otman Baba's transition from his struggle with Mü'min Derviş and the *qadis* to becoming a soldier in the Battle of Otlukbeli corresponds to a dramatic change in political plan. With this new narrative, the idea that Otman Baba did not pose a threat to the central administration and that he helped Mehmet II gains an epic image. For this reason, it is possible to think that the pressures of Mü'min Derviş and the *qadis* on the *sûfi* circle of Otman Baba have yielded results. In this context, especially in the second half of the 15th century, the Ottoman administration brought the Bektashi order to the fore in order to restrain the wandering dervish groups, the *Kalenderis* and the proto-Qizilbashes, and the group of Mü'min Dervish is a candidate to be representative of this policy. As Yıldırım (2019b, p. 291) points out, the centralization of the Bektashi order is a historical phenomenon that cannot be separated from the Ottoman centralization, and it is especially related to the Safavids increasing their sphere of influence.

In the following parts of the *velâyetnâme*, there are details such as Otman Baba's encounter with Mahmud Pasha, Prince Mustafa and Mehmet II, and even Otman Baba's

⁹³¹ The person they believe in as Otman Baba does not have the grace of God, and those who believe in this person are unbelievers and infidels.

first drawing a sword against Mehmet II and then donating it to him (Yalçın, 2008, pp. 208-219), shows that the contradictions between the central administration and the wandering dervishes deepened and intensified, but in the final analysis, the dervish groups did not succeed in overcoming the power of central administration. In another story in the *velâyetnâme*, a group of ulama and state officials advise Mehmet II to at least put *abdals* on the stake and hang them on a hook if he cannot execute Otman Baba (Yalçın, 2008, p. 249). Otman Baba dervishes, on the other hand, started to fight with arrows against the Mehmet II soldier who came upon them (Yalçın, 2008, p. 250). But in the next episode, the vizier Sinan Pasha comes to visit Otman Baba with a group of people, including the *qadiasker*, the treasurer, and the *subaşı* of the city, and they are welcomed (Yalçın, 2008, p. 252). It is even seen that these Ottoman officers brought money to Otman Baba during their visits, and he refused to accept it and gave it back in anger by saying, “bu çirkin yiğrenci benü cazuliyayum diye idersin (...) ol bokunu bokına kat” (Yalçın, 2008, p. 254).⁹³²

These political oscillations signify the succession of the Ottoman administration’s use of force and consent tactics. In this context, the triple political tactical pattern of the Ottoman administration is realized as follows: (i) ‘domestication’ of autonomous groups by developing cultural and economic patronage relations, (ii) making the palpable threat of violence and terror on autonomous groups, (iii) legitimizing the elimination of autonomous groups on a religious) basis, especially by *fiqh*. It is possible to observe the extensions of these tactics in the 16th century, especially after the development of the Qizilbash/Safavid movement, which will be discussed further in the following sections.

VII.III.III. Aspects of Justice: The Notion of Justice Between Tactics and Strategy

“The sultan has to obey two kinds of justice. The first is common with other people, like protecting your own property and status. The second is the improvement of the affairs of servants and the people [tm]”.

İdrîs-i Bitlisî (Uğur, 2001, p. 101)

The concept of justice is one of the most emphasized concepts throughout the history of political thought in terms of its form and content. From the problem of sharing

⁹³² You give this ugly and disgusting thing to bewitch me, put this shit on your own shit.

the spoils in accordance with their statuses between Agamemnon and Achilles in the Epic of *Iliad*, to the relations between Indian castes in the *Mahabharata*, to the distinction between absolute and relative justice in Aristotle's *Peri Politika*, and to the synthetic concepts of Islamic political thought that developed between moral, legal and ontological understandings of justice. The debate on justice has acquired many new contexts and meanings throughout history. The relationship between the presentation and concrete social content of this concept that developed over a long historical process has always been shaped under the influence of two formal poles. While the first of these poles constitutes the justice models developed by the social power holders on the share/right/status of the subordinate groups and aiming to reproduce the social order/status quo, the second is settled in an alternative political theme in which the subordinate social segments express their right/share/status demands.

In this respect, the concept of justice is a strategic concept in terms of realizing the interests or demands of different social segments/classes/strata, based on social struggles. When the subject is examined in the context of real social relations, the unequal and combined development of the negotiations, struggles, and dominant or secondary forms of contradictions between these two poles crystallize in the concepts of justice that emerged in different ages and societies. To the extent that social relations are expressed in this concept, it is natural that the subjective right and status claims in the sense that people or groups impose themselves on other people or groups (Duguit, 2019, pp. 27-28) and the relations between the objective rights and statuses arising from the fact of living as a society constitute the content of this concept. Thus, the formal establishment of the concept of justice can be based on the social relationship between subjective rights and statuses and objective rights and statuses that ground the legitimacy of power. Whether these relations have an egalitarian form or are formed within the framework of asymmetric power relations, they can have a legitimacy claim under the concept of justice that will ultimately secure the formal unity of the society. As a result, the encountering of both subjective and objective rights in this concept and the regulation of the relations between them will largely reflect the projections of a social structure divided into strata/classes, or the collective morality of an egalitarian social structure. In other words, the concept of justice functions as a supporter of ideals of social order or peace, or as a legitimator of social struggles.

Çağrı (1988) states that the concept of justice is used in the meanings of "order, balance, equivalence, equality, ruling in accordance with the truth, following the

right path, turning to taqwa, honesty, impartiality [tm]” in Islamic sources. Depending on the context in which it is used, this concept may refer to the aesthetic harmony of the body, its psychological balance, the harmony between its virtues or the indiscriminate granting of legal rights. Kömbe (2014, p. 240) states that the word ‘*adl*’ is used in the Qur’an as “justice, ransom, similarity (equivalence) and character integrity [tm]” and draws attention to the possible concrete determinations of the concept and instead of the term justice, that the terms ‘*kıst*’, ‘*hak*’, ‘*vasat*’ are also used.

An issue that should be emphasized when considering the concept of justice is the relationship of this concept with the concept of ‘oppression’ or ‘persecution’. The word oppression/persecution (*zlm*) means putting something from its place to another (Mumcu, 2007, p. xvii) or withholding one’s right instead of giving justice (Bağdatlı, 2018, p. 317) in terms of its etymological meaning. Based on this definition, it is possible to define the concept of justice as ‘the fulfillment of a right’ and ‘everything is in its proper place’ and the concept of persecution as the deprivation of a legitimate right of individuals or groups. In this respect, the concept of persecution/oppression is somewhat similar to the concept of extortion. In particular, persecution in the exchange of goods, collection of taxes, and distribution of social status corresponds to the taking away of goods or status/honour, which are considered the right of individuals or groups, without any reasonable remuneration. There are two main elements seen in this proposition. The first is justice as equality (for example, compliance with the duty or contract undertaken in the exchange of goods or money), and the second is justice as a proportional inequality (observance of a measure of tax collection, obedience to the decency required by social statuses). In addition to these, it is known that there is another understanding of justice that requires a person to be fair to himself. As Öztürk (2017, p. 305) states, the concept of oppression is perceived by the *sûfîs* as separation from the framework of wisdom. On the basis of this understanding, there is an approach that identifies justice with fulfilling religious requirements and morality. However, it is possible to evaluate this approach in the category of ‘compliance with the contract’. Because the provision of ‘being just towards yourself’ demanded from the rulers is based on the belief that man made a contract with God on the day of creation and is obliged to abide by these religious provisions. This interpretation forms the basis for a more mystical interpretation in which justice is identified with piety and sincerity. In addition, in accordance with the provision asserting that “the subjects are on the religion of the ruler [tm]” (Öztürk, 2017, p.306), since the religiousness of the ruler is directly

associated with the justice and order of the ruled, the ideas of personal morality and religiosity and social order are articulated in the notion of subordination.

In the final analysis, these three approaches, which deal with the concept of justice, are all about the regulation of the material world, from human psychology to exchange and political relations, and reflect a kind of ‘good governance’ ideal, including security and welfare, as Türk (2018, p. 143) states. While the ideal of good governance is on the one hand evaluated within a secular conceptualization that ‘the state is positioned as strong and the people prosperous’, on the other hand, It can also be interpreted as the abolition of arbitrary administration as Şeker (2013, p. 134) points out which depending on a range of values (especially religious values) that limits the ruler. It is not theoretically possible to make a historical reduction by accepting either of the two interpretations as absolute and to determine the determination of the concept of justice in concrete social formations. The concrete content of these interpretations is determined by the real power relations in the historical context. In this context, Bowering (2013, p. 290) states that the concept of justice should be evaluated as a kind of social contract between the ruler and his subjects. But what this contract-like notion corresponds to in terms of the asymmetry of power relations is not always predetermined.

It is also an issue that should not be overlooked that the concept of justice, which is a part of social struggles in real terms, has become an important extension of political ideologies with its symbolic and imaginary aspects. Within this category, an ideological presentation of the ideal of ‘good governance’ is encountered. This use of the concept of justice is particularly common in the Islamic tradition. So to speak, the concept of justice assumes the function of an idea of ‘invisible hand’ for Islamic political thought. An example can be given by an anecdote quoted in the *Kitâbu'l-Lu'lueti fi's-Sultan*, which constitutes a section in the compilation on politics of the 10th century writer Ibn Abdiraabih's work named *al-İkdü'l-Ferîd*. Ibn Abdirabbih (2018, pp. 58-59) states that during the reign of Caliph Omar bin Abdulaziz, a governor who wanted to build a castle in the city wrote a letter to the caliph containing this request, and states that the response of the caliph was as follows: "Consolidate the city with justice first! Cleanse your ways from oppression! This is real security! [tm]".⁹³³ It is natural for these expressions to imply that the provision of justice at first glance is of primary importance in the establishment of social peace. On the other hand, the fact that the rights and freedoms

⁹³³ The same anecdote is quoted in Kafiyeci's (2018, p. 66) work named *Seyfü'l-Müluk*.

on which social peace will be built are not mentioned in these statements, that is, slavery, the status of women, the use of state power, private property, labor and exchange relations are placed on a plan that does not problematize the real content of the concept of justice. Thus, the concept of justice is turned into a reflection of a social order in which existing rights and privileges are guaranteed. Other images constructed within the same framework can be mentioned. For example, thanks to justice, lamb and wolf wandered together during the reign of Caliph Omar, the country was prosperous in such a way that even an old piece of tile could not be found during the reign of Enushirvan (Amâsî, 2016, p. 409), thanks to the justice of Bayezid II, the hawk and partridge were sitting in the same nest, wolves shepherd the flock (Tursun, 1977, p. 18), ducks, geese and falcons fly together (Öztürk, 2001, p. 12) and so on. The common point of such narratives adorned with such images is that they abstract the material relations necessary for the provision of justice, that is, the real content of justice, and that a concept of justice is reduced to the sole subject as ruler and the sole determinant is the morality/religiousness of the ruler, and thus instilling the idea that everything necessary for justice comes into place with divine help. The main factor leading to this inference is based on the fact that the existing power relations in the stratified/class-based social structures as were discussed are already sanctified through a religious affirmation. In this context, since affirmation of the existing social structure is meant the implicit affirmation of the subjective notion of rights that lies behind it, the protection of these rights and statuses through justice automatically comes to the same level as declaring new claims for rights illegitimate. Thus, it can be assumed that the invisible hand of justice works in favor of the public interest, while the existing power relations, which are seen as legitimate in the divine plan, are kept in place through justice. An interesting story exemplifying this dual relationship is in Kemal's work called *Selâtinâme*. According to the story (Öztürk, 2001, pp. 109-111), a monarch retreats to rest on the edge of a garden while hunting with his entourage. He brings some fruit in this garden to cool him down, and he likes it very much. Then he thinks about buying the garden where this sweet fruit grows and has another fruit collected and brought. While the first fruit is extraordinarily juicy and delicious, this second fruit is dry and bitter. When it is understood that the God did not leave water and flavor in the fruit as a result of the ruler's intention to seize the garden, the ruler gives up the oppression and the fruits return to their old taste. While this story tells that the ruler should not disrupt the order of property by force, it also operates the invisible hand of

justice through the duality of the taste/bitterness of the fruit that refers symbolically to the concept of abundance.

In Ottoman political thought, a place is systematically allocated to the concept of justice. When the secondary literature is examined, argumentation and commentary about this concept presented as such: It indicates the direction to state actions (Şeker, 2013, p. 178), gains importance for the continuity of the political system (Çiçek, 1999, p. 417), and expresses the mutual rights and obligations of the sultan and his servants (Ergene, 2013, p. 2001), or, it does not constitute a starting point in the establishment of the social order, but is seen as the basic element of the preservation of an existing order (Bağdatlı, 2018, p. 293). Moreover, Murphey (2017, p. 40) places the concept of justice under the conceptualization of “restorative justice” as such the search for the provision of individual-society balance and public interests through the protection of the obvious superiority of the authority of the monarch and the protection of general interests against group interests. Furthermore, Keskintaş (2017, p. 136 et al.) considers the tendency to transition from particulars to the universal context in this concept as the ‘passion for unity’ in the relationship of human beings with other beings, and states that it gains meanings in many areas from the individual plane to the social and cosmological scale. Although these formulations are partially and descriptively correct, they largely leave out of the analysis the issue of the reproduction of particular class interests and the institutions of subordination that support it, in which the concept of justice gains its concrete content.

On the other hand, the 15th century historian Kemal can clearly reveal the purpose of justice practices. Kemal’s proposition is as follows (Öztürk, 2001, p. 82): “Şeh ola kıla gerek ‘adl ü dadı/ Ki halkun muhkem ola i’tikadı/ Zulm kılmağı terk ide cihanda/ Sever anun gibi şahı cihan da”.⁹³⁴ When these lines are interpreted it is noticed that justice is formulated as a political instrument in order to gain the loyalty and love/consent of the people under the ruler’s subordination, thus reproducing the social order. While the use of this strategic instrument in general follows the complex structure of subordination relations, it can also turn into a tactical tool in the hands of different social segments (such as ulama or *sûfis*) in special social plans.

In this context, in order to trace the concept of justice in Ottoman political thought, it is necessary to consider three interrelated levels. These can be listed as such:

⁹³⁴ The ruler should provide justice and do good / For the people to have strong faith in him / He should abandon oppression in the world / The people of the world love a ruler like him.

(i) justice as the principle of the relationship of the ruler with himself, (ii) the abstract meaning and function of justice in terms of social order, (iii) concrete aspects of the practices of justice in terms of Ottoman history. The first of these titles idealizes the power relationship between the ruler and the ulama members and *sūfis*, who are the representatives of religious ideology, in terms of the religious and moral qualities of the ruler. The second title deals with the theoretical position given to the concept and practice of justice in order to reproduce the social order. The third title refers to the criticisms developed around the concept of justice regarding the practices of the ruler by directly measuring the 15th century Ottoman society and political practices.

First, let's take the title 'justice as the principle of the relationship of the ruler with himself'. This principle can be considered as part of the quest to subject rulers to moral control or education, which is generally embodied in different variations in politics. The fact that it is based on a principle in which the demand for justice of all social segments governed in general can be expressed in isolation from their particular determinations, that is, asserting the ruler is moral, is important in terms of constituting a principle of legitimacy around which all subordinate segments can gather. While the essence of this principle is the opinion of the people about the legitimacy of the ruler, the subject of this principle emerges as a strata of religious experts (ulama and *sūfis*) who can express these opinions or educate/influence the ruler so that ruler can comply with the said legitimacy criteria. The fact that these two groups, who present themselves as the social representatives of the idea of moral righteousness, have moral leaders who will replace the spokespersons of the social opposition in the final analysis, forms the basis for them to become a pressure group that has an implicit or explicit effect on the ruler. In this respect, the demands of the representatives of the idea of religious/moral righteousness that the ruler be 'just to himself' also means that the ruler is tried to be included in a certain moral discipline. Thus, an area has emerged where those who monopolize the codes, philosophy and practices of this moral discipline can exercise their power. The method in question is not limited to Ottoman or Islamic political discourse, even in a Buddhist text such as the *Suvarnabhāsa Sūtra*, the writing of which is dated around the 4th century. In this text, there are statements suggesting that the 'king of men' should behave respectfully in front of the priest (*bhikshu*) who preaches the dharma in order to achieve peace, breadth, dominance, security, prosperity, and listen and learn the religious text without arrogance, pride, self-conceit (Kaya, 2020, pp. 39-40). Such statements are generally constructed to legitimize the intellectual-moral

effects of the ulama/priests/religious officials over the rulers. For example, Tursun Beg (1977, p. 28) puts the group in question to the fore, while suggesting, in the words of Mahmud Pasha, that the best morality for rulers is to stay close to the ulama members and sheikhs - and thus to achieve happiness in both worlds. In this framework, while Tursun Beg describes Bayezid II as a ruler who revives religious sciences and increases justice day by day, thus, he associates the notion justice and ulama. Moreover, as Demir (2020, pp. 17-18) states, it cannot be considered a coincidence that the two indicated epistemic communities that were dominant between the 14th and 16th centuries were at the center of this discourse. It should be added that social groups that have a function in ensuring justice, including these two groups, can also be effective on the ruler. In his work titled *Selâtinname*, Kemal names these groups as “keepers of the justice [tm]” (2001, pp. 101, 107) and includes the Ottoman gatekeepers in this group by using the phrase “they are the ones who carry out the justice of the ruler [tm]”.

First of all, let’s try to determine the place of the notion of ‘being just to oneself’ in Ottoman political thought. Although this notion is based on the ideal of ‘the faculties of mind have to be harmonious’ in ancient Greek philosophy, both in the search for Stoic and Epicurean *ataraxia* in Hellenistic thought as well as the Christian belief that Augustine (2019, p. 112) formulated around the 4th century, “internal justice is to obey the decrees of God [tm]”, and finally manifests itself in Islamic thought. Keskintaş (2017, p. 137) formulates this notion as the manifestation of justice in the individual sphere and underlines that both Aristotelian and Islamic approaches on this issue are included in the Ottoman political thought literature. While the Aristotelian approach focuses on the forces of the soul and the middle justice created accordingly, the Islamic approach focuses on the practical value of providing unity and peace in oneself and in the world (Keskintaş, 2017, p. 137). It is seen that these two approaches are more or less intertwined, while the first one is used in developing practical suggestions, the second one lays the ground for the theological justification of the morality of ruler.

The first discussion on this subject takes place in Hüsameddin Amâsî’s book *Mirâtu'l-Mülûk*. Amâsî (2016, p. 243) argues that human beings’s adhesion to Allah’s right and trying to fulfill this right is a part of justice. In order to achieve this goal, a person must try to be a virtuous person and overcome the diseases of his soul. Amâsî (2016, pp. 253-85) evaluates ignorance, wrath, fear of death, sadness and jealousy as the evils of the soul that need to be corrected. According to him, to the extent that these impulses of the soul are eliminated with knowledge, moderation and philanthropy,

reduction of worldly passions, contentment and emulation, one's justice towards himself and some of his responsibilities towards God are fulfilled. For example, the moral qualities demanded by Amâsî do not have a purpose limited to ensuring that the ruler attains purely subjective goodness and divine mercy. Beyond the subjective domain, having these moral qualities is expected to have a positive outcome in terms of objective power relations. Şeyhoğlu Mustafa clarifies the problem of objective expectations in his work named *Kenz'ül-Küberâ ve Mehek'ül-'ulemâ*. According to Şeyhoğlu Mustafa (2013, p. 70), the relationship between the monarch and the country is an instrumental relationship, and the monarch can use the country and the reign to “give the soul's desire and enjoy the taste of lust [tm]”. In this case, giving a moral formation to the self of the ruler indirectly becomes a political issue. Tursun Beg (1977, p. 15) argues that the supremacy of rulers was not bestowed upon them by God in order to greedily collect treasure and jewels, increase his army and gain wealth and power, deceived by their delicious tastes. In this framework, the extent and moral limits of the instrumental relationship between the ruler and his subjects are problematized. The criterion of this relationship is the direct reproduction of power because, according to a famous saying, “melik-i bi-adl paydar olmaz”⁹³⁵ (Tursun, 1977, p. 18). In this expression, Tursun Beg (1977, p. 17) does not use the term justice only in the sense of social relations at the macro level, because he evaluates justice as a type of virtue and finds the content of this virtue in moderation and balance (*adl ü insaf*). Thus, he establishes a direct relationship between the reproduction of power and the subjective morality of the ruler. It is possible to observe this connection in Amâsî's propositions as well. Amâsî (2016, p. 251) argues that due to the ugliness/evil (*rezilet*) of the soul, worldly and otherworldly affairs are corrupted, and turmoil (*fesâd* and *ihtilal*) occurs. Similarly, Sinan Pasha (2013, pp. 720-22) argues that the ruler can correct (*ıslah*) the people to the extent that he corrects his own self, and thus the loyalty of those under his rule will increase, he will gain the consent of the people, those under his rule will obey the ruler's orders, and will gain prestige and value in the eyes of the people. Moreover, İdrîs-i Bitlisî, in his book named *Kanûn-ı Şahensahî*, states that the rulers' obedience to divine orders will bring justice and equity to the country and will protect “the property and the sultanate from oppression and encroachment [tm]” (as cited in Öztürk, 2017, p. 357). As a result, it is considered necessary for the ruler to have moral qualities, that is,

⁹³⁵ An unjust ruler cannot stay on the throne.

to have the notion of justice inherent in his personality, to reproduce the social order materially and spiritually (by consent, dignity, etc.).

The demand for the individual justice of the ruler necessarily leads to two separate interconnected doors. The first of these is general justice in order to protect the social order, while the second is “special justice required for its own private subjects and those in the circle of sultanate [tm]” (Öztürk, 2017, p. 363). The issue of general justice will be discussed in the next section. It is clear that this second element, defined as ‘special justice’, which İdris-i Bitlisi deems necessary for “officers in the quotation were given in the introduction of this subsection, is seen especially crucial for the members of the state bureaucracy and the ulama. This second element, which means both an assurance against arbitrary punishments and an identity politics in terms of protecting and recognizing social status, is the subject of the works of Sinan Pasha, Muhyiddin el-Kâfiyeci and Tursun Beg. Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 724) advises the ruler to take care of everyone according to their values and rank and not to punish them unjustly. Similarly, Muhyiddin el-Kâfiyeci (2018, p. 52) in his work named *Seyfü'l-Müluk ve'l-Hükkam* states that a part of justice is justice in words and that according to this type of justice, the duty of the ruler is “not to address a person who is superior in virtue with the style you use when addressing a lower person, and to a scholar as used to an ignorant person [tm]”. El-Kâfiyeci (2018, p. 54) completes the concept of ‘justice in words’ with the advice of ‘justice in deeds’ and advises the ruler not to punish unjustly and not to get angry. In this context, Tursun Beg (1977, p. 19) advises the ruler to be prudent and to restrain his power in times of anger and make his forgiveness prevail. In this regard, Tursun Beg (1977, p. 26) even criticizes Mehmet II’s behavior through the words of the Grand Vizier Mahmud Pasha and claims that the sultan’s wrath prevailed over his temper. Pointing out that this is a wrong attitude, he expresses the ideal behavior pattern for the ruler with the following lines (Tursun, 1977, p. 26): “Seni ger öldürem didüm, nideyin/ Sebakat rahmeti ala gazabi”⁹³⁶. As a result, in the works of Sinan Pasha, Tursun Beg and el-Kâfiyeci, the significance of the individual morals and virtues of the ruler is reinterpreted in search of a security and status for the state officials. Especially Sinan Pasha clearly lists the social segments that the ruler should personally act justly and virtuously. According to the Sinan Pasha (2013, pp. 724-45), the ruler is obliged to act in a courteous and fair manner towards the soldiers, the viziers and the *sûfis*. The ruler

⁹³⁶ Thought I'd kill you, but what can I do/ The mercy of being patient removes the wrath.

is expected to be aware of the specific functions of these social segments and their status based on it, and to act kindly as required by these statuses.

When the moral qualities demanded are examined as a whole, it is seen that they form moral repression mechanisms against the action-inducing powers of bodily or mental desires, and thus suppress and pacify the desire to act. For example, Tursun Beg (1977, p. 15) urges the ruler to adopt a dervish morality, almost devoted to worship, by arguing that “sebike-i zikri bute-i fikr ile ateş-i hayrete salıp, halis-ayar i'tikad ihtiyar eyle(...)”⁹³⁷. This is interesting advice because it is seen that many of the strategic moves to reproduce the social power of the ruler are aimed at increasing the power to act. However, contrary to the moral notion attributed to the ruler, it is noticed that this advice reduces and pacifies ruler's power to act. If so, it is possible to think that the absolute purpose of these moral qualities is to obtain an objective gain by reducing the subjective power of action of the ruler, and therefore, it has a tactical nature. Because the political thought of the 15th century, which could not even propose to limit the power of the monarch directly to an institution such as a parliament, representative group or judicial review, could not find any other way out than to connect this function to some subjective-moral principles by using only the field of religious legitimacy. All the writers were discussed, without exception, attribute mildness and religious morality to the ruler as a norm, while they accept the ruler's ability to take drastic measures in necessary situations as legitimate, and instead of denying this, they only make it a secondary quality compared to compliance (*hilm*).

The second title to be discussed in this subsection is devoted to the general-scale formulation of the concept of justice, which aims to reproduce the social formation. It is noticed that the concept of justice in major works of Islamic political thought, without exception, corresponds to a strategic application that is deemed necessary for the ruler to reproduce his power. This approach, which finds its expression in the motto ‘a ruler without religion can stand, but an unjust state cannot live long’, has three important levels. The first of these levels is the rhetorical level that expresses an opinion on an abstract concept of justice by making the general significance of the phenomenon of justice a parable, the second is the factual level that emphasizes the importance of the practices to ensure justice, and the last is the aesthetic level that describes a just country by considering the consequences of justice. All three

⁹³⁷ So, it is necessary to throw the dhikr nugget into the fire of astonishment in the pot of ideas and choose this belief that is purely tuned.

understandings have been developed to ensure that the power relations between the personal and dynastic power of the ruler and other social layers are reproduced in favor of the ruler and class domination in general. This search for reproduction generally evaluates the *reâyâ*, middle status elites and high status elites as the object of justice in accordance with the triple-quadruple social class analyzes made in the sources of political thought. In this distinction, the subject of justice is directly seen as the ruler, and indirectly the ruler himself is placed at the center of this political discourse, instead of the ulama and *qadis* who practically perform justice instead of the ruler. The realization of the results of justice depending on a kind of 'invisible hand' focuses on the general good and the welfare of the people as the subject matter of the description of a just country.

First of all, it is necessary to focus on how the general and abstract concept of justice was formulated in the examples of political thought written in the second half of the 15th century. First, Ottoman political thought conceptualized justice as a necessity, not an arbitrariness, and just behavior as a ground of legitimacy. But much of this conceptualization is devoted to a rhetorical praise to justice and offers little determination of the material content of justice. The presentation of the concept of justice with rhetorical tools takes place in two main themes. The first of these is structured using secular discourse on justice, and the second follows the line of religious mystification. Secular discourse specifically focuses on the argument that justice is essential for the reinforcement of power. For example, Sinan Pasha (2013, pp. 666-68) argues that the sultans cannot have a stronger army than justice, and that justice is the strongest protector of the reign. Similarly, Tursun Beg (1977, pp. 18-19) draws attention to the fact that an unjust ruler cannot remain on his throne, and that the longevity of the state and the power can be gained through justice. Muhyiddin el-Kâfiyeci (2018, p. 62) similarly states that the reign of a cruel ruler cannot be permanent, and that even the Iranians, whose reign has ruled the world for four thousand years, ensure continuity thanks to justice.

In all three examples, it is seen that the concept of justice is directly determined by material social relations and cannot be directly reduced to religious codes. On the other hand, it is interesting that the same authors developed a rhetoric of justice with religious references in the history of Ottoman political thought. To cite a few examples, according to el-Kâfiyeci (2018, p. 52), justice is a religious order made firm by the

orders of the Qur'an.⁹³⁸ el-Kâfiyeci (2018, p. 56) supports this view with hadiths and argues that justice practices are better than religious worship. el-Kâfiyeci (2018, p. 56) refers to three hadiths in this context; (i) "One day's deed of a righteous imam for his people is better than a hundred or fifty years' work of a religious person for his family" (Abu Hurayra), (ii) "An hour of justice is better than a year of worship" (Ibn Sirin), (iii) "He who has authority and acts justly will go to heaven" (Abu Muslim). It is seen that the rhetorical discourse on the necessity of justice, built by el-Kâfiyeci based on religious sources, also covers Sinan Pasha's search for the continuity of power.

Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 704) argues that the reign of unjust rulers will not be long, because a certain period of time is given to a cruel ruler by God, and if the ruler tries to destroy the pillars of the established order and destroy the Sharia, he will be punished by God and deprived of his throne and life: "Fi'l-cümle padişah-ı zalime imhal olunur/ Ta şuna deđin ki erkan-ı imareti bozmak isteye/ Ve sultan-ı cabire müsamaha kılınır/ Ta ona deđin ki bünyan-ı şeriatı yıkmak isteye /O vakitte kayyim-i alem gayrete gelir, onu ihlak eder/ Veyahud irha-yı inan edip o memleketi helak eder".⁹³⁹ In these lines, Sinan Pasha has dealt with two aspects of what will happen when justice is abolished. First, he accepted a historical fact by expressing the idea that oppressive rulers were in power for a while, and that God gave them a respite until they crossed a certain limit. Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 704) dared to present a historical experience based on factual foundations in terms of justice-oppression duality, by asking himself a question that "many oppressive rulers lived for a long time, but many just rulers died in a short time [tm]". As Tulum (2014, p. 19-25) points out, it can be argued that features such as skepticism, criticality and rationality that appear from time to time in Sinan Pasha's thought are effective in this proposition. However, Sinan Pasha's response to this contradiction always suggests that whether a cruel ruler's life is taken away by God or not, alternatively, God's wrath can be fulfilled by "turning the country into a mass [tm]". On the other hand, since this second/indirect path taken by Sinan Pasha corresponds to an uprising or loss of power in the final analysis, divine punishment is synonymous with a worldly outcome. This conclusion of Sinan Pasha is not surprising. As summarized in the previous chapters, the view that rulers are on earth as the shadow of God, with a

⁹³⁸ He gives such examples: Qur'an (3:104, 3:110 and 16:90).

⁹³⁹ In short, time is given to the oppressive sultan/ Until he wants to overthrow the pillars of the established order/ And the overbearing sultan is tolerated/ Until he wants to demolish the Sharia building/ That's when the god who holds the reins of the universe comes to the fore, takes his life/ Or he puts his reins and turns the country into a mess.

direct divine assignment, essentially internally combines negative or positive phenomena that arise in the secular administrative process and the notion of religious legitimacy. In this case, the right to reign is originally entrusted to the ruler independently of justice, but since the material reproduction of the rulership is directly dependent on justice, the loss of justice means the loss of both divine grace and earthly power. Thus, in the last instance, the loss of the rulership becomes the only concrete reference point from which God's decision can also be understood. If this conclusion is evaluated in reverse, striving not to lose the reign can also be considered as the continuation of divine privileges.

The view expressed by Tursun Beg (1977, p. 25) as “şükr-i saltanat alemiyana addür”⁹⁴⁰ can be interpreted in this context as the reign is given from a divine source, and justice consists of a series of secular practices carried out in a way that means gratitude for this ‘blessing’. In parallel with this view, el-Kâfiyeci (2018, p. 64) underlines that the ruler's insistence on oppression is a behavior that “changes God's blessing and accelerates the punishment that will be replaced it [tm]”. This view is common in the historical sources of the period. For example, Kemal includes the following couplets in his work named *Selâtinname* (2001, p. 82): “Şeh olan kıla gerek ‘adl ü dadı/ Ki halkun muhkem ola i’tikadı/ Zulm kılmağı terk ide cihanda/ Sever anun gibi şahı cihan da/ Ki zalim zulm kılsa görür afet/ Koparur başına Allah kıyamet”.⁹⁴¹ While making just decisions in these couplets enables the ruler to obtain the belief of the people and the love/consent of the ruler, injustice leads to a divine punishment. Thus, both the religious and worldly contexts of the concept of justice are brought into a whole. Thus, a religious interpretation including material facts has been developed between the transfer of worldly power to the ruler and its loss. In this framework, the concept of justice is formulated as both a religious and a secular responsibility, and injustice manifests itself primarily in worldly outcomes, as can be observed at the factual level. Worldly consequences can be listed as the loss of the throne or life of the ruler. However, these results do not mean that the unjust ruler is free from eternal punishment, as it is seen in el-Kâfiyeci. Thus, the rhetoric developed on justice converges on the judgment that the ruler is responsible both secular and religious regard.

⁹⁴⁰ The gratitude of the kingdom is to offer justice to the world.

⁹⁴¹ The ruler must offer justice and goodness/ For the people to have firm belief in him/He should stop making oppression in the world/ The whole world loves a ruler like him/ If the cruel person makes an oppression, he will suffer disaster / Allah will break the doomsday for him.

After discussing the rhetorical construction of the concept of justice, it would now be appropriate to examine the examples of political thought that deal with how the concept of justice becomes operational at the factual level. The primary factual determination of the concept of justice is 'order'. Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 742) sees justice as an essential part of the phenomenon of administration in his thought that he formulated as "Padişahlar nizam için konulur/ Ve nizam dahi adl ile bulunur".⁹⁴² Similarly, Tursun Beg (1977, p. 18) stated that the implementation of justice will lead to the maintenance of the established order by finding its consistency: "(...) iltizam-ı tarika-i adl (...) mucib-i kıvam-ı intizam-ı alemiyan olur".⁹⁴³ In addition, Tursun Beg (1977, p. 18) makes a sociological analysis that relates justice to administration. He states that even the socially excluded segments have the phenomenon of administration in themselves and therefore they need justice (1977, p. 18): "(...) temamet-i tavayif-i muhtelifle adle muhtacdur. Mesela, uğrılar ve yol basıcılar ve erbab-ı müşatarat ve gayruhüm aralarında bir mümtaz şahs olup, 'eddi külle zi-hakkın hakkahu' emrini ikamet itmeyince bir gün işleri muntazam olmaz. Belki esbab-ı mürafakat müfarakate mübeddel olur"⁹⁴⁴. Thus, Tursun Beg bases the need for justice on the basis of the universality of the phenomenon of administration, making it an essential feature of living in a society. This is a decisive judgment, because the privilege of the authority to give justice as an administrative authority is thus made inherent in the concept of justice. In this framework, it is formulated as a whole that living in a society requires justice, and providing justice requires elites or authorities. When this scheme is applied to stratified social formations, it can be hypothetically said that the function of providing justice is indirectly used to legitimize the existence of social strata. In this respect, justice acts as a two-way lever to ensure the hierarchical order in a stratified/classified society. The first is to keep society together by concluding particular social conflicts, and the second is to preserve the social hierarchy. It can be seen this second aspect more clearly in the theories on the 'circle of justice', because the need for the concentration of military and financial power to provide justice indirectly depends on an ideal of social peace that ensures social stratification. Moreover, the fact that the justice function

⁹⁴² Rulers arise for order/ And even order is established with justice.

⁹⁴³ The necessity of the way of justice is that the worlds must find order and consistency.

⁹⁴⁴ All diverse communities are in need of justice. For example, thieves, bandits, those who share a common value, and others among others, find a distinguished person and don't do things right one day, unless they act in accordance with the command to give every right to its owner, maybe the reason for coming together will turn into a dispersal.

requires the administration, imposes political alienation because it compels the state (or at least a hierarchical authority) as a third party in the solution of social problems.

In this context, it may be more explanatory to consider the concrete aspects of the concept of justice in Ottoman political thought. First of all, it is possible to identify two different concrete aspects of the concept of justice in political texts and these could be denominated as general and specific aspects. The general view consists of the embodiment of political and economic relations on a strategic line designed to maintain the balance between social classes/strata. According to el-Kâfiyeci (2018, p. 52) a ruler is responsible for ensuring justice by using three mediums in the general plan as such: (i) words, (ii) goods and (iii) actions. The specific content covered in these titles will be discussed later. In general, these three titles correspond to (i) status relations, (ii) distribution patterns and (iii) judicial functions and aim to reproduce the social hierarchy in favor of a ruler. This search for reproduction arises from the need to strategically preserve a triple social divide. According to this distinction, there is a dominant hierarchy exist in the society where the ruler is at the top, the rentier strata (in other words sub-branches of ruling class) under him and the *reâyâ* below them. The ruler should be able to use the loyalty of the people against the elite by using the justice function and should be able to separate the high-status groups from the ‘ordinary’ people within the framework of their social status. The principle put forward by Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 743) in this regard is that if the ruler loses both two groups under him, he will lose the country as well: “Her melik ki cevr eder evliyasına ve raiyyetine/ Hemin ianet eder zeval-i mülküne ve devletine”.⁹⁴⁵ Moreover, Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 624) stipulates that the weak should not be oppressed by the strong and that the ‘honorable’ should be protected against the ‘degenerate’ in order to maintain a balance between the three social strata.

The first step of this strategy lies in gaining the trust of the people despite the elite, thanks to the fair practices of the monarch. el-Kâfiyeci lays out this strategy quite clearly in his lines addressing the ruler as follows (2018, p. 64):

Let your favorite works be the most balanced in fairness, the most comprehensive in justice and the ones that will ensure the satisfaction of the people in the most successful way. For, while the anger of the general public erodes the satisfaction

⁹⁴⁵ Every ruler who torments his protectors and subjects/ He also serves to destroy his government and state.

of the elite, the anger of the elites in the face of the general public's satisfaction is negligible. [tm]

Muhyiddin el-Kâfiyeci argues that the quantitative majority of the people should be preferred to the qualitative privilege of the elites, and states that in this way a general rebellion can be prevented, and the discontent of the elites will become manageable. In Tursun Beg (1977, p. 19), the politics to be carried out regarding the elites are defined in more detail. Tursun Beg, argues that a specific segment of the elite in the society will not be satisfied only through justice and that the ruler should add another quality to justice. Tursun Beg's proposition is as follows (1977, p. 19):

(...) havâss-ı ibâd mümkindür ki mücerred adl ile râzî olalar; ammâ evsât-ı umûm metâmi'ü metâmiheri iktizâsı ile dilerler ki, akrân arasında ba'zı ba'zından imtiyâz hâsıl ideler. Ve mahz-ı adl ile bu ma'nâ mütemeşşi olmaz, illâ inzımâm-ı fazl ile ki, netâyic-i hilmdendür. (...) Pes çün pâdişâh-ı halîm ü âdil mahall ü makâma münâsib bi-kaderi mâ yenbagî iş buyursa, ve fazl kapularından ifâzat-ı ihsân itse, bu emr ayn-i hikmet olur ki, âmme-i re'âyâ ve kâffe-i berâyâ harûr-ı cevri-i dehri anunla teskîn iderler.⁹⁴⁶

If Tursun Beg's words are to be analyzed, it is seen that he first divides the society into three sections (*havass*, *evsat-ı umum* and *reâyâ*). The segment that he coined with the term '*havass-ı ibad*' means 'elite servants', but it can also be read as religiously distinguished people who are the 'elite' of the worshipers. According to Tursun Beg, this group is the people who are 'possible' to consent to an abstract justice. Even if their unequivocal consent is not claimed by the author, it can be assumed that this possibility stems from their virtues/morality, since this group is also availed to being positioned as the religious elite, it is likely that the author ascribes an ideal qualification to them. The second group is called '*evsat-ı umum*' and this term can be interpreted as the middle class. Tursun Beg states that social struggles are taking place among the middle class, mostly due to economic reasons, and since this segment demands that some people or groups be privileged among equals, an abstract justice is not sufficient for them. In this

⁹⁴⁶ Mere justice is enough for the elite to be satisfied; but the middle class in the society, because of their excessive desire and greed to seize, wish for some of them to be privileged among their peers, and therefore only justice is not enough, and the desired result can only be achieved with the inclusion of grace from the works of gentleness. In this case, if the gentle and just sultan does a proper and worthy work and spreads goodness from the doors of grace, what he does will be wisdom itself, and all the people and all the elites will remove the burning of the troubles of time with it.

context, a material justice, that is, the geometric distribution of justice is recommended. At this point, Tursun Beg proposes that a ruler should not suppress the quest for privilege but respond with grace and sees this as a result of patience. Since the concept of '*hilm*' means 'gentleness' and the term '*fazl*' means 'beneficence, grace, generosity', it is clear that he meant the granting of privileges by ruler. In the last lines of this statements as had quoted above, Tursun Beg states that it would be more appropriate for a ruler to bestow favors on both the *reâyâ* and the *berâyâ*, and establishes a balance mechanism that will ensure social peace. To give a concrete example, Kivâmî (2018, p. 544) states that, as an indicator of Bayezid II's justice, the ruler donated a property and a village to the sanjak begs of Anatolia and Rumelia, and that he bestowed favors on other officers and *sipâhîs* according to their social position. As a result, conducting a policy appropriate to their social position among these segments ensures an order in which the ruler can be placed in the first place of the social hierarchy.

Secondly, it is necessary to deal with the specific and concrete aspects of the concept of justice in Ottoman political thought. As it is mentioned before, Muhyiddin el-Kâfiyeci made a triple distinction that facilitates the examination of the specific and concrete aspects in question. According to el-Kâfiyeci (2018, p. 52), the ruler is obliged to provide justice by using (i) words, (ii) goods and (iii) actions. These three titles, which correspond to (i) status relations, (ii) distribution patterns and (iii) judicial functions in the general plan, can be divided into two main branches: (a) providing concrete justice in economic relations and (b) providing concrete justice in political relations. In terms of both titles, the provision of justice mostly requires either the application of *fiqh* principles or compliance with moral conventions.

First of all, it would be appropriate to examine the concrete propositions that formulated within the scope of the term justice when the economic relations are mentioned. El-Kâfiyeci puts forward two significant criteria in this regard. The first of these criteria is in the field of law of obligations, and the second is in the field of public finance. According to el-Kâfiyeci (2018, p. 78), administrators should "treat equally between two borrowers, should not give privileges to either of them, and should not have the desire to justify someone because of matters such as kinship, friendship or power [tm]". In these expressions, it is clearly seen that the notion of justice in goods/riches means that there is no privilege in favor of the ruler or administrators in commercial relations. İdrîs-i Bitlisî, on the other hand, recommends that the duty of the ruler to develop the country's trade and the flow of money/wealth to the country is to

ensure road maintenance and safety, as well as to regulate justly the taxes to be levied on the merchants and the fixed price policy (*narh*) (Uğur, 2001, p. 99).

Secondly, Muhyiddin el-Kâfiyeci (2018, p. 54) defines the justice of a ruler in goods/riches as taking from the public as much as necessary and delivering the goods to the deserved ones. There are two main aspects to this formulation. The first aspect is the emphasis on the proportionality of taxation. İdrîs-i Bitlisî states that the ruler should take “taxes from the people in proportion to their solvency [tm]” and advises that taxes be collected when the crop is plentiful (Uğur, 2001, p. 99). Similarly, Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 624) emphasizes the same point while advising the ruler to act justly, not to persecute anybody and own property that he does not deserve, and not to dominate people other than his slaves. Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 628) determines the limit of the goods that a ruler can obtain based on Islamic criteria: “Ahmaktır o kişi ki hakkı olmadığını alıp hakkı olmayana verir/ Verdiğinin sevabı olmaz, aldığıının ikabı kalır”.⁹⁴⁷ The word ‘*ikap*’, as it means torment, indicates torment due to a sin. Sinan Pasha states that if a ruler acquires property through religiously illegitimate ways, even if he distributes this property to third party people, he will not be able to get rid of his guilt. El-Kâfiyeci (2018, p. 92) discussed in detail what kind of income a ruler had a right to get, and he listed them as tribute of *land* and *mukasseme*, *jizya*, *fay*, *zakat* and booty.

The second aspect is that ruler’s right to levy taxes, which is accepted as legitimate to the extent that the distribution of these taxes is done in accordance with the rules. According to Islamic law, it is generally clear where the taxes given to a ruler should be spent. For example, in a *siyâsetnâme* named *Tuhfettü't-Türk*, written by et-Tarsûsî, four basic items were identified in the expenditure of taxes and goods transferred to the treasury. These are as follows (et-Tarsûsî, 2018, pp. 102-4): (i) one-fifth booty, tithe and zakat income should be given to the wayfarer, the poor and the needy; (ii) kharaj, jizya and taxes collected from non-Muslim merchants should be spent on *ghazis*, border warriors, *qadis*, *ihtisap* officers (bazaar police), muftis, and public works (masjid, fortress, water canal, etc.), (iii) unclaimed estates should be spent on the needs of administrators, burial expenses, needs of sick people, widows’ dowry, (iv) found goods can be given to poors as alms and can be spent for the common benefit of society. As can be seen, in et-Tarsûsî’s fiscal division, there is no item for the private expenditures of the monarch, and in general, taxes are reserved for public benefit. For

⁹⁴⁷ He is a fool who takes what he has no right and gives to those who do not have the right/ What he gives has no reward, what he takes will be tormented.

example, the issue that the ruler should help the people in case of natural disasters was included in *Kanûn-i Şahenşahî* (Uğur, 2001, p. 99). In this context, el-Kâfiyeci (2018, pp. 82-84) stated that the ruler should provide money and food aid to the people in times of famine and in cases of price increase by citing from al-Ghazali's book named *Tuhfetu's-Süluk fi Nasihati'l-Muluk*, and stated that aid-based expenditures were extraordinary item of expense.

However, it is doubtful to what extent both et-Tarsûsî's and el-Kâfiyeci's propositions, which outweighed with Islamic formalism, were valid for the Ottoman state. For example, in the study of the booty law named *Hallu İşkali'l-efkar fi Hilli Emvali'l-Kuffar*, written by Prince Korkud (2013, p. 130), it was expressed over the issue of the distribution of slaves and concubines that there was no legitimate sharing of booty in the Ottoman state according to Islamic criteria. In fact, Prince Korkud demanded that the allowance to be given to him when he retired to Antalya Castle in order to deal with religious sciences should be included in the tax revenue, which he considered halal (Köksal, 2016, p. 240). This demand of Prince Korkud reveals his opinion that the Ottoman treasury establishment is in a doubtful state in terms of provisions of *fiqh* and that the legitimacy of the allocation taken from there cannot be trusted. Of course, it has to do with the fact that Korkud's view is largely based on Shafi'i school of *fiqh* in the theoretical context, but it cannot be claimed that his criticism in general is completely unjustified in Hanafi school, because in the division of et-Tarsûsî that is quoted above, according to Hanafi jurisprudence that the ulama should receive a share of the tribute and jizya income.

The second issue that needs to be addressed when considering the concrete aspects of the notion of justice in Ottoman political thought is the provision of justice in political relations, including the judiciary and social status. Let us first consider the issue of jurisdiction. First of all, the fact that the rulers directly listen to the problems of the people and have the authority to judge is a feature encountered in many historical examples from Western European feudalism to Islamic states and Turkish-Mongolian social organization. İnalçık (2019j, p. 159) is of the opinion that the right to apply directly to the ruler and the privilege of the ruler to handle and adjudicate the judicial cases constitute a special interpretation of justice, which is considered one of the main principles of the "Middle Eastern state and government system [tm]". Kanar (2019b, p. 37) states that this practice, called '*Dîvân-ı Mezâlim*', was applied during the period of four caliphs, and although it was not seen to the same extent during the Umayyad period,

it became widespread again during the Abbasid State. Köksal (2016, pp. 54-55) states that Islamic political theorists such as al-Mawardi, al-Maqrizi and Ibn Farhoun have established a parallelism between the practice of *Dîvân-ı Mezâlim* and the Shari' politics (*siyâset-i şer'îyye*). Accordingly, Köksal (2016, pp. 54-55) notes that in terms of the use of political power, this practice is understood as equivalent to customary rule in Egyptian and Syrian Mamluk Turks, and in this context, it is seen as equivalent to "investigating the atrocities of political authorities [tm]". As an example, Nizam'ül-Mülk (2018, pp. 17-18) considered this issue as an obligation for the rulers to make an unmediated judgment by establishing the *Dîvân-ı Mezâlim* two days a week. Nizam'ül-Mülk (2018, pp. 17-18) states that the execution of the judicial function without an intermediary is seen even among the Sassanid state, and that the method of building wooden plane on horseback is applied so that the intermediaries/*hajibs* and officials cannot prevent the complaints from being submitted to the ruler. Çiçek (1998, p. 418) draws attention to the fact that the methods of *Dîvân-ı Mezâlim* were applied in most periods and that they were considered as the minimum condition for political legitimacy.

It is seen that this issue was frequently touched upon in Ottoman political thought. For example, İdrîs-i Bitlisî mentions that it is a fair practice for the rulers to accept the complaints of the people through the gatekeepers and viziers, but he does not find this sufficient and recommends both using secret spies and listening to the complaints of the people directly two days a week (Uğur, 2001, p. 100). El-Kâfiyeci (2018, p. 88) states that rulers have the authority to make judgments and they can use this authority in cases related to property and life matters and make judgments about personal rights. It is the principle of justice that the ruler does not punish anyone innocently while using this authority and does not forgive anyone who does not repent sincerely (el-Kâfiyeci, 2018, p. 54). Tursun Beg (1977, p. 25) considers that the rulers' healing to the oppressed by the law of justice (*kanun-ı 'adl*) is a blessing for his own health. However, how a ruler will use his jurisdiction is also a matter of discussion. El-Kâfiyeci (2018, p. 88) argues that the ruler himself should strictly follow the case and evidence procedures in the *fiqh* books while performing judicial activities, provided that he is authorized to give a verdict, and gives detailed information about the court procedures in this context. Köksal (2016, p. 163) is of the opinion that el-Kâfiyeci wrote his information about the trial procedures in order to "adhere to the basic judicial principles determined by the Sharia for all qadis and not abuse his office by resorting to illegality if the sultan wishes

to render a judgment in person in the court [tm]”. In this context, Sinan Pasha considers science (*ilm*) and reason as necessary guides for the realization of justice in practice. According to Sinan Pasha (2013, p. 560), reason is a groom, justice is a guard, and knowledge is a tool that prevents oppression. In these evaluations, while bringing reason and science to the fore in ensuring justice, there is a direct pursuit of *fiqh* principles and indirectly a search for moral maturity in which a ruler can put his individual interests in the background. Thus, it is tried to ensure that the cultural formation of a ruler develops under the expertise of the ulama members.

If the Ottoman sources, in which the concept of *Dîvân-ı Mezâlim* are seen, are examined, it is an interesting picture become prominent. In the literature, while the practice of *Dîvân-ı Mezâlim* is evaluated as necessary to ensure justice, it is seen that the customs that form the basis of this practice, which are based on the meeting of the ruler and the subjects in the public sphere, have weakened relatively in this period. For example, it was accepted as a standard practice for the ruler to pray separately from the public for the first time during the reign of Mehmet II, but interestingly, there is no information about this decision in the *siyâsetnâmes*. KIVILCIMLI (2007, p. 128) draws attention to another earlier example. There is a popular narrative -which KIVILCIMLI indicates- about the reign of Bayezid I that the ruler was warned by Sheikh Emir Sultan for not attending the worship together with the people. However, this early example is widespread known, its meaning is not clear enough.

According to Çoruh (195?, p. 155), this incident developed as follows: After the opening of Great Mosque of Bursa, Bayezid I asks Emir Sultan if there is anything deficient in the new mosque and Emir Sultan responds that there are need for four taverns on all sides. When the ruler, angered by this answer, demanded that he should explain the meaning of the words, Emir Sultan offered the following explanation: “If four taverns were built for you at the four corners of the mosque, it would be an excuse for you to come to the mosque and you get a mansion for drinking with your friends [tm]” (Çoruh, 195?, p. 155). The issue that is criticized here is not the fact that the ruler does not come to the mosque, but his drinking habits. However, the meaning of the alienating practice that emerged during the reign of Mehmet II is different in character from this example. Emecen (2019a, p. 176) states that Mehmet II separated himself from the people and the ulama and placed them above them by implementing the ‘*hunkâr mahfili*’. According to Emecen (2019a, p. 176), this practice is part of the sultan’s quest to abstract his power by raising himself to a transcendent status. The fact

that Mehmet II placed himself in an invisible position both in the *Diwan* and in the mosque can also be interpreted in connection with his search for controlling the public image of the ruler.⁹⁴⁸ The exercise and legitimation of power, as formulated by Balandier (2021, pp. 1, 4-5, 36), requires the use of images and theatricality. In this respect, controlling the situations where the ruler is in the *Diwan* or the mosque and shaping it with various procedures also means a public image control. Kıvılcımlı conducts a much more refined analysis on this issue. According to Kıvılcımlı (2007, p. 127), the fact that various social segments pray together, and the ruler is among them constitutes a kind of democratic control mechanism.⁹⁴⁹ In this respect, the abolition of the tradition of being together with subjects during religious ceremonies is a symbolic indication that the ruler placed himself above other social strata. On the other hand, it is seen that some objections have arisen from within the political thought against this new practice.

For example, the anonymous *siyâsetnâme* to Bayezid II, summarized by Kavak (2019a, p. 206), criticizes the absolute segregation of a ruler from the people and states that “allowing the common people to enter his presence at certain times by a ruler [tm]” will break the monopoly of the gatekeepers and the viziers on the information resources. The anonymous author of the work advises the ruler to go among the people on Friday prayers and listen to their complaints, and make judgments by holding public meetings (Kavak, 2019a, p. 206). Another example is in the anonymous chronicle published by Giese. According to the story in the anonymous chronicle (Giese, 1992, p. 108-9) there was a tower pillar located under the Istanbul Eğrikapı. There was a pavilion on this tower in ancient times and a just ruler lived there. This ruler had chains attached to a marble pole near the tower and had one end of these chains tied to his own pavilion. If there was a person who was persecuted among the people, he would come and tell the ruler, if he could not find the ruler, he would shake these chains. Noticing the shaking of the chains, the ruler would go out and listen to the complaint of the persecuted person

⁹⁴⁸ A similar situation is seen in the disappearance of practices such as the ruler's participation in public feasts and showing himself to the soldiers every day after Bayezid II. For detailed information, see: Necipoğlu (2007, pp. 43-46).

⁹⁴⁹ It is clear that this practice is also related to the appellate function, which is based on the direct acceptance of the applications of the people by the monarchs. For example, while the anonymous author of the Arabic work *Raka'ik al-hilel fi Dakaik al-Hiyal* criticizes the ruling style of Nevadarac the king of Iran, he states that he was an arrogant person, that no one could raise his voice against him when he passed through the people, and that he could not call out even if he was a “victim of injustice” (Khawam, 2011, p. 296).

(Giese, 1992, p. 109). In this story, the anonymous historian both praises the ruler as ‘just’ and emphasizes several times that the rulers should listen directly to the complaints. According to the anonymous author (Giese, 1992, p. 109), the ruler listens to every complaint himself, does not respect the officials who convey the news to him, and says “if they do oppression, it will me torment for me in the hereafter [tm]” as the reason for his practice. It is clear that the author of the anonymous chronicle, while telling this story, indirectly points to the reader the significance of a direct justice mechanism similar to the *Dîvân-ı Mezâlim*.⁹⁵⁰

In fact, there are examples in the sources where these advice may have gained reality in some way. For example, as reported by the Venetian Sanuto in his *Diarii*, a letter of complaint was sent to the sultan during a Friday prayer attended by Bayezid II in May 1506, describing the greed and injustices of the Grand Vizier Mustafa Pasha, and this event had an impact on his disgrace (Reidl, 2014, p. 236). It is widely accepted as a political strategy to keep the direct judicial channels known as *Dîvân-ı Mezâlim* or *Ayak Divanı* open between the rulers and the subjects in the imperial regimes. The scene above, which shows that Bayezid II also recognizes the right of direct application of the persecuted ones and personally evaluates this case, should be considered within this framework. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to think that Bayezid II’s political approach was to completely nullify the real hierarchy between the ruling class and the people, or to act against the ‘honour of the sultan’. However, this direct connection between the people and the ruler should not be regarded as a social relationship that eliminates class differences. Bayezid II’s couplet in his *diwan*, which he wrote under the pen name Adlî, stating that the servants are not even worthy of praising the ruler: “Bendeye layık degüldür eylemek sultanı medh”.⁹⁵¹ This is an example that shows how the ruler internalizes the class distinction, and sheds light on the world of mentality of class-domination.

Finally, it is necessary to focus on the problem of how the issue of social status, which was briefly mentioned above, finds a response in the notion of justice. It is seen that the issue of social status in Islamic political thought is a source of an understanding

⁹⁵⁰ It is also possible that this argument has a particular *fiqh* background. In the view of the Hanafi sect, whether to accept the testimony of state officials (and informants) is an issue that is subject to debate. For example, in *et-Tehsil* the *fiqh* work of Sheikh Bedreddin, it is argued that the testimony of civilians working on behalf of the ruler in favor of state officials is unacceptable (Dadaş, 2018, p. 251).

⁹⁵¹ Praising the sultan is not worthy of slaves. See: Adlî (2018, p. 53).

of justice in terms of both judicial practices and addresses and etiquette practices. For example, el-Kâfiyeci (2018, p. 52) argues that the rulers should be just in their words, and as a way to do this, he shows that the style he uses when addressing people is arranged according to the social status, virtue and goodness/evils of the person addressed. In this respect, it is an important issue that the status of the social segment that engages in criminal behavior as well as the size of the crime constitutes a criterion in the implementation of *ta'zîr* (reprimand, condemnation) punishments in Hanafi *fiqh*. As Köksal (2016, p. 127) states, the penalty of *ta'zîr* to be applied to the ulama and sayyids, whom Hanafi *fiqh* sees as the most elite part of the society, consists only of notification (*al-i'lamu'l-mücerred*), however, a lower part of the elites directly brought to the *qadi* court and reproached to his face, members of middle classes such as tradesmen should be brought to the *qadi* court and prison sentences can be considered appropriate for them, lastly, it is known that the sub-classes known as '*erazil*' be sentenced to beating as well as all these. In this framework, it is seen that a proportional relationship between social status and justice in some specific areas is accepted as the norm. In this context, İdrîs-i Bitlisî defends the principle that punishments change according to social status. According to him (Uğur, 2001, p. 100):

Penalties also vary from person to person. If he is of bad character and stingy, extremism and violence are required in punishing him; If he is one of the enlightened, intelligent and honorable people, the punishments should be mitigated. Because they give up their tastes and desires with a small punishment for self-esteem. Ambitious people endure a lot of humiliation and contempt for a little pleasure. [tm]

İdrîs-i Bitlisî's views reveal very strikingly how social statuses affect justice: The fact that elites can be reformed with a small punishment for their 'self-esteem', it also shows that someone with social status has a high fear of humiliation, that is, they can easily be attached to political power for a small price with the motive of protecting their social status. If this phenomenon is interpreted in reverse, if a person with a high social status is sentenced to be humiliated in public, it is possible that this person will harbor an uncompromising grudge against the administration. And therefore, a ruler must regenerate his power by being 'moderate' in punishment, as the privileged groups is likely to damage the current power structure.

Another issue that should be emphasized is that the protection of the social status of men by the ruler finds its place in political thought as a principle of justice. The patriarchal ideological code that mentions men as superior to women in general,

similar to other Islamic *siyâsetnâmes*, is widely used in Ottoman politics. To give a few examples; the following words of Sinan Pasha in the *Maârifnâme* (2013, p. 670): “Ahlak-ı nisvan padişahlara büyük ayb olur/ Na-gah ziyade ihtihat ile onlardan ahlak kesb olunur”⁹⁵², and following words of İdrîs-i Bitlisî in can be cited (Uğur, 2001, p. 101): “Rulers should not converse with women at the time of consultation. They should not regard them as trustworthy in religious and worldly affairs [tm]”. An interesting example in which this asymmetrical power relationship based on gender discrimination takes place within the notion of social justice, which also concerns the political practices of a ruler, is encountered in İdrîs-i Bitlisî’s work named *Kanûn-i Şahenşahî*. İdrîs-i Bitlisî states that the oppressed people can be patient and even be consoled by the oppressed practices that encroach on the property of the people by the ruler, but that oppression directed at chastity and honor cannot be tolerated. According to İdrîs-i Bitlisî, “violation of chastity is more severe than oppression to property [tm]” (Uğur, 2001, p. 99). Since İdrîs-i Bitlisî cannot be expected to explain the violence directed towards ‘chastity and honor’ with a modern understanding such as human rights and freedoms, the point mentioned in these statements is that the attacks on the chastity and honor will undermine the domination of men over the *oikos* (household), which is the base of men’s privileged social status. Even though they came from different social classes or strata, there was a dominant belief that men had a ‘natural’ and ‘divine’ power over women in Ottoman society. The attack on this area was seen as dangerous in terms of the reproduction of power of men, as it may lead to a crack that is difficult to repair in the social power structure, which is largely organized as a hierarchical brotherhood. The fact that Rum Mehmet Pasha stripped women and children naked during the Karaman campaign is considered as oppression in this context, in the subsection where was discussed the examples of terror from political tactics, is an example of this. To make a comparison, in the political narratives that are an example of the *ghaza* discourse, the rape of non-Muslim women by the soldiers or the enslavement of these people, or the enslavement and sale of children are not expressed negatively.

Finally, within the framework of the concept of justice, it is necessary to examine the aesthetic discourse that describes the situations in which justice is carried out. The main discussion that constitutes the material for this sub-title is whether there was a difference in terms of justice between the periods of Mehmet II and Bayezid II

⁹⁵² Feminine morality would be a shame for sultans/ Too much gathering unnecessarily leads to inheriting the morality of women.

and how this was represented in the political discourse. When the aesthetic discourse on justice developed by the writers of the period is examined, it is understood that the historical period in which such a discourse intensified corresponds to the first years of the reign of Bayezid II after the death of Mehmet II. As it was discussed in the previous chapters, Mehmet II's attempt to gain an absolute regulatory authority over the existing class powers as an extension of his autarkic policy. Also, social reactions to the Mehmet II raises in a series of topics such as the compulsory resettlement policy to Istanbul and the confiscation of *waqf* properties. This has made it necessary for the justice-centered discussions to focus on this period. With the death of Mehmet II, the fact that this period was definitely closed, and this had opened the door for the writers of the period to criticize this period, albeit cautiously. Moreover, the fact that Prince Bayezid resisted Mehmet II's orders regarding the reform on *waqfs* and that officers such as Sinan Pasha and Çandarlı İbrahim Pasha, who were punished during the reign of Mehmet II regained their prestige during the reign of Bayezid II, made these cautious criticisms possible in the final analysis. Moreover, the removal of the figure of Mehmet II, who had an effective charismatic authority due to the conquest of Constantinople, necessitates the replacement of such an authority by the new ruler, and therefore, it is tried to establish a discourse of dual authority of Bayezid II's sainthood on the one hand and about his justice on the other. The claim of 'sainthood' in this discourse will be examined in the previous sections. To briefly mention, Bayezid II is portrayed as a almighty person with miracles in anonymous chronicles, which are thought to be written especially to be read to the public and ordinary soldiers. This discourse must have been developed to replace Mehmet II's charismatic authority. The second form of discourse that will be discussed in this section is about the 'justice' of Bayezid II, and this second form of discourse facilitates the articulation of class power with other ruling classes and strata. Thus, the class articulation pattern that was damaged during the reign of Mehmet II is restored and re-sealed with a religious discourse during the reign of Bayezid II. As will be discussed in the discourse of justice, this situation realizes the restoration in question as a reproduction model in which realist and idealist elements are strategically articulated.

The attribution of the title of justice to Bayezid II should be evaluated as an official strategy in this context. Because it can be seen in the sources that both Bayezid II personally and the writers around the palace embraced this discourse. The fact that Bayezid II chose the pen name Adlî as a poet also reinforces this opinion. For example, Bayezid II describes himself as a just ruler in one of his poems as indicated previous

chapters.⁹⁵³ Similarly, Molla Lütflî wrote in his annotation for his work *er-Risâle fi'l-Ulûmi's-Şer'iyye ve'l-Arabiyye* (Arslan, 2012, p. 111): “What is meant here is Sultan Bayezid b. Sultan Mehmet. Because he is just in a way that no one has been before and no one will ever be [tm]”, he tries to use this discourse as a means of articulation with the ruling circle. Kıvâmî (2018, p. 546) describes Bayezid II as the ruler of the world of justice (*şah-ı cihan-ı adl*), Tursun Beg (1977, p. 17) claims that Bayezid II has the virtue of justice by nature, the author of *Selâtinname* praise of Bayezid II's justice in the *Medh-i Padişahi* section of his work (Öztürk, 2001, p. 12) exemplifies the widespread use of the discourse.

It is possible to identify the examples of the discourse of ‘*Bayezid-i âdil*’ (just Bayezid) in the poems of Kıvâmî's *Fetihname* and Kemal's *Selâtinname*. In both works, the justice of Bayezid II is praised with the help of aesthetic images and symbols, and some criticisms are brought, albeit limited, aimed to the reign of Mehmet II. Kıvâmî (2018, p. 546) declares Bayezid II as a hero of justice and invents twenty-five different images and symbols describing his justice or just administration. If these images and symbols are categorized, it is seen that a significant part of them is met with terms such as star, sky, welkin, heavens, cycle, earth etc. which refer to the cosmic order. For example, according to Kıvâmî, in the reign of Bayezid II, the sky is the guardian of justice at night (2018, p. 548), the ruler's reign is a shadow of justice even if the heavens gather his tent (2018, p. 548), the stars of justice are the ornaments of the sky of reign (2018, p. 550), the beautiful face of the ruler mirrors the sky of justice (2018, p. 550) etc. In addition to cosmic elements, it is seen that Kıvâmî likens justice to vital elements. For example, the justice of Bayezid II is likened to a bone filled with marrow (2018, p. 548), water given to the needy on the migration routes (2018, p. 548) and a safe bird's nest (2018, p. 550). Thus, the imaginary representation of cosmic forces is combined with the symbolic affirmation of life. This formal representation of justice brings together the divine/heavenly imagination of the ruler and real human needs such as life/happiness/peace/security. The concept of justice, which it is defined as a kind of ‘invisible hand’ in the previous pages, thus emerges in the form of such discourse. Secondly, it is seen that the metaphors of justice are concentrated in the field of wealth and prosperity. The justice of Bayezid II in the lines of Kıvâmî is described as a building prospered while in ruins (2018, p. 546), a reused shop when idle (2018, p. 546), a

⁹⁵³ See: Adlı (2018, p. 109): “Canına zulm ü sitem eyleyüben sevdi seni/ ‘Adli’yiçün dimesünler dahı şah-ı ‘adil’”.

wardrobe full of robes (2018, p. 550) and a generous table presented to those who come to the door (2018, p. 552). Complementing the images of wealth, the justice of Bayezid II is also symbolized in the following forms: A flock and caravan stopping at a gate (2018, p. 546), a shepherd (2018, p. 548), a rose garden (2018, p. 552) and a gardener (2018, p. 550). A central point of emphasis in this form of discourse is the relationship between justice and well-being. For example, in the history of Kemâl, this relationship was clearly established and the justice of Bayezid II to make the world prosperous and the people happy (Öztürk, 2001, p. 12). When both forms of discourse are brought together, we encounter the term ‘world of justice’ used by Kivâmî. Kivâmî (2018, p. 546) mentions Bayezid II as the king of the world of justice. From this concept comes the meaning of the ruler of the earthly land where heavenly justice is manifested, and thus the term justice-world constructs an image in which heaven and earth are presented together. Thirdly, it is seen that the justice of Bayezid II is likened to war instruments or war-related subjects. Kivâmî likens Bayezid II’s justice to a bow (2018, p. 548), a baton (2018, p. 548), a spear (2018, p. 548) and a wrestler carrying a heavy mace (2018, p. 548). These images implicitly express that justice needs a refine view of finding the target of the arrow, a function like a stick that keeps people in line, and a courage like a wrestler fighting against oppression. It should be acknowledged that these expressions are also effective elements in the aesthetic presentation of the concept of justice, because the factual closeness of the application of justice and the state’s organization of violence are integrated with the procedure of images that evoke violence.

Since a restoration effort regarding the period of Mehmet II was effective in the emergence of the ‘*Bayezid-i âdil*’ discourse, it is necessary to deal with the criticisms on justice directed at Mehmet II in the sources of the period. First, the direct and indirect examples of criticism are found in Kivâmî’s *Fetihnâme*. The indirect criticism that Kivâmî brought in the first place is seen in his statement that ‘the people are relieved’ with the accession of Bayezid II to the throne. Kivâmî (2018, p. 542) states with the following couplets that the change of throne after the death of Mehmet II created a certain relief: “Gidicek dünyeden Sultan Muhammed/ Yiri daru’l-cinan olsun muhalled/ Gelip ne resme tahta basdugın pay/ Ferahlar buldugın yoksul-ıla bay”.⁹⁵⁴ This ‘relief’ may to some extent point to the end of the turmoil in Istanbul, but it is possible to observe that it has gained a more general meaning in the couplets in which the justice

⁹⁵⁴ When you leave this world, Sultan Mohammed/ May his place be heavens forever/ Because you ascended the throne/ The poor and the rich are relieved.

of Bayezid II is praised. For example, Kivâmî (2018, p. 551) states that the world which had died, came to life again with the accession of Bayezid II to the throne. Similarly, Kemal considers Bayezid II's ascension to the throne as an event that abolished the oppression from the country (Öztürk, 2001, p. 189): “Geçüp atası tahtına oturdu/ Olan zulmü il üstünden götürdi”.⁹⁵⁵

Kivâmî mentions Mehmet II's justice only in the lines in which he describes his accession to the throne in his work, *Fetihnâme-i Sultan Mehmed*, in which he mostly tells about Mehmet II's military expeditions. Kivâmî (2018, p. 68) mentions Mehmet II's accession to the throne as an event that “gives security and confidence to the people of the world [tm]” and eradicates thieves, bandits, seditious ones, and Kivâmî does not mention about justice for a long time. On the other hand, the accession of Bayezid II to the throne is considered by Kivâmî to praise to justice at length and is the subject of an ode with the rhyme ‘*adl*’, so most of the justice motifs in his work are formed for this section. When the following couplets of Kivâmî are examined, it becomes clearer that the term ‘relief’ mentioned above is about getting rid of the troubles of the Mehmet II period: “Kındıl-i devletün vireli şu’le ‘aleme/ Oldu cihanda gün bigi zahir ü nihan adl/ [...] Özin haraba dutmuş-iken buldı hoş yine/ Mi’mar cudun-ıla şeref, hanedan-ı adl/ ‘Ahdünde gördi dürlü meta’-ıla zineti/ Olmuşdı yıllar-ıla mu’attal dükkan-ı adl”.⁹⁵⁶ In the first verse, the implicit reference that justice remained in the forfeit position before Bayezid II is directly critically clarified in the second and third verses, and he puts his thoughts into verses with analogies such as ‘justice was ruined’ and ‘the justice shop remained idle’.

While these criticisms take on direct, indirect, concrete and abstract appearances, they especially focus on the change of the status of some *waqf* lands by Mehmet II. Kivâmî gives an example of the return of *waqf* lands, which were turned into *timar* status during the reign of Mehmet II, to their owners, among the actions of Bayezid II to establish justice (2018, p. 544): “[...] memleketde ba’zı evkaf-ı Müslimin ki merhum, mağfur Sultan Muhammed Han [...] zamanında vüzera-yı na-pakler ve bi-idrakler ma’rifeti-le ki tımar olmuşdı; Sultan Bayezid Han [...] ta’zim idüp buyırdı ki,

⁹⁵⁵ He sat on his father's throne/ He removed the oppression from the country.

⁹⁵⁶ Ever since the lamp of your state gave light to the world/ Justice became clearly apparent as day in the world/ [...] He was good again when he was ruined/ Honored by you repairing it free of charge, dynasty of justice/ He saw various valuables in your word/ The justice shop had been idle for years.

giri ne kadar evkaf-ı müslimin var-ısa, sahibli sahibine mükerrer ideler”.⁹⁵⁷ It is possible to follow Bayezid II’s made return of the *waqf* properties to their former owners from the census records of the period. According to Yıldırım (2019b, p. 223) from a cadastral record dated 1486, the hamlets hold by the *waqf* of Kızıldeli Sultan lodge were converted into *timars* by Mehmet II, but were turned into *waqf* status during the reign of Bayezid II and returned to their former owners. Kivâmî (2018, p. 544) states that “the mirror of religion shines [tm]”, “the face of the state be watched in that mirror [tm]”, and “the people of the world live in justice and security [tm]” due to the decision of Bayezid II to return the *waqf* properties. In these statements, the glorification of religion, the fulfillment of justice, the reproduction of the state and the consent of the people are presented as a whole and there are ideals represented with Tursun Beg’s views.

Tursun Beg (1977, p. 22) states that during the reign of Mehmet II, more than twenty thousand villages and hamlets were taken from the owners of *waqfs* and property, but these lands were returned to their owners thanks to Bayezid II’s benevolence—that is, related to his virtue of justice. Tursun Beg’s view on the new context brought about by the change of reign includes an indirect criticism of the reign of Mehmet II (1977, p. 17):

(...) zat-ı kudsiyyü’-sıfat Hazret-i saltanat-penahi padişahumuz Sultan Bayezid (...) hazretinün evsafında tasvir idüp mu’ayene gösterem. Amma fazilet-i adalet ki adl ü insaf andan ibarettür -ki hafız-ı silsile-i mevcudat ve radi’-i mevadd-ı fesad-ı mahlukattur- padişah-ı muzafferün garize-i şerifinde merkuzdür; nitekim asarı mahsustur. Bi-hamdi’llah ki ahd-i saltanatında tığ-ı şer’i hak meslul ve rekabe-i zulm ü batıl mağluldür. Ve emn ü eman ve inkita’-ı mevadd-ı fetret ü fesad ve inhidam-ı ekser-i bünyan-ı bida’ bunun şahid-i adlıdır.⁹⁵⁸

In these lines, while Bayezid II is identified with ‘justice’ and ‘holiness’, it is claimed that the sword of right is drawn from its sheath and that injustice is chained. It

⁹⁵⁷ Some *waqfs* of the Muslims in the country, were transformed into *timars* by the efforts of sinful viziers and ignorant people during the reign of Sultan Muhammad Khan, the deceased, may God forgive him [...]; Sultan Bayezid Khan [...] respected and ordered that whatever Muslim *waqfs* there are, they should be returned to their owners.

⁹⁵⁸ I wish to describe and reveal some of the qualities of our holy person, our sultan, great Sultan Bayezid [...]. But the virtue of justice, which is nothing but moderation and balance, which is the protector of the chain of beings and prevents the deterioration of creatures, is found in the honorable creation of the victorious sultan, as a matter of fact, its effects are seen on him. Thank God, during his reign, the sword of the righteous path was stripped of its sheath, and the neck of injustice and wrongdoing was shackled. And security, the interruption of the roads of disorder and corruption, the destruction of many of the structures of evil, are reliable witnesses of this.

would be correct to interpret these lines as containing two or more meanings. First, there is the construction of rhetorical prose on the theme of the use of force and defeating the enemy. While the sword element indicates the power and decisiveness of the ruler in a symbolic manner, the shackle of oppression represents the success of the ruler on the path of truth. Secondly, Tursun Beg states that the persecution of false beliefs and the building of *bid'at* were abolished and security was established during the reign of Bayezid II. These terms, on the one hand, may be related to the prosecution of Qizilbash movements, which were not evaluated the frame of in orthodox Islam in the sources of this period, as well as indirectly touching the exchange of *waqf* properties. In this respect, it is possible to include some criticisms between the lines about the period of Mehmet II. Because Tursun Beg bases the execution of justice on protecting the chain of being and preventing corruption. In this framework, giving assurance to the social strata (especially the ulama and the *sûfis*) is praised and the abolition of this assurance (*zulm*) through practices that have no basis in religion (*bid'at*) will mean the abolition of justice. Thirdly, by the term 'elimination of disorder and corruption', Tursun Beg may mean both ending the lack of authority in Istanbul after the death of Mehmet II and preventing the Prince Cem incident. As a result, although all these terms are placed in a general justice rhetoric, they have the ability to indirectly point out the events in the period of Bayezid II. As a result, Tursun Beg argues that in the final analysis, the Bayezid II period was more just, and this can be observed materially. According to Tursun Beg (1977, pp. 22-23) Bayezid II not only corrected the injustices in the reign of Mehmet II, but also made gifts such as *akçe*, gold coin, robe, village to many begs and servants. The author adds that as a result of these gifts, the treasury or the soldiers did not decrease, but increased. This is a proposition that deserves attention. Tursun Beg's statements are as follows (1977, p. 22-23):

Ve kulları ve begleri üzerine bab-ı ihsanı feth itdi; akça ve filori ve fahir hil'atlerden gayrı, niçe aded şehir gibi kuyler temlik eyledi. Bununla yine emval ü hazayin-i devletünün yümn-i kifayeti ile şol kadar müyesser oldı ki, mehazin-i bahr ü ma'adin-i berr ile da'vi-i tekasür ider. Atası merhum sultan Mehemmed-i gazi [...] -ki ittifak-ı alem ile hulasa-ı selef-i Al-i Osman'dur- 've'l-veledü sırru ebihi' anun kapusuna zı'finca kapu ve yarak tertib itti.⁹⁵⁹

⁹⁵⁹ He also opened the door of donation upon his servants and lords; He granted villages like many cities other than *akçe*, filori and robes as property. Even so, so much has been possible, again due to the adequacy of state property and treasury, that it claims surplus with its sea cellars and land mines. He gathered twice as many soldiers and equipment as the gate of his ancestor,

Tursun Beg touches on two important points in his words quoted above: First, the treasury overflowing after Bayezid II's just practices, and secondly, his possession of more soldiers and equipment/weapons than before. These two points are essentially known elements of the circle of justice model: Rulers need soldiers and treasury, and it is not possible to obtain them without justice. So, discussing the increase in soldiers and treasury is another way of indirectly suggesting that Bayezid II was a more just ruler than the previous period. On the other hand, it should not be overlooked that Prince Korkud, the son of Bayezid II, has a very radical criticism that is completely outside of this discourse. According to Prince Korkud (2022, p. 218), a person who claims that the rulers were just in that period will be a disbeliever. The basis of this argument is the debate on customary law practices, which it will be discussed in the next section. Prince Korkud (2022, pp. 47, 218, 225) argues that the Sharia Law was not valid in the Ottoman society of the period, that even the qadis made decisions according to customary law, and argues that the notion of justice could not be valid from a religious stand point.

the deceased Ghazi Sultan Muhammed (...), who is generally accepted as the essence of the past of the Ottoman dynasty. The son is the essence of his father.

CHAPTER VIII

POLITICAL THOUGHT ON THE VERGE⁹⁶⁰ OF THE 16TH CENTURY: GEOPOLITICS, THE STATE, AND IDENTITY

The period of Bayezid II in the history of the Ottoman Empire is characterized by the multiplicity of historical narratives. The only feature of these historical narratives is not that they are chronicles produced by the official historiographers of the state (*vak'ainüvis/vekayi'nüvis*) which can be seen intensely from the second half of the 16th century (Kütükoğlu, 1994, p. 104). Rather, they are 'semi-official' or even 'unofficial' chronicles that aim to create an ideological construct for the benefit of different social actors and to articulate with them. Some of them are the expression of the interests of social groups such as dervishes and raiders, while the other part has a specific characteristic that differs from the previous period with the abundance of Ottoman histories that were started to be written by the ruler's own initiative. Although there are various political/ideological reasons for this situation, it can be thought that the most basic issue is to determine the changing nature of the empire, to realize the necessary administrative adaptations for this and to transmit all these to new generations by putting them in a suitable pedagogical format for the ruling classes and subaltern groups. To the extent that transmit, or pedagogy is mentioned, it would be appropriate to mention that the works in question contain a certain vision or projection of the future. For this reason, historical narratives, which identify the new historical situation, reconstruct the past accordingly, encode their narratives in a language that is prestigious for the dominant classes and 'understandable' for the subordinated classes, became widespread in this period. On the other hand, historical narratives created by those who resist the central state or struggle for a more privileged position in the field of power are also established positions of historical counter-narratives.

⁹⁶⁰ The word 'verge' is used here with a double meaning to cover both aspects. It denotes both a certain limit that expected to be exceeded, and a phase that has just been skipped and left behind but has not yet completely moved away. Since the scope of our thesis ends with the period of Bayezid II, the last period we will deal with corresponds to the last years of the period of Bayezid II, both chronologically and thematically. In this respect, the period under consideration can be understood as having one foot at the end of the 15th century and the other at the beginning of the 16th century, that is, with a part of it on both sides of the verge.

In this respect, it is necessary to place the sphere of historical narratives written at the end of the 15th century and the beginning of the 16th century, as a specific sphere of written culture, within the relations of social struggles. It is seen that in this discursive area where political thoughts are formulated, given in the subtext, narrated or brought into the form of direct advice, there are works such as *siyâsetnâme*, *menâkibnâme*, *tevârih*, *gazavâtnâme*, poetry and theological commentary. If these works are to be classified in terms of their political content, it is seen that this classification can be made around the duality of centripetal narratives and centrifugal -or autonomist- narratives. Focusing on the centripetal narratives category, the six works combine the above-mentioned genres by developing a synthetic and detailed narrative form. In this context, the detailed works of Mehmet Neşri's *Kitâb-ı Cihannümâ*⁹⁶¹, Rûhî's *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osmân*⁹⁶², İdrîs-i Bitlisî's *Hest Behişt*⁹⁶³, Kemalpaşazâde's *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osmân*⁹⁶⁴ and Behiştî's *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osmân*⁹⁶⁵ ideologically reunites the political structure of the Bayezid II period with combining reference points of a fictionalized past and a projected future narrative. The common point of these narratives is their synthesis of *ghaza* narratives, theological propositions, hagiography and chronicle narratives circulating in the popular sphere. The very large-scale and dynastic fiction of both historical narratives is particularly important in terms of being a source for the official history narratives that will be formed after them. Referring to Çamuroğlu (2016, p. 10), if history is conceived as a past organized by the paradigm of domination, it emerges in a conceptual framework in which the objects and bases of domination are revealed at the verge of the 16th century in the narrative put forward by the five authors. For this reason, ethnic distinctions, mode of appropriation distinctions and their bases, the ways in which religious authority is exercised and the representations of economic relations become the subjects in which these dominating conceptualizations crystallize. The political

⁹⁶¹ It is estimated that Neşri wrote his work named *Kitâb-ı Cihannümâ* between the years 1485-1493 (Ménage, 1964, p. 9; Özcan, 1994b).

⁹⁶² Rûhî's history covers events that took place up to 1511. For this reason, the completion date of the work is accepted as around 1511. Considering the differences in scope in different copies of the work and the possibility that the last chapters were added later, it is highly likely that the history of Rûhî was written between 1485 and 1511 (Yücel & Cengiz, 1992, p. 365).

⁹⁶³ İdrîs-i Bitlisî left Iran in 1501 and joined Bayezid II in 1502 (Markiewicz, 2019, p. 66). It is understood that he was given the task of writing the work called *Hest Behişt* in 1502, but the work was written in 1506 and completed in 1512 (Karataş et al., 2008a, p. 49).

⁹⁶⁴ The task of writing *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osmân* was given to Kemalpaşazâde in 1503, when he was appointed as a *muderris* at Edirne Taşlık Madrasa (Türkyılmaz, 2009, p. 27).

⁹⁶⁵ It is estimated that the history of Behiştî was completed in 1512 (Kaytaz, 2011, p. XXVIII).

discourse developed in this framework mostly includes the geopolitical index of the bases of domination, the organizational structure of the state as an administrative device, and the identity construction of the Ottoman dynasty in search of legitimacy. If these titles are presented in general categories, in this section, the geopolitical, institutional and historical index constructions of the Ottoman state's dominance and internal organization will be discussed. These indexes are worth examining under the category of political considerations, as they reveal both a factual inventory of the relations of domination and discipline, and the horizon of the state as a political norm. In this section, the structural developments in the Ottoman political discourse will be tried to be summarized by focusing on the five historical narratives mentioned in particular. Moreover, while analyzing the discursive structure developed in these works, a comparative analysis will be made with other works that can be considered contemporary, and it will be tried to reveal how social contradictions take place in the differences in political discourse.

VIII.I. *Index Geopoliticus: Seas, Lands and Trade*⁹⁶⁶

“The existence of human beings is made up of earth and water,
which are opposites of each other [tm]”
İdrîs-i Bitlisî (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 85)

Although the Ottoman Empire presents the appearance of a territorial empire based largely on agricultural revenues, it is surprising that the examples of political thought, written especially at the beginning of the 16th century, emphasize the natural resources and maritime trade -not the land revenues allocated for military use. It is as if the issue of agricultural incomes was left to the *sipâhîs*, who exploited the rent income of the lands in the status of *timar*, and the central government turned to other sources of direct cash income. There are several understandable reasons for this situation, first of all, *timar* rents do not flow directly into the account of the central government and are extracted by local rentiers. Second, the central government needs direct cash revenues to feed a large salaried army and stratum of state officials. Finally, it should be taken into account that commercial relations developed, and the first cores of pre-industrial

⁹⁶⁶ The word 'index' means both to show/point, to list/order, and to declare/state something specific. It will be seen that it is used to meet all three meanings here and in the following subsection titles. For more detailed information, see: Glare (1968, p. 881).

capitalism spread rapidly during the period as is discussed. For this reason, how the related income sources are handled in political thought poses a crucial problem in terms of reproducing class domination. My proposition is that the vision for these resources finds its way into primary sources as a geopolitical problem and indicated the right-based element of politics. In this context, it would be appropriate to consider comparatively how the administrators of the Ottoman Empire approached problem of economic resources as the problem presented in the literature of political thought.

The second half of the 15th century and the 16th century as a whole represents a critical turning point for Western European history as well as for world trade, colonized communities/peoples and the Mediterranean economic sphere. In this period, the European-Far East sea-route was first used by turning the Cape of Good Hope, the African coasts and Americas were discovered by European sailors and the door to modern colonialism was opened to the end. At the same time, Mediterranean trade showed great development in this century; The accelerating commercial relations between the Levant, Egypt, North African coasts, Italian city-states, Baltic and Western European coasts - and their hinterlands - also brought along competition/conflict/refining processes and results in many fields from maritime techniques to military technology and banking. It is impossible to exclude the Ottoman Empire from the context of this transformation. The awareness of maritime trade in the Ottoman Empire and the quest to control it become visible from the middle of the 15th century. İnalçık (2019a, pp. 278-79) states that Mehmet II tried to establish dominance over the Aegean islands by sea from the summer of 1455, and made three major expeditions until the autumn of 1456, and changed the navy captain three times due to failures. The lines showing that Mehmet II had a large navy prepared for the Kefe (Feodosia) and Rhodes expeditions in the history of Behiştî (Kaytaz, 2011, p. 277) show how seriously the domination over the seas was taken, especially in military terms. Moreover, as pointed out in the *Historia Turchesca* written by Angiolello (2022, p. 45), the fact that a Crusader navy prepared by order of Pope Pius II posed a serious threat to Ottoman naval dominance must have increased the investment in the Ottoman navy.

Another aspect of the problem of domination over the sea is encountered in the writings of Pîrî Reis. Pîrî Reis (1973, p. 115) states that in the chapter of the *Kitâb-ı Bahriyye* dealing with Bozcaada, Mehmet II ordered that a castle be built on the island so that the merchant ships could navigate safely. As Bilge (2012, p. 20) points out, the intensification and systematization of maritime activities during the reign of Bayezid II

and the formation of a strong navy make sense in this context. In addition, during the reign of Bayezid II, the castles on the shores of the empire were repaired or new castles were built on the shores and the security on the sea borders was systematically strengthened (Eyice, 2021, p. 110). In the same period, it is seen that Prince Korkud emerged as a figure who financially and politically supported piracy activities (Al-Tikriti, 2004, p. 102). Behiştî presents a detailed index of the navy of the historical Bayezid II period and glorifies Bayezid II as the sultan of “*bahr u berr*” (Kaytaç, 2011, pp. 344-46). The same title is also used in the history of Rûhî (Yücel & Cengiz, 1992, p. 371). This expression, which means the ruler of the seas and lands, was first used for Mehmet II, and then turned into one of the generic expressions describing Bayezid II. For example, in the history of Konevî, this expression describes the ‘world scale’ power of Mehmet II (Salduz, 2019, p. 30). The same expression is also found in the eulogies written by Efsahî for Bayezid II: “Sultan-ı berr u bahr Ebu’n-nasr Bayezid/ Ân şah k’eş ne-dîde karîn çeşm-i rûzgar”⁹⁶⁷ (Ölçer & Tanındı, 2012, p. 38).

In the first chapters of *Kitâb-ı Bahriyye*, the issue of crossing the Cape of Good Hope and opening the way to India (Pîrî Reis, 1973, pp. 54-57) can be considered the clearest indicator of the interest in global maritime. In this context, the new emphases emerging in the political discourse on the land and sea relationship also offer various clues about the representation of this context in the consciousness of the ruling classes. When a later work, such as the *Kitâb-ı Bahriyye* by Pîrî Reis, is examined, it is noticed that a significant part of the maritime experience of the famous captain was acquired during the reign of Bayezid II. Pîrî Reis (1973, pp. 33, 40) draws attention to the fact that his uncle Kemal Reis entered the service of Bayezid II by edict or ruler and served him for seventeen years. The history of Behiştî also needed to commemorate Kemal Reis and appreciated his talent in naval warfare (Kaytaç, 2011, p. 353). Moreover, in Firdevsî-i Rumî’s (2011, p. 57, 70) work called *Kutbnâme*, the character of Kemal Reis takes place in the epic narrative as a maritime hero respected by Bayezid II.

As it was tried to be presented in the previous sections, the authority of the ruler in Ottoman political thought was tried to be visualized in the metaphor of the body or shepherd, and the structure of the state and administrative organization was detailed using the tent metaphor or the circle of justice model. In this new period a new image emerged in the catalogue of political analogies in the Ottoman literature. This image is

⁹⁶⁷ “Sultan of land and seas, Bayezid, the great/ A shah such as the eye of time has seen no like” (Ölçer & Tanındı, 2012, p. 39).

a 'ship's anchor'. İdrîs-i Bitlisî uses a composite image to describe the vizier Yahya Pasha in the eighth book of his work *Heşt Behişt*. According to him, Yahya Pasha is the pillar of the state, and his strong position resembles 'a ship's anchor cast ashore' (Genç, 2014, p. 859). This imagination contains more than one analogy. First of all, the vizier is likened to a pillar, that is, the solid support that keeps the state tent or building standing. Secondly, a semantic link is established between this robustness and the landing of a ship's anchor. While the first analogy is clear in meaning, the second analogy needs interpretation.

Is the 'anchor' mentioned by İdrîs-i Bitlisî imagined as an object standing on land as something difficult to lift, or as an instrument or fulcrum that will protect a ship on the sea from drifting, fix it at a certain point and keep it under control? In my opinion, both analogies are common under a certain metaphorical narrative, that is, the building/tent mast and the ship anchor do not have a meaning on their own, on the contrary, they are seen as instruments that have meaning in accordance with the functions they perform as representations. In the first example, a mast has a function in terms of carrying a building or a tent, in the second example, an anchor has a function in terms of fixing the ship. The building and the ship, the mast and the anchor are located in the same metaphorical world of meaning and imply a context in which the monarch becomes the central figure of the order by controlling the organizational structure and semantic references in a world where nothing can stand by itself. The equivalent of this imagination at the level of real power relations is land and sea. The building and/or tent are the basic elements of territorial power: Tents or buildings as the residence of families, castles where garrisons settle, buildings for administrative activities, camps, festive tents, religious and commercial buildings, shops constitute the places where social power forms are concentrated, preserved and interacted. On the other hand, the ship is the most fundamental instrument of power over the seas: Overseas trade, maritime war, communication and travel cannot exist without the mediation of navigation. The analogy of İdrîs-i Bitlisî in this respect refers to a composite form of power: domination over the lands and seas as a whole. In this context, the anchor analogy used for Yahya Pasha is a small but important indicator that also points to the geopolitical struggle on the seas.

When the texts of this period are examined, it is encountered with clear emphases about the geopolitical importance of maritime. For example, İdrîs-i Bitlisî draws attention to this issue in his work called *Heşt Behişt*, and draws a retrospective

panorama of the early Ottoman period. The specificity of retrospective panoramas in terms of political discourse is that the author of the discourse constructs a sub-text that criticizes or affirms his own period by making an implicit comparison between his own period and the past period. İdrîs-i Bitlisî makes visible the naval superiority of the Byzantine Empire over the early Ottoman principality in many parts of his work. The author, who occasionally states that the imperial forces could easily cross the straits with the help of their ships or send soldiers to distant regions in case of need, is of the opinion that this situation threatened the Ottoman advance. To give an example, İdrîs-i Bitlisî states that sending military aid to the city of Izmit by the Byzantine and Frankish rulers from the sea -with its strong bastions and crowded population- made it difficult to capture it (Koçarslan, 2019, p. 169). The second example given by İdrîs-i Bitlisî is quite striking. The transfer of military forces to Gallipoli in the early period of the Ottoman principality took place under very difficult conditions, since the principality did not have an independent navy. According to İdrîs-i Bitlisî, organizing the transfer process was possible with the notables of Karesî province, experienced warriors, travelers of land and sea countries, traders and swimmers coming together and inventing a solution for crossing (Koçarslan, 2019, pp. 238- 39). This example is important in that it emphasizes the necessity of having a state-funded navy, as well as mentions the merchants who have experience in overseas relations. In this respect, maritime activities also point to a social structure change belonging to the early-modern period, when merchants became the support of the state. The pertinence of our argument will be better understood as the other propositions that establish the maritime and commercial connection are considered later in this chapter.

From the perspective of Western Anatolian history, the symbol name of the theme of owning a navy and dominating the seas emerges as Umur Beg. Kemalpaşazâde states that Umur Beg was a *muktada-i cumhur* in the naval war and his heroic stories were told in a large community of people (Imazawa, 2000, p. 217). Ottoman political discourse occasionally benefited from the figure of Umur Beg, who is still alive in the collective memory, and tried to operate his prestige in favor of the latter by placing him in a common narrative world with the Ottoman rulers. To give an example, Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî (1990, p. 260) portrays Osman Beg, the founder of the dynasty, as a *ghazi* who was a fellow of Umur Beg. This situation seems to have changed during the reign of Bayezid II. The maritime narrative centered on Bayezid II represents him in a status that exceeds the fame of Umur Beg. İdrîs-i Bitlisî argues that Bayezid II built ships of

unprecedented size since Noah's Ark and that no 'old or new' Islamic ruler was able to complete such ships (Genç, 2014, p. 737). The second point Bitlisî emphasizes is that shipbuilding is carried out by Muslim craftsmen who are inspired by the provisions of the Qur'an and aim to support the ruler's sea expeditions (Genç, 2014, p. 737).⁹⁶⁸ This emphasis, in the final analysis, means affirming the existence of a social group that is subject to Islamic discourse, that is, completely under control, on which the Ottoman ruler carefully placed his domain of power. The only scale of comparison that can be made between Umur Beg and Bayezid II is not the size of the vessels. A similar comparison can be made between regions of domination and visions of power. While İdrîs-i Bitlisî describes Selim I by centered on the maritime area, he defines him as a ruler who "appointed a governor"⁹⁶⁹ to the Rums with an Indian sword and sent ships to India from the Sea of Rum" (Genç, 2014, p. 913). The definition in question seems to have been written for Bayezid II, but later changed its name after Selim I's entourage, rather than describing Selim I, who was still in the early days of his rule. The second part of this statement indicates that Bayezid II's success in the maritime field -unlike Umur Beg- was not local but intercontinental. The expression 'Sea of Rum' corresponds to the Adriatic sea, that is, the most advanced Ottoman maritime border of the period, while the word 'Hind' - obviously - refers to India. Considering the historical conditions of the period, it is not entirely clear whether the ships in question sailed around the Cape of Good Hope or whether the goods they were to transport reached the Red Sea or the Persian Gulf by caravan routes. It is unclear whether this statement reveals a fact or a future projection/vision in this context. Moreover, the description of 'appointing a governor [*şahne*] with an Indian sword' in the first part of the statement also needs explanation. The word '*şahne*' has the meaning of the governor of a particular region and is a political term used for the rulers of the Great Seljuk Empire (Merçil, 2010). The expression 'Indian sword', on the other hand, is a *mazmun* (proposition) and refers to the 'Indian pure iron sword', also called "*muhennad, hindi, hinduvani*" (Bozkurt, 2022). This type of sword was used as a status symbol among Arabs in the years when Islam was born (Bozkurt, 2022). The fact that the sword was brought to the Middle East via distant maritime trade via India suggests that this sword may have been used in the Ottoman army, especially as a status symbol in the command. It is also possible to think that this expression refers to the territorial extent of the Ottoman Empire. If İdrîs-i

⁹⁶⁸ Also see: Korkud (2022, pp. 228-29).

⁹⁶⁹ '*Şahne*' in the original text.

Bitlisi's statement is interpreted in this respect, it becomes clear that overseas trade also has a military aspect that supports the Ottoman territorial domination.

The main link of the chain that combines maritime power and territorial domination is long-distance trade. Thanks to long-distance trade, the image of the 'ship anchor' ceases to be an abstract analogy displaying the strength of the state and is cast from iron as the founding element of real power relations. İdrîs-i Bitlisî states that the Greek/Rum people were superior to the rest of the world in the art of travel and navigation, and that materials related to navigation were transported from Anatolia to many places from the Franks to Western countries, from Egypt and Alexandria to Damascus (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 85; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 70). İdrîs-i Bitlisî, in his lines in which he indexes the treasury income sources of the Ottoman Empire, emphasizes the importance of the iron mines in Rumelia for the sultanate/state interests (Yıldırım, 2010, pp. 83-84; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 69). According to him, iron from Rumelia is transported to Turkistan, Mongolia, Maghreb, Frankia, Egypt, Alexandria, Rum and Armenia to the Iranian border, Bulgaria and Saxon regions (Yıldırım, 2010, pp. 83-84; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 69). In fact, İdrîs-i Bitlisî states that this iron mine was used in the construction of ships floating in the Frankish Sea and the North Sea, and that the mine was transported to the Mediterranean islands with the help of ships (Yıldırım, 2010, pp. 83-84; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 69). Secondly, he deals with the copper mine and states that the copper extracted from Anatolia was transported to Indian, Turkish, Arab and Iranian countries (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 84; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 69). Another source of treasury is salt mines, and according to İdrîs-i Bitlisî, the privilege of selling salt to the whole world, which finds a market opportunity in the northern regions and Turkistan, is under the monopoly of the Ottoman rulers (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 85; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 70). In the final analysis, İdrîs-i Bitlisî deeply understood that the importance of these natural resources for the Ottoman Empire was related to commercial activities and expressed the indispensability of operating trade routes in terms of class dominance as well as keeping these resources under control. İdrîs-i Bitlisî describes the seas as the "conquered property [tm]" of the ruler (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 85; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 70). According to him, the number of ships operating in Rum and Frank countries, the transportation of goods by ships and ship routes in this 'conquered property' is much higher than the rest of the world (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 85; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 70). In this context, the fact that the territorial resources dominated by the ruler are subject to commerce also causes an increase in the taxes

collected from commercial transactions (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 85; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, pp. 70-71). It can be said that the trio of natural resources, long-distance trade and taxation constitutes a kind of new ‘circle of commerce’ model in which the Ottoman Empire integrated with the world economy in the new phase it entered. The center of this unnamed circle is necessarily commercial activities. The extraction and transportation of raw materials required a certain monetary investment and ultimately had to be calculated whether this investment was converted into profits through sales. Although there is no detailed information about Ottoman accounting methods in this period, there is a note that the annual income of the treasury was calculated by deducting labor and transportation costs when it comes to the salt trade in İdrîs-i Bitlisî (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 85; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 70).

It is understood from the above index that Ottoman political vision was aware of the developing Mediterranean and world trade and considered it necessary to integrate it as an exporter of valuable raw materials in terms of its own class interests. Considering the 16th century, the fact that these natural resources were subject to maritime trade cannot be separated from the caravan trade carried out on land. The caravan trade constitutes the intermediate link that enables the transport of commodities to towns and cities constituting large markets, and from there to be shipped for sea transport. Ottoman political thought is worth examining separately, as it contains passages that refer to the geopolitical importance of caravan trade and city markets. The existence of certain reservations about the legitimacy of commercial transactions in the literature of Islamic political and legal thought has brought along some discussions about the legitimate limits of commercial profits and their justification (Ermiş, 2020, pp. 140-41). In the first centuries of Islam, the criticisms developed by the *sûfî* circles about the disappearance of ‘halal’ trade opportunities constitute prominent prototypes in this framework (Baser, 2021, pp. 50-51). Although the influence and prevalence of *sûfî* approaches are controversial, it is possible to detect that such criticisms continue in the late period. For example, Ibn Khaldun (2021, pp. 720-21) stated that deception and cunning skills have an effect on commercial profits and that they have ‘evil and fraud’ effects on the soul and a certain annotation has been made on his acceptance of the moral legitimacy of trade. Sayar (2000, p. 120) states that there are similar views in the early Islamic history; For example, Sheikh Qadi Omer defines the ‘good’ merchant as a person who distributes his profits as alms, and the early jurists stated that ‘acceptable’ trade was trade done over long distances and predicted a consistency between profit-

risk-effort factors. On the other hand, it can be said that *sūfî* circles were stand more critical to commercial activities compared to jurists. For example, in the *menâkibnâme* of Ebü'l-Vefâ, it is told that the famous sheikh did not allow a disciple to trade, and that the disciple, who received partial permission, could not gain any profit as a result of preferring trade to *sūfîsm* (Vâsîr'î, 2011, pp. 97-98). However, this reservation seen in the *menâkibnâme* of Ebü'l-Vefâ is not repeated in the same way in all other *menâkibnâmes*.

When a series of *menâkibnâmes* written at the verge of the 16th century are examined, it is seen that commercial relations, especially maritime trade, take place in the texts as a narrative element that supports the miracle claims. There is also an example among the miracles of Ebü'l-Vefâ, who had a negative attitude towards the involvement of his followers in commercial activities, in which he rescued a convoy of merchants from the mouth of a large fish and received a thousand dinars in return (Vâsîr'î, 2011, p. 80). Especially such stories are encountered in the *menâkibnâmes* of Sheikh Mecdüddin Îsâ from Akhisar, Sheikh Alâeddin Ali es-Samarkandî and Pîrî Baba. Sheikh Alâeddin Ali es-Samarkandî, who died in the middle of the 15th century and whose life is understood to have been written around the 16th century, contains many anecdotes about maritime trade. In these anecdotes, the famous sheikh saves the ships from the storms at sea, protects the cruise ships from the attacks of Christian pirates or knights around the island of Cyprus (Mercan, 2009, pp. 72-3), saves the captives on the island of Malta (Mercan, 2009, p. 89), and makes the passengers on the ship swear allegiance to him (Mercan, 2009, p. 92). It is possible to come across similar narratives in the *menâkibnâme* of Sheikh Mecdüddin Îsâ from Akhisar, who is known to have died in the middle of the 16th century. According to one of the anecdotes in his *menâkibnâme*, the sheikh, who knew that a ship bound for Alexandria would be attacked by seven Christian ships, informed a passenger on the ship and asked him to come to his own place and give him thirty pieces of gold after he had saved (Küçük & Muslu, 2003, p. 68). In another anecdote, the story of the rescue of four ships navigating from Anatolia to the Maghreb for trade is told. When Christian ships attacked these merchants to loot, they promised to give an Arab slave to the first saint to save them, and then Sheikh Isa rescued the merchant ships (Küçük & Muslu, 2003, p. 67). Another story that Sheikh Îsâ rescued the merchants from the sea raiders is found in the *menâkibnâme* of *Bayrâmiyye tariqa*. According to this story, Sheikh Îsâ sees that Christian sailors will attack four Muslim merchant ships in the port and tells a merchant on the ship to give

five bushels of rice, lentils, broad beans, some butter and enough money to buy fifteen shoes to save them (Hamarat, 2015, p. 54). According to the anecdote in the *menâkıbnâme* of Pîrî Baba, a person named Şamluođlu Hoca İbrahim is caught in a storm at sea and prays to Pîrî Baba to get rid of it. In this prayer, the merchant promises that if he survives the storm, he will have built a tomb for Pîrî Baba. This person, who was saved by the miracle of Pîrî Baba, not only has the tomb built, but also buys a place to establish a lodge and *waqfs* (Dođanbaş, 2005, pp. 179-80). In these examples, there is a form of discourse built on the protection of long-distance trade, which is a very dangerous activity due to the conditions of the period, by the *sûfi* circles by using supernatural forces. This form of discourse is widely used in the *sûfi* sources of the period. In this respect, it can be thought that the *sûfi* circles adapted to the rapidly developing long-distance trade practices, created some stories that would give moral assurance to the merchants, and received donations from the merchants in return. In this respect, the discourse of the *sûfi* circles does not include the denial of trade, but the gaining of a certain benefit from it, and therefore the legitimation of commercial activities. The discourse, which is built on the legitimation of commercial activities and gaining benefits from them, is more intensely encountered in historical narratives. İdrîs-i Bitlisî legitimizes the existence of commercial relations for the Ottoman state by claiming that commercial activities are necessary for the power of the ruler to be reproduced. According to a dialogue that İdrîs-i Bitlisî set up retrospectively for the period of Orhan Beg, some enterprising/vigilant people inform the ruler about the political importance of trade in order to persuade Orhan Beg to conquer Bursa. According to this narrative, the feet of the throne of the sultanate depend on the proper execution of two tasks: (i) collecting incomes and (ii) facilitating the livelihood of the people (Koçarslan, 2019, p. 137). In this context, İdrîs-i Bitlisî argues that the main sources of income are agricultural and commercial activities, among them, “profitable trade and transaction business [tm]” is one of the legitimate/respected/popular ways and this situation is proven by hadiths (Koçarslan, 2019, p. 137).

İdrîs-i Bitlisî’s classification of commercial activities as one of the foundations of the ruler’s power and constructing a narrative centered on the example of Bursa cannot be considered a unique example. In the literature of this period, the way the authors deal with a series of cities that have been under Ottoman rule for a long time or that have been newly captured is shaped depending on the location of these cities on the trade routes. To briefly mention a few of these cities, it will suffice to summarize how

the cities and environs of Sinop, Tosya, Osmancık, Bosnia, Skopje, Kili and Akkerman are represented. İdrîs-i Bitlisî deals with the city of Sinop together with the city of Kastamonu. According to him, Kastamonu region is full of silver and copper mines, and Sinop, as the port of this region, is an important trade center where “traders from Russian, Kefe, Crimea and other countries” come and “the income from ships is very high [tm]” (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 80; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 66). The characteristic of Tosya is that it exports wool and woolen products to different parts of the world, which is why Tosya attracts trade convoys (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 80; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 66). Similarly, Kemalpaşazâde, while describing the city of Skopje, refers to commodity exchange as such “It is the marketplace of the merchants at the frontiers of Rumelia, it is the place of profit for those dealing with commercial accounts [tm]” (Imazawa, 2000, p. 29). The importance of these cities and regions is also appreciated by the central government and strategic investments are made in these areas. According to what we learned from İdrîs-i Bitlisî, a bridge was built by Bayezid II around the city of Osmancık, located on the edge of Kızılırmak, in the province of *Rumiye-i Suğra* (Açikel, 2008), which corresponds to the vicinity of Sivas-Tokat-Amasya. He explains the reason for the construction of the bridge based on the fact that this region is on the transit route of the merchants going to Damascus and Iraq (Genç, 2014, pp. 554-55). Another example is the province of Bosnia. According to İdrîs-i Bitlisî, Bosnia, as a province containing gold, silver, lapis lazuli and Armenian rose mines, is located at a crossroads extending to the Frankish countries, *Üngürüs* (region of Hungary), Rumelia and the Adriatic Sea (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 195; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 166). The fact that the region contains precious metals and is at the center of the main trade routes must have increased its geopolitical importance in the eyes of the Ottoman administration. A similar situation is also valid for the Karabogdan region. According to İdrîs-i Bitlisî, Karabogdan is located on the transit route of Kefe, Crimea and *Tatar Ovası* merchants, and on the transit route of passengers going to Lehistan and *Deşt-i Turkistan*, and dominating this route is essential for the security of trade (Genç, 2014, p. 621). For this reason, Bayezid II took action to conquer the Kili and Akkerman castles at strategic points in the Karabogdan region. Kemalpaşazâde describes the Akkerman castle as a cosmopolitan trade center where people from Moldavia, Wallachia, Hungary, *Ebkaz*, Circassian and Polish countries and Russia live and where Jewish, Christian and Armenian merchants come and reside for trade (Uğur, 1997, p. 73). But it would be misleading to think that all Ottoman chronicles contain a similar economic description.

For example, in the history of Behiştî, Kili and Akkerman castles are depicted from a purely military perspective, without any economic references (Kaytaz, 2011, p. 313). The same is true for Behiştî's descriptions of the Koron and Moton castles. Although Behiştî describes in detail the height of the towers of these two castles and the strength of their walls from a military perspective, he does not make any judgments about their importance in terms of economic relations or strategic trade routes (Kaytaz, 2011, p. 353). However, according to the information in the Byzantine short chronicle number 58 (1500/7008, 3. Induction, 16 August), Bayezid II welcomed the nobles who surrendered the Coron castle to him, exempted them from all taxes and thus encouraged maritime trade (Kılıç, 2013, p. 173). In this case, it would be appropriate to accept that there is a significant difference between the two significant elements of the strategic vision, namely the military and commercial approaches, and that the latter may have been more effective in determining military targets.

As a result, as can be clearly seen from the examples above, Ottoman political thought developed a geopolitical orientation based on the dominance of maritime trade routes, caravan routes and natural resources at the verge of the 16th century. Although, as discussed in the previous sections, dominating the mines and salt deposits has always been important for the Ottoman ruling class, it was with the 16th century that this vision gained an expanded context to include intercontinental trade. The ideology built by the Ottoman ruling class as a territorial empire, that the Ottoman ruler had a priori right to rule over all other peoples, began to include the element of sea routes in this period. As İdrîs-i Bitlisî put forward, the ruler is described as a ruler worthy of holding "land and sea treasures and all the mines in the world [tm]" (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 65; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 53). In this framework, the dream myth will be enriched with new interpretations and adapted to the new context. In the dream myth reinterpreted by İdrîs-i Bitlisî, the water element takes place more intensely than in other versions. To remind, Osman I falls asleep in the lodge of Sheikh Edebâli and sees in his dream that a big tree has grown from his belly, the branches of this tree reach all over the world, and under these branches mountains, rivers and fountains appear. İdrîs-i Bitlisî adds another element to the interpretation of this dream: The seas. The tree motif symbolizes the horizons and continuity of the sultanate, and the presence of mountains and seas under the tree indicates that the dynasty will find "popularity and perseverance [tm]" (Genç, 2007, pp. 141-42). It should be noted that there is no reference to the seas in any version of the dream that as had discussed before. In the final analysis, the tree is an element of

terrestrial flora, and the imagination of the dream myth is filled with terrestrial symbols of fertility and dominance. However, İdrîs-i Bitlisî's reinterpretation of the dream with reference to the tree figure that covers the mountains, and the sea is a small but meaningful example of both the reconstruction of the tradition and its adaptation to the new political situation.

VIII.II. *Index Institutional*: Organization, Treasury, and Ideology

The organizational infrastructure of the Ottoman state began to develop systematically, especially after the second half of the 15th century. On the one hand, the expansion and diversification of the economic resources under the control of the Ottoman state, and on the other hand, the search for a systematization of administrative practices with the expansion of the population, army and ruling class is effective in the emergence of this trend. When both factors are considered together, the necessity of regulating both distribution and administration relations in order to reproduce the class domination of the rentier classes that directly or indirectly seize the natural resources and labor products can be accepted as the determining factor in the structuring of the state. In this context, the development and capillarization of the Ottoman state -the development of the imperial regime- finds its expression under three main headings in political thought. These titles can be expressed as: (i) the organizational formation, in which the state organization, hierarchy and administrative duties are defined, (ii) the financial formation that focuses on the recording and regulation of state revenues, (iii) ideological formation which developed to establish rulers' absolute authority, and the legitimacy of the state organization among the ruling groups and the subordinated groups. To these three formations, the legal formation including the *Kanunnâmes*, *fatwas* and *qadi* decisions that were put into practice during the reigns of Mehmet II and Bayezid II, and finally the judicial practices related to this can be added. However, since there is not enough data on this subject in the works had discussed, this possible title is leaved out of this thesis. Although there is a great need for a detailed study on the ideology of Law in the Ottoman *Kanunnâmes* in the field of historiography, this significant subject has been left out of our thesis, since the academic formation of the author of these lines will not be enough to carry out comparative studies on Law. On the other hand, the three basic formations, which will be discussed in detail below, emerged as the main pillars of the Ottoman state and class domination at the end of the

15th century and the beginning of the 16th century, and continued their functions until the Ottoman modernization.

VIII.II.I. Blood-Ink-Sweat: The General Organization Chart of the State

The Ottoman dynasty and the various social groups gathered around it had been working since at least the 14th century in order to establish a certain status quo in terms of social power relations, to secure the social privileges of the ruling classes, to protect the population and lands under their control from revolutionary reactions from within and threats of invasion and plunder possibly come from the borders. From then on, they turned their political effort onto the process of state building. In the first stage, the state building process was realized with the establishment of the central army, the *Diwan* organization, the land allocation records and the establishment of administrative authorities. The first phase in question is characterized by the emergence of a typical early state in which financial resources and military power are tried to be centralized within the early state form based on feudal relations. From the end of the 14th century, albeit with various interruptions, the early state form completed its transitional stage, some features of the early state form were reformed, new relations were developed, and some social relations were abolished. Although the relationship between these two state forms went through phases where contradictions intensified and ruptures occurred, it resulted in favor of the latter due to the concentration and qualitative development of the military/ideological/financial resources controlled by the mature state form. Especially since the second half of the 15th century, the Ottoman ruler's access to a military and financial power that could suppress other social powers strengthened his tendency to centralize, and with the quantitative and qualitative changes brought about by territorial expansion, the mature state form turned into an imperial regime and absorbed feudal relations. The phase of imperial regime, which started with the reign of Mehmet II, has a character that can be called bureaucratic autarky, in which the state organization is developed, the authority of the monarch is made absolute, the administrative hierarchy and discipline are elaborated. Another feature of the indicated development period is the increased role of an educated social segment in power, which keeps state records and specializes in calculation/categorization/regulation. This section is mentioned under the symbol of 'pen' and its relationship with the group of military professionals referred to under the symbol of 'sword' becomes a major problem to be resolved when discussing the structure of the state.

The historical sources of this period comprise a competent presentation of the state organization that gained a detailed systematic with the period of Mehmet II. An interesting detail in this regard is that although there are limited representations about various hierarchical relations, office holders, military command level and palace servants in the Ottoman literature of the period, a wide presentation was made by outside observers to the Ottoman palace. If we were to explain this observation, while information about the Ottoman state organization was given with a low detail in sources such as histories of Kemalpařazâde, Neřrî or Behiřtî, on the other hand, a very broad description was given in İdrîs-i Bitlisî's *Heřt Behiřt* and Giovanni Maria Angiolello's *Historia Turchesca*. It is a historical question that needs clarification that writers of *ilmiyye* or *seyfiyye* origin who were directly involved in the Ottoman administrative system did not deal with this issue. One of the possible solutions to this problem may be that state officials who have not dealt with the issue have already been trained in the bureaucratic hierarchy in question for many years and they take it as a tradition. From this point of view, writing this down was not seen as the subject of historiography for the writers of this period, since there was no major change in the administrative hierarchy. A second explanation would center on the possibility that outside observers were more curious about the structure they encountered and considered it significant to produce knowledge of this structure. If this second explanation is followed, the systematic descriptions of İdrîs-i Bitlisî and Angiolello, on the one hand, mean the representation of the power of the ruler through the exposition of the state organization, on the other hand, it may be that the information about the state organization was produced for the demand of another group other than the Ottoman ruler or administrators. Based on organizational complexity, İdrîs-i Bitlisî's presentation on the state organization leaves the impression of a narrative that aims to glorify the power of the state and the ruler. On the other hand, when Angiolello's historical narrative is considered together with the work of the same author, *Breve narratione della vita et fatti del signor Ussuncassano*, which he wrote about the political life of Uzun Hasan, it is possible to think that it was written primarily to inform the Venetian aristocracy about the developments in the Near East politics. The common point of both works is that the richness of the details given about the state organization also includes a political representation of the power of the imperial organization in the final analysis. While this representation takes the form of an intense affirmation of the state and its organizational

schema in İdrîs-i Bitlisî's narrative of history, Angiolello's narrative mostly includes an index of the Ottoman military and administrative organization.

VIII.II.I.I. The Contradictory Association of Pen and Sword

Before proceeding to the presentation of the state organization, it is necessary to mention how the problem of the functioning of the state as a whole is handled in the historical sources. When the chronicles written in the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 15th century and the beginning of the 16th century are examined, it is seen that they contain some basic judgments about the nature and function of the state. In general, if these judgments are brought together, the state is seen as an instrument of domination in which the ruler stands at the center in terms of Ottoman political thought. The literature of this period emphasizes the notion of domination in a way that dominates the notion of justice. In this respect, the power of the state emerges depending on its administrative competence and splendor in image, and the state fulfills the function assigned to it in this way. The framework drawn in the sources of the period regarding the administrative competence of the state becomes visible on two simple symbols in Ottoman political thought, thus, pen and sword. Although the sword of these symbols is made visible as the dominant element throughout the *gazavât-nâmes* and chronicles, which are generally fictionalized as a war narrative, the issue is not so simple when it comes to the symbolic field -and as an extension of it, a theoretical categorization.

While the pen symbol does not appear at all in Kâşifi's *Gazânâme-i Rûm*, which is an early example of a *ghaza* narrative, an old sage who came to Mehmet II's side in an anecdote and advises that the world resembles a 'bride', that he can take her with a sword and keep her with a sword (Esmail, 2005, p. 32). In this narrative, the worldview of a ruler who does not yet need scribal services is placed on a patriarchal representation of the use of violence. On the other hand, when the works written at the threshold of the 16th century are examined, it is not surprising to see that none of the writers evaluate with confidence to a dominance placed on the symbol of the sword alone -considering the development of the imperial regime. The texts written half a century after *Gazânâme-i Rûm* often include interpretations in which pen and sword are sometimes equivalent and sometimes the first one is superior to the second.

The first of these symbols, the pen, has references such as keeping records of the state, regulating its expenditures, carrying out the judicial function in a systematic way and being prudent (*tedbîrli*) in terms of administrative tactics and strategies. The

main signified of the pen symbol is the ulama stratum and the financial bureaucracy, and the influence and status of this stratum is legitimized by the reference of this symbol to the basic functions of the state. The second symbol, the sword, refers to the military organization of the state and accepts the effective operation of the means of violence as a guarantee of the social order. The use of the sword symbol to indicate one of the main pillars of the state should be interpreted not only as a figure of speech, but also as a representation of the position occupied by a certain social segment in class relations. In this period, it is a topic that should be emphasized that the relationship between the fields of expertise represented by the pen and sword symbols and the social segments as the subject of historical narratives, poems and political theory. The use of these two in the historical narratives of İdrîs-i Bitlisî and Konevî, and the presence of Firdevsî-i Rûmî's work entitled *Münâzara-i Seyf ü Kalem*, which is knitted around these symbols, are examples worth mentioning. The main argument of the works of the period, which has not been fully detailed, is that the pen and the sword, together, are common parts of the functioning of the state. In this representation, the figure of the pen was used in the symbolic sense of both reason, calculation, precaution, registration, consultation and religious/*shar'*i knowledge. However, this emphasis shifts according to the authors and contexts.

For example, Konevî argues that when the pen comes to 'reign' -state power and class domination- reason (*akl*) is the complement of the sword, that things that cannot be done with the sword can be done by using the reason, and therefore, the precaution/prudentia comes before the action (Salduz, 2019, p. 50). Similarly, Kemalpaşazâde, in his work called *Nesâyih*, asserts that the wealth gained in the world turns into reputation with skill, and benefit with wisdom (Türkyılmaz, 2009, pp. 87-88). The term 'skill' (*hüner*) in this argument refers to a particular technical skill, a craft. The 'craft', in the concrete sense meant by the author, refers to the financial, organizational or legal system that represents the reasonable orientation in state administration - and to the stratum of ulama who claim to have knowledge of them. In this respect, the 'pen' symbol is combined with the operation of the reason and is embodied in the spending of wealth. This view expressed by Kemalpaşazâde in the couplet "Ger zeri bostani vü ne nehi be-cay/ Ender ayed akıbet z'anki be pay" predicts the reasonable control of the spending of wealth (Türkyılmaz, 2009, p. 100).⁹⁷⁰ In this framework, administrative function is secured by being articulated with the element of

⁹⁷⁰ "If you have a garden full of gold and you don't spend it properly, it will eventually run out.

'reason', especially when it comes to financial discipline. Kemalpaşazâde considers reason as the 'partner' of the ruler and places the competent use of reason at the base of the statecraft through the argument that "the state's skill is from the perfection of reason [tm]" (Türkyılmaz, 2009, p. 89).⁹⁷¹ A similar argument can be found in Firdevsî-i Rûmî's work called *Kutbnâme*. Firdevsî-i Rûmî (2011, p. 276) argues that the state and reason should be united, otherwise the sovereignty and property will be wasted, and he underlines that intelligent people should be consulted in order to unite the reason and the state. Since this argument of Firdevsî-i Rûmî was expressed in the context of the military defeat of the King of Hungary, the term 'state' has a semantic link with military power in this usage. While there is a gradual balance between reason and sword in Konevî's argument, in Kemalpaşazâde's argument the state as a whole is placed under the rule of reason and the political tendency latent in the argument is in favor of the 'pen'. The fact that difference between two official position - Konevî is most likely a mid-level clerk, whereas Kemalpaşazâde is a high-ranking professor (*muderris*)- may explain the difference in emphasis. On the other hand, as will be seen in Firdevsî-i Rumî's work called *Münâzara-i Seyf ü Kalem*, although he tends to partially favor the pen, he foresees harmony or 'synthesis' between the two elements.

Firdevsî-i Rumî explains in his work *Münâzara-i Seyf ü Kalem* by putting the social status struggle between the representatives of the 'pen' and 'sword' symbols in the center. The fictional discussion between a soldier named Ra'd ibn Berk and a scholar named Nasır bin Faylesof takes place in front of the prophet Solomon. Because of Bayezid II, who is likened to Solomon, the discussion scene is carried to the current political world where the poet lives. The discussion is established by referring to the contradictory association of the 'pen' and the 'sword' - and therefore the social groups that are the real representatives of these two symbols - due to the fact that the conflict elements are intense throughout the text. The soldier named Ra'd ibn Berk problematizes his sitting in a lower status than Nasır bin Feylosof, claiming that the sword is superior to the pen (Tanyıldız, 2005, p. 86). In this context, it is understood that the discussion has two open and a one latent element. While the obvious elements are the pen and the sword, the latent element is the presence of the ruler, that is, the state authority, which forms the basis of the discussion. In this framework, the element of the ruler not only constitutes the dominant element that will reconcile the pen and the sword

⁹⁷¹ "Devletin hüneri kemal-i akıldandır" (Türkyılmaz, 2009, p. 89).

within the framework of an official purpose, but also is a symbol of authority that the social segments represented by the ‘pen’ and ‘sword’ implicitly try to dominate.

It is possible to briefly summarize the main arguments of the parties. First, the ‘sword’ bases its claim of superiority on the following arguments: (i) it destroys rebels and enemies and establishes social order, (ii) religious rules (*ahkam-ı şer’iye*) and justice persist with the sword, (iii) it is impossible to seize power without the sword, and the scribal men serve the sword (Tanyıldız, 2005, pp. 86-87), (iv) the conquest of property and its administration is possible with the sword, (v) the ulama and clerks owe their existence to the sword (Tanyıldız, 2005, pp. 98-105). On the other hand, the ‘pen’ argues that its dignity and virtue are superior to the ‘sword’, voicing the following arguments: (i) countries are recorded with the pen and connected by writing (“*kalem ile mazbut*” and “*rakam ile merbut*”), (ii) the pen favors the friends and drives away the enemies, (iii) the pen with the prudent does what the sword cannot do, (iv) the pen is related to the consultation and the fortune of the state and the throne of the monarch depend on it, (v) such improperness is not found in the people of the pen, while the sword owners revolt with the ambition of becoming a ruler or owning a city, (vi) sword owners spend the goods they have seized without accumulating them, and those who lose their property become despicable, while pen owners cause the goods to be accumulated before they are spent, and even if they lose their property, they will not be insulted (Tanyıldız, 2005, pp. 88-91). In this discussion, the ‘sword’ arguments embodied in the fictional character of Ra’d ibn Berk argue that violence is the determining factor in the establishment of social order and class domination, and that the status of the social segment that has the power to use violence is higher than the ‘pen’. For example, Ra’d ibn Berk attributes the values of justice and welfare traditionally attributed to the ‘pen’ to the violence of the sword: “Memleket ma’mur u abad olmaz/ Hasımı tende tolmasa kan kılıcı”⁹⁷² (Tanyıldız, 2005, p. 99). The ‘pen’ arguments represented by the fictional character Nasser bin Feylosof, on the other hand, claim superiority by highlighting some features such as prudentia/wiseness, record keeping, regulation by writing, fiscal discipline and being more docile towards the ruler’s authority.

On the other hand, this discussion in the presence of the ruler is not completed with an end in which the two sides realize their ‘irreconcilable’ contradictions and

⁹⁷² The country will not be prosperous and rich / If the sword does not fill the bodies of the enemies with blood.

continue the struggle more fiercely. On the contrary, with the intervention of the ruler, the complementary aspects of ‘pen’ and ‘sword’ are revealed, and it is argued that all three elements need each other in this framework. Firdevsî-i Rûmî states that the ruler and the country rose with the sword, but the emerging order of Sharia was ruled by the pen, and he articulates the elements of violence and regulation within the framework of the idea of common domination, saying that politics cannot be done without a sword and ruling cannot be done without a pen (Tanyıldız, 2005, p. 122). It is possible to find a second example of the forms of synthetic association established between both elements, especially in the works of İdrîs-i Bitlisî. İdrîs-i Bitlisî devoted a separate title to the relationship between ‘pen’ and ‘sword’ in the *Heşt Behişt*.⁹⁷³ Unlike Firdevsî-i Rûmî, İdrîs-i Bitlisî constructs his narrative by depicting the symbols of ‘pen’ and ‘sword’ in an essential consensus. In this respect, the tension revealed in the first stage in Firdevsî-i Rûmî and reconciled at the end has been completely suppressed in Bitlisî’s text and the tense relationship makes its presence felt as a mere subtext. Bitlisî considers the unity of the pen and the sword as the basis for the unity and harmony of sharia and leadership (*riyaset*) (Genç, 2007, p. 21). According to Bitlisî, the ‘pen’ and the ‘sword’ are the two substances that separate right and wrong, thus correcting ‘mischiefs’ and carrying out ‘benefits’ (Genç, 2007, p. 21). Bitlisî’s definition of these two elements as ‘substances’ will be better understood if the word ‘*cevher*’ is understood as an indivisible and indestructible substance in the context of Islamic philosophy, not in the sense of mineral types containing value. These two substances are accepted as the indestructible pillars of the state, and the association of these two substances emerges as the ‘chemistry’ of the state. Bitlisî states that the foundation of the road to eternal life was laid with the sword, and, the property and the body of the ruler were laid “with the pen of prudent scholars and scribes [tm]” (Genç, 2007, p. 22). Although the sword is an important element that provides social order in Bitlisî’s discourse, it is not the only basis of order. According to him, the pen also provides the order of the world because divine truths make themselves known through the pen (Genç, 2007, p. 23). In Bitlisî’s reasoning lies the idea of compatibility between divine life as the purpose of the world and the earthly order that makes it possible to reach it. Another example of the integrative discourse constructed by the author between the ‘pen’ and the ‘sword’ is found in the eighth book of *Heşt Behişt*. In this text, İdrîs-i Bitlisî depicts Bayezid II as

⁹⁷³ The same theme is repeated in a later work, *Kanun-i Şahşahi*, see: İdrîs-i Bitlisî (2022, pp. 71-72).

a ruler holding a ‘sword candle’ in one hand and a ‘sharia candle’ in the other and enlightening the world (Genç, 2014, p. 913). This description combines the elements of ‘pen’ and ‘sword’ in another common symbol - a ‘candle’ and established a kind of ‘two swords doctrine’. The interesting thing about this symbol is that the ‘candle’ is a guide in the dark. The idea contained in the symbol is that the ‘pen’ and ‘sword’ regulate worldly affairs and direct the people under their rule to eternal life, which is accepted as the truth. The introduction of the idea of life after death is both the absolute reason for the union of the ‘pen’ and the ‘sword’ and the legitimate basis of its authority. Considering that the ‘pen’ and ‘sword’ are under the control of the ruler, the ruler is accepted as the moral leader of the society, and it is seen that the ‘way of truth’ is built as the integrity of two basic forms of power -religious and military-authority. In this respect, the ‘path’ corresponds to a certain system of social order, and the ‘pen’ and ‘sword’ correspond to two regulatory mechanisms that direct this social order by symbolic or material force. At the center of this mechanism is the state organization.

VIII.II.I.II. Structure of the State: Pen Holders, Sword Bearers and Servants

When the works written at the verge of the 16th century are examined, it is noticed that İdrîs-i Bitlisî’s *Heşt Behişt* and Giovanni Maria Angiolello’s *Historia Turchesca* contain a detailed classification of the Ottoman state organization. As mentioned under the heading of this section, the observations of these two names have a remarkable importance in terms of producing the first historical texts on the structure of the Ottoman state. Both names classify the elements of the Ottoman state organization in a similar way. In general, the scheme they put forward is as follows: (i) a palace surrounded by servants, chatmates and guards, (ii) the *Diwan* where the administrative function is gathered, (iii) the military and administrative hierarchy organized under different branches in the empire capital and in the provinces.

Angiolello’s categorization of the divisions of the Ottoman state provides a detailed picture of the administrative hierarchy and division of labor. The general structure of Angiolello’s presentation focuses on three parts of the Ottoman state: (i) the ruler, personal servants and officials around the ruler, (ii) members of the *Diwan*, (iii) groups in the military hierarchy who performing specific tasks. İdrîs-i Bitlisî, on the other hand, uses a similar categorization, but also emphasizes its moral aspects. While İdrîs-i Bitlisî categorically defines the Ottoman state organization, he argues that there are six parts of the state and four pillars of the throne. Both divisions have a certain

ethical-political character together. According to Bitlisî, the parts of the state are as follows (Genç, 2014, p. 833): (i) *viziers*, (ii) *emirs* and *beylerbeyis*, (iii) high-ranking *qadis* (*qadiaskers*), (iv) *defterdars*, (v) scribes, (vi) servants and slaves.⁹⁷⁴ Bitlisî also enumerates the four moral principles he calls “the four pillars of the throne [tm]”, thus expressing the abstract projection of the power/state organization contained in the throne symbol. These four principles are (i) justice (*adâlet*), (ii) sagaciousness (*dirâyet*), (iii) courage (*şe’câat*) and (iv) protection (*muhâfaza*) (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 19; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 12). The first two of the moral qualities Bitlisî mentions are related to the activities he carries out in the *ilmiyye* stratum, which is symbolized by the ‘pen’. The justice mechanism is operated in a hierarchy ranging from *qadiaskers* to *qadis* and *naibs* serving in local courts. While the first meaning of the word ‘sagaciousness’ (*dirâye*) is ‘intelligence’, the second meaning is defined as “dexterity and power given by wisdom and experience [tm]” (Ayverdi, 2010, p. 288). In this respect, the sagaciousness of the ruler depends on the fact that he has advisors or viziers with high knowledge and experience around him and refers to the segments represented by the ‘pen’ symbol. The word ‘şe’câat’ means to be brave, and together with the word guard, it takes place in Bitlisî’s ranking as a reflection of a certain military code of ethics. In this respect, the last two elements, courage and protection, are ultimately related to the symbol of the ‘sword’. Bitlisî proposes three alternative but similar elements to these four elements in the VIIth book of *Hest Behişt*. These elements are listed as (i) wisdom (*hikmet*), (ii) bravery (*şe’câat*) and courage (*cesâret*), (iii) chastity (*iffet*) and justice (*adâlet*) (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 42; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 33).⁹⁷⁵ The first of these second group moral qualities, which Bitlisî wrote, refers to the ‘pen’, the second ‘sword’, and the third finally refers to the balanced/harmonic combination of both elements. As a result, while listing the six parts of the state, İdrîs-i Bitlisî makes a division in accordance with the moral elements discussed above, and the *qadiaskers*, treasurers,

⁹⁷⁴ Although İdrîs-i Bitlisî uses six titles in its broad definition, *Hest Behişt*’s VII. Book has gathered the same subject under four titles. These titles are; (i) *diwan* members, *emirs*, commanders, (ii) *qadiaskers*, (iii) *ehl-i kalem*, (iv) *naibs* of palace (Yıldırım, 2010, pp. 54-55; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, pp. 44-45). There is no significant difference between the six-title version and the four-title version that would radically change the interpretation.

⁹⁷⁵ These titles suggested by Bitlisî belong to the moral philosophy of Ibn Miskeveyh. Ibn Miskeveyh lists moral virtues as (i) wisdom, (ii) chastity, (iii) courage, (iv) justice (Sunar, 1980, p. 87). Radez (2019, p. xi) states that the basis of these moral principles is Plato’s ‘cardinal virtues’ scheme. The same four elements are also found in the work named *Tasvîrül-Kulûb*, which is controversially attributed to Börklüce Mustafa (Gümüšoğlu, 2015, p. 201).

clerks/writers group represented by the ‘pen’ symbol and the *emirs*, *beylerbeyis* and *hassa* soldiers represented by the ‘sword’ symbol are divided into two large categories, thus structures the ‘body’ of the state. In this framework, although the rulers and viziers are not completely excluded from these two major categories, they emerge as administrative positions that reconcile the characteristics of both categories and operate around certain purposes.

After briefly discussing the general categorization principles of both authors, it would be appropriate to mention the details of the index they wrote on the Ottoman state. Angiolello, while describing the elements of the state organization, first starts with the monarch and his personal circle - the inner palace. On the contrary, Bitlisî counts the members of the *Diwan* first, and gives the last place to the naibs of the ruler. Angiolello begins to describe the ruler’s close circle with the eunuch, the chief treasurer, and the chief cellar. According to him, the eunuch is an official who has the authority to give orders to everyone in the palace and personally directs the visitors who will meet with the ruler (Angiolello, 2022, pp. 131-32). Angiolello (2022, p. 132) secondly mentions the chief treasurer, who guarded the ruler’s valuables, money and jewels. The third person mentioned by the author, the chief cellar, is the caretaker of the food of the monarch and his family (Angiolello, 2022, p. 133). He states that one hundred young servants work under the command of each of the three eunuchs, and that in addition to these, twenty eunuchs provide communication with the gate guards of the palace, and argues that three hundred and forty people are in charge of the three eunuchs and ruler (Angiolello, 2022, p. 133). Apart from the ones listed, Angiolello (2022, pp. 134-136) listed that the existence of a butler in charge of the kitchen and fifty maids under the management of this person, there is a chief baker responsible from the kitchen, there are about forty masters, one hundred and twenty cooks, a *helva* maker, twenty-five servants who prepare bread and a chief laundryman. Finally, the author, who states that a significant part of the inner palace hosts the harem, states that the administration of this place is in the hands of the eunuch and his twenty assistants (Angiolello, 2022, p. 138). He completes the border of this inner palace organization by drawing forty soldiers who provide security at the gates (Angiolello, 2022, p. 138). İdrîs-i Bitlisî, on the other hand, mentions this structure, which can be called the inner palace organization, in terms of status relations, after the members of the *Diwan*, the *qadiaskers* and the pen holders. Bitlisî describes the group of people in this status, which he briefly discussed, as regents of the palaces and *has* relatives/friends (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 56; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p.

45). According to him, he states that there is *hacibu'l-hüccap* at the head of the palace servants group, and this officer is both the gatekeeper of the *halvethane-i Hümayun* and the *devlethane-i birun-ı divan*, and also ensures the security of the inner courtyard of the palace (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 56; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, pp. 44-45). While there are a thousand *hassa ghulam* under the command of *Hacibu'l-hüccab*, there are five hundred *ghulams* under the command of other gatekeepers (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 56; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 45). Finally, Bitlisî mentions the official who has the key to the *hazine-i sultani* (treasury of the ruler) among the distinguished members of this group (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 56; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 45).

İdrîs-i Bitlisî counts the aforementioned group of people in the category of army of the ruler, together with the *Diwan*, the army and the judges. In this respect, the concept of 'the ruler's army' functions as a meta-concept that includes both the inner palace, the administrative levels and the concept of the state in general. Angiolello, on the other hand, deals with both the close circle of the ruler and the administrative level under the term palace. It is a difference worth examining that both authors consider more than one field of expertise and practical function under the same term, and that this term includes a certain difference of perspective. Angiolello envisions the ruler's domain as an area of seignorial power organized around a *palazzo* or *maison* (household). İdrîs-i Bitlisî, on the other hand, makes a distinction between the personal circle of the dynasty and the administrative levels, but considers both under the concept of the army and envisions a common dominion area similar to Angiolello. On the other hand, while the concept of 'army' refers to a hierarchy of military purpose and legitimacy (for example, *ghaza* and pillage) and service hierarchy, the concept of 'palace' refers to a much more static field of power organized around the principle of *potestatis*. In this context, Angiolello's approach describes the Ottoman state in a framework that can be called a palace analogy, while İdrîs-i Bitlisî comprehends the same structure within the framework of the army analogy.

While writing Angiolello, he took his experiences during the reign of Mehmet II as a reference, while İdrîs-i Bitlisî wrote his historical narrative during the reign of Bayezid II. Although both approaches have terminological differences related to the cultural backgrounds of the authors, their common political cores have a factual integrity within the imperial regime. As analyzed in the previous sections, the imperial regime, as a specific state structure, on the one hand includes logico-legal organization, the elaboration of state officials and discipline, the development of the monetary

economy and military centralization, on the other hand, it brings with it the control of social forces under the decisive authority of an emperor. In this respect, the complex development and contradictory coexistence of the ruling classes and the state is presented, in the final analysis, under an imperial authority - the 'glory' of the ruler that reflects this. On the other hand, while Angiolello emphasized the central position of the emperor as a seigneur, İdrîs-i Bitlisî emphasized the frame of bureaucratic administration. In the final analysis, this dichotomy is nothing but the expression of the internal political contradiction (bureaucratic autarchy) of the imperial regime. However, it is possible to think that the dissolution of feudal relations and the establishment of the imperial regime from the period of Mehmet II to the period of Bayezid II had an effect on the difference of depictions. This connection becomes clearer as the different compartments of the comprehensive knowledge that Angiolello and İdrîs-i Bitlisî provide on the Ottoman state organization are considered.

The second title to be discussed in this subsection is the *Diwan*, which constitutes the secondary decision-making authority in the Ottoman Empire. Both Angiolello and İdrîs-i Bitlisî recognized the effectiveness of the *Diwan* organization in decision making and made it an significant part of their index. Angiolello (2022, p. 141) describes the *Diwan* as an organization where *viziers*, *qadiaskers* and treasurers, who are the high administrators under the command of the ruler, come together, state policies and problems are presented, and finally, the *qadiaskers* and the treasurers leave and the four viziers and the ruler meet and decide in confidentially. According to him, the *viziers* in the court were the advisers of the ruler and gave public speeches on behalf of the ruler, their wealth and social status were quite high as they received a generous salary (Angiolello, 2022, p. 139). The second category of officials in the *Diwan* is the *qadiaskers*, who handle juridical cases, resolve disputes and generally operate the justice mechanism in the regions under the authority of the state - and their decisions cannot be reversed except for the monarch (Angiolello, 2022, p. 139). Secondly, these officials select *qadis* and *imams* (Angiolello, 2022, p. 139). He states that *qadiaskers* receive six hundred thousand silver coins annually and gifts for their work (Angiolello, 2022, p. 139). Finally, there are two treasurers in the *Diwan* who are responsible for the execution of financial affairs (Angiolello, 2022, pp. 139-40). Angiolello (2022, pp. 141-42) also gives information about the clerks who kept the financial records, the *nişancı* who wrote the edicts, and the *veznedar* who counted the coins, although he did not mention them in the *Diwan*. As can be noticed, the framework Angiolello drew for the

Diwan organization is close to the ‘pen’ symbol. The *Diwan* resembles a kind of secretariat where counselors, clerks and jurists coexist. This design is in line with Angiolello’s general depiction of the ‘palace’ and likely has some degree of truth in how his autarkic rule looks from the outside. He states that two guards guarded the section where the council meeting was held, that these guards had assistants called *kethüüdâ*, and that the ruler appointed two secretaries as the manager of these two guards (Angiolello, 2022, pp. 144-45). İdrîs-i Bitlisî, on the other hand, offers a more detailed description of the members of the *Diwan*, which includes elements that go beyond the external view and reflect a view from the inside. According to him, there are three basic classes of officials who have a say in the *Diwan* and assume administrative functions, these are listed according to their status as (i) *viziers* and commanders, (ii) *qadiaskers*, (iii) people of the pen. Bitlisî states that the decisions of the *Diwan* are put to the vote of the members of the *Diwan*, in other words, it shows that the members of the *Diwan* assume a collective authority and responsibility in the decision-making process (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 54; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 44).

Considering the first group, Bitlisî states that this group consists of prominent *viziers* and *beylerbeyis* (Yıldırım, 2010, pp. 54-55; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 44). The *vizier*, who is the most authoritative of these, has a decisive influence in the decisions of the *Diwan*, in law practices (*icrâ-ı ahkâm*) in the regulation of the affairs of the ordinary people and the elite, in the protection of the treasury and in the management of the army during wartime (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 54-55; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 44). The second *vizier* bears the seal of the ruler, assists the first *vizier* and commands the left wing of the army in wars (Yıldırım, 2010, pp. 54-55; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 44). The other group of people who rule in the *Diwan* together with the *viziers* are the *beylerbeyis*. Bitlisî names these people as “army vizier [tm]” and pasha and states that they are interested in the control of the cavalry, the regulation of military affairs, “the collection and payment of taxes and duties, affairs about the army commanders and the payments [tm]” (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 55; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 44). Moreover, Bitlisî especially emphasizes that this group has absolute authority over the army in the region of Anatolia or Rumelia to which they are appointed (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 55; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 44). According to this task definition, persons in the status of *beylerbeyi* are generally military officials who deal with the affairs of the *sipâhî* army. In this respect, as the first part of the *Diwan* organization, *viziers* and *beylerbeyis* were structured according to the principle of the unity of the symbols of ‘pen’ and ‘sword’. The second

group that Bitlisî mentions in the *Diwan* organization is the *qadiaskers*. According to him, this group is appointed from among the distinguished *ulama* and *qadis* based on their expertise in Sharia (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 55; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 44). Their main duty is to implement the Sharia provisions, and they form the first group to be accepted in the *Diwan* and the presence of the ruler (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 55; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, pp. 44-45). The third group following the *qadiaskers* is the people of the pen. They write edicts and provisions, keep financial records and are responsible to the first *vizier* (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 55; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 45). More details on this last office will be given in the next section. As a result, the *Diwan* organization, as described by Bitlisî, is a fully authorized administrative organization under the domination of the people of the ‘pen’ and in principle, the ‘pen’ and ‘sword’ elements coexist. The point that draws attention in Bitlisî’s presentation is that the members of the *Diwan* are not a kind of secretariat as Angiolello describes, but an effective administration unit in decision-making and implementation processes.

As the last part of this sub-title, we will examine how the military organization in the Ottoman Empire was handled in Angiolello and İdrîs-i Bitlisî. Angiolello lists the elements of the monarch’s army under thirty headings.⁹⁷⁶ Twelve of these titles define combat forces directly, while eighteen are auxiliary units such as communications, military manufacture and transportation. If these units are to be listed, the combat forces are (Angiolello, 2022, pp. 146-161): (i) *silahars*, (ii) *sipâhîs*, (iii) *kapıkulu sipâhîs*, (iv) *gunnars*, (v) *Janissaries*, (vi) *cavalarymen*, (vii) *subaşıs*, (viii) *çeribaşıs*, (ix) *timariots*, (x) *akincis*, (xi) *azaps*, (xii) *cerehors*. The auxiliary forces are those (Angiolello, 2022, pp. 148-156): (i) *ulufecis*, (ii) *emir-i alem* and *mehteran*, (iii) *falcon keeper*, (iv) *cebecis*, (v) *tent mehters*, (vi) *arabacis*, (vii) *tailors*, (viii) *barn attendants*, (ix) *mule keepers*, (x) *camel keepers*, (xi) *feeders of animals*, (xii) *blacksmiths*, (xiii) *saddlers*, (xiv) *stirrup makers*, (xv) *sekbans*, (xvi) *dog keepers*, (xvii) *elephant keepers*, (xviii) *messengers*. İdrîs-i Bitlisî, on the other hand, lists the military units in a much more limited way. The units presented by Bitlisî under fifteen titles are listed as follows (Yıldırım, 2010, pp. 56-65; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, pp. 46-53): (i) *emirs*, (ii) *subaşıs*, (iii) *timariot sipâhîs*, (iv) *Janissaries*, (v) *hassa ghulams*, (vi) *müteferrikas*, (vii) *sipâhîoğlanlaris*, (viii) *silahars*, (ix) *ulufecis*, (x) *garip yiğitleris*, (xi) *azabs*, (xii) *akincis*, (xiii) *müsellems*, (xvi) *yayas*, (xv) *voynuks*.

⁹⁷⁶ In addition, the history of Behişî provides a detailed description of the navy of the Bayezid II period (Kaytaz, 2011, pp. 344-46).

The detailed lists put forward by both authors are quite different from each other in terms of listing principles. First, Angiolello gives a rather colorful list of auxiliary units, more than combat forces. It is possible to say that this list partially reflects a curiosity towards the 'oriental world' because it includes the category of elephant keepers. Secondly, Angiolello's list does not conform to the actual order of hierarchy and status. Finally, Angiolello seems to have taken an interest in the auxiliary classes, which made possible the successful organization of an army much larger than the combatant classes. On the other hand, İdrîs-i Bitlisî makes its ranking based on hierarchy and status distinctions. The remarkable aspect of Bitlisî's ranking is that he placed the *sancakbeys* and the *sipâhî* army below them in a higher status than the Janissaries. Another detail states that the group he gave under the category of *garip yiğitleri* of İdrîs-i Bitlisî was founded by "young people from Kurdistan tribes [tm]" and he claims that these people are religious people who have strong Islamic faith, and are *ahl as-sunnah*. In this context, İdrîs-i Bitlisî defends the interests of the ethnic group from which he belongs and the military-political formation on which this group is based, also within the military index. In the final analysis, Angiolello's index is structured in a non-systematic way and is mostly structured to produce the information of auxiliary units, while Bitlisî makes a systematic presentation in a way that defends the interests of social segments which articulated under the form of the feudal relations.

VIII.II.II. The Organization of Treasury, *Ehl-i Kalem* and Representations of the Property Relations

Examples of political thoughts reflecting the development of views on treasury and financial management in the Ottoman Empire are a subject that deserves to be dealt with on its own. The exposition made in the previous section on this subject shows that the transition of the Ottoman Principality from an early state structure to a developed imperial administration -with all its cultural, economic and political articulation paths- also affects the financial mentality. The early examples of Ottoman political thought and the examples that were written at the end of the 15th century and which have anti-centralization tendencies, as a whole, carry a critical distance in terms of having a large treasury and accumulating property or wealth. On the other hand, another way of thinking that developed cautiously from the beginning of the 15th century and became hegemonic at the end of the 15th century and the beginning of the 16th century, emphasizes the significance of the treasury and process of accumulation and tries to

legitimize its existence. The main characteristics of the latter trend are that they emphasize the irrefutable role of the central treasury in the reproduction of the class system, the religious and customary legitimacy of treasure hoarding, and the necessity of a specific group of experts to carry out activities such as professional planning/supervision/registration in the use of the treasury. In this context, it will be first briefly discussed the political discourse developed on owning and operating the treasure in the works of the period. Next, it will be examined how an index on the revenues of treasury became the subject of political discourse and finally how an expert group (*ehl-i hesap*) tasked with controlling treasury revenues and expenditures is represented in political discourse.

VIII.II.II.I. Treasury and Finance

In the previous section, it was discussed how the principle of fiscalism was influential in Ottoman economic and political thought. It is noticed that this principle makes itself visible again in the sources of this period. However, the level and measure of the said visibility takes a form specific to the period during the reign of Bayezid II. In general, considering the sources which are discussed throughout the thesis, it is seen that there are quite different approaches about the ruler's possession of the treasury and his savings. These approaches can be listed within a basically triple coordinate system ranging from (i) denying the legitimacy of the sovereign's possession of the treasury and cash accumulation, (ii) to making it conditional or (iii) to affirming it.

When we turn our focus to the chronicles written in the reign of Bayezid II, it is observed that the last of the three approaches, namely the affirmation of treasure or wealth accumulation, becomes more and more dominant. It is seen that especially this tendency has become evident in İdrîs-i Bitlisî's work called *Heşt Behişt* and it is tried to be grounded as a right and necessity for the ruler to have wealth. Bitlisî argues that wealth is the basis of a line from personal subsistence to world order and finally to the power of rulers—class power position. İdrîs-i Bitlisî first bases wealth by accepting ontological necessity, pointing to both *bare life* and *bios-politikos* categories. According to him, wealth is the basic substance of “human feelings and joy [tm]” and is the essential element of providing a living (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 52; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 42). Secondly, Bitlisî mentions that wealth is the first condition necessary for meeting all the aims and needs of the human species (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 52; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 42). Finally, Bitlisî states that wealth is “the strongest member of the sultan's body

[tm]” (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 52; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 42). He presents a unique use of the body metaphor in this statement. The analogy of wealth to a body part means to treat it as an instrument, and the direct association of this instrument with power posits that the ruler’s capacity to act is substantively dependent on wealth. On the other hand, Bitlisî reveals that the substantive relationship in question is not an immediate relationship, on the contrary, it is a relationship that needs to be managed/regulated. İdrîs-i Bitlisî’s theses on this subject can be listed as follows: (i) keeping all the needs of the time in order and arranging the means of magnificence depends on the order of the property and the strength of the property in several ways, (ii) sultans should always be cautious for the perpetuity of religion and property (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 52; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 42).

It would be appropriate to reevaluate these theses as a basic political economy principle proposed for the Ottoman monarchy. If Bitlisî’s theses are analyzed, three basic elements will emerge: (i) *nizam*/ order and perpetuity, (ii) *tedbîr*/prudentia, and (iii) wealth. These elements are articulated in three basic dimensions: Essential, substantial and relational. The essential dimension constitutes the essence, that is, the basic motivation, of the principle of political economy. The definition of this dimension is expressed by Bitlisî as being able to meet the ‘needs of the time’ and ‘means of magnificence’ in a controlled manner. These two expressions need to be interpreted side by side. The expression ‘needs of the time’ may refer, on one side, to the material needs of the state and the dynasty, and on the other hand, it may correspond to the livelihood needs of the people of the country. İdrîs-i Bitlisî uses the concept of ‘need’ in the same subsection as the needs/livelihood/welfare of the human species. In this case, the above expression means that production and distribution relations can be maintained in a ‘regular’ manner in a particular country. To put it more clearly, when İdrîs-i Bitlisî talks about keeping the ‘needs of the time in order’, he means the continuation of human needs, which are met through production and distribution relations, in an order that is in line with the class interests of the ruler. I think that İdrîs-i Bitlisî’s use of the expression ‘needs of the time’ and ‘means of magnificence’ side by side justifies our emphasis. As was emphasized in the previous sections, the concept of ‘magnificence’ finds its place in Ottoman political thought as a quality that a ruler must have in order to reproduce his authority. In this context, the expression ‘organizing the means of magnificence’ means keeping in order some bases that enable the ruler to reproduce his authority, that is, maintaining the instrumental relationship. This instrumental

relationship is largely related to the military power of the monarch. While both expressions refer to the foundations of the reproducibility of the ruler's power, they define these foundations, that is, the substantive level, with two other concepts. These concepts are expressed as 'the order of the property' and 'the strength of the property'. If the term 'property' (*mülk*) is understood here to mean 'state', it is possible to rename both substantive levels as the order of the state and the treasury. The common object of the said substantive level in terms of power relations is military power. İdrîs-i Bitlisî states that military power is necessary for the 'order of property and religion' in a way that restamps the circle of justice model (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 52; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 42). In the final analysis, the essence of the search for class domination represented by the ruler, its substance that requires state organization, and the structure of military and financial relations as a whole constitute the view of Bitlisî in term of political economy. In this context, Bitlisî argues that the ruler should be 'prudent' for perpetuity of religion and property (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 52; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 42). The concept of perpetuity in this expression means the maintenance of a certain power relationship model and its broad reproducibility. In this context, the concept of 'prudentia' includes reasonable foresight on one side and political action on the other. So, how is the material content of the concepts of 'reasonable foresight/caution' and 'political action' determined? When the text of İdrîs-i Bitlisî is reevaluated, it will be seen that the concept of 'prudentia' can be interpreted as instrumental control, including the rational management of both military power and the treasury. The use of the concept of measure in the economic plan also finds a response in Ottoman political thought in the form of '*ilm-i tedbîr-i devlet*' and '*ilm-i tedbîr-i menzil*'. While the first of these uses corresponds to the macro-economic plan that corresponds to the "normative balance of the economy [tm]" (Sayar, 2001, p. 108), the second one finds its counterpart in the concept of *oikonomia*, which entered Islamic thought through the works of Aristotle (Sayar, 2000, p. 84). The works of this period, which envisage the monarch to spend his wealth within the framework of the purpose-means-measure relationship and highlight some expenditure items in this context, such as military power, justice, public works or religious institutions, comprehend both *tedbîr* /prudentia approaches in a common framework. The concept of *tedbir*/prudentia in this respect refers to the spending discipline as well as the accumulation strategy of the monarch. Kemalpaşazâde points out that the discipline of spending as much as saving is determinant in terms of social order, while saying that prosperity, libation and comfort in the world ("*asayiş-i refayihet*

ile ayş ü işret ve sürur-ı rahat”) emerge through spending on goods (Türkyılmaz, 2009, pp. 104-5). The treasury or lands considered to belong to the ruler are on the one hand considered a part of the ‘house’ of the ruler, and the survival of the ‘household’ is also seen as the survival of the dynasty and the state – in the final analysis, class domination. In this respect, the macro and micro scales of the ‘household’ administration are embodied in the state structure organized around the ruler, who is the common point of the class relations bundle. In this respect, it is not a coincidence that the concept of *tedbîr/prudentia* in the sense of rational management of the ruler’s treasury is also encountered in Kemalpaşazâde’s work called *Nesâyih*. Kemalpaşazâde argues that objects stand with the soul and the soul with the reason, and if all the goods and properties of the world are presented to someone who does not have “*tedbir-i akl-i alem*” (prudentia of the reason) they will be lost and perished in a short time (Türkyılmaz, 2009, p. 87).

Wealth accumulation constitutes a field of political struggle in itself in terms of the source of this wealth, its management/supervision and its translation into social status relations. The contradiction between the agents of wealth accumulation and the agents of its control is explicitly or implicitly found in the history of political thought. Kemalpaşazâde expresses this contradiction in terms of relations of social status in his *Nesâyih*. Kemalpaşazâde’s main thesis is that the holders of knowledge have – or should have – a higher status than the owners of property and wealth. The arguments of the author are listed as follows (Türkyılmaz, 2009, p. 105): (i) scholars are more honorable in the eyes of the ruler, because the wealthy ones served their sultans and his servants to protect their own property, (ii) scholars are protected from error and trouble based on knowledge, wealthy people are restless because their lives and properties are constantly in danger, (iii) goods disappear under extraordinary circumstances, but knowledge is preserved in memory, (iv) even though property is destroyed by excessive spending or wastage, knowledge increases as it is spent, (v) ownership turns into torment in the hereafter, while the ulama can own property with their knowledge, wealthy people cannot acquire knowledge with their wealth. Kemalpaşazâde does not deny the legitimacy of the property ownership in principle, on the contrary, he sees ownership as the basis of the social order (Türkyılmaz, 2009, p. 87). On the other hand, he claims that under the five main headings as were summarized above, ownership of knowledge has a higher status as relational, essential and moral sense than ownership of wealth. In his first proposition, Kemalpaşazâde states that rulers depend on scholars, whereas wealth

owners rely on rulers for the security of their property, and shows that in this relationship model, the supporter (scholars) is superior to the seekers of a support (wealthy ones). In his second thesis, he draws attention to the moral projection of the essential difference between the two activities, stating that 'peace' as a spiritual virtue manifests itself in the owners of knowledge, but that the wealth owners cannot reach this virtue. At this point, it would be appropriate to mention an opposing view in terms of contrast. İdrîs-i Bitlisî, on the other hand, constructs the relationship between scholars and wealth with a different critical approach than Kemalpaşazâde. While Bitlisî grounds the legitimacy of possession of goods and wealth, he does not agree with the view that the owners of knowledge will essentially be more moral/rectitudinous than the owners of wealth. On the contrary, Bitlisî states very harshly that the ulama were afflicted with greed and avidity in terms of their innate temperament and nature, and that this group ate and drank at the table of the ruler till they get start gurgling because of their endless niggardness (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 51; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 40).

To continue, Kemalpaşazâde, in his third and fourth theses, draws attention to the essential difference between the ownership of knowledge and the ownership of wealth, and exemplifies that knowledge (*ilm*) is subject to the laws of the divine world rather than the laws of the realm of formation and corruption (*kevn u fesâd, coming-to-be and corruption*), through the fact that it is free from the defects of deterioration/loss/decrease like goods. Finally, with his last thesis, he logically proves that the ownership of property is a lower level than the ownership of knowledge, by mentioning that, based on religious belief, life in the hereafter will be gained not with property but with knowledge. To sum up, Kemalpaşazâde does not oppose the acquisition of property by the ruler or independent persons, but recommends that rational elements should be prioritized in the possession/expenditure of this property. In this framework, he does not develop an absolute critique against the social position of property and wealth owners, but defends the moral superiority of scholars against them. However, in this defense, it is striking that Kemalpaşazâde did not propose a clear solution on how real social relations between scholars and wealth owners should be established. Instead of an obvious solution, Kemalpaşazâde states that knowledge donates perfection and beauty, and wealth leads to good fortune, that people who do not have knowledge and do not own property are despised, and emphasizes the necessity of having these two together (Türkyılmaz, 2009, p. 134). On the other hand, he reiterates his criticism by pointing out that the words of the wealth owners (*maldars*) are valued

in the elite assemblies, but the dervishes are despised. As a result, Kemalpaşazâde develops a normative criticism based on a notion of justice that centers social status relations and limits his thesis to this framework. This framework is a critical framework that does not focus on the accumulation and use of property by the ruler, but on the third party's ownership of property and wealth and their conversion to social status. In this respect, Kemalpaşazâde's ideas contain a certain overlap with the tendency of fiscalism in the Ottoman administration.

The classical Ottoman discourse developed and frequently repeated on the accumulation and wise spending of goods/wealth is based on the circle of justice model. However, the notion of justice, which occupies an important place in the classical circle of justice model, has almost completely disappeared from the Bitlisi's interpretation. The reason for this difference - to put it more clearly, the notion of justice is ignored - is that Bitlisi tries to analyze the necessity of the ruler to have a large treasury in a very realistic way, that is, he puts the idea of guaranteeing certain ruling privileges with political and economic power. In this respect, it can be said that the classical circle of justice model has turned into the model of a circle of wealth in the Bitlisi's interpretation.⁹⁷⁷ In this new model, wealth becomes the dominant substance of the ruler's class position and is supported by military/financial state organization. The point of view underlying Bitlisi's realist interpretation lies in the author's approach to military and financial organization as two different areas of expertise -and making them compatible with each other. The distinction between 'pencil and sword', which was analyzed at the beginning of this subsection, in this respect, is based on the separation and specialization of military, financial and ideological organizations. As was discussed in the previous chapter, this distinction should be read as synonymous with a definitive break from military chiefdoms or early state structures, in which the war-loot-distribution nexus was organized as a whole, and the construction of a sophisticated imperial structure. For this very reason, the organization of military conquests and the security organization does not directly correspond to the financial structure itself, and the relationship between them becomes more and more external. Therefore, the reproduction of the ruler's power is based not only on wealth, but also on the registration and systematic spending of this wealth - therefore on the discipline of finance. In this framework, as well as grounding the legitimacy of the ruler's wealth, taking an

⁹⁷⁷ For a criticism directed against the arguments that wealth accumulation is necessary for the continuity of the state, see: Korkud (2022, pp. 49-50, 211-12).

inventory of the resources of this wealth and making it rationally manageable – and therefore reproducible – has become one of the basic elements of political thought. I will try to exemplify this situation through the development of the state official called the *ehl-i kalem* and representations of different relations of ownership.

VIII.II.II.II. Scribal Service (*Ehl-i Kalem*)

Firdevsî-i Rûmî, in his poetic work *Kutbnâme*, describes the death of the Grand Vizier of the Bayezid II era, Mesih Pasha, and the replacement of him with Ahmed Pasha with the following lines (2011, p. 179): “Pes vezâret mesnedi kaldı tehî/ Zabt ider yok mülki vü mâl-i şehi (...) Hükm-i Sultan bu ki ta’cil gidesin/ Şâh için mâl cem’in anda idesin”.⁹⁷⁸ In these lines, registering the wealth and property of the ruler is used almost in the same sense as the seizure of property and wealth, the same political value is attributed to these two modalities, and moreover, they are both entrusted to the same vizier office. While listing the revenues of the Ottoman treasury, the author of *Heşt Behişt*, İdrîs-i Bitlisî, uses a new term that will give an idea about how the maritime trade was recorded and taxed. According to Bitlisî, “sea-side records [tm]” keep a record of such commercial relations and as it is understood from Bitlisî’s access to them, these records are shared with offices of the central state (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 85; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 71). As the cash revenues and expenses of the Ottoman Empire’s finances increased, recording this monetary circulation gains significance in terms of both efficient taxation of these resources and regulating expenses. Depending on the development of the finance organization, the increase in pedagogical needs for the theory and practices of finance has also encouraged the writing of reference works on the subject. Fazlıoğlu (2003, pp. 349-50) shows that since the period of Bayezid I, a series of translations and original works on accounting have been written, and although some of them have not survived, the subject of accounting mathematics has been carefully studied. If we briefly list these works those ones could be counted; Ali b. Hibetullah’s *Hulâsatu’l-mihnâc fî ilmi’l-hisâb*, Abdurrahman Bistamî’s *Durretu funûni’l-kuttâb ve kurratu uyûni’l-hussâb*, *Mebâhucu’l-elbâb fî menâhici ilmi’-hisâb* and *Kitâbu’d-darb ve’l-kısme*, Mahmud Kadî-i Manyas’s *A’cebu’l-‘uccâb*, Hayreddin Halil bin İbrahim’s *Miftâh-i kunûz-i erbâb-i kalem ve misbâh-i rumûz-i eshâb-ı rakam*, a translation made by Pir Mahmud Sıdkî Edirnevî named *Tercemetü miftâh-i kunûz-i*

⁹⁷⁸ The vizier's office is empty/ No one records the property and wealth of the ruler/ Sultan's decree is that go immediately/ Collect wealth for the ruler as soon as possible.

erbâb- i kalem ve misbâh-i rumûz-i eshâb-ı rakam, another translation made by Muhyiddin Mehmed named *Tercemetü 'l-fasli 's-sâdis 'aşara fî beyâni 'l-hata'eyn min miftâh-i kunûz-i er- bâb-i kalem ve misbah-i rumuz-i eshab-ı rakam*, *Miftâhu 'l-hussâb* which was written by an anonymous writer, Hamza Balı b. Arslan's *Misbâhu 'l-Kunûz* (Fazlıoğlu, 2003, pp. 349-354). In addition, Muhyeddin Muhammed's work named *Mecma 'ü'l-Kavâ'id*, which was written in 1494, should be counted among these names. In the introduction of the *Mecma 'ü'l-Kavâ'id*, which was written on accounting principles, he states that accounting is a very necessary and honorable science (*ilm*) and that wise people need it and dedicates the work to Bayezid II (Özçelik, 2009, pp. 105-6). The fact that the work is the first applied accounting book written for the Ottoman state (Küçükler & Can, 2020, p. 2-3), indicates the tendency of the financial system to be standardized in the 15th century.

Although the importance of financial recording and expenditure discipline in terms of reproducing the state apparatus and thus class dominance was recognized quite early, its regulation within the state organization was institutionalized with Mehmet II's organizational law (*Teşkilât Kanunnâmesi*).⁹⁷⁹ According to this law, the *reîsülküttab* (chief treasurer, *başdefterdar*) is considered as the representative of all the properties belonging to the ruler, and no income can be recorded in the treasury without his registration (Özcan, 1981, p. 36).⁹⁸⁰ The law also states that all the treasurers under the *reîsülküttab* are considered to be the representatives of the property of the monarch and that dozens of lesser clerks will be appointed and dismissed (Özcan, 1981, p. 36). In addition, the law appoints the grand vizier as the manager of this entire financial process and characterizes it as the most general representative of the property of the monarch (Özcan, 1981, p. 30). Thus, a four-level scribal service hierarchy, ranging from the grand vizier to the ordinary treasurers, emerges. Angiolello (2022, p. 141) stated that the clerks working in the central organization were about forty people, they received a salary of thirty to three hundred silver coins, there was a manager named *avianbarsi/divanbassi* in their management, three of them calculated the treasury

⁹⁷⁹ İnalçık (2021a, p. 10) states that from the arrangement of the Arnavid region *icmal* registrations dated 1431, the *tahrir*-statistics methods were applied at this date and the references in the book can be traced back to the period of Bayezid I. In the light of this interpretation, it is seen that the development of the registry systematic goes back to the early periods of the Ottoman state.

⁹⁸⁰ For the discussions that the office of *reîsülküttab* may have been added to the law of Mehmet II later, see: Ahışhalı (2007).

revenues and three of them treasury expenses, that the books of all these transactions were recorded. It states that it is kept and sealed and stored. In fact, he records that a cashier who receives a daily salary of fifty *akçes* is in charge of counting coins and employs ten assistants with a salary of eight *akçes* (Angiolello, 2022, p. 142).

Considering the central and provincial branches, it is undoubted that this hierarchy was one of the main pillars of the Ottoman state organization. Despite this, it will be necessary to wait until the beginning of the 16th century -following the reign of Mehmet II- for the aforementioned organization or the group of officials carrying out this work to be named definitively. Fleischer (1986b, p. 311) states that during the reign of Mehmet II, the institution of the revenue office (*defterdarlık*) was inherited from the Ilkhanate financial system and that this was the basis of the Ottoman financial bureaucracy. İpşirli (2001) states that there is no general concept or term to describe the civil servant group in question in the organizational code published by Mehmet II, and that the definition of *Diwan-ı Hümâyun* and treasury officers, and bookkeepers as “*kalemiye erbabi*” took place after the 16th century. Although İpşirli (2001) points to the period of Suleyman I in terms of the acceptance of this term and the emergence of specialization in bureaucracy, the sources of the period we examined present different data on this subject.⁹⁸¹

İdrîs-i Bitlisî, while listing the highest level of Ottoman state administrators, mentions a category of experts that he calls *sahib-i kalem*. This category corresponds to the third of the four main sections within the high state bureaucracy and is divided into two sub-sections. According to Bitlisî, these two groups generally work as “accountants of unlimited supplies” and clerks of law (“*menşur ve ahkam-ı ‘alem-intizamın katipleri*”) (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 55; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 45). The first group mentioned in the category of *sahib-i kalem* is the bookkeepers who keep the financial records. Bitlisî states that this group is the “*ehl-i hesab*”, that they record the goods, report to the ruler in the *Diwan*, and that their suggestions are put into practice if accepted by the grand vizier’s office (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 55; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 45). According to Bitlisî, there is one treasurer from Anatolia and Rumelia in this category, and they are chosen from among those who are knowledgeable in the sciences, especially in the “*ilm-i Hikmet*” (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 55; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 45). The second group is

⁹⁸¹ İpşirli (2021, p. 185) states that two professional groups, namely *ilmiye* and *seyfiye*, became prominent during the reign of Mehmet II, and that the *kalemiye* was organized later, but he accepts a certain concentration in the financial-registrations in this way.

menşur and *ahkâm* (prose and provision) writers and edict writers and they are called “*tuğrayî*” (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 55; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012; p. 45).

As it can be understood from the definitions of İdrîs-i Bitlisî, the keeping and evaluation of financial records in the Ottoman Empire became systematic and its organizational structure became clear during this period. İdrîs-i Bitlisî book deals with the finance organization consisting of two treasurers with the duty areas of which are Rumelia and Anatolia, in *Heşt Behişt*'s VIIth Book which he devoted to the reign of Mehmet II. This situation presents a crucial consistency with the issues stated in the organizational law. Fleischer (1986b, p. 311) states that first the treasurer of Rumelia (*defterdar*) was appointed, and then, with the establishment of the treasurer office of Anatolia (*defstardarlık*) and the development of the financial system, the treasurer Rumelia became a “general supervisor of all imperial finances” and began to serve the *Diwan*. Findley (1989, p. 6) states that this service group consists of officials who handle government correspondence, keep financial records, and record land tenures. The social position of the said administrative section, on the other hand, needs to be analyzed sociologically. According to Findley (1980, p. 51), although this group was organized in the 16th century, it still constitutes a small group and functions under the grand vizier. Findley (1989, pp. 6-7) argues that this group first served as servants of the monarch in accordance with the state typology shaped around the “extended household model” of the patrimonial monarchy, and with the 18th century they had more decisive administrative positions as a member of the ruling class. Findley (1989, p. 8) states that the group of clerks earn their living – instead of regular salary in the modern sense – with the help of revue-collection rights/prebends.

Although Findley's interpretation cannot be considered completely wrong, it needs some corrections. Although Findley's voluminous studies (1980, 1988), which still remain the main reference source, are important in that they contain detailed analyzes of the Ottoman financial bureaucracy, they have an over-simplifying opinion about the early nature of the scribal service as he focuses on the development of the modern bureaucracy. First of all, it can be claimed based on the existence of the members of the scribal service, who are referred to as the *ehl-i kalem*, that they are not as small a group as one might think. As was mentioned above, the four-level hierarchy from the clerks holding the seaside registers to the chief executives (such as *reisülküttab*) gives an idea about the extent of the vertical and horizontal organization of this group. Darling's (2019, pp. 41-43) studies of Ottoman financial records reveal

that their comprehensive structure has been developing since at least the reign of Murat I. İnalçık (2021a, p. 29) argues that there was a great improvement in *Diwan* writing styles during the reign of Bayezid I, citing Arabic and Persian scripts as examples. Küçükler and Can (2020, p. 57) state that the term '*defterdar*' has been used at least since the reign of Murat II, and the financial organization became more complex as the empire expanded. Secondly, the fact that this group is mentioned among the four basic classes (*ümera*, *qadiaskers*, *ehl-i kalem*, palace *naibs*) that use the authority of imperial administration and are under the supervision of ruler provides an important clue about their administrative authority and responsibilities. Also, in *Heşt Behişt*, which was written at the beginning of the 16th century, a special section is reserved for the *defterdars* and the leading figures of the period are mentioned with their names and authorities for the first time in the history of Ottoman political thought. In this respect, İdrîs-i Bitlisî gives information about the names of Mevlânâ Muhyiddin Mehmed, Feylesofoğlu Ahmed Çelebi, Cenderecioğlu Mustafa Çelebi, Alaeddin Ali Çelebi son Zağanos Pasha, the sons of Mevlânâ Yegen, Hüseyin Çelebi, Kasım Çelebi, Cemaleddinoğlu Pir Mehmed Çelebi, who keep the registry records (Genç, 2014, pp. 881-83). The fact that the *defterdars* were given information that they came from distinguished families and that they were honored in this way reveals the recognition and status of the organization in question.

This group, which is responsible for keeping the imperial financial records, securing land assignments and conducting government correspondence, has a partial autonomy against the other members of the council because it is considered directly responsible to the grand vizier. Finally, the fact that this group has large land incomes is the most important feature that shows that they should be accepted within the rentier ruling class. In addition, the realization of the payments made to the members of the financial bureaucracy in the form of land income instead of salary has been the subject of an application that was re-enacted as a kind of reversal after the 17th century, contrary to Findley's modernization approach. As Darling (2019, p. 69) shows, despite the fact that the number of finance personnel has not decreased since the middle of the 17th century, the fact that they are financed by alternative income sources instead of salaries is important in terms of indicating a certain pass-through -contrary to Findley's approach.

VIII.II.III. Ownership Representations Between Booty and Property

The ownership structure in the Ottoman Empire and how it was represented in the political discourse constitute an important historical problem. When the emphasis on property in the historical narratives were have discussed is carefully examined, it is striking that there are serious differences between them. Considering that the history books written at the verge of the 16th century, especially which presented a military narrative and portrayed an expanding empire with wars and land conquests, how the landed and movable assets were shared and owned becomes a direct or indirect part of these narratives. In the examples of political thought discussed in this historical period, representations of more than one form of ownership are encountered. These forms are divided into three basic typologies in terms of their origins, structures and corresponding social segments. These typologies can be listed as (i) booty ownership, (ii) conditional ownership, (iii) absolute ownership. To the extent that these typologies become the subject of the history of political thought, they become ‘property norms’ and their legitimacy is reinforced through political discourse produced around them. Thus, as well as definition of the politics includes social struggles around the right and status relations, the problem of representations of ownership patterns also should be evaluated as a part of political relations and political thought.

The social struggle over these forms of appropriation becomes visible in the way these forms are represented in various historical narratives. For this reason, how the forms of ownership or appropriation/possession are represented in the narrative of chronicles becomes a subject of the history of political thought. How the various values such as lands, cities, mines and war spoils/loot mentioned in the chronicles of the period were appropriated are subject to different emphases. For example, in Kemalpaşazâde’s book *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman*, the theme of war and land acquisition is often conveyed to the reader by referring to the revenues of plunder, whereas the lands appropriated by people or groups close to the dynasty and large raider families in the status of *mülk* or *zeâmet* are excluded from the narrative of history. On the other hand, in İdrîs-i Bitlisî’s work *Heşt Behişt*, private property or similar forms of land assignment are often included in the historical narrative in the distribution of newly acquired lands. The aforementioned differences in emphasis are open to interpretation as a kind of difference of political representation in the final analysis. The struggles between the various classes and social strata that shaped the Ottoman Empire focused especially on the issues of land ownership and the appropriation of land rent. In this respect, the problem

of how appropriated income and income sources are described in the political discourse in the newly conquered lands is also integrated with the problem of the representation of the social segments that claim dominance over these resources. The most general judgment that can be made about the forms and representations of appropriation that will be discussed in this section is that they have not achieved a satisfactory 'index' in political thought. The sophistication of the organizational index that was discussed in the previous section, the consistency in the development line of the geopolitical index, and the level of detail of the historical index that it will be discussed later do not apply to forms of appropriation. This is probably because in the empire on the verge of the sixteenth century, the incompatibility between *de facto* and *de jure* forms of property were much greater than historiographical literature had supposed. Although this conflict was tried to be resolved in the first half of the 16th century, especially with the *Kanunnâme* of Budin, it would continue to exist until the *Tanzîmat* era. In this respect, I think it can be seen that the reliability of the Ottoman land law and registers are drawn towards a multilayered field of struggle by the political thought included in the Ottoman historiography.

VIII.II.III.I. Appropriation in the Form of Booty

Let's first start with the analysis of the elements in the historical narrative constructed by Kemalpaşazâde. Kemalpaşazâde evaluates the appropriation of movable assets in the form of booty throughout the detailed notebooks of his work *Tevârih-i Âli Osman* as the central element of his narrative. The fact that the booty form has become the central narrative brings with it the representation of two other important economic elements. These are (i) the burning and destruction of a given region in a way that damages the productive infrastructure, and (ii) the extraction of a certain share of the loot for the ruler's treasury. In this context, the relations of appropriation that developed in the form of plunder also bear the traces of an expansion policy based on frontier lords and raider unions, and the power relations between these elements and the central state. Let us now try to illustrate and analyze these elements. Kemalpaşazâde frequently uses the theme of plunder while describing the military expeditions that took place during the reign of Murat I. For example, Kemalpaşazâde, who states that the raiders destroyed the entire region during the campaigns on *Kösova*, states that "one side of this place was destroyed [tm]" during the campaigns to the lands of Serbia and captives and booty were obtained (Satun, 2009, pp. 66, 69). While discussing the raiding activities that took

place during the reign of Murat II, Kemalpaşazâde states that these soldiers headed towards the surrounding areas of the region where they were being campaigned and they burned and destroyed everything without leaving any household (Yılmaz, 2018a, p. 126). Moreover, the information in the history of Behiştî (Kaytaç, 2011, p. 143) that *Beyleybeyi* of Rumelia Sinan Beg raided and destroyed the province of Laz (Serbia) during the Murat II period, and that he plundered and obtained booty is a similar example. The following expressions used by Kemalpaşazâde while describing the campaigns carried out against the Aq Qoyunlu state during the reign of Mehmet II are another example (Turan, 1991, p. 332): “Ak-koyunlu’nun otağına ol ac kurdları gönderdi, varan akıncının hayl-ı bi-meyli ol bucağı at ayağına çiğnedüb it yatağına dönderdi; Akşar ve Bayburd yöresin kara yurd idüb seylab-ı ilgarla ol diyarun ocağın söyündürdü”.⁹⁸² Tâcizâde Câfer Çelebi, in his book *Mahrûse-i İstanbul Fetihnâmesi*, describes the spoils gained by the capture of Istanbul as follows (Başkurt & Doğan, 2020, p. 55);

Şol denlü evani-yi zerrin ve simin var idi ki ol mikdar çemenlerde semen ü nesrin yoğıdı. Bir veçhile ganimet oldu ki gaziler altını gül gibi siperle üleşdiler ve gonca gibi rengin kumaşlardan hayme vü hargah doldırdılar. Ol gazada bulunanlara bir veçhile gına geldi ki sığar u kibar manend-i cuybar ömürleri oldıkça simi su gibi harç iderlerdi. Hatta şimdi dahi beyne’n-nas mesel olmuşdır. Bir kimesne bezl ü israf yolın tutsa ‘İstanbul yağmasında bile miydün?’ dirler.⁹⁸³

A political formulation in the history of Behiştî outlines the form of appropriation in the form of booty in terms of general political relations. According to Behiştî, the appropriation of the booty makes the country prosperous, makes the cavalry happy, and the prosperity of the country and the soldier fills the treasury of the ruler (Kaytaç, 2011, pp. 115-16). Behiştî’s formulation is reminiscent of the circle of justice model, but it is noteworthy that it does not include the element of *reâyâ* or justice. In this respect, this

⁹⁸² He sent hungry wolves to the pasture of Aq-Qoyunlu, many ruthless raiders trampled that area under horses' feet and turned it into a dog bed; He made the *Akşar* and *Bayburd* regions a place of fire and destroyed the hearth of theregion with attacks like floods.

⁹⁸³ There was so much variety of gold and silver that there were no jasmine and roses in all the grass. It was a trophy that the ghazis divided the gold into bowls like roses and filled large tents of rose-coloured fabrics. The ghazis were so fed up that they would waste silver like water as long as they lived, similar to large and small rivers. Even now, there has been a story among the people. If someone were to be generous and wasteful, they would say, 'Were you in plunder of Istanbul?'

model can be called *circle of booty* with a new name. In this model, although there is a vague royal treasury, this treasury is likely to be personal—that is, not take the form of a treasury of a state under the control of bureaucracy. In this framework, the model as be called the *circle of booty* depends on the presence of irregular or semi-regular military units in raids to obtain booty, and in this model, a part of the booty is extracted by the ruler. It is clear that this model does not make any reference to rent incomes or landed property.

As it is known, the extraction of a part of the booty by the Ottoman ruler took place with the suggestion of Halil Pasha and Kara Rüstem during the reign of Murat I. The representation of this practice in Ottoman political thought is the subject of conflicting approaches. The first of these approaches is the humiliation of Halil Pasha and Rüstem and a negative attitude towards the extraction practice in question. To give an example, the unknown author of the anonymous chronicle published by Giese (1992, p. 33), Ahmedî (2018, p. 577), and Âşikpaşazâde (2017, p. 75) are examples of the first approach – as were pointed out in previous chapters. On the other hand, especially when we come to the 16th century, it is seen that these negative approaches started to disappear from the historical narratives and left their place to the examples in which this extraction practice was affirmed. For example, there is no negative adjective for Kara Çandarlı Halil or Kara Rüstem in the history of Neşrî (1949, p. 197). In the history of Konevî, the vizier of Çandarlı Halil is associated with the suggestion of the sheikh of Qadiriyya in this period. According to the narrative in the history of Konevî, Murat I, one day, thinks with a pure heart and a perfect creed, researches his surroundings for the advancement of the country's affairs and the spiritual needs of the country, and chooses the Qadiriyya sheikh Mevlânâ Sheikh Fahrüddin Efendi as the vizier (Salduz, 2019, p. 44). Qadiriyya Sheikh recommends Çandarlı Halil to him (Salduz, 2019, p. 44). In the continuation of this story, there is information that Murat I's soldiers returned to Bursa by obtaining booty, and that they collected the treasures they took from the castles, cities and provinces in the "*havzay-ı tasarruf*" (pool of savings/ deposit account) (Salduz, 2019, p. 46). The same narrative about the appointment of Çandarlı Halil to the vizierate also takes place in the history of Kemalpaşazâde without any obvious difference (Satun, 2009, pp. 3-4). İdrîs-i Bitlisî similarly affirms Çandarlı Halil Pasha and his role in the establishment of the state (Genç, 2014, p. 840; Koçarlan, 2019, pp. 180-81). However, the fact that the affirmation in question reaches its highest form is the legitimation of the practice initiated by Kara Rüstem -and therefore Çandarlı Halil-

through mystification. In the *menâkıbnâme* of Seyyid Ali Sultan, the lines in which the Ottoman ruler of the period begged God and the ruler was informed that he would come to him with a answer from God which evangels an arrive of an assistant from Khorasan is a typical example in this respect (Yıldırım, 2007, p. 162). According to the author of the *menâkıbnâme*, the person who came to be appointed by God is Rüstem, and Prophet Muhammed orders the Ottoman ruler to implement the taxation method taken from the booty proposed by the Rüstem (Yıldırım, 2007, p. 166). Similarly, Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî (1987, p. 42; 1990, p. 193) mentions two examples where Sarı Saltuk sent a share of the booty to the Seljuk ruler, and in the second example he especially emphasizes that this is a necessity - and draws attention to the one-fifth rate. In this context, the practice of giving the ruler a share of the booty was supported by legendary warrior-saint figures such as Sarı Saltuk and placed in popular narratives, which more or less indicates the existence of a social struggle around this practice. If the aforementioned examples are subject to a general interpretation, the negative reaction seen in the trio of Ahmedî, Âşıkpaşazâde and Giese anonymous against Çandarlı Halil and the practice of the ruler's share of the booty can be interpreted as an extension of the political thought or world view of the declassé groups who directly participated in the war/plunder. For this reason, the reaction was largely the reflection of a specific historical period when the Ottoman power was established at the early state level, the central state power was not yet developed, and class distinctions were partially inchoate. Although it is clear that we do not have enough information about the modeling of the political order in this period due to limited historical sources, it is possible to think that a structure in which the booty is seized collectively or individually and shared with the war chief is idealized. Moreover, within this framework, the circle of booty model can be considered as the intermediate link of the transition from the traditional tribal practice in which the booty is divided by the war chieftain, to an early state model in which the central state is partially control and supervise the distribution. On the other hand, when the 16th century is especially focused on, it is seen that the reaction against the ruler's share of the loot is excluded from the semi-official Ottoman historiography. This situation has two meanings. First of all, since the Çandarlı family was reassigned to the *Diwan* membership with the Bayezid II period and regained its former power, it is no longer preferable for chroniclers to develop a critique of their family history. For this reason, the narrative of history had to be reshaped and built a discourse that would mean restitution. Secondly, this practice is also advocated as a part of ruling class

consciousness, since the Ottoman state separated from its early state form and became a mature empire, class relations became clear, and administrative hierarchy developed depending on the extraction of a part of the booty revenues by the ruler. Moreover, as be seen in the histories of Konevî and Kemalpaşazâde, *Saltuknâme* and especially in the *menâkıbnâme* of Seyyid Ali Sultan, this practice was mystified in order to make propaganda among the groups participating in the plundering raids. In the final analysis, appropriation in the form of booty - the tradition of plunder - is a form that excludes the control of a certain authority in its development. The only valid authority structure in this form is based on *ad-hocratic* authority, in which a given war chief becomes the conciliator to settle disputes that may arise over the division of the loot. On the other hand, the fact that the Ottoman military expeditions began to be planned by the central state emerged simultaneously with the attempt to control the booty revenues by the ruler. In this respect, the authority of the war chief is tried to be replaced by the authority of the Ottoman ruler, and at the same time, a certain financial control is developed over the booty revenues. In this respect, the two different approaches that we tried to illustrate above reflect the political struggle between the raiders who directly appropriate the booty and the central state representators that indirectly extracts the booty revenues. The political struggle in question bears the traces of the evolution of the booty from absolute ownership to a kind of conditional ownership.

VIII.II.III.II.II. Conditional Ownership Forms

The form of ownership representation, which will be discussed second in this subsection, is conditional ownership. The basic forms of this form, which is widely discussed in the literature of Ottoman history, are the lands distributed in the status of *timar* or *dirlik*. In addition to the aforementioned basic forms, lands that have attained the status of *waqf* can also be evaluated under the conditional ownership form. In addition to these lands, examples where the revenues of a particular region or city are donated by the monarch to members of the military class for a certain period of time can also be evaluated under the same category. In this period, the main sources that represent the conditional ownership forms are the chronicles of Behiştî and Neşrî. In these sources, *timar* grants are often mentioned and affirmed, similar to the predominance of appropriation forms under the booty form as was mentioned previously. On the other hand, there is no direct criticism against this form of ownership in other sources where conditional ownership forms are not frequently represented, and

the demand for the inheritance of land from father to son, such as *timars*, becomes the subject of political thoughts.

Contrary to the representation of booty, the representation of conditional ownership presents the ruler's permission or ratification, which is expressed under the forms of consent/grant/assignment, as the basis of possession and definitive a condition of ownership. In this environment, three basic typologies of narratives containing contingent property forms emerge: (i) the distribution of newly conquered territories among the warriors, (ii) the transfer of the right of possession on land for a certain period of time for administrative purposes, (iii) the transformation of the absolute ownership forms into conditional ones, whose origins date back to pre-Ottoman rule. If there is a need to exemplify these typologies, it would be appropriate to start with how the practice carried out in the newly conquered areas was reflected in the historical narratives.

Neşrî (1949, p. 113) states that the area around Köprühisar was conquered with looting and the area around it was allocated to *timar* holders (“*timar erlerine tevzic*”). A significant point underlined by the author is that the villages around Iznik are allocated to *timar* holders with “*emn-u aman*” (by giving quarter) which means that the land allocation is both (i) a security relationship between the ruler and the peasants, and (ii) a regulative relation between the ruler and the warriors. Similarly, the villages around Izmit/Yalakova were divided among the *timar* holders (*timar erleri*) whereas the *Ermeni-pazari* was grant to *Yahşilu* and *Kandri* to the administration of Akbaş (Neşrî, 1949, p. 153). If Neşrî's narrative is followed, it is seen that the income of Bilecik was grant to Sheik Edebâli as a *timar* in the period of Osman Beg, while the administration of small towns in central locations such as Karacahisar, Yarhisar and İnegöl was grant to dynasty members or military leaders (Neşrî, 1949, p. 113). A dual narrative is encountered here. First, when a certain region is captured, the center of this region is grant to the military commanders, whereas the surrounding villages are most likely given as fiefs to the warriors gathered around this commander. In other words, an articulation emerges between the first and second typologies of ownership. The form of ownership under which the town or city-scale central regions were given is not clearly stated in the historical sources of this period. The reason for this may be that the status of some lands given as private property (*mülk*) in the 14th century was changed in the 15th and 16th centuries, and the historians were cautious not to lay claim of ownership rights about these lands. Another reason is that in the period when the relevant towns and cities were assign to the administration of certain people, this practice was not based

on a definite form of ownership, that is, this possessions was determined largely within the framework of personal relations with the monarch.⁹⁸⁴ If this explanation is taken as a basis, the lands in question should be considered as places that are disposed of depending on a kind of conditional ownership which shaped under the form of feudal political relations and rentier mode of production.

When the primary historical sources are examined, it is noticed that there are some evaluations that cannot be considered fully consistent about the land consignments in accordance with this typology in the narratives based on the conditional property form. For example, Behiştî states that some newly acquired lands around Plovdiv during the reign of Murat II were turned into “*sancağ*” and given to Mezid Beg (Kaytaç, 2011, p. 144). In Behiştî’s statements, there is no clarity as to the status of the places in question, and the knowledge of turning the region into a sanjak comes after the knowledge of giving the lands to Mezid Beg. In this case, it is possible to conclude that there is a unity that has not undergone linguistic/legal/ideological differentiation between administrative authority and the rights of possession and ownership. Similarly, in the history of Kemalpaşazâde, the administrators of certain cities are mentioned as “*ümera-i sahib-i liva*” (Imazawa, 2000, p. 21). In fact, Kemalpaşazâde uses the term “*şehr emiri*” for Umur Beg, the son of Timurtaş Beg, one of the prominent commanders of the reign of Bayezid I (Imazawa, 2000, p. 263). It is possible to understand how this expression can be interpreted from two different sources. Firstly, Neşrî (1949, p. 167) states that Orhan Beg gave the province of Karasi as “*mansib*” to his son Suleyman Pasha. This transformation of the status of a specific property is seen as a kind of gift by İdrîs-i Bitlisî. He states that Isfendiyarid dynasty are descendants of Halid b. Velid, and therefore they were respected by the Ottoman rulers, and for this reason, their properties were “transformed” (*tebdil*) and they were given provincial and city management in Anatolia and Rumelia (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 80; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 66). The witness of the period Angiolello (2022, p. 42) claims that Plovdiv and Sofia were gifted to the Isfendiyarid dynasty.⁹⁸⁵ On the other hand, in the history of

⁹⁸⁴ A similar situation can be seen in the history of the Anatolian Seljuks. For example, İzzeddin Keykavus I distributed Niğde, Malatya and Elbistan to his comrades, see Gordlevski (1988, p. 133).

⁹⁸⁵ In *Saltuknâme*, there are examples where Seljuk and Crimean rulers entrusted a certain city. Ebü'l-Hayr-ı Rûmî (1987, p. 27, 89) mentions two separate examples where Kayseri is given as *timar* and Kefe is given as *dirlik*. On the other hand, the fact that Ebü'l-Hayr-ı Rûmî (1987, p. 27; 1988, p. 219) also mentions the examples in which “the sultanate in the property of Kirvan”

Kemalpaşazâde, there is a statement for Murat II that “alduđı vilayetin hasılın leşkere üleşdürürdi (...) bir kimseye mülk bađışlasa karye virmez, şehir virürdi” (Yılmaz, 2018a, p. 172).⁹⁸⁶ The issue of distribution of land to the soldiers in Kemalpaşazâde’s statement is equivalent to the distribution of *timars* mentioned above. However, when the distribution of *timars* and the deposit of cities are mentioned side by side, it is remarkable that the latter is mentioned under the form of private property (*mülk*). In this case, the ownership relationship, which is about cities, can emerge in both the ‘*mansib*’ and ‘*mülk*’ forms. On the other hand, it is seen that the giving of cities as a property is also the subject of an implicit criticism in Kemalpaşazâde. Kemalpaşazâde states that Murat II donated the city of Gallipoli to a female singer as a private property, but it is claimed that the members of the *Diwan* took the city back and freed it the next day in exchange for money (Yılmaz, 2018a, p. 172).⁹⁸⁷ This detail expressed by Kemalpaşazâde is quite remarkable. The fact that the members of the *Diwan* reincorporated a city that was given the status of private property into the property of the ruler shows that a social segment whose interests conflict with the absolute ownership of the segments other than the ruler can be effective in the *Diwan*. The reason for this may be that this social group allocates the opportunity to acquire property to their own social group, or it may also be that they see the conditional ownership form more suitable for their own interests. On the other hand, in Firdevsî-i Rûmî’s (2011, p. 33) work called *Kutbnâme*, the fact that the ruler gave city and property to anyone he wanted turns into a rhetoric used to praise Bayezid II. Firdevsî-i Rûmî’s talk of such donations as a poet with enthusiasm can be explained by his need for a patronage relationship that includes large monetary donations, even if it is not a city. In the final analysis, the existence of two different social groups that make positive and negative judgments about such practices and the differentiation of interests between these two groups is crystallized through the representation in political thought.

The last typology, in which the conditional ownership form is the subject of political discourse, is that the ruler changes the status of the properties in the newly conquered lands. When primary historical sources are examined, it is seen that the

and Mount Alagöz are given as “private property” (*mülk*) shows that he makes a clearer distinction between *timar/dirlik* and absolute forms of ownership.

⁹⁸⁶ He would divide the whole of the province he conquered among the soldiers (...) if he donated property to anyone, he would not give a village, he would give a city.

⁹⁸⁷ For another criticism about granting wealth and property to slaves, singers and poets, see: Korkud (2022, p. 233).

mentioned status change emerged in three forms: (i) from private property to *mukata'a*, (ii) from private property to *timar*, (iii) from private property to *waqf* and *harâcî* status lands. The first example of conditional ownership appears in the form of converting from private property to *mukata'a*. The term '*mukata'a*' comes from the root '*kat*', meaning to cut, and means mutual agreement, engagement, reaching an agreement in return for an amount (Genç, 2020). In the works of this period, the form of conditional ownership in this status takes place in the literature as the redistribution of private property status houses under the status of *mukata'a*. Especially after the capture of Istanbul, Mehmet II first distributed these houses as private property, then gave them the status of *mukata'a* (i.e. rent), re-accepting the status of private property after the reactions, and reverting these houses to the status of *mukata'a*, together with the previous and negative opinions discussed in the previous sections. For this reason, instead of repeating the subject, it will be sufficient to remember these examples only in order to see how much the transitivity between the statuses can be in the case of conditional ownership forms.⁹⁸⁸

The second form, the conversion from private property to *timar*, is seen especially in the examples of the abolition of the private property status of the lands of the Christian rulers in Rumelia and the local principalities in Anatolia. While addressing the history of the reign of Mehmet II, Kemalpaşazâde states that the most distinctive feature of this ruler was to expand his country by oppressing the *cihandars*, to take the properties of the private owners in Rum and to give them to his servants (Turan, 1991, p. 5). This argument more or less applicable to the rulers who preceded Mehmet II, and moreover, another obscure facet of this argument is the fate of those whose private property was confiscated. In the history of Behiştî, it is possible to find some information about the fate of former ruling class members whose properties were confiscated. According to Behiştî, the castle of a local landowner named Haydar Beg, who owns a castle in the Kocakayası area around Osmançık, is conquered by deception, and Haydar Beg, who surrenders the castle at the last moment, is placed in a *timar* suitable for his social status (Kaytaz, 2011, p. 150). In another example in the history of Behiştî, Hüseyin Beg, son of Canik ruler Alp Aslan, escaped while traveling to Bursa to hand over his lands to Murat II and to meet the ruler. When he met with the ruler two years later, he was given a *timar* in Rumelia (Kaytaz, 2011, p. 150). It is possible to

⁹⁸⁸ Tâcizâde Câfer Çelebi unequivocally states that these houses were distributed by giving "*mülkname-i hümayun*", or giving the status of private property (Başkurt & Doğan, 2020, p. 58).

come across similar information about the conversion of privately owned lands into *timars* in the history of Neşrî. For example, according to the history of Neşrî (1957, p. 755), Mehmet II confiscated the lands of Kızıl Ahmet Beg from İsfendiyarid dynasty, distributed these lands among his servants, and grant a *timar* to Kızıl Ahmet Beg in Rumelia. In another example, it is seen that Mehmet II seized the lands of Kılıç Arslan, the Beg of Alâiye and grant Komotini and his entourage as a *timar* to him (Neşrî, 1957, p 795). In addition, it is recorded by the history of Neşrî that Mehmet II grant *dirliks* to the Ungurus soldiers in Anatolia after the Kara Bogdan (Moldavia) expedition (Neşrî, 1957, p. 821). Angiolello (2022, p. 42) states that during the reign of Mehmet II, Constantia near Edirne was given to the Emperor of Trabzon as a gift. The status of this last example is not entirely clear. Finally, since the issue of converting a substantial amount of land in the status of private property and *waqf* to *timar* status during the reign of Mehmet II was discussed in the previous sections, it did not need to be repeated here.

Finally, the third of the conditional forms of ownership are *waqfs* and *harâcî* lands. *Waqf* lands are lands that the state apparatus can control *-de jure* at least- and change its status in certain cases where the *waqf* loses its function. In terms of use, it is an instrument used by certain families, high administrators and members of the ruling dynasty to secure private property, as well as for the conduct of public affairs. It is known that after the death of Bayezid I in Neşrî (1957, p. 431), many lands in the status of foundation were distributed for the construction of soup kitchens. Endowments made for the purpose of building and operating an *imaret* or charitable institution also correspond to a different conditional ownership relationship in terms of the return of some of the foundation incomes to the treasury. There is information that after the death of Bayezid I in Neşrî (1957, p. 431), many lands in the status of *waqf* were distributed for the establishment of *imarets*. Endowments made for the purpose of building and operating an *imaret* or charity organization also correspond to a different conditional ownership relationship in terms of the return of some of the *waqf* incomes to the treasury. İdrîs-i Bitlisî states that the remaining three hundred thousand *akçes* from the *waqfs* operating during the reign of Bayezid II were recorded as income to the central treasury (Genç, 2014, p. 548). The example cited by İdrîs-i Bitlisî shows how *waqfs*, as an example of conditional form of ownership, are articulated with absolute ownership due to central state control. Secondly, a special form of tributary lands, namely local governments that are freed in their internal affairs on the condition of paying tribute, needs to be considered. It is conceivable that subordinated kingdoms from which tribute

is extracted also exercise some kind of conditional property right. For example, Firdevsî-i Rûmî gives clear advice to the rulers of tributary states, reminding them of the relations of dependency so that they can maintain their state and fortune as well as dominant class position (2011, p. 280): “Ger dilersen devletün gitmeye çüst/ Vir harâcî Padişâha ol dûst”.⁹⁸⁹ Although the dominant form of ownership in such political units emerges in the form of private ownership of the dominant class due to their internal structure, the ability of these classes to reproduce their dominance depends on satisfying the financial and administrative conditions imposed by the Ottoman ruling class. When these conditions are not satisfied, the Ottoman ruler can appoint new rulers to these regions and even make the lands his private property. For example, Firdevsî-i Rûmî (2011, pp. 96-97) in his work *Kutbnâme* states that the king of Hungary, who was called the ruler of Beni Asfar by Bayezid II, thought he was the king but could not go beyond being a small “*Ban*”, he was weak enough to pay a feeble tribute to the Ottoman state. It includes verses stating that the sultan's raiders were plundering his country and that he could not be considered as a lord. In other lines of the poem, there is information that Bayezid II turned *Ban*'s lands into *timars* when they were already established as private property (Firdevsî-i Rûmî, 2011, p. 96). Although the ownership of the lands in this status is considered conditional property, the incomes obtained from these lands are the subject of absolute property in terms of transferring the treasury of the monarch, and for this reason, it will be discussed in this form in the following section.

VIII.II.II.III.III. Absolute Ownership Forms and the Problem of Representation

In the Ottoman historiography, the representation of absolute property forms in the period we are considering can be positioned under three main headings as follows: (i) tributes received from subordinated rulers and subjects, (ii) private properties belonging to individuals (iii) incomes extracted by the ruler from natural resources. If we start by considering the first title, it is seen that the tributes/taxes from the *harâcî* lands is one of the main incomes of the state finance and is considered as a source of a social status because it depends on the military success of the monarch. Kemalpaşazâde, describing the military achievements of Mehmet II, uses such an expression that “bir mülkün bac'ın alub bir meliki haraca kesti”⁹⁹⁰ (Turan, 1991, p. 5). This expression

⁹⁸⁹ If you want your state/fortune/majesty not to disappear quickly/ Pay tribute to the sultan and befriend him.

⁹⁹⁰ He took the tax of a property and forced a ruler to pay tribute.

shows that extortion is based on private property relations on one side, and on the other hand, it can be considered as an expression of a status relation specific to the rentier mode of production. İdrîs-i Bitlisî defines the source of the said income as “the conquests made by force and persecution and the tithes and tributes taken from the countries, towns and land” (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 81; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 67). He states that the revenues in this status were handed over to the treasury by the administrators of regions such as Moldavia, Wallachia, Venice, Chios, Dubrovnik, and that these administrators thought they were “kaisers on their own [tm]” (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 81-82; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 67). It is understood from this expression that the mentioned regions are considered to be partially independent, but in reality, there is no such situation exist and they are subject to a dependency relationship with the Ottoman state in a special status. This relationship, on the one hand, brings about the fact that the private or public property in the relevant regions is dependent on the ruler’s assurance - that is, it approaches the conditional property form as stated in the previous section - and on the other hand, a certain tribute is appropriated by the ruler and the state in return for the assurance of the Ottoman ruler. Bitlisî informs that the tribute received from the Christian rulers is registered in the “*hazine-i amire*” and had a sum of forty million *akçes*, corresponding to ten million dirhams of silver (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 81; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 67). Two origins of this income category can be mentioned. The general origin is that the Ottoman military advance abolished the security of private property in certain regions, and thus extracted a cash rent from local ruling class.⁹⁹¹ In particular, it can be thought that the tribute collected in the form of *jizya* is not just a simple tax payment, but is paid in return for the right to life, and in this respect, it has a similar aspect with the tribute received from the Christian rulers. Secondly, it is in question that the social segments, who still maintain the right to own private property at the local level, shared a part of the exploitation revenues with the Ottoman state in return for property security. The examples in which the private property guarantee in question disappeared are mentioned in the historical records of this period. For example, Behiştî states that during the reign of Mehmet II, the Moldavian ruler did not send his tribute, this was interpreted as a sign of rebellion against the Ottoman state, and it was ordered that the tribute be brought personally (Kaytaç, 2011, p. 278). In the example cited by

⁹⁹¹ As Cezar (1986, p. 28) stated, the incomes obtained from the *timar* system are not transferred to the center. For this reason, the related incomes and the social segments that try to dominate them crystallize apart from the *sipâhîs* who directly appropriate the ground rent.

Behiştî, it is clear that not sending the tribute poses a serious risk to the class position and even to the life of the local ruler. As a third form, the child levy can be mentioned. With the capture of a certain region, the people of this region became the subjects of the ruler and especially the Christian population was placed under the status of dependency due to tribute relations, making it possible for the ruler to collect captives from these subjects as his personal property. Secondly, Bitlisî states that the people of the regions liable to pay the *jizye* and *kharaj* were considered the “*mamluks*” (slave, servant) of the sultan, and that one boy from each family was taken and raised in the name of the state (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 59; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 47-48). In this respect, the child levy corresponds to a relationship that is received in return for the right to live and transforms the protection of the existing status into rent, and constitutes a historical category of the labor-rent form.

Rent revenues collected in the form of tribute and their representation as an absolute form of ownership are not clear in Ottoman historical sources. In the examples were given above, there is also a subtext worth discussing about the appropriation of tribute proceeds. The dominant representation about the appropriation of tribute revenues is that they are the personal property of the monarch. The conquest of new countries, the emergence of neighborly relations with new rulers or changes in the religio-cultural affiliation of the subjects are translated into a certain rent income depending on the political-conjunctural power of the Ottoman ruler. The fact that such incomes were directly at the disposal of the ruler, especially in the early period, should be accepted as a political norm considering the early state structure. On the other hand, the development and institutionalization of the imperial organization in this historical period makes it necessary to reconsider the issue of administration of the indicated revenues. In this context, it would be appropriate to draw attention to two details. In a passage quoted above, Bitlisî states that tribute income is recorded as an input to the “*hazine-i amire*” (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 81; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 67). According to Orhonlu (1998), the Ottoman treasury consisted of two units, *Enderûn* (*hazine-i hassa*, inner treasury) and *Birûn* (*hazine-i amire*, outer treasury) until the end of the 18th century, thus he states that the first of these is used as a reserve treasury and the second one is used as a central treasury. Considering the transformation phases of the Ottoman financial organization, it is seen that the inner treasury was allocated to the expenditures of the ruler in the historical process in terms of restricting the expenditures of the ruler (Tozduman-Terzi, 1998). On the other hand, it has been shown in the previous sections

that the Ottoman rulers had personal inheritances in terms of movable assets and even donated their assets in money and precious stones to various charitable and religious activities after their death. For this reason, the principle that the personal wealth of the monarch can be separated from the state treasury to a certain extent should be considered partially valid for the 15th century as well. For example, Angiolello (2022, p. 132) presents the treasurers (*defterdar*), who keep the records of the central treasury, and the chief treasurer (*hazinedarbaşı*), who preserves the precious metals and jewels distributed by the ruler as gifts and gives them to the ruler when requested, under separate headings. In this context, the term “*hazîne-i âmire*” used by İdrîs-i Bitlisî bears a certain trace of a financial structure in which expenditures are regulated bureaucratically, although it is strictly controlled by the ruler. In fact, some implicit criticisms of the expenditures of monarchs mentioned in historical sources are placed in a similar context in that they indirectly affirm bureaucratic control over financial resources. To give an example, Behiştî expresses with ferly that Murat II granted Mevlânâ Hâkim Sinaneddin with more than one hundred thousand *jaziyes* (*akçe*, money) for an ode (Kaytaz, 2011, p. 151). Kemalpaşazâde, on the other hand, states that when Mehmet II came to the throne, the treasury was empty and he spent his own jewels to go on a military expedition (Yılmaz, 2018a, p. 172).

In the final analysis, the sources of Ottoman political thought had various political tendencies that oscillated between the generosity of the ruler and the decisiveness of the fiscal discipline, and with the strengthening of a tendency in favor of the second norm regarding the use of the private property of the ruler, it gains a form suitable for its own period. The ideological and political framework of this new form is drawn around the financial bureaucracy’s record-based and rational control over the expenditure of cash income. Cezar (1986, p. 28) argues that the revenues of the *Hazîne-i Âmire* should be considered rather small compared to all financial revenues in the Ottoman country, moreover, seventy percent of these revenues were used to cover the expenses of the *Kapıkulus*, and the rest was allocated to the expenditures of the palace. The fact that the treasury is protected by the *Kapıkulu* army in the case of interregnum period shows how dependent the group in question is on cash income. In this respect, the dominant relationship between the income and expenses of the treasury can be formulated as the relationship between the military power and the financing of the *Kapıkulu* members. This relationship gains a second dimension as the monarch spends the resources at his disposal for gifts, honors or public works (charity works, religious

buildings, etc.). The relationship between revenues of treasury and the financing of *Kapıkulu* army indirectly affects the necessity of fiscal discipline and the development of the fiscal bureaucracy. Although this situation does not completely remove the tribute and similar revenues from being the absolute property of the monarch, it attributes the use of these revenues to two determining factors, which can be listed as the financing of the *Kapıkulus* and the control of the financial bureaucracy, and thus the financial organization will have a relative autonomy. The increase in this autonomy put the *timar* incomes under the financial mediation of the central state since the end of the 16th century and caused the development of the tax farming system.

The second form of private property representation, which will be discussed in this subsection, deals with the properties belonging to the dynasty and the people around it. An important part of these properties were the lands controlled by the frontier lords in the process of Ottoman territorial expansion and the lands that were appropriated by the dynasty and the circles close to the dynasty. The status of the lands in question is often given in a complex terminology, and the complexity of the terminology makes the transitivity of the statuses and thus the struggle over property visible. Especially in İdrîs-i Bitlisî's work called *Heşt Behişt*, a competent representation of the prevalence and legitimacy of lands in various property statuses during the establishment period of the Ottoman state is presented. The representation of ownership relations in the history of Bitlisî systematically brings together social stratification and forms of appropriation based. A second point is that while İdrîs-i Bitlisî places the forms of appropriation within the narrative of history, he generally mentions the examples of forms of conditional and absolute ownership together. In this form of representation, land 'allocations' and 'inherited *waqfs*', '*iktâs*' and '*mülks*', 'independent seignorial' areas and regions under administrative subordination come together. Let us first consider the lands given to Derviş Tarud, a disciple of Sheikh Edebâli, and Kumral Abdal, who is understood to be a wandering dervish, during the reign of Osman Beg. According to Bitlisî, after Osman Beg had his famous dream interpreted, he promised Derviş Tarud, who demanded a town from him, that he would meet this request, and allocated (*tahsis*) a lodge, villages and fields to him (Genç, 2007, p. 146). The term 'allocation' (*tahsis*) used by Bitlisî suggests that the transfer of property took place in a conditional status, but the fact that the author shares the information that Derviş Tarud's children still control and earn their living from this region complicates the issue (Genç, 2007, p.

146).⁹⁹² In the history of Rûhî, there is an information that Osman Beg promised to give a city to Derviş Tarud, but the dervish demanded a village (Yücel & Cengiz, 1992, p. 380), the terms ‘allocation’ or ‘*waqf*’ are not included in this narrative. The second example is that a dervish named Kumral Abdal evangelizes Osman Beg as his reign of religion and the world, and in return, he endowed a region around the *Ermeni Derbendi* to Kumral Abdal (Genç, 2007, pp. 148-49). In these two successive examples, the terms ‘allocation’ and ‘*waqf*’ are used and it is underlined that these practices continued until Bitlisî’s period. The terminological confusion in the land grant method mentioned in the examples is due to the fact that their grant status is not entirely clear. Most likely, the lands given during the Ottoman establishment period were granted as private properties based on interpersonal affiliation relations (or feudal relations) without written records, however, they gained official status over time and their status was reshaped in line with the interests of the central state. As a result of this, some of the given lands gained the status of *waqf*, in some of them the private property was protected by narrowing, and it was partially passed to the conditional property form such as *iqta/dirlik*. A similar situation can be found in the information about Samsa Çavuş. According to İdrîs-i Bitlisî, Osman Beg left one of the castles in Lefke to the charge of Samsa Çavuş, and thus Samsa Çavuş began to rule that region with the title of an ‘independent ruler’ (“*müstakil hakim*”) (Genç, 2007, pp. 239-40). As stated in the first part of our thesis, Samsa Çavuş was a rentier who received tribute from a Christian community around the Sakarya river before the conquests of Osman Beg began. In this case, it can be mentioned that Osman Beg did not donate land to him, but a fortified castle where he could manage his lands as a seigneur. In this case, the dominance over the land that made Samsa Çavuş an independent ruler should be based on absolute ownership, not conditional, and the feudal loyalty relationship is reinforced by Osman Beg’s donation of a castle. In the period of Orhan Beg, there is information in İdrîs-i Bitlisî that Samandra was given to Ağca Hacı, that Ağca Hacı made this place the center of his government and owns the entire property and was ‘independent’ there (Koçarslan, 2019, p. 153). Bitlisî makes a similar relationship visible in the examples where Osman Beg distributed the castles he dominated to military leaders. According to Bitlisî, Osman Beg “distributed all the provinces and fortresses under possession (...)

⁹⁹² Bitlisî uses the term allocation as a general category, which can correspond to forms of absolute ownership or conditional ownership. For example, he states that after Osman Beg’s death, the horses owned by him were made “*merbut*” (bonded) to their riders and were not given to anyone else with property allocation (*mülkiyet tahsisi*) (Koçarslan, 2019, p. 118).

to the commanders and soldiers of the mujahideen [tm]” (Genç, 2007, p. 2018). In this installment, it is seen that both Orhan Beg and Gündüz Alp, who were members of the dynasty, bought a castle, and Aygud Alp, Hasan Alp and Turgud Alp, who were *ghazi* commanders, own a country and a castle (Genç, 2007, p. 220). Bitlisî does not give clear information about the ownership status of the said division. On the other hand, since it is clearly stated in the following lines that other names who have the same status as the *ghazi* commanders mentioned above, received *ıqtâ*, it is possible to think that their grants here also have the status of private property, but this status was later reformed. Bitlisî, who informed that in the region owned by Ağca Hacı, sites and villages were distributed among the *ghazis*, and that the *Ermeni Pazarı* and *Kandıra* were donated to Akbaş Ghazi and Bahışlu Ghazi, Bitlisî draws a panorama in accordance with the principles of feudal property distribution, albeit implicitly (Koçarslan, 2019, p. 153).

Bitlisî also focuses on the land acquisitions of the Ottoman dynasty and people who can be considered as close to the dynasty such as tribe members or *nökers*. For this reason, *ıqtâ* and *mülk* statuses are transitive with each other. For example, according to Bitlisî, Aygud Alp’s son Kara Ali added the castle named *Tekfurpinari* to his other *ıqtâs* as an assignment (*temlik*) in return for his military successes around Ulubad (Genç, 2007, pp. 237, 242). In this example, both the terms ‘*temlik*’ and ‘*ıqtâ*’ are used together. As stated by Aybakan (2011), the term ‘*temlik*’ means the transfer of the right of private ownership, different from the terms ‘*tefviz*’ or ‘*tahsis*’. The fact that it was emphasized that Kara Ali was included in the group of the children of warriors from the *Kayı* tribe, who came to Söğüt with Ertugrul Beg, can explain the transitivity between the terms *temlik* and *ıqtâ*. The fact that the anecdote in question occurred in the early Ottoman period, that is, in a phase when feudal relations as an early state form was dominant, secures the property relation on the basis of a verbal agreement between the lord and his allies. This agreement is in the form of the lord appointing the properties held by the high-ranking warriors, limited to his own lifetime, and providing assurance, in return for the warriors to be bound by the duty of military service to the lord. The fact that the recognition of property is limited to time-life is due to the fact that the state has not developed yet to keep property records and give them historical continuity, that is, the early state form was limited to personal loyalty. In another example in Bitlisî, it is seen that Orhan Beg, after conquering a castle on the way to Kocaeli, assigned the administration of this place to a warrior named Karaceş, who ruled that castle until his death, protected the border and the name of the castle was called Karaceş since 16th

century (Genç, 2007, p. 253). Although it is known that in the case of Karaceyş castle, the allocation of the castle took place together with a military assignment, the fact that the warrior dominated it until the end of his life is an ambiguous example that falls between the conditional and absolute forms of ownership.

On the other hand, there is a different emphasis in another example where the term *ıqtâ* is used for the same period. In the example given by Bitlisî, Orhan Beg peacefully surrenders a castle around Bursa, known as Alp Sofu, and grants it to Konur Alp (Genç, 2007, p. 254). In this example, the fact that the castle was taken peacefully, not by war, transfers it directly to Orhan Beg's ownership, and for this reason, he transfers a place in his possession to someone else with the status of *ıqtâ*. For example, some of the lands between *Iznikmid* and *Balakova*, which the ruler seized directly during the period of Orhan Beg, were donated to Kara Mürsel, and the status of the remaining neighborhoods was "determined by his own soldiers [tm]" (Koçarslan, 2019, p. 172). In this context, the main property allocation rule in the establishment period of Ottoman state was that when a place was captured, those who participated in this war would acquire property within the framework of their status, receive a share of the booty, and if the region was captured by *emannâme* (letter of quarter), the property remained with the ruler, but donations were made to the warriors. Clear examples of this situation emerge on the examples of *Hereke*, *Tarakçı Yenicesi*, *Göynük* and *Mudurnu* captured during the Orhan Beg period. İdrîs-i Bitlisî states that *Hereke* and in general the regions around *Iznikmid* that came under Ottoman rule remained under the direct ownership of the ruler and this situation continued until the 16th century (Koçarslan, 2019, p. 173). The same situation is valid for *Tarakçı Yenicesi*, *Göynük* and *Mudurnu*, and according to Bitlisî, these regions were taken over by *emannâme* and passed under Ottoman rule, therefore, there were no looting or captives (Koçarslan, 2019, p. 205). The information in the history of the Konevî that the *Amasra* castle became the "property of the sultan [tm]" during the reign of Mehmet II can also be evaluated within the same framework (Salduz, 2019, p. 66). Moreover, for example, Bitlisî states that the Akkerman castle, which was captured with an *emannâme* during the reign of Bayezid II, was directly appropriated by the ruler (Genç, 2014, p. 624).

Expressing the forms of appropriation in Bitlisî's narrative with different terms such as *tasarruf* (possession or manage), *bağış* (donation or grant), *mülk* (private property), *ıqtâ* (prebend) has a certain meaning in terms of the political discourse of the 16th century. Although Bitlisî uses the aforementioned complex terminology, while

summarizing the subject in the final analysis, he states that the ruler assigns *ıqtâs* to each warrior according to the “vast of their power [tm]” and argues that all of these lands are inherited from generation to generation among the warriors (Koçarslan, 2019, pp. 205- 6). This framework drawn by Bitlisî (i) refers to the category of “*çiftlikten hisse*” which is not used in the text directly, (ii) considers all land grants as “*ıqtâ*” and (iii) posits the inheritability of lands as a general principle. The lands in the status of *hisseli çiftlik* probably correspond to the lands in the status of *mâlikâne-dîvânî*, which will increase in political importance in the second half of the 15th century and the 16th century in Ottoman Empire, but Bitlisî’s proposal is quite anachronistic one, since this status did not have a significant importance for the establishment period of the Ottoman state. Secondly, Bitlisî used the term *ıqtâ* as an overarching concept for the general category of property, not as a specific term for conditional forms of ownership. Finally, the emphasis on the inheritability of lands shows that the expectation for land consignment is largely based on absolute property rights. It is possible to see another representation in this regard in Tâcîzâde Câfer Çelebi’s book *Mahrûse-i İstanbul Fetihnâmesi*. Tâcîzâde Câfer states that Mehmet II made land promises to the soldiers before the final attack for the conquest of Istanbul and lists the promises as follows (Başkurt & Doğan, 2020, p. 50): (i) those who have not received *dirlik* will receive more *dirlik* than usual, (ii) *dirlik* holders will be promoted to office of *subaşı*, (iii) *subaşı* will be promoted to sanjak lords, (iv) sanjak lords will promoted to the rank of *beylerbeyi*. According to Tâcîzâde Câfer, these promises will be granted with religious provisions, the rights of those who acquire the land will be transferred to their children until the extinction of their generation, and they will be recognized by the Ottoman state (Başkurt & Doğan, 2020, p. 50). Tâcîzâde Câfer draws attention to the fact that after these promises, presented with a guarantee similar to the right of private property, the soldiers gathered, made wills and are ready for war (Baskurt & Dogan, 2020, p. 50).

The historical discourse in which the work of İdrîs-i Bitlisî includes the representation of conditional and absolute forms of ownership has two basic qualities in this respect: (i) affirmation of appropriations in the form of private property among the forms of land consignment, (ii) the privilege of a certain nobility in land appropriation. İdrîs-i Bitlisî deepens his judgments about the mentioned first quality around the fiction of a dream myth in the text he has constructed. While the famous dream myth examined in the previous sections heralds the establishment of the Ottoman state, the second dream that Bitlisî mentions is a guide for the organization of the state

and the continuity of the class structure. Although Bitlisî does not describe the content of the dream, he lists the arrangements that the dream indicates at length. According to İdrîs-i Bitlisî, the expansion of the Ottoman state with conquests would develop depending on its inheritance from father to son and their securing the rights of the warriors who were with them during their rule, which will gain historical continuity. Bitlisî argues that mujahideen/warriors are “partners in religious and worldly interests [tm]” and therefore (i) the descendants of the deceased warrior should be given a share from the treasury, (ii) children should inherit their father’s rights, (iii) even if the children are small, they should receive their father's share and when they grow up, they should be accepted in the *askerî* class (Genç, 2007, pp. 226-27). Secondly, there is a certain emphasis on the idea of nobility in the text of İdrîs-i Bitlisî. In many of the examples were listed above, Osman Beg’s relatives, tribal warriors or members of the dynasty are mentioned while talking about the land and castle endowments, and even information about the genealogy of these people is given. For example, İdrîs-i Bitlisî states that before he died, Osman Beg gathered Sheikh Edebâli, Ahi Şemseddin, Ahi Hüseyin, Turgud Alp, Saltuk Alp, Çandarlı Halil and Karaoğlu with him to state his will, thus referring to a certain group that he considered to have rights over the administration (Genç, 2007, p. 276). Bitlisî’s proposition that noble sons will emerge from noble families, that “the fertile lineages will find prudence [tm]” will arise from the “unification of intelligent roots [tm]” (Genç, 2007, p. 249), and thus that treasures can be preserved for generations, it is open to interpretation in a way that points to the same theme. Considering the period of Bayezid II, when Bitlisî wrote *Heşt Behişt*, it is seen that the Ottoman dynasty developed marriage ties both with the dynasties of the principalities ruling before the Ottoman rule and with the officials at various levels in the state. These ties are quantitatively much higher than in previous periods, especially considering the large number of Bayezid II’s wives and children.⁹⁹³ According to detailed analysis of Uluçay (2012, pp. 213-30), Bayezid II personally married members of the Dulkadirid, Karamaid and Crimean Tatar dynasties, and made married his sons to members of dynasties such as Isfendiyarid, the Crimean Tatar family, and the Safavids, he made married his daughters to local dynasty members and state officials of the rank such as *beylerbeyi/sancakbeyleri/kapicibaşı*. Alderson (1999, p. 144) finds that

⁹⁹³ For a large diagram showing the family members of Bayezid II, see: Alderson (1999, p. 241-43). In addition, Reindl’s (2014) comprehensive monograph also provides detailed information on marital ties.

Bayezid II made it a political principle to marry his daughters especially to the most prestigious subordinates. In this context, in the short biographical notes Bitlisî wrote about some of the prestigious *ulama* and commanders who served in the *Diwan* during the reign of Bayezid II, he especially includes the genealogy of these people dating back to the Ottoman establishment period. Moreover, the fact that a large passage has been allocated to the *mansibs* and estates under the use of these people in the historical narrative is another important indicator revealing the author's opinion about an unofficial nobility. To briefly point out, the names that Bitlisî mentioned can be listed as follows; Mustafa Pasha, son of Hamza Beg (Genç, 2014, p. 834), Davud Pasha, who his son become the groom of the monarch family (Genç, 2014, p. 836), Mehmed Pasha, son of Hızır Beg (Genç, 2014, p. 839), Fenârî and Çandarlı family members (Genç, 2014, pp. 839-41), İskender Pasha and his son Mustafa Beg (Genç, 2014, p. 842), Yahya Pasha the groom (Genç, 2014, pp. 857-58), etc. Although Bitlisî lists these names who served the Ottoman dynasty for a long time and even became members of the dynasty, it is also striking that especially with the reign of Mehmet II, the high officials were largely held by people of *devshirme* origin. In this respect, the representation of the link between lineage and property also indirectly includes a kind of historical legitimacy claim regarding the social status and class position of commander and *ulama* families.

As the last subject of this section, the representations of the stocks managed by the monarch within the framework of the absolute ownership relationship will be discussed. İdrîs-i Bitlisî provides a very detailed index of the stock income of the Ottoman ruler. Bitlisî divides the treasury revenues into two main headings. Some of these are tithes and tributes taken from towns and land, *fey* and booty, taxes collected from dhimmis who own goods and estates, and looting revenues (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 81; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 67). The second part is the income recorded in the treasury through the exploitation, trade and taxation of valuable natural resources. As had discussed above the first category incomes mentioned by Bitlisî listed as representations of the forms of appropriation. In this section, it will be concluded this subsection by mentioning only the category of precious metals included in the ruler's treasury. İdrîs-i Bitlisî states that these sources of income are under the direct control of the ruler, that is, they are considered his private property in terms of legal status, and he starts the index of these sources with gold mines. According to Bitlisî, the Ottoman ruler had twenty gold mines in Rumelia and five in Anatolia, and according to the records of accountants, pure gold as much as the big finger of the hand is obtained from these

mines every day, and approximately three-fifths of it (as much as the little finger of the hand) registered the treasury of the ruler (Yıldırım, 2010, pp. 82-83; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 68). Secondly, Bitlisî deals with iron mines and states that these mines are especially abundant in Rumelia and -as was discussed before- they are commodities in long-distance trade (Yıldırım, 2010, pp. 83-84; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 69). The third mine that İdrîs-i Bitlisî mentions is copper, and according to him, the copper mines concentrated in Rumelia are much higher yields than the regions of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan and become a commodity for long-distance trade (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 84; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 69). Bitlisî is the fourth subject of salt mines and states that the income from salt sales to the treasury is higher than most other mines (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 85; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 70). Remarkable points in all this count-index table of İdrîs-i Bitlisî: (i) systematic recording of sources of income, (ii) mine revenues are largely based on long-distance trade, (iii) no metal other than gold enters the treasury directly. These three topics are ultimately interrelated. While Bitlisî asserts the property right of the ruler over the mines, the exercise of this right depends on the income generated as a result of the production in the property and the sale of its commodities. For example, the income of Kastamonu copper is recorded as eighty thousand *Rûmî akçes* per day after deducting the 'labor costs' (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 84; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 69). Iron was represented not as an object which embodies the value, but as a commodity that "brings income like mountains [tm]" (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 83-84; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 69). In this framework, the property right of the ruler over the mines corresponds to the representation of the ruler as absolute rentier. On the other hand, this right is realized depending on the conversion of a real estate into a movable value. For this reason, the ruler's utilization of the right to property depends on the appreciation of this property as a commodity, which is not seen in other representations of ownership. To the extent that commodity value depends on the process of production—and its realization in circulation—the ruler's absolute right of ownership is articulated with the conditional right of possession of the secondary rentiers. For example, Bitlisî states that only three-fifths of the gold obtained from the gold mines were registered the treasury, but does not give information about what kind of distribution the remaining part is. The said composite situation is integrated with the affirmation of both conditional forms of property -for example, mining tenures- and commercial relations in terms of realizing the property right of the ruler.

As a result, it is seen that in the literature written at the verge of the 16th century, the relations of ownership (and possession) are represented in more than one form, which is different from each other and in some cases conflicting. This complexity would increase even more if the regular records kept by the Ottoman state on land ownership are taken into account. Because at the factual level, there is a pass-through between the ownership forms on the land, and at the intellectual level, the representation of the land appropriation forms is given in a terminological complexity. A good example of the transition between appropriation forms is the estates of Princess Şah Sultan, one of the daughters of Bayezid II. Uluçay (2012, p. 230) states that Bayezid II ‘granted’ (*ihsan*) four villages to his daughter in 1492 in Dimetoka, and the *mülknâme* for these villages was written in 1506, but, It is reported that Shah Sultan donated these properties to the mosque and primary school, which he had built in Edirne in 1506. In the light of this information, a complex situation emerges in which there are fourteen years between ‘bestowal/grant’ and ‘appropriation’ and the estate is tried to be protected by turning its status into *waqf* as it is acquired, but under this form, a share is also allocated for public services. In the final analysis, there are complex historical relationships in which the dominant position of a certain group that has possession on properties does not change, but the status of possession and even those who benefit from the right of possession or ownership change.

It is necessary to dwell on the reasons for this situation. The possible reasons for the complex representations of the ownership forms were mentioned can be listed as follows: (i) historiographers do not have sufficient knowledge of the official status of the lands, (ii) the land regime in the Ottoman Empire did not attain its final form, (iii) the emergence of a complex representation as a result of the impact of the land-possession/ownership struggle between different social segments - the rentier class struggle - on political texts.

The first argument has a certain truth in that the production, storage and circulation of knowledge in the pre-modern period was not uniform. Knowledge and terminology about land ownership forms are affected by the personal experiences, rhetorical differences and even local pronunciation differences of various authors, since the information is not uniform. In this context, different forms of expression such as *iqta/dirlik/timar* may mean the same, and the same term may have different meanings in the hands of different authors. The second thesis may also be considered to have partial truth. Since the land law in the pre-modern Ottoman Empire reached its most

developed form with the Budin code, it can be thought that the land law and its terminology are not clear enough for the period we are considering. A second aspect that this thesis might contain is that private ownership of land in the Ottoman Empire was an accidental situation, and for this reason, it cannot be expected to include a clear ownership emphasis and framework similar to the Western European example in the texts discussed. On the other hand, the accuracy of these theses is only partially acceptable. It is known that Ottoman land records have been kept since at least the reign of Murat I. It should be kept in mind that the scale and systematics of these records were developed until the 16th century, and that an Islamic jurist like Kemalpaşazâde could not be far from this systematic, even finding the opportunity to see the registry books. The second thesis, reminiscent of the AMP concept, explains the ambiguity in land ownership terminology with the lack of general and systematic property law. However, as it was shown above, the tendency of land ownership in the establishment period of the Ottoman Empire tends to be more in favor of private ownership. In this context, the interpretation that I will propose offers a more composite explanation centered on political relations. Firstly, the difference in land ownership terminology is mainly shaped by the themes of the difference in political perspectives, although partly due to the fact that the terminology has not been clarified for cultural reasons. Explicit or abstaining claims of ownership, possession habits and contradictions between different social segments cause different representations of ownership and emphasis in political thought.

In this context, it is necessary to make a more general evaluation on land ownership in the Ottoman Empire. First, only one of the sources from which information can be obtained about land ownership patterns should not be taken as the decisive reference point. As Voloshinov (2001, p. 54) states, it should be kept in mind that words are ideological phenomena and cannot be separated from social struggles. Since the struggle over land ownership in the Ottoman Empire continued under cultural and political forms, the texts showing the relations of tenure only reflect one dimension of this struggle. For example, while *tahrir* registers try to regulate land-possession relations in terms of the interests of the central state and the ruler, rent and exploitation relations within the framework of local habits/traditions and alliances have a different reality from the centrally accrued tax amounts. Moreover, the arguments of the central state toward the right of *rakabe* (bare property) turn into an administrative orientation that tries to be effective rather than decisive in the face of land-possession practices and

succession demands of timariot *sipâhîs*. In this case, the fact that both the *tahrir* records, the local traditions, the legal discussions and the details in the chronicle narratives deal with the subject differently from each other, becomes open to be read as the struggle of different interests and tendencies. As a result, the complexity reflected in the examples of political thought is a reflection of this situation. Even though the complexity in question is tried to be clarified with the sanjak *Kanunnâmes*, the mode of possession that is valid in the field of social reality is determined by the traditions, interests, local laws and particular uses of force that develop depending on the real power relations.

VIII.II.III. Elaborating the Ideological Formation: *Riyâset*, *Caliphate* and *Velâyet*

“Kutbu'l-aktâb olalı Şeh Bâyezîd
Bahr u berde hark u gark oldu Yezîd”⁹⁹⁴
Firdevsî-i Rûmî (2011, p. 33)

In the examples of political thought written at the threshold of the 16th century, there is no great innovation or fiction about the grounding of class domination. Despite the Marxist approach, which envisages an improvement in the ideological codification that legitimizes class domination in parallel with the development of material social relations, Ottoman political thought did not show an unusual development -at least in theory- in the first quarter of the 16th century. It is an epistemological contrast worth emphasizing that, relative to the enormous development in the material infrastructure of the empire and the networks of political relations, the philosophical or theoretical grounding of class domination has not made a leap. The main reason underlying this situation is that the development of political thought –similar to the development of state organization– is embodied in detail that are more difficult to observe. It is clear that these details concentrate on architectural forms (*selâtin* mosques, *külliyes*, tombs, palaces, baths, covered bazaars, etc.)⁹⁹⁵, patronage relations established with *sûfî* circles,

⁹⁹⁴ Shah Bayezid, since he was the head of the saints/ Yazid, burned and sunk in land and sea.

⁹⁹⁵ Although the interpretation of Ottoman architecture as a part of the history of political thought is a significant subject, the breadth of the field and the necessity of exemplifying it with visual material exceeds the scope and method of our thesis. I have to be content with mentioning some information and comments in this field to the extent that they are related to the main structure of our thesis. For works in which architectural works and architectural practice are handled as an ideological signification process, see: Šuvaković (2014, pp. 10-12), *Architecture and Ideology* compiled by Mako, Blagojević and Lazar (2014), R. Barthes (2012, pp. 206- 17) in the field of urban semiotics and, more broadly, Deleuze’s (1993) philosophical monograph on ‘fold’ and

formation of intra-state traditions and protocols, edicts and letter rhetoric, and especially historiography. Secondly, the lack of theoretical works on which political influence and dominance are based at the macro level can be explained by the effect of the uncertainty affecting the political atmosphere, since Prince Cem constitutes an alternative ruler for a long time that he can take the throne. Because it will be very difficult for Ottoman writers, who cannot renounce the idea of a certain dynasty's right to rule over the lands, to defend both this principle and the autarkic authority of the current Ottoman ruler. To put this problem in another way, the problem of the turnover of the regnum creates an irreconcilable tension line between the centrifugal ethnic traditions and the centralized state structure within the Ottoman Empire. Although the practical solution to this problem is found in the practice of fratricide and partly in the ideological support of this practice, it is not possible to consider these two elements to be a competent theoretical solution when it comes to the history of political ideas. On the other hand, it should be taken into account that the theory of the caliphate, which is one of the most comprehensive elements in the history of Islamic political thought, offers an alternative solution to the problem in question. The theory of Islamic caliphate defines the caliph as the legitimate ruler, moral leader, and direct or indirect representative of God, making him the owner of an indivisible religious-administrative authority. Although there have been various references to the concepts of caliph and caliphate in Ottoman political thought since the beginning of the 15th century, the development of an interest in the above-mentioned framework took place towards the 16th century. In this respect, the reflections of the theory of caliphate on Ottoman political thought in the 16th century are different from the reflections in the 15th century. The term caliph, used in the 15th century, objectively describes rulers in the position of *emîr-caliph*. In other words, in the first half of the 15th century, this term provided the Islamic legitimacy of a ruler who was at the head of an organization of principality and was surrounded by other small principalities. On the other hand, the term caliph, as used in the 16th century, characterizes a *caliph-sultan*, meaning primarily a ruler who claims *plenitudo potestatis* to encompass all Muslims and his absolute authority over his subjects. The transition between these two forms of meaning reached its highest form in the second half of the 16th century, in favor of the latter. However, the theoretical investment on the second meaning started in the reign of Mehmet II and gained specific details during the reign

Karatani's (1995) *Architecture as Metaphor*. For a brief evaluation on the ideological meaning of Ottoman architecture, see: Ousterhout (1995, pp. 50, 60), Kuban (2021, pp. 67-68).

of Bayezid II. Undoubtedly, the rise of the Safavid state and the fact that the caliphate arguments of Twelver Shiism found supporters in the Ottoman lands were effective among the main reasons why the aforementioned development line gained specific forms during the reign of Bayezid II. In this subsection, I will try to analyze the ideological framework formulated in connection with the concepts of *riyâset* and caliphate in Ottoman political thought.

The examples of political theory written in the first half of the 16th century come from two different origins. The first of these is the approach that was discussed in the previous sections -especially formulated during the reign of Mehmet II- and which finds its basic principle in the grounding of secular administration. The second form of political theory is based on Islamic sources and grounding the authority of the ruler around the concept of caliphate. The common point of these two different approaches, starting from these two different origins, is that they are not in conflict with each other, on the contrary, they tend to gradually include each other and form a kind of synthesis. In this respect, it would be more accurate to talk about a unity, not a contradiction, between the efforts to ground the idea of class domination as secular and religious. In this framework, problems such as *prudantia*, subordination, and justice, which are the main subjects of the context of secular administration, are transferred into the theory of the caliphate without changing their essence. Although it is possible to define such elements discussed in Bayezid II period as secular-residuals, it is necessary to accept that they have not lost their actual significance. On the other hand, the theory of the caliphate tends to include the broad decision-making authority and privileges that the concept of secular rule confers on the ruler, without rendering it obsolete. In particular, the mystical fictions that support the privileged position of the Ottoman ruler constitute discursive mechanisms that bridge the two approaches and hide potential contradictions.

VIII.II.III.I. Circle of *Riyâset*: Sultan as a Worldly Ruler

First of all, let's start by briefly discussing the traces left by the secular political understanding in the texts. The terminology used to ground or characterize the formation of political authority in Ottoman political thought is mostly put forward with reference to religious concepts. On the other hand, when particular political narratives are considered, it is seen that the religious terminology in question is occasionally used to cover secular content and occasionally to combine religious and secular concepts. In this context, it is seen that there is a secular undercurrent exist in Ottoman political

thought, or at least to the extent that it is directed by political facts, a secular understanding occasionally reemerged.

It is possible to find traces of secular political understanding in the examples of political thought written at the verge of the 16th century. For example, an interesting theoretical perspective is in the history of Behiştî. Behiştî bases the existence of the center of political authority, which he has framed by using the term caliph, on the idea of establishing a common and harmonious life between different social segments. According to Behiştî, the reason for the existence of the caliph was to provide livelihood and friendship among the ruling classes, and to create harmony between hearts through laws / camaraderie / good nature, to develop and renew good relations (Kaytaz, 2011, p. 311). Behiştî states that in this way, the sultanate ensures a good order in the affairs of a country and has the favor of the both notables and the subordinated people (Kaytaz, 2011, p. 311). In this example, the terms caliphate and sultanate are used interchangeably and the ideal of worldly harmony and friendship is presented as the content of the concepts in general. It is seen that this conceptualization primarily refers to a harmony between the members of the ruling class, and then to a harmony between the subaltern segments of the society through laws, and defines the necessity of the existence of the ruler in a quite secular framework in terms of social order. Although there is no concept such as justice, prudentia, leadership or politics in Behiştî's justification, the fulfillment of the functions he put forward can be categorized under the concepts of order and prudentia (*tedbîr*) in the final analysis. While the idea of order put forward by Behiştî is mostly based on good management of affairs and establishing emotional intimacy between people, there is no sufficient explanation about the content of the measures to be taken. On the other hand, it is possible to come across examples of these concepts in a wider framework in the works of Neşrî and İdrîs-i Bitlisî.

Neşrî deals with the concepts of politics and prophecy together, but leaving a certain difference between them. According to this distinction, Neşrî (1949, p. 5), who expresses the Islamic tradition with the term *nur-i nubuwwat* (light of prophecy), argues that if the Islamic tradition did not exist, people would be in heresy, the reason would be perplexed and would not be able to achieve salvation. On the other hand, Neşrî (1949, p. 5) states that if the secular government, which he calls *umur-i siyâset* disappears, there will be no order in the world and because of the increase in oppression, the weak will be persecuted and oppression will spread to the world. In this dual formulation, Neşrî bases the necessity of Islam on the universal salvation theology against the

helplessness of reason against particulars, while basing the necessity of politics around concrete social relations. In the same framework, Neşrî (1949, p. 5) argues that the prophets preached, the *ulama* dealt with the lore of worship, and the sultans dealt with justice and politics, but in the final analysis, he states that rulers are needed to fulfill the religious rules. İdrîs-i Bitlisî similarly expresses the duties of the rulers under the concepts of justice and prudentia. Bitlisî, who sees the authority of the ruler as the primary determinant in the operation of these two principles, bases the continuity of the “*mülûk ve selâtin*” (state and rulership) on the existence of two types of authority relations (Genç, 2007, p. 192): (i) the subordination of the military; and (ii) the subordination of the subjects. It is clear that these two authority/subordination relations are based on political measures in term of the use of prudentia. Bitlisî briefly discussed the issues of secular politics in the second book of *Heşt Behişt*. The formulation in the second book in terms of its theoretical content relates the existence of the ruler with the need for the organization of affairs in time and space and the execution of things in an orderly manner (“*tertib ve nizam*”) (Koçarlan, 2019, p. 174). Meeting this need and gaining continuity in Bitlisî is realized through reason and prudentia (Koçarlan, 2019, p. 174).

Although his arguments are based on a similar conceptual framework, Kemalpaşazâde draws attention to the fact that secular politics has two practical aspects. These two aspects are listed as politics and leadership (*siyâset and riyâset*) (Turan, 1991, p. 20). While the phenomenon indicated by the term politics is the ruler’s right to impose the death penalty and to apply it, the term leadership refers to the ability to produce tactical-administrative solutions to political problems instead of using violence. Kemalpaşazâde formulates the contradictory unity between these two with the following couplet (Turan, 1991, p. 21): “Medar-ı riyaset, siyasetdurur/ Siyaset olıcak, riyaset turur”.⁹⁹⁶ In Kemalpaşazâde’s formulation, the phenomenon of politics, which includes the use of violence, is mentioned as a tool of ruling, but it is argued that the operation of politics (in the sense of violence) is not a positive quality for ruling. In this case, Kemalpaşazâde points out the threat of violence as the basis of the tactics and strategies of the administration, which he meets with the term ‘*riyâset*’, but draws attention to the fact that the actualization of violence invalidates the tactics and strategies of the administration. In the political terminology of the Ottoman Empire, the

⁹⁹⁶ The tool of ruling/leadership is politics of execution/ When the execution policy is implemented, ruling/leadership disappears.

term ‘*siyâset*’ is also used synonymously with the death penalty. The relationship between the term politics and violence also has a historical background. Discourses on punishment (*danda* literature) developed in Indian political culture have also been incorporated into Islamic culture through Persian translations, and Arjomand (2021, p. 80) points out that the affinity between the concepts of politics and punishment may have come from this origin. In the final analysis, Kemalpaşazâde’s conceptualization of ‘*riyâset*’ belongs to a secular framework centered on reason and prudentia, which does not refer to a religious background.

The most basic feature of the mentioned framework is that the rulership phenomenon finds its basis in the need for management, that is, it uses a self-referring reference system. This is not simply a tautology or paradox, but rather an indication of the institutionalization of class domination. Because the class domination structure gives rise to the ruling relations at the factual level, and the hierarchical relations that are tried to be absolutized both administratively and ideologically are seen as the only reason for the existence of the society in terms of the ruling classes. This form of imagery bears an image of the objective consciousness of the ruling classes reflected in the general scheme of society. The most basic examples of this imagery can be found in the circle of justice model. As examined in the previous sections, the circle of justice model deals with the continuation of the contradictory unity of different social segments and classes under one ruling power and the reproduction of class domination in this way. The notion of reproduction of class relations, on the other hand, is hidden under the concept of justice, giving ideological legitimacy to the general schema of exiting social hierarchies.

As of the historical period considered, the emergence of variants of the circle of justice model, which does not include the notion of ‘justice’, is surprising and in need of explanation. The circle of justice model, as formulated by İdrîs-i Bitlisî, depends on the two subordinated social segments to preserve their social positions. These segments are listed as (Koçarslan, 2019, p. 174): (i) soldiers/ *sipâhîs* and (ii) subjects/ *reâyâ*. Bitlisî’s formulation most clearly expresses the basis of this relationship (Genç, 2007, p. 192): “(...) The main element and essential substance of having subject is to dominate them [tm]”. In order to eliminate the tautological appearance of Bitlisî’s formula, which can be summarized as ‘the way to keep the people under control, is to keep them under control’, it is necessary to consider another example in which this formula is explained. İdrîs-i Bitlisî uses a new version of the circle of justice model in the second book of

Heşt Behişt. According to this version, the arguments in which the circle is framed are as follows (Koçarslan, 2019, p. 174): (i) the stability of the country and the expansion of the lands are achieved by military force, (ii) the increase in goods and welfare occur depending on the subordination of the people. Bitlisî, once again, refers to the circle of justice model he formulated based on two main points, with reference to a ruler named Melik Husheng (Koçarslan, 2019, p. 174): “Sultan ancak orduyla olur. Ordu ancak melikle olur. Melik ancak rical-i devletle olur. Rical-i devlet malla olur. Mal ancak raiyyetle olur. Raiyyet de ancak siyasetle olur”.⁹⁹⁷ There is a common point in the two versions that Bitlisî both fictionalized and quoted from Melik Husheng: There is no notion of ‘justice’ in this circle of justice model. In the first version, the welfare of the subjects is achieved by ‘following the ruler’, and in the second version, by ‘executing politics’. In another version quoted above, Bitlisî argues that the way to have subjects is to ‘dominate’ (Genç, 2007, p. 192). If these three arguments are taken into consideration in general, the notion of justice in the classical circle of justice model, which unites the ruler and the subjects with an internal moral relationship, has been removed. It is noticed that the notion of justice, which has moral aspects, is replaced by an external administrative relationship, ‘to rule’ or ‘to execute’ for the ruler, and ‘to obey the rules’ for the subjects. In this respect, it would be more appropriate to call this new model, which replaces the classical notion of the circle of justice, the model of the circle of administration or *dâire-i riyâset*. The fact that the circle of justice model has been reconstructed without the notion of ‘justice’ necessitates a new evaluation of this concept in the passages dealing with the content of the concept of justice in the works of the period. İdrîs-i Bitlisî deals with the concept of justice and its content specifically in the seventh and eighth books of *Heşt Behişt*. The first of these presentations mainly belongs to the field of practical politics, while the second includes theoretical implications.

The first notion of justice, framed by İdrîs-i Bitlisî, deals with the relations of the ruling classes among themselves and with the subordinated social classes. İdrîs-i Bitlisî, in the seventh book of *Heşt Behişt*, wrote a detailed version of the notion of justice in terms of the relations between the ruling classes. In this first version, Bitlisî shares his views on the subject and consequences of the ruler’s just behavior under the

⁹⁹⁷ *Sultan* exists only with the army. The army exists only with the ruler. The ruler exists only with state officials. State officials exist with property. The property is only with the people subject to the ruler. The people also exist only through politics.

category of justice he calls '*adâlet-i sultânî*'. This category includes social content that can be grouped under three sub-headings. Firstly, Bitlisî argues that disorder and misery, oppression and injustice, turmoil and disturbance, sedition, murder, shedding of blood did not occur during the reign of Mehmet II, whom he refers to as a just ruler (Genç, 2010, pp. 43-44; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 34). The common point of these features listed by Bitlisî is that they establish a close relationship between justice and social order. The fact that there is especially 'disorder' (*tefrika*), 'turmoil' (*teşviş*) and 'sedition' (*fitne*) among the facts placed against the notion of justice points to a situation in which there is no dominant authority over the society and where more than one authority claims and authorities are struggling with each other. This description, which is likely to refer to the interregnum period that emerged after the Battle of Ankara (1402), points to phenomena such as oppression, bloodshed, and unrest in terms of its consequences. When the meaning of this category is analyzed to the end, it is seen that the just society that Bitlisî imagines is a static society subject to a single authority. Bitlisî states that Mehmet II distributed ranks in accordance with qualifications and merits, gave respectable positions to the ulama, appointed people who were deemed unworthy to high ranks because they did useful works, and reduced the great rulers to the status of ordinary servant ("*âdî kul*") (Genç, 2010, p. 44; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, pp. 34-35). Bitlisî argues that Mehmet II appointed military and religious authorities based on merit, did not allow the administrators to oppress those under his rule, and did not put pressure on the ruled (Genç, 2010, p. 44, İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, pp. 34-35). In this second notion put forward by Bitlisî, there is the idea that the administrators' being subject to the absolute authority of the ruler and their appointment to offices with merit are indirectly determinative for the welfare and happiness of the ruled. Thirdly, İdrîs-i Bitlisî also included the notion of justice for Mehmet II to be respectful to the *sûfi* sheikhs and the sayyid group, to make donations to them, to shape their behavior according to the views of the Islamic jurists, to bring the members of the ulama to the administrative offices, to protect the craftsmen and to employ them in Istanbul (Genç, 2010, p. 46; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 36). In this third definition of the notion of justice, it is in question that the ruler recognizes the social position of certain status groups and supports this with state power. When we consider all three examples of justice, it is seen that Bitlisî bases the realization of social justice in general terms by referring to the following three titles: (i) the existence of an unrivaled authority of a ruler, (ii) the ruler's control of the ruling groups under him, (iii) the support of the social segments that have a certain status with

the ruler's ability in the religious or industrial field. All three of these titles dissolve the notion of justice into the notion of administration and conclude -implicitly- that the administration that can reproduce the social order/status quo will be just. In this respect, the understanding of 'justice' put forward by Bitlisî has an internal connection with the network of relations can be called the circle of administration.

Moving on to the presentation of the second notion of justice, which is formulated by İdrîs-i Bitlisî and includes theoretical implications, it is striking that this notion is mostly constructed on a theo-political context. According to Bitlisî, justice is a feature given to human beings by nature and is based on balancing the impulses of the *nafs* (Genç, 2014, p. 507). Although justice as a quality has a foundation based on creation, reason and revelation must be in balance in order for it to emerge (Genç, 2014, p. 507). While the first of these two elements, the reason, is a feature presented to people as a divine gift, the ability to have the knowledge of revelation and to act accordingly is an acquired feature (Genç, 2014, p. 507). In this respect, the notion of justice develops depending on the attainment of the virtue of moderation based on divine orders and prohibitions so that the reason, which is accepted as a divine gift, can function properly. The notion of justice, whose general theological framework is drawn in this way by Bitlisî, gains content under four main categories. Bitlisî states that these categories are valid for different segments of human communities and lists them as follows (Genç, 2014, pp. 507-8): (i) justice between the servant and God, (ii) justice in the relationship of the person with his own self (*nafs*), (iii) justice in the relationship between the ruling and the ruled, (iv) justice in the relationship of people with other people who are their equals/similar ones. If these categories are briefly detailed, the first notion of justice emerges when people accept the unity and greatness of God, remember God with divine attributes, and obey divine orders and prohibitions (Genç, 2014, p. 507). The second notion of justice develops depending on people's struggle with their own selves and trying to stay away from evil tendencies (Genç, 2014, p. 507). The third notion of justice depends on the execution of the orders of the rulers by the ruled people (Genç, 2014, p. 508), the last notion of justice is formulated as people helping each other and bestow favors to each other (Genç, 2014, p. 508). While the first two of these four categories formulated by Bitlisî are related to complying with and maintaining the religious belief codification, the other two are topics related to the establishment of social order. It is a remarkable detail that the third title makes the absolute authority of the ruling classes over the society a part of the notion of justice. Within these four headings, the

compatibility of the relationship between the ruling classes and the ruled with the notion of justice is drawn as a one-sided relationship of subordination, and in particular, no legitimacy or political participation criteria are included in this formulation. In this respect, the notion of justice elaborated by Bitlisî is in accordance with what we call the circle of administration. In other words, the notion of justice put forward by Bitlisî identifies justice itself with the existence of authority in terms of drawing a social framework in which the members of the society obey religious rules and are subject to the ruler. It should be noted that the notions of justice put forward by Bitlisî synthesize secular and religious features in the idea of administration and place the priority of administration activity at the center of his political thought as a founding feature. When the layers of the second notion of justice formulated by Bitlisî are unfolded, a generalized culture of obedience is encountered. While the individual's adoption and application of the principles of Islamic belief requires obedience to Islamic codes at the level of consciousness and practice, she is obliged to obey the ruling classes at the macro level. Finally, the fourth level of the notion of justice, the principle of cooperation among the members of the society, refers to the theory of the economic establishment of society, which has its roots in classical Greek thought and was carried to Ottoman political thought through Nasîrûddin Tûsî. Another remarkable point in this context is that the figure of the ruler/administrator is placed at the center of all three levels, which has a certain continuity with the formulation of the theory of caliphate.

When the works of the period are examined, it is seen that the general characteristic of political thought is shaped based on the principle of the indivisibility of political authority. Although this principle was occasionally presented in the examples of Ottoman political thought written at the end of the 14th century and in the first half of the 15th century, it became the dominant form of political thought with the 16th century. Although the absolute authority of the Ottoman ruler was tried to be established in the examples of political thought written at the end of the 14th century and at the beginning of the 15th century, the hidden or overt representations of both the political groups other than the ruler and the tribal traditions based on the division of power among brothers can find a place in political thought. It is noticed that with the end of the 15th century and the beginning of the 16th century, such indicators began to disappear from the examples of political thought and the absolute authority of the monarch began to be represented almost in a way close to divine authority. In the development of this new trend, as well as the influence of the imperial regime structured

around the infrastructural, military and financial power branches that expanded during the reign of Mehmet II, the fight for the throne, which turned into a protracted struggle between Prince Cem and Bayezid II, was also effective. It is precisely in this context that the principle of the indivisibility of the reign is included in the eighth book of Kemalpaşazâde's history. Kemalpaşazâde, in his passages about the struggle between Prince Cem and Bayezid II, states that Selçuk Hatun, the daughter of Mehmet I and the aunt of Mehmet II, was a petitioner from Bayezid II and demanded that the empire be divided into two between the two princes (Uğur, 1997, p. 16). This demand, which has the last traces of the tradition of dividing the country among the brothers, is rejected by saying that "two swords cannot be put in one sheath [tm]" (Uğur, 1997, p. 16). Kemalpaşazâde criticizes the inappropriateness of this demand by claiming that there cannot be two rulers in a country and two commanders in an army, and writes the following couplet: "Çün şeh başdur ana ten/ Yaraşmaz iki başlu olmak beden" (Uğur, 1997, p. 17).⁹⁹⁸ It is clear that in the arguments formulated by Kemalpaşazâde, the idea that there should be a single authority, especially in the administrative and military context, is emphasized. This concept of authority shows that the party trying to gain superiority, especially in intra-dynastic struggles, still asserts its authority with a secular reference. On the other hand, with Shah Ismail's seizure of the Iranian throne and becoming an alternative center of power, it becomes impossible for the Ottoman dynasty to express its authority over the subjects directly in secular terms. Because, although both rulers have some differences -in the broadest sense- they defend the social order, and in this respect, there is no categorical difference in terms of the secular foundations of power -at least in terms of arguments. On the other hand, the points where both power claims differ are mostly seen in ethnological and theological plans. The analysis of how ethnographic and ethnological elements placed in Ottoman political thought and the analysis of their political meaning will take place in the next section. For this reason, in the next subsection, the theo-political context of the theory of the caliphate will be discussed and in this context, the propositions of Ottoman political thought will be revealed.

In addition to this section, it should be noted that there are serious criticisms about the secular scope of the concept of '*riyâset*'. The most radical criticism directed at mainstream political thought in this regard was formulated by Prince Korkud, who was himself a member of the Ottoman dynasty and thus had the right to the succession

⁹⁹⁸ Because the ruler is the head of the body/ It is not befitting for a body to have two heads.

of the throne.⁹⁹⁹ In his voluminous work called *Da'vetü'n-nefsi't-taliha ile'l-a'mâli's-sâliha*, he subjected the customary practices in operating together with the religious provisions in the Ottoman state to a systematic criticism. Prince Korkud's criticisms can be discussed under the following headings: (i) the rejection of the *Meşşâî* philosophy, which is also the source of the prudentia (*tedbîr*) literature, (ii) rejection of the theological argument grounding the absolute authority of the monarch, (iii) criticism of the state's principles and practices of taxation, (iv) criticism of confiscations, gift givings, briberies, and penalties which are not compatible with the Islamic Law. In general, Korkud (2022, p. 47) argues that it was not possible to fully implement the Sharia Law in his lifetime because the customary law was widely practiced, although it was suspicious or completely contrary to the Sharia. Moreover, the author states that these practices are defended as "the custom of the ruler" and that most of the people do not oppose it (Korkud, 2022, p. 47). Korkud (2022, p. 225), citing a discussion in his own administrative circle, argued that in this discussion, obeying the sharia comes before obeying the ruler, and it would be considered blasphemy to claim that social order would be achieved only through customary practices. Korkud (2022, p. 218) absolutely rejects the thesis that if the customary law of the ruler is abolished, the social order will be disrupted, and chaos will arise in the lives of people. On the other hand, Korkud (2022, p. 225) gave an original answer to the problem by stating that customary law emerged as a result of the rulers abandoning religious orders and returning to "their own ugly customs [tm]" and that additions were made to the Sharia provisions in this way. Moreover, in this context, he argues that *qadis* also obey customary law. According to Korkud (2022, pp. 277, 290), *qadis* examine cases according to the rules of Sharia, but decide in accordance with customary law. In this context, the author, who underlines that it is not religiously appropriate for administrators to make judgments according to customary law, states that the right to make judgments should only be exercised by those who have the capacity to judge according to the principles of Sharia (Korkud, 2022, pp. 244-45). As a result, it is understood that Korkud took a side in a debate between the customary regulations and Sharia Law that developed in his own time and defended the Sharia against the customary practices in the Ottoman rule.

To start with the first title, Korkud (2022, p. 391) claims that philosophers such as al-Farabi and Avicenna were dissolute and ignorant, that they were hostile to the prophets and broke the Sharia rules, that they did not know the Qur'an and hadiths by

⁹⁹⁹ See: Köksal and Sancak (2022, pp. 24-25).

heart, and that they called their delusions as wisdom. In this context, it is clear that he considers the *Meşşâî* philosophy tradition as a non-Islamic trend, and categorizes the philosophers as Muslim-looking people who do not believe in religion and trying to destroy it (Korkud, 2022, p. 391). In general, it is seen that Korkud accepted al-Ghazali's criticisms against *Meşşâî* philosophy. Although he did not directly criticize the theses of *Meşşâî* philosophy on political philosophy, it is significant for his other views to bring a general and fundamental criticism. Secondly, it is seen that the author reinterprets the theological thesis that grounds the absolute authority of the ruler in Islamic political thought. According to this thesis based on the 49th verse of Surah an-Nisa, obedience to the rulers took the form of a religious rule and this principle, called obedience to *ulu'l-amr*, was used to legitimize monarchies.¹⁰⁰⁰ Prince Korkud (2022, pp. 463-66) argues that the rulers referred to in the aforementioned verse are not kings or four caliphs, on the contrary, they are people who are "*ahlü'l-hall ve'l-akd*"¹⁰⁰¹ among Muslims, that is, ulama. In this context, Korkud (2022, p. 567) argues that even if the expression *ulu'l-amr* is understood as kings, the opinion of all Muslims, including the ulama, should be taken when the orders of the rulers and religious orders conflict. This is an idea close to Sunni political election theory which would be discussed in the following section. To focus on the essence of the discussion, the idea that the authority to rule should be used absolutely within religious principles takes the right to rule - theologically- from the monopoly of the rulers who are endowed with customary authority, but transfers it to another social stratum - the ulama - who is supposed to have knowledge about religious decrees.

Another topic that Prince Korkud criticizes is about the principles and practices of customary taxation. It is noteworthy that this title is a critical point which he especially concentrates his criticisms. According to Korkud, taxes levied on the basis of customary law, without considering the Sharia principles, are quite common, and it is possible to come across them in a wide circle from the central treasury of the state to the incomes of governors and *timar* holders, and even to *waqf* properties. In principle, Korkud (2022, p. 50) states that taxes obtained within the framework of customary law are *haram*, and this status will not change even if these taxes are given by consent, habit or pretending to consent. In general, the thesis that some of the collected taxes do not

¹⁰⁰⁰ The relevant verse is as follows (an-Nisa, 4/49): "Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with authority among you" (Ali, 2000, p. 67). See another translation (Dawood, 1999, p. 67): "Believers, obey God and obey the Apostle and those in authority among you".

¹⁰⁰¹ Masters of spirituality and creed/*fiqh*.

have a Sharia basis, and that some of them are mixed with Sharia taxes, but consist essentially of non-Sharia taxes, is formulated in this context (Korkud, 2022, p. 49). Moreover, the limit of the ruler's disposition on the goods is thus drawn with the limit of the Sharia, and customary taxation is seen as an unjustified confiscation of property in the final analysis (Korkud, 2022, p. 219). Among the mentioned customary taxes are the tributes taken from those who buy and sell in the market, the forced use or confiscation of the animals of the villagers, the collection of taxes from the properties saved by the *sûfi* circles, the collection of goods for reasons such as hunting, collection from people who have no product other than the amount of food they eat, new taxes and demands invented by the *timar* holders besides the Sharia-based tax can be counted (Korkud, 2022, pp. 235-36, 246-48, 258, 267-68, 272). Considering the Ottoman Empire, it is stated by the author that such taxes were put into effect by governors, *emîrs*, those who took on the duties of *emîr-i şikar*, *timar* holders, members of the army, *waqf* owners and even *viziers*, and in this context, those taxes were transferred to the central treasury (Korkud, 2022, pp. 244-45, 258, 260, 267, 269, 272).

Finally, Prince Korkud criticizes the customary practices, which are out of the taxation practice, but indirectly based on extracting goods from the villagers and the townspeople, the forms of possessing of the confiscated goods and the penalties imposed. The first of the practices that are subject to criticism is that local people have to offer food to state officers wherever they come (Korkud, 2022, p. 244). This situation is repeated in the relations between farmers and *timar* holders, farmers have to give food to *timar* holders and even *timar* holders appropriate the best part of the farmer's product as tax (Korkud, 2022, p. 268). Secondly, the fact that *qadis* receive gifts and bribes and that they legitimize the customary practices of the administrators is the subject of criticism (Korkud, 2022, pp. 245, 284, 287). According to him in the Ottoman example, the Sharia is not absolutely decisive for the use of property possessed by the ruler or administrators. Korkud (2022, pp. 231-36) criticizes the granting of *iqtâ* lands to slaves and to spend the treasury revenues for the personal pleasure of the monarch (giving a share to his close men and allies, giving donations to poets/singers/slaves), also he considers serving food to the poor or building mosques extracted goods in the category of non-Sharia practices. Finally, death sentences given according to customary law are the subject of the author's criticism. According to Korkud (2022, p. 47), one of the worst practices of customary law is to order execution without any religious grounds.

As a result, Prince Korkud supports the Sharia against the customary law in the ideas he advocates, not the coexistence of these two in accordance with the principle of *prudentia*, on the contrary, he advocates the absolute superiority of the Sharia without exception. In this framework, the groups that Korkud brought to the forefront against the customary administrators in terms of social privileges and status can be identified as the *ulama* and a small number of Sunni *sûfi* circles. In particular, the fact that Korkud criticizes the customary administrators because they find extracted social wealth to be scarce for themselves and grudging them for the *ulama* (2022, p. 280), and that he only recognizes the *ulama* as the decision-making authority supports this proposition. In accordance with this proposition, which can be read as a decisive political choice, Korkud (2022, pp. 362-63) criticizes the *ulama* and sheikhs who have lost their autonomy due to their subordination to the ruler and administrators, and maintains his critical attitude towards the bribed *qadis* and the historians who take a share of the state property. In addition, Korkud (2022, pp. 61-63) declares *sûfi* groups that do not apply religious prohibitions and claim that it is *halal* to receive gifts of property and land from the ruler as heretics/*zendeqas*. In the final analysis, Prince Korkud's approach, which proposes that the political authority should be given to the religious authorities and their priority should be supported by *sûfi* groups, is limited to the problem of sharing the rent incomes. It can be said that the Korkud, who had no military activity and therefore had no supporters among the Janissaries or the timariot cavalry, tried to establish his claim to sultanate largely on the superiority of Sharia practices and the authority of the *ulama* stratum. However, the theses he put forward in this framework should not be understood as individual reflections of a mere search for personal power, but as particular appendages of a social power struggle among various rentier fractions.

VIII.II.III.II. *Divinum Repraesentativum Dei: Ruler as the Caliph/Mujaddid/Saint*

In the Ottoman political thought that developed in the 16th century, the use of the concept of caliphate expanded and the content of the concept was elaborated. It is possible to think that this conceptual shift emerged due to certain political needs. It is seen that the political reactions against the policies of Ottoman state on the issues of land regime, taxation, administrative and legal practices and religious-ideological preferences turned into widespread social movements with the emergence of the Safavid state. In this period, the autonomist tendencies among the Turkmen groups were strengthened and turned into armed conflicts with the Ottoman state. It seems that this

trend turned into an open rebellion with the *Şahkulu* revolt, which will be briefly discussed in the next section. In this historical framework, the concept of caliphate gained new details in Ottoman political thought. These details proceed around two purposes; (i) in general, to strengthen the secular and religious authority of the ruler over both the state apparatus and the subordinated classes, (ii) specifically to restructure the authority of the Ottoman ruler against the rising Safavid theo-political claims.

At this point, it is necessary to briefly mention the origin and structure of the concept of caliphate in Islamic political thought. It is not possible to talk about a definite consensus about the religious and/or secular nature of the concept of caliphate in the literature of Islamic political thought. The word '*khalif*' (successor), which is at the base of the concept, means to replace the person who came before him or to represent him as a deputy for someone else (Azimli, 2018, p. 14). It is seen that the word is used in several different ways in the text of the Qur'an. Some of these uses take place in the Qur'an in plural form of *khalaiif* and *khulefa*, and are used in the sense of beings that existed in the world before human beings or antecedent human generations (Azimli, 2018, pp. 13-14). On the other hand, singular usage (*khalife*) is figured in Surahs al-Baqara (2:30) and Sad (38:26). The expression in the thirtieth verse of Surat al-Baqara is as follows (Ali, 2000, p. 6): "Behold thy Lord said to the angels: 'I will create a vicegerent on earth.' They said 'Wilt Thou place therein one who will make mischief therein and shed blood? Whilst we do celebrate Thy praises and glorify Thy holy (name)?' He said: 'I know what ye know not.'"

In the twenty-sixth verse of the Surah Sad, there is the following expression (Ali, 2000, p. 383): "O David! We did indeed make thee a vicegerent on earth: so judge thou between men in truth (and justice) (...)". In the first verse, it is seen that the word caliph (translated as vicegerent) is used in the sense of man/Adam, but here the meaning is not clear enough. In the second verse, the word caliph is used in a way that can mean ruler, administrator or representative. Ed-Dûrî (2019, p. 77) states that both expressions are used in the sense of 'representative/deputy'. On the other hand, Bayındır (2007, pp. 68-70) states that both expressions are used in the sense of generation or people that follow each other and replace each other, and that a relationship of representation cannot be established between God and man based on these expressions. Here, Bayındır's (2007, p. 69) interpretation seems more correct because the context of the verse about David is established with reference to the historical continuity of the people of Israel, in this case the word 'caliph' means 'the succeeding generation of the Israelites' rather

than the representative of God. İnan (1999, p. 170) argues that the word caliph used in the twenty-sixth verse of Surah Sad has a political meaning (ruler), but this meaning does not have a theocratic meaning that can mean the deputy/representative of God or a basis that can be used to justify this meaning. In this context, the first usage of the word in the political context is far from including a reference that a ruler can directly wield divine authority.

VIII.II.III.III. The Concepts of Caliphate and Imamate in Islamic Political Thought

The prevalence of the concept of caliph in the political literature took place in the historical phase that opened after the death of Muhammad. This phase, called the period of the Four Caliphs, *Çehar-ı yar-ı güzün* or *Hülafa-i raşidin*, lasted for thirty years. During the rule of Abu Bakr, the first post-Muhammadic ruler of the Islamic state, he used the title “*khalifat rasul Allah*”, that is, the caliph of the messenger of God (Watt, 2003, p. 32). When the second caliph, Umar ibn Khattab, came to power, he was given the title of ‘*khalifetu khalifeti Resulillah*’ (the caliph of the caliph of the messenger of God), but since this expression was not suitable for practical use, his title changed to the form of ‘*amir’ul mu’minin*’ (İnan, 1999, p. 186). On the other hand, in the periods of Osman bin Affan, who was the third caliph, and his successor Mu’awiya, it is seen that the word caliph gained the meaning of the representative of God and the noun phrase form *khalifat Allah* (the caliph of Allah) was accepted (Crone & Hinds, 2003, p. 6). The use of this title form in the Umayyad and Abbasid periods is an independent discussion topic. Goldziher (1971, pp. 66-67) argues that the term ‘*khalifat Allah*’ was used systematically, especially in the Abbasid period, and the concept of caliph gained a theocratic content. A similar view was put forward by ed-Dûrî (2019, p. 54) and he states that there was a significant difference in terms of the use of the concept of caliphate by the Umayyad and Abbasid political authorities, emphasizing the theocratic and metaphysical meaning of the latter use. Ed-Dûrî (2019, pp. 54-55) states that during the Abbasid period, the Caliph Mansur defined himself as the caliph of Allah on earth and states that the Abbasid rulers presented themselves as superhuman beings. While this claim is partially true, it is incomplete. The studies of Crone and Hinds (2003, pp. 6-11) show that the Umayyad rulers (from Yazid I to Marwan II) generally identify themselves with the title ‘*khalifat Allah*’.

The evolution of the concept of caliph from the meaning of ‘successor of the prophet’ to the meaning of ‘representative of God’ -because this second meaning was dominant in Ottoman political thought- constitutes a political phenomenon that needs to be explained. Ed-Dûrî states that there are three socio-political approaches that have been influential throughout the history of Islam in the formation of the authority of the caliphate. These approaches are (ed-Dûrî, 2019, p. 46); (i) the rule of the best and most virtuous among Muslims (Islamic principle), (ii) the rule of eldest in age and experience (tribal principle), (iii) the succession of the right to rule from father to son (inheritance principle). The first two of these principles correspond to election or aristocratic appointment practices, while the last one corresponds to the principle of hereditary monarchy. The first uses of the concept of caliphate recognize the status of ‘successor of the prophet’ to the legitimate ruler brought to power through election. After Umar ibn Khattab, although the principle of election did not completely disappear, the determination of the caliph began to turn into an aristocratic appointment principle and the tribal *asabiyyah* (ethos) became effective. Ultimately, the struggle between Mu’awiya and Ali during the reign of the fourth caliph Ali ibn Abu Talib brought the principle of succession to the agenda of political discussions. In this phase, a tension with sociological grounds emerged between the principle of election, the principle of tribal assignment, and the principle of hereditary inheritance, and the principle of hereditary succession gained a significant importance after the civil war phase. Ed-Dûrî (2019, p. 54) argues that tribal ties were strong during the Umayyad period and the principle of hereditary inheritance became dominant during the Abbasid period. However, this approach suffers from some inconsistencies brought about by the search for schematization. To make a more accurate interpretation, it would be more appropriate to state that the principle of hereditary inheritance was tried to be put into practice in both periods, but it was institutionalized during the Abbasid period. Although this situation is mostly explained in the second literature as the degeneration of classical Islamic political thought and the dominance of the Persian royal tradition (Tabâtabâi, 2021, p. 99), the existence of hereditary monarchy in the Umayyad period casts a shadow over the certainty of this view. Historically, it would be more accurate to think that all three principle were effective in dominant or recessive sense, partly independent of the development in the theory of the caliphate.

Another important detail is that (i) Sunni, (ii) Shiite and (iii) Kharijite approaches to the problem of caliphate developed during this period -although this

distinction is not terminologically correct. These approaches are in general parallel with the elective/hereditary/tribal principles. The principle of election was applied in the early periods of Islam and continued its influence, at least theoretically, until the late periods. Azimli states that there are three typical applications of this principle. These forms are listed as follows (Azimli, 2018, p. 121): (i) “the people choose one among themselves [tm]”, (ii) “the people approve of someone proposed by the previous caliph [tm]”, (iii) “the election of the people as a caliph from among several candidates proposed by the previous caliph [tm]”. In all three methods, it is seen that two separate political processes are operated, namely the election and the homage to the elected person. Ed-Dûrî (2019, p. 42) argues that the principles of election and homage are the basis of the Sunni caliphate tradition but were essentially a reflection of Arab tribal traditions. Although this view is partially correct, there are also examples where the election method took place in a limited aristocratic group in which not all of the people participated, whereas homage was assumed to cover all social segments. It is not possible to understand these examples by referring directly to Arab tribal traditions. It would be more correct to base such practices within the framework of the political traditions of the city-states of Mecca and Medina. If a general judgment is to be formulated in this context, it would be reasonable to argue that the Sunni version of the Islamic caliphate theory is based on aristocratic republican forms (city-state) and formal unity model (tribal confederation) of Bedouin tribes. However, the synthesis of both forms generally feeds the monarchist tendency in accordance with the invasion/assimilation relationship patterns between nomads and settlers. It is possible to detect that the specific form of this trend in the early stages of Islamic history emerged in the form of conditional/legitimated hereditary monarchy. The 11th century theologian Abd al-Jabbar identified three systematic approaches to the institution of the caliphate (the caliphate as a religious necessity, worldly necessity, and considered as not necessary) in his work *al-Mughni* (Yücesoy, 2011, p. 15). These approaches were effective even in the Ottoman period, both in grounding the monarchy and in naming the social struggles against the central authority.

The principle of conditional/legitimated hereditary monarchy has been developed over many centuries in both Sunni and Shiite political theory. The Kharijite opposition, which negated the form of the legitimacy element contained in this principle and entirely the elements of heredity and monarchy, also showed its effect in the first centuries of Islamic history. To first mention the view of the last group, it is seen that

the Kharijites, as a historical community, opposed the aristocratic electoral and hereditary monarchy principles and developed a system of political thought in accordance with this opposition. Ed-Dûrî (2019, pp. 90-92) states that the Kharijites are a political group associated with egalitarian tribes, they are against the principles of testament-deputation (*vasiyet-vekâlet* or hereditary principle) and appointment-election (aristocratic election), they do not consider the existence of a head of state (caliph) necessary, and states that they consider it obligatory (*vâcip/fard*) to rise up against the illegitimate/oppressive ruler. It is known that the Necedât branch of the Kharijites firmly opposed the idea that Muslims needed a caliph (Azimli, 2018, p. 24). Watt (1985, pp. 11-12) states that the Kharijites defend the “communalistic” world view against an individualized religious morality structured in the text of the Qur’an, while Goldziher (1981, p. 172) emphasizes the democratic tendency of the Kharijite. The originality of the Kharijite political doctrine, as İnan (1999, p. 202) points out, lies in its “anti-ethatist” character and is seen in their assertion that the existence of the caliph was neither religiously necessary nor always worldly beneficial. Crone (2004, pp. 57-58) states that the Kharijites completely opposed the principle of heredity and accepted to have “merit” (*virtue/al-afdal*) as the only legitimacy principle. In this context, it becomes clear why the Qizilbash movement was first named with the term *Havaric* (Kharijite) in the 16th century Ottoman political thought. As it will be shown in the next subsection, Ottoman political thought, while describing the Qizilbash movement, particularly focuses on its tribal structure and its political vision that resists the central authority. Watt (2003, p. 56-57) states that most of the Kharijite leaders came from northern Arabian tribes and re-established small tribe/clan groups on an Islamic basis. In this respect, the fact that the Kharijite political doctrine was close to the socio-political structure of the tribes, and that it adopted a partially egalitarian and autonomist political discourse, caused them to be seen as similar to the Qizilbash movement in Ottoman political thought. On the other hand, as the theological connection of the Qizilbash movement with the Shiite imamate theory was better understood, the form of political discourse developed by Ottoman writers underwent a second differentiation in this direction, which will be discussed in detail later.

It is seen that the thinkers of the Mu’tazila school put forward similar views to the Kharijites (Afsaruddin, 2021, p. 40). For example, Abu Bakr al-Asam and Abu Ishaq al-Nazzam defend the argument that the caliphate is not obligatory (Azimli, 2018, p. 24; Afsaruddin, 2021, p. 40). Yücesoy (2011, pp. 13-15) claims that the Kharijite

approach and the caliphate theory of certain Mu'tazila groups have an anarchist perspective. It is understood that some Mu'tazila thinkers argue that the caliphate is morally obligatory, not religious (İnan, 1999, pp. 202-3). The best-known example of this argument is given by al-Jahiz in his book *Risale-i Osmaniye*, in which he combines pragmatic and aristocratic arguments (Afsaruddin, 2021, pp. 40-41; Kadi & Shahin, 2013, p. 85). Al-Jahiz's moment of synthesis and the role he assumed in the theory of the caliphate of the Mu'tazila school are similar to the role of al-Mawardi in the Sunni theory of the caliphate and Ja'far al-Sadiq in the Shiite theory of the caliphate.

If the conditional/legitimated hereditary monarchy principle is taken into consideration in general, it is seen that the preconditions of ruling were established around secular and/or theological discourse, absolute or relative forms of inheritance were developed, whereas the monarchical element always had an obvious determinant. The focus of the discussions conducted in this framework is on how to establish the relationship between legitimacy and succession secularly and/or theologically. For example, controversial issues such as whether the existence of the caliph is a secular or a religious 'obligation', whether the caliph is a representative of God, the method and meaning of appointment and dismissal of the caliph in religious context, whether the right to caliphate can be monopolized by a particular tribe/lineage, reveal fundamental divergences. If the Sunni theory of caliphate is summarized in general historical lines, it is possible to say that the value of the election principle as a principle of legitimacy has gradually decreased, and therefore it has largely ceased to be a political precondition (legitimate principle). The theoretical and practical vacuum created by the principle of election, on the other hand, has been tried to be filled with the practices of succession that will replace the election and the theological discourse built around the divine-appointment argument. This situation has concrete historical grounds. First of all, since the borders of the Islamic state expanded to Iran, North Africa and Eastern Anatolia, neither the direct election of the caliph nor the organization of a political authority in the form of a confederation of tribes became possible. In this case, while it may be a more reasonable solution to divide the social formation into autonomous parts, it is understood that the ruling class consisting of the families that hold the authority of the caliphate and the civilian or military elites who joined it -at least for that period- did not accept such a solution and tried to institutionalize the central state. In this case, the Sunni caliphate theory –which is also valid for the Shiite caliphate theory– is broken off from the shura/election traditions, and its monarchical rule is built on the theory of succession

and supported by theological legitimacy pillars. If the Sunni political literature is taken into consideration, this discussion will begin with the treatise of Abdulhamid al-Katib's *Risâletü Abdilhamîd el-Kâtib fî Nasîhati Veliyyilahd*, and the work of Ibn'ul Muqaffa's *al-Edebu's-Sagir ve'l-Edebu'l-Kebir*, Abu Yusuf's works named *Kitab al-Kharaj*, works on ideal city and politics of *Meşşâî* philosophy tradition, and were developed with al-Mawardi's *al-Ahkam al-Sultania w'al-Wilayat al-Diniyya*, also it has been enriched with many *fiqh/theology/* hadith studies from Abu'l Hasan Ash'ari to Ibn Kathir.¹⁰⁰²

One of the first works written in the field of caliphate theory, Abdülhamid al-Katib's work named *Risâletü Abdilhamîd el-Kâtib fî Nasîhati Veliyyilahd*, dated 8th century, was written in the form of a long letter. The main problematic of this letter is to give advice to the son of the Umayyad Ruler, Marwan II, about his military campaign against the Kharijite rebellion (Abu Safieh, 2017, pp. 172-73). In this letter, there are arguments that Marwan II's son Abdullah was chosen as the heir to the throne by Allah and that the caliphs are the representatives of God (Abu Safieh, 2017, pp. 173-74). The fact that the caliph should be more religious than his personal circle, and that the crown prince can achieve success by following the orders and advice of the monarch in the letter shows that aristocratic and monarchical principles are used together (Canatan, 2014, pp. 17, 19, 20). Moreover, in the second part of the work called *el-Edebu's-Sagir ve'l-Edebu'l-Kebir*, which was written by Ibn al-Muqaffa in the 8th century, three types of government are listed. The first of these is based on religion, the second on prudence (*tedbîr*) and the third on passions (Canatan, 2014, p. 34). In this work, religious administration is considered better than others as a political form in which the subjects obey the state authority and fulfill their duties within the framework of the prohibitions and orders (Rosenthal, 1962, p. 71). While the first political form matures, the rule based on prudence also reveals social opposition, the last form was translated by Rosenthal (1962, p. 71) with the term "arbitrary rule" and defined as a perishable form of government. It is seen that this theoretical formulation combines the traditions of religious authority and secular administration, on the other hand, it proposes a certain principle of legitimacy against the phenomenon of arbitrary administration. Rosenthal (1962, p. 72) underlines that in *Risâletü 'ş-şahâbe*, another work of Ibn al-Muqaffa, there

¹⁰⁰² Since we have discussed the arguments on this issue in the chapters where we refer to the philosophy of al-Farabi, al-Razi, Avicenna and Averroes, it would not be summarized them in this subsection.

is a more intense emphasis on the use of religious and political authority by the caliph, and the divine inspiration and the reasonable laws of the ruler (*ra'y*) indicates that they were combined in the figure of the caliph. In general, Ibn al-Muqaffa, who counts the protection and continuation of religion among his political duties, states that this duty is fulfilled by prophets, representatives of God (caliphs) and friends of God (saints) (Crone & Hinds, 2003, p. 82). In Abu Yusuf's book called *Kitab al-Kharaj*, it is argued that the power of the caliph emerged with divine order and that his duty was to rule with justice by obeying divine laws (Rosenthal, 1962, p. 74). In this framework, the caliph is accepted as the representative of God and his authority to direct his subjects to the 'right way' is granted (Crone & Hinds, 2003, pp. 82-83). Another notable aspect of Abu Yusuf's theory of the caliphate is the absolute obligation to obey the ruler. This necessity is based on the thesis that a caliph expressed divine orders in the final analysis and obeying a caliph means obeying divine orders (ed-Dûrî, 2019, p. 78). According to another extension of this thesis, whether the rulers are benevolent or oppressive is completely God's will, and just as God has made a decision about a certain society -in accordance with the justice of God, such a person becomes a ruler - in this case, obedience is considered obligatory under all circumstances (ed-Dûrî, 2019, p. 78). As Heck (2013, pp. 15-16) points out, the significant aspect of Abu Yusuf's theory of caliphate is that a caliph was given divine authority *a priori*, and thus, a caliph had the authority to legislate at the necessary points, especially the taxation issues. This point shows that as the expansion and institutionalization of Islamic empires, the administrative/criminal/legal needs also expanded, and therefore the secular authority of the caliph was expanded by basing it on religious authority. In the 10th and 11th centuries, the Sunni version of the theory of the caliphate reached its most developed form. The characteristic of these centuries is the loss of the Islamic state to its administrative integrity, the emergence of authority conflicts between the caliphs and local dynasties, and the emergence of rival states (Fatimids and Buyids) adopting the beliefs of different sects. The rise of secular politics with the conflicts between Islamic sects has brought with it a clear interest in the tradition of class domination of the past centuries, as seen in the example of history of al-Tabari. In the aforementioned context, the concern of protecting the authority of the caliph -but this authority periodically lost its direct sanction power- affected the course of development of the theory of caliphate. In this context, both the necessity of the caliphate and its nature have been the subject of discussion separately. While the first representatives of this debate are Abu'l Hasan

Ash'ari and the theologians belonging to the Ash'ari school, the second most influential reference point is al-Mawardi. Although Abu'l Hasan Ash'ari was a former follower of the Mu'tazilite school, he developed his theory of caliphate against Mu'tazila and Shiite arguments. In this context, the author argues that the caliphate is a religious obligation and that there is no religious dogma that gives privilege to the Ahl al-Bayt in the appointment of the caliph (Afsaruddin, 2021, p. 43; Fettâh, 1995). Schools following Ash'ari thought spread since the middle of the 10th century and had a great impact on intellectual life (Corbin, 2001, p. 117; Black, 2011, p. 83). Thinkers belonging to the Ash'ari school preached that the first four caliphs were legitimate examples, that the laws were valid even during the reign of aggressor rulers, that it was essential to obey all rulers as long as they did not violate divine orders, and that it was essential to keep the community together and direct it to the right path rather than the personality of the ruler (Meguid, 2013, p. 44). To continue, it is possible to argue that the thinker who had the greatest influence on the Sunni theory of caliphate was al-Mawardi, who had the belief of the Ash'ari school (Afsaruddin, 2006a, p. 132). In this context, al-Mawardi's works named *Dürerü's-Sülûk fi Siyâseti'l-Mülûk* and *al-Ahkâmü's-sultâniyye ve'l-vilâyâtü'd-dîniyye* are worth mentioning. Al-Mawardi argues that religion and state complement each other, religion is the ground and state is the guardian, and the caliph owes his authority to religion (el-Mâverdi, 2019, p. 64). According to these arguments, the caliphs have a religious authority and can maintain their own dominance by following the religion and protecting it with the power of the state (el-Mâverdi, 2019, p. 66). Al-Mawardi, in his work named *al-Ahkâmü's-sultâniyye ve'l-vilâyâtü'd-dîniyye*, conducted a detailed reasoning on the basis of the caliphate, the principles of the election and appointment of the caliph, and the conditions of being elected as the caliph. First of all, the author argues that the existence of the caliph/imam is obligatory for the conduct of religion and state affairs in terms of being the prophet's deputy, and that it is obligatory to follow the caliph/imam (al-Mawardi, 1996, p. 3). Al-Mawardi, who follows the Ash'ari school, claims that the existence of a ruler is not reasonable but a religious need (ed-Dûrî, 2019, p. 81). On the other hand, al-Mawardi stated that it was obligatory (*vacip*) for the caliph to be known by all Muslims, while it was religiously objectionable to directly give the title of 'the caliph of Allah' to the caliph (al-Mawardi, 1996, pp. 15-16). It is clear that this view is an argument developed against the theory of the Shiite caliphate. In addition, al-Mawardi suggested that the caliph should be in charge with the election procedure, claimed that the election could be made even by a

single person, stated that the less virtuous person could be chosen instead of the most virtuous person, and opposed the idea of the legitimacy of the reign of two or more caliphs at the same time (al-Mawardi, 1996, pp. 5-14). It is understood that these propositions are generally based on the conflict between the Baghdad caliph and the Buwayhi state and are put forward against the Shiite caliphate theory (Rosenthal, 1962, p. 27; ed-Dûrî, 2019, p. 81-83). Another significant point is the project of regaining the lost influence on the Abbasid caliph residing in Baghdad. For this reason, al-Mawardi draws a theoretical framework that can have the widest area of legitimacy and theoretically exclude Shiite caliphs from this area. As Crone (2004, p. 253) points out, al-Mawardi's theory of caliphate equates the caliph with the king ("the king as khalif") and counting religious, legal and military duties among the duties of the imam/caliph (ed-Dûrî, 2019, p. 83) reinforces his emphasis.¹⁰⁰³

The Sunni theory of the caliphate has developed, in general terms, inseparable from the practice of the caliphate. The administrative practices and/or practical needs of the dynastic and social powers that held power during the four caliphs and the following Umayyad and Abbasid administrations shaped the theory of caliphate within a common tradition. On the other hand, the theory of the Shiite caliphate cannot be considered to have been shaped in the same historical context. The historical conditions in which the Shiite caliphate theory was shaped bear the traces of a long history of political struggle, in which political power was lost and the social opposition was tried to be reorganized around an alternative political center -contrary to the Sunni version. Although these traces were not completely erased during the periods when Ismaili, Zaydi and finally Twelver groups took power, they gained new forms and new meanings in favor of the dominant social segments or classes. For this reason, it is possible to talk about the two main periods of the Shiite caliphate theory, pre- and post-government, and three different paradigms, namely Ismaili/Zaydi/Twelver. Theoretical and mystical arguments of heterodox (or in case antinomian) groups called *ghulat* can be added to these paradigms.

Looking at the secondary literature on the theory of the Shiite caliphate, it is possible to come across a general opinion that the main backbone of the theory in question is the caliph's coming to power by testament of previous caliph or inheritance

¹⁰⁰³ Al-Mawardi also uses the term Imam instead of the term caliph. The tendency of Ash'ari theology to limit the caliphate to four caliphs and to characterize the remaining rulers as imams following the example of the four caliphs may have been influential in this terminological preference.

(Madelun, 2004, p. 141; İnan, 1999, p. 200; Afsaruddin, 2006a, p. 132). However, this opinion cannot be considered fully valid in terms of the development history of the Shiite caliphate theory. The principle of election, which is at the root of the theory of the caliphate, has not been completely abandoned in the Sunni tradition (Ed-Dûrî, 2019, p. 35), and it is possible to find traces of this in the roots of the Shiite tradition. Afsaruddin (2021, p. 35-36) states that the Shiite theory of caliphate is not based solely on the principle of succession, and that the criterion of virtue is also an effective argument, especially in the early period. Al-Katib (1997, p. 13) also argues that the original Shiite political theory was based on the principle of *shura* (council) rather than monarchy. It is stated in the historical sources that the people gathered around Ali ibn Abu Talib, when he was going to take power as the fourth caliph, supported Ali by claiming that he would not abandon the principle of *shura* (Madelung, 2004, p. 145). This detail is crucial in terms of the practical relationship established between election and *shura* principles. It is seen that the principle of *shura* continued in the debates about who will be the crown prince after Mu'awiya, and the people gathered around Huseyn bin Ali criticized the proclamation of Yazid as the Byzantine and Sassanid tradition, and they asserted the principle of election (Demircan, 2014, pp. 129-30). Afsaruddin (2006a, p. 132; 2021, p. 35) states that among the preconditions for being elected caliph in early Shiite sources, the principles of being "*afdal*" (better than others) and being a "*sabikun*" (being one of the devout Muslims) among other candidates were put forward. In this case, in the early examples of Shiite caliphate theory, Ali Abu Talib's religious authority and his affiliation to the tribe of Hashemites are supported by the principle of election. On the other hand, the fact that the theses claiming that Ali bin Abu Talib was the most qualified person with the power to lead the Muslim community and that he was the "*wasi*" of Muhammad in support of his caliphate, in the early period, reveals the versatility of the issue (Madelung, 2004, p. 179). The fact that Ali bin Abu Talib also has letters in which he expressed his opinion that the caliphate will be his right as long as there is a member of the Ahl al-Bayt who is knowledgeable in religious matters further complicates the issue (Daftary, 2016, p. 46).

It can be argued that this framework began to transform in Huseyn bin Ali and the period that followed, and the principle of succession prevailed. The killing of most of the members of the Ahl al-Bayt who refused to give allegiance to Yazid I in the Battle of Karbala and the resistances such as the *Tawwabîn* movement that developed against the Umayyad administration after this event increased the political significance of the

surviving members of the Ahl al-Bayt. The Shiite movement of the late 7th century, which was organized by Mukhtar es-Sekafi and gained the support of the *Mewali* groups, declared the last surviving son of Ali, Muhammad bin Hanafiyye, as an imam and *mahdi*, and set a decisive example for the Shiite caliphate theory (Daftary, 2016, p. 54; Yiğit, 2020). The Mukhtar movement defined Muhammad b. Hanafiyye as the highest representative of divine wisdom on earth and the divinely appointed representative of Muhammad, moreover, after the death of Mukhtar, there was a belief that he was lost and will return (*gaiba/raj'a*) (Lewis, 1940, p. 26) -which these arguments will later be seen in the Ismaili and Twelver sects. The movement initiated by Mukhtar es-Sakafi was later known as *Keysaniyye* - and partly *ghulat* -, and the theo-political arguments that constitute the political ideology of this movement envisioned their leaders (Ali, Hasan, Hussein and Mohammed b. Hanafiyye) as imams endowed with divine authority and powers, who were the successors of Muhammad (Daftary, 2016, p. 60). On the other hand, Ali Zeyn al-Abidin, who survived the Battle of Karbala, stayed away from this movement, and three important names emerged among his children who systematized the Shiite caliphate theory since the eighth century. These names are Muhammad al-Baqir and Ja'far al-Sadiq, who is considered the founder of Twelver Shiism, and Isma'il ibn Ja'far, whom Ismaili Shiism considers him the lost imam. A second epoch that emerged in the eighth century is the Zaydi caliphate theory and theology, which emerged after the revolt of Zayd bin 'Ali, who also had an Alid genealogy, against the Umayyads. In general, it is noticed that the Ismaili and Twelver caliphate theories constitute political ideas with an absolute monarchy inclination, which replaces the principle of legitimacy based on the principle of divine order, while the Zaydis, on the other hand, embrace the conditionality/legitimation principle more. A similar distinction can be noticed in Ismaili caliphate theories and *ghulat* approaches, which will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

First, starting with Zaydis, the Zaydi theory of the caliphate makes a partial distinction between early caliphs and Imams. The Zaydi approach accepts the caliphate of Abu Bakr and Omar, but argues that the right to caliphate after Omar belongs to Ali bin Abu Talib (Daftayr, 2016, p. 190). The Zaydis accept that Ali and his sons Hasan and Husayn are the infallible Imams appointed by Muhammad (Zysow, 2013, p. 605). While being among the sons of Ali bin Abu Talib was not counted as the precondition of being an Imam in the early Zaydis, it is understood that this principle was strengthened by some political criteria that developed over time. These criteria are

formulated as (i) to be knowledgeable in religious matters, (ii) to be brave/valiant, (iii) to be devoted (*zahid*), and (iv) to have the qualifications of every 'Alid who rebelled (*khuruc/kiyama*) to be an imam (Gölpınarlı, 1987, p. 88). Another feature of the Zaydi caliphate/imamate theory is that the people elected as Imams are not protected by the veil of infallibility, the hereditary line of imams is not accepted, the authority of an underage or missing imam is rejected, the *mahdi*-oriented tendencies are weak, and imams' political functions are concentrated in the administrative rather than religious (Zysow, 2013, p. 605; Daftary, 2016, p. 192-93). The fact that Zaydi groups –similar to Nizari Ismaili groups– recognize the authority of a living Imam who can rule materially (Newman, 2013, p. 1) makes visible the importance they attach to the practical administrative aspect of political authority and their approach that excludes the mystification of the ruler. Zaydis generally recognized the election of an 'Alid person, who is more virtuous (*afdal*) than other candidates -or a non-Alid ruler (*muhtesibun/muktasida*) as the representative of this office -as a legitimate method of forming caliphate (Watt, 1985, p. 130; Daftary, 2016, p. 192).

Another branch that was decisive in the development of the Shiite caliphate/imamate theory emerged depending on Ismaili theology and political movements. The origin of Ismaili Shiism was shaped under the influence of Muhammad al-Baqir and Ja'far al-Sadiq's studies in the field of hadith, tafsir and theology, similar to the Twelver sect. At the center of Ja'far al-Sadiq's systematic approach to the theory of the caliphate is the proposition that imamate is a religious dogma, and as an extension of this (i) there is only one true imam in every historical period, (ii) imams point to the imam who will come after them (*wasi*) (Daftary, 2007, p. 81). After the death of Ja'far al-Sadiq in the middle of the 8th century, several opposing approaches emerged regarding the leadership of the Fatimid-Alid family, that is, the imamate. It is possible to list these approaches as follows (Lewis, 1940, pp. 30-31): (i) *Nawusiya*, who believes that Ja'far al-Sadiq is immortal and will return as the Mahdi, (ii) the group that accepted the leadership of Musa el-Kazim, son of Ja'far al-Sadiq, later to be named as Twelver, (iii) the Ismaili group, which accepted the leadership of Ismail, the son of Ja'far al-Sadiq, who passed away before him. There is no satisfactory information about the establishment and development of the third group in question, as there is about the historical personality of Isma'il ibn Ja'far. On the other hand, this group is thought to be related to the circle of Abu'l-Khattab, which developed a mystical doctrine and followed a radical political line (Lewis, 1940, p. 40). The allegation that Abu'l-Khattab

was appointed as a *dai* (Shiite promoter) and *wasi* (successor) by Ja'far al-Sadiq, although he was later dismissed from this position, is stated in the sources of the period (Amir-Moezzi, EI, Khattabiya article), and it is understood that a mystical caliphate theory was built around this claim.¹⁰⁰⁴ While there are seven different versions of this theory summarized by Amir-Moezzi (EI, Khattabiya article), the main idea (also accepted by Massignon and Lewis) is that through a kind of “spiritual adoption” the right to imam is passed to Abu'l-Khattab and that imams have supernatural qualities that extend to features such as being incarnation of the God.¹⁰⁰⁵ Although Daftary (2007, pp. 92-3) states that the relation mentioned between Khattabiya and Ismailiya in the secondary literature in general should not be exaggerated, it would be a reasonable approach to think that both theo-political notions are nourished by a common set of beliefs and that these common features are revived in the Ismaili caliphate theory.

It is seen that the mystified doctrine of imamate developed and systematized in the period from the death of Isma'il ibn Ja'far to the Fatimid caliphs, and the doctrine of the hidden imam, which allowed spiritual inheritance, was accepted (Corbin, 2001, p. 76). The general arguments of the Ismaili imamate theory are explained in detail in the 11th century text *ar-Risala fi l-Imama*, published during the Fatimid period. According to this text, Imamate is a religious and reasonable necessity and at a certain historical moment there is only one Imam, descended from Ali, this Imam is appointed by God, the existence of this Imam is accepted as religious dogma (*nass*), Imams always appoint an heir, and the Imamate succeeds in lineage of Isma'il ibn Ja'far (Makarem, 1972, pp. 22, 27, 41, 43, 46). Another remarkable aspect of the Ismaili imamate theory is a belief that the imam has a cosmic-divine body rather than a human body (*al-nafs al-rihiyah*) and they have both divine and human aspects together (Corbin, 2001, pp. 90-91). The translation of this theory into the language of political doctrines is that the divine body and the divine secrets entrusted with can be transferred between people who are not biologically related, and therefore the caliphate/imam could be inherited in this way (Lewis, 1940, pp. 49-50). Thus, the theory of the caliphate gained both the norm of personal succession and a spiritualist-ideological basis that could support the theocratic monarchy. Ismaili cosmology also includes the belief that God created the world in seven days and eight nights, and accordingly, seven imams will come in each

¹⁰⁰⁴ There are also arguments exists that Muhammad al-Baqir may have appointed Abu'l-Khattab as *Dai*. See: Sachedina (EI, Abu'l-Kattāb Asadī article).

¹⁰⁰⁵ For the arguments of Massignon and Lewis, see: Lewis (1940, p. 49) and Daftary (2007, pp. 92-3).

successive period and the *Mahdi* will appear as the last imam (Hodgson, 1955, pp. 16-17; Crone, 2004, pp. 199-200). Ismaili theorists have applied this approach to a wide discursive area, including the Judeo-Christian tradition, for example, they mentioned every seven prophets from Adam on in the *wasi* chain (Adam-Noah-Abraham-Moses-Jesus-Muhammad) and also Isma'il ibn Ja'far in this lineage (Gölpınarlı, 1987, pp. 89-90). In the final analysis, it can be said that the essence of the Ismaili theory of caliphate is that Imams are accepted as a necessary element for religious and administrative guidance, that they rule completely by inheritance, regardless of whether they are spiritual or material, and that they prepare people for the apocalypse by completing the seventh cosmic cycle (Crone, 2004, p. 207). In this framework, the core of Ismaili political theory is the idea that absolute subjection to Imams is the subjection to God (Netton, 1991, pp. 97-98). When the works of a famous Ismaili *dai* such as Abu Yakub es-Sicistani, who wrote his works in the 10th century, are examined, the situations where the figures of imam and prophet replace each other can be seen more clearly. According to one of the main arguments of es-Sicistani, there is only one prophet in the world who will reveal and guide the divine secrets in a certain historical period (Walker, 1993, p. 117). Ismaili imams are also placed in a prophet-like position because of their uniqueness and the belief that those who do not recognize their authority cannot be considered believers. The interpretation, application and announcement of the divine secrets brought by this 'prophet' require a hierarchical organization. According to the framework drawn by Walker (1993, p. 18), this hierarchy consists of five steps:

Natiq, Asas, Imam, Lahiq, Janah. These terms roughly translate respectively as speaking-prophet (the lawgiver), founder (of the Interpretation), imam (the preserver and maintainer of the Interpretation in each generation), his deputy or adjunct (here al-Sijistani means the twelve regional chiefs of the da'wa), and lastly the ordinary missionary-dai.

As a result, Akhtar (2022, pp. 55, 60) stated that the Ismaili caliphate theory, which was dominant during the Fatimids, replaced the caliph as an imperial ruler figure with a Neo-Platonist configurations, thus, unlike the Sunni caliph he states that *imams* has much more religious authority.

It is also necessary to briefly dwell on the *Ikhwan-i Safa*, *Qarmatian*, *Nizari* and *ghulat* variants of the Ismaili caliphate theory. *Ikhwan-i Safa* (Brethren of Purity) is the name of a group of writers whose unknown members were active in the 10th century. The academic debates on the treatises (*Rasa'il*) on philosophy, theology, natural

sciences, cosmology and political theory, written by this group collectively, have not yet come to an end.¹⁰⁰⁶ The intensive use of Ismaili terminology in their treatises provided the basis for the debates around whether they are Ismaili or not (Netton, 1991, p. 96; de Callataÿ, 2005, p. xi; Uysal, 2000). It can be said that these treatises generally accepted and developed early Ismaili views, but they did not directly reflect the dominant Ismaili view of the period in which they were written (Netton, 1991, p. 96). Despite the Ismaili theory suggesting that Ali ibn Abu Talib was an imam with *nass*, Baffioni (2011, p. 81) considers the absence of such a dogma in the *Ikhwan al-Safa* treatises as a sign of such differentiation. On the other hand, it is a remarkable view that the treatises in question contain a non-Fatimid Ismaili view and may be addressing Ismaili groups, such as the Qarmatians, who were excluded from the Fatimid *dawa* (Daftary, 2007, pp. 235-36). In this context, it is possible to find traces of Ismaili cyclical cosmology in the *Ikhwan al-Safa* treatises. According to this view, human societies need divine guidance in order to access correct information and obey divine laws -and this guidance is undertaken by six successive prophets and seventh leader (Abouzeid, 1987, pp. 399-400). Moreover, according to the *Ikhwan-i Safa* treatises, religion and reign are twin brothers, the religion precedes reign, and reign supports the religion (Abouzeid, 1987, p. 402). Although the treatises of *Ikhwan-i Safa* implicitly suggest that an imam belonging to the Ahl al-bayt should lead on behalf of all Muslims, they argue that the authority of the imam can be used rationally by a group of believers (Ali-De-Unzaga, 2013, p. 74). The theological basis of bringing the rational element to the fore is the view that the divine reason governs the universe and that the idea of superiority of the caliph over people is based on his share of this divine reason. In the origins of this theory, there is the argument that grounds the social existence based on the concepts of solidarity and religious leadership in al-Farabi's work named *al Medinetu'l fazila*. In this framework, the *Ikhwan-i Safa* group brought the concepts of *ta'awun* (mutual aid) and *sadāqa* (friendship) to the fore in the establishment of social authority, in a way that might appeal to Qarmatian groups (Ali-De-Unzaga, 2013, p. 74). Ultimately, it can be said that the *Ikhwan-i Safa* treatises brought the pre-Fatimid Ismaili view closer to the aristocratic principle of election and reconstructed the caliphate authority in the form of philosopher-imam, which places them in a synthesis moment closer to the second between the *Meşşâî* thinkers and Nasîrüddin Tûsî.

¹⁰⁰⁶ For a list of modern editions and translations of the treatises, see: Daftary (2004, pp. 167-73).

Qarmatism emerged at the end of the 9th century as an Ismaili sect with revolutionary ideas, spread among the tribes organized especially in Kufa and Bahrain at the beginning of the 10th century, and started an uprising with the expectation of the *Mahdi*, claiming that the cosmological cycle had come to an end (Daftary, 2007, p. 149). The political doctrine of the early Qarmatians is the belief that Isma'il ibn Ja'far is the seventh imam after Muhammad and that he will come again as the *Mahdi*, the cyclical understanding of history, and that two imams, one of whom speaks (*natiq*) and the other is silent (*samed*), were born as *wasis*, and argues that after Isma'il ibn Ja'far divine secrets were revealed and the visible laws of religion became obsolete (Daftary, 1990). The main point where they differed from Fatimid-Ismailism is that they did not adopt the belief that the imamate passed to the rulers through *hujjet* and continued to wait for the return of Isma'il ibn Ja'far (Walker, 1993, p. 11). The partial failure of the Qarmatian revolts led to the spread of this group into Iran and Khorasan, while some of the Qarmatians established an autonomous administration in Bahrain and built a partially egalitarian and politically participatory regime (Daftary, 1990). In Qarmatism, the belief in the supernatural powers and divine knowledge of the *Mahdi* and other Imams is believed, and in practice, as an extension of the doomsday expectation, the ideal of establishing a communal society by eliminating formal *fiqh* rules becomes a reality - albeit limited (Tucker, 2008, pp. 115-16).

Nizari-Ismailism, another variant of the Ismaili caliphate/imamat theory, developed within communities that adopted Ismaili principles. Nizariism is an Ismaili branch that developed in parallel with the succession crisis of the Fatimid state centered in Cairo at the end of the 11th century, and in this respect, it basically focuses on a political orientation. The starting point of this branch was that, after the death of Fatimid caliph al-Mustansir in 1094, Iranian Ismailis did not recognize the new caliph al-Mustali as an authority and accepted al-Mustansir's son Nizar as their leader, who probably died in isolation and prison conditions. From this division, two different approaches have emerged within Ismailism, the first of which is Nizarism, which is active in Iran and Syria, and the other is Musta'li, which is active in Egypt, a part of Syria and Yemen (Daftary, 2007, p. 238).¹⁰⁰⁷ At the origins of this divergence lies a fundamental theo-

¹⁰⁰⁷ The Musta'li sect will not be discussed in detail. The Musta'li sect split into many branches in a short time. Among them, *Tayyibis* developed a new political practice by giving absolute authority to their imam-deputies, whom they called *dai-i mutlaq*, and they were influential in Yemen and India (Daftary, 2007, pp. 275-76). For an interesting text in which dais are given the same role as prophets in *Tayyibi dawa* literature, see: Klemm & Walker & Karam (2011, p. 35).

political problem. Caliph al-Mustansir appointed his eldest son Nizar to be the Fatimid caliph after him (Daftary, 2007, p. 241), and according to the Shiite caliphate theory, this dogma (*nass*) with its spiritual and worldly dimensions constitutes an order to be followed. For this reason, some of the Ismaili groups did not recognize al-Mustali, who was brought to power by some political intrigues, as the caliph and took Nizar's son/grandson with them to Iran, accrediting him as a hidden imam, and constructing partly a new Ismaili theology (*Davet'ül Cedide* or *al-da'wa al-jadida*). In this new theology put forward by Hasan Sabbah, it is most likely that old Shiite traditions are brought to life again, and it is claimed that God can be known not based on reason or inference, but through the imam's *ta'lim*, that is, his teaching (Daftary, 2007, p. 339; Öz, 2010). Hasan Sabbah claimed that there was only one imam appointed by God in every historical era, that the existence of the imam at the limit of the reasoning of individual individuals solved the problem of the mind simply by existing -without the need for a justification- and constructed prophecy as a logical link between the imams and God (Daftary, 2007, pp. 341-42). Hasan Sabbah claimed that there was only one imam appointed by God in every era, that the existence of the imam at the limit of the reasoning of individuals solved the problem of the reason by simply existing -without the need for a justification- and constructed prophecy as a logical link between the imams and God (Daftary, 2007, p. 341-42). Another notable aspect of Nizari Ismailism is that it allows for dethronement of a ruler if he is not pious and just. In this respect, the *fedayeen* (*fi'da'i*) groups led by Hasan Sabbah and his successors were based on this principle while taking a role in the change of political authority (Lewis, 2012, p. 221). Black (2011, p. 48) argues that another distinguishing feature of Nizari imamate theology is that it favors imams over prophets and formulates this proposition as follows:

According to surviving accounts of their teaching, al-Sabbah and the Nizaris put forward the argument that Prophecy and Imamate are necessary because, we can observe, humans cannot live without cooperation and coercive governance. Having proved that society in general requires leadership, they then argued that such leadership has divine sanction because people will accept constraints and rules only if they are from God (a presciently Durkheimian argument): 'the legislator must be that one whom God shall have appointed as his lieutenant' (that is, a Prophet). Divine revelation, moreover, requires an authoritative exponent. It was even argued that 'Ali and his successors as leaders were of higher status than

Muhammad because it was they who reveal the inner and truer meaning of God's revelation.

It is clear that this theory is based on the distinction made between *natiq* and *samed* imams and indirectly gives absolute authority to the *dais*, called *hujjet*, when the imam is hidden. The second phase of Nizarism was in the middle of the 12th century. It begins with the introduction of the *Qiyama* theory during the period of Hasan II. Hasan II explains the claim of the spiritual inheritance of the imamate by preaching that the last days of the world have come, that he is the caliph of God, the representative of the *dai* and the imam, and that the formal Sharia has been abolished (Hodgson, 1955, pp. 148-153). When Hasan II was killed in the resistance against the *Qiyama* movement, his son Mohammed II succeeded him and he developed the theory that the imam was a direct revelation of God (Hodgson, 1955, p. 163). This theory is based on the assumption that the purpose of life in the world is to see and know God and that the realization of this purpose is possible by seeing the Imam.

Nizari Ismailism, which spread in the geography of Southern Iran, has extraordinary connections with Ottoman political thought. One of the most well-known theoreticians of Nizari Ismailism is Nasîrüddin Tûsî, and as was discussed in the previous sections, Tûsî's work called *Ahlak-ı Nâsirî* is frequently referred to in the sources of Ottoman political thought. But the interaction is not limited to this. It should not be surprising that the influence of Ismaili Shi'ism (syncretic popular Shi'ism) was also found in the *sûfî* circles that can be observed in 13th century Anatolia. To give an example, such influences can be found in the poems of Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî, antinomian dervishes, Akbaris, *Hurûfî*, and even *Ahi*, *Bayramî* and Bektashi circles. It is seen that these effects were still kept alive through the *Melâmîs* in the 16th century and their traces can still be found in the Qizilbash communities.¹⁰⁰⁸ It is possible to think that some of these effects spread through the Nizari groups who fled to Anatolia after the Mongol invasion. Another possibility of interaction is *ghulat* groups, which will be

¹⁰⁰⁸ It is also discussed by philologists that the Alevi-Zaza people living in the Dersim region may be of Deylam origin (Keskin, 2015, p. 96). It is clear that Deylam is a region where various branches of Shiism are widely organized in Iran and finally forms the center of Nizarism. This also reveals a possible ethnic and linguistic affinity between the two regions. About the Daylemites, see: Felix and Madelung (2011)

discussed later.¹⁰⁰⁹ Although Shah Ismail had a belief in Twelver Shiism, the ideological influence of Shah Ismail Safavi on the Turkmen masses living in Anatolia can be sought in the memory of such an Ismaili tradition kept alive through the activities of *sūfi* circles. A similar discursive structure was first introduced in the 15th century works under the influence of Tūsī and Ibn Miskaveyh's political thought, and then in Ottoman political thought through monarchy theories referring to the concepts of *Qutb/Mahdi/Caliph/Imam*, and it was tried to be conveyed to the subaltern mass through dervish circles. These examples will be discussed further in following sections.

In this section, it is necessary to briefly touch on the ideology of the Shiite *ghulat* groups and its political meaning. The word *ghulat* (ḡolāt) is the plural of the word *gali* (ḡālī), which is derived from the Arabic word *gulūv* (ḡoluw), meaning deviated/overdone (Ayverdi, 2010, p. 440). This term is used especially by Shiite circles who have the belief of Twelver Shiitism, to describe the Shiite and partially antinomian groups who put forward 'extreme' views that are incompatible with the principles of Twelver belief. However, it is seen that the term is also used by Sunni-Sha'afi writers. For example, the 11th century thinker Abu Mansur al-Baghdadi (1920, p. 36) in his work *Al-Farq bayn al-Firaq* described the term *ghulat* both as radical elements of any sect and as antinomian communities, which he excluded from the Islamic community, such as *Bayaniyye*, *Mughiriya*, *Janahiye*, *Mansuriye*, *Kattabiyye/Keysaniyye* and *Halluliye* to describe the groups called. Öz (1996) lists the belief elements found in most of the groups called *ghulat* as follows: (i) *uluhiyyet* and *hulul* (the belief that the holy spirit passed to Muhammad and then to Ali, that Ali was a God and/or that a divine essence was embodied in Ali), (ii) *teşbih* (the belief of Allah resembles human beings or human beings resemble Allah), (iii) *beda* (believing that knowledge of Allah is not certain), (iv) belief that prophecy does not end and it continues in Imams, (v) belief that Imams are the successors of the prophet, have the authority of the prophet, know the hidden secrets (*gayb*), will not die and will return (*rec'at*), (vi) *tenâsüh* (the belief that the soul will pass from one body to another), (vii) acceptance of the esoteric practice of *ta'wil* (symbolic commentary method which based on the assertion that the Qur'an has hidden meanings). Halm (2012) states that the basic belief element that causes these groups to be called *ghulat* is to attribute divine attributes to Imams, that such attributes are called *hulul* (incarnation), but in reality what is in question can be seen as the

¹⁰⁰⁹ For the traces of popular forms of Shiism in the *sūfi* groups of the Ottoman period, see: Terzioğlu (2012, pp. 86-96).

manifestation of God in the body of Imams. Similar to Öz, Gulpayganî (2014, p. 310) counts seven basic articles and mentions two decisive titles such as having divine skills in creation/giving sustenance and the authority to remove religious prohibitions. Tucker (2008, p. 109) lists the prevalence of speculative thought about the nature of God, magical use of esoteric knowledge, religious elitism and terrorist practices against dissidents, in addition to these items. In particular, the decisive trend created by the last title in terms of political practices is grounded and legitimized within specific forms of political thought. Tucker (2008, pp. 122-24) states that millennial expectations are common among *ghulat* communities and that there is a belief that a messiah/*mahdi* will come and establish heaven on earth –he will eliminate injustice, worldly suffering, false beliefs, even death – and the activist *ghulat* groups contribute to this expectation through armed struggle. Another important point is that alternative approaches have been formulated in the theory of imamate/caliphate among the *ghulat* groups. Crone (2004, p. 82) finds that *ghulat* groups ascribe the status of imam to people who were not caliphs or who were not involved in the struggle for the caliphate for the first time. This is an important differentiation and paves the way for local cult leaders to be accepted as imams by attributing divine attributes. As Al-Baghdadi (1935, p. 56) states, the assumed emergence of the divine spirit in a series of people through inheritance and the acceptance of these people as Imams in *ghulat* groups such as *Bayaniyya* and *Harbiyya* gives an extraordinary combination of the aristocratic principle of election and allegiance. In this context, in the belief of the *ghulat* groups organized around the city of Kufa, the necessity of the Imams to come from Alii/Fatimid origin has been removed, which is a common feature in the Twelver and Ismaili sects. For example, in the groups formed by Bayan ibn Sam'an and his supporters in the 8th century, the claim that Bayan, who was non-'Alid and non-Hashimite, is an Imam was accepted (Tucker, 2010, p. 48). Another *ghulat* group led by Al-Mughira ibn Sa'id formed an alternative Imamate genealogy centered on the lineage of Hasan ibn Ali and adopted armed resistance methods (Tucker, 2010, pp. 67-70).

The thesis that the theological discourse, principles of belief, practices and political tendencies built by Shiite *ghulat* groups continued even in the Ottoman period is worth considering in terms of our subject. In the large monograph written by Matti Moosa, the Shabaki, Babaî, Bektashi, Safavid/Qizilbash and Alawite groups that have maintained their historical presence in the Ottoman geography are also evaluated under the *ghulat* category. In this framework, Shabak's followers emerge as Turkmen and

Kurdish groups affiliated with the Safavid order and have messianic political tendencies (Moosa, 1987, p. 5-7). Moosa (1987, p. 17) states that Baba Ishak was also associated with extreme Shiite movements, declared himself apostle (apostle of Allah) and hid within *sūfism*. Although the subject of Bektashism is more complex, Moosa (1987, p. 20) states that this order was influenced by the religious structures of its own period such as *Hurūfī*, *Babaī*, *Ahi* and Abdal orders, that could be seen as narratives and symbols as such the birth of Balim Sultan without a father, use of the Allah-Muhammed-Ali trilogy and counting Muhammad and Ali as a single person points out that it has similarities with *ghulat* doctrines. The most radical argument in this regard was expressed by F. W. Hasluck (1929a, p. 160), and the author points to the famous Hurūfī Fadlullah as the founder of the Bektashi order. According to Hasluck (1929b, p. 565), after Fadlullah's death, his students came to the lodge of Hacı Bektâş-ı Velî and spread the *Hurūfī* teaching and continued the secret teaching under the protection of the name of Hacı Bektâş-ı Velî. The *ghulat* effects are also observed in the development of the Safavid order. Moosa (1987, p. 30) states that both Sheikh Ali and Sheikh Junayd were deified after their deaths, underlining that Junayd was particularly influenced by the Shiite extremist Mushasha Muhammad Ibn Falah. How the theory of the caliphate took place in Safavid political thought will be examined in the following paragraphs on the theory of caliphate in Ottoman Empire.

In this section, finally it will be summarized the propositions of Twelver Shi'ism about the caliphate/*imamate*. The origins of the Shiite sect, known as the *Isna Ashriya*, *Imamiyya* or Twelver Imam Shiism, date back to Musa al-Kazim, the younger son of the sixth Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq, and the Shiite groups that pledged allegiance to him. According to the fundamental doctrine of this sect, Imams are twelve, caliphs designated by Muhammad, and they are descendants of Huseyn ibn Ali (Gulpayganî, 2014, p. 141). The creed of Twelver Shiism is based on five titles, and these are listed as (i) tawhid, (ii) prophethood/*nubuvvet*, (iii) *imamate*, (iv) justice and (v) *mead/resurrection* (Gölpınarlı, 1987, p. 226). While the first two titles are based on the acknowledgment of the unity of God and the existence of the prophet, the titles of *Imamate* and justice indicate theo-political principles that have been made into a creed, and the last title includes resurrection after death. The elements in the *Imamate* doctrine of the Twelver sect developed within the concrete historical discussion and struggle phases, and especially the splits with Ismailism and Zaydiism, and then the Mufawwida-Nishaburi (*Naysaburi*) split in the 9th century had a decisive influence on this

development. While Mufawwida and his supporters claimed that Imams had supernatural knowledge, and that divine revelation continued after the Prophet and was received by Imams, on the other hand, Nishaburi and his followers claimed that Imams had human nature and were distinguished from others by their correct interpretation of the Qur'an (Modaressi, 1993, pp. 38-39). This second interpretation seems to have been influential in the doctrines and practices of the following centuries, which transferred the social leadership (*welayet*) to the jurists at the time when the imams were missing. Crone (2004, p. 110) states that the Imamate theory of the Twelver sect, unlike other Shiite sects that were contemporaries of it, does not contain tribal traditions, it has been developed in accordance with the needs of an urbanized group of people and has a de-politicized form in that it does not contain the idea of rebellion (*huruc*). The fact that the Twelver leaders resided in cities such as Kufa, Qom or Medina and did not participate in the Zaydi/Qarmatian/Ismaili uprisings, as well as their efforts to establish and maintain an orthodox position against the *ghulat* groups, were also effective in the formation of this ideological position (Crone, 2004, pp. 110-13). In this context, the Imamate doctrine has closed the theological perspective, where the Imam is defined as an infallible religious authority rather than the political interpretation in which he is established as a contemporary savior figure expected by Shiites (Modaressi, 1993, p. 9). On the other hand, after the death of Hasan al-Askari, who was accepted as the eleventh Imam by Twelvers, the disagreements among the followers of the sect about the succession of the Imamate were influential in the development of the theory of messianism. Modaressi (1993, pp. 89-90) states that the concept of messianism (waiting for the come of *mahdi*) is not a classical Twelver concept, but instead refers to the concept of *qa'im*. However, the debate around the death of Hasan al-Askari at the end of the 9th century and the uncertainty of whether he left an heir to his place made the concept of the *Mahdi* an indispensable place in the Twelver political lexicon. It is generally accepted that after Hasan al-Askari, a different group over ten emerged among the Twelvers. Some of these groups said that al-Askari died without leaving a successor, another part said that al-Askari would not die as an imam, and that he would return, some of them said that Muhammad bin Ali or Cafer bin Ali was the imam, not al-Askari, a last group believes that al-Askari left a son (Öz, 2003). Finally, with the dominance of the last group, the practice of believing in the major and minor hiding periods of Imam, and using his religious authority with the help of representatives during these periods, became widespread in the Twelver sect. In this framework, a social group

known as the representatives, protectors, spokespersons or ‘*wasi*’ of the hidden Imam has emerged and the function of this group has been institutionalized theoretically and practically (Hayes, 2022, p. 79).¹⁰¹⁰ As Amir-Moezzi (1994, p. 111-12) mentioned, the belief that these agents/representatives have some supernatural powers seems to have emerged in practice. The views of the Twelver sect on the Imamate reached their most developed formulation in the 10th century. Muhammed b. Yakub al-Küleyni’s *Usûlü’l-Kâfi* and ‘Ali b. Babawayh al-Qummi’s *Kitab al-Imama wa’l-tabsira min al-hayra* have become basic reference texts in this respect. In this context, the main arguments of the Imamate view, which is outlined in detail in Muhammad b. Yakub al-Küleyni’s work called *Usûlü’l-Kâfi*, are briefly as follows (Ed-Dûrî, 2019, pp. 94-97):

- (i) Imams are the earthly successors of both the prophet and God, constituting the religious and political authority and decision-making authority on behalf of the believers,
- (ii) Imamate is a religious dogma (*nass*) and a divine necessity, not a rational one,
- (iii) The inheritance of the Imamate is carried out by God and the right to become an Imam is reserved for the descendants of Ali bin Abu Talib,
- (iv) Imams have superior characteristics than other people, such as innocence and wisdom.

The Imamate teaching of the Twelver sect includes the belief that Imams are innocent like prophets, that Imams are chosen by God as the protection of innocence can only be provided by God, and that the last Imam will emerge as the Mahdi and make divine justice prevail (Gulpayganî, 2014, p. 141). Moreover, another of the main arguments of this sect on Imamate is that Imamate is one of the basic dogmas (*nass*) of religion, and recognizing, loving and supporting the Imam of the time is an inseparable part of belief (Ed-Dûrî, 2019, p. 93-94). In the works of al-Sharîf al-Murtadâ, who wrote his works at the end of the 10th and the beginning of the 11th century and developed the Shiite imamate doctrine within the framework of the possibilities of Mutazili theology, it is seen that the Imamate attained a form that includes prophecy. According to Al-Murtadâ, Imamate is a kind of leadership (*ri’asa*) institution that emerged for human communities to reach moral righteousness and divine help, and all prophets have

¹⁰¹⁰ For information on the relationship, correspondence and fictional encounters between these representatives, who can be called Mediates of Imam, and the hidden imam, see: Amir-Moezzi (1994, pp. 115-16; 2011b, pp. 339-74; 2011c 431-40), Ghaemmaghami (2020).

the characteristics of imams -even if there is no revelation, the trait of prophethood disappears, but the imamate remains (Abdulsater, 2017, pp. 154-55). This theory also has specific extensions in terms of practical politics. First of all, the definition of prophets as imams or leaders (*reis*) brings with it the idea of prioritizing the rules of law and morality they preached over the norms required by the political regimes of their time. In this respect, the status of Imam is placed in a decisive position in terms of compliance/implementation of political laws and norms. As Gölpınarlı (1987, p. 307-8) states, the Twelver sect accepts that the prophets did not obey the laws of the rulers who were their contemporaries, but instead acted in accordance with the decrees revealed to them -or revealed to the prophets before them. In this respect, Imams emerge as the religious authorities who carry out the provisions of revelation as the successors of the prophets, at the same time, since they have the attribute of *ismet* (innocence), their views and behaviors constitute *sunnah*. The authority of Imams, who are believed to have the ability (*ilm*) to explain the hidden aspects of religious texts, in terms of religious interpretation/annotation, in the last analysis includes a law-forming (*ijtihad*) authority in practice (see: Amir-Moezzi, 2011a, pp. 247-62). The privilege of using this authority is available to the representatives, who are also called *mujtahids*. In the periods when the Imam is missing, *mujtahids* become absolute regents who have the authority to execute punishments and adjudicate on social issues (Gölpınarlı, 1987, p. 232). Although the early Twelver view, under the influence of Al-Murtadā, denies the authority of *ijtihad* and especially the method of *qiyas*, it also includes the right to make *ijtihad* because religious laws are shaped according to the principle of *akbār al-āhād* and Imams are endowed with the divine infallibility privilege (Zysow, 2011).

VIII.II.III.IV. The Representation of Caliph's Authority in Ottoman Political Thought

The fact that the Ottoman rulers were referred to as *caliph*, *imam*, *sultan*, *kutb*, *mujaddid* or *veli* in the examples of Ottoman political thought written at the verge of the 16th century reveals how broad the political/ideological conceptualization framework was. At first glance, it can be thought that all these expressions aim to endow the ruler with a form of transcendent authority as the concrete representative of the idea of God embodied on earth. However, if these forms of conceptualization are treated simply as expressions of exaltation or adjective of praise, it is not possible to fully understand the traditions of political discourse in which they take place. As was

summarized in the subsection above, it is seen that the theological and political approaches, which are considered to be completely opposite to each other in Islamic political thought, also correspond to specific signification systems and forms of political discourse. In this context, the forms of expression that can be associated with the concept of caliphate in Ottoman political thought are based on more than one Islamic political discourse form/tradition, and these bases are adapted to the Ottoman political context within an eclecticism that can be considered theoretically contradictory. In this respect, the discursive foundations that were effective in shaping Ottoman political thought can be listed as (i) classical Sunni caliphate theory, (ii) Shiite-Isma'ili Imamate theory and (iii) partially the mysticism of Shiite *ghulat* groups.

Considering the fact that the Ottoman ruling classes adopted the Sunni-Islamic identity at least as of the 16th century and expressed this clearly in many texts, it is quite surprising that elements of Shiite political theory were included in Ottoman political thought. However, this feature, which seems surprising at first glance, can be easily explained if a few prominent historical and sociological factors are taken into account. First of all, the effects of Shiism - evident or hidden - are quite common in the people of Anatolia and Rumelia, where it is not possible to find any clear evidence that the Ottoman state had undergone a major change from its establishment to the 16th century. The aforementioned Shiite tendencies continued to exist as a suppressed undercurrent throughout the Seljuk and Ottoman history, and produced political phenomena that resurfaced from time to time within the *Babâî/Hurûfî/Bedreddinî/Bektashi/Bayramî/Safavid/Melâmî* movements and beliefs. Secondly, the establishment of the Safavid state at the beginning of the 16th century and its effective propaganda in Anatolia must have had an impact on the Ottoman political discourse. These effects are of several types. The first effect is that the Ottoman ruling class defines itself more predominantly as Sunni, the second effect is that the scholars and poets from the Aq Qoyunlu circles carried the Shiite terminology, which they were partially aware of, to the Ottoman political language -İdrîs-i Bitlisî is the clearest example, and the last effect is the emergence of an alternative political discourse that propagates the Ottoman ruler against the Safavid propaganda and uses popular Shiite elements while doing this. On the other hand, the effects of the Shiite political discourse appearing in Ottoman political thought show an eclectic quality articulated with the Sunni political discourse rather than providing a consistent integrity. This situation constitutes a signification systematic that should be mentioned. The fact that

Shiite and Sunni forms of political discourse can be used together in general reveals that the main concern of the Ottoman ruling classes was the foundation of political authority and the preservation of class domination. To give an example, Prince Korkud, who accepted the Shafî'i sect and wrote many works within this framework, formulating the duty of the ruler to wage *jihad* with the concept of Shiite *da'wa* (Al-Tikriti, 2004, pp. 194-95) corresponds to such a discursive tactic. The forms of political discourse that we will discuss in this framework necessitate accepting the existence of the class capacity to adapt to the cultural context as a distinctive political phenomenon by centered on the class interests of the ruling classes rather than their ethnic and religious backgrounds.

The most striking examples of Ottoman political thought, in which the figure of the caliph was constructed in political discourse in the works written during the historical period as was discussed, can be found in İdrîs-i Bitlisî's detailed history called *Heşt Behişt*, and in the history of Behiştî¹⁰¹¹, in Efsahî's eulogies, and especially in Firdevsî-i Rûmî's *Kutbnâme*. If the works in question are examined -in the sense of basic theses- it is understood that divine grace is at the base of the caliphate, and the emergence of this grace in the field of practical dominance is seen as the manifestation of some divine qualities/signs. If the concrete content of this theory is examined, it can be presented as İdrîs-i Bitlisî states that since the prophet Muhammad is a human being, a human being is responsible for political leadership in a certain historical period (Genç, 2007, p. 12). According to Bitlisî, the caliphate and sultanate are the greatest divine blessings given to people (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 12; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 7). However, there is no information about the election or appointment procedure in the passages about the origin of the administrative function -which is called the caliphate and/or sultanate- carried out by human beings. It is noteworthy that İdrîs-i Bitlisî used two different terms for the phenomenon of political domination, namely caliphate and sultanate. He does not preserve this distinction throughout the text and occasionally uses only the term caliphate, only sultanate or both. The reason why these two terms are sometimes used together and sometimes separately is not the concrete determinations made about the content of these terms, but the differences in the political thought traditions to which the way these terms are used. While Bitlisî uses the terms caliphate and sultanate together, he builds his political position around the concepts of the classical Sunni theory of the caliphate, however, while using the term caliph only, he

¹⁰¹¹ The concept of caliph in the history of Behiştî will not be discussed again in this subsection, since it mostly belongs to secular political thought and was discussed in the previous subsection.

refers in part to the concepts of the Shiite Imamate theory. The main point on which these two political discourse traditions, which can be considered different and largely contradictory, are agreed upon in Bitlisî's pen, lies in the fact that the ruler is supposed to be endowed with some divine privileges in both. In this respect, it would not be wrong to say that both Sunni and Shiite political theology models used by Bitlisî were used to ground the hereditary absolute monarchy. In this respect, while the Sunni ideology model used by Bitlisî bases the discourse on the divine gifts held by the ruler within the framework of following the Sunnah and being similar to Muhammad, the Shiite ideology model used by him makes the divine features visible on the ruler as the dominant narrative theme.

First of all, it would be appropriate to focus on the content of the Sunni caliphate theory in Bitlisî. At first glance, Bitlisî uses the term caliph in two different senses, as those are also included in the Sunni caliphate tradition. While the first of these meanings indicates that the caliph is the caliph of the prophet Muhammad as having religious and political authority, the second conceptualizes the caliph directly as the caliph of God. The fact that these two usage forms are included in the Sunni caliphate tradition does not fully validate the assumption that both of them were theoretically shaped within the Sunni tradition. The reason why this assumption is invalid is that numerological propositions are included in the passages in which İdrîs-i Bitlisî treats the ruler as the caliph of God and that divine attributes are ascribed to the caliph. Therefore, there are traces of the Shiite theory of imamate in such passages, which will be considered in the next subsection. On the other hand, the presence of passages in Bitlisî's works in which the caliph is treated as the representative of the prophet, not the God, shows that he applied a dual narrative strategy. For example, İdrîs-i Bitlisî claims that the caliphate flags of every sultan rise under the shadow of the Sharia brought by the prophet (Koçarlan, 2019, p. 105). In another passage, Bitlisî clearly states that the caliphs or sultans are the successors of the prophets (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 13; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 7). The form of political thought contained in these passages generally follows the early Sunni tradition, presenting the rulers as the prophet's caliph. On the other hand, it is open to debate to what extent İdrîs-i Bitlisî supports this view with secondary arguments. When the context of the passages in which Bitlisî presents his arguments is examined, it is surprising that some views and signs that are incompatible with the Sunni caliphate theory are also included in the text. The first of these signs is that only the names of Muhammad, Abu Bakr and Ali are counted while the ruler is counted as the

caliph of the caliphs, and it is stated that the path of the *Ahl al-Bayt* is the right one (Genç, 2007, p. 14; Koçarslan, 2019, p. 106). The second series of indicators is the reference to some homological, homonymic and numerological bases when explaining the gift of the caliphate to the rulers by God. The first of these, homological signs, can be interpreted in both Sunni and Shiite political theories. According to the homological semiotics approach, the right to caliphate belongs to the person who resembles the prophet Muhammad the most (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 13; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 7). Drawing the framework of this similarity, Bitlisî sees a similarity between Mehmet II and Muhammad in terms of conquests, rank and honor, ijtihad and advocacy of religion, and bases this on the principle that the morality of the caliph must resemble the prophet in general (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 13; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 7-8). Bitlisî's argument is constructed within the Sunni tradition, where the caliph is generally seen as the enforcer of Islamic Sharia. Accordingly, the caliph becomes worthy of the caliphate to the extent that he complies with the sunnah of Muhammad and the practices of the successors and companions of the prophet (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 13; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, pp.7-8). However, Bitlisî discusses the homological argument not the legitimacy of the caliphate, but the competent use of office - that is, its merit - and expands the similarity argument by adding it to a more complex system of signs in this framework. In this respect, the framework of the homological argument, which is clearly constructed within the framework of Sunni theology, gives the impression of a 'legitimate' introduction to the nomological and numerological arguments. Because the argument of resemblance to the prophet is based on the claim of a similarity between the ruler and the God, based on the proposition that the prophet is the mirror of divine signs.

Secondly, let us consider the arguments inspired by the Shiite Imamate theory in Bitlisî. The forms of political discourse originating from Shiite theology in *Heşt Behişt* appear mainly under several categories. Although these are generally narratives that try to show that the Ottoman rulers were endowed with divine gifts, these narratives are divided into four subgroups as (i) sampling of gifts/graces, (ii) nomological signs, (iii) numerological signs, (iv) theomorphic signs. Let us begin by looking at the context of the concept of divine grace or gift (*lutf-u ilâhî*). İdrîs-i Bitlisî presents the idea that the right of caliphate was given to the Ottoman rulers as a divine gift through a few examples. In order to better understand the characteristics of the divine grace in question, Bitlisî refers to some extraordinary fictional signs seen in the births and childhoods of the rulers. For example, İdrîs-i Bitlisî claims that the birth of Murat I

coincided with the year Orhan Beg came to the sultanate and that the stars were on an auspicious day and hour during the birth of the prince (Koçarslan, 2019, p. 147). Stating that the sun was in the house of honor at the birth of Murat I and gave the birth sign its dominant character, Bitlisî claims that the fixed and traveling stars are in high orbit and the Holy Spirit named baby as Murat, which is one of their names (Koçarslan, 2019, p. 148). A second example is mentioned with reference to the childhood of Mehmet II. According to this example given by Bitlisî, when Murat II looks at Prince Mehmet, he receives divine inspirations and sees some divine signs in him (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 18; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 12). According to these signs, the divine mercy (*rahmet-i ilâhî*) appeared on Mehmet II's face and it was inspired by Murat II that the people of the world would find justice with his son's ascension to the throne (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 18; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 12).¹⁰¹²

If we focus more carefully on the two anecdotes cited by Bitlisî, which contain the content of the rulers carrying divine signs, it will be noticed that the first of them brings together astrological and theological elements, and the second one presents an image suitable for the expectation of the *Mahdi*. In the first anecdote, while the interpretation of the birth of the ruler on a fictional Zodiac is a practice that can often be seen in medieval works, the fact that the detail which the ruler's name was given by the Holy Spirit is not directly meaningful. The probable meaning of this detail may be that the name of the ruler was appointed by God and revealed to the sublunar realm by the Holy Spirit. If this interpretation is to be accepted, it is possible to think that Bitlisî has established a divine connection between astrology, the determination of human names and the fate of the name holders. In the second example, there is a short fictional description of Mehmet II being chosen by God as a ruler who will bring a new order to the world and bring justice. The fact that the ideals of justice, welfare and security were generally presented as dominant social values in pre-modern states may cause these statements to be seen as an ordinary repetition. However, İdrîs-i Bitlisî's presentation of these ideals to the reader along with the divine signs appearing on Mehmet II's 'face' makes the general framework of the passage open to alternative interpretations. The 'face' or facial signs form the basis of popular Shiite narratives that were widely used

¹⁰¹² A similar but older version of this story is found in the work *Gazânâme-i Rûm*, written by Kâşîfî at the beginning of the second half of the 15th century. In this version, only the good news of conquest and victory are mentioned, not the divine attributes manifested in Mehmet II. In addition, it is not Murat II who gives this good news, but an old and wise person - in a way, *Khidr* or the figure of the saint. For this version, see Esmail (2005, p. 14).

in the 15th and 16th centuries, as they are the most well-known element of the *Hurûfî* interpretation tradition. The proposition that divine secrets are manifested in the human face as the words of God constitutes one of the most central elements of *Hurûfî* teaching (Bashir, 2013, pp. 52-53).¹⁰¹³ In general, it should be considered that every important confirmation of the rulers and the history of the Ottoman state in the works of İdrîs-i Bitlisî is interpreted by referring to the word equivalents in the Qur'anic verses. In this case, the *Hurûfî* interpretation method of Bitlisî's works is used as a rhetorical technique, even if it is not an element of belief.

The effects of *Hurûfî* commentary and Shiite theology are more clearly seen in the nomological, numerological and theomorphic indicators in *Hest Behîşt*. If the analyze is started with the nomological signs, it is seen that İdrîs-i Bitlisî focuses on the divine meanings of the names of the rulers and the similarities they indicate. According to Bitlisî, there is an opinion that there is a spiritual relationship between names and things that bear that name, and that names are the source of things that bear that name (Genç, 2007, p. 163). Although Bitlisî does not explicitly mention the name of the view or approach that accepts this relationship, he accepts the connection between names and objects and comments within the framework of this view. According to this interpretation, having a certain name also creates effects on the people who bear that name, and these effects have divine meanings (Genç, 2007, p. 163). Moreover, İdrîs-i Bitlisî states that the similarities between the names reveal spiritual and material similarities, and the name of the person is a short *tercüme-i hâl* (life story) (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 14; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 8). According to İdrîs-i Bitlisî, the reason for the emergence of the 'prophetic caliphate' (*nebevî hilâfet / hilâfet-i nebevî*) in the Ottoman state is related to the meaning of the word 'Osman', and since the word 'Osman' means the healing of the bone and the Ottoman state emerged after the Mongol invasion, the word 'Osman' signifies the recovery of the 'damaged' Islamic countries (Genç, 2007, p. 163). According to Bitlisî, the name of Osman Beg, the founder of the Ottoman dynasty, descended from the sky to bear this divine meaning (Genç, 2007, p. 163). The second nomological similarity proposed by Bitlisî is constructed between the names of Muhammed and Mehmet II. According to this fiction, the rising dominance and success of Mehmet II was given by God and was not won by effort -it is

¹⁰¹³ For arguments on the 'divine face' of the Imam in Shiite theology, see: Corbin (2016, p. 210 ff.). In *Selîmnâme* of Keşfi, another work written in the 16th century, the face of Suleyman I is likened to the verses of the Qur'an (Severcan, 1988, p. 32).

'*vehbî*', not '*kesbî*' (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 14; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 8). Bitlisî argues that extraordinary situations occurred during the caliphate of Mehmet II and that the reason for this was that Mehmet II and Muhammad had the same name (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 14; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 8). In this respect, Bitlisî argues that Mehmet II was the regent of the "*nübüvvet-i Muhammedî*" (prophethood of Muhammad) (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 14; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 8). It should not be overlooked that the similarities put forward by Bitlisî also refer to the field of political theory. Bitlisî specifically refers to Mehmet II's namesake with Muhammad, presenting him as the regent of the prophethood of Muhammad and ascribing divine authority to him. The concept of 'regent' here is worth examining more closely. If this expression is analyzed, it is seen that he does not refer to the representation of a worldly authority, on the contrary, it is based on a political argument that combines religious and worldly authority, and describes Mehmet II as a representative similar to the concept of Imam regency -because the subject in question is the categorical representation Muhammad's prophethood. This representational relationship can be understood in two ways. The first of the possible approaches is that the expression '*nübüvvet-i Muhammedî*' points to the caliph as the representative of the prophet in the preservation of the rules of Sharia and the principles of belief preached by Muhammad. However, in this interpretation, the broad meaning of the word prophethood is not fully met, because a political position limited to the application of Sharia rules largely falls within the domain of secular authority and does not adequately fill the framework of the concept of 'regency of prophethood'. On the basis of the second interpretation, there is the idea that the regency of the prophethood refers to the religious and worldly representation endowed with an authority similar to the prophetic authority, accepting that the regency is a time-limited representative duty carried out until the actual holder of a certain office comes. İdrîs-i Bitlisî also uses the concept of "*pâdişah-ı nebevî*", which is similar to the concept of 'regent of the Prophet Muhammad', to combine the concept of prophecy with political authority (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 14; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 9). Although the use of both concepts for Mehmet II has an internal reference to the realization of a hadith that is partly associated with the conquest of Istanbul, the search to endow the ruler with a prophetic authority is at the center of the ideological fiction. In order to understand this argument more clearly, numerological and theomorphic signifiers need to be analyzed.

It is not surprising that in Ottoman political thought, especially at the end of the 15th century and the beginning of the 16th century, the Ottoman ruler was tried to be

constructed as a political figure with divine authority. The basis of this discursive construction is the needs of class-dominance in the imperial regime established during the reign of Mehmet II, as well as the effects of the Ottoman-Safavid struggle that rose during the reign of Bayezid II. As was mentioned above, a certain trend in Ottoman political thought envisions the Ottoman ruler under the concept of caliph and systematically transfers authority from the image of the prophet to the figure of the ruler. In terms of authority transference, the institution of prophecy constitutes a symbolic mediation moment in terms of the transfer of divine authority to material human beings. In this respect, it should not be overlooked that a kind of similarity relationship is established between the prophet and God, which is also included in the sub-texts. For example, the lines in which İdrîs-i Bitlisî claims that Muhammad's cheeks are the mirror of God's face constitute the clearest example of such a relationship (Genç, 2007, p. 12). On the other hand, considering that there are two main methods of transferring authority using the concept of caliph, as Sunni and Shiite, within the framework of Islamic political thought, the examples in Ottoman political thought should be examined more closely in this context. As it can be noticed on the examples of political thought that will be discussed, Shiite caliphate/imamate theories had a significant impact on Ottoman political thought in the 16th century. It would be appropriate to determine that this effect becomes visible especially through the construction and interpretation of numerological and theomorphic signifiers.

The two most prominent examples of numerological sign construction and their interpretation are found in the chapters of *Hes̄t Behişt*, where Bitlisî deals with the reigns of Osman Beg and Mehmet II. In both examples, it is striking that the number seven is emphasized as a numerological symbol. First of all, İdrîs-i Bitlisî states that Osman Beg founded the Ottoman state in the seventh century according to the Hijri calendar and claims that after this event, the foundation of the destroyed faith building was laid again and the religion of Islam was renewed (*tecdid/tajdid*) (Genç, 2007, p. 106). The discourse developed on the renewal of religion (*tecdid/tajdid*) is also used for Bayezid II. İdrîs-i Bitlisî claims that at the beginning of every century, God sent a *mujaddid* for the renewal of religion, and in the 10th century, the God sent Bayezid II as a *mujaddid* (Genç, 2014, p. 491). The concept of *mujaddid* originated primarily in Shiite eschatology and developed as part of its cyclical hagio-history. In this respect, the role of Imams - and partly their intermediaries - is to renew the corrupt religion and show the people the right path as religious authorities with the title of *ismet* (innocence) or

taking orders from the hidden imam. This concept probably started to find a place in Sunni theology with the 9th and 10th centuries, when the Shiite-Sunni struggle intensified, and reached its most developed form after the 13th century. In this framework, two different schools have emerged on the problem of renewal in religion whether have religious or political meaning. It is seen that Mecdüddin İbnü'l-Esîr, Ebü'l-Fidâ İbn Katîr, Tâceddin es-Subki and Süyûtî are in the first school, but Sayyid Şerîf el-Cürcânî formulated the issue politically (Görgün, 2011). Moreover, the concept of *mujaddid* is also used in *sûfî* circles, and Sheikh Ahmed Sirhindi and Imam-i Rabbani are referred to as *mujaddids* (Afsaruddin, 2006b, p. 678). In this context, various rulers were also referred to as *mujaddids*, and this title was also used by al-Cürcânî for Tamerlane (Görgün, 2011). If a facile interpretation is to be made, this concept, as used by İdrîs-i Bitlisî, is used as a rhetoric of praise for Osman Beg, and for Bayezid II, it also assumes the function of a sign for the ruler's support of religious circles. On the other hand, the fact that Bayezid II was endowed with the titles of *wali* and *qutb* and engaged in a large-scale war of position against the Safavids, who were declared 'heretics', reveals the traces of a certain ideological construction in which the ruler is depicted as a superhuman with transcendent authority, rather than a rhetorical function in the use of this concept.

In the second numerological example, Bitlisî states that Mehmet II is the seventh caliph and the seventh *Islamic Kaiser*, and that the number seven bears many divine signs (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 15; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 9). There are seven crowns in the painting of Mehmet II by Bellini. Magemizoglu (2021, pp. 122-23) evaluates these crowns as a reference to the Ottoman sanjak with seven tugs, but also states that the symbol of number seven in Christian theology may have been used for legitimation. The use of seven crowns in Bellini's painting, in my opinion, symbolizes Mehmet II's being the seventh ruler and does not contain any reference to Christian theology. Furthermore, the number seven, as used by İdrîs-i Bitlisî, is mostly related to Shiite-Ismaïli theology. The divine signs that Bitlisî needs to emphasize that they are related to the number seven are as follows; (i) God's essential attributes are seven, (ii) the sky is sevenfold, (iii) the highest level of heaven is the seventh floor, (iv) the caliph is endowed with seven divine attributes (Yıldırım, 2010, pp. 9, 15, 16; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, pp. 4, 9, 10). It is seen that Bitlisî gives cosmological, eschatological and political meanings to the number seven and establishes semantic connections by placing them on a theological ground as a whole. In this context, İdrîs-i Bitlisî also includes a theory

of caliphate that centers the number seven on theological common ground. According to this theory, the seven personal attributes of Allah precede his names in the Qur'an and are called *Esmâ-i Hüsnâ*, and the basis of people's caliphate on earth is based on these divine names (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 15; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 9). According to Bitlisî, the prophets and the sultans with divine grace were endowed with these seven divine attributes and thus became the shadow of God on earth (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 15; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 9). While İdrîs-i Bitlisî states that the manifestation of the divine attributes of God in humans is determinative in the emergence of the caliphate, he adds to his suggestions that the caliphate of man is established in seven layers of heaven and held above everything because of the divine source of the caliphate, and that the number seven has effects on the formation of the divine caliphate (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 15; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 9). In addition, Bitlisî states that Mehmet II is endowed with seven divine attributes and is distinguished from all other rulers in terms of the degree of domination (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 16; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 10). Bitlisî's giving a distinguished position to Mehmet II has two basis, factual and theological. The factual basis is that Mehmet II was an extraordinary ruler who conquered Constantinople and expanded the borders of the Ottoman Empire, raising his personal authority and state power to an unprecedented level in the previous century. In the theological dimension, the reference to the hadith believed to have heralded the conquest of Constantinople by Muhammad is a primary reference point. On the other hand, the myth of the caliphate that Bitlisî reconstructed around the number seven also has a theological basis. Especially in the history of Shiite-Ismaïli thought, it is shown in the above section that the elements of cosmology, divine attributes and political elements are integrated around the number seven. In this context, Bitlisî's opening of a new era in Islamic history with Osman Beg's reign in the seventh century in the Hijri calendar and accepting the seventh Ottoman ruler as the seventh caliph and ascribing divine attributes to him -at least formally- bear elements of the Ismaïli way of thinking. On the other hand, Bitlisî's commemoration of Osman Beg with the title of *mujaddid* is similar to the concepts of Imamate and renewal of religion, which are interrelated in Shiite eschatology. As Ocak (2021, p. 336) states, in the Ismaïli-Nizari sect, it is believed that an innocent Imam who will interpret the Qur'an will come in every age and will have the right knowledge as the caliph of the prophet.

Another significant aspect of the caliphate theory of İdrîs-i Bitlisî, formulated around the number seven, is that the rulers are endowed with seven divine attributes,

and within this framework, a theomorphic image of the rulers is constructed. This image brings with it a political discourse that directly accepts the caliphate as the representation of God and imagines the caliph as the reflection of God. In this discourse, the attribution of titles such as *mujaddid*, *mahdi*, *qutb*, *wali* and some superhuman characteristics to the rulers bears some formal similarities with the Shiite-*ghulat* political theory. In this subsection, we will briefly touch upon these discursive constructions and the conceptualization of the caliphate to which they depend. As it was underlined at the beginning of this section, Bitlisî's theory of the caliphate bears traces of two conflicting schools of Islamic political thought. The first of these schools is the classical Sunni school, which sees the ruler as the caliph of the prophet, while the second is the Shiite -or Shiite-influenced- school, which sees the caliph/imam figure directly as the representative of God and endows him with divine features. Although İdrîs-i Bitlisî uses the arguments of both schools, he tends to the arguments of the second school, especially when dealing with the periods of Mehmet II and Bayezid II. The reason for this is not only to seek to establish the transcendent authority of the ruler in the imperial regime, but also to re-authorize the population of Anatolian, who, due to the rise of the Safavid state, went beyond the Ottoman ideological control mechanisms and had a similar religious belief system with forms of popular Shi'ism. It is possible to observe that the aforementioned political theme systematically tries to re-establish the ideological bonds between the center and the periphery, since the discourses about Bayezid II's being a saint take place especially in anonymous chronicles.

Another issue that needs to be emphasized is the imaginary relationship established between the ruler and the God. It is possible to frequently encounter the form of this relationship based on the 'shadow' metaphor in the works of this period. For example, in the works of Firdevsî-i Rûmî (2009, p. 370; 2011, p. 46; 2015, p. 265), Bayezid II is referred to as "*zill-i Sübhan*", "*Zill-i Yezdan*" and "*Zill-i Huda*". Efsahî (2012, pp. 42, 70) argues that Bayezid II was declared "*zill-i Kirdigar*" by the prophet, and that the prefecture of the ruler, known as "*zill-i ilah*", was determined by the Qur'an and the prophet. In all these idioms, the ruler is presented as the shadow of God. It is noticed that the shadow metaphor was tried to be grounded in more than one way in Ottoman political thought. First of all, Neşrî clarifies the meaning of this metaphor by referring to a political authority that combines the phenomena of prophecy and politics. According to Neşrî (1949, p. 5), the reason why the rulers are given the title of the shadow of God on earth is that the rulers both know and spread the religious rules and

apply them politically. In this context, Neşrî assigns rulers a religio-political role similar to Muhammad's authority. The figure of the ruler revealed by Neşrî (1949, p. 5) is both a person who knows the explicit and hidden meanings of the religious decrees brought by the prophet (*mazhar-ı ahkâm-ı nübüvvet* and *kâşif-i ahval-i risâlet*) and a ruler who applies them on other people. These two attributes mainly refer to the dual social position of Muhammad, in which, by virtue of his prophethood, he both had the meaning of divine laws and, as head of state, oversaw their implementation. In this case, the conditions that legitimize the characterization of Muhammad as the shadow or (caliph) of God -if the problem of the origin of the knowledge of revelation is excluded- are accepted as valid for the Ottoman rulers in Neşrî's proposition, and for this reason the rulers are equipped with the qualification of being the shadow of God. Neşrî (1949, p. 5) repeatedly emphasizes the thesis that both qualities are integrated, and invokes the analogy that prophecy and reign are two rings on the same finger, or two substances in the same blood.

Another writer who differs from Firdevsî-i Rûmî and Efsahî in terms of trying to deepen the theoretical background while using the shadow metaphor is İdrîs-i Bitlisî. According to İdrîs-i Bitlisî, rulers are the shadows of God and divine attributes manifested on them. Bitlisî argues that there is a close relationship between shadow (ruler) and God (shade owner), and that rulers are the manifestation of divine attributes (Genç, 2014, p. 492). Eliade (2009b, p. 141) characterizes the acceptance of the Imam as epiphany (*tecelli-i ilâhî*) and theophany (*mazhar-ı ilâhî*) as the distinguishing feature of the Shiite Imamate theory. In this respect, it is possible to find some traces of this view in İdrîs-i Bitlisî's theomorphic propositions. Bitlisî carefully draws the boundaries, content and political consequences of the concept of the emergence of divine attributes on the rulers. According to this framework, although there is no ruler on earth with unqualifiable attributes specific to God, rulers can have knowable divine attributes that in different degrees and they are similar to God in these aspects (Genç, 2014, p. 492). The main categories of these adjectives are maturity, beauty, grandeur, knowledge/*ilm* and power (Genç, 2014, p. 492). The manifestation of these attributes, which Bitlisî ascribes to the rulers, is understood not symbolically, but materially, and in this way an ontological relationship ground between the God and the rulers is assumed. The descriptions rising on this ground suggest that the material existence of the ruler, which includes the whole of his appearance and actions (*amel*), should be understood as a divine reflection. For example, Bitlisî is of the opinion that the faces of the rulers are

filled with the reflection of divine strength and power like a mirror, and the actions of the sultans constitute an example of divine glory and beauty (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 12; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 7).¹⁰¹⁴ As it can be understood from this example, Bitlisî sees the rulers in general and the rulers of the Ottoman dynasty in particular as the people from whom the names of God appear, and in this context, uses the contents of the names of God to characterize the rulers (Genç, 2007, p. 14). To summarize in general terms, this discourse, which was built by centering Mehmet II, İdrîs-i Bitlisî states that (i) the wisdom of the ruler is an indicator of divine knowledge, (ii) the courage of the ruler is the shadow of the divine attribute of power, (iii) the benevolence of the ruler is the shadow of the God's attributes of volition and will, (iv) the ruler's attribute of vigilance is the shadow of the God's name "*Semî*" (hearing), (v) the compassion and mercy of the ruler is an example of the God's attribute of "*Basar*" (sighting), (vi) the ruler's attributes of grace, generosity and virtue are examples of divine grace (Yıldırım, 2010, pp. 46-52; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, pp. 36-41). The argument that the mentioned divine names became visible on the ruler complements the argument that the ruler was the human—and therefore the caliph—who had the highest manifestation of the divine attributes in his time. From the general theological perspective, Bitlisî argues that God has visible and invisible attributes, the second type of attributes emerged on prophets, rulers and saints, and he states that religious and worldly authority is entrusted to people according to the level of manifestation of these attributes. In this case, Bitlisî assumes that God, as an omnipotent entity, is the ruler of the experienced and unexperienced being, and that it is also manifested in the being and the dominance is based on this manifestation in terms of origin and degree. In terms of *Hurûfî doctrine*, it is necessary to remember at this point that there is the belief that the universe and man are seen as the manifestation of God and that this manifestation reaches its most developed form in human beings (Gölpınarlı, 1973, p. 19). If this framework is to be accepted as a subtext in Bitlisî's works, it would be appropriate to think that the author sees the ruler as the highest level of God's manifestation and therefore lists the characteristics of the ruler in a way that corresponds to the attributes of the God. The metaphor of the shadow appears in the text, which is considered as the main discursive form in which the aforementioned manifestation is indicated. As the shadow of God, the caliph is considered the representative of an absolute religious and worldly authority, and within this

¹⁰¹⁴ İdrîs-i Bitlisî first expressed this view in his work called *Mir'atü'l-Cemâl*. See: Uslu (2021b, p. 161).

framework, the shadow of divine attributes appears on the caliph. To attaining such a content of the concept of the caliphate leads to the inclusion of absolute obedience and service to the caliph as a religious obligation in it, which will be discussed at the end of this subsection in terms of the political implications of the theory of the caliphate.

The most extreme examples of endowing the figure of the caliph with divine attributes are found especially in texts in which Bayezid II is referred to as saint/*wali*, *qutb* or *mahdi*. Since the previous chapters discussed the examples in which the ruler was transformed into transcendent theo-political figures by using theomorphic imagination, the discourse of sainthood/*walayah* built about Bayezid II will be briefly mentioned in this chapter. The discourse of sainthood/guardianship built about Bayezid II has a significance in that it is the official discourse of the Ottoman state and that this discourse can be found in many places from inscriptions to historical works and poems. According to what Ibn Khaldun (2021, p. 597) quoted from al-Kindi, it is believed that when person ascribed as the saint and the *Mahdi* appear in the world, he will lead the noon prayer, innovate in Islam (*tajdid*), ensure justice, and conquer Constantinople. It should be noted that in anonymous chronicles (for example Taş, 2020, p. 289) Bayezid II is shown as the second conqueror of Istanbul. In addition, as was discussed in the previous sections that Bayezid II used the pen name *Adli* (judicial/just) in his poems. It is possible to evaluate the anecdote about the emergence of the ‘sainthood’ of Bayezid II during the noon prayer at the opening of the Bayezid Mosque, within this framework. As a result, all of these elements are included in the sainthood narrative built for Bayezid II. The discourse of sainthood/*walayah*, which was built by centering Bayezid II, has three main moments. The first of these, exemplifies the pious character of Bayezid II and suggests evidence for his sainthood, the second presents the miracles of Bayezid II observed by other people, and the superhuman characteristics believed to be possessed by Bayezid II are made a subject of praise. It is seen that the first discourse of religiosity, which was generally built about the Ottoman rulers, was also produced about Bayezid II, but this second discourse examples were written in more detail than the others. For example, the adjective “*padişâh-ı dindâr*”¹⁰¹⁵ is used for Bayezid II (Firdevsî-i Rûmî, 2009, p. 375), and he is praised as “*sultân-ı pâk-dîn*”¹⁰¹⁶ because he does not even drink *nebiz*¹⁰¹⁷ (Efsahî, 2012, p. 70). Firdevsî-i Rûmî (2011, p. 33) details the narrative of

¹⁰¹⁵ Religious ruler.

¹⁰¹⁶ Ruler with pure faith and religion.

¹⁰¹⁷ *Nebiz* is a fermented drink containing alcohol. Unlike wine, consumption of *nebiz* is not forbidden in the Qur'an. Whether the consumption of this drink is haram or not has been the

Bayezid II's piety at several points, according to him, Bayezid II worships God day and night, reads *virâd* and *ikhlas*, does not appear to have stepped on the floor without ablution throughout his life, does not abandon worship, and recites the whole Qur'an every three days. İdrîs-i Bitlisî argues that Bayezid II was engaged in archery every day for a long time, since archery was considered a *sunnah*, and reached a distinguished competence in this field (Genç, 2014, pp. 519-20). In a passage in the anonymous chronicles published by Köklü (2004, p. 59) and Taş (2020, p. 277), there is information that Bayezid II started his education at the age of fourteen, and when he was fifteen, he had access to the knowledge to give *fatwa* and became superior in worship and *taqwa*.¹⁰¹⁸ Another religious discourse built about Bayezid II is that he never abandoned the sunnah of prayer throughout his life (Köklü, 2004, p. 65; Taş, 2020, p. 295). The meaning of all signs of religiosity in the texts, on the other hand, is ultimately tied to a single specific *point de capitone*: Bayezid II is a pious, just and innocent ruler who deserves to be a saint/*wali*. In this framework, signifiers are in an implicit orientation towards the concept of innocence. Since obeying the *sunnah* in Sunni political thought means re-living the practices of the prophet, who is believed to be innocent, it maintains the ideal of being protected from sins as much as possible, although it does not claim of absolute innocence. On the other hand, the belief that Imams have the attribute of *ismet*, that is, the innocence of Imams/protection from sins by God, is an important element of Shiite political theory as well as an element believed to have in popular Shiism movements. In this context, the recognition of religious authority in *sûfî* circles with Sunni or Shiite tendencies is institutionalized together with the rhetoric of staying away from sins -even being protected. Although there is no clear statement that Bayezid II had the title of *ismet* in the texts of Ottoman political thought, Firdevsî-i Rûmî, who claimed that Bayezid II was a *qutb*, prayed twice for the protection of the ruler from mistakes by God -it can be considered an implicit reference to innocence because it is pronounced with the concept of *qutb* (Firdevsî-i Rûmî, 2009, pp. 372, 377). It is not

subject of debates among the scholars until today. For more detailed information, see: Bozkurt (2000) and Bakır (2000).

¹⁰¹⁸ The Bible story, which is at the root of the narratives with the theme of the chosen one who answers the questions of the clergy with his miraculous knowledge at a young age, is as follows: The twelve-year-old boy Jesus disappears in Jerusalem on Passover. His family and acquaintances who seek him find Jesus sitting among the Jewish rabbis in the Temple, asking clever questions and answering brilliant (Luke 2:41-52). The other versions of this narrative, which were fictionalized for Mehmet II and Mahmud Pasha, were mentioned in the previous chapters.

possible to make a definite judgment about the nature of this reference within the framework of the available data. On the other hand, the texts of the period present much richer examples in terms of discourse built on the sainthood of Bayezid II.

In the works of this period, there are also some narratives that do not apparently claim to be a saint, but that endow Bayezid II with supernatural powers. In this type of narrative, especially built by İdrîs-i Bitlisî for Bayezid II, Bayezid II is portrayed as a ruler with superhuman strength and skill in using bows and arrows, which is accepted as the *sunnah* of Muhammad. İdrîs-i Bitlisî claims that an arrow master named Ustad Sheik Bayezid, who came from Azerbaijan and was introduced as the commander of Khorasan/Herat/Tajik/Turkmen archers, competed with Bayezid II and the ruler was superior to him (Genç, 2014, p. 519). In another anecdote quoted by Bitlisî, a bow that Bayezid II frequently used and which was about to loosen fell into the hands of the Egyptian Sultan Qaitbay, and the arrow masters who tested the strength of this bow stated that they did not have the strength to stretch it, and that Bayezid II was the one all over the world who had the power to stretch it, thus they accept that Bayezid II are superior to all archers in the world (Genç, 2014, p. 521).¹⁰¹⁹ Bitlisî also states that Bayezid II had an extraordinary ability to use arrows while hunting (Genç, 2014, pp. 521-22). Another talent that Bitlisî mentioned about is that Bayezid II has a heavy mace carried by several people and he can lift this mace with the ring fingers of both hands (Genç, 2014, p. 522). In another narrative about the use of the heavy mace, there is the information that Bayezid II used it to kill a cow that was running towards him with one hit (Genç, 2014, p. 525).¹⁰²⁰ The interesting point about these stories is that they were written by İdrîs-i Bitlisî not on behalf of other Ottoman rulers, but mostly on behalf of Bayezid II. In these anecdotes, it is seen that Bayezid II is depicted as a hero, with the exceptional talent of archery which being accepted as *sunnah*. It is clear that this depiction is largely politically motivated, since the reconstruction of the image of Bayezid II as a warrior is of far greater importance for the reproduction of the political

¹⁰¹⁹ Anecdotes about the bows belonging to the rulers, which cannot be stretched by others and which require great strength to stretch, are frequently found in the sources of this period. For another example of this motif, see Şikarî (2011, p. 218).

¹⁰²⁰ The repetition of such hunting scenes for show, similar to gladiator fights, is a part of the entertainment concept of this period. In the travel book of J. Barbaro (2016, pp. 58-59) written in the 15th century, there are examples of such demonstrations. In addition, the discourse developed on the fact that the rulers were engaged in hunting and being competent in using hunting and war tools was also operated in different societies as a common patriarchal discourse. For other examples of this kind, see Roux (2020, pp. 171-74).

order than during the reign of previous rulers. Bayezid II is a ruler who has fought much less war than the Ottoman rulers before him, first because of the possibility of Prince Cem's accession to the throne, and then because of his personal health problems. Secondly, Shah Ismail's dominance of Aq Qoyunlu lands and his reputation as a legendary warrior makes the image of Bayezid II pale in the face of the charismatic leader of the Safavids. For example, when Shah İsmail came to Erzincan (*Saru Kaya* near Tercan), as described in the sources of this period, he killed a giant bear alone, which frightened the villagers, and strengthened the warrior ethos built around him (Sümer, 1976, p. 18). In this context, İdris-i Bitlisi's creation of a heroic narrative similar to Bayezid II's name shows the quality of a political discourse that gains meaning in terms of protecting the charisma of the ruler. The supernatural elements in these narratives also carry a veiled implication of divine appointment, as they contain signs that Bayezid II was a superior warrior than the other Muslim rulers around him, even though they do not directly contain the discourse of sainthood.

On the other hand, the existence of texts in which Bayezid II is directly referred to as a saint and miracles are attributed to him exemplifies how wide the horizon of political discourse on divine appointment and the use of religious authority is. In the anonymous chronicles published by Köklü and Taş, there are three examples where Bayezid II showed miracles that are visible to everyone and was declared a saint by those who witnessed these miracles. The first of these is about Bayezid II leading the first Friday prayer after the completion of the mosque he had built in his name. According to this anecdote, Bayezid II, as the only person in the mosque who did not miss any of the *sunnahs* of the afternoon and evening prayers, he said "Imamah became our duty" and ascended the pulpit and led the prayer with three *takbirs* (Köklü, 2004, pp. 65-66; Taş, 2020, p. 295).¹⁰²¹ The fact that the ruler leads the prayer with three *takbirs*, contrary to the traditional practice, draws the attention of the scholars and when they ask the reason for this, the ruler says that he can only see the *Kaaba* in the third *takbir* (Köklü, 2004, p. 66; Taş, 2020, p. 297).¹⁰²² This anecdote is a classic legend that has been adapted for other Ottoman rulers and even *süfi* leaders. The anonymous author of the chronicle states that after this event, Bayezid II was called *wali/saint* (Taş, 2020, p. 297). In this anecdote, it is seen that Bayezid II took the position of 'imam' -in both

¹⁰²¹ The story of this miracle has been told before for Murat I. For this example, in Ahmedî's *gazavetnâme*, see İnalçık (2021a, p. 346).

¹⁰²² A similar narrative was created for Karamanî İbrahim Beg. In this narrative, İbrahim Beg saw the *Kaaba* in the second *takbir* (Şikarî, 2011, p. 234).

symbolically and really- because he showed miracles, displayed his piety and provided these conditions. The coexistence of all three elements shows that in the subtext of the anecdote, there is a political discourse in which the political authority of Bayezid II is based both in terms of divine attributes and Sharia. Another example of the fictionalized sainthood narrative about Bayezid II is about the ruler's use of his supernatural powers for military defense. According to the anecdote in which this second narrative takes place, a group of people known as infidels of *Urus/Muscovite* during the reign of Bayezid II went to *Yeniköy* (Neohorion) and began to loot it, upon which the ruler gathered the Muslim people of Istanbul to *Okmeydanı* and prayed, and a strong wind broke out and sunk the ships of the looters (Köklü, 2004, p. 64; Taş, 2020, p. 291). Anonymous chroniclers on this event state that the miracle of Bayezid II was revealed (Taş, 2020, p. 293) and that the ulama present in *Okmeydanı* confirmed that the ruler is a saint (Köklü, 2004, p. 64). In this anecdote, the defense of the country, which was a one of the main duties assigned to the caliphs, was fulfilled by Bayezid II, and his miracle was again approved by the ulama. The third narrative includes another anecdote, which includes land acquisition and tribute granting. According to this anecdote, the King of Hungary sent a letter declaring war to the Ottoman state with his envoy, Bayezid II told the envoy that his king should stand 'decently' or he would take his eyes out (Köklü, 2004, p. 66; Taş, 2020, p. 299). In the second part of the anecdote, it is stated that when the ambassador returned to Hungary, both eyes of the king were blinded as soon as Bayezid said these words (Köklü, 2004, p. 66; Taş, 2020, p. 301), and then the expedition of the Ottoman forces into the Hungary was successful (Taş, 2020, p. 303). If examined carefully, it can be seen that all three narratives are about a ruler with supernatural powers fulfilling the three basic political functions assigned to the caliph. These functions can be listed as (i) establishing religious authority over the people under his rule, and personally obeying religious rules, (ii) defending the country, (iii) gaining new lands. In this context, the search for Bayezid II's authority to be placed on a divine ground shows itself in the subtext of the sainthood narratives. The divine ground in question is constructed as an extension of the belief that the actions of the ruler are not limited by time-space constraints, and that his words/prayers turn into reality directly. This belief can be evaluated under the category of popular Shiism, which attributes divine characteristics to religious authorities in terms of the history of Islamic thought. It is possible to encounter similar views both in Shiite-*ghulat* beliefs, Ismailism and in

sûfîsm movements such as *Melâmîs*, which are likely to be related to them. The traces of such movements could be identified in Ottoman political thought.

In the history of Behiştî, Bayezid II is referred to as “*mehdi-suret*” (*mahdi-looking*), and by Firdevsî-i Rûmî (2009, p.372; 2011, p. 29) he is called “*kutbu'l-aktab*” (*qutb* of the *qutbs*, or head of the saints), “*kutb-u zaman*” (head saint of the contemporary era) or “*kamil mürşid*” (perfect spiritual guide). This terminology has common points with both post 10th century Islamic mysticism terminology, Ibn Arabi metaphysics and Shiite political theology. The concept of ‘*qutb*’ means the mile or center point around which the millstone rotates, and in mystic terminology it is used for a saint who is in the center of a group of spiritual beings (*ricâl-i gayb*) with divine duties and divine powers, and leads them. In this respect, the term *qutb* means the absolute caliph of God, who has the power to cover the material and spiritual world, and a middle entity who standing the highest rank between God and all created beings (Öztürk, 2017, p. 209-10). If the elements in the discourse of Firdevsî-i Rumî are examined, a very detailed structure is encountered. First of all, Firdevsî-i Rûmî (2011, p. 29) argues that the order of the world depends on the *qutb* and it is not right to deny its existence. Secondly, he claims that Bayezid II is the ‘*kutbu'l-aktab*’ and ‘*mürşid-i kâmil*’ and that the wind, sea and lightning are under his command (Firdevsî-i Rûmî, 2011, pp. 30, 32). Finally, he states that the knowledge of miracles and *walayah* was endowed to Bayezid II (Firdevsî-i Rûmî, 2009, p. 371). The fact that Bayezid II is referred to as the “*alim imam*” in Lâmi’î Çelebi’s ode for Bayezid II draws attention to the prevalence of a similar discourse (as cited in Bilkan, 2021, p. 172): “Emîn-ü devlet ü püşt ü penâh-devlet ü dîn/ İmâm-ı ‘âlim ü ‘âdil halîfe-i devrân”.¹⁰²³ It is clear that the terminology of esoteric *sûfîsm*, which is frequently used in popular Shiite movements, is used in these statements. One of the most fundamental elements in Shiite political theory is the belief that the figure of the Imam has a competence in wisdom (*ilm*). In this respect, Bayezid II’s being referred to as ‘*kutbu'l-aktab*’ (head saint of the saints) and ‘*mürşid-i kâmil*’ (a spiritually mature person who guides the way to the truth) confirms the proposition that he had superhuman knowledge and authority in both religious and worldly matters.

It is understood that the term *qutb* is used with a mystical meaning, especially when Firdevsî-i Rûmî’s lines showing Bayezid II as effective person on the forces of nature, the source of the world order and the perfect spiritual guide for human beings

¹⁰²³ The guardian of the state, the support of the state and religion/ Wise *imam* and just caliph of this period.

are taken into account in its superficial meaning. On the other hand, the concept of *qutb*, in mystical (*tasavvuf*) terminology, corresponds to an authority of disposition above the ruler, who appears to be dominant in material terms. With the features emphasized by Firdevsî-i Rûmî, Bayezid II is described as a religious figure who combines the concept of mystical sainthood and material sovereignty in his own body. According to Ibn Khaldun (2021, p. 594), the doctrine of *qutb* and *abdal* (fool-hermits of the God) are the beliefs of Shiism that emerged among the *sûfis* and mystics (*mutasavvifs*) with the development of the Ismaili sect. Schimmel (2020, p. 215) is of the opinion that the concept of *qutb* has a close relationship with the Shiite doctrine of the hidden imam. Ocak (2021, p. 391) states that the concepts of *qutb* and *mahdi* take place in both Sunni and Shiite mysticism, and in the latter, they become a basis of belief by combining with the doctrine of Imamate. For example, the inclusion of the belief in the *Mahdi* in the *Saltuknâme*, which can be regarded as having Sunni arguments in general, indicates this transitivity (Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî, 1990, p. 92). In this respect, the expressions in the work of Firdevsî-i Rûmî are similar to the Shiite-Ismaili approach, as they combine these concepts with the authority of the rulership and put forward to believe in these mystical elements as a religious dogma. Bilkan (2021, p. 170) has rightly stated that this form of discourse, which emerged in the 16th century in Ottoman political thought and sanctifies the personality of the ruler, is closer to the Shiite Imamate theory than to the Sunni caliphate theory. In this context, it can be accepted that the political discourse produced on the sainthood of Bayezid II, unlike the one produced for other rulers, sanctifies his body.

The narrative form Firdevsî-i Rûmî developed on Bayezid II has some striking features in terms of politics. While the author develops a certain sainthood theory and attributes supernatural features to the ruler, on the other hand, he likens Bayezid II to four caliphs. To give another example, Firdevsî-i Rûmî wrote a fortune-telling book with *Hurûfî* themes on which he based his method with reference to the seventh Shiite Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq, but also included a section in this book in which he praised the four caliphs (Şenödeyici & Koşık, 2017, pp. 85, 88).¹⁰²⁴ The fact that a similar method was used in both examples shows that Firdevsî-i Rûmî -and his contemporaries- copied

¹⁰²⁴ Interestingly, Akşemseddin is another name for fortune telling referring to Ja'far al-Sadiq. Akşemseddin, who read the Qur'an in the hope of finding a way in the days when the siege of Constantinople was not yet successful, then he encountered a guiding sign from Ja'far al-Sadiq. He mentions this encounter in the letter he wrote to Mehmet II. For the text of this letter, see: Pertusi (2004, p. 268).

the discourse forms of both mainstream Islamic sects and used them in the production of political discourse. To explain this duality, it can be thought that Firdevsî-i Rûmî was familiar with the Shiite sources, but he preferred to use them by blending with classical Sunni themes -for political reasons- instead of using the Shiite political theory directly in Ottoman political thought. There are several possible explanations for choosing this method. The first of these explanations is the possibility that writers who use some elements from Shiite political theory try to hide it by using the Sunni discourse. The second possibility is that the Shiite political theory was partially accepted by the Ottoman ruling class and a kind of eclectic discourse emerged. Finally, it can be emphasized that the relevant authors deliberately constructed their political discourses in this way to create a certain power relationship between the ruling and subaltern groups.

At this point, my interpretation corresponds to the last possibility. There are two reasons for me to adopt this interpretation: (i) the historical background and prevalence of popular Shi'ism in Anatolia, (ii) the rise of the Safavid order and the success of its propaganda. First of all, it is clear that popular forms of Shi'ism have existed widely in Anatolia since at least the 13th century, and some of them periodically generated messianic political movements. To briefly enumerate these movements, the religious terminology of the *Kalenderîs*, *Babaîs*, *Şemsîs*, *Hurûfîs*, *Bayramîs*, *Melamîs* and Bektashi order includes either the concepts of *qutb* and *mahdi*, or the forms of esoteric interpretation -which was accepted as a dominant interpretation form of popular Shiism.¹⁰²⁵ This form of mysticism, which became popular especially with the Mongol invasion, can be called *tariqa* Shi'ism or popular Shi'ism as Hodgson (1977, p. 494) suggests. For example, the concept of *qutb* takes place such works as Ocak (2021, pp. 287-90) stated, in *Maqalat* attributed to Hacı Bektâş-ı Velî, Seyyid Hüseyin b. Seyyid Gaybî's work called *Şerhu Hutbeti'l-Beyan*, in Kaygusuz Abdal's work called *Vücutnâme*, in Akşemseddin's writings, in Yusuf Hakîkî Baba's *Mahabbetnâme*. Ay (2012, pp. 137-53) is of the opinion that *Melamî*, *Kalenderî* and *Vefâî* orders, *Ahis*, Bektashis and Qizilbash groups have influences from Nizari-Ismaili beliefs. It is possible to add Mevlevî order to this list. While Schimmel (2020, pp. 215-16) draws

¹⁰²⁵ In addition, it is possible to place the *Ishrâqi* groups and Ibn Arabi's metaphysics in this interaction area. Moreover, the fact that Nasîrüddin Tûsî's works also took place in Ottoman political thought shows that this effect did not occur only in mystical plan. For opinions in which Tûsî's works are evaluated in connection with Shiism, see: Corbin (2001, pp. 33-34), Lewis (2012, p. 151), Newman (2013, p. 158), Daftary (2016, pp. 100-101).

attention to the Shiite influences in Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî's works, Lewis (2000, pp. 408-10) provides clear examples of the terms *qutb/mahdi/imam* in the *Masnavi*. These elements in Rûmî can be found in the teachings of Shams-i Tabrizi, who is thought to have knowledge of the Ismaili tradition.¹⁰²⁶ Corbin (2001, p. 29) argues that the concepts of *qutb* and *welayah* originally emerged from the common origin of Shiite theology, but emerged under the cloak of *sûfîsm* especially after the disintegration of the Nizari-Ismaili centers. Trimmingham (1971, p. 52) and Daftary (2016, p. 105) state that although some of the orders that emerged in this period were apparently Sunni, they had Shiite elements in terms of their belief, and as in the examples such as *Nurbahshiyya* and *Nimetullahiyye*, their complete conversion to Shiism took place after the rise of the Safavids. On the other hand, there are indications that even in the middle of the 16th century, theological views of the Shiite *ghulat* still took place in Anatolia. It is possible to think that mainly Turkic groups met with the *ghulat* Shiism quite early and carried such elements of belief from Khorasan to Rumelia. For example, in the travel book of Ebu Dülef Mis'ar b. Mühelhil el-Benazici, it is determined that the people of Karahan/Bugran believed that Ali b. Abu Talib is the God (Şeşen, 2022, p. 65). Similarly, Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî (1987, pp. 122, 184) indicates a few short anecdotes about a community that considers Ali as the God in *Saltuknâme*. According to the anecdote included in the work of Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî (1987, p. 185), the leader of the groups that consider Ali as the God, he also believes that he is the *mahdi* or a prophet, and leads his group to an uprising. The information about the existence of groups believing in a sect of reincarnation (*tenasüh mezhebi*) in the *menâkıbnâme* of Sheikh Îsâ from Akhisar (Küçük & Muslu, 2003, p. 135 and 214) clearly reveals the traces of *ghulat*. As stated in this *menâkıbnâme*, Sheik Îsâ (Küçük & Muslu, 2003, p. 135) states that all the people of Aydın, Nazilli, Kestel, Menteşe, Çine, Kızıltepe are from this sect, and that the people of this region actively participated in both the Börklüce and Şahkulu rebellions. It would not be wrong to think that there is a large population of people with antinomian or heterodox beliefs in Rumelia. For example, in the *menâkıbnâme* of Otman Baba, an important example of antinomian *sûfîsm*, Şahkulu is mentioned as a saint who heralded Otman Baba's arrival in Anatolia (Yalçın, 2008, pp. 65-66).

Another significant point to be emphasized in this context is the existence of sectarian Shi'ism or a series of political movements in which popular Shi'ism is

¹⁰²⁶ For pro and contrary views on this issue, see: Lewis (2000, p. 135), Ergun (2022, p. 22), Ceyhan (2010).

effective. The first of the political movements that emerged from such groups is the Baba İshak revolt, which emerged at the beginning of the 7th century according to the Hijri calendar, that is, at the beginning of the seven-step eschatological cycle, the second is the Sheikh Bedreddin and Börklüce rebellions, and the last is the Qizilbash/Safavid rebellion that occurred at the beginning of the 10th century. The presence of leaders claiming to be the *mahdi/messiah* in all three revolts and their influence on a common nomadic population necessitates the acceptance of popular forms of Shiism as political ideologies with widespread and historical continuity in Anatolia. The common aspect of the sainthood narratives developed on Bayezid II is that they were developed simultaneously with the rising of Shah Ismail, who emerged at the beginning of the 16th century and renewed the expectation of the *mahdi*. The political propaganda carried out by the Safavid movement led by Shah Ismail has an effective content on the doctrine of *walayah* noted above. Savory and Karamustafa (2012) state that during the Safavid propaganda (*da'wa*), Sheikh Junayd was named as the God or the son of God, while Sheikh Hajdar's divinity was declared, also Shah Ismail spread the claim of his divine incarnation at the time of his rising. According to this, it is possible to come across examples as such Shah Ismail depicted as the representative of the hidden imam or the *mahdi* (Dalkesen, 1999, p. 40; Daftary, 2016, p. 108), directly the lost Imam or the *mahdi* himself (Bilkan, 2021, p. 70), even the God descended to earth in the human form (Bashir, 2013, p. 101; Ocak, 2021, p. 412).

The examples of the propaganda made by the rebels about the coming of the *mahdi* or the reemerge of the prophet during the Şahkulu revolt (Uluçay, 1954, pp. 47, 48, 50) make the theo-political context in question clearer. Such narratives are also supported by the claim of a caliphate alternative to the Ottoman rule and the theological arguments to support it.¹⁰²⁷ For example, in a *Buyruk* text of the Safavid order dated to the middle of the 16th century, the theory of caliphate is discussed. Accordingly, it is claimed that the authority of the caliphate is primarily the right of Ali b. Abu Talib and his sons, eleven Imams, and after these, it is stated that this right belongs to the descendants of twelve imams and finally the people they appoint as a regents (*naib*) can be caliphs (Yıldırım, 2020b, p. 356). After Shah Ismail established his dominance in Iran, he based his family line on Imam Musa al-Kazim and is accepted as the regent of

¹⁰²⁷ Uslu (2021b, p. 159) claims that those who participated in the Şahkulu (and Şah Kalender) revolts rebelled against the ruling class bloc with an egalitarian ideology. However, it is not easy to support this claim with historical data.

Imam -in some cases he was directly accepted as the Imam- (Savory & Karamustafa, 2012). This practical situation is coherent with the political theory formulated in the *Buyruk* in general and the Imamate theory in particular. On the other hand, it is understood that there was an effort to develop a *walayah* discourse that could be effective on the same social groups in Ottoman political thought. Although it is easier to identify the examples of Ottoman counter-discourse in chronicles and poetry books, it is possible to think that at least hypothetically, similar discourses were tried to spread in the *sūfī* circles and even in mosques under the patronage of Bayezid II. Considering that the narthex places of mosques in Anatolia were expanded during the reign of Bayezid II (Kuban, 2021, pp. 214-15), it is possible that such propaganda was made by increasing the mosque community, especially during Friday sermons. Kemalpaşazâde (Uğur, 1997, pp. 251-52), stating that Ottoman subjects united against the Qizilbash movement, took their property and killed them, provides a striking example of how effective such propaganda could be.

As a result, sainthood and *walayah* narratives should be considered as eclectic political discourses produced for the audience that the Ottoman ruler tried to impose his class authority on. Bilkan (2021, p. 81) argues that terms such as *qutb*, *kutbu'l-aktab*, *mehdi-i zaman* in Ottoman political thought are a reflection of the classical Ottoman imperial ideology, which is based on the ruler's gathering of worldly power and religious authority in his personal authority. Another piece of evidence to support this proposition is that sainthood narratives or theomorphic fictions are equipped with systematic propositions that postulate absolute obedience to the caliph as a religious rule. To give an example, İdrîs-i Bitlisî considers it necessary to have a strong bond of love between Bayezid II, who was the caliph of the period, and the people who were subordinate to him, and for this reason, he highlights praying to the caliph as a practice to increase love (Genç, 2014, p. 495). Bitlisî draws the representative bond between the caliph and the God to an ontological ground, claiming that praying for the ruler is "loving God in God [tm]". In another proposition that exemplifies this relationship, İdrîs-i Bitlisî argues that it will be enough to remember the ruler, who is the shadow of the God, in order to thank God, and to praise the ruler is to thank God (Genç, 2014, p. 505). It is possible to come across similar propositions in the poems of Firdevsî-i Rûmî. For example, Firdevsî-i Rûmî (2009, p. 381) states that it is a religious obligatory to serve Bayezid II in the following couplet: "Şah ki Zıllu'l-lah fi'l-arzı oldı pes/ Hidmet

itmek sünneti farz oldı pes”.¹⁰²⁸ As can be seen from these examples, the transformation and personalization of the Ottoman class authority into a supernatural religious authority makes obedience to the ruler an absolute religious rule. In this respect, it would be appropriate to conclude that the descriptions and arguments in Ottoman political thought, which rig the ruler with some theomorphic features, were ultimately constructed for the construction of hereditary absolute monarchy within theological and mystical discourse.

VIII.III. *Index Historicus*: History, Ethnicity and Identity

“The Rum was defeated”

The excerpt from the 2nd verse of Surah Rum
while describing the Battle of Ankara (1402)

by the Timurid historian Nizâmeddin Şâmî (Kafadar, 2017a, p. 59)

Does the Ottoman dynasty have a political or cultural ‘identity’? This question can be answered with a simple equation in terms of contemporary conservative historiography, which conceives of the Ottoman Empire as a synthesis of Turkish ethnicity and Islamic belief with all its historical roots. According to this answer, the Ottoman dynasty is Turkish in lineage and Muslim in terms of religious belief, so these two characteristics determine its ‘historical’ identity. Against this view, there are criticisms formulated by a historiographic tradition that carries overt or implicit nationalist references to an Ottoman Empire that was neither ‘sufficiently’ Turkish nor ‘sufficiently’ Muslim, and hence formulated it as a ‘degenerate’ identity. Considering that Ottoman historical sources contain complex piles of clues that will serve to ‘ground’ both approaches, the problem definitely turns into a paradox that cannot be resolved within these two approaches. At this point, several alternative ways can be considered in order to reconsider the problem. The first of these is to abolish the problem by assuming that the problem of ‘identity’ cannot be discussed at least for the 15th and 16th centuries, which are within the scope of our thesis, and that it will be an anachronism. The author of these lines does not agree with the first solution because the category of identity/*Identität* is among the constituent elements of discursive structures as the basic element of both logic of identity and difference. The orderly state of social power relations at the end of the 15th century and the beginning of the 16th century,

¹⁰²⁸ The ruler became the shadow of God/ Serving him became *sunnah* and *fard*.

when the institutionalization process of the Ottoman state systematically progressed and the imperial regime developed, takes place in coordination with the process of regulation/'settlement' of social positions and identities. In this respect, the discursive movement towards the construction of identity -aside from being anachronistic- has a constitutive characteristic of historicity.

A second solution is to consider how the Ottoman ruling class preferred to see themselves and others - not from an external but from an internal point of view- rather than how the Ottoman identity looked. If this second approach is taken as a basis, the development of an identity does not depend on how it is named externally, but on how it names other social units that it locates external to itself and how it receives its own reflection based on this. In this respect, the formation of an identity emerges in its relationship with the 'other'. If it can be excused to say the last thing to be said at the beginning, it can be said that the first drafts of the Ottoman identity, which will be framed towards the end of the 16th century, emerged as of this period, although there is no clearly defined Ottoman identity for the period. In this subsection, the search for identity construction around the Ottoman dynasty and the drafts of Ottoman identity will be discussed.

When the works written at the verge of the sixteenth century are carefully examined, it appears that the identity of the Ottoman ruling class had very complex borders rather than being ambiguous. This complexity is based on multiple references to multiple sources, uncertainties about the scope of identity, and finally conflicting perspectives on the owner of identity. As was pointed out in the previous sections, the dynastic identities of the local principalities that ruled Anatolia before the Ottoman Empire, the genealogies of the Ottoman family that go back to almost the first human, the *ijazet* genealogies of the *sūfi* circles, the ethnogenetic narratives of the nomadic groups and the lineage lines of the sayyids allegedly going back to the prophet Muhammad are the basis of alternative identities owned by different status groups. Moreover, the expansion of the lands ruled by the Ottoman Empire and the increase in the number of cultural groups subordinated to it, and the inclusion of new members of Anatolian, Balkan, Iranian, Arabian and even North African origin within the ruling class systematically increased the possibilities of constructing an identity with ethnic and religious references. As a fundamental part of this broadly drawn framework, the Ottoman dynasty's formation of its own identity has a political importance in terms of making its relationship with the different identities and affiliations 'manageable',

therefore, the historical discourse towards identity construction becomes a part of the history of political thought.

When the historical works, poems, legends and fragments of *siyâsetnâmes* written at the threshold of the sixteenth century are considered, it is striking that ethnic signs have increased in these narratives in a way that was not seen in previous century. Ethnic affiliations are both translated into identity signifiers in accordance with the perspective of the Ottoman central power, become a part of the status discourses built to be presented to the center, and become the pillars on which the dynasty builds its own identity. In this respect, the process of constructing its own politico-cultural identity of the Ottoman dynasty is shaped by the signs constructing a 'self' and self-constructing signs produced about 'other' social entities. Signs and arguments developed in this framework can be listed under several basic categories: (i) ethnographic signs, (ii) ethno-potestatic signs, (iii) ethno-mimetic signs. The characteristics of ethnicity representations, which were constructed as positive and negative in the three basic types of signs mentioned, were arranged in a way that creates a certain Ottoman dynasty identity in the final analysis. As noted above, although this 'arrangement' had not yet reached its highest form at the verge of the sixteenth century, it presented a draft worthy to analyze.

VIII. III. I. Ethnographic Signs

In the pre-modern period, the compilation of ethnographic data and its inclusion in political thought is a widely observed phenomenon. It is possible to come across fragments and passages containing ethnographic material in the history of Herodotus, in Xenophon's *Anabasis* and *Hellenika*, and in other ancient Greek literature. However, when Western literature is taken into consideration, it was with the Roman period that ethnographic interest became systematized. It can be seen that there is a large ethnographic literature written in the Roman Empire starting from the end of the Republican period. For example, Julius Caesar's *Commentarii de Bello Gallico*, Tacitus' *De Origine Et Situ Germanorum*, Valesianus' *Chronica Theodericiana* and Strabo's *Geographika* can be cited.¹⁰²⁹ Similarly, it is seen that Chinese historians

¹⁰²⁹ Reading the *Geographika* with its different aspects as a work of history, geography and ethnography can be a fruitful starting point for building a similar approach to Ottoman chronicles. Distinctions such as civilized/barbarian, moral/immoral, ecumene/tribal, noble/primitive are as much in Ottoman political thought as they are in Strabo's work. It should be kept in mind that such distinctions are not purely ethnographic data, but also constitute

collect ethnographic material for military and political purposes. For example, in the historical canon known as Sima Qian's *Shiji* (Records of the Grand Historian) followed by *Erh-shih-szu shih* (Twenty-Four Histories), ethnographic data about many tribes neighboring China are presented.¹⁰³⁰ The advanced use of ethnographic data is also observed in Byzantine historiography and theology. It is possible to talk about an ethnographic literature that has developed since the works of classical writers such as Prokopios, Agathias, Theophylaktos and diplomatic mission writers such as Priskos, Graikos, Zemarchos and Yuhannah of Amida.¹⁰³¹ Similarly, it is seen that a series of works that collect and evaluate ethnographic data were written during the Abbasid, Ghaznavid and Seljuk states. To give an example, al-Jahiz's *Fezâ'ilü'l-Etrâk* and Ibn Hassûl's *Kitâbü Tafzîli'l-Etrâk* are worth mentioning especially for the information they contain about Arab and Turkish tribes.¹⁰³² There are also ethnographic data in the works of the travelers as such Suleyman Tâcir, Sirâfi, Ebû Dülef, Ibn Battuta, historians like Balâzurî, Makdîsi, geographers like Ibn Hurdâzbih, Mes'ûdî and finally researchers of the history of religions such as Adu'l-Kahir el-Bağdadî, Shahrîstani, Bîrûnî, Ibn Rusta, İbnu'n-Nedîm (Demirci, 2021, pp. 39-40).¹⁰³³ In addition, it is possible to encounter intense ethnographic evaluations in the Islamic literature, which is known as *al-milel ve'n-nihal* literature and can be called the historical studies of religions/sects. Finally, the ethnographic material processed in Ibn Khaldun's book *Muqaddimah* with a theoretical systematic and became a part of the general thesis of history. As a result, to the extent that the imperial regimes have a certain level of development, they compile ethnographic data within the framework of administrative needs and build a political discourse based on it. This discourse has a breadth of covering the political organization, cultural codes, moral structures and economic activities of the groups under consideration, and also includes the indications of the political contradictions between those who produce the discourse and those who are the subject of the discourse.

identity constructions in the projection of political power relations. For information on Strabo's ethnography, see: Almagor (2005) and Dandrow (2017).

¹⁰³⁰ For information about the Hsiung-nu tribe in *Shi Ji*, see Otkan (2018, pp. 58-59 ff.). Also, for detailed information about tribes in Chinese chronicles, see: Eberhard (1996).

¹⁰³¹ For a general presentation of ethnographic elements in Byzantine historiography, see Kaldellis (2013, pp. 1-25; 2019, pp. i-xiv).

¹⁰³² See: Yaltkaya (2018, pp. 32, 78)

¹⁰³³ Demirci (2021, pp. 39-40) states that the works of these names are also sources for the literature of *al-milel ve'n-nihal*. Another important resource is travel records. For examples of ethnographic information about Turks taken from *Kitâbü Ahbar el-Buldan*, *Kitab el-Fiten*, *Fazail el-Etrak* and hadith corpus, see: Şeşen (2022, pp. 48-49).

Although ethnography is a modern term, it originally refers to the writing down of observations on ethnic characteristics. Ethnographic literature acquires an ethnological character to the extent that it deals with the explanation of ethnic characteristics, and ethnopolitical to the extent that these explanations are a part of political discourse. If the origin of the term is examined, the word ‘ethnic’ is used to indicate two meanings. The first of these characterizes a social group connected to each other as kinship, the other refers to a certain group of people living together under same politico-cultural formation. The word ἔθνος, which is at the base of the term, is used to describe a group, a herd, many people (or animals) (Montanari, 2015, p. 594). While the word ἔθνος, which derives from the same base as ἔθνος, refers to the habits and traditions or individual character that is valid among a group of people, the word ἔθικός refers to the moral rules/customs to which a particular group of people adheres (Montanari, 2015, pp. 594-95). ἔθνικός, another word derived from the same root, can be defined as a group of people (tribe) with a certain character, moral, cultural codes and habits in relation to the words mentioned above. In fact, this term is also used in Ibn Khaldun’s *Muqaddimah*, which can be considered the last great representative of the Aristotelian tradition in Islamic thought. Ibn Khaldun refers to the concept of *asabiyyah* (عصبية) when describing the founding nature of the Bedouin tribes. If this concept were translated into ancient Greek, its equivalent would be ‘ethos’ (ἔθος) and would refer to the moral and political structure of the tribal community united around certain warrior traditions.¹⁰³⁴

To sum up, the ethos/ethnos/ethnicity concept group -in the pre-modern sense- refers to human communities that have a certain cultural formation morally and traditionally and are bound by tribal ties. It is also undeniable that the term has a certain genetic meaning. The fact that tribal structures are largely formed in consanguineous communities and that romantic nationalism gives too much attention to this factor while constructing ethnogenetic narratives has led to a closeness of meaning between ethnicity and kinship. On the other hand, the researches of Herwig Wolfram and Reinhard Wenskus on early medieval communities agree that ethnic communities cannot be reduced to a mere genetic origin, on the contrary, it would be more appropriate to consider ethnicity as a political and historical unity (İsmailoğlu-Kacı, 2020, p. 13).

¹⁰³⁴ While developing the concept of ‘*asabiyyah*’, Ibn Khaldun emphasized the strong lineage ties especially in tribal communities. The main reference of the author on this subject is the lineage evaluation in Averroes’ interpretation of Aristotle. For Ibn Khaldun’s critique of the concept of lineage ties used in *Telhisu’l-Kitab*, see: Ibn Khaldun (2021, p. 343).

An example confirming the approach of Wolfram and Wenskus is found in the 12th century Byzantine epic *Akritas*. In the epic text, a distinction is made between the ethnic group of the hero Digenes Akrites and the *genos* to which he belongs, and the first of these refers not to the biological bond but to the community he lives with (Page, 2008, p. 41). Weatherford (2008, p. 304) states that the word *ἔθνος* refers to human communities made up of pagans and represents an ‘alien’ group outside one's own group. The concept gained a theo-political connotation as Christianity became the dominant religious code. The word *ἔθνικός* (ethnicus), another variant of the concept of ethnicity, is used in medieval Latin to name communities that maintain pagan traditions (Niermeyer, 1976, p. 382). This new meaning of the word reflects the political conflict between the local and autonomous character of the ethnic formation and the universalism of the ecumenical (*οικουμενισμός*) religious ideology.

When the representation of ethnic groups in Ottoman political thought is examined, it is noticed that a wide sign-network has been established that includes both a certain form of morality, tribal structures and relations with religious orthodoxy as stated above. It is possible to list the ethnic groups subject to Ottoman political thought as Rûms/Greeks, Arabs, Persians, Circassians, Tatars, Kurds, Albanians and Turkmens.¹⁰³⁵ Let us briefly consider the signs about the listed ethnic groups. First of all, the representation of the ‘Rûm’ ethnicity, which is included in the Ottoman political thought, has more than one contradictory aspect. This difference arises from the ambiguity of the word’s content and extension as a concept. The word ‘Rûm’ denotes, on the one hand, the memory of a particular geographical area that was historically under Roman-Byzantine rule, and on the other hand, the Greco-Roman people who took part in this historical area. Since the effect of the word ‘Rûm’, which is used as a concept of political geography, on the construction of the Ottoman identity will be discussed in the next subsection, the second meaning, which has a more dominant ethnic emphasis,

¹⁰³⁵ It is possible to add Slavs and Bosnians to these groups. In the *Saltuknâme*, it is mentioned in a positive context that the Bosnians are very beautiful physically, they are descendants of 'Ays son of Isaac and they converted to Islam (Ebü'l-Hayr-ı Rûmî, 1987, pp. 78-9). The ‘Ays generation narrative is most likely based on the myth that this generation is the origin of the monarch lineages. An important detail here is the inclusion in this myth of an alternative historical narrative that all ruling classes are born of the same generation. For information on the generation of ‘Ays’ as the generation of rulers, see: (Ebü'l-Hayr-ı Rumî, 1988, p. 110). For a brief review on the change of ethnic roles in the Ottoman Empire, see: McNeill (1980, p. 127-29). In addition, it is seen that Karamanid historian Şikârî characterizes various social groups based on ethnic distinctions in his work. For the ethnic diversity presented by Şikârî, see (Şikârî, 2011, p. 124).

will be focused here. The term ‘Rûm’ appears in the sources of the period under two different tendencies as it characterizes a certain ethnic group. First of all, it is seen that this term is used with a negative meaning. For example, in Kivâmî’s book *Fetihnâme* and Âşikpaşazâde’s *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osmân*, Rûm Mehmet Pasha was represented even an evil figure who confiscated houses in Istanbul because of his ethnic and religious affiliations, he “forbid goodness [tm]”, and organized the confiscation of *mülk* and *waqf* lands, also was described as an ‘infidel’ (Kala, 2013, p. 246; Apzd, 2017, p. 208; Kivâmî, 2018, pp. 519, 531). Similarly, Neşrî (1957, p. 711) claims that Rûm Mehmet Pasha was a ‘child of Istanbul’ and was envious of the Muslims taking over the houses in Istanbul. Kivâmî, Âşikpaşazâde and Neşrî treat being ‘Rûm’ as ethnically in terms of being against Islam and place the social contradiction of property relations in an ethno-religious context. The only example in which the Rûm ethnicity is positively mentioned is the work of Firdevsî-i Rûmî named *Kutbnâme*. In this work, Firdevsî-i Rûmî (2011, pp. 98, 100) states that the army of the King of Hungary occupies the whole place and does not leave space for Turk, Rûm and Arab people, while he names Bayezid II, who will confront this army, as “*Hakan-ı Rum*”. The fact that the poet has a reference to ‘Rûm’ in his pseudonym, that he refers to the Ottoman ruler as the khan of Rûm and that the ethnic majority of the people under Bayezid II’s rule has been counted as Turks, Rûms and Arabs shows that the word has a positive meaning. In *Saltuknâme*, on the other hand, Arabs are represented in two ways, the first refers to an Arab woman as a healer, while the other refers to the bandit tribes (Ebü’l-Hayr Rûmî, 1987, pp. 51-52). It is clear that both representations refer to tribal groups in general and within this framework they develop positive and negative representations. These examples are one of the rare examples in which Arab ethnicity is mentioned - as of the period, the Ottoman lands did not yet include southeast Anatolia, the Levant, Palestine, Hejaz and Egypt, where the Arab population was concentrated. Another point to be emphasized is that there is no clear reference to Persian ethnicity in the works of the period. However, in the works written in the earlier periods of the 15th century, Persian ethnicity is mentioned negatively and under the term ‘*Acem*’. For example, Âşikpaşazâde argues that ‘*Acem* danishmends’ were influential in the degeneration of Bayezid I’s administration from moral values (Apzd, 2017, p. 76). Although such a judgment can be found in various anonymous chronicles, such references have begun to be disappeared from political thought due to the influence of the cosmopolitan empire structure that started to be institutionalized with the 16th century. However, this period,

in which a new discourse centered on the people of the region of Persia, developed, is more clearly seen in the works written. To give an example, Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî (1987, pp. 183, 191) is the spokesperson of this new form of discourse, while he argues from *Sarı Saltuk*'s mouth that the Persian people are 'heretics' (*rafidhis*) and that everyone from them should be killed.

The Ottoman-Mamluk relations, which became tense as of the reign of Bayezid II, brought a negative point of view in terms of Circassian representations in Ottoman political thought. While describing the struggles between the Dulkadirids and the Mamluks, Kemalpaşazâde mentions the Dulkadirids, who were made subordinate during the reign of Mehmet II, positively and oppressed, and the Mamluk commander Şam Temers, whom he called "*Çerkes-i bed-fercam*", in a negative sense (Uğur, 1997, p. 82).¹⁰³⁶ İdrîs-i Bitlisî argues that the Circassians, who ruled the Mamluk Sultanate, are "scrooge and despicable [tm]" in terms of their "ancestry and roots [tm]", accusing them of being deprived of a noble lineage and origin (Genç, 2014, p. 642). In fact, Bitlisî calls the Circassians as "degenerate communities [tm]" (Genç, 2014, p. 647). This claim goes directly to the ethno-political origin, referring to the slave origin of the Mamluk Circassians. A similar expression is also included in the *Saltuknâme*, and it is mentioned in a negative context that the servants become rulers (Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî, 1990, p. 131). The conclusion of the Ottoman-Safavid wars in favor of the Ottomans during the reign of Selim I causes the Mamluks to be included in the Ottoman fatwas as 'traitors' supporting the 'heterodox' Safavids (İvanov, 2013, p. 34) and makes the ethno-religious subtext of the Circassian representation visible. In the letter that Mehmet II sent to the Mamluk Sultan Inal after his capture of Constantinople the sultan's reminder of his slave past and mentioning that his power to rule was inherited from his jihadist ancestors (Magemizoğlu, 2021, p. 103) shows how the connection between nobility, religion and property was installed in Ottoman thought. It is clear that this provision can also be applied in the opposite direction. When Hersekzâde Ahmed Pasha, who was captured by the Mamluks during the reign of Bayezid II, was accepted by the Mamluk Sultan Qayitbay, he was reminded that both of them were of 'servant/slave' (*kul*) origin (Muslu, 2016, pp. 187-88). Qayitbay, who released Hersekzâde, tried to establish a certain affinity with the people of slave-origin under the Ottoman rule. On the other hand, it should also be noted that the Mamluk ruling class and the Bedouin chiefs close to them also saw the Ottoman rulers and their subjects as 'filthy', 'uncouth barbarians'

¹⁰³⁶ Circassian with a disastrous-fate.

(İvanov, 2013, p. 25). The reciprocity of negative image construction reveals that ethnic representation -as could be seen in those examples- is a cultural element of a specific type of political discourse.

Another ethnic group representation is about Tatars. In general, as was discussed in the previous parts of this thesis, the image of ‘Tatar’ is used together with images such as aimless violence, looting, massacre and horror in terms of Ottoman political thought, historiography and even poetry. It can be said that the experience of the Ilkhanate administration, the Timurid invasion and the various conflicts with the Tatar clans were decisive in the spread of this usage. The descriptions about Tatar ethnicity in this period are presented in a similar framework.¹⁰³⁷ For example, İdrîs-i Bitlisî (Genç, 2007, pp. 99-100) argues that the Tatar tribe/*milla* are “the seditionists of the time of iniquity [tm]” and that they are tools for “the strife and mischief of the people of unbelief and stubbornness [tm]”. In another description, İdrîs-i Bitlisî (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 44; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 34) states that peace and security prevailed during the reign of Mehmet II, and that strife and mischief were seen only in the “eyes of Tatar Turks which become wineful in nights [tm]”. The word “*humar*” used here is used in the sense of stupor after drinking (Ayverdi, 2010, p. 518) and thus includes a reference to the non-Islamic lifestyle of the ethnic group described as Tatar Turks. Bitlisî’s characterization of the said group as ‘Tatar Turks’ suggests that this group is one of the tribes that came to Anatolia with the Mongol invasions, and in this respect, it shows that the word Tatar was originally used for both Turkish and Mongolian ethnicity. A similar usage is also included in the anonymous chronicle published by K. Taş. According to the narrative in this chronicle, Grand Vizier Çandarlı Halil Pasha was of ‘Tatar origin’ and therefore wrote a letter to the Crimean Khan in order to replace newly enthroned Mehmet II, thus making him a ‘traitor’ (Taş, 2020, p. 131). The only work in which Tatar ethnicity is positively mentioned is Firdevsî-i Rûmî’s *Kutbnâme*. In this work, the poet penned the following line to indicate the breadth of Bayezid II’s justice (Firdevsî-i Rûmî, 2011, p. 43): “Yasağun tutdı Tatar içinde Kürd/ ‘Adlün itdi koyuna çupan kurd”.¹⁰³⁸ The positive mention of Tatar and Kurdish groups in this verse is related to Bayezid II’s acceptance of his dominance. However, in terms of wolf-sheep/Tatar-

¹⁰³⁷ Ebü’l-Hayr-ı Rumî (1987, pp. 157-58) states that Tatars shed blood unjustly. In Harîmî’s *diwan*, which is thought to belong to Prince Korkud (Akin, 2009, p. 58), there is an analogy pointing out that the law of the Mongols is shedding blood.

¹⁰³⁸ Kurds in Tatar obeyed your ban/ Your justice made the wolf a shepherd for the sheep.

Kurdish similarity, this line still contains a distant acceptance of the status of Tatar ethnicity.¹⁰³⁹

On the other hand, it is seen in the texts that both Firdevsî-i Rûmî and İdrîs-i Bitlisî approach Kurdish ethnicity positively.¹⁰⁴⁰ Moreover, in the work named *Saltuknâme* compiled by Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî (1987, p. 25), Kurdish fighters were praised as a force that stopped the Frankish invasion and evaluated as the main force that defeated the Rûm soldiers. While counting the divisions of the Ottoman army, İdrîs-i Bitlisî mentions a section he calls “*garîp yiğidi*” (peregrine and valiant ones). According to him, this group consists of around two thousand people who have taken up *jihad*, have experience in combat, have strong Islamic faith, are devout, and follow the *sunnahs* (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 61; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 50). The majority of the mentioned group comes from the tribes of Kurdistan and they serve the ruler closely (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 62; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 50). In these statements, Bitlisî emphasizes that Kurdish tribal warriors are especially religious and Sunni, which distinguishes them from Turkmen warriors. It is noticed that Kurdish fighters are mentioned with praise in a similar way in *Saltuknâme* (Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî, 1987, p. 9).

Another community that is the subject of ethnographic interest is the Albanians. The continuous resistance of the Albanian tribes to the Ottoman rule, not paying tribute and gaining military successes against the Ottoman forces are at the source of this interest. The depictions of Albanian people in İdrîs-i Bitlisî and Kemalpaşazâde are worth considering. Before giving information about the characteristics of the Albanian people, İdrîs-i Bitlisî makes an ethnological reasoning. According to this reasoning, the temperament, morality and behavior style of certain groups of people are shaped according to the conditions of the “dwelling and space [tm]” in which they live (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 214; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 182). Bitlisî claims that the warlike and headstrong Albanians living in the mountainous regions, resembling “wild animals [tm]”, are the “most malignant [tm]” tribe in the region of Rûm (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 214; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 183). According to him, Albanians could not reach “civilized society [tm]”, could not come together and establish a communal life in one place,

¹⁰³⁹ It would be wrong to say that this verse has a precise clarity of meaning. It can be interpreted as the fact that the Kurds, who are among the Tatars who do not comply with the order, are subject to the Ottomans, or it can be interpreted as both obeying the order.

¹⁰⁴⁰ In the work titled *Gazânâme-i Rûm*, written by Kâşîfî at the beginning of the second half of the 15th century, the Kurdish soldiers in Mehmet II's close circle are positively mentioned (Esmail, 2005, pp. 18, 29).

because they were not subject to any Islamic rulers, and they did not even unite among themselves and enter the administration of a leader (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 214; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 183). Kemalpaşazâde argues that in the region where the Albanian rebels lived, there was neither a cultivated land nor trees, they did not have livelihoods, tools or fabrics (Turan, 1991, p. 269). Bitlisî's ethnographic narrative was developed in accordance with the civilized-savage dichotomy and assigned a 'civilizing' mission to the Ottoman occupation. While this mission includes taking under the authority of the state, it also includes killing and 'cleansing' the Albanians who are called "*ehl-i şirk*" (polytheists) (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 218; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 186). The decisive factor here is the state authority. For example, Bitlisî considers the Voynuks, who are Christian *sipâhîs*, to be 'useful' people in the army of the ruler, although they maintain their "obstinacy and blasphemy [tm]" (Yıldırım, 2010, pp. 64-65; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 52). In this respect, the difference between a Voynuk and an Albanian is determined in terms of accepting state authority, and the ethnological examination for the latter focuses on whether it is sufficient to establish a relationship with the state in a 'desirable way'. In fact, a similar situation exists for Tatars and Turkmens, and if the problem is generalized, it stems from a fundamental contradiction between state authority and tribal autonomy.

At the end of this subsection, the issue of ethnographic discourse built on the Turkmens, the ethnic group for which the most advanced signification systematic was developed about in Ottoman political thought, will be mentioned. Considering the image of Turk/Turkmen in Ottoman political thought, it is seen that this image originates from two main sources.¹⁰⁴¹ The first of these sources becomes visible because the Ottomans were defined as 'Turkish' by their Western neighbors. Burçoğlu-Kuran (2010, pp. 23-27) shows that the Turkish image, which is generally defined as cruel/blood-shedding and infidel in Western sources, continued from the 11th to the 16th centuries without any major changes. Although it does not always follow this image, it is possible to follow from the sources of this period that the Ottoman domination was interpreted around the Turkish image. For example, when Broquiére (2000, p. 169) entered the Anatolian lands, he first reached the lands under the rule of Ramazanid dynasty and described this ruler as a 'Turk' and his country as a "Turkmen

¹⁰⁴¹ Although it is often argued in the second literature that the terms '*Turk*' and '*Turkmen*' have different meanings -and that the word Turkmen is used for Turkish groups that have converted to Islam. On the other hand, *Turk/Turkmen/Oghuz* or other clan names have been used interchangeably in their historical usage. On the subject, see: Peacock (2020, pp. 57-58).

country [tm]” in his travel book. In the part of the travelogue devoted to the Ottoman state, Broquiére (2000, p. 199-200) generally describes the local people as ‘Turkish’ and Bursa as a “Turkish city [tm]”. In Byzantine short chronicles (*Chronica Byzantina Breviora*), the Ottomans are sometimes named with the words *Ísmaelitai*, *Agarenoi*, *Mousoulmanoi*, *Tourkoi/Tourkos* (Kılıç, 2013, p. 59; footnote 1). Giovanni Maria Angiolello, who wrote his work during the reign of Mehmet II, chose *Historia Turchesca* as the title for his Ottoman history. The Eastern European writer Miechowita (2022, pp. 113-14) used the words Ottoman and Turk synonymously in his work titled *Tractatus de duabus Sarmatis Europiana et Asiana et de contentis in eis*, which he wrote at the beginning of the 16th century, and discussed dynastical genealogy in connection with the Tatar lineage. Similarly, it is seen that Baron Vratislav (1998, p. 16), who visited the Ottoman country at the end of the 16th century, used the words Ottoman and Turkish interchangeably. Studies by M. Soykut (2001, pp. 15-44) in the Italian-Latin literature between the 15th and 18th centuries show that the Ottoman state was generally presented in association with the ‘Turkish’ image. In addition to the fact that European states faced the Ottomans as both military and ideological antagonists, there was also a certain problem of religious identity on the basis of this choice of presentation. The definition of the Ottoman state as ‘Turk’ also means to posit politically a heresy or infidelity movement with ethnic origins against the ideology of Catholic Christianity. In this respect, the naming of the Ottoman state as ‘Turk’ has an internal relationship with the concept of ‘ethnicus’ used by the Catholic church to describe pagans.¹⁰⁴²

Secondly, the word ‘Turk’ as it is used in Ottoman sources has a meaning that needs to be analyzed separately. The image of ‘Turk’ is mentioned in two different ways in Ottoman sources. The first of these is the positive ‘Turk’ image that can often be observed in the work named *Saltuknâme* of Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî. When the *Saltuknâme* is examined, it is often possible to encounter evaluations such as the words Muslim and Turkish mean the same thing in the eyes of the Balkan rulers and religious leaders in general, and arguments such as Muhammad “came to the Turks as a prophet [tm]” (Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî, 1987, pp. 6-7, 25, 72 etc.). Evaluations of this kind, as it is translated into *Saltuknâme*, show that the image of ‘Turk’, in which Western observers participate, was partially accepted by Turkic groups fighting in the Balkans and may have become

¹⁰⁴² For an example of this usage, see: Stevenson (2016, p. 91). Georgius de Hungaria generally uses the word Turk both in the sense of Muslim and draws attention to the fact that this name characterizes a tribe throughout his work.

self-identity. In Firdevsî-i Rûmî's work called *Kutbnâme* (2011, p. 139), the defeat of the Hungarian army while trying to cross the eastern bank of the Danube is described by the king as follows: "Tunadan geçmek dilerken Türke biz/ Terse dönüb ha kaçaruz ürke biz/ Türke kılmak diler iken akını/ Kaçaruz uşda deriga sakını/ Türk ilinden atımız su içmeden/ Hayf kaçduk Tuna suyn geçmeden"¹⁰⁴³

In these lines, it is seen that the word 'Turk' is referred to as a certain country or region. The poet, who wrote these lines, indirectly uses the word 'Turk' in an ethno-political sense and defines the Ottomans in this way -positively- from the eyes of the King of Hungary. However, there is a certain limit to the category of 'Turk', which is considered positively in the works of both Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî and Firdevsî-i Rûmî. This limit is that the 'Turks' mentioned in both works are 'Sunni'. To give an example, Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî (1987, p. 25) states that the forces united against the Franks and Rûmî army are 'Sunni', while Firdevsî-i Rûmî (2011, p. 269) states that the Franks cannot conquer the "Sunni property [tm]" and states that it highlights Sunnism as the most general anti-Christian category. In another example, Firdevsî-i Rûmî (2011, p. 134) praises Bayezid II as a *Sunni* ruler. Since military successes are of central importance in these narratives, although religious discourse is not given an intense place, the emphasis on 'Sunniism' suggests that this was a conscious political choice.

On the other hand, a rather negative image of 'Turk' is usually drawn in Ottoman historical narratives. This image includes moral and political evaluations such as 'vulgarity/rudeness', 'bloodshed', 'ignorance of authority', and moreover, it identifies Turkish ethnicity with religious heresy. Especially during the 16th century, when the Ottoman-Safavid struggle intensified, the word 'Turk' gained a new religious meaning signifies the 'heretic' in Ottoman political thought. This is a very striking interpretation because in this context, the word 'Turk' in Ottoman political thought and in Western sources is handled with a common negative judgment, albeit with different reference points. At this point, it would be appropriate to focus on typical examples where the word 'Turk' is used with a negative meaning in the ethnic context. When the examples of political thought written at the threshold of the 16th century are examined, the main sources that make a negative judgment about the 'Turkish' ethnicity can be listed as Kemalpaşazâde, İdrîs-i Bitlisî, Neşrî and Behiştî. Kemalpaşazâde builds the

¹⁰⁴³ While we wanted to cross the Danube river to the Turkish land/ We got scared and turned upside down and fled/ While we want to raid on the Turks / We run away gasping, lamenting, and avoiding/ We escaped from the Turkish country before our horse even drank water/ Alas, we escaped without crossing the Danube river.

image of ‘Turk’ and ‘Turkmen’ on two pillars: The first as a ‘vulgar’ and ‘despicable’ stratum of the people, and the second in the sense of ‘heretics’. While the first of these constructions is mostly found in the historical narratives of the Ottoman establishment period, the second is an extension of the current political sphere opened with the 16th century. In the examples in the first category, Kemalpaşazâde uses the terms “*kabail-i Türkmen*” (Turkmen tribes) and describes them as “*Etrak-ı bi-bak*” (rude Turks, without fear and hesitation etc.) (Imazawa, 2000, p. 201).¹⁰⁴⁴ Moreover, for a Turkmen war chief, he uses the expression as such (Imazawa, 2000, p. 205): “Türkman sürüsünün çupanlarından Köpek-oğlu demekle iştihar bulmuş bir bed-kirdar”.¹⁰⁴⁵ In this second example, the metaphor of the herd is reversed, the ‘dog’ is shown as the guardian of the herd, evoking the name of the war chief, and in this way the status of the Turkmen group is humiliated along with its leader. In another example, Kemalpaşazâde describes the Turkmens as a group that does not keep their word, accuses them of cheating and describes them as “*ahd-ü peyman bilmez bir tayife*” (Turan, 1991, p. 194).¹⁰⁴⁶ Kemalpaşazâde transcribes his claim to aesthetic sphere with a couplet as follows (Turan, 1991, p. 194): “Türkmanın aslıdur terk-i aman/ Cem’ ola mı hiç aman ve Türkman”.¹⁰⁴⁷ These words of Kemalpaşazâde can be interpreted as the Turkmens gathered around Karamanid dynasty resisting being subject to the Ottoman state, but this is not the only meaning. The term ‘*ahd-ü peyman*’ (words and oath) also has a religious connotation and refers to the contract made with God to comply with certain religious rules. In this respect, the definition of ‘not obeying an oath’ as a general Turkmen characteristic opens the door to more religious sub-texts where labels such as ‘apostate’, ‘infidel’ or ‘denier’ can be put on Turkmens. The interpretation of the subject by İdrîs-i Bitlisî also does not show a great difference.

While Bitlisî discusses the Ottoman-Karamanid relations, he argues that the Karamanid’s breaking of the peace was “provoked by the nature of the Turkmen tribe [tm]” (Yıldırım, 2010, pp. 230-31; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 197). In this example, too, the emphasis is placed on the ‘nature’ of Turkmen ethnicity, that is, a moral-ethnic

¹⁰⁴⁴ For another example, with a similar meaning, see: İdrîs-i Bitlisî’s description of the “ignorant Turkmen physician” who caused the death of Karamanid Pir Ahmet (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 269; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 231).

¹⁰⁴⁵ One of the shepherds of the Turkmen herd, one of the bad deeds, who became famous with the name of Son-of-dog.

¹⁰⁴⁶ A group that knows no words and oaths.

¹⁰⁴⁷ The essence of Turkmen is to abandon giving mercy/ Will Turkmen and mercy ever come together?.

prejudice is naturalized and universalized –thus transforming it into abstract political discourse. In this respect, it can be said that a systematic Turkmen hostility in Ottoman political thought gained a remarkable intensity within the framework of the Ottoman-Karamanid struggle during the reign of Mehmet II. On the other hand, the negative arguments pointed out reached their peak with Prince Cem's claim to the throne against Bayezid II and finally with the Qizilbash uprisings. In fact, the negative arguments written in the 16th century also contain a certain retrospective judgment about the period of Mehmet II. This hostility was primarily effective in the development of a format in which Turkmen ethnicity was denied in the construction of the political identity of the Ottoman dynasty. Because the Turkmen identity in the works of writers such as Ahmedî, Yazıcızâde 'Alî and Âşıkpaşazâde does not contain the negative image existing in the chronicles written in the 16th century.

Let's continue the section by examining the Turkmen image that developed with the incident of Prince Cem in Ottoman political thought. In the works written during this period, it is seen and criticized that Prince Cem made an alliance with the Turkmen groups on the basis of his claim to the throne. This claim can be considered correct because the Turkish/Turkmen identity is reflected in a very positive way in the work named *Saltuknâme*, compiled by the request of Prince Cem. Some adventures of epic figures such as Seyyid Battal Ghazi and Müseyyeb Ghazi, who became heroes of the epics written before the Ottoman expansion, are adapted to the lives of Turkmen groups and placed on the stage of Rumelia in *Saltuknâme*. When viewed from the Ottoman palace dominated by Bayezid II, the panorama drawn is quite different. İdrîs-i Bitlisî underlines that the group that was with Prince Cem when he set out to besiege Bursa consisted of “cruel Turgud Turks [tm]” and “Karaman and Varsak Turkmens [tm]” (Genç, 2014, pp. 590, 596). Kemalpaşazâde (Uğur, 1997, p. 11) states that “pure hypocritical and defeatist [tm]” Varsaks and “obstinate [tm]” Turguds gather around Prince Cem, thus the author combines the idea of political resistance and tribal ethos in a negative way. Behiştî, who wrote the same incident, claims that Prince Cem received help from Karaman and Turgut Turkmens and that the natural temperament and essence from creation of these two groups were ‘degenerated’ (Kaytaz, 2011, p. 298). İdrîs-i Bitlisî, on the other hand, states that the ‘cruel’ Varsak and Turgut Turkmens sided with Prince Cem (Genç, 2014, pp. 590, 596). There is no direct reference to Turkmen tribes in the chronicle named *Vakiât-ı Sultan Cem*, written by a contemporary observer who was with Prince Cem during the uprising against Bayezid II and whose name is thought

to be Haydar Çelebi. It was stated that the Konya and Karaman tribes were deeply saddened by the departure of Prince Cem, but ethnic details were not presented (Vatin, 1997, p. 127). Moreover, it is an interesting detail that while Prince Cem was defeated and moved south to take shelter in the Mamluk state, a Turkmen chief named Uyuz Beg was counted among the people who blocked his way around the Bulgar Mountain and delayed his departure (Vatin, 1997, p. 127). Kemalpaşazâde states that Uyuz Beg was the chief of the Varsak chiefs (Uğur, 1997, p. 105). İdrîs-i Bitlisî, on the other hand, states that a group called “sahara Turks [tm]” cut off Prince Cem’s path and robbed him, and Bayezid II punished them by crucifying them for their ‘insolence’ (Genç, 2014, p. 597).¹⁰⁴⁸

A difference between the narratives of the supporters of Bayezid II and Prince Cem needs explanation. The fact that no other work like *Vakîât-ı Sultân Cem* has survived, deprives researchers of a secondary reference to compare the singular discourse contained herein and to avoid making an incorrect generalization. For this reason, the difference in discourse we encounter may be due to the erroneous generalization of a single example. On the other hand, another pillar that can explain the difference in question may be hidden in the historico-political meaning of the discourse developed on ethnicity. When the two forms of discourse are examined in terms of their subjects and objects, it is seen that the discourse developed by the ruling circle of Bayezid II is the continuation of an ethnic index that is placed in the perspective of the central state. This index -as will be discussed theoretically at the end of this subsection- has specific consideration for tribal structures as it sees them as autonomist-oriented political structures and fails to articulate them bureaucratically and ideologically to central authority. This perspective also shows itself in political

¹⁰⁴⁸ We see an interesting example of Ottoman political discourse in İdrîs-i Bitlisî’s narrative. In the Şah Kulu revolt, the rebels claimed that the Ottoman Empire was corrupt and that the brothers fought each other and broke the ‘custom’, referring to the memory of the Bayezid II-Prince Cem struggle that has not been erased from the collective memory. In the example given by İdrîs-i Bitlisî, it is seen that the ruler, who gave a cruel punishment against the tribes who usurped his enemy brother, both protected his dynastic authority and protected his brother's status even if he was an enemy. As a similar example, Emir Suleyman was killed by the villagers during the interregnum period and Musa Çelebi set the whole village on fire as revenge. The existence of alternative narratives, especially about the second example, necessitates questioning whether the first example is also a fiction. Another similar example is in Ahmedî’s work called *Ahval-i Sultan Mehmed*. According to the story told by Ahmedî, when Mehmet I captured Musa Çelebi, he was drowned by a lord named *Baltaoğlu* to avenge Suleyman Çelebi (İnalçık, 2021a, p. 444). The fact that all three examples are handled as political signifiers, apart from factual signifieds, shows that such a discourse was deliberately constructed in the final analysis.

terminology, moral and political signs. On the other hand, the people gathered around Prince Cem and partially supported by the Turkmen tribes do not feel the need to use the same language as the state to make sense of their social existence. For this reason, their representation in political discourse does not include ethnic signifiers.¹⁰⁴⁹

On the other hand, it is observed that the discourse on Turkmen ethnicity developed by the authors who were in engagement with the Ottoman state became more and more complex and negative. For example, it is noticed that the discourse of ethnic humiliation, which refers to natural origins, has gained a religious and historical depth in the history of Neşrî. Neşrî (1946, p. 9) argues that some of the Turks are nomads, some of them worship the sun/fire/stone and even idols called *Sanem/Bakar/Şecer* - that is, they are pagan - while others live completely unaware of religious beliefs. Although Neşrî did not make this evaluation by referring specifically to the Turkmen groups living in Anatolia and pointed out the historical origin, this evaluation is still important in that it deals with the pagane beliefs of a particular ethnic group. The following lines of the poet Fakîrî, who wrote his work *Ta'rifât* in the middle of the 16th century, show that a similar judgment continues and is indirectly applied to contemporary Turkmen tribes (as cited in Kalpaklı, 2010, p. 15): “Nedir bildin mi sen âlemde Türk’ü/ Ola eğninde kürkü, başında börkü/ Ne mezhep bile, ne din, ne diyânet/ Yumaz yüzün ne abdest ü tehâret”¹⁰⁵⁰.

To continue, it is seen that the term ‘Qizilbash’ have been introduced the Ottoman political literature with the 16th century. This term is used for the followers of the Safavid order, which, in its historical origin, acquired a certain uniform by dressing the disciples of Sheikh Hajdar with a twelve-slice scarlet tie. Gölpınarlı (1977, p. 789) states that the semiologic meaning of wearing red is a tradition that goes way back in the history of religions, especially esoteric and egalitarian movements (*Mazdekî, Babakî, Zoroastrian* etc.) have worn red clothes throughout history and are referred to as “*muhammara*” (crimson) in the sources. However, the relation of the historical background presented by Gölpınarlı with the Qizilbash movement that emerged in the 16th century is highly doubtful. Gölpınarlı conducts a theo-historical analysis that presupposes a type of religious heterodoxy in its subtext, but completely ignores the

¹⁰⁴⁹ As a last possibility, it can be said that the author of the text made an implicit effort to protect the tribes that supported Prince Cem by not mentioning their names.

¹⁰⁵⁰ “Did you know who is the Turk in this world/ The one who has fur on back and a fur hat on his head/ He does not know about religion or mezhep (religious sect) or piety/ Never washes his face, perform ablutions (abdest) or taharet (cleanse himself)” (Kalpaklı, 2010, p. 15).

ethnographic dimension of the issue. Safavid Sheikh Hajdar's making the red cap a symbol of the order is simultaneous with the spread of the Safavid order among Turkmen groups. This has its foundations based on the closeness established between the belief and ritual principles and symbols of the order and the cultural codes of Turkmen groups. In this context, the red cap bears a great resemblance to the red 'bork' used by the nomads. It is possible to follow this affinity in the ethnographic discourse within the Ottoman political thought regarding the groups called Qizilbash. For example, Kemalpaşazâde describes Prince Cem's return from Bursa to Konya as a kind of Pyrrhic victory in which the Varsak and Turgud Turkmens wore scarlet caps and raised banners (Uğur, 1997, p. 21). When focusing on the red cap symbology, it is possible to see the importance of this in the fact that the tribal forces around the Ottoman principality wore a red cap, while the Janissary army was used to wear a white cap. In this second example, the difference between the tribal forces and the army organized under the state emerges more clearly.

The view of the Ottoman political thought towards the Qizilbash order and the political movement that developed in connection with it is divided into three historical phases. These phases can be listed as the first period until Shah Ismail, the second is the period of Shah Ismail, and finally the third period starting shortly before the Battle of Çaldıran in 1514 and extending to the period after Shah Tahmasb. In the first period, the Safavid order was also helped by the Ottoman dynasty, and financial aid was provided to both the lodges in Ardebil and in Korkuteli, which was administered by Hasan Khalifa (Giese, 1992, p. 132; Eravcı, 2011, p. 48). Although Sheikh Junayd, who was dismissed from the presidency of the Safavid order in this period, had military successes in the eastern borders of the Ottoman Empire and gained influence over the Turkmens of Taurus mountains, disturbed the Ottoman state. But it cannot be asserted that the Ottoman political discourse showed a great interest in the subject since a mass Qizilbash political movement had not emerged yet. The recognition and interpretation of the Qizilbash movement by the Ottoman political discourse emerges especially when Shah İsmail abolished the Aq Qoyunlu state and ascended to the Iranian throne. Within the framework of this development, especially the period of Sheikh Junayd is reconsidered and made the subject of political discourse.

As Sümer (1976, p. 10) states, the main source describing the days and struggle of Sheikh Junayd in Anatolia is the history of Âşıkpaşazâde. The fact that Âşıkpaşazâde made a special mention on the subject is important in terms of showing that Sheikh

Junayd's political activities were followed and evaluated retrospectively. Âşıkpaşazâde states that Bayezid II exiled the followers of Ardebil lodge to Rumelia and grounds the reason for this by referring to the period of Sheikh Junayd. According to Âşıkpaşazâde, while the Safavid order was a 'benevolent' order that followed the Sharia, it was corrupted during the reign of Sheikh Junayd and was accused by the ulama to being 'infidel' (Kala, 2013, p. 373). Sheikh Junayd requested the Kurtbeli region from Murat II as a residence and was rejected, upon which he went to Konya under the rule of Karamanid dynasty, and while he was residing in the *zawiya* of Sheikh Sadreddin Konevî, he was declared as infidel by the sheikh of this *zawiya*, named Abdullatif (Kala, 2013, p. 374). Upon this, Junayd, who came out of Konya, moved to the regions where the Varsak Turks were concentrated and made them subject to him (Kala, 2013, p. 374). Later, Âşıkpaşazâde states that Junayd settled in a castle near Aleppo and gathered the followers of Sheikh Bedreddin next to him (Kala, 2013, p. 375). Âşıkpaşazâde generally stated that the Safavid order became heretic with the period of Sheikh Junayd and Sheikh Hajdar, they said 'Shah' instead of '*salam aleykum*' to introduce themselves, they preferred to go to Ardebil instead of going to Mecca, they did not pray or fast, and they used heresy-related (*rafida*) words a lot (Kala, 2013, pp. 376-77). According to Âşıkpaşazâde, the reason why Murat II did not give land to Sheikh Junayd is explained by the thought that "two sultans cannot fit on one throne [tm]", moreover, Sheikh Abdullatif writes a letter to Karamanid İbrahim Beg and stating that Junayd "destroyed the sharia and demanded an emirate/chiefdom for himself [tm]" (Kala, 2013, pp. 373-74). In his narrative, Âşıkpaşazâde, while mentioning the Varsak Turks, focuses the emphasis on the points of claiming heresy and political dominance. In this respect, though the Varsaks are a partial fulcrum, the main pillar of this discourse tends towards the emerging theo-political ethos.

The second phase, in which the Qizilbash movement is discussed in Ottoman sources, corresponds to the period of Shah Ismail. Yıldırım (2008, p. 330) rightly states that Ottoman sources remained mostly silent on the subject until Shah İsmail's Dulkadirid campaign. This period covers a period of ten/twelve years, which includes the enthronement of Shah Ismail at the beginning of the 16th century and the destruction of the Aq Qoyunlu state and his domination in a region stretching from the Euphrates to the Ceyhun River in a short time. In this phase, the Qizilbash movement developed its organizational structure and transformed from a widespread *sûfî* order to a state. In the development of this process, the influence of the popular Shiite imagination and the

sûfî Shi'ism, which was common among the nomads, is very clear. Shah Ismail's kidnapping from Ardebil at a young age and hiding by Lahijan *sûfîs* and his death at a young age bears resemblance to the belief of Imam Mahdi, believed in the Twelver Shiism, that he disappeared in a cave at a young age and will reappear in the End Times. It is seen that Shah Ismail and his circle -at least in their early periods- also embraced this claim. For example, Shah Ismail (2005, p. 357; Ergun, 1956, p. 133) -or someone from his circle- describes himself as the *Mahdi* in the verses he wrote under the pen name *Hatâyî*: "Xətayi Mehdi oldu/ Imamlar cəhdi oldu/ Gətir, gotdi qəm-qüssə/ Şadilik vaxtı oldu".¹⁰⁵¹ Moreover, the spread of the extraordinarily beautiful poems written by Shah Ismail among the people of the region increased the curiosity and expectations about him. In addition, the traces of Nizari-Ismaili Shiism and even the Zaydi sect continue in the region where Shah Ismail grew up and started an uprising -for example, in the Lahijan region.¹⁰⁵² It is seen that these traces are partly the subject of the works of the period. İdris-i Bitlisî defines the followers of Şah Kulu as *rafidas* and *kharijites* belonging to the Ismaili sect in *Selimnâme*, which he wrote during the reign of Selim I (Aksoy, 2021, p. 56). In this respect, the influence of the strong tradition of the Shiite imamate and *mahdi* belief in the background of Shah Ismail's capture of Tabriz at an age that can be considered a child is undeniable. The fact that a large part of the masses gathered under the charismatic leadership of Shah Ismail are Turkmen tribes of Anatolian origin and that the Safavid circles historically developed close relations with certain Kurdish tribes caused the political movement to have a large potential in an ethnic, religious and political nature.¹⁰⁵³ Moreover, as can be seen in the Karaman uprisings and the Şahkulu rebellion, the advance to develop and institutionalize the tax relations of the Ottoman Empire had a great impact on the emergence of the Qizilbash movement, and the political conflict ground became antagonistic. In this period, it is seen that the word Qizilbash was used more in relation to the Turkmen masses.

¹⁰⁵¹ Hatâyî became the Mahdi/ The struggle of the imams took place/ It's gone, sorrow and worry/ It's time for happiness.

¹⁰⁵² It is noteworthy that this region is also targeted in the *Saltuknâme*. Ebü'l-Hayr-ı Rumî (1988, pp. 201, 208) points out the Gilan/Lahijan region as one of the three sources of heresy.

¹⁰⁵³ On the Kurdish origins of the Safavid order, see: Morimoto (2010, pp. 451-54). For Kurdish tribes close to the Safavid order, see: Sümer (1976, pp. 2-3). Also, for the Turkmen tribes that played a role in the establishment of the Safavid state, see: Sümer (1976, pp. 43-109) Efendiev (1997, pp. 36-39) and *Tarih-i Kızılbaşan* (Gündüz, 2015, pp. 21-30, 41-55, 63-94). For Kurdish Qizilbashes, see also: Van Bruinessen (1993, p. 22) and Bayrak's extensive literature review (1997, pp. 266-469).

The basis of this political usage is the influence of the Turkmen groups, which could not be fully controlled since the 1480s and were articulated with the newly emerged Qizilbash movement. These groups started resistance against the central authority in a line extending from Karaman-Taşeli and from there to Dulkadirid lands. These resistance movements show themselves in the Karaman rebellions, the anti-Ottoman resistances in the Ottoman-Mamluk struggle, the false Karamanid Mustafa rebellion and finally the Şahkulu rebellion.¹⁰⁵⁴ Kemalpaşazâde defines them as “*mufsid*”, “*fasid-nihad*” and “*bed-nijad*”,¹⁰⁵⁵ stating that after the disappearance of the Karamanid dynasty, a group calling itself Turgutlu -but not affiliated from the Turgutlu tribe- rebelled, gathered Turgutlu and Varsak tribes around it, dispersed villages and other tribes (Uğur, 1997, p. 53). Âşıkpaşazâde stated that Bayezid II sent Davud Pasha to the regions where the Varsaks lived, which became the battlefield of the Mamluk-Ottoman struggle in 1485, and that the army combed out this region and forced the Varsak tribes to obey (Kala, 2013, p. 349). He states that in this process, Davud Pasha took *Boğaoğlu, Akbaşoğlu, Elvanoğlu, Sümeroğlu, Ekderoğlu, Uranoğlu, Adalioğlu, Oğuz Beg, Arık Satanoğlu* and many more Varsak groups under obedience, and they expelled the *Turgud* tribe (Kala, 2013, p. 349). Kemalpaşazâde states that the military forces led by Davud Pasha put the rebel groups in order in *Çukurabad* (Çukurova) and *Taşiçi* region (Uğur, 1997, pp. 103-104). However, the authority of the Ottoman state over the mentioned groups will not continue for a long time. In 1501, a person named Mustafa (or İbrahim), who claimed to be a member of the Karamanid dynasty, revolts in the Karaman region and gathers the Varsak and Turgut tribes around him (Yıldırım, 2008, p. 323). Âşıkpaşazâde states that a person who was the assistant of Prince Cem and later re-connected to the Ottoman state was influential in the rebellion of this person, this person deliberately registered the *timars* above their value and distributed them, so the *sipâhîs* of Karaman rebelled (Kala, 2013, p.371). Kemalpaşazâde does not express an opinion on the reasons for this revolt, but draws attention to the fact that the support of the Varsak Turks was decisive in the strengthening of false Karamanid Mustafa revolt (Uğur, 1997, p. 210). It is understood that these tribes are mostly part of the tribes (*Turgutlu, Bayburtlu, Varsak, Samagar* etc.) that make up the Karamanid army

¹⁰⁵⁴ Although these social movements continued throughout the 16th century, only the Şahkulu rebellion will be considered, since the scope of our thesis is limited to the period of Bayezid II.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Corruptive-one, sinister-race, evil-race.

(Karadeniz, 2008, p. 14).¹⁰⁵⁶ On the other hand, in the history of Behiştî, it is stated that false Karamanid Mustafa gathered people around him by propagating that the *Kharijites* rebelled, and it is mentioned that after the rebellion was suppressed, a remedial action was taken against the Varsak people in the region (Kaytaz, 2011, p. 364). Behiştî's description of rebellious groups as '*Kharijite*' suggests a certain Qizilbash connection. When the history of Karamanid dynasty is investigated, there is information that Nureddin Sofî was a follower of Baba İlyas and that Karaman Beg was accepted as the sheikh of the *Babai* order (Karadeniz, 2008, pp. 101-103). In this context, the religious structure of the tribes in the Karaman region and the related problem of the legitimacy of the political authority may have revealed such a terminology. On the other hand, the tendency of the Ottoman state to name the rebellious groups in religious terms may have caused the early Qizilbash movement to be associated with Kharijites, which in mainstream Sunni Islamic discourse is characterized by the arguments of interpreting the provisions of the Qur'an 'literally' and 'not recognizing the legitimate caliph'.

It is noteworthy that this event was almost simultaneous with the coronation of Shah Ismail in Tabriz. It is clear that a general atmosphere of rebellion against the institutional power of the Ottoman and Aq Qoyunlu states spread, and the main attraction in this atmosphere was the Qizilbashes, who represented a new political ethos. Tansel (1966, p. 117) rightly states that when there was a struggle for the reorganization of the Karamanid Principality in this period, especially the groups of people living in the Taurus Mountains supported this struggle. However, when the issue is examined from a political perspective, it is necessary to explain why the nomads living in the Taurus Mountains persistently supported an alternative power center against the Ottoman Empire. The habit of freedom, the search for freedom or the need for freedom lie on the basis of this phenomenon, which cannot be explained only by a traditional loyalty or cultural closeness to the Karamanid dynasty. Faced with the danger of losing their traditional autonomy in the face of the military and bureaucratic power of the Ottoman Empire and becoming a subordinate element of the relations of rentier exploitation through taxation, the nomadic or newly settled groups carefully evaluate political and ideological alternatives in order not to lose their autonomy. In this context, the uprising of Shah Ismail is a remarkable sign for the masses in question. Moreover,

¹⁰⁵⁶ In his work called *gazavâtnâme*, Ahmedî lists the elements of the Karamanid army as follows (İnalçık, 2021a, p. 304): Tatar, Turkmen, Varsak, Turgud, Bayburd and their commanders Teberrük the lord of Tatars, Hızır the son of Samagar, Barambay, Cazagan, Suga, Tosbuğa.

Shah Ismail's campaign against Dulkadirid state in 1508 with his army, which he strengthened with the Turkmens who joined him around Erzurum and Erzincan, and his annexation of Diyarbakir to the borders of the Safavid state reinforced the hopes for him (Sümer, 1976, p. 29). The capture of Baghdad by Shah Ismail in the following year must have strengthened the legendary narrative around his personality, and after this date, political movements aiming to articulate with Safavids in the Ottoman Empire seem to have gained momentum.

As Sümer (1976, p. 19) underlines, the participation of Turkmen tribes to Shah Ismail -which tribes settled at a relatively late date due to Mongol invasion, signifies that these political hopes were adopted by the 'weakest link' (or newly settled social segment) against the economic, political and religious/ideological control mechanisms brought by the imperial regime. In the chronicle of Kreutel (1997, p. 45), it is stated that Shah Ismail's rapid successes also affected the peoples around him, Turks/*Yörüks* from all over Anatolia took action to join him, and in this case, there was the effect of a weaker form of religion that did not have obligations such as prayer/fasting. The criticism of Prince Korkud (2022, p. 234) that there are no people praying in the villages and towns of Anatolia, and that even in the cities, the rituals of prayer are not followed, expresses a general cultural formation within this framework. In Safavid sources such as *Tarih-i Kızılbaşan* and contemporary secondary sources, it is clearly revealed that the forces that joined Shah Ismail were especially Turkmen tribes. As discussed above, when discussing the period of Ottoman political thought until the death of Shah Ismail, it is often referred to the attitude of Turkmen groups that does not recognize the central authority. On the other hand, with the Dulkadirid campaign of Shah Ismail, it is striking that the ethno-political representation in the Ottoman political thought carefully began to use a different language. Kemalpaşazâde substitutes another rather interesting alternative to the standard anti-Turkmen discourse in the face of Shah Ismail's abolition of the Aq Qoyunlu dynasty and his subsequent seizure of Dulkadirid lands. The new form of discourse used by Kemalpaşazâde focuses on ignoring the connection of Shah Ismail forces with Turkmen groups and considering them only as a group of heretics gathered around the Qizilbash order -and harming the Turkmen groups. It is clear that this new discourse is organized around a specific strategic vision. This vision most likely consists of enlisting the support of local Sunni forces in the region against Shah Ismail and even going into a pro-status quo alliance with the Mamluks. Kemalpaşazâde, who gives this vision in the subtext, states that the state will survive with alliance, not

conflict, and expresses both a strategy of unity within the borders of the empire and the search for regional status quo (Uğur, 1997, pp. 276-77). Kemalpaşazâde claims that Shah Ismail lit a “candle of strife [tm]” and that ‘Qizilbashes of Anatolia’ and different vagrants gathered next to him, and this group “devastated [tm]” Dulkadirid Turkmens (Uğur, 1997, p. 251). Moreover, Kemalpaşazâde states that Shah Ismail entered the country of Dulkadir and destroyed the ‘Turkmen plains’ and ruined Maraş and Elbistan (Uğur, 1997, p. 256). The narration of Kemalpaşazâde, which level of detail has increased due to the development of the events, states that Shah Ismail defeated and captured Turkmens, destroyed the Bayindir tribe, Kara Yuluk clan, Uzun Hasan lineage, captured Tabriz and burned the Turkmen property, he conquered cities such as Isfahan, Kum, Kashan, Rey Hamedan from the domination of Turkmens (Uğur, 1997, pp. 276-77). It is quite interesting that Kemalpaşazâde tried to interpret the Qizilbash advance as a direct threat to Turkmen groups. For example, Kemalpaşazâde formulates the harsh measures Bayezid II took against the Qizilbashes as “the expulsion of the Qizilbash over the Turkmens [tm]” (Uğur, 1997, p. 256). The second point that Kemal Paşazade emphasizes is that Shah Ismail's conquest of Baghdad reflects the danger that developed against the Ahl al-Sunnah as a kind of ‘general example’ or ‘warning’. According to Kemalpaşazâde, when Shah Ismail captured Baghdad, while the heretics were saved, the followers of the Sunnah and the Sharia faced torment, then Baghdad left Islam and fell into the darkness of heresy (Uğur, 1997, p. 278). In Kemalpaşazâde’s discourse, his effort to re-interpret the authority of the Ottoman Empire as the patron of Turkmen groups and Sunnism is clearly understood. The expectation that the occupation of the former Dulkadirid lands could have a negative effect on the Turkmen groups must have played a role in this effort. With this expectation, it is possible to come across an appropriate historical narrative in anonymous chronicles. For example, in the anonymous chronicle published by Z. Taş, it is stated that Ahmet Beg, who is mentioned as the ancestor of the Ottoman dynasty, was the chief of a Turkmen tribe living in Iran, and it is claimed that he lived under the rule of a non- Qizilbashes ruler named Muhammad Shah (Taş, 2020, p. 69). Hüseyin Shah, who succeeded Muhammad Shah after his death, replaces the old mufti and appoints a new mufti named Hüseyin Kâşî (Taş, 2020, p. 75). This new mufti, on the other hand, falsified the Qur'an and caused conflict among the scholars, for this reason Osman Beg's ancestors migrated from Iran and came to Anatolia (Taş, 2020, p. 75). The direct mention of Turkmen groups in the narrative of the anonymous chronicle, the reference to the Qizilbash belief as a new

sect, and finally the story of a tribe that migrated from Iran to Anatolia presents a very current political vision for the 16th century. Gündüz (1997, pp. 37-38) stated that with Shah Ismail's domination of Iran, he started massacres against the Aq Qoyunlu dynasty and their allied tribes, for this reason, he states that an *oymaq* of Turkmen was formed in Iran and that the notables of Aq Qoyunlu and their tribes migrated to the Ottoman lands. Here is a detail that should be noted: The tribes in question, who migrated from Iran, were subject to census, taken under administrative control and subjected to taxation by the Ottoman state (Gündüz, 1997, pp. 37-38). In this case, the Turkmen groups, who lost their traditional autonomy to a large extent, had to accept the fate that the Turkmen who took refuge in the Safavids resisted. However, if the overall picture is evaluated, the relationship between Qizilbash and Turkmen groups must have developed in the opposite direction of what Kemalpaşazâde suggested. The Qizilbash movement received the support of the Bayat and Avşar tribes living around Diyarbakir, Maraş, Aleppo and Antep, and the Varsaks living around Cilicia (Kehl-Bodrogi, 2017, p. 26). In this context, the political expectation that the Ottoman state developed by putting the Turkmen groups in the center will be completely out of date with the Şahkulu revolt.¹⁰⁵⁷

The tension rising between the Ottoman imperial regime and the political alternative put forward by the Safavids takes its final form with the Şahkulu revolt. Eravcı (2011, p. 52) states that Bayezid II's attitude towards Shah Ismail was largely flexible, but the Qizilbash movement grew stronger at a time when the fight for the throne between the princes deepened and finally the Şahkulu revolt that took place in 1511 brought the end of Bayezid II's policy. This thesis is partially true. Bayezid II avoids direct confrontation with the Safavid forces, and the same trend is observed on

¹⁰⁵⁷ Karaca (1997, p. 33) expresses the thesis that the people living in the Teke peninsula have been close to the Safavids since the early date, as they were protected from the Timurid raid by the Sheikh of Ardebil, Sadreddin Musa. This thesis does not seem chronologically correct. V. Minorsky states that this name is Sheikh Ali (Efendiev, 1997, p. 33). Moosa (1987, p. 27) reports that Sheikh Ali asked Tamerlane to release the captives he captured after the Battle of Ankara, and Tamerlane realized this wish. The main issue that needs to be explained is whether the *Halvetî/ Bayramî/Babâî/Vefâî zawiyyas*, which spread throughout Anatolia, have a relationship with the Safavid lodge. Karakaya-Stump (2020b, p. 84) argues that at the base of the Qizilbash movement that developed in Anatolia, there were people which disciplines of *Vefâî* order close to the or *Vefâî* groups, and that the Safavid caliphs were especially selected within the *Vefâî* lineage. For the *Halvetî* -Safavid connection, see: Trimmingham (1971, pp. 74-78). In addition, the *Hurûfî* movement, which reached its peak in the 15th century, and whether it established secret ties between the *sûfî* lodges locating from Anatolia to Iran is an issue that needs to be addressed. Moreover, Ismaili influences have not been adequately studied.

the side of Shah Ismail.¹⁰⁵⁸ In fact, when Bayezid II realized that he could not prevent the participation of Shah Ismail, he allowed those who went to the Safavids “on the condition that they return [tm]” (Artan, 2019, p. 292).

In this respect, although it can be said that a relatively flexible policy is followed, the tension is increasing day by day, especially as described in the anonymous chronicle of Kreutel (1997, p. 45), and Bayezid II issues edicts ordering that groups trying to join the Safavids should be prevented from emigrating, killed or exiled, even those who appear to support the Safavids and even those who wear red heads. On the other hand, as Uluçay’s (1954, pp. 54-55) detailed analysis shows, the year 1511 was a year in which the struggle for the throne between the four sons of Bayezid II accelerated, and this situation also prepared a suitable ground for the Şahkulu uprising. When the relevant Ottoman sources are examined, references to both the religious and ethnic character of the Şahkulu uprising are encountered. One of the most notable of these, İdrîs-i Bitlisî states that Şah Kulu was a disciple of the Qizilbash order and started an uprising that put Shiism in the center by gathering dervishes and people from the ‘lower class’ around him (Genç, 2014, p. 917). It is surprising that there is no ethnic reference in Bitlisî’s statements, and that religious references are made directly to Shiism, that is, there is no such evaluation as heretic/*rafida*. Markiewicz (2019, p. 73) states that while describing Bitlisî’s autobiography, he expressed the reason for taking refuge in the Ottoman Empire from Iran as “the predations of the heretics” and this refers to the rise of Shah Ismail. However, Bitlisî seems to have developed some contacts to return to Iran, as it was subjected to pressure by the close circle of Bayezid II and especially by the supporters of Prince Ahmed. As Genç (2015, p. 47) states, it is seen that Bitlisî started to develop the idea of returning after 1506 and expressed his desire to go to Diyarbakir under the rule of Shah İsmail around 1510-11. Bitlisî praises Shah Ismail in two odes he wrote while he was in Mecca in 1512/13 and demands to be accepted again by him (Genç, 2015, p. 51). In the letters İdrîs-i Bitlisî wrote to Shah Ismail, it is not overlooked that he generally constructed an imperial ideology based on the Shiite belief as Genç pointed out (2015, p. 53):

In the letter, the political polemics around Shah Ismail in his favor and against the Ottoman Empire and the Shiite-oriented legitimacy debates make themselves felt. It should be noted right away that far beyond being an ordinary letter, in the

¹⁰⁵⁸ Sarwar (1939, pp. 72-73) points to the courteous correspondence of the two rulers, but also points out that Bayezid II polled the surrounding lords for an anti-Qizilbash alliance.

text, which has a political aspect, Bidlisî drew the area of his political sovereignty even before he joined the Shah and based the legitimacy of his power with Shiite references, created a Shah profile that brought together Islamic and Iranian references by presenting him as the absolute owner of a wide geography from east to west, from north to south, within the imperial fiction he created. [tm]

Considering in the light of Genç's evaluations, it would not be wrong to claim that İdrîs-i Bitlisî examined the Şahkulu rebellion by the shortest way possible, while giving a long discussion to the struggle between the Ottoman princes. The reason for this is that when İdrîs-i Bitlisî wrote the relevant part of *Heşt Behişt*, he had already started to seek to join Shah Ismail. That's why he avoids making a harsh ethnic or religious comment. Bitlisî would clearly define the followers of Şah Kulu as heretics and Kharijites belonging to the Ismaili sect in his *Selîmnâme*, which he wrote only after he re-entered the Ottoman service during the reign of Selim I (Aksoy, 2021, p. 56). However, it is not possible to see a similar 'ideological shyness' in other chronicles and reports written in the same period.

In Ottoman official reports, the Şah Kulu revolt is primarily addressed as a security issue. Since the unpredictable development of events did not allow the sources to make ideological fictions at the same speed, the first issue to be addressed is the disappearance of state authority and the beginning of plunder. In this context, religious and ethnic emphases increase as revolt spread, and finally, they create variations on retrospective presentations of historical details. In this respect, the ethno-political interpretations that are partially included in the Giese and Kreutel chronicles -and in the reports sent to the center during the rebellion- will reach the most advanced form from the pen of Hadîdî, Kemalpaşazâde, Celâlzâde Mustafa and Hoca Sadettin in the future, and will be developed with rich variations in the *Selîmnâme* literature.¹⁰⁵⁹ In an undated report written during the rebellion, it is claimed that Shah Kulu aimed to seize the whole country, and when he won the battle of Kütahya, he skewered three people and cooked them (Uluçay, 1954, p. 62; footnote 11). In another report, it was stated that there are rumors as Shah Ismail would also appear in the summer months and some claims to being the expected *mahdi* (Uluçay, 1954, p. 63; footnote 13). In a letter sent by the *qadi* of Antalya to Prince Korkud, indicated that the Şah Kulu claimed that he is the God and a prophet, and that anyone who does not believe in him would die as an unbeliever, this

¹⁰⁵⁹ For general information about *Selîmnâme* literature, see: Argunşah (2009).

report propagandizes that the struggle is between Sunnis and Ardebil *sûfîs* (Uluçay, 1954, p. 64; footnote 14). In a report sent by Prince Osman to the center, it is stated that Şah Kulu distributed governorships and military chiefdoms and claimed himself to be the *mahdi* (Uluçay, 1954, p. 67). As the revolt grew stronger, more and more interpretations of the ethno-religious background of the Qizilbash movement were found in the reports sent to the center. In the report of Hajdar Pasha, who claims that the Ottoman Prince Şehinşah cooperated with the Qizilbashes, it is claimed that the people who introduced the prince to the Qizilbash are people without belonging any Islamic sects and atheists and corruptors (*mezhebsiz, mülhid* and *müfsid*) (Uluçay, 1954, p. 69). In a letter written by Prince Ahmed to Bayezid II, Şah Kulu is called “servant of devil [tm]” (Uluçay, 1954, p. 72; footnote 25). In a report sent to the center by someone named Ez’af u'l-ibad Hacı Mustafa, Qizilbashes are called “*melahid*” and Şah Kulu is called “*mulhid*” (Uluçay, 1954, p.73; footnote 27). In another report, in which the sign “M.” was put instead of the name, it is stated that the people who participated in the Şahkulu revolt were generally Turks and that people who were harmed due to the malpractices of the governor (*beylerbeyi*) were added to these groups (Uluçay, 1954, p. 73; footnote 26).¹⁰⁶⁰ In the anonymous chronicle published by Giese (1991, p. 132), there is information that Şah Kulu was a secret Qizilbash, that he sent news to the secret Qizilbash groups like his one and rebelled, and that he gathered people around his “own religion [tm]”. The author of the anonymous chronicle of Giese presents a detail indicating the religious beliefs of the Qizilbash groups as follows (1991, p. 132): “haşa sebb-i çâryâr eylediler”.¹⁰⁶¹ This detail is a sign of to the classical Shiite caliphate theory, and its method of popular-political propaganda, which includes the insult to usurper of caliphate within the four caliphs. In the chronicle of Kreutel (1997, p. 48), there is information that Şah Kulu “followed the devil [tm]” and claimed that the Ottoman rule ended, that he was given a sword from the sky and that world domination was heralded to him. The author of the chronicle of Kreutel (1997, p. 48-49) records that Şah Kulu’s power grew with the support of the hermits called *Işk*, and that there were *sipâhîs* among those who joined him. It is possible that the *Işks* mentioned here are *Kalenderî* or *Torlak* dervishes (Ocak, 1992a, pp. 132-33).

¹⁰⁶⁰ For other sources that give detailed information about taking bribes in *timar* grants and the participation of *sipâhîs* in the rebellion, see: Hoca Sadettin Efendi (1979, p. 44) and Ishak b. İbrahim (Keskin, 1998, pp. 40-41).

¹⁰⁶¹ God forbid, they cursed the four caliphs.

The aforementioned report and the letters in the form of reports contain observations and propositions that have not yet been transformed into an official ideology during the Şah Kulu revolt and that have not been included in official historiography. It is seen that these observations were primarily interested in the military side of the problem and considered the uprising as a security issue, and then they developed some interpretations in order to conceive the ethos of the insurgents and reconstruct it ideologically. In anonymous chronicles, on the other hand, the first cores of a propaganda-like discourse on the subject stand out. The last phase of the ethnographic representation of Turkmen groups in the context of Qizilbash order started after the Şahkulu revolt, intensified especially after the Battle of Çaldıran (1514), and reached its final form in the middle of the 16th century. Although the mentioned period is not within the scope of our thesis, it will be important to give a few examples briefly in order to better understand the previous period.¹⁰⁶² The last period mentioned can be considered to have started with Kemalpaşazâde's anti-Qizilbash pamphlet.¹⁰⁶³ In the pamphlet written before the Battle of Çaldıran, he claims that "the killing of Shiites is permissible, their property is halal, their marriage is invalid [tm]", states that the war against Shiites has the status of *jihād*, and he directly criticizes Shah Ismail and his belief system (Parmaksızoğlu, 1977, p. 563). The framework drawn in the aforementioned pamphlet is that the Qizilbash groups are counted as completely out of the religion, and a religious mission is imposed on the Ottoman state as to make them Sunni. While describing the Şahkulu revolt in his book titled *Selimnâme*, Kemalpaşazâde states that a "*Turki*" named Şah Kulu, the leader of the Qizilbashes who harmed religion, gathered around the bandit Turks and that several thousand Turks rebelled (Kökoğlu, 1994, p. 78). Kemalpaşazâde characterizes the masses who joined Şah Kulu from Teke province with the characteristics of "şirret u fesad ve muhalefet ü inad" (Kökoğlu, 1994, p. 78).¹⁰⁶⁴ It is surprising that Kemalpaşazâde repeatedly referred to Turkish ethnicity in the same paragraph while describing the Şah Kulu revolt. Kemalpaşazâde describes Karagöz Pasha's battle with the supporters of Şah Kulu in front of Kütahya as "kurd koyuna girer gibi ol Etrâke girişüb, anı cem'iyetlerini perişân eyledi" and "bir nice yüz Etrak yüzün döndürüp (...) taşra sürdiler" (Kökoğlu, 1994, p.

¹⁰⁶² For a comparative analysis of the 16th century sources dealing with the Şahkulu revolt, see Gümüş (2018, pp. 104-39).

¹⁰⁶³ For the text of the pamphlet, see: Grignaschi (1984, pp. 61-63).

¹⁰⁶⁴ Hussy and wicked and oppositional and stubborn.

78).¹⁰⁶⁵ Kemalpaşazâde generally describes the rebels with the words “Etrak-ı na-pak”, “mufsid”, “Turk-i bi-devlet”, “Etrak-i bi-se'adet” (Kökoğlu, 1994, pp. 80, 81, 84).¹⁰⁶⁶ In *Selimnâme*, written by İshak b. İbrahim, the people of Teke region, who participated in the Şah Kulu rebellion, are referred to as Turks with a dirty body (“vücut-ı na-pak”) and it is claimed that these are animals with human appearance (Keskin, 1998, p. 39). İshak b. İbrahim argues that the ‘sick hearts’ of those who participated in the rebellion do not carry the light of faith (Keskin, 1998, p. 42). İshak b. İbrahim describes those who participated in the uprising as “ağaç ayaklu Kızılbaş Türkleri” (Keskin, 1998, p. 43).¹⁰⁶⁷ Another detail in the mentioned work is that after the rebels plundered Kütahya, they gathered somewhere and ‘consulted’ to determine their demands (Keskin, 1998, p. 44). It is seen that İshak b. İbrahim also emphasized Turkish ethnicity, combined Turkishness and being Qizilbash, and included tribal traditions such as forming a war council. There is an example in *Selimnâme*, written by Celâlzâde Mustafa, where the words Turk and Qizilbash are used in the same sense. Celâlzâde Mustafa (1990, p. 72) states that the rebel, whom he named as *Şeytankuli* (servant of devil), gathered “eshirra-vü-ettrak” around him, that wine was drunk without hiding and looting was done.¹⁰⁶⁸ Celâlzâde (1990, p. 79) states in his work that Ali Pasha defined the military forces of Şah Kulu as ‘dishonorables/disreputables’, ‘a group of dirty stingy’, ‘Turks’, Qizilbashes and ‘corruptors/wicked’. Celâlzâde (1990, p. 80) describes the army of Şah Kulu fleeing from the forces of Ali Pasha with the words ““bir bölük Türk (...) başlarında külah-ı börk””.¹⁰⁶⁹ The references to Turkish ethnicity in these expressions carry a distinct contemptuous meaning. It is seen that Celâlzâde also handled the Şahkulu rebellion in an ethno-political framework and highlighted its ethnic characteristics rather than its religious aspects. A similar interpretation can be seen in the history of Hadîdî. Hadîdî (1991, p. 359) argues that the followers of Şah Kulu are ‘robbers’, ‘heretics’, ‘bandits’ and ‘thieves’ and that they harm the people of Islam. Hadîdî (1991, p. 360) reports that Ali Pasha called the Qizilbashes as “goat thief Turks [tm]”. Finally, let us consider the retrospective context and ethnographic terminology interpreted by the Şahkulu revolt in the work *Tâcü't-Tevârih* written by Hoca Sadettin Efendi. Hoca

¹⁰⁶⁵ Just as the wolf attacked the sheep, they attacked the Turks and devastated their community, and, they turned hundreds of Turks and drove them out.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Dirty Turks, corruptors, Turks without greatness/state, Turks without luck and happiness.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Qizilbash Turks whose feet are made of wood.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Evil-ones and Turks.

¹⁰⁶⁹ A group of Turk with cones and bork on their head.

Sadettin (1979, pp. 42-43) argues that the Turks of Teke region, who participated in the Şahkulu revolt, are 'stubborn', 'despicable in nature', 'ugly-faced', 'dissenting in heart', 'human-looking but animal-like' in terms of creation. Hoca Sadettin (1979, p. 46) generally describes the rebels as "nasty Turks [tm]". Hoca Sadettin (1979, p. 43) states that these people gathered among themselves and chose a person named Şah Kulu as their leader "according to their customs [tm]". Sadettin Efendi (1979, pp. 44-45) claims that the rebel group, which he also calls Qizilbash, is heretical and harms Muslims' property and lives. Hoca Sadettin Efendi (1979, p. 46) describes the rebels by indicating their social position as "walking around the world on foot [tm]", 'scarceless', 'idle', and assert that these people divide the goods they plundered among themselves. It is noteworthy that Hoca Sadettin emphasized the ethnic characteristics of the people who participated in the movement rather than the religious characteristics of the Qizilbash movement. In the narrative constructed by Hoca Sadettin, the fact that the rebels chose their leaders and shared the spoils are the signs that should be emphasized. In general, those who participated in the rebellion are described as a '*ta'ife*' (of *Turk*, Qizilbash, *mulhid*, *mufsid* etc.) in the works that contain the examples above. The concept of '*ta'ife*', unlike the concept of '*tariqa*', is a concept that expresses groups of people gathered around certain practices, not those who follow a certain and respected method/path of *sûfism* (Trimingham, 1971, p. 67). Kalpaklı (2010, p. 14) argues that minorities were referred to as '*milla*' in Ottoman political thought, whereas Muslim groups that did not conform to the Sunni-Islamic identity of the Empire were called '*ta'ife*'. In this respect, it is seen that Ottoman political thought tried to make sense of the rebels by emphasizing their ethnic characteristics rather than referring to the Safavid order, which started to have ecumenical claims. The reason for this is clear: Membership of a specific order is a particular case for the Ottoman political system - and political thought. However, the strength and spreading tendency of the Şahkulu revolt goes beyond the particular framework of being a member of a particular order and has the character of a general political issue, which also concerns class domination. In this case, the basis of the political problem should be sought in the social relations between the rebels and the central authority and in the differences in the form of social organization. In this context, the Safavid order and the rise of Shah Ismail show the characteristics of a particular factor that triggered general social contradictions and caused them to come to the surface.

Ethnographic indicators and ethnological/ethno-political interpretations in Ottoman political thought are especially concentrated in the 16th century. As was discussed above, the Rûm/Byzantine aristocracy, Arabs, Persians, Circassians, Tatars, Kurds, Albanians and Turkmens can be counted as the objects of these interpretations. What is striking about this index is that there are no references to Christian and Muslim villagers or townspeople from different ethnicities -mainly Slavs, Greeks, Armenians, Syriacs - who make up the overwhelming majority of Ottoman subjects.¹⁰⁷⁰ Most of the ethnic groups that the texts deal with either still carry the traces of their tribal past or live as nomadic tribes. With the exception of the Voynuks and Kurds, the communities that maintain their relationship with the tribal form of social organization are associated with negative moral judgments. The reason why these two ethnic groups constitute an exception is that they were articulated with the Ottoman state by assuming a military function. On the other hand, negatively mentioned ethnic groups differ from others both in their tendency to preserve their tribal autonomy and in their resistance to accepting the moral-religious formation directly. In particular, it is possible to place Tatars, Albanians and Turkmens in this group. In this context, it is necessary to make sense of the ethnographic data found in Ottoman political thought by referring to the socio-political contradictions that emerged between the state and the tribes.

The contradiction between the nomads and the state structures that developed centralizing tendencies is a phenomenon that can be observed widely throughout world history. The prevalence of this phenomenon becomes clearer when attention is paid to the struggles between Sumerian city-states and Semitic nomads, the Great Wall of China, which was started to be built against steppe nomads during the Qin dynasty (221-207 BC), Roman garrisons and defense positions placed on the borders of Britain, Gaul and Germania, wars between Iran and Turan which is the subject of Ferdowsi's *Shahnameh*, the history of the conflicts and reconciliations of the Eastern Roman Empire with the nomadic groups, especially in the Balkan borders, the cycles of invasion and assimilation in the history of India from the Vedic period to the Mughal Empire. When considered in general terms, it is striking that the relationship between settled peoples and nomads has three dimensions. The first of these can be listed as the

¹⁰⁷⁰ An interesting exception to this is found in the work *Gazânâme-i Rûm*, written by Kâşîfî at the beginning of the second half of the 15th century. In this work, Kâşîfî points to the groups that Mehmet II defines as "Rum" and "Rus" soldiers in many places as the founding elements of his army (Esmail, 2005, pp. 28, 33). The word 'Rus' in this expression most likely refers to the Slavs.

symbiotic relationship between the two groups based on the exchange of agricultural products and animal products, the second as the conflicts arising from the looting and invasion movements of the nomads, and the third as the defense strategies developed by the central states to control the nomadic groups - and the resistance of the nomads against them. When the history of the Middle East region is examined, it is seen that all three forms gain historical reality. For example, a kind of symbiotic relationship was established between the Sumerian city-states and the Semitic nomads - a similar one can be seen between Osman Beg and the Tekfurs around him - and plundering movements of the nomads were observed, as seen in examples such as the expansion of the Ottoman state in the Balkans or the Timurid invasion, or, different examples of the settlement policy, which was witnessed in its most developed form in the Ottoman history in the 18th century, emerged. In the final analysis, the more advanced the central state form to which the settled communities are attached, the more advanced forms of conflict and integration emerge. The essence of these forms of conflict and integration varies depending on how the problem is defined by the state. The main definition axis of the problem is generally constructed under military, economic and cultural titles. The military definition changes according to the definition of nomadic groups as military allies or threats, and within this framework, central states turn to one of the integration/segregation/termination strategies. The economic definition, on the other hand, develops to a large extent with taxation or sedentarization strategies, against which there is a negative military solution. The cultural definition of the problem envisages the articulation of nomadic groups with the religious/ideological cultural networks controlled by the central state, and again places a negative military solution against them. There are many examples of these tendencies realized in the history of the pre-Ottoman era in Middle East. It will be sufficient to cite two examples from the Umayyads/Abbasids and Seljuks periods, which also constitute the sources of Ottoman political thought. Yaltkaya (2021, p. 27) states that during the Umayyad period, the Bedouin tribes did not abandon their pre-Islamic traditions and that the conflicts between Islamic culture and tribal culture caused some velitations. Considering the effect of the Abu Muslim al-Khorasani rebellion and the Turkish tribes gathered around it, especially in the collapse of the Umayyad state and the coming to power of the Abbasids, it becomes clear how significant the management of this cultural conflict

is.¹⁰⁷¹ Another example can be found in Nizam'ül-Mülk's work named *Siyâsetnâme*. The famous Seljuk Vizier suggests that Turkmen groups have rights in the state, despite their weariness, and that a few thousand of them should be taken into the palace service as *ghulams* and thus be satisfied and placed under the authority of the ruler (Nizam'ül-Mülk, 2018, p. 147). Gündüz (1997, p. 25) is of the opinion that this proposal was formulated in order to accustom the Turkmen groups to the state order, to remove their distrust of the state and to 'civilize' them step by step.

In terms of the Ottoman state, there is a similar situation when it comes to relations with nomads. During the establishment period of the Ottoman state, nomadic tribes contributed to the expansion of the land, especially with their military activities in Rumelia. The main feature of these nomadic groups is that they are small communities, and they are relatively easy to control since they were transferred from the Anatolia to Rumelia and remained spatially between the Christian states and the Ottomans. Similarly, Tatar communities in Anatolia can be easily taken under the authority of the Ottoman army, as they are relatively small communities. In addition, the level of development of the land registration, security, taxation and judicial system of the Ottoman state was still far from leading these groups to a decisive struggle. But this situation has changed since the second half of the 15th century. The systematic development that took place in the borders and organization of the state during the reign of Mehmet II places the balance in question on a new fulcrum. As Wittek (1963, p. 264) states, the capture of Central Anatolian lands during the reign of Mehmet II and the reaching of the Eastern Anatolian plateaus through the Erzincan plateau brought the large Turkmen tribes, which had not yet been divided into small pieces, and which continued their tribal traditions, in contact with the Ottoman state. Moreover, the development of the administrative, ideological and judicial branches of the imperial regime brings the contact with these groups to the ground of more serious political tensions compared to the previous period. It is possible to follow this tension in Ottoman political thought. Wittek (1963, p. 264) states that tribes were seen as sources of unrest and rebellion in the Ottoman chronicles, and they could not find a place in the literature of *siyâsetnâmes*. Wittek's proposition is partly true, partly incomplete. It can be accepted as true that nomadic groups are ignored in terms of the moral propositions of the literature of political thought, but it cannot be said that there is no representation of

¹⁰⁷¹ The fact that the Abu Muslim rebellion turned into a popular epic is another indicator of this relation. For the epic of Abu Muslim, see: Mélikoff (2012).

the problem in the political consciousness of the ruling class, as seen in Nizam'ül-Mülk's *Siyâsetnâme*. In the examples were presented above, the mode of representation of Turkmen groups is a part of political thought in terms of the ethnographic details given about their ethnic and religious lives. As Kalpaklı (2010, p. 13) states, the term 'Turk' is generally used in the meaning of "non-urban, rural, ignorant, common, nomadic [tm]" in Ottoman political thought. Moreover, when this ethnic designation is used together with the term 'Qizilbash', it means 'heretic' or 'heretic rebel' (Melikoff, 1998, p. 7). Karolewski (2008, p. 441) also draws attention to the fact that the term 'Qizilbash' is used in the sense of against law and order and that it means 'heretic and immoral' in polemical writings.

In this framework, the inclusion of Turkmen groups in the ethnic index of the Ottoman state has a dual formation. The first form can be described as a 'vulgar', 'primitive' lifestyle indicative systematics related to nomadism, and the second form can be described as a 'religious heresy' based signification systematic. The first of these characterizations, as it is associated with the tribal structure, refers to the communities that can avoid the influence of the central authority and tend to maintain their organized and autonomous structure, which is also valid in the case of Albanians. The second meaning, on the other hand, first started to be expressed by some *tariqas* and madrasah circles, which can be considered as the representatives of *muteşerri*' Islam, for the wandering dervishes called *İşk*, and then it became the main element of the religio-political discourse aimed at preventing the Qizilbash movement. In the final analysis, it is a question worth considering whether both ethno-political and ethno-religious discourse forms are integrated. Avcı (2014, p. 33) argues that the Qizilbash ideology is a typical nomadic Turkmen ideology and reflects the needs of the "closed rural society [tm]". On the other hand, Karakaya-Stump (2020b, pp. 83-84) states that in general literature on Alevism identifies Qizilbash masses with Turkmen nomads, but concludes that it would be wrong to understand the Qizilbash movement as a historical phenomenon in the center of tribal structures. According to Karakaya-Stump (2020b, p. 84), the Qizilbash movement was a continuation of antinomian wandering dervish groups, *Vefâîs* and similar traditions that came together under the leadership of Safavids rather than tribal structures. Karakaya-Stump's proposition can be considered partially correct, as she tries to correct the concept of Alevism, which official/nationalist historiography has 'Turkify', by placing it in its original historical context. However, this does not justify ignoring the effects of nomadic life and the tribal structure. The

ability of *Babai/Vefâi* and *Halveti* leaders (*babas*), who were active in Anatolia before the Qizilbash movement, to find support in rural areas, and that an unconventional understanding of Islam could become the dominant form in rural areas is closely related to the existence of nomadic tribes. Prince Korkud (2022, p. 401) points to the phenomenon in question when he argues that Turkish tribes despise the jurists and deny their teachings. The main reason for this situation is that, taking into account the possible pre-Islamic foundations of the Qizilbash belief, it can be preserved within the political autonomy of the tribal structures and these belief elements can spread through spatial displacement.¹⁰⁷² Moreover, it is possible to argue that this form of belief is more suitable for the formation of the community and the property structure of tribal structures than Sharia, and for this reason it is protected. In this context, the main direction in the representation of the Qizilbash-Turkmen is determined by the resistance of these groups to state authority against being articulated politically/economically/culturally. In this respect, the representation of Turkmen ethnicity in Ottoman political thought is similar to the social segments which term *ethnics* signified in Western languages. The fact that in the examples given above within the scope of Ottoman political thought, Turkish ethnicity is often given by specifying tribal ties, strengthens this argument.

The way the issue is handled in Qizilbash sources also includes the representation of tribal ties to a large extent. For example, in the work called *Tarih-i Kızılbaşan, Şamlu, Rumlu, Ağaçeri, Bayramlu, Ekremi, Ördeklü, Karaçorlu, Bayındırlı, Mosullu, Pürnek/Purnak, Şeyhavend, Çepni, Bayat, Bozçalı/Bozcalu, Arapgirli, Hınıslı, Tekeli, Türkmən, Alpavutlu, Baharlu, Cakirlü, Karamanlu, Sa'dlu, Hacılı, Baybutlu, Varsak, Evoğlu, Karacadağlı, Ustaclu, Dulkadir, Aşar/Afşar, Kaçar* tribes and Kurdish and Lor divisions are mentioned (Gündüz, 2015, pp. 21-30, 41-55, 63-94). Moreover, in *Ahsenü't-Tevârîh*, written by Hasan Beg Rumlu (2017, p. 363), the tribes that sided with Shah Ismail are listed as *Ustaclu, Şamlu, Tekeli, Dulkadir, Afşar, Kaçar, Varsak*, and

¹⁰⁷² I have not heard any discussion of specifically delving into the pre-Islamic origins of Qizilbash belief and practice. Because such a discussion necessarily necessitates examining the pre-Islamic foundations of Islamic belief and going down to the animist and moral common roots of religious beliefs and practices. Only going down to the pre-Islamic foundations of Qizilbash will bring with it the interpretation of the Islamic discourse placed against it as a sui-generic entity. In this case, since a one-sided discussion would not be beneficial to reveal the essence of the issue and would be out of the scope of the thesis, I found it more appropriate to leave the issue to future studies. For the related discussion, see: Ocak (2002), Melikoff (1997, pp. 11-29; 2010, pp. 31-36).

Karacadağ *sūfîs* are mentioned next to them. Another example, which is of greater significance in terms of the history of political thought, is found in the oldest Qizilbash/Safavid *Buyruk* compilation found in Anatolia. In the *Menâkıb-ı Evliyâ* (*Buyruk*) compilation published by Yıldırım, the story of Adam and Eve's expulsion from paradise is told quite differently from the Judeo-Christian tradition and Islamic sources. According to the narrative in the *Buyruk*, while Adam and Eve were living happily in heaven, Satan tricked Eve and made her eat wheat (Yıldırım, 2020b, p. 369). Thereupon, Eve was expelled from heaven and Adam ate wheat and came to the world with her in order not to be separated from Eve (Yıldırım, 2020b, p. 369). The fact that the forbidden fruit, which is also described as grapes/apples in classical sources, has a new expression as 'wheat' needs to be explained. My suggestion is that 'wheat' represents the image of settled life for nomads and therefore it is included in the text in the form of forbidden fruit. It is possible to come across a similar interpretation of this symbol in the work named *Tasvîrü'l-Kulûb*, which is claimed to have been written by Börklüce Mustafa and a few copies from the 16th century have survived. In this work, Börklüce Mustafa mentions two different versions of the forbidden tree as grape or wheat, but makes his own interpretation by referring to the wheat version (Gümüšoğlu, 2015, pp. 213-14). It is interesting that a similar view took place in both *Tasvîrü'l-Kulûb* and *Buyruk*. In this case, it is necessary to consider that the view in question has a certain historical background. The presentation of the forbidden fruit as grapes suggests that the object that caused the expulsion from heaven -and therefore the religious prohibition- was wine. On the other hand, the interpretation of this story with reference to the wheat element contains a criticism against the deterioration of the nomadic lifestyle and the sedentarization of nomadic groups.

The political meaning of this narrative can be interpreted as the fact that the world view of the tribes, who adopted the resistance to the settled life against the Ottoman order, also found a place in the Qizilbash ideology. It may be helpful to consider another myth for comparison with the *Buyruk*. The foundation myth of Seydişehir, as described in the work called *Makâlât-ı Seyyid Harun*, written in the 16th century, begins with the God commanding Harun, a dervish, to establish a city. In the work, it is seen that the plan of the city was given to Harun with a divine sign (Şahin, 2009). In the order that came to Harun, God orders that the people of the city be "*suleh*" (peaceful), that "the fate of the rebellious will not be good [tm]", and by this narrative a moral basis assigned to settled life style (Kuban, 2021, p. 51). The importance of the Sayyid Harun figure

lies in the fact that his genealogy is connected to the Khorasan region and Imam Musa al-Kazim, that he was politically active among the Turkmen tribes, and that even a branch of his family still exists among the Akçeken tribes, and *Kalenderî/Abdal* dervishes and *Babas* gathered around him (Şahin, 2009). In this context, although Seyyid Harun is a close person with nomads and antinomian dervishes, he represents a different politico-cultural trend from the one presented in the *Buyruk* in terms of representing sedentarization and urbanization. Kuban (2021, p. 51) is of the opinion that the city-building narrative in Sayyid Harun's legend can be interpreted as a counter-attitude against the nomadic Turkmen masses.

İdrîs-i Bitlisî claims that the realization of 'mixing' or 'unification' between nomadic and settled elements is one of the main duties of the rulers (Koçarslan, 2019, p. 174). This relationship envisioned by Bitlisî seems to have historically been organized step by step in favor of the residents. Considering the historical development of the Ottoman state, a significant part of the nomads was exempted from tax in the early period (Halaçoğlu, 1991, p. 13). On the other hand, in the development period, it is seen that nomadic groups are kept under control, and they are forced to settle down and/or pay taxes to the extent that the balance of power turns against them (Halaçoğlu, 1991, pp. 14-15). Political containment, ideological indoctrination, and taxation represent a long-term pattern in the development of exploitative relations—and the emergence of nomadic resistance. Because the contradictions between the central state's search for control and the tribal ethos continue on the same basis. For example, Kemalpaşazâde states in the X. book of *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osmân*, which he wrote at the end of the 16th century, that the Turkmens of Bozok tribe did not accept to be registered and to receive *timar*, and they rebelled because it was too heavy to pay the *çift* and *bağ* taxes (Severcan, 1996, pp. 342-44). Kasaba (2009, pp. 5, 20) determines that the groups resisting the Ottoman state were basically organized as tribes and argues that the state determined it as a political orientation to expand the peasant base and regulate the nomads. In this context, some laws were codified to keep the tribes under regulation and the nomads were recorded (Kasaba, 2009, p. 21). Lindner underlines that there are several structural reasons for the nomad and state conflict. According to the author, the difficulty of restricting the nomads spatially made it difficult to control them, and the practice of self-government in tribal organization resulted in their negating the Ottoman authority (Lindner, 1983, p. 55). Avcı (2014, p. 180) mentions a similar conclusion and states that nomadic and semi-nomadic communities persistently stay away from state

control and tax liability. The main argument of P. Clastres as a result of his anthropological research on primitive societies seems valid within this framework. According to Clastres (2007, p. 198), the political establishment of power relations can introduce economic exploitation relations: The emergence of the state also determines the emergence of classes, and the first alienation takes place in the political field, not economic. In this context, it is seen that the mentioned ethnic communities have moved to the Safavid side in response to both ideological, administrative and economic pressures, which means resisting a new class distinction that imposes the dominance of the Ottoman dynasty and state -apart from the stratification within themselves. On the other hand, it should not be ignored that this resistance may be the basis of an alternative class construction. Efendiev (1997, pp. 31, 39) counts the transition of tribal aristocracies to Safavid discipleship as a feudal class among the main factors in the rise of Shah Ismail. In this respect, the Qizilbash movement, on the one hand, was an ideological and administrative resistance movement against the institutional dominance of the Ottoman state, on the other hand, it became the basis of the pattern of class-structuring of the tribes that led the moral and organizational leadership of this movement. In the final analysis, it should be taken into account that these groups succeeded in overcoming ethnic constraints by articulating anti-Ottoman local/tribal resistances in a new religious spirit.

In this respect, it should be considered natural that the structure of resistance movements containing ethnic references are multidimensional. The aforementioned resistance movements have different views, on one side, religious rebellions (Ahmet Refik, [1932]1994, pp. 24-25), on the other hand, identity-centered resistances (Öz, 1992, p. 150), anti-central-authority movements (Eroğlu, 2016a, p. 134) or class struggles (Öz, 1992, p. 166) etc. For this reason, the Ottoman state also develops administrative, economic and ideological responses to different views. Apart from the administrative and military responses, the main ideological response is the execution of a state-dependent Islamization process. In this context, as discussed in the previous sections, the support of many *süfi* orders during the reign of Bayezid II and the reorganization of the Bektashi order in particular, which was especially appreciated by the Turkmen base, became one of the main strategies.¹⁰⁷³ However, at the center of these

¹⁰⁷³ In this respect, Bektashism has been seen as the ‘legitimate’ Alevism/Qizilbash belief or the ‘antidote’ of Qizilbash movement. Considering the Alevi/Qizilbash population in a common framework with the Bektashi order continues to be influential in contemporary historiography as a part of the said political strategy. The most influential view in this field is that of F. Köprülü,

resistances are the autonomist tribes that assume both moral and military leadership functions. For this reason, although Ottoman political thought emphasized different aspects of the issue, it always made ethnicity a part of its discourse and emphasized it. Ibn Khaldun dealt with the contradiction between tribes and the central state in theoretical and historical plans at a very early date. According to Ibn Khaldun (2021, pp. 334-35), the *asabiyyah* among the tribe members is organized around the unity of lineage or acceptances that have the same meaning. In this respect, the lineage relationship constitutes an ethnic affiliation. Ibn Khaldun (2021, p. 354) also emphasizes the moral and political side of the ethnic affiliation that corresponds to ethos, and states that the tribal ethos will not be willing to pay taxes without losing status (“*mezellel*”), and that even the tribal ethos (*asabiyya*) resists such a situation. Ibn Khaldun reveals the contradictory nature of the issue by stating that the foundation of the state is the tribal ethos and that the tribal affiliations pose a threat to the state during the institutionalization phase of the state. In this context, Ibn Khaldun (2021, pp. 378, 400) states that relying on a common religious belief will strengthen states that dominate large areas, and argues that the institutionalization of states is largely due to the dissolution of tribal relations. Ibn Khaldun’s suggestions are also valid in terms of ethnic discourse in Ottoman political thought. Although the Ottoman dynasty circulated genealogical lists emphasizing its own ethnic origin, especially with the rise of the Aq Qoyunlu state, it mainly saw tribal structures as a threat to its own authority. For this reason, the central state tried to bring non-tribal people to military and administrative duties, and tried to substitute a controlled religious identity instead of tribal identity by following the policy of Islamization. In this framework, ethnic ties were equated with

who makes a constitutive distinction between popular/rural Islam and elite/urban Islam. In addition, similar conclusions are reached in the studies conducted by Baha Sait Bey (2000) in 1920’s. Following Köprülü, Bardakçı (1950), Ulusoy (1986, pp. 109, 255) Birge (1991, p. 238) and Özkırımlı (1996, pp. 180-181) advocate the similarity of the two beliefs/practices and Melikoff (1993, pp. 29-31; 2011a, p. 54) evaluates Alevi and Bektashi belief/practice under the concept of “Turkish folk Islam” and maintains the Köprülü paradigm. On the other hand, Bektashi Sheikh Ulusoy (1986, p. 110) is aware of Bayezid II’s patronage and reorganization of the Bektashi order, and while emphasizing the originary commonality between both religious communities, he implicitly acknowledges the political factors in the formation of Bektashism. Köprülü’s approach, which puts forward the Alevi-Bektashi partnership (Melikoff, 1993, p. 33), firstly suffered greatly with the criticism of the nationalist thesis underlying this approach. Berktaş’s (1983b) general criticism was followed by the detailed studies of Dressler (2013) and Yıldırım (2019b), and the paradigm has changed drastically.

religious heresy and sub-human status to the extent that they did not assume a useful function on behalf of the state.

VIII.III.II. Ethno-Potestatic Signs

One of the basic signifier series used in the rhetorical construction of Ottoman class domination is included in the signs constructed about the past of the dynasty and the meaning of this fictive past. In previous sections, it was mentioned in detail how the dynastic history is constructed genetically. In this subsection, it will be briefly discussed how the ethnic origin of the dynasty was made sense by placing it in a potestatic frame of reference, although it partially includes genetic references. The word '*potestas*' means to dominate objects and/or people, to have the power to decide/manage/act (Glare, 1968, p. 1417; Niermeyer, 1976, p. 819). The word '*potestatis*', as it has acquired a literal meaning in the history of political thought, can be translated into late medieval Ottoman political terminology as having determining power/power/property/state. As a signification systematic, ethno-potestatic signs construct an alternative continuity discourse instead of justifying the authority of a certain power group by constructing its ethno-genealogical origins. The basis of this form of discourse is the definition of a certain authority as a continuation of the institutional structures that preceded it. In this form of definition, the ethno-political authority of a particular dynasty is associated with other historical examples that are not directly related to their own dynasties, thus legitimizing their authority. In this respect, it is possible to understand the function of ethno-potestatic signs in the context of *translatio imperii*.

When the Ottoman political thought, which was written on the verge of the 16th century, is considered, it is striking that the ethno-potestatic signs were constructed especially in the Ottoman-Seljuk and Ottoman-Byzantine axes. The significance of the first of these two axes lies in the fact that it appeals to the traditional loyalties of Karaman (*bilad-ı Rûm*) and the people around it, which was directly under the rule of the Ottoman state from the end of the 15th century to the beginning of the 16th century. The people of the region, who traditionally accept the authority of the Anatolian Seljuks and the Karamanids who replaced them, resist against the Ottoman state administration whenever they find the opportunity and unite around the members of the Karamanid dynasty. For this reason, Ottoman political discourse developed a political formulation claiming that their authority was inherited from the Seljuk state in order to take over the

authority of the Karamanid dynasty. In the second axis, the Ottoman state, which captured the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire and subordinated Orthodox Greek people, seeks to establish a relationship of continuity between them and the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire in order to consolidate their power over the people in question. Although the notion of being the continuation of Islamic empires can be added as a third to these two axes, it is not possible to come across such a discourse before the middle of the 16th century. The common point of the first two axes mentioned is that they are geographically related to the *diyar-ı Rûm* and combines the Seljuk heritage with the claim of authority over the Turkmen and *Rûm* people.

First, let's consider how the bond between the Ottoman Empire and the Seljuk State was established through ethno-potestatic signs. In the narrative we named the 'dream myth' in the previous sections, examples of Osman I having his dream interpreted in the Seljuk capital and that the Seljuk viziers appointed Osman Beg as the ruler were mentioned. These examples are often included in anonymous chronicles and as it turns out, they were designed to persuade not only urban dwellers but also Turkmen groups. In the chronicles written in the first quarter of the 16th century, the Ottoman-Seljuk bond is emphasized more clearly and is constructed in a way that gains new connotations. The first of these fictions was written by Hacı Halil Konevî. Konevî states that the Ottoman histories written before him established a connection between the emergence of the Ottoman dynasty and the Seljuk state, and asserts that he wrote the history of this connection himself, since the information about this bond did not satisfy him (Salduz, 2019, p. 32). Konevî argues that the historical connection he established between the Seljuk State and the establishment of the Ottoman State was accepted by all his contemporaries (Salduz, 2019, p. 32). According to the narrative constructed by Konevî, the last ruler to ascend to the Seljuk throne was Keyhüsrev and ruled until 1275, but the Seljuk dynasty was interrupted after Keyhüsrev (Salduz, 2019, p. 33). Stating that no dynasty member claiming to sit on the Seljuk throne emerged in this period, Konevî argues that the Ottoman sultanate emerged with the "bestowal" of Keyhüsrev (Salduz, 2019, pp. 33-34). According to this proposition, Keyhüsrev honored Osman Beg by sending "*tuğ*", "*nekkare*", "*buk*", and in this way, Osman took over the reign (Salduz, 2019, p. 34).¹⁰⁷⁴ Konevî does not say that the Seljuk ruler Keyhüsrev directly appointed Osman Beg as the legitimate heir to the Seljuk throne, but implies that a clear transfer of power (*translatio imperii*) took place through the sending of the sultanate

¹⁰⁷⁴ Brigadier, tympani and horn.

insignia. A similar narrative is repeated by İdrîs-i Bitlisî. According to İdrîs-i Bitlisî, when Ertugrul Beg came to Anatolia, the ruler of “*bilad-ı Rûm*” was Alâeddin Keykubat and Ertugrul Beg entered the service of Keykubat (Genç, 2007, pp. 95, 97). Ertugrul Beg, who served Alâeddin Keykubat on the battlefields, was appointed by the ruler as the “*ahunci*” (raider) commander and his sons were given pastures, winter quarters, *iqtas* and provinces (Genç, 2007, p. 101). İdrîs-i Bitlisî states that Ertugrul Beg’s son Osman Beg also served Sultan Alâeddin Keykubat, obeyed him like his son, and the sultan assigned him to important tasks - thus Osman Beg’s rank increased (Genç, 2007, p. 109). According to Bitlisî, in this period, turmoil arose in the Seljuk state due to the Mongol invasion and the monarchy began to pass to Osman Beg due to divine reasons (Genç, 2007, pp. 110-11). According to Bitlisî, Osman Beg was appointed as the commander of *mujahideen* by Sultan Alâeddin in this period, a *sancak/gerdanlık/kös/nefir* was sent to him, and these signs indicated that the reign would pass to Osman Beg (Genç, 2007, p. 125).¹⁰⁷⁵ After the Mongols invaded Anatolia, the Seljuk commanders dispersed, but most of the warriors gathered around Osman Beg and accepted him as the leader (Genç, 2007, p. 126). At this point, İdrîs-i Bitlisî gives its definite character to the passing of the Seljuk throne to Osman Beg, with an act of allegiance. Bitlisî, who claims that a group of people from the Turkish tribes belonging to the Oghuz tribe and the *Kayı* tribe chose Osman Beg as a candidate for the Seljuk throne and gave him allegiance, grounds the transition of power to the Ottomans in this way (Genç, 2007, p. 156). An alternative narrative about the continuity between the Seljuk-Ottoman states is in the *Saltuknâme*. According to this narrative, which may have been fictionalized by Ebü’l-Hayr Rûmî (1988, p. 109), Osman Beg was first portrayed as a respected warrior who sent gifts and shares of the booty to the Seljuk ruler. He also gives place to the information that the Seljuk ruler gave Ertugrul Beg and his men to *Sürmeli-çukuru* as winter quarters and summer pastures (Ebü’l-Hayr Rûmî, 1988, p. 108). Upon Osman Beg’s success in the wars, Sarı Saltuk gave Osman Beg a *şefaatnâme* and sent him to the Sultan Alâeddin and demanded that the Hercenevan region be given to Osman as a *timar* (Ebü’l-Hayr Rûmî, 1990, p. 225). Sultan Alâeddin, on the other hand, states that he cannot leave this Hercenevan region to anyone because he does not have a son, and the lords next to him unanimously commemorate Ertugrul Beg and state that he is suitable to appropriate this place (Ebü’l-Hayr Rûmî, 1990, p. 238). The wording in the text suggests that this area was a dynastic estate, and it was proposed to

¹⁰⁷⁵ Banner, neckband, wardrum, horn.

be handed over in the form of private property. As a result of the developing events, Osman Beg's success in the wars, the Seljuk ruler Osman gifted with his own sword and married him to his own daughter (Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî, 1990, p. 274). An important point in the narrative of Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî (1990, p. 238) is that Osman Beg's generation is from Dede Korkut, that he is a member of the Oghuzes, that he comes from the origin of Ays, son of Isaac, and for these reasons, the Sultan of Seljuk is symbolically represented handing over power to the Ottoman dynasty. Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî (1990, pp. 274, 277) also points out that the marriage of Osman Beg to the daughter of the Seljuk ruler was envied by the Karaman Beg, he even claiming that in the Seljuk palace, the Karamanids were the gatekeepers and the Ottomans were the falcons-feeders, he constructs an alternative past of the two powers that were constantly at war with each other. In the final analysis, this narrative gains meaning in terms of grounding the contradiction between the two states that claimed the throne of the Seljuks and showing the status relationship between them. Accordingly, the Seljuk ruler Alâeddin chose the Ottoman dynasty as its successor instead of the Karamanid dynasty, but this situation was not accepted by the Karamanids, who had a higher status in the Seljuk state.

The common point of the narratives written by both Konevî, Bitlisî and Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî is that Osman Beg gained rank by the Seljuk rulers, and this rank stems partly from his ethnic connections with the Turkish tribes and partly from his *ghaza* ethos. All three authors have placed the Ottoman dynasty in filling the authority vacuum created with the collapse of the Seljuk state, and thus the Seljuk authority was transferred to the Ottomans -without any conflict- in the sub-text of their fictions. All three authors refer to Osman Beg's moral character, his devotion to the Sultan and his war achievements. In the final analysis, each narrative brings to the fore the feudal loyalty and warrior ethos and builds a legitimate ground for Osman Beg's becoming a ruler, establishes a connection between the end of the Seljuk dynasty in terms of lineage and the rise of Osman Beg, and draws these two lines from transfer of the Seljuk potestas to the Ottoman Empire to justify it. It is possible to conclude that the narrative about these reasons has an ethno-potestatic form. Beldiceanu (2019, p. 34) argues that the fictions depicting the Ottoman dynasty as the legal heirs of the Seljuk lineage emerged in political thought as a result of the dissolution of consanguineous relations, and that its main purpose was *translatio imperii*.

In another example, the lineage of the Ottoman dynasty is based on the Quraysh tribe, and in this way the ethnic affiliation is transformed into the ruling authority. In a

work written by Ahmed b. al-Huseyin al-'Uleyyif from Mecca and presented to Bayezid II, it is seen that the origins of the Ottoman dynasty are based on the Arabs of Medina and their genealogy is associated with Osman ibn Affan (Karadeniz, 2008, p. 157). The meaning of this claim is that the Ottoman dynasty was originally from the Quraysh tribe and thus obtained the right of caliphate. Thus, genetic signifiers can be easily translated into the language of ethno-potestatic signs. There are two clear examples of the translation in question. According to the first example in the history of Oruç Beg, Osman ibn Affan's sword, which was held by the Sultan Alâeddin, was sent to Osman Beg by the sultan and the sultan declared him an independent ruler with this gift (Atsız, 2011, p. 27). The second example is in Hadîdî (1991, p. 39), according to this record, Osman ibn Affan's sword was sent to Osman Beg by the Sultan of Egypt. In the first example, the circulation of the right to reign is established within the Seljuk-Ottoman relation, while in the second example, the figure of the Seljuk ruler is removed and the power is taken directly from the Mamluk Sultan, who is the protector of the holy cities.

The third ethno-potestatic signification form, which found a place in Ottoman political thought, is built around the issue of continuity between the Ottoman state and the Eastern Roman Empire. The Bithynia region, where the Ottoman state was founded, and both regions of Rumelia and Central Anatolia, where it showed a tendency to expand, were referred to as the 'Rûm' country in Arab and Iranian sources were especially in the 7th-8th centuries. The term 'Rûm' refers to both a geographical indication and a cultural-political nomenclature. The basis of this naming is that the eastern border of the Roman Empire is located on the mentioned region, and moreover, the Roman identity continued to influence the region until the Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantine Empire) collapsed. As Page (2008, pp. 46-48) depicted in detail, the Rûm/Roman identity (*Rhomaïos/Rhomaïkos*) developed as an ethnic, religious and political identity and was able to reproduce itself as long as the Byzantine Empire lasted. Moreover, this identity interacted with new groups of people who came to the region as a result of Turkish/Muslim migrations and influxes and created some common forms. As Bavilet (1994, pp. 100-5) stated, Islamic cultural elements could find their place in Trabzon, where the Komnenos dynasty ruled, and in Alaşehir (Philadelphia), which was surrounded by the Ottomans, intermediate cultural combinations were born that led to

its being called the ‘Greek Emirate’. Moreover, these interactions seem to have produced syncretic forms in religious and architectural terms.¹⁰⁷⁶

The construction of the concept of ‘*diyar-ı Rûm*’ from an outside perspective has also established certain partnerships with the self-view and identities of the inhabitants of the region of Rûm. The presence of the Surah of ar-Rum in the Qur’an and the fact that this title refers to the Eastern Roman Empire has been effective in the spread of this nomenclature. It is seen that the nomenclature Rûm is frequently used in hadith sources that emerged in the early periods of Islam and were transferred from oral culture to written culture in the middle of the 9th century (Avcı, 2008). As Kafadar points out, the word ‘Rûm’/ ‘Rûmî’ was established in Arabic, Persian and possibly Kurdish languages as early as the 10th century. Kafadar (2017a, pp. 43-45) gives as an example to one of these early uses as poems written by Ebu Firas al-Hamdanî and known as *Rûmiyyât*, and the “Bilad-el Rûm” section in the Al-Istahrî’s famous geography book *Kitâbü'l-Mesâlik ve'l-memâlik*. Along with the Seljuk rule in Anatolia, the Rûmî identity began to be adopted by Muslim writers. For example, although the *sûfi* and poet Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî who born in the city of Behl in Afghanistan, he was called ‘Rûmî’, and the same nomenclature was used for other people seen in the example of Eşrefoğlu Rûmî. Until the 14th and 15th centuries, it is seen that the word Rûm became richer by gaining various positive and negative meanings. Timurid historian Nizâmeddîn Şâmî, who wrote his work after the Battle of Ankara (1402), which took place between Tamerlane and Bayezid I, and as a result of which the Ottoman state entered the interregnum period, recorded the outcome of the war in his history with the statement that the Rûm were defeated (Kafadar, 2017a, p. 59). In this recording, the ‘Rûm’ region is implicitly conceived as the political antagonist of the Iranian throne. On the other hand, Ibn Khaldun (2019, pp. 244-45) states that *bilad-ı Rûm* started from the north of the Damascus region and there were Turkmens ruled by the Ottoman dynasty.¹⁰⁷⁷ It is clear that the Rûmî identity -at least as a geographical

¹⁰⁷⁶ For religious affiliations, see: Bavilet (1994, pp. 119-22; 1999, p. 24-29). For architectural affinities, see: Gibbons (2017, p. 229) and Blessing (2016, pp. 206-207), and for a contrary view, Eyice (1963, pp. 101-103) and Ayverdi (1972, p. 539). In addition, Kuban (2021, pp. 164, 216-17) argues that Ottoman architecture is not directly reducible to Byzantine architecture, while drawing attention to the intersections between Ottoman architecture and Byzantine architecture and building art throughout his voluminous study.

¹⁰⁷⁷ This expression is very close to the definition of Ibn Battuta. Ibn Battuta defines the same region as “*berr et-Turkiyye al-ma'ruf bi-bilad er-Rum*” (Kafadar, 2017a, p. 70). References to Ibn Battuta in the *Muqaddimah* show that Ibn Khaldun was aware of this work.

indication- was embraced during the Ottoman rule as well. To give an example, in the history of Âşıkpaşazâde, there are four groups of people who ‘come to the Rûm’. These are listed as “*gaziyan-ı rum*”, “*ahıyan-ı rum*”, “*abdalan-ı rum*” and “*bacıyan-ı rum*” (Kala, 2013, p. 319).¹⁰⁷⁸ It is quite interesting that these four groups are made up of warriors, craftsmen, dervishes and women. The first three groups (i) captured the Rûm lands militarily, (ii) ensured the settlement of cities/crafts and commercial relations, (iii) gave the region its dominant religious character - that is, literally settled the Rûm and ensured the existence of a community there- three social segments. The expression ‘sisters of Rûm’ have been the subject of long-term speculation and probably indicates a warrior group of women or a cult circle.¹⁰⁷⁹ Identity elements constructed about the people living in *Diyar-ı Rûm* are also presented under a moral form. For example, when Sheikh Bedreddin went into a trance state alongside his sheikh Hüseyin Ahlatî, this situation was explained with the Rûmî nature (*tab-ı Rûm*) in Bedreddin (Kafadar, 2017a, pp. 50-51). The idea that the water element is determinant in nature of Rûm and that it affects human temperament and morality is based on a certain interpretation of geography and Aristotelian theory of four elements. Kafadar (2017a, p. 51) states in an anecdote set in the 15th century that Molla Camî defended the superiority of the nature of Rûm in a meeting in Herat and praised the “*tiynet-i Rumiyan*”. İdrîs-i Bitlisî reiterates a similar view in his work named *Heşt Behişt* and attributes the peculiar temperament of the people living in the Rûm region to the excess water element in the bodies of the people living there due to the excess water in the Rûm region (Genç, 2014, p. 538).

To draw a general framework after this information, the Rûm identity is both a signifier adopted as a geographical indication by the Turkish and Muslim groups that settled in Anatolia, and a complex identity adopted by the subjects and ruling class of the Eastern Roman Empire. The geographical nature of the Rûm sign can be observed more clearly in the adventures of Sarı Saltuk, which is largely set in the imaginary scene of the 12th and 13th centuries and was written down at the end of the 15th century. In the work named *Saltuknâme*, Sarı Saltuk is sometimes referred to as the ‘*Sarı Saltuk-ı Rûmî*’ and is fighting against the ‘infidels’ in a wide geography extending to Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Rumelia, India, China, Caucasia and the Carpathians. The point to be noted in this narrative is that the land of Rûm is in the center of the world image in

¹⁰⁷⁸ Ghazis, ahis, hermits/dervishes and sisters.

¹⁰⁷⁹ For different interpretations, see: Köprülü (1991).

Saltuknâme. This image -as a mirror image of Nizâmeddin Şâmî's vision- gives information about the antagonistic neighbors of the region of Rûm. In any case, the pre-Ottoman and after-Ottoman Rûmî identity shows some continuities and these continuities do not develop independently of political organization - and therefore political thoughts. In the pre-Ottoman period, three main elements can be mentioned that were effective in the formation of the Rûmî identity. These items are (i) Orthodox church, (ii) Eastern Roman state and emperor cult, (iii) Greco-Roman ethnicity. These elements will be effective in the emergence of the Ottoman syncretic Rûmî identity by gaining new forms and contents.¹⁰⁸⁰

The 16th century poet İshak b. İbrahim describes *bilad-ı Rûm* as such phrase “bunca zamândan kadîmî âşiyân-ı devletdir” (Keskin, 1998, p. 50).¹⁰⁸¹ This characterization is extraordinarily decisive for understanding the layout of potestatic images. What kind of symbolic order the word ‘state’ belongs to, as used in this expression, should be examined carefully. In the expression of İshak b. İbrahim, the state is an entity that has settled in a bird nest (*âşiyân*) and has a historical continuity since ancient times. In this framework, ‘state’ and evokes the Latin term *estado/état* in Western languages. However, it would not be correct to limit this meaning to ‘settlement’ or ‘urbanization’. The connotations such as fortune/greatness/circle, which are mostly attributed to the word *dawla* in the Arabic and Iranian tradition, are also included in the expression of İshak b. İbrahim.¹⁰⁸² In this respect, the word ‘state’ combines structural continuity and, to be considered, the characteristics of being handled over from person to person or from dynasty to dynasty. In this form, the word ‘state’ actually acquires a similar meaning to the imperial regime -which gains administrative, financial, ideological, legal complexity and continuity. Continuity and handover (inheritance/transition) are the two most basic pillars in the construction of the ethno-potestatic imagination. The political vision, which is expressed in terms of ‘*bilad-ı Rûm*’, ‘people of Rûm’, ‘ruler of Rûm’ in Ottoman political thought, largely constructs a continuity narrative designed to take over the historical status and authority of the Eastern Roman Empire. If the geographical and political continuity concept in the expression as was quoted from İshak b. İbrahim is placed on the ground of this

¹⁰⁸⁰ For the connection between the imperial cult and Greek ethnicity, see Price (2004, pp. 158-60).

¹⁰⁸¹ It has long been the ancient birdnest of the state.

¹⁰⁸² In addition, the combination of this word with the image of the bird's nest refers to another legendary context in which the *Huma* bird takes part in the appointment of ruler.

narrative, the walls of the narrative building are (i) ethnogenetic fictions and (ii) politico-geographical antagonisms, and the roof (iii) the transcendent image of the emperor.

Let us first consider the ethnogenetic underpinnings of the ethno-potestatic discourse. In the Ottoman political discourse, the ethnogenetic fiction about the common origin of the peoples living in the land of Rûm is encountered in the histories of Neşrî and İdrîs-i Bitlisî. Neşrî (1949, p. 55) in his book *Kitâb-ı Cihannümâ*, while writing the genealogy of the Ottoman dynasty, claims that this lineage came from Yafes, the son of Prophet Noah. While Neşrî (1949, p. 57) specifically states that *Iyş* is included in some Ottoman genealogies, he states that this is incorrect because *Iyş* is descended from Sam the son of Noah. In the history of Behiştî, unlike Neşrî, the Ottoman lineage is connected to *Iyş*, the son of prophet Isaac (Kaytaz, 2011, p. 1). This information, which is also included in the spiritual history, points to a composite ethnopotestic discourse. According to the information in the history of Rûhî, Jakop from the lineage of Isaac is called the ancestor of all prophets and *Iys* is called the ancestor of the all rulers (Yücel & Cengiz, 1992, pp. 373-75). Thus, the social groups with class priorities or authority in the world are united in a single genealogy. It is possible to see this discourse in the work called *Halilnâme*, which was written at the beginning of the 15th century. The work written by Abdülvasî Çelebi includes the history of the prophets in a short verse and derives the Arab, Roman and Persian rulers from the same prophetic lineages (Güldaş, 1996, pp. 397-98). The most striking point of this genealogy is that the eastern Roman/Rûm rulers are also considered to be from the *Ays* lineage and the Ottoman rulers who came after them are also from the same lineage (Güldaş, 1996, pp. 398-99). Ultimately, the complementary nature of ethnogenetic and ethnopotestatic constructs can be seen more clearly in this example.

Within this general framework, Neşrî (1949, p. 57) puts forward his main argument as to why the Sam lineage should be removed from the Ottoman genealogy: Ottoman dynasty are descendants of Yafes because Oghuz Khan is Yafes himself, the common ancestor of Turks and Rûms. İdrîs-i Bitlisî also gives place to a similar foundation. Bitlisî narrates two rumors about the genealogy of the Ottoman dynasty. The first of these is that the Ottomans are the sons of *Iyş* b. Ishak and his descendant, Oghuz Han, and that the ‘Turkistan Khans’, the rulers of Eastern countries, Arab, Iranian and Rûm rulers are also descended from this lineage (Genç, 2007, pp. 79-80). The second rumor is that *Iyş* is *Kayı Khan*, and he is a descendant of Yafes, son of Noah

(Yücel & Cengiz, 1992, pp. 373-75; Genç, 2007, p. 92). İdrîs-i Bitlisî argues that this second rumor is very common and that asserts “the inhabitants of all towns from Turkistan to Greeks [tm]” come from the Yafes generation (Genç, 2007, p. 93). Both histories of Neşrî and İdrîs-i Bitlisî include the information that the Ottomans and Rûms came from the same lineage in the ethnogenetic fictions they narrated, and they base this information on genealogical fictions of religious nature. The fact that these genealogies are of Old Testament origin in the final analysis and the partial exclusion of the genealogy based on *Iyş*, son of Isaac - that is, the exclusion of the Israelites’ genealogy - strengthens the Christian aspect of these fictions and connects it with the *Oghuznames*. The two ethnogenetic discourses we have discussed in this context unite the two main groups of the Ottoman dynasty and its subjects (Turks and Rûms) in the same genealogy, thus linking the Ottoman dynasty with traditional authority constructs.

Second, let us consider examples in which Ottoman ethno-potestatic discourse was grounded within the framework of politico-geographical antagonisms and cultural traditions. It is possible to come across examples of both narrative forms in İdrîs-i Bitlisî’s history named *Heşt Behişt*. Firstly, Bitlisî integrates a politico-geographical struggle with a discourse about the priority of the Ottoman dynasty by narrating an event that caused the revelation of the Surah ar-Rum of the Qur’an. The event in the Surah ar-Rum of the Qur’an (30:2-6) is the defeat of the Byzantine armies in a war between the Sasanian and Byzantine states (Komisyon, 2011, p. 445, Footnote 2).¹⁰⁸³ In the verses mentioned on this event, it is prophesied that the Rûms were defeated but that they will soon be victorious, and it is stated that this is an unchanging promise of the God. Extending this verse in a politico-geographical context, İdrîs-i Bitlisî suggests that there has been a struggle between Persian *kisras* and Rûm *kaisers* since ancient times (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 258; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 220). İdrîs-i Bitlisî, who continues to generalize this example by abstracting, argues that the victory of the Byzantine army against the Sassanids a few years later is similar to the victory of Mehmet II against Uzun Hasan (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 260; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 221). Bitlisî establishes this similarity on a few points. These points are: (i) Mehmet II is the Sultan of Rûm and Uzun Hasan holds the throne of Iran, (ii) the battle took place in Erzurum, which is the

¹⁰⁸³ Qur’an (30, 2-6) (Ali, 2000, 336): “The Roman Empire has been defeated in a land close by; but they, (even) after (this) defeat of theirs, will soon be victorious within a few years. With Allah is the Decision, in the Past and in the Future: on that Day shall the Believers rejoice with the help of Allah. He helps whom He wills, and HE is exalted in Might, Most Merciful. (It is) the promise of Allah. Never does Allah depart from His promise: but most men understand not.”

border of the land of Rûm, (iii) the Battle of Otlukbeli can be associated with the Surah ar-Rum by *abjad* calculation. While explaining the reason for the revelation of the Surah ar-Rum, İdrîs-i Bitlisî claimed that the companions felt close to the Rûm forces because they were people of the book (*ehl-i kitap*) and were saddened by their defeat, and that the verse was revealed as a consolation (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 261; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 222-23). In this context, Bitlisî likens Bayezid I's defeat in the Battle of Ankara to the defeat indicated in the Surah ar-Rum and Mehmet II's victory in the Battle of Otlukbeli to the promised victory –even going beyond the analogy and claiming that this is pointed out (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 262; İdrîs-i Bitlisî, 2012, p. 223). The emphasis in question – given that Nizâmeddin Şâmî also refers to the same verse– gives a clear example of how the interpretative activity carried out on the same ideological element also turns into a political struggle. The discourse that Bitlisî constructed is quite remarkable in terms of trying to unite Rûmî Christians and Muslims around the Iranian- Rûm conflict. Since this discourse is built on the Surah er-Rum, it was originally written to be effective on Muslim subjects, but due to the continuity relationship it established between the Byzantine state and the Ottoman state, it also constructs an ideology for Christian Rûms in the subtext. It is clear that the emergence of this ideology was caused by the Ottoman-Iranian struggle, which became sharper with the Safavid dynasty's seizure of the Iranian throne in the 16th century. In the context of this struggle, Bitlisî is trying to unite the Rûm people around the Ottoman authority as an alternative to the Turkmen groups articulated to the authority of the Safavids. In this respect, Bitlisî's discourse shows ethno-potestatic features in terms of combining the Christian Rûmî ethos with the Islamic revelation. A more developed version of this discourse can be found in the terminology such as 'kaisers of Islam' - examples of this type will be discussed below.

The second issue to be addressed in this subsection is the construction of ethno-potestatic signs in Ottoman political thought with reference to the emperor/kaiser symbol. In the previous section, how Ottoman political thought was theomorphically constructed was examined in detail. In this subsection, the way in which the image in question is associated with the Roman emperors will be examined. Firstly, being a Rûmî ruler of 'Rûm' in the list of titles of Ottoman rulers is accepted as a sign of status and is widely used. This nomenclature, which was used in edicts, charters, diplomatic correspondence and inscriptions, expanded in meaning in the 16th century and became an expression of a particular idea of historical continuity. For example, İdrîs-i Bitlisî draws the framework of the Ottoman state with the concept of "*bilad-ı Rûm*" and

describes the dynasty as ‘rulers of Rûm’ (Genç, 2014, pp. 917, 944). Similarly, in the *Saltuknâme*, the Rum region is described as the most valuable and ostentatious place in the world, and it is stated that no one will want to abandon this valuable region (“*kimse devlet hâtemin terk eylemez*”) (Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî, 1990, p. 89). However, this conceptual framework should not be understood as a mere geographical signifier. The reason why this signifier gains a sign value is that the political authority inherited from the Eastern Roman Empire is an implicit signifier. If we go back a little, it can be seen more clearly that İdrîs-i Bitlisî has constructed a political discourse about the takeover of political authority, starting from the seventh book of *Heşt Behişt*. According to Bitlisî, Constantinople has always been the capital of the Caesars, and for this reason, it has become the center of the caliphate in the period of the Muslims (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 75). This transition took place with the capture of Constantinople by Mehmet II, and with the elimination of the Emperor, who was the “last of the Caesars descendants from Greeks [tm]”, the throne was transferred to the “Caesar of Islam [tm]” (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 75). İdrîs-i Bitlisî uses this eclectic concept in other contexts as well. For example, in a passage in which he deals with the borders of the empire, he defines the Ottoman state as “the reign of the dynasty of Caesars of Islam” (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 85). The definition in question includes not only the use of the word ‘kaiser’/’caesar’/’*kayser*’ as a political term in the sense of ruler, but also a certain political discourse preference. It is possible to observe the related form of discourse, which aimed to transfer the political authority that the Eastern Roman Empire had historically to the Ottoman Empire, in the efforts to systematically combine the institution of the rule of kaisers and Turkic and Islamic political terminology. To give a few examples, İdrîs-i Bitlisî claims that Bayezid II is the “eighth kaiser in property of religious [tm]”, names the ruler as “ghazi kaiser [tm]” and states that he “has a type of morality specific to a kaiser [tm]” (Genç, 2014, pp. 485-86, 584, 586). The peculiarity of these forms of nomenclature and characterization is that they combine Islamic praise and titles with the term ‘kaiser’. Thus, the term ‘kaiser’ is given a religious and moral framework, and moreover, it is combined with the ethos of *ghaza*. In addition to these, İdrîs-i Bitlisî combines the term ‘kaiser’ with the Turkic rulership title ‘*hakan*’. According to Bitlisî, Selim I, who ascended the throne, such a ruler is the “khan on the throne of Caesars [tm]” (Genç, 2014, p. 913). In this expression, it is seen that the ‘throne of Caesars’ is considered as a more general and higher status authority, and the khanate as a more specific category under it. In this respect, it becomes more probable that the term ‘kaiser’ refers to an institutional authority with

historical continuity, which is more general than the meaning of the ruler holding the administrative power. Finally, İdrîs-i Bitlisî resorted to a political discourse that also establishes a connection between the authority of the kaiser and the genealogical structure of the Ottoman dynasty. According to this form of discourse, the Ottoman dynasty is defined as the “group of Islamic kaisers [tm]” and it is claimed that they sit in the “kaiser’s office [tm]” without accepting any ‘foreign’ element within themselves (Genç, 2014, pp. 489-90). This is a very interesting example of praise. As mentioned before, the Ottoman dynasty -similar to many other principality rulers of its time- intermarried with other ruling class members, and some of these marriages were with members of the Byzantine ruling class. While Bitlisî could actually claim that the Ottoman dynasty was the heir of the Byzantine lands in particular and the Roman Empire in general through these marriages, he refrained from doing so, on the contrary, claimed generic purity. Bitlisî’s argument can be understood more easily, considering that the writers of the period included information about marriages with the Christian ruling class, especially since the reign of Bayezid I, and that these marriages were criticizing that they corrupted the Islamic beliefs and practices of the Ottoman dynasty. While the arguments of Bitlisî includes the idea of a certain continuity between the Ottoman and Eastern Roman Empires throughout his work, he also excludes the idea of evaluating this continuity on a specific ethnic basis. While the author generally favors the argument that the Rûm and Turkestan peoples are based on the Yafes lineage, it is reasonable that he avoided fictionalizing the association of the Ottoman dynasty with a Christian origin, thinking that it might create a problem of legitimacy. As a result, it can be argued that while the ethno-potestatic discourse in Ottoman political thought identifies with the geographical identity of the Rûm region and associates itself with the Rûm people ethnically, it avoids being seen as the genetic heir of the Eastern Roman/Byzantine Empire ruling dynasties –it only inherited the imperial ethos.

VIII.III.III. Ethno-Mimetic Signs

“Muhammed hulk-i Yûsuf halk, Mûsî dest-i Îsî dem
Ferîdûn ferr-i hâkân câh, Hâtem cûd-i dârâ râ”¹⁰⁸⁴

The eulogy written for Bayezid II by Efsahî (2012, p. 74)

¹⁰⁸⁴ “That sultan with the character of Muhammed, the beauty of Joseph, the hand of Moses and the breath of Jesus/ Splendid as Feridûn, famed as the ruler, generous as Hatem” (Efsahî, 2012, p. 75).

It is possible to name an ethnically-referred signification systematic, which found a place in Ottoman political thought, with the concept of ethno-mimetic signification. The word *ethnos* in the first part of this concept -as was discussed at the beginning of the chapter- refers to both the generic and moral/traditional structure of a particular social group. The second word, *mimesis*, simply means likeness or imitation. The concept of ethno-mimetic as a whole means the adoption and maintenance of the culture of a particular social group by another social group through imitation. In this context, ethno-mimetic signs should be understood as sign units that produce real or imaginary similarities in order to establish a certain cultural authority/tradition/legitimacy relationship to the extent that they are a part of political discourse. Considering the Ottoman political thought, this aspect will be especially emphasized since ethno-mimetic signs are constructed in an imaginary context.

In general, when various chronicles, poems, *menâkıbnâmes*, *siyâsetnâmes* or *gazavatnâmes* written from the beginning of the 15th century to the beginning of the 16th century are examined, it is noticed that various mimetic signs that put the Ottoman dynasty in the center were constructed. These signs often associate Ottoman rulers with Alexander the Great, prominent ancient Iranian rulers, Israeli prophets famous for their power to rule, or famous warriors mentioned in history. These analogies are generally not of a systematic nature, but are poetic embellishments and expressions of praise shaped under the influence of Iranian poetry tradition. The lack of systematicity of the analogies prevents the deepening of their symbolic aspects and makes it difficult to reveal the intellectual -and political- architecture behind them. Since these analogies form similar sections from two words to a line scattered across many works, their compilation and interpretation in detail should be the topic of another academic study. On the other hand, in a series of chronicles written at the verge of the 16th century, it is noticed that the analogies in question are enriched with a new category and gain a wider framework. In this new category, Ottoman rulers are likened to the prophet Muhammad or some historical figures in period of the four caliphs. These similarities are established under two forms. While the first of these forms settles in the ethnic perspective, which includes appearance and morality, the second performs a numerical method based on abjad calculations and which can be thought to be influenced by *Hurûfî* methodology. Since the form containing the numerological method is exemplified in the sections above and this method cannot be placed under the concept of ethno-mimesis, it will not

be discussed in this subsection. On the other hand, it will be tried to briefly evaluate the examples of analogical references as mentioned.

Let's start by summarizing the general political scheme of ethno-mimetic signs. In Ottoman political thought, there are two types of mimetic signs that are basically constructed by religious signifiers. The first of these is based on the likeness of the Ottoman ruler to the prophet Muhammad. The second one develops in the form of associating the moral qualities of the Ottoman ruler with the holy names of the God. These two sign forms have an internal connection with each other. In Islamic theological fiction, God is equated with ontological completeness. This completeness can be categorized under the headings of potestatic, ethical, and aesthetic (power, goodness, and beauty) forms. In Islamic theology, it can be mentioned that there are two main orientations that developed with the influence of ancient Greek philosophy.

The first of these is the Plotinian *Īsrâkî* (Illuminationist) theology, which is based on the idea that the divine completeness of things appears in matter and is degenerated and degraded in this way along the hierarchy of being, and the second is the Aristotelian-*Meşşâî* theology, which argues that the *telos* of things is to reach completeness/perfection.¹⁰⁸⁵ Both theological fictions see the God as the source of completeness/perfection. In this framework, it is possible for things to reach perfection, that is, to realize their purpose of existence -in other words, to obey God's will and be on the 'right path' - by trying to make divine attributes exist on themselves. This religious ideology requires obeying divine prohibitions and fulfilling obligations. However, the fulfillment of this purpose was not understood only in the unity of prohibitions and worship, and scientific and mystical elements were added to them.¹⁰⁸⁶ While the scientific (*ilm*) elements develop in relation to the regulation of prohibitions and worships in the social plan (credos, *fiqh*, theology, sunnah and hadith), the mystical elements aim to experience the divine being and to deepen the form of religious

¹⁰⁸⁵ These theological approaches will also have reflections in the fields of *fiqh*, cosmology and psychology (see: Akhtar, 2022, p. 40). In addition, the tradition of *Zahiri* theology and the contribution of Ibn Hazm can be added to this framework as a third orientation (Akhtar, 2022, p. 44). Apart from this, it is undeniable that there are also *Zaydi*, *Ismaili*, *sūfî* or syncretic forms of theology.

¹⁰⁸⁶ A wide debate in which the scientific elements of *fiqh* and kalam and mystical elements are excluded from this framework has been going on since the 11th century. In particular, the debates between Mu'tazili and Salafi approaches and *sūfî* circles can be evaluated within this framework. For the *Kadizadelis-Sivasis* debate, which is an extension of these discussions in the Ottoman context, see: Bilkan (2016) and Baz (2019).

consciousness in this way. While the scientific (*ilm*) approach deals with determining the ideal forms of social and individual life (by the disciplines of kalam, sunnah and hadith), on the other hand, they try to find answers to current problems by referring to ideal religious forms. On the other hand, the process of being educated by a master is the basis of most of the mystical practices. This master owes his authority to the succession of his predecessors to Muhammad - and from the prophet to the God. In this way, the secret-knowledge believed to have been received by the prophet from the God is transmitted from generation to generation, and the behavioral codes of the prophet are similarly transmitted from generation to generation and passed on to the members of the *sūfī* circles. Especially in orders such as Naqshbandi-Khalidi, which centered on *ittiba al-sunnah* (following the sunnah), great importance is attached to the fact that the orders's lineage carries the sunnah codes from the prophet and transfers them to the new generation. In this transmission process, the masters are equipped with absolute religious authority as people who are believed to be similar to the prophet and therefore to the manifestation of divine names on themselves. In most of the *sūfī* approaches, the existence of traditions that ascribe supernatural powers (flying in the air, walking on water, speaking the language of animals, creating from nothing, etc.) to the elders of the order, and which are called miracles, are based on the manifestation of divine power in individuals due to the lineage in question. In this respect, connecting to the prophet and the God through succession is accepted as the most basic form of legitimizing the authority of *sūfī*sm and *sūfī* traditions.¹⁰⁸⁷ As a result, one of the specific ways of justifying religious authority is to establish a relationship of continuity and similarity between the *sūfī* master, prophet and the God. Some of these similarities are directly based on ethnic relations (belonging to the family of prophet), while the other part is mimetic (resembling a prophet).

It is seen that similarities of the second type are used in Ottoman political thought. In particular, it is noticed when the historical sources that Mehmet II and Bayezid II are compared to Muhammad are examined. Especially when *Heşt Behişt* is examined, it is seen that İdrīs-i Bitlisī has established a similar relationship between

¹⁰⁸⁷ There are exceptions to this justification. It is claimed that some of the saints who are classified with the term '*üveysi*' were able to perform miracles without anyone's discipline. However, the legitimation of this type of saints is explained by the fact that they took lessons from the legendary figure of *Khizir*. There is also an alternative approach called the *istidraj* theory, which argues that the miracles shown may have a demonic nature rather than a divine nature. For the concept of *istidraj*, see: Kelâbâzî (2019, p.121).

Muhammed and Mehmet II in many ways. For example, Bitlisî claims that spiritual and material similarities can be seen in people with the same name, and describes Mehmet II as the “Pâdişah-ı Nebevî” (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 14). Another similarity is the analogy established between the wars in which the two historical figures participated and the way they occurred (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 159). On the other hand, it is possible to talk about another form of similarity that is more systematically established. In this form of resemblance, it is constructed not by a form of discourse referring to the names of rulers or the biography of the prophet, but by directly referring to the similarity of their material bodily features. To give an example, İdrîs-i Bitlisî claims that Mehmet II has similarities with Muhammad in terms of material characteristics. Bitlisî particularly emphasizes the similarity in appearance and argues that this similarity can be seen in Mehmet II's paintings and is confirmed by those around him (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 41). İdrîs-i Bitlisî lists the categories of these similarities under ten titles and the titles are as follows (Yıldırım, 2010, pp. 41-42): (i) having a rose-skin and fair face, (ii) having wide eyelids and eyes, and having dark blue eyes, (iii) having a smiling face, (iv) high back of the nose, (v) round face, light forehead, slightly sparse beard, (vi) having gaps between teeth, (vii) having broad chest, broad shoulders, having thick neck and strong arms, (viii) to have wide palms, (ix) to have less hair on the body, (x) to be of medium length and width. It is a big question mark to what extent these features listed by Bitlisî are consistent with Muhammad’s external appearance. The description of Muhammad presented in the work named *Târîhu'l-ümem ve'l-mülûk* written by Taberî (1992, pp. 863-68) contains some contrasts with the description of Bitlisî. In this respect, it should be considered that Bitlisî gave priority to characterizing Mehmet II and that this description aimed to draw a portrait of Muhammad more similar to Mehmet II.

The second feature of the ethno-mimetic sign order is that it also includes an analogy in terms of morality/disposition/character. As quoted in the introduction to the subsection, Efsahî’s (2012, p. 74) praising Bayezid II as having character of Muhammed (“Muhammed hulk”) is a good example in this context. Similarly, Bitlisî, who abstractly formulates the moral similarity of Muhammad and Mehmet II, expresses this proposition as follows (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 23): “He gained fame in the Islamic world with his moral quality of creation similar to the morality of the Prophet [tm]”. According to İdrîs-i Bitlisî, the ten physical similarities listed above also correspond to moral character similarities. These similarities are listed as follows (Yıldırım, 2010, pp. 41-42): (i) a perfect sense of shame (*haya*), (ii) courage and love, (iii) bravery and

generosity, (iv) benevolence and courage based on reason, (v) thoughtfulness, dignity and happiness, (vi) having the truthful talking and behavior, (vii) courage and strong will, (viii) generosity, (ix) quick understanding and ability to distinguish between right and wrong, (x) reason and intelligence.

At this point, it is a question that needs to be explained why Bitlisî tries to establish a physical and moral similarity between Muhammad and Mehmet II. Because, as was discussed in the sections above, Ottoman political thought, contrary to general Islamic practices, directly likens the attributes of rulers to the God and evaluates rulers as the shadow of the God, not the prophet. Ottoman political thought, as it appears in the literature, lists in detail which divine characteristics were manifested in the ruler. In this case, it is an inconsistency that the literature of political thought both directly endows the ruler with divine features and relates the prophet's physical appearance and simple moral characteristics. There may be several logical explanations for this inconsistency. The first of these explanations is that the assertion of similarity is included in the text as an extension of the rule of 'following the sunnah', which is generally accepted by Sunni sects, and therefore as a sign of piety.¹⁰⁸⁸ However, it is difficult to think that this is the purpose of the analogy, since any details about following the sunnah (beard cutting, clothes, eating habits, worship, etc.) are not included in the text. However, since this form of discourse emerged during the reign of Bayezid II and many legends were derived about Bayezid II about following the sunnah, it can be mentioned that there is an unclear connection. To give an example, in an anecdote included in Taş (2020, p. 295) and other anonymous chronicles, at the opening of Bayezid Mosque, a person who had not abandoned the *sunnahs* of prayer throughout his life was sought, but no one other than Bayezid II was found in Istanbul. The fact that this anecdote is especially based on the element of Islamic sunnah and that it is included in many anonymous chronicles that are likely to be read in public places constitutes clear evidence of the desire to spread such a discourse. The second possibility is that the political thought that produced the theomorphic image of the ruler was an ideological fiction for the masses, whereas the ethno-mimetic fiction that directly compared the ruler to the prophet was written for a smaller group of officials who had the privilege of meeting with the ruler. Considering this possibility, the purpose of writing the text can

¹⁰⁸⁸ For the development of the concept of *sunnah*, see: Crone (2004, pp. 126-27), Crone & Hinds (2003, pp. 58-59), Boekhoff-von der Voort (2015, pp. 33-34) and Keleş (2015, pp. 35-70). For the different meanings of the concept, see: Özsoy (1994, pp. 49-53).

be defined as establishing authority over a small group of high officials who can physically see the ruler, and reproducing a hierarchy led by the ruler within his narrow staff. The fact that the ruler is surrounded by a religious authority around this presupposition can be facilitated by the discourse built on his physical resemblance to the prophet. Although this form of explanation is plausible, the presence of more macro-level relations between resembling the prophet and obtaining the caliphate in İdris-i Bitlisî's text causes this explanation to remain in the background. The last explanation, as stated, is much more macro-level. According to the third possible explanation, the establishment of the authority of the ruler necessitates his association with the prophet family in terms of historical conjuncture. Especially after the rise of Shah Ismail, the rise of the Shiite caliphate theory in the Ottoman lands, and the fact that Shah Ismail began to have a popular-mystical authority based on his acceptance as a member of the Ahl al-Bayt / lost imam / reincarnation of Ali may have brought up such a need. It is possible that this form was also used by Ottoman ideologues, since the resemblance to Muhammad and his family constitutes a form of authority-founding ethnic discourse used in the *sûfî* orders, including the Safavids. There are some signs that strengthen the second possibility mentioned in the *Heşt Behişt*. İdris-i Bitlisî, in the introduction of the seventh book of the *Heşt Behişt*, argues that the caliphs are the successors (*khalef*) of the prophets, and therefore, they will achieve sovereignty to the extent that they are similar to Muhammad in religious and world affairs (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 13). On the other hand, the similarity of rulers to Muhammad in conquests, *ijtihad*s, protection and spreading of religion, moral virtues and compliance with religious obligations makes them worthy of 'sultanate' and 'caliphate' (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 13). It is seen that Bitlisî made a vague distinction between obtaining the right to rule and being worthy of it, caliphate and sultanate. If the caliphate element in this distinction is interpreted as a continuity that includes direct physical similarity, it will be seen that the Shiite caliphate theory acts on a similar basis with the ethno-genetic arguments. Even if Bitlisî did not express this argument openly, it can be considered that he wrote prolegomena, a form of political discourse that could be constructed in the future, by mentioning Mehmet II's physical resemblance to Muhammad in detail. Considering that Ottoman political thought was not unfamiliar with the Shiite theo-political approach, as pointed out in the previous subsection, it should not be considered impossible that such a thought is implicitly found in the texts of İdris-i Bitlisî. The fact that the Imam's *hulûl* (incarnation) and *ulûhiyye* (divinity), or the belief that Imams can return as spiritual

personalities (*ric'at*), are generally accepted in Ismaili Shiism and *ghulat* approaches, is suspended proposition that does not have clear lines in Bitlisi's text. This is partly because *Hurûfi* rhetoric (homonym, numerology and esoteric *tafsir*) was used with Sunni theological elements by İdrîs-i Bitlisi.

VIII.III.IV. On the 'History' and Identity of the Ottoman Ruling Class

One of the main sources of Ottoman political thought is the Ottoman chronicles as used throughout our thesis. These works host different levels of abstraction and forms of political thought, both in terms of carrying historical narratives/fictions containing particular interpretations of history and supporting this historical interpretation with theoretical judgments in terms of grounding political authority. This situation seems to be a common feature of historical narratives in pre-modern societies in general, far beyond being the unique feature of Ottoman political thought. Especially in Islamic societies, where current political issues are also perceived as religious problems, the development of historiography cannot be excluded from this judgment. Watt (2003, pp. 36-37) states that discussions of Islamic political theory are especially expressed in historical narratives. Al-Azme (2021, p. 259) argues that current political differences and ideas are reshaped in historical texts, and certain political positions are justified through positive and negative approaches to past events. Similarly, Paecock (2020, pp. 7-8) underlined that Islamic historiography is a type of literature that "supports the political agenda and reinforces the legitimacy of the ruler [tm]". In this respect, it would not be wrong to think that historiography -although it contains hagiohistorical narratives- also provides an opportunity of development for a partially secular discussion environment. These works, in which historical events are listed one after the other with a certain fiction, also constitute channels that allow the construction of current political discourse through historical examples. In this respect, in terms of the history of political thought, historical texts exemplify a contemporary discussion environment in which political themes are both reflected and constructed (theoretical, representative and practical). To have the same meaning, the practice of historiography and the sharing of historical knowledge can also be categorized as a kind of oral or written ceremony that will legitimize or reinforce power (Foucault, 2003, p. 66).

In particular, the fact that political conflicts and debates have a chance to be represented in these texts provides valuable data on the forms of self-consciousness of the Ottoman ruling class and its factions. As it is known, how political conflicts and

debates take place in a certain historical context and to what extent this is reflected in the texts is a decisive problem in term of commentating. Considering that there is no record of the discussions and information sharing in daily life, the views of the *sûfî* circles, the decisions taken in the tribal councils, or the political views shared by the urban artisans in their own guilds, the true weight of the historical narratives in political thought can be better understood. This weight can be considered quantitatively quite light when considering the circulation of verbal forms of political thought, but qualitatively quite effective considering the relations of historiographers with the ruling class. Keeping in mind the material dimension of this effect, there is another, more abstract and ideological dimension. Historiography also has a determinative place in the consciousness and identity construction of the ruling classes. When it comes to the political consciousness and identity of the dominant classes, the construction of these ideological structures is basically determined by the representation of the imaginary communities to which these classes are articulated and the characteristics of the real social segments in which they position themselves in conflict. As of the considered period, it is seen that history writers have added passages to the texts they have written in order to justify the necessity, meaning and usefulness of historiography in this manner. By examining these passages, it is understood that history writers have a clear political awareness about the historiography practice they carry out in this context, and they invite history-readers to a similar political understanding. In general terms, the authors of the period, who claim that the purpose of historiography is to provide models and examples that will help the administrative practices of the ruling classes, also make an effort to build an identity on the axis of the political conflicts in actual.

In the historical works written on the verge of the 16th century, there are three examples of narratives constructed to explain the real social functions undertaken by historical knowledge and historiography. The first of these examples belongs to Neşrî, the second belongs to Konevî, and the third -and the most advanced version- belongs to İdrîs-i Bitlisî. According to Neşrî (1949, pp. 3, 5), the source of wisdom (*ilm*) and education is based on divine pages and books, and the information coming from divine sources is divided into three titles. These titles are (Neşrî, 1949, p. 5): (i) *ilm-i tawhid* (*knowledge of unity*), (ii) *ilm-i şerayi'a* (*science of religious law*) and (iii) *ilm-i tevarih* (*science of history*). It lists three different social segments that Neşrî describes as honorables (*eşref-i insan*) corresponding to the three titles he lists and explains the relationship between them.

According to this theory, the distinguishing feature of the prophets corresponding to *ilm-i tawhid* is annunciation and prophethood, the distinguishing feature of the *ulama* corresponding to *ilm-i şerayi'a* is science and worship, the distinguishing feature of the rulers corresponding *ilm-i tevarih* to its feature is defined as justice and politics (Neşrî, 1949, p. 5). In this triple classification, the elements of politics and history are placed together with the practice and knowledge of the rulership. Neşrî (1949, p. 5) strengthened the position of the ruler by stating that even if the *ulama* had all these sciences, the ruler would be needed for their implementation. Moreover, in this context, he states that if a ruler learns the science of Sharia and masters on history and especially the events of the rulers before him, he will dominate all three sciences and thus have the title of 'shadow of god' (Neşrî, 1949, p. 5). The interesting aspect in this argument is that Neşrî claims that the ruler's knowledge of Sharia and history will result in divine light filling his heart, knowing the rules of prophecy and discovering the state of prophecy ("*kâşif-i ahval-i risalet*"). In other words, Neşrî claimed the necessity of historical knowledge for the ruler to attain divine knowledge and authority based on divine knowledge, and based the legitimacy and status of historical narratives on divine books. Another issue that Neşrî (1949, p. 5) emphasizes is the understanding of prophecy and rulership as a whole and the idea that the most basic function of rulers is to protect the order of the world -in accordance with religious codes.¹⁰⁸⁹ In the final analysis, if Neşrî's arguments are considered together, the author's reason for grounding his knowledge of history becomes clear as the rulers could establish and maintain the world order thanks to this knowledge. Considering what kind of historical knowledge Neşrî included in his work after this theoretical judgment, the relationship he established between the order of the world and the knowledge of history can be analyzed in a better way.

Neşrî lists the chapters of his book in the introduction section of *Kitâb-ı Cihannümâ* (1949, p. 7) as such: (i) the genealogy of the Ottoman dynasty from Oghuz Khan, (ii) the history of the Anatolian Seljuk sultans, (iii) the history of the Ottoman rulers. If we pay attention, Neşrî's division does not only present a series of historical

¹⁰⁸⁹ On the other hand, the results of Neşrî's separation of political knowledge from Sharia knowledge are based on a philosophical basis that can lead to the grounding of secular politics and customary law. Political practices that fall into the field of practical philosophy are thus articulated with the epistemological position of historiography, which is a secular pursuit. Perhaps this is why it can be thought that Prince Korkud, who defended the politics of Sharia, took a critical attitude towards historians.

events, but also contains a certain identity construction theme. Neşrî, who placed the necessity of historical knowledge for a theo-practical purpose, as stated above, does not see the mission of creating an identity for the dynasty outside of this practical purpose. The meaning of this lies in the emergence of the identity problem as an extension of the requirements of practical politics and becoming one of the important parts of authority building. The fact that Neşrî associates the Ottoman dynasty with the Turkic tribal tradition as the Oghuz Han generation and the need to present a historical narrative on the Seljuk-Ottoman continuity constitute the two most basic pillars of this identity construction. The third chapter, history of the Ottoman rulers, on one hand presents the political and cultural practices of the rulers as examples to guide current political orientations, and on the other hand, makes the history of the ruling class a reference point for identity construction. In this context, while the first title seems to contain an identity narrative centered on ethnogenetic signs, the main political message it contains is to build an ethno-potestatic continuity between the authority of the Ottoman dynasty and the traditional understanding of authority of the Turkic tribes.¹⁰⁹⁰ The second and third titles, on the other hand, are shaped directly around ethno-potestatic signification systematics. When these three titles are considered together, it is noticed that the identity constructed in the Ottoman historical narratives was shaped by placing the Ottoman dynasty at the center of the ruling class, with reference to its historicizing political authority. In this case, it would be appropriate to argue that the potestatic principle is dominant on the basis of the identity form that Neşrî constructs. Considering the reason why Neşrî's historical narrative was written, another dimension of the issue emerges. Neşrî (1949, p. 7) bases his reason for writing Ottoman history on the complexity and messiness of existing histories. It is possible to come across a similar argument in the history of Konevî. Konevî argues that the histories written before him associate the emergence of the Ottomans with the Seljuks, but that those information are inaccurate and contradictory (Salduz, 2019, p. 32). In this context, Konevî argues that since there are conflicting views on the emergence of the Ottoman state, he wrote a history and removed the inaccuracies and differences of opinion and the uncertainty about the origin of the Ottoman state (Salduz, 2019, p. 32). It should be noted that both Neşrî and Behiştî claim to remove the 'confusion' in the histories written before them, thus, to integrate this with the ethno-potestatic narratives that historically establish the Seljuk-Ottoman

¹⁰⁹⁰ For an alternative thesis that argues that Neşrî places 'Turkic heritage' at the center of Ottoman identity, see: Mengüç (2016, pp. 67, 71).

connection. In this respect, it is revealed that both authors sorted out alternative views that could pose a threat to the political authority of the Ottoman dynasty and constructed a new narrative to create a coherent identity.

İdrîs-i Bitlisî's way of establishing historiography on the foundations follows a more complex path compared to Behiştî and Konevî. Accordingly, Bitlisî (i) grounds the idea of history theoretically, (ii) practically legitimizes the function of historiography. If the first title is briefly mentioned, Bitlisî generally understands history as a quantitative information about time. He considers commercial contracts, practices of agricultural production, the doing of religious rituals, the methods of using religious information, and the regulation of taxation and payments depending on the knowledge of the time (Genç, 2007, pp. 48-49). In this respect, the idea of history presented by Bitlisî is a temporal determination that covers the secular and religious dimensions of social relations. In this respect, historiography corresponds to a form of knowledge related to the sociality of history. According to Bitlisî, historiography is a science in which the knowledge of events occurring in time produced by it (Genç, 2007, p. 44). This science differs from the sciences such as *fiqh*, medicine and astronomy, which mediate the knowledge of various events and phenomena, in that it establishes a quantitative connection with the beginning of time (Genç, 2007, pp. 44-45). It is noticed that Bitlisî distinguishes history as a series of sequential and interconnected events and states with a beginning, from other sciences that examine mostly synchronic events.

Secondly, İdrîs-i Bitlisî refers to the practical meaning of historical knowledge. The significance of this field is related to the direct and indirect use of historical knowledge. As was mentioned above, direct use is associated with production, distribution, worship and management practices that function depending on the quantitative calculation of time. Indirect use, on the other hand, is the use that first needs historiography in order to benefit from historical knowledge, and it assumes communicative, administrative and ideological functions. The first of these can be exemplified as follows; Bitlisî evaluates the science of history as a part of "*ilm-i muhadarat*" and according to him, it is essential to know the science of history in order to speak in assemblies and show rhetoric (Genç, 2007, p. 46). This function is based on the use of historical knowledge in the communicative field and partially becoming a tool of social status struggles. The second practical function that Bitlisî attributes to the knowledge of history emerges in the context of administrative relations. Accordingly, thanks to the knowledge of history, information about the benefits of political actions,

the results of the action methods, the knowledge of the aims and the course of power from the beginning to the end, provides the right organization of this administration practice ('health of the sultanate') (Genç, 2007, p. 53). Moreover, in this context, İdrîs-i Bitlisî draws attention to the fact that historical knowledge sets a precedent for the rulers and that past events can be used to decide current policies (*tedbîr*) (Genç, 2007, p. 55).

Finally, let us examine the practical function of historical knowledge in the ideological context. First of all, Bitlisî expresses his claim to establish a 'corrected' (*tashih*) historical narrative similar to Behiştî and Konevî, but not contenting himself with this proposition alone and states that he wishes to honor the Ottoman rulers by writing a clear and beautiful history similar to Mongolian and Timurid historiography (Genç, 2007, p. 31). Bitlisî states that the content of the historical work he wrote is based on the presentation of the Ottoman dynasty's history of conquests and benevolences in an arranged form (corrected form) and promises that this history will be a formal example of a fancy rhetoric (Genç, 2007, p. 30). If Bitlisî's historiographic problematic is interpreted, it is understood that his emphasis on the elements of style and regularity is a result of his generally seeing Ottoman historiography as inadequate against Mongolian and Timurid historiography, for which Cüveynî, Vassâf and Yezdî gave best examples. For this reason, for Bitlisî, historiography itself is positioned as a signifier of the political status of the dynasties. The problematic that Bitlisî has put forward up to this point has a potestatic political theme, in which history is seen as a representative of the network of power relations shaped around certain dynasties. The theme in question has three different narrative layers: The first of these is the violence-centered layer in which the Ottoman dynasty is represented by its military successes and conquests, the second is the legitimacy-centered layer, where the public buildings built by the Ottoman dynasty, and their in-kind and cash donations to various social segments are commemorated, and the third is the status-centered layer, in which the historical narrative about the Ottoman dynasty constitutes a status symbol compared to other historical narratives. It is clear that the narratives in the first two layers are also intensely present in the Ottoman chronicles written in the first three quarters of the 15th century. In this framework, İdrîs-i Bitlisî also grounds the historiography corresponding to the first two layers as a form of discourse that provides a basis for the legitimacy of power by addressing different social segments. To exemplify with reference to the text, Bitlisî states that Bayezid II ordered him to write Ottoman history, and in this order, it was

demanded that the historical work have the qualities that would be appreciated by ‘ordinary people and honorables’ (Genç, 2007, p. 30). In a similar proposition, Bitlisi argues that the history he wrote helped to ‘conquer the hearts’ of believers by carrying the voices of ancient rulers to his own time (Genç, 2007, p. 38). In both cases, there are clear indications that the historiography was constructed for ceremonial purposes. It is inevitable that the function of historical works read aloud in the public sphere, the circulation of historical knowledge and historical narratives in the status struggle of different political structures will turn into a power ceremony as Foucault (2003, p. 66) points out in this context. On the other hand, the status-centered narrative form began to take place in Ottoman histories, especially during the reign of Mehmet II, and reached its most developed form in the 16th century. The most basic feature of this narrative form is to build the self-consciousness of a particular dynasty against other dynasties and to represent the status of a particular dynasty vis-à-vis other dynasties. If all three layers are considered together, it is understood that these layers are integrated with the class power of the Ottoman ruling class knitted around the war-patronage-status phenomena and at the same time the identity construction corresponding to this form of power.

A significant question to ask at this point is whether the Ottoman ruling classes have a distinct identity –and if so, what is its structure. Contemporary debates on Ottoman history largely date the formation of a distinctive Ottoman identity—or debates over it—to the second half of the 19th century. Particularly, some of these pursuits, which are called nationalist, Islamist and Ottomanist, try to design a new Ottoman identity or transform the traditional Ottoman identity around the search for a new identity.¹⁰⁹¹ However, the development of the aforementioned quests in the original context of the 19th century and the fact that they formulated identity codes together with a reform program centered on the state reveals their modern side as a formative unity project. For this reason, the political jargon of neither the New Ottomans, the Young Turks, the Islamists, nor the non-Muslim nationalist movements can be taken to the founding period of the Ottoman Empire and used for the discovery of an ‘authentic’ identity. On the other hand, it can be thought that modern studies that focus on the second half of the 16th century and question the existence of an authentic Ottoman

¹⁰⁹¹ For details, see: Akçura (1995, pp. 17-40), Akşin (1987, pp. 80-82), Berkes (2010, pp. 282-87, 393-400), Mardin (1990a, pp. 40-43; 2000, pp. 396-408; 2008, pp. 265-90) and Karpat (2002, pp. 712-29).

identity under the term ‘classical period’ may also suffer from a similar problem.¹⁰⁹² Because the hypothesis that the population living in the lands controlled by the Ottoman state in the 16th century could have a common religious or cultural identity shared with the state administrators (especially within the framework of religion, public buildings, aesthetic commonalities, *sûfi* practices, etc.) will in the final analysis be an anachronistic reflection of the concept of modern identity. Because it would be wrong to establish a direct relationship between the existence of common cultural elements and the identity patterns of a political nature. On the other hand, the problem of identity in the Ottoman state remains in the shadow before the 16th century and especially when it is established.

The reason for such misceptions and ambiguities is that the modern concept of ‘identity’ necessarily corresponds to a phenomenon developed under the form of modern means of communication, education, law, labor relations, social classes and finally the capitalist state. On the other hand, the specific nature of the historical context in which the modern concept of ‘identity’ developed does not make it necessary to deny the possibility that the identity phenomenon may have pre-modern aspects. The main qualitative difference between modern forms of identity and their pre-modern antecedents is that the first form symbolically connects individuals and masses who are anonymized in social relations. On the other hand, pre-modern identity forms are based on a particular or ecumenical community (*gemeinschaft*) symbology without having an individual content construct, or they build a symbolic relationship within a certain community or between different communities. It is possible to call the first of these identity forms *gesellschaftliche-identität*, and the second *gemeinschaftliche-identität*.¹⁰⁹³ When these two identity forms are examined under the general categorization of social formation forms, it will be seen that the first of them develops in the form of formative unity, and the second develops as an element that cannot be separated from formal unity. If a second argument is to be put forward, it is necessary to determine that these identity forms largely bear the traces of various forms of struggle developed among human communities. These traces may be about asymmetric power

¹⁰⁹² For a contrary view, see: Bavilet (1994, pp. 194-97). In addition, Yılmaz (2014, pp. 97) argues that Kınalızâde Ali’s work called *Ahlâk-ı Alâî* contributed to the establishment of the Ottoman identity and typically reflects its basic characteristics.

¹⁰⁹³ A third form of identity can be called *kommunitaristisch-identität*. This form of identity develops in communities with organic integrity where class relations or social hierarchy do not develop. Its modern form can be found in socialist societies. For the distinction between *gesellschaft* and *gemeinschaft*, see: Tönnies (2019, pp. 36, 42, 98).

relations within a particular community, as well as the lines of conflict between communities or in broad social contexts.

First of all, it is necessary to deal with the issue of identity formally. If the identity problem in the Ottoman Empire is reconsidered within the framework set out above, the only identity form that could possibly be considered to have been built by the 16th century would be *gemeinschaftliche-identität*. There are several basic aspects that this form of identity acquired in Ottoman society at the beginning of the 16th century. These aspects can be listed as follows: (i) the mystical-religious identities of various *sûfi* groups, (ii) examples of identities of various tribes woven around and historicized in regard of kinship relations, (iii) guild-centered identity form developed by urban artisans, (iv) Identity constructed with *ilm* and *fiqh* references accepted among the ulama groups/madrasah members/*qadis*, (v) the identity of the *ghazi*/warrior groups that are not under the strict control of the central government, (vi) the identity of the military and civil officials organized around the state, (vii) the identity of the ruler and dynastic family, (viii) settled peasant identity and its religious/sectarian variants. The number of these identity forms can be increased or decreased according to the periodical characteristics - for example, there are periods when the timariot *sipâhîs* did not have a clear identity representation, and the theo-political super-identity developed by the Qizilbash communities can be added to this list. The social formation constituting the Ottoman Empire can be formulated with the concept of the rentier mode of production determined by the asymmetrical power relationship between the direct producers and the members of the 'military class', and within this mode of production, different social groups form a formal unity within the framework of political and cultural relations. The typical feature of the formal unity form observed in social formations divided by class distinctions is that the social segments, which are the executives of the political and cultural connections that provide the formal unity, are also in a dominant position in the power relations. In terms of Ottoman society, these segments can be listed as the hierarchy of the ulama, leaders of the *sûfi* orders articulated with the state, and the military elite. In the context of the identity construction debate, it is noticed that these groups do not develop absolutely autonomous identities, on the contrary, they adopt a discourse form that integrates it with the ruler and/or the state while preserving their specific identity content as an extension of their social position and activities. To put it in a general formulation, the thesis that the dominant form of identity in the Ottoman Empire is the identity of the ruling class -or, to mean the same thing, the 'imperial

elites'- is widely accepted in the secondary literature (Kalpaklı, 2010, p. 13; Kunt, 2012, p. 108; Miljković, 2017, p. 334; Fodor, 2017, pp. 21-22; Magemizoğlu, 2021, p. 200).¹⁰⁹⁴ In addition, the examples that can be called the dominant identity form in the Ottoman society have a structure that articulates different social segments belonging to the ruling class and the organized state power under certain discursive forms. It should also be noted that this structure has at least two sides. The identity constructed in the projection of the articulation between the dominant class and strata also gains a certain content in terms of denying the resistance possibilities and practices of subaltern classes, strata and cultural groups. Fodor focuses in particular on the first aspect of dominant identity, that is, the form that prevails across the ruling class and strata. Fodor (2017, p. 22) formulates a dominant identity form around which the identity of the court officials, which he defines as an estate rather than a class, is shaped around their commitment to (i) the dynasty, (ii) Islam, (iii) Ottoman customs (*âdab*) and lifestyle. The Ottoman dominant identity, which was built in the period discussed in the framework drawn by Fodor, aims to articulate the ruling classes among themselves and places the Ottoman dynasty at the center of the content it has constructed. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this composition explains why Ottoman historiography bases itself on its mission of guiding genealogy-writing and administrative practices. On the other hand, dominant identity formation cannot be understood simply as the historical juxtaposition of certain political and cultural elements. Behind the characteristics Fodor stated, the traces of the suppressed forms of social existence on which the dominant identity rises should not be denied. As a result, the construction of the Ottoman dominant identity as the identity of the ruling classes is also mediated by the contexts of various subordination and domination relations.

Secondly, it would be appropriate to analyze the content of the Ottoman dominant identity. Kalpaklı (2010, p. 13) argues that the dominant Ottoman identity was built around the claim to be transcendent in content from all examples of ethnic, social and economic identity. At first glance, Kalpaklı's proposition seems to have several weaknesses. The first of these aspects, as discussed in the previous sections, is the intense use of dynastic genealogies in the establishment of the Ottoman identity and the emphasis on the Turkmen origin of the Ottoman dynasty in these genealogies.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Although it can be argued that Mustafa Ali tried to construct a certain Ottoman identity at the end of the 16th century, there was still the Ottoman ruling class at its center (Fleischer, 1986a, p. 256). For the transitions in the dominant class identity and the construction of identity after the 16th century, see Tezcan (2010, pp. 34-6; 2012, pp. 161-62), Boogert (2014, pp. 17-19).

Secondly, in terms of religious codes that can be evaluated in the category of social relations, Ottoman writers often defined their own communities as *Sunnî*. Finally, it is seen in the sources that the Ottoman dominant identity has an economic aspect related to owning lands, collecting tribute and taxes, ruling the mines and treasury - and even spending them in charity activities. On the other hand, when Kalpaklı's (2010, p. 13) thesis is evaluated in a broader context, it is revealed that all these ethnic, religious and economic indicators are not founding but carrier elements of Ottoman identity. We can make this proposition clearer as follows: The determination of the Ottoman dominant identity does not occur through passive identification of the elements of that identity, but through -actively- defining them with reference to the things they dominate. In this respect, the content of the Ottoman dominant identity has a relational, not a transcendent, reality in the face of ethnic, religious/social or economic elements.

In this framework, it is possible to show the other social elements and the form of this relationship in a complete manner, with which the Ottoman dominant identity was established. The dominant form of the relationship in question is to accept and submit to the power of the Ottoman dynasty/state/ruling class. In this respect, different social elements are represented in terms of their position in the power relationship and become a part of the dominant identity. To the extent that there is an incomplete domination relationship between the master and the subordinate, this relationship is represented as a conflict horizon that establishes the Ottoman dominant identity. To give an example, ethnographic signs in Ottoman political thought refer to such a discourse about Circassians, Tatars, Albanians and Turkmens and make the struggle against these groups a part of the Ottoman dominant identity. The main signifier of this identity is the representation of the sovereign right of a settled and organized power against ethnic groups that are declared 'irregular', 'disobedient' and 'inferior'. An example that differs from this representation by the radicality of its political discourse is the representation of Qizilbash groups in Ottoman political thought. The role played by the Qizilbash movement in constructing the Ottoman dominant identity is more complex than the role played by other ethnic groups or tribes. One of the most important results of the struggle between the Ottoman ruling class and the Qizilbash rebels was the construction of the ruling class's identity around *Sunnî* -sect (Terzioğlu, 2012, p. 87). 'Not being a Qizilbash', as suggested in the anonymous chronicle published by Taş (2020, p. 67), became a part of the Ottoman dominant identity. As Winter (2012, p. 171) states, the fact that the *Sunnî* identity of the empire and the Qizilbash belief has become

the antithesis of each other is largely due to the fact that the political order and privileges institutionalized under the organizing of the ruling class form a whole with the dominant identity, rather than the theological distance between *Sunnī* and Shiite beliefs. Fodor (2017, p. 49) states that the *Sunnī* paradigm was influential in the formation of the identity of the Ottoman dynasty and interprets this as the strengthening of the world view of the *ulama* in the final analysis. Al-Tikriti (2016, p. 99) summarizes the formation of this identity, which he calls “Ottoman Sunnism”¹⁰⁹⁵, as follows:

(...) both Ottoman and Safavid Empires set out to define their respective communal identities against each other, consolidate rule over their respective territories, and decide how to deal with their newly defined internal enemies. For the Ottomans, this search for collective identity was a long, gradual process of creeping orthodoxy, which gained momentum in the early sixteenth century and resulted in an official ideology, sometimes characterized as ‘Ottoman Sunnism.’ This self-consciously Sunni-umbrella religious identity, the limits of which were defined in contrast to a Safavid-dominated Shiism, allowed for the active joint participation of a wide variety of formerly incompatible legal and philosophical subgroups in the imperial enterprise. As a result, *sūfi* orders as diverse as Naqshbandīs, Mevlevis, Bektaşīs, Halvetis, and others all became loosely redefined as Sunnis, supporting the same Ottoman team.

There are two main reasons why the Ottoman-Safavid struggle is so decisive. The first of these, as mentioned before, is that the population living in Anatolian and Rumelia has been acquainted with popular Shiite beliefs since at least the 10th century and has adopted some of them. For this reason, when the Ottoman state, which used the *Sunnī fiqh* codification extensively in state-building, encountered a rival with an ideology closer to the religious-cultural formation of the population it dominated, it became necessary to take a radical position against it. Secondly, the power Qizilbash movement- as opposed to its military and ideological strength stemming from the traditional autonomy of various ethnic groups- is derived from an organized movement that spreads over the vast Iranian hinterland. For this reason, the Safavids, on the one hand, respond to the Turkic tribes’ search for autonomy, on the other hand, they show their ability to coordinate them. In this case, the Ottoman dominant identity, which faced

¹⁰⁹⁵ Also, for the role of Prince Korkud in the formation of the Ottoman religious identity, see: Al-Tikriti (2004, pp. 11-13).

a strong and organized rival, on one side gave importance to define itself as *Sunnî*, on the other hand tried to place some elements inspired by Shiite theology into the theory of caliphate. Moreover, within this framework, the Turkish identity adopted in the *Saltuknâme* has been replaced by a wide distrust and hostility towards the Turkmen masses. Kasaba (2009, p. 46) states that in this context, Iranian or Alevi population living in Anatolian lands outside the area known as *Bilad-ı Rûm* are not defined as “true Ottomans”. In this respect, the Ottoman dominant identity is shaped in accordance with a largely urban model with *Sunnî* Law and worship codes, appealing to the political culture of its settled and obedient subjects. To give an example, Ebü'l-Hayr Rûmî (1990, p. 273) in *Saltuknâme* advises Osman Beg, the founder of the Ottoman dynasty, through the mouth of Sarı Saltuk: “(...) ve şeri’ate boyun tutun ilm ü ibadete şüru eylen. Rafiziye ve hariciye ve münafika rahm itmen öldürün, / oda urun. Ve bu Hanefî mezhebin daim gözet ki cemi mezhebün akdem ve akvası ve paküdür”.¹⁰⁹⁶ In this respect, the form of religious authority represented by the method of ethnomimetic signs strengthens the construction of *Sunnî* identity.

The second type of relationship that shapes the content of the Ottoman dominant identity is the open subordination relationship. In cases where the dominance of the Ottoman ruling class is clearly accepted or seen as a high probability, the dominant identity is constructed within ethno-potestatic signs. These ethno-potestatic signs basically aim to legitimize the domination over the Rûm, Muslim and Turkish populations in the Anatolian region, and the representation of this power becomes a part of the Ottoman dominant identity. It is possible to observe the discourses centered on the Rûm population in the historical continuity relation established between the institutional identity of the Ottoman state and the Eastern Roman Empire and in the title lists.¹⁰⁹⁷ Kasaba (2009, p. 44) argues that systematic marriages with Christian nobles were decisive in determining the identity of the Ottoman dynasty. The frequent occurrence of such marriages, especially until the reign of Bayezid II, represents the genetic dimension of the historical continuity established between the Eastern Roman

¹⁰⁹⁶ And follow the Sharia, start learning knowledge and worship. Show no mercy to heretics, Kharijites and hypocrites, kill them burn them. And always prioritize this *Hanafi* sect because it is the most senior, most powerful and pure of all sects.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Fodor (2015, p. 103) draws attention to this continuity, especially in the context of “self-identity and political ambitions”. Isom-Verhaaren (2014, p. 113) is of the opinion that the dominant political articulations that determined the Ottoman identity during the reign of Mehmet II and Bayezid II were carried out especially by the Byzantine and Balkan elites.

Empire and the Ottoman Empire. As Çolak (2015, pp. 14-17) examined, the use of the terms *tekfür*, *fasilyus* (basileus) and *kayser/kaysar* in early Ottoman historiography indicates such a continuity.

Another discourse typology is included in the claim of historical continuity established between the Seljuk and Ottoman dynasties. Finally, the form of discourse that tends to establish authority over Turkic groups and connects the genealogy of the Ottoman dynasty with ‘Turkistan khans’ or ‘Oghuz tribes’ constitutes the content of the dominant identity constructed through ethno-potestatic signs. On the other hand, it cannot be claimed that the power relationship established with the Ottoman ruling class always had a visible effect on the construction of the dominant identity. In cases where the power relationship is absolutely complete and turns from a subordination relationship to an open domination relationship, the dominant identity constructs itself by keeping silent about subordinate groups. For example, the peasant population liable to pay taxes and drudgery services is not represented in the dominant identity form. Historically, the circle of justice model and the notion of justice, which are prior elements of early Ottoman political thought, lost their place in Ottoman political thought from the beginning of the 15th century to the beginning of the 16th century. The reason for this was the establishment of absolute dominance over the peasant population with the development of the imperial regime. Interestingly, it was from the middle of the 16th century that the circle of justice model re-entered into Ottoman political thought and the discourse on the just administration of the peasant population began to take place in the dominant identity. Especially at the verge of the 17th century, the frequency of peasant revolts and the emergence of a reform literature in Ottoman political thought cause this notion to reappear.

In general, it is necessary to make a few more important additions to the elements of Ottoman dominant identity that have been examined above. Another important practical line that establishes the Ottoman dominant identity is the discourses built around war-patronage-status relations. To give an example, it is clear that the concept of *ghaza* and the image of *ghazi* were used to construct an identity by centered on the war successes of the Ottoman ruling class. This identity is enriched with elements from different cultural backgrounds and its scope is expanded occasionally. For example, discourses in which rulers are likened to Alexander the Great or that sultans are called as “the *mujaddid* of Alexander’s conquests [tm]” (İdris-i Bitlisi, 2012, p. 236) make such composite fictions visible. Moreover, it is seen that an identity construction that

develops depending on the presentation of the warrior ethos in the literature of *gazavatnâmes*, *fetihnâmes* and *Selimnâmes*, which is a later example, continues. Moreover, the fact that samples of the *gazavatnâme* literature were written for Ottoman rulers as well as for military leaders such as the *Mihaloğlu* family, or the achievements of some commanders (for example Davud Pasha, Gedik Ahmet Pasha, etc.) reveals that identity construction by military-narrative is a general phenomenon for the ruling class.

A second aspect of dominant identity construction is networks of patronage involving redistributive relations. The region dominated by the Ottoman Empire is characterized by many mosques, *imarets*, public baths, dervish lodges, madrasahs, bazaars and the *waqfs* to which they were built in the name of rulers, members of the dynasty and military officials. In the inscriptions of these structures, there are references to the social status of their benefactors, moreover, there are lists of the structures and aids built by the members of the ruling class in the historical records. In particular, the construction of public buildings and donations to *sûfi* groups help to build a shield of legitimacy around the ruling class, making the patronage of such activities as part of the Ottoman dominant identity. This identity should be considered together with the other identity constructs that were mentioned above. For example, donations to *sûfi* circles or financial support of madrasah students can be an significant part of Islamic identity construction, while in examples such as İdris-i Bitlisî (Genç, 2014, p. 769) states that the construction of *imarets* takes place “according to the Rûm tradition [tm]”, this becomes a symbol of geographical or ethno-potestatic affiliations. In the final analysis, social status, solidarity among the members of the ruling class and the establishment/protection of the legitimate image in the eyes of the subordinated classes can be accepted as the primary goals in the formation of the Ottoman dominant identity. Finally, another essential element of dominant identity is male dominance. As was discussed in the introduction that the patriarchal mentality structure exists as the dominant ideological formation within the rentier mode of production. In this context, the Ottoman dominant identity was also built on masculine values. It is possible to detect this situation due to the prevalence of ideological elements such as belligerency, courage and domination over women in political thought. In addition, it is noticed that various ruling class fractions that embrace the ideal of patriarchal domination also criticize each other within this framework and try to re-establish their masculinity forms over other alternative forms of authority and in a dominant position. In this context, it is seen that those involved in the field of military activity humiliate the *ulama* stratum,

criticisms have been developed by *ulama* about the members of *sūfī* orders, and as a whole, many segments accuse each other of homosexuality. The debate over whether it is more important to define the 'man' (*er*) as a social norm to follow religious rules, to struggle with one's self, or to swing a sword with courage on the battlefields reveals the contradictions between different representatives of patriarchal identity as an incomplete debate in this respect.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION: OTTOMAN POLITICAL THOUGHT ON CHECKERED BOARD

A standard chess game common today is played on a sixty-four square board with sixteen pawns, four rooks, four bishops/elephants, four knights, two queens/viziers and two kings/shahs. The rules are pretty simple, pawns can only move one square forward, bishops move diagonally, a king can run in any direction even though it moves almost like a pawn, and a queen is the star of the game with her attacking style moving in all directions across the board. However, when the impressive history of this great game is examined, it is quite surprising to see that neither the game board, nor the rules of movement of the pieces have remained the same for centuries. To give an example, the queen/vizier, the strongest piece of the board in the modern game of chess, had only as much movement power as the king was known two hundred and fifty years ago -even in some versions of chess, the positions of the modern king and queen seem to have been swapped, or the queen was absent at all. If one considers the relative strengths of a monarch and vizier in the pre-capitalist world, the two must be of equal power on the throne, or the king being in the shadow of the vizier would be a symbolic power relation difficult to accept—even if it was a game. In another case, on the chessboard, which is imagined as a battlefield, the king will be portrayed as a general whose movement is very restricted and helpless between his own soldiers and enemy troops. This imagination is quite consistent for premodern wars, where troops are advanced one by one and the last surviving side's game is seen as sufficient to win the war. On the other hand, modern chess has turned into a game in which small operational units make tactical attacks, the positioning of the forces on the board as a whole rather than individual pieces is important, and above all, moves are determined by a risk and gain calculation. In another dimension, this game has undergone a major transformation from an enjoyable war-based entertainment tool to a challenge of intelligence, from a central planning metaphor to a cold war analogy and finally to the experimental field of machine learning.

In general, the game of chess has reached its current form by being influenced by many factors such as how the game is imaged, in which social conditions it is played,

what it represents, how it is financed, the ethnic and political background of the players (such as the development of Indian Defenses). In this respect, the historical development of the game of chess, which is considered one of the most popular intelligence based games together with Go and Bridge, shows a great similarity with the development lines of the history of political thought. In the establishment of this similarity, the similarity in the general development patterns of symbolic social phenomena, as well as the variable signification patterns of the political and military figures in the chess game (King/Shah, queen/vizier, bishop/elephant etc.) are also effective. This similarity makes it possible and meaningful to consider the post-antiquity period of the history of political ideas in general, and the political thoughts in the Ottoman Empire in particular, through the metaphor of chess.

More than one chess-based metaphor can be formulated in this framework. According to the first of these metaphors, the region where the Ottoman Empire was located resembles a chessboard, and this board is divided between Christian Europeans (Crusaders) and Muslim Ottomans -that is, between black and white pieces. The Ottomans opened the game with their mounted raiders, the Christian infantry were helpless in the face of these raids, the bishops fled, and the castles of the *Tekfurs* were taken over by the Muslims one by one. Even though the Crusader forces gathered and counterattacked in the continuation of the game, these attacks were repelled by the efforts of the rulers and viziers, and the efforts of the Muslim jurists and *sûfis*. Finally, the game ended with the use of cannons on the battlefield and a new historical era was opened -until its degeneration. If such a narrative is translated into the language of the history of political thought, the following scene emerges: In the Ottoman Empire, political thoughts first emerged as Islamic war narratives in which the *ghazis* gathered around the Ottoman dynasty, and Islamic law and thought took root with the development of the state over time. Different segments of Ottoman society were united around this common culture. Although this common culture has been tried to be destroyed by some 'heretic' movements and the attacks of Christian states, it has managed to maintain its validity for many centuries from the daily life of ordinary believers to the administrators. The classical age and its effects continued to be experienced until some disorders emerged in the Islamic rule and the Europeans besieged the Empire and forcibly modernized it.

It can be said that this thesis, which is tried to be presented in long and detailed sections, is based on the effort to reverse the metaphorical expression summarized

above - to substitute it with another metaphor, so to speak. According to this new metaphor, the chessboard on which the Ottoman Empire was founded is a piece of land dominated by the rentier mode of production. In this chessboard, the game pieces are not separated from each other as black and white pieces from the very beginning, on the contrary, they form alliances or engage in struggle with each other in order to appropriate rents, gain political power or maintain and improve their social status. Moreover, it is possible to talk about the existence of deeper ties in which black and white stones, which converge around rent relations, military alliances and social status construction, partner with each other on the basis of patriarchal organization. In political thoughts, which is a discursive field in which these relations are concentrated at a symbolic level, each game piece tries to show their own positions more important than they are, on the other hand, they also organize the relations of alliance and enmity discursively. In this framework, for example, the old shah, who can make a single move at a time, can be represented as a saint, the ruler of time and space, the poor dervishes as the real founders of the state, and the Christian soldiers as useful pawns. For this reason, the positions of the pieces on the board gain meaning in the context of their interests and their social relations with each other, and the movement principles of the pieces are formed in a conceptual change in which their position is historically re-evaluated. Since positions, strategies and tactics are decisive in this chess game, not the sides, the primary method for understanding the game is to analyze these elements.

First of all, it would be appropriate to briefly examine the structure, the actors and the original historical conjunctures in which the positions of these actors realized of this 'game', which constitutes the subject of the history of political thought. First, the development of political ideas in the region under the Ottoman rule eventually took place with the current pattern of development of political problems. This pattern is often based on the contradictory unity of interrelated economic, cultural and political motifs. In this respect, it is possible to gather the political thoughts that developed in the region under Ottoman rule under certain common categories and to re-interpret them around some dominant political motifs. According to this thesis, the essence of the Ottoman rule, which started in Bithynia and spread to the Balkans and Anatolia, determined the development lines of the history of political thought in the regions under this administration. It is possible to explain the basis of this development by referring to a single line of antagonism: The establishment of class domination and counter movements/resistances against it. To formulate the antagonism in question more clearly,

it is possible to determine the existence of two categories that expand into sub-branches. First of all, the establishment and consolidation of the class domination of the social segments organized around the Ottoman dynasty and the restoration and reformations made in the class domination scheme within this framework constitute one of the main political problems. On the other hand, how different social segments will articulate or resist this developmental path is one of the main sub-texts of this problem.

If the problem is handled in this framework, the formation of political thoughts in the region under Ottoman rule took place in three basic phases. The first of these phases corresponds to the period at the beginning of the 14th century, which can be called the founding period or the early period. A sufficient number of sources and examples of political thought on the form and content characteristics of the political problems that emerged in this period have not reached the present day. However, as it is understood from the sources written extensively at the end of the 14th century and the beginning of the 15th century, the political reality of this period was organized around the problems of organization of war activities, distribution of war spoils, determination of social status and protection of social structure. The handling of these problems in political thought emerges in several ways. First of all, the ideological status of military activities organized around the Ottoman dynasty constitutes an important issue of political discourse. When the early sources are examined comparatively, it is understood that military activities were interpreted under the concept of *ghaza*, but in reality, non-Muslim groups also participated in such activities. In this respect, the concept of *ghaza* emerges in search of the discipline of military activities, moreover, it is closely related to the status of the social groups participating in the war and the organization of the distribution of property rights. In this context, the problems of representation, rights, status and management of various nomadic tribesmen, peasants, *Ahis*, and *sûfi* circles participating in military expeditions as political subjects require both practical and ideological regulation of the war activity. While this necessity arises in line with the needs of existing social classes -for example, local landowners, local dynasties, urban small producers and merchants, etc.- on the other hand, it is shaped around the Ottoman dynasty's search for class domination. For this reason, the organization of this problem includes the categorization of the warrior groups, their taxation, and finally the search for balancing uncontrolled military forces. It is understood that the political activities carried out in this period largely corresponded to either military campaigns or symbolic articulation efforts between various social

groups. In other words, the formation and coordination of military forces (its extensions based on land assignment and distribution of spoils), search for articulation with urban producers, traders, ulama and *sūfi* circles develop together in this period. The fact that the political ideas that emerged in this period were largely a part of the oral culture and were not recorded directly indicates the pre-institutionalization character of political relations. On the other hand, the Ottoman dynasty's control of the raiding activities and its taxation imply a transition to a new phase of the indicated political pattern.

The transition to a new era and revival of political problems and the emergence of the new examples of political ideas in the region ruled by the Ottomans arises with the systematization of administrative practices and their institutionalization around a state organization. This new phase lasted roughly from the end of the first quarter to the third quarter of the 14th century. The opening of this phase is heralded by two remarkable political problems in the historical sources: Taxation from the local markets by the Ottoman ruler and the seizure of one-fifth of the booty of the border warriors by military qadis on behalf of the ruler. These two striking examples are of particular importance, both because of the controversy they created around them and because they brought a certain clarity to the financial resources that the Ottoman dynasty had acquired. To these examples, it is possible to add the lands divided between frontier warriors, *sūfi* groups, local rentier families and the Ottoman dynasty, the *kharaj* imposition on non-Muslim peasants and finally the establishment of a central army. At this stage, it is understood that the state was organized around the Ottoman dynasty, the rent and booty revenues were controlled by this organization and the administrative mechanisms were structured with the indicated financing mechanism. To clarify this stage theoretically, it is possible to talk about a political sphere where feudal relations continue, and the feudal early state form develops and leaves the inchoate stage behind. In this phase, the economic resources concentrated around the Ottoman dynasty were spent for the development of political power and cultural articulations, and there was a certain improvement in the social status of the cadres who carry out this process. It is clear that especially qadis and faqihs, madrasa scholars, consultants and scholars from foreign countries undertook administrative, financial and judicial functions in this period. In this framework, rent and booty incomes gained a systematic form, and land consignments were recorded. At this stage, the organization of the state has made the state one of the main issues of political thought. On the one hand, the control of this organized power drew the reaction of border warriors and antinomian *sūfi* groups, on

the other hand, it reveals the support of new social segments whose status and privileges were institutionalized in relation to the state. To give a few examples, at the end of this period, analogical models on the functions, scope and organization of the state became one of the main subjects of political thought. In addition, problems such as the discipline of the members of the ulama, who specialized in matters such as justice and finance, the articulation of the *sūfi* groups with the state, and the formation of the central army, found expression in political thoughts.

The transformation of this phase, on the other hand, takes place with a historical intermediate period oscillating between the establishment and dissolution of the institutional structure. The opening of this period, which covers the end of the 14th century and the first half of the 15th century, begins with the conquests of Bayezid I in Anatolia and the Balkans. The conquests in question not only widened the scale of the ruler's symbolic authority, deepened the debate about the accumulation and use of the seized wealth, but also brought problems with the status of the old ruling classes and dynastic families in Anatolia. In particular, the end of the Bayezid I period with the Timurid invasion, the war between the Ottoman princes, the emergence of the interregnum period and the 1416 rebellions following this process constitute the basis of the structure of the period, which is very lively in terms of the history of political thought. First of all, the increase in state revenues, the gaining of great power of the devshirme-based professional army and the establishment of an autocratic government by the ruler became the subject of political theory and criticism. Moreover, the fact that Bayezid I took the throne by having his brother killed on the battlefield makes the succession problem a part of the regime problem. In addition, Bayezid I's expedition on the Muslim rulers of Anatolia places the problems of political legitimacy, Islamic ideology and secular administration at the center of political thought. The search for political institutionalization in this period was interrupted by the Timurid invasion, and the struggle between the princes turned into a military and ideological struggle of different social segments. Another distinctive feature of this period is the emergence of the administration of pashas, the strengthening of the Janissary corps in political sense and the organization of peasant revolts. In this respect, interregnum and restoration phases have specific political problems in terms of both the social structure, the political regime and the organization of the state. The end of this phase is largely due to the reconfiguration of the political sphere after the conquest of Constantinople.

If the end of the 14th century can be called a kind of ‘failed-empire’ in Ottoman political history, the second half of the 15th century can also be called ‘rapid-empire-building’. In accordance with this concrete nature of the historical phase in question, political thoughts were also positioned on the pros and cons of this problem. First of all, Mehmet II’s unexpected military successes made how to establish the image of the ruler and establish his symbolic authority the subject of political discourse construction. Secondly, the search for the discipline of military, administrative and judicial circles within the imperial regime was discussed within this framework. Thirdly, the problem of the construction of the legal formation and the nature of the ruler’s powers in this period are included in the history of political thought. Another topic that was the subject of discussion in this period was the problem of reproduction of the empire and the financial and administrative measures deemed necessary in this framework, which has been the subject of political debates on a wide range from confiscation to terror, from forced settlement to justice. It can be said that the imperial regime, the foundations of which were laid during the reign of Bayezid I, continued to develop by institutionalizing and developing capillary connections, in this framework, the development in subjects such as property, taxation, concentration of rent income, structuring of the military and bureaucratic apparatus and cultural policies continued in a similar way until the end of Bayezid II period. In this period, the geographical area and organizational structure dominated by the imperial authority became an object of knowledge, the fictions of history and identity became clear, the authority of the ruler was mystified, and his powers were discussed in detail. It is also noteworthy that during the reign of Bayezid II, the rights and status of local landowners were restored in order to eliminate the damage caused by the previous period of rapid empire building. The development of this regime form also limited the rights and autonomy of social groups such as nomads, taxable peasants, antinomian dervish groups, small fief holders, and damaged their status. For this reason, it is understood that a series of rural rebellion and resistance movements emerged under the leadership of these social segments from the 1416 revolts to the beginning of the 17th century. In this context, Ottoman political thought aimed to detail the structure of the state, to regulate the distribution of positions connected with the state, to regulate access to rent and status, and to make sense of and suppress resistance movements. To make a comparison within this framework, while the main antagonist of political thoughts in the first period is the landowning Christian ruling classes, this element turns into *sûfî* groups resisting the state authority, members of the

ulama, local Muslim dynasties and Tatar invaders in the second period. In the third phase discussed, the peasant rebels, mystique dervishes, nomads and the Qizilbash movement, which constitute an alternative political project against the empire, constitute the main antagonist of political thought. This basic antagonism also corresponds to a scheme of both inter and intra class struggle. The determination of the ways to be followed in the face of these social conflict lines is also related to the answer to the question of how the rent and social status will be divided. The development or reformation of imperial authority is also part of a political vision of the division of rights and status among local landowners, timariot *sipâhîs*, frontier warriors, and the Janissary army. Similarly, the development of Islamic legal formation constitutes a political path that reveals irreconcilable contradictions between tribal traditions/autonomy, taxation patterns, conditional property forms and *waqfs*, state possessions and ideological codes of *sûfî* circles. In this context, the Islamic or mystical grounding of the emperor's authority also brings problems such as the restriction of the ruler's policies by the ulama or *sûfî* circles, the rights and status of the secular administrators, and the control of the fiscalist tendencies of the state etc. Similarly, sect-based Islamic preferences and investments in ideology-production also reveal some contradictions between the popular support of rulers and the structure of intra-class balances. In any case, the development of the imperial regime, its financing and regulation create a relational sphere that requires all social classes and strata to take positions according to both general class interests and their particular class and strata position/status. In this case, the multiple positioning of each social class and stratum also forms the basis for the existence of contradictory political ideas with multiple levels, references and subtexts.

Returning to the chess metaphor, it is possible to talk about three main elements of Ottoman political thought in the early imperial period. These elements consist of openings, strategies and tactical moves -as in a chess game. The formation principles of all three elements are based on both diachronic and synchronic principles. Accordingly, on the chessboard dominated by the rentier mode of production, every political actor takes a position in favor of or against their function and position in this mode of production. Actors historicize their own positions in accordance with this position and, taking into account other positions, make a declaration of will that includes claims of political rights and status. It is possible to liken this initial positioning to chess openings. A particular chess opening contains both previous game experiences and the theoretical expression of these experiences, furthermore, it imposes a certain way of spreading the

pieces on the game board and develops this position according to the position of the opponent. A similar situation can be seen in the history of political thought. When political actors put forward a certain political thought, they first take care to place it in a legitimate position where they can defend their own social position and develop their positions in relation to the positions of other actors. Two ideal opening positions of political actors can be mentioned in Ottoman political thought. While the first of these accepts the idea of order as the main source of legitimacy, the second is based on religious provisions. For example, approaches that emphasize the customary authority of the ruler base the existence of the state, the authority of the ruler, the duties of the army and bureaucracy on the idea of the world order. The distinctive point of this approach is that while bringing the idea of order to the forefront, it presents it together with the ideas of balance between different social classes and strata, general interests of people and customary administration. Secondly, the approaches that bring religious legitimacy to the fore are based on interpreting the meaning of worldly activities within a certain religious vision. The indicated religious vision is shaped with reference to basic ideas such as the perfection of the soul, the dissemination of religious belief, and happiness in the hereafter. Both positions may have arguments that articulate and diverge from each other historically, and the social segments they represent differ from each other. While it is determined that the social segments that embrace the first argument are mostly composed of civil and military administrators who hold government offices, the second approach is dominant in the ulama and *sūfī* circles. In addition, within this framework, the positions of landowners, *timar* holders, merchants and urban small producers oscillate between these two approaches. Whether these two approaches include or negate each other is also an issue that needs to be emphasized. The institutionalization of the state along with the development of the imperial regime united the representatives of both approaches within the same organizational structure and around common general class-based interests. In this case, while the idea of order is formulated under a religious overdeterminer, the implementation of religious orders can also constitute the content of a customary rule. On the other hand, these two approaches can take a critical view of each other, especially based on the argument which organized around the idea of 'disruption of order'. For example, messianic movements build the idea of a new social order within the framework of religious mysticism, based on the argument that the social order is dislocated. In another example, social segments that are the subject of Sharia knowledge can make the idea of disruption

of the worldly order a part of a religious and moral reformation project. On the other hand, the resistance movements of *sûfi* circles and state-centered criticisms about the corruption in judicial practices can identify the re-establishment of the order with a bureaucratic reform idea or spirituel-moral revival project. In the final analysis, both approaches articulate at the point of reproduction of the privileged position of the ruling classes, or diverge at the point of defending or representing the particular interests of different social strata. In this respect, the starting point of an important part of political thought is to protect the privileges of the ruling classes by considering its social legitimacy, and to represent the particular interests of the social segment defended within this structure. On the other hand, it is understood that the social segments that resisted the ruling classes organized around the Ottoman dynasty also tried to operate the religious legitimacy ground in this political thought structure in their favor. In this context, the history of political thought in the Ottoman Empire has a wide range of examples, from theological elaboration of religious ideology to its parodied versions or its translations into a counter-ideology form.

Secondly, the constitutive element of political thought is strategic planning. In general, it is possible to define the concept of strategy as a mereological construction in which the relationship between the part and the whole is established. The establishment of the element of strategy in political thought means that this political thought combines or separates general, particular and individual contexts, and produces strategic information, historical narrative or discourse for certain social segments within this political plan. Three basic strategic configurations have been included in the forms of political discourse discussed throughout this thesis. The first of these is the representation of a strategic alliance established between declassified groups, religious circles and the ruler in political thought. Although the written sources of the first and authentic examples of this strategic framework are quite limited, it is possible to come across such examples, for example, in Ahmedî, especially at the threshold of the 15th century. In this strategic discourse, while the military activity in frontiers aimed gain booty constitutes the general reference point, the clarification of the functions and status of the warrior groups, the ruler and the religious circles (jurists and *sûfis*) as the elements of this activity is the subject of the strategy in question. The second strategic configuration is formulated on the basis of the sharing of rent income among different social segments. This form of strategic discourse has developed within the framework of the discussions on the direct and indirect sharing of rent incomes and their usage

areas. At the heart of this strategic form is the search for the continuation of productive activities—and thus rent-based exploitation. The continuation of production activities makes it possible to implement taxes and its share within dominant classes in kind or in cash. However, problems such as how these activities will be organized (*timar*, tax farming, etc.), their legal status, the rights of direct producers and rentier classes, the problems in monetization and accumulation of rent income, and the relations between social segments benefiting from rent income were discussed in strategic terms in order to reproduce the social formation. Most of the examples of political thought discussed throughout this thesis have been formulated in this strategic plan and can be termed as rentier social formation-based formal unity projects. The third strategic plan emerges in the lines of development of state organization, bureaucratic control, discipline and resistance against it. This strategic plan first includes an index of the state's financial resources, organizational chart, administrative units, and ideological formation. The identification and production of knowledge of the ideological and organizational form of the state and its allies constitute a crucial need to manage the internal and external tensions around the expansion lines of the imperial regime. The expansion of the empire and the elaboration of its administrative function result in the visibility of the resistance against the power relations that emerged and intensified within the same framework. In this respect, harmonizing the organized power, identity and ideology of the ruling class against the centers of resistance corresponds to a state-centered strategic vision.

Third, the last of the constitutive elements of political thought is discursive tactics. Combinations made between pieces are the basis of tactical moves in a chess game. Similarly, examples from the history of political thought make use of various discourse combinations to encode the political message they contain in linguistic medium and convey them to the targeted social segments. There are three main categories used in these tactical combinations: (i) emotional imagination, (ii) rational justification, (iii) historical narratives. Examples of political thought in the Ottoman Empire frequently make use of all three forms of discourse, but it is possible to talk about the existence of specific categories in which these forms are concentrated. Considering the examples of political thought, it is understood that the examples in which the emotional imagination form is used most intensely are concentrated in war narratives and hagiographic anecdotes. The depiction of battle scenes in war narratives and the impressive prominence of certain commanders, military groups or rulers (or, on the contrary, accusing them of cowardice, etc.) constitute discursive forms that refer to

status relations and are suitable for repetition in oral culture. Similarly, the depiction of the spoils of war or the description of the practices of terror include emotional representations aimed at creating collective motivation for military activities or depoliticizing resistance movements. Moreover, examples of miracles in hagiographic narratives constitute examples of political thought that includes both status and will representations as a discursive tactic that centers on the feeling of bewilderment. The daily circulation of such discourses (among the members of the ruling class, the soldiers, the townspeople, or the peasants) is the prerequisite for their ability to perform their political functions. For this reason, the language of such discourse examples is far from theoretical, can be circulated easily, and is loaded with emotion-based descriptions. While there are poetic indications in this form of discourse, the emotional coding of relations such as authority-dominance-hierarchy, not justification, constitutes the basis of political tactic. It would be appropriate to examine the rational justification form as the second political discourse tactic. The characteristic of rational-justification-based political discourses is that they present or criticize a particular political action, presupposition, or form of authority by justifying it. The justification in question is based on religious, rational, traditional or experience-based premises. The existence of the justification form of discourse shows that such discourses are built for a certain political decision-making mechanism or authority. Such discursive tactics are heavily involved in theoretical political thought and especially in examples of *siyâsetnâmes*, partly becoming a part of historical narratives. The construction of a specific justification essentially means the representation of the social segments that are the bearers of that policy, and the criticism of a specific justification means the criticism of the social segment that is its actor. In this respect, justification discourse is also used as a principle of verbal agreement in alliances and struggles between ruling strata and fractions of the ruling class. Finally, historical narratives constitute the most common medium in which examples of political thought were written down in the Ottoman Empire. As a discursive tactic, at the root of the historic narrative lies the relationship with pre-modern forms of legitimacy. In pre-modern social formations where the form of legitimacy based on tradition was common, the knowledge of authority, identity and political structures were carried in written or oral cultural products that determine the tradition. In this respect, historical narratives not only identify certain political practices or political mentalities, but also establish their legitimacy by providing their historical continuity. Although the target audience of historical narratives differs, they generally

construct the identity of the ruling class within administrative practices and genealogical narratives, and persuade the ruled classes to accept the social status of the ruling classes and a particular idea of 'world order'. On the other hand, another feature of historical narratives is that they contain representations of both historical continuity and discontinuity. Accordingly, while the narrative of continuity is identified with the idea of order, discontinuity is subject to political criticism as an example of disorder or corruption.

As a final conclusion, a wide theoretical discussion, historical and contextual analysis and thematic synthesis were made on Ottoman history and political thought throughout this thesis. The result that emerges throughout this analysis is that Ottoman political thought in the early imperial period did not present a homogeneous unity, although it included common themes and debates. In other words, the examined examples of political thought refer to a basis such as the general scheme of class domination and the common general interests of the ruling classes, but always make explicit or implicit references to the particular interests, rights and status of certain social segments. As a direct result of this analysis, it can be claimed that political thoughts in Ottoman society cannot be regarded as belonging directly to a religious, ethnic or traditional cultural formation. On the contrary, although examples of political thought are formulated in relation to thought traditions and forms before them, they generally function within the framework of their social structure, political problems and power relations. In this framework, political ideas are political phenomena that include the claims of rights of certain social segments, representations of status and will. When the political ideas formulated in the Ottoman society are examined in this theoretical context, it is understood that the political thoughts developed around social contradictions to the extent of the development of class domination and the state. The traces of the lines of development of the said power relations crystallize in the political discourse of the social segments that both support and resist it.

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APPENDICES

A. CURRICULUM VITAE

OZAN EKİN DERİN

Address:

Email:

Phone:

EDUCATION

2013-2016 **Master's Degree**

Middle East Technical University, Department of Media and Cultural Studies

Thesis Title: Kadro Movement and Its Political Practice in the Context of Early Republican Era

Advisor: Prof. Dr. Necmi Erdoğan

2007-2013 **Bachelor's Degree**

Middle East Technical University, Department of Political Science and Public Administration

WORK EXPERIENCE

2014-ongoing **Research Assistant**

Middle East Technical University, Department of Media and Cultural Studies

REFEREED ARTICLES

Derin, O. E. (2023). Rossum'un Evrensel Robotları Lüks Komünizminden Tanrının Gazabına Gelecek Vizyonlarını Güncel Siyasette Yeniden Konumlandırmak. *Sosyoloji Araştırmaları Dergisi* (in press).

CONFERENCE PAPERS

Derin, O. E. (2023, May). Geleceğin Sosyolojisine Bir Prolegomena: Çapek Tiyatrosu'ndan Robotik Ütopya Dersleri, *Rossumovi Univerzalni Roboti*. Paper presented at Geleceğin Sosyolojisi, Sosyolojinin Geleceği Konferansı, Başkent Üniversitesi, Ankara, Türkiye.

Derin, O. E. (2023, September). Initiating The Ottoman Political Thought: Aşık Paşa's Garib-name. Paper presented at Turkologentag 2023, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria.

Derin, O. E. & Bozdoğan, M. (2023, September). Tilkinin Yolculuğu: Doğanın ve Topluluğun Düzeni Üzerine İki Halk Hikâyesi. Paper presented at Turkologentag 2023, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria.

LANGUAGES

Turkish (native), English (fluent), Ottoman Turkish (reading skill), Ancient Greek (reading skill), Russian (reading skill), French (Beginner).

B. TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu tez çalışması Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun erken döneminde siyasal düşüncelerin gelişimini, yapısını ve içeriğini tespit etmeyi ve siyasal düşünceleri içerisinde geliştiği tarihsel, toplumsal ve entelektüel bağlama atıfla yorumlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Tezin dönemsal kapsamı Osmanlı siyasal düşünce örneklerinin tespit edilebildiği on dördüncü yüzyıldan başlamakta ve on altıncı yüzyılın başında sona ermektedir. Tez kapsamının bu şekilde sınırlandırılmasının temel sebebi on altıncı yüzyıl ve sonrasında ortaya çıkan siyasal düşünce biçimlerinin akademik alanda pek çok nitelikli çalışmaya konu olmasına karşın erken dönemin yeterince incelenmemiş olması ve bu alanda yapılacak bir katkıya Osmanlı toplumsal yapısı ve siyasal düşüncesinin anlaşılması bakımından ihtiyaç bulunmasıdır. Bu çerçevede işaret edilen tarihsel dönemdeki birincil kaynaklar siyasal düşüncelerin formüle edildiği, iletildiği veya tartışıldığı mecralar olarak kabul edilerek tez kapsamı içerisinde değerlendirilmiş ve sistematik olarak çözümlenmiştir.

Tez araştırması ve metnin inşasında kompozit bir metodoloji kullanılmıştır. İlk olarak belirtilen döneme tarihlenen siyâsetnâmeler, nasîhatnâmeler, menâkıbnâmeler, tasavvufî eserler, Şer'î ilimler üzerine eserler, gazavâtnâmeler, seyahatnâmeler, tarih eserleri, edebiyat eserleri, bilimsel eserler, mektuplar, hatıratlar, fütüvvetnâmeler, örfî hukuk derlemeleri, felsefî metinler, ve kısmen mimari eserler, yazıtlar ve sikkelerin içerdikleri siyasal düşünce örnekleri tespit edilmiştir. İkinci olarak bu örneklerde yer alan siyasal düşünce fragmanlarının anlamı, içerisinde bulunduğu tarihsel gelenek ve kendi dönemlerinin siyasal ve toplumsal yapısı içerisinde çözümlenmiştir. Son olarak belirli bir dönemde yer alan siyasal düşünce örneklerinin birbirleri ile olan ilişkisi eşsüremli ve artsüremli olarak incelenip toplumsal yapının değişimi bakımından yeniden konumlandırılmaya çalışılmıştır. Son tahlilde ele alınan siyasal düşünce örneklerinin hem içerisinde geliştikleri düşünsel gelenek içerisinde, hem mevcut toplumsal yapı ve siyasal ilişkiler içerisinde hem de birer düşünce ürünü olarak kendi entelektüel bağlamlarında ortaya çıkan toplumsal anlamları bütünlüklü bir şekilde ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır.

Bu tez çalışması sekiz temel bölümden oluşmaktadır. Bu bölümlerin ilki siyasetin yapısının, siyasal düşüncelerin varlık koşullarının ve siyasal düşünceler tarihi araştırmalarında metodoloji sorunlarının teorik olarak irdelenmesine ayrılmıştır. İkinci bölümde ise toplumsal yapı problemi ve Osmanlı toplumsal yapısı hakkındaki teorik ve

tarihsel yaklaşımlar ayrıntılı olarak incelenmiştir. Bu bölümlerde literatüre yapılan temel katkı Osmanlı toplumsal yapısının rantıye üretim tarzı kavramı altında yeni bir çözümlenmesinin sunulması ve bu üretim tarzı ile siyasal düşünceler yapısal özellikleri arasındaki ilişkinin çözümlenmesidir. İkinci olarak Osmanlı devletinin erken-devlet biçiminden imparatorluk rejimine doğru gelişimi yeni bir bakış açısıyla analiz edilmiş ve imparatorluk biçimini bir siyasal rejim olarak tanımlamayı mümkün kılmak üzere yeni bir kavram olan bürokratik otarşi kavramı önerilmiştir. Tezin üçüncü ve dördüncü bölümlerinde Ankara Muharebesi ve Fetret dönemine değin Osmanlı devletinin gelişimi, çeşitli toplumsal kesimler arasındaki ittifak ve çatışma hatları ve siyasal düşüncelerin gelişim çizgileri detaylı olarak ele alınmaktadır. Bu meyanda özellikle dönemin siyasal düşünce yapısında yer bulan daire-i adalet modeli, dört unsur teorisi, çadır, beden ve çoban metaforları karşılaştırmalı olarak incelenmektedir. İlgili bölümlerde bu model ve metaforların tarihsel bağlamı, içerdikleri vurgu farkları, kısmi değişikliklerle yeniden formüle edilmiş biçimleri ve işaret ettikleri toplumsal sınıf ve statü ilişkileri detaylı bir şekilde ele alınmıştır. Tezin beşinci bölümü bir bütün olarak Ankara Muharebesi ve sonrasında ortaya çıkan siyasal problemlere ayrılmış olup, şehzadeler arasındaki taht mücadelesinin ve direniş hareketlerinin toplumsal yapı içerisindeki konumu ve siyasal düşünceler tarihindeki izdüşümleri kaynaklar karşılaştırmalı olarak kullanılarak incelenmiştir. Tezin altıncı ve yedinci bölümlerinde özellikle on beşinci yüzyılın ortasından itibaren siyasal sistemin kurumsal yapısını ve imparatorluk rejiminin kuruluşu problemi merkeze alınmakta bu çerçevede özellikle II. Mehmet dönemi sonuna değin siyasal düşüncelerin konusu ve biçiminin nasıl şekillendiğini tematik olarak irdelemektedir. Nihayet tezin sekizinci bölümünde II. Bayezid döneminde siyasal düşüncelerin gelişim çizgileri imparatorluk rejiminin yapısı, bölgesel mücadeleler ve kimlik inşası problemleri etrafında yorumlanarak ortaya konulmaktadır. Tezin sonuç bölümünde ise Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun erken döneminde siyasal düşünceler ve toplumsal yapıya dair yürütülen analiz netleştirilerek literatürdeki diğer yaklaşıma tarzlarından farklı olarak çalışmanın ortaya koyduğu sonuçlara kısaca değinilmektedir.

Tezin genel yapısı göz önünde bulundurulduğunda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda siyasal düşüncelerin gelişim çizgilerinin iki temel tarihsel kategori altında geliştiği ve bu kategorilerin içerisinde buldukları tarihsel koşullar altında pek çok alt başlık ve içerik kazandığı görülmektedir. Bu kategorilerden ilki özellikle on beşinci yüzyıl öncesinde varlığını önemli ölçüde hissettiren ve akisleri en azından on beşinci yüzyıl

ortasına kadar azalarak siyasal ilişkilere tesir eden erken devletin gelişimi ve aşılması sürecine tekabül etmektedir. İkinci kategori ise imparatorluk rejiminin kurulması sürecinde ortaya çıkan toplumsal çelişkiler, mücadeleler ve siyasal rejiminin özgül iktisadi, idari ve ideolojik dayanaklarına tekabül eden tarihsel evreyi içermektedir. Bu iki kategorinin içsel çelişkileri ve dayandıkları toplumsal ilişki biçimleri tez çalışması boyunca analiz edilmiş ve ilk kategoriden ikinci kategoriye geçiş süreci siyasal düşünceler tarihi merkeze alınarak anlaşılmaya çalışılmıştır. Her iki kategorinin de içerdikleri toplumsal ilişki ve çelişkilerin açıklanması ve birinci kategoriden ikinci kategoriye doğru gelişen tarihsel sürecin analizi tezin genel konusunu oluşturduğu ölçüde üzerinde durulmaya değer bir mesele teşkil etmektedir.

İlk kategoriden başlamak gerekirse Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesinin gelişiminin erken dönemi, özünde Osmanlı devletinin gelişimi ve rantıye sınıfın toplumsal iktidarını kurması problemi ile karakterize olmaktadır. Bu evrede siyasal alanın gelişiminde etkili olan toplumsal kesimler genel olarak şu şekilde sıralanabilirler: Osmanlı hanedanı, Ahiler, ulema mensupları, sūfi çevreleri, gaziler, kapıkulu ordusu, toprak sahipleri ve tımarlı sipahiler. Bu kesimlerin kendi aralarında yaptıkları ittifaklar, kendi içsel çelişkilerini ve madun toplumsal kesimlerle olan iktidar ilişkilerini yönetme biçimlerinin bir sonucu olarak Osmanlı devleti, bir erken devlet örneği olarak on dördüncü yüzyıl boyunca gelişme imkânı bulmuştur. Bu çerçevede erken devletin gelişimi ve bunun mütekamil bir forma kavuşması kendisini birkaç temel problem üzerinde görünür kılmaktadır. İlk olarak gaza ideali ve gazilik temsili erken devlet biçiminin gelişimi ile bağlantılı bir problem olarak Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesinde yer bulmaktadır. Bu problem bir yanıla sınırlarda savaşılan toplulukların katıldığı toprak ve mal kazanımlarının devam etmesini konu edinirken, diğer yanıla da bu savaşçı toplulukların yerleşik sınıflar lehine olmak üzere kontrol edilmesini ve vergilendirilmesini amaçlamaktadır. Bu bakımdan Osmanlı hükümdarlarının gazi hükümdarlar olarak çizilen portreleri bir yanıla onların sınır bölgelerinin savaşçıları üzerinde otoritelerini sağlamak, bir yanıla da savaşçı hükümdarlar olarak yerleşik sınıflar üzerinde siyasal meşruyetlerini sağlamlaştırmak için kurgulanmaktadır. Dönemin siyasal düşüncesinde karşılık bulan bir diğer başlık ise Osmanlı hükümdarları ve diğer toplumsal kesimler arasındaki ilişkinin sistematik olarak düzenlenmesi ve devlet örgütünün dolayımından geçirilmesi sürecinde karşılığını bulmaktadır. Bu çerçevede Osmanlı hanedanı ve hükümdarları ile onlara tabi kesimler arasında iktisadi, kültürel ve siyasal bağımlılık ilişkilerinin geliştirildiği görülmektedir. Özellikler

vergilendirme, nüfus politikası, dini çevrelerle yapılan ittifaklar ve toprak dağıtımını gibi başlıklar altında gelişen ve siyasal düşünceler tarihinde yansımaları bulan bu ilişkiler, Osmanlı hükümdarlarının otoritesinin ve askeri gücünün belirli bir düzeyi aşması ile beraber birbiri ile eklemlenmiş sistematik bir iktidar ilişkileri ağına dönüşmektedir. Bu çerçevede erken devlet biçiminin gelişmesinin son evresine varıldığı, devlet organizasyonunda ara katmanların oluştuğu ve hükümdarın otoritesinin kandaşlık ilişkileri aşan yeni bir zemine yerleştiği anlaşılmaktadır.

İkinci olarak on dördüncü yüzyılın sonu ve on beşinci yüzyılın başı itibariyle Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesinin sistematik bir şekilde geliştiğini, yeni konu ve temalar etrafında yürütülen düşünsel inşa ve tartışmaların çeşitlendiğini saptamak mümkündür. Bu evrede dikkat çeken hususlardan ilki Şer'i hukukun kullanım sahasının gelişmesi ve medrese kökenli toplumsal tabakanın toplumsal iktidarın örgütlenmesinde hukuki, idari ve mali işlevler yüklenerek statü ve nüfuzlarını arttırmalarıdır. Bu gelişme hattı bir yanyıla toplumsal iktidarın ve yönetsel pozisyonların bölüşülmesi konusunda belirli bir mücadele temasını siyasal düşüncelerin odağına yerleştirirken, diğer yanyıla da devletin mali alanda örgütlenmesi ve idari kadroları rant gelirleri yoluyla finanse edilmesi eğilimini siyasal mücadelelerin bir parçası haline getirmektedir. Bu dönemde yürütülen tartışmalar gözden geçirildiğinde özellikle hükümdarların çevresinde bulunan ulema kökenli danışmanların öncülük ettiği siyasalara ve kadı kararlarına ve vergi tahakkuklarına yönelik eleştirilerin özellikle sûfi çevreleri tarafından dile getirildiği görülmektedir. Öte yandan özellikle ulema kökenli yazarlar tarafından toprak ve ganimet gelirleri üzerindeki yeni vergilendirme usulleri ve devletin idari kapasitesinin genişletilmesi savunulmakta ve hem dini hem de seküler argümanlar yordamıyla temellendirilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Söz konusu tartışmanın bir diğer boyutu devletin mali yapısı ve özellikle merkezi bir hazinenin teşekkülü konusunda yoğunlaşmakta ve I. Bayezid'in Timur karşısında yenilgiye uğraması sonrası geriye dönük bir eleştiri konusu haline gelmektedir. Meseleye genel olarak yaklaşıldığında işaret edilen çatışma hattının toprak rejimi, vakıflar ve çeşitli gelir kalemleri üzerindeki tartışmalarda da etkili olduğu açıktır ve bu yönüyle sınır savaşıları, hükümdara bağlı olarak örgütlenen yaya ordusu, sipahiler, devlete angaje olan ve olmayan sûfi grupları ve ulema arasındaki toplumsal mücadelelerin bir uzantısı olarak şekillenmektedir. Yapısal planda bu şekilde konumlanan siyasal problem Ahmedî ve Şeyhoğlu Mustafa gibi dönem yazarlarının kalemlerinde de birbirlerine yönelen eleştirel yorumlarda bireysel düzleme kadar etkisini sürdürmektedir.

Bu dönemin siyasal düşüncesi incelenirken dikkate değer bir farklılaşma da çeşitli toplumsal iktidar modellerinin ve metaforların da sistematik bir şekilde siyasal tartışmaların bir aracı haline gelmiş olmasıdır. Bu modellerden ilki olan *Dâire-i Adâlet* modeli idari, askeri, iktisadi ve adli işlevleri bir bütün olarak tanımlayan katmanlaşmış bir toplum şeması kurgulayarak toplumun biçimsel birliğini hem bir bütün hem de farklı grupların tikel işlevleri bakımından ortaya koymaktadır. Tez çalışmasında bu modelin antik Mezopotamya ve İran siyasal kültüründeki kökenlerine dikkat çekilmiş ve Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesi içerisinde ortaya çıkan varyasyonları çözümlenmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu çözümlemede ulaşılan dikkat çekici sonuç, işaret edilen modelin ne eşsüremli ve de artsüremli olarak tek bir örneğin tekrarından ibaret olmadığı, tam tersine temsil ettiği toplumsal sınıf, statü grubu veya tabakanın çıkarları doğrultusunda özgün vurgularla yeniden kurgulandığıdır. Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesinin erken dönemi odağa alındığında bu vurgu farklılıklarının hükümdar-yönlü, sınır savaşçısı gazi gruplar merkezli veya ulema tabakasını ön plana çıkartan örnekleri tezin ilgili bölümde incelenmiştir. İkinci toplumsal iktidar modeli ise devlet organizasyonunu merkeze alan çadır metaforu kullanılarak inşa edilmiştir. Çadır motifi siyasal söylemin, organizasyonun ve imgelemin bir ögesi olarak hem Yahudi ve İslam inançlarında, hem de Türk-Moğol bozkır kültüründe yer bulan kadim bir geçmişe sahiptir. Bu motifin bir siyasal model olarak Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesi içerisinde kullanılması, çadırın bölümlerine ve bu bölümlerin birbiri ile olan hiyerarşik ilişkisine atıfla devlet örgütlenmesinin yapısını, bu örgütlenme içerisindeki idari konumların statüsünü ve bu statüyü sahiplenen toplumsal kesimlerin toplumun biçimsel birliği içerisindeki konumu söylemsel olarak yapılandırmak amacıyla gerçekleşmiştir. Çadır metaforunun Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesi içerisinde nasıl kullanıldığı ve dönemselsel özgüllükler kazanıp kazanmadığı sorununun açıklığa kavuşturmak için, metaforun sistematik olarak kullanıldığı Necmeddîn-i Dâye, Şeyhoğlu Mustafa ve Karahisârî'ye ait metinler karşılaştırılarak incelenmiştir ve yüksek askeri bürokrasi, yerel beyler ve hükümdar arasındaki ilişkinin siyasal yapıyı yansıtacak şekilde birden fazla şekilde kurgulandığı sonucuna varılmıştır. Üçüncü olarak dört element teorisi ve benden metaforu etrafında şekillenen siyasal düşünce biçimi incelenmiştir. Dört element teorisi (*anâsır-ı erbaa*, *ahlât-ı erbaa*) ve bununla bağlantılı olarak inşa edilen beden metaforunun kökenleri Sümer-Babil ve antik Mısır mitolojisinden Hitit büyüculük ekollerine, Türk mitlerine ve Nordik mitolojiye kadar çok geniş bir tarihsel arka plana sahiptir ve eşbiçimli olarak farklı kültürlerde ortaya çıkabilmektedir. Söz konusu mitik köken veya kökenler antik

felsefe ve tıp uygulamasının öğeleri haline gelmişler, özellikle Aristoteles ve Galenus tarafından geliştirilerek yaygınlık kazanmışlardır. Felsefe, tıp teorisi ve uygulamaları yoluyla İslam düşüncesine giren bu düşünce formu hem Meşşâî felsefesi hem de çeşitli sūfî ekollerinde yeni bir teoloji içerisinde konumlandırmışlardır. Osmanlı siyaset ve tasavvuf düşüncesi işaret edilen entelektüel geleneğin bir devamı olarak bu formları miras almış ve güncel toplumsal gerçekliği dikkate alarak yeniden yorumlamıştır. Ele alınan dönemde formüle edilen siyasal düşünce örnekleri incelendiğinde Osmanlı düşünürlerinin söz konusu iktidar modelini toplumsal sistemin yeniden üretilmesi için zorunlu gördükleri toplumsal kesim ve ilişkilerin şematik bir sunumunu yapmak, dahası bu şemaya dahil olan daha küçük toplumsal grup ve mesleklerin de işlev ve statülerini düzenlemek amacıyla kullandıkları görülmektedir. İncelenen farklı örneklerde toplumsal yapının yeniden üretilmesi arayışı toplumsal kesimler arasında dengenin kurulması fikrine bağlı olarak geliştirilmekte ve bu dengenin yönetilmesi açısından otoritenin tesisinde farklı toplumsal kesimler lehine vurgu farklılıkları ortaya çıkmaktadır. Son olarak ele alınan dönemde siyasal düşüncelerin formüle edilmesinde ve aktarılmasında çoban metaforunun yaygın olarak kullanıldığı görülmektedir. Öncelikle bu metaforun antik Mezopotamya kültürü, Yahudi, Hristiyan ve İslam dini metinleri ve bozkır kültürü içerisindeki kökenleri incelenmiş ve Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesindeki yeri çeşitli gelenekler bakımından tespit edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu çerçevede çoban metaforunun kullanım tarzı hükümdar ve uyruklar arasındaki doğrudan ilişkiler ve belirli bir toplumsal sistemdeki toplumsal sınıf ve katmanlar arasındaki ilişkinin hükümdarın otoritesi altında düzenlenme tarzı bakımlarından çözümlenmiş ve tespit edilen çeşitli varyantları yorumlanmıştır.

On beşinci yüzyıl Osmanlı siyasal yapısında ve düşüncesinde başat etkiye sahip olan bir dönüşüm dönemidir. Bu yüzyılın ilk çeyreği Osmanlı idaresinin Timur işgali altında çözülmesi, şehzadeler arasındaki taht mücadelesi, Anadolu ve Rumeli'deki farklı toplumsal kesimlerin birbirlerine karşı iktidar mücadelesi, yönetici sınıfların kendi özgül çıkarları etrafında örgütlenme arayışları, toplumsal sistemin restorasyonu, reformu veya ilgası üzerinde yoğunlaşan mücadelelerin derin izleriyle karakterize olmaktadır. Dönemin siyasal ilişkilerini şekillendiren bu yoğun ve karmaşık toplumsal çatışma hatları siyasal düşünceler alanını da doğrudan ve dolaylı olarak şekillendirmektedir. Bu tarihsel dönemde siyasal düşünce örneklerinin yoğunlaştığı konular genel olarak I. Bayezid dönemindeki askeri, idari ve mali uygulamaların eleştirisi, toprak sahipleri, sınır savaşıcı gruplar, ulema ve Kapıkulları arasında iktidar

paylaşımı, devlet örgütünün restorasyonu, köylü isyanları, merkezi otoritenin kurulmasında etkili olan siyasal eğilimler ve otorite paydaşlarının kompozisyonu sorunu şeklinde sıralanabilir. Bu dönemin sona erişi Osmanlı devletinin çözülmeye uğramayan bileşenleri merkeze alınarak yeniden inşası, imparatorluk rejimine dayanak olacak iktisadi ve idari yapıların geliştirilmesi ve siyasa oluşturma ve yürütme otoritesinin tesisinde özgül birtakım yapıların ortaya çıkması ile birlikte gerçekleşmektedir. Kısaca bunlardan bahsetmek gerekirse askeri planda Yeniçeri birliklerinin, idari planda ise Kapıkullarının ve ulemanın etkisi eskiye göre artacak, toprak sahibi kesimler ise bu grupları sınır savaşı ve tımar sahibi toplumsal kesimlere karşı destekleyeceklerdir. Bu çerçevede söz konusu toplumsal kesimlerin çıkarları savaş ve barış partisi ismi verilebilecek iki ayrı eğilim içerisinde temsil edilecek ve bu karmaşık yapının idaresinde Divan'da yer alan paşaların ittifakı etkili olacaktır. Son tahlilde bu yeni siyasal yapı, onun iç çelişkileri ve gelişme imkanları ile birlikte siyasal düşünce örneklerinin konusu olmaktadır.

İlk olarak bu yeni siyasal yapının on beşinci yüzyılın ortasından itibaren en yüksek formuna kavuştuğunu ve bunun etrafında gelişen siyasal düşünce biçimlerinin de özgün örneklerini verdiklerini söylemek yanlış olmayacaktır. Bu çerçevede siyasal düşünce örnekleri belirli bir imparatorluk ideolojisi inşa etmekten idari kadroların disipline edilmesine, toplumsal katmanlaşma şemasının ortaya konulmasından iktisadi ve siyasal yeniden üretim döngülerinin formüle edilmesine ve nihayet seküler siyasetin bir imkân ve gereklilik olarak ortaya konulmasına değin çeşitlilik göstermektedir. Genel olarak bu başlıklar altında ortaya çıkan siyasal düşünce örnekleri imparatorluk rejiminin temel özelliği olan bürokratik otarşi karakterini yansıtmakta, daha açık bir ifadeyle bir yanıyla Osmanlı hükümdarı üzerinde cisimleşen merkezi ve belirleyici otoriteyi söylemsel alanda inşa etmekte iken diğer yanıyla da devlet örgütünün yapısal otoritesini yansıtmakta ve bunun düzenlenmesine dair söylemsel düzenekler içermektedir.

Ele alınan dönemde siyasal düşünce sistematüğinde ortaya çıkan söz konusu yeni içeriğın ilk kategorisi hükümdarın otoritesini dayanakları ve kapsamı bakımından geliştiren kurgular olarak tanımlanabilir. Bu türden kurguların dört alt kategorisi bulunmaktadır. İlk olarak bu dönemde kaleme alınan siyasal düşünce örneklerinde Osmanlı hükümdarları tanrısal işaretlerin bir tecelligâhı olarak resmedilmekte, doğumlarından savaş kararlarının alınmasına, toprak kazançlarından birtakım insan üstü olaylara ve uğurlu kabul edilen tanrısal işaretlere değin bu türden bir ilahi belirlenim ilişkisinin izleri yaşam öykülerine yerleştirilmektedir. Bu türden bir söylemsel inşa bir

yönüyle İstanbul'un fethi sonrası özellikle Doğu Avrupa üzerinde yayılan ve Müslüman nüfus üzerinde de etkili olan kıyamet beklentisini kırmak ve kitleleri İstanbul'un yeni sahibi olan hükümdarın otoritesini kabule zorlamak için oluşturulmakta, diğer yanı sıra ise imparatorluk rejiminin bir parçası olarak hükümdarın gücünü farklı toplumsal tabaka ve iktidar gruplarının üzerinde konumlandırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Öte yandan özellikle sûfi çevrelerinde bu türden aşkınlaştırıcı bir söyleme karşı geliştirilen direniş örnekleri de bulunmaktadır. Bunun sebebi sûfi çevrelerinin de benzer bir şekilde liderlerini tanrısal sırların tecelligâhı olarak betimlemesi ve dünyaya dair benzer bir mutlak otorite iddiasında bulunan bu iki toplumsal kesimin iddialarının son tahlilde uzlaşmaz hale gelmesidir. Fakat özellikle II. Bayezid dönemi ile birlikte Osmanlı hükümdarlarının da bir ermiş figürü olarak yeniden yorumlanmaları, hem onları mistik otoritenin bir kullanıcısı haline getirmiş hem de iktisadi ve politik süreçlerce de desteklenen sûfi çevreleri ve hükümdar arasındaki eklemlenmeye metafizik bir temel de kazandırmıştır. İkinci olarak bu dönemde Osmanlı hükümdarlarının kategorik olarak diğer hükümdarların üzerinde konumlandırılan ve diğer hükümdarların ilkesel olarak Osmanlı hükümdarına tabi olması gerektiğini savunan bir siyasal düşünce tarzı gelişmiştir. Bu düşünce tarzının temelinde dünya üzerinde güç sahibi olan hükümdarların belirli bir statü ilkesi çerçevesinde birbirlerinin üzerinde ya da altında yer aldıkları fikri yer almakta, Osmanlı hükümdarlarının ise özellikle İstanbul'un fethinden sonra kazandıkları statü ile diğer dünya hükümdarlarının üzerinde ve onların efendisi haline geldikleri bu çerçevede savunulmaktadır. Üçüncü olarak dönemin siyasal düşüncesinde, yukarıda işaret edilen iki maddenin bir uzantısı olarak, Osmanlı hükümdarının otoritesinin kapsadığı alan hakkında da yeni yargılara varılmıştır. Buna göre Osmanlı hükümdarının otoritesi sadece kendi tebaası üzerinde geçerli değildir, aynı zamanda bu otorite tüm İslam dünyası, Rum iklimi ve daha geniş bir değerlendirmeye tüm dünya üzerinde de kategorik olarak etkilidir. Dördüncü olarak bu dönemde Osmanlı hanedanının kökenleri üzerinde de birbirinden farklı bir seri soykütük inşası gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu inşalar genel olarak üç temel referans sistemine göre kurgulanmış olup, bu çerçevede Osmanlı hanedanının geçmişi Oğuz kabilelerine, antik Grek mitlerine veya Semitik kökene atfedilmektedir. Her üç referans sistematığı de imparatorluk nüfusunun etnik ve dini karakterine uygun olarak kurgulanmış olup hanedanın otoritesini meşrulaştırmaya hizmet etmektedir. Yukarıda işaret edilen dört alt kategoriye ek olarak Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesinde hükümdarın onuru, iradesi ve haşmeti düşüncesi üzerine inşa edilen siyasal söylem biçimini de eklemek mümkündür

ve bu söylem biçimi etrafında Osmanlı hükümdarının kararları aşkın otoritenin yeniden üretilmesi ihtiyacına uygun biçimde şekillenmektedir.

On beşinci yüzyılın ortasında Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesinde ortaya çıkan bir diğer tema ise imparatorluğun seküler idaresi problemi ile ilişkili olarak tartışılan disiplin, yeniden üretim ve adalet öğeleri etrafında gelişmektedir. Disiplin probleminin Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesi içerisinde yer bulması birkaç şekilde olmaktadır, bunlardan ilki protokol ilkeleri yoluyla devlet bürokrasisinin disiplin altına alınmasıdır. II. Mehmet'in yayınladığı teşkilat kanunnâmesi Dîvân'ın yapısını, hükümdara arzların sistematiğini, yemek ve tören usullerini tespit ederken bir yandan da hükümdarın huzurunda davranış kuralları ve statü şemasını ortaya koyarak yüksek düzeyli yöneticileri disipline etmektedir. İkinci olarak özellikle bürokratik görevler üstenen yazarlar belirli bir göreve atanma, burasının imkanlarından faydalanma ve bu görevden azledilme veya cezalandırılma durumlarının esaslarını tespit etmek ve bürokrasinin iç disiplini ile bürokratik görevlerin hukuki ve ahlaki güvenceleri arasında bir denge kurabilmek için bir seri siyasal düşünce örneği üretmişlerdir. Öte yandan kadıların ve ordunun imparatorluk idaresi tarafından disipline edilmesine yönelik tartışmalar da bu dönemde üretilen siyasal düşüncelerin bir diğer odağını teşkil etmektedir. Disiplin tartışmasına ek olarak bu dönemde ortaya çıkan bir diğer siyasal problem ise imparatorluğu bir arada tutan siyasal ve toplumsal iktidarın yeniden üretilmesi sorunu olarak tanımlanabilir. İlk olarak yeniden üretim sorunu, Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesine yansıdığı biçimiyle bir toplumsal tabakalaşma sorunu olarak ele alınmış ve siyasal iktidarın sürdürülmesi aynı zamanda toplumun ideal olarak belirli tabakalara bölünmüş hiyerarşik yapısının korunması meselesi olarak ele alınmıştır. İkinci olarak yeniden üretim sorunu devlet hazinesinin teşekkülü ve zenginliği, aynı zamanda da bunu besleyen fiskalist uygulamaların meşruiyeti sorunu olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Bu meyanda özellikle II. Mehmet döneminde büyük sayıdaki özel mülke ve vakıf toprağına devlet hesabına el konulması ve bunların tımara dönüştürülmesi, II. Bayezid döneminde ise müsadere edilen bu toprakların eski sahiplerine geri iade edilmesi siyasal düşüncelerin aleyhte ve lehte konumlanarak odaklandıkları önemli başlıkları teşkil etmektedir. Meselenin tartışıldığı üçüncü başlık ise yeniden üretimin hukuk, siyasal taktikler ve stratejiler ile adalet gibi birbirinden ayrılamaz yönlerini konu edinmektedir. Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesi on beşinci yüzyılın ikinci yarısından itibaren dikkate değer bir süre Meşşâî felsefe geleneğinin teorik etkisi altında gelişmiştir. Bu bakımdan toplumun birbirine indirgenemez öğelerden müteşekkil bir çokluk olduğu, bu öğeler

arasındaki iktisadi, siyasi ve ahlaki iliřkilerin toplumsal bütünü kurduđu, ve bu iliřkilerin iyi ve uyumlu řekilde sürdürülmesi toplumun iyiliđi ve bireylerin ahlaki geliřimi için zorunlu olduđu fikri Osmanlı siyasi düşüncesinde de yer almaktadır. Buna ek olarak özellikle çokluk ve tedbir kavramları altında Osmanlı siyasi düşüncesi siyasi otoritenin seküler amaçlarla kullanımının ve dünyevi düzen idealine dayanılarak temellendirilmesinin örneklerini vermiştir. Öte yandan siyasi iktidarın temellendirilmesinde, siyasi kararların verilmesinde ve siyasi uygulamaların denetlenmesinde İslam hukuku ve örfi hukukun ne derece belirleyiciliđe sahip olması gerektiđi sorusu, aynı zamanda bu iki hukuku formasyonun taşıyıcısı olan toplumsal gruplar arasında da bir güç mücadelesinin konusu olduđu ölçüde Osmanlı siyasi düşüncesinde de tartışmaların odađında kalmaya devam etmiştir. Siyasi iktidarın yeniden üretilmesi arayışında tartışmaların yöneldiđi diđer öğeler, bu dönem için, hükümdar deđişikliđi durumunda tahta geçiř ilkelerinin belirlenmesi ya da kardeř katli tartışması ve yerel direniř odaklarının kontrol altına alınmasından dini çevrelerle eklemlenmeye kadar uzanan geniř bir skalada siyasi taktikler řeklinde sıralanabilir. Söz konusu siyasi taktikler genel olarak tedbir kavramı altında yer almakta ve Osmanlı devletinin gelecek neslinde yer alacak olan hükümdar ve idarecilere bazen bir model sunması bazen de bu türden uygulamaların tekrarlanmasının önüne geçilmesi amacıyla kayda geçirilmektedir. Özellikle yerel halka uygulanan řiddet ve kardeř katli fikrinin meşrulařtırmaya çalışılması bu meyanda üzerinde en fazla lehte ve aleyhte siyasi söylem üretilen konular olarak dikkat çekmektedir. Bunlara ek olarak on beřinci yüzyılın sonlarına dođru adalet kavramı etrafında geliřen tartışmalar geliřkin bir içerik kazandıđından bahsetmek mümkündür. Bu tartışmalarda hükümdarın kendi kendisine karřı adil olmasından, toplumsal düzenin unsurlarına karřı adil olmasına ve bir yönetim pratiđi olarak adli, idari ve mali alanlara kadar yayılan bir adalet anlayışına deđin birden çok düzey ve yapıda adalet kavramlařtırmalarına denk gelmek mümkündür. Dahası bu kavramların bir bölümü dođrudan dođruya on beřinci yüzyıl Osmanlı Devleti'nin siyasalarını ele almak için de iřletilmiş ve örneđin II. Mehmet'in müsadere politikası adalet kavramın dayanılarak eleřtirilirken II. Bayezid'in restorasyon hamlesi aynı ölçüt kullanılarak desteklenmiştir.

Genel olarak II. Mehmet döneminin sona ermesi ve II. Bayezid'in hükümdarlıđının başlaması, Osmanlı tarihi ve siyasi düşüncesi için on altıncı yüzyılın eřiđinde tarihin iki yanına da uzanan ve özgün karakteristikler gösteren bir dönemin açılıřına tekabül etmektedir. II. Bayezid'in tahtta kaldıđı yıllar bir önceki döneme

kıyasla daha az askeri seferin gerçekleştirildiği, Şehzade Cem'in Osmanlı tahtına dair ilgisinin uzun süre kendisini hissettirdiği, Osmanlı Devleti'nin doğu sınırında Safevî Devleti'nin ortaya çıktığı, denizcilik ve uzak mesafeli ticarete olan ilginin yoğunlaştığı ve bir seri tarihçinin sarayın patronajı altında mufassal tarihler kaleme aldıkları bir döneme tekabül etmektedir. Bu dönem doğal olarak imparatorluk rejiminin bir uzantısı ve var olan siyasal ilişki kategorilerinin on beşinci yüzyıl boyunca sürdüren gelişiminin bir devamıdır ve bu sebeple on beşinci yüzyılın ortasında ortaya çıkan ideolojik, idari, mali ve siyasal izlekler bu dönemde de etkilerini derinleşerek sürdürmektedirler. On altıncı yüzyılın eşiği ismi verilebilecek bu dönemde ortaya çıkan siyasal düşünce örneklerinin formüle edildiği birkaç temel kategoriden bahsetmek mümkündür. Bu kategoriler Osmanlı devlet örgütü, yönetim altındaki iktisadi kaynaklar, yönetici sınıfın kimliği ve geçmişi ve ideolojik tercihleri yansıtan bir seri siyasal dizine tekabül etmektedir ve şu şekilde isimlendirilebilirler: (i) jeopolitik dizin, (ii) kurumsal dizin, (iii) tarihsel gösterge dizini.

İlk dizin sistematüğini kısaca özetleyecek olursak, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun hakimiyeti altındaki toprakların genişlemesi, bu topraklardan elde edilen gelirlerin çeşitlenmesi ve bunların hazine tarafından kaydedilmesinin sistematikleşmesi kendisini siyasal düşünceler tarihi içerisinde de göstermektedir. Bu dönemde kaleme alınan tarih ve edebiyat anlatılarında Osmanlıların hâkim olduğu deniz ve kara yolları, madenler, tuzlalar, değerli taş yatakları gibi detaylar yer almakta, ayrıca bu kaynakların ticarete dönük olarak üretimi, kaydedilmesi, vergilendirilmesi, sahiplik yapısı ve uzun mesafe ticaretteki önemine dair bilgiler siyasal iktidarın altyapısına dair fikir vermek adına serimlenmektedir.

İkinci olarak dönem kaynakları Osmanlı devlet örgütünün yapısı, ganimet ve toprak cinsinden varlıkların mülkiyet esasları, ve hükümdarın otoritesinin ideolojik olarak temellendirilmesi konuları üzerinde yoğunlaşan siyasal düşünce örneklerine ev sahipliği yapmaktadır. On altıncı yüzyılın başında kaleme alınan eserlerde Osmanlı devlet örgütünün dayandığı ve askerler, katipler ve hizmetliler olarak kategorize edilebilecek üç temel insan grubu ön plana çıkartılmaktadır. Bu grupların yüklendikleri işlevler, birbirlerine göre hiyerarşik konumları ve statüleri, kendi iç bölünmeleri ve mücadeleleri ayrıca siyasal düşünceler tarihinin konusu haline gelmektedir. Özellikle dönem siyasal düşüncesinde 'kalem' ve 'kılıç' sembolleriyle işaret edilen ve farklı yönetsel işlevler üstlenen iki toplumsal kesimin siyasal nüfuz ve toplumsal statü mücadelelerine geniş yer verilmektedir. İmparatorluk rejiminin gelişimine bağlı olarak

askeri alandan gelmeyen, ulema veya kalemiye kökenli yöneticilerin işlevinin ve gücünün artmış olması dönem düşüncesinde de 'kalem' ve 'kılıç' sembolleri arasındaki mücadelenin genellikle 'kalem' lehine uzlaştırılmasının temelini oluşturmaktadır. Bu insan grubunun siyasal rejimin gelişimi boyunca çeşitlenen ve derinleşen işlevi *ehl-i kalem* ismi verilen bürokratların Osmanlı maliyesinin örgütlenmesindeki önemine değinen on altıncı yüzyılın eşiğinde kaleme alınan siyasal düşünce örneklerinde açıkça gözlemlenebilmektedir. Öte yandan mali kayıtların ve mülkiyet tipolojilerinin gelişimi, siyasal düşünce içerisinde sahiplik formlarına dair standart bir anlatı biçiminin gelişimi ile sonuçlanmamış, tam tersine mülkiyet ve koşullu kullanım biçimlerinin oldukça geniş bir terminoloji içerisinde temsil edilmesi bu biçimler üzerinde belirli bir toplumsal mücadelenin sürdüğünü de siyasal düşünceler tarihi üzerinden okumayı imkân dahiline sokmuştur.

Dönem düşüncesinde yer alan ve kurumsal dizin kategorisi içerisinde değerlendirilebilecek bir diğer siyasal tartışma hattı ise Osmanlı hükümdarının otoritesinin yeni dayanak ve sembollerle geliştirilmesi ihtiyacı etrafında şekillenmektedir. Bu çerçevede on altıncı yüzyılın eşiğinde kaleme alınan Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesinde hükümdarın otoritesini temellendirmek ve bu otoritenin çerçevesini genişletmek için dört farklı kavrama ideolojik yatırım yapıldığı anlaşılmaktadır. Bu kavramlardan ilki riyâset kavramıdır. Bu kavrama göre hükümdar toplumsal otoritenin oluşumunun seküler gereklilikler tarafından belirlenmiş bir yönetsel güce sahiptir, toplumun bir arada durması hükümdarın siyasal gücüne bağlıdır ve siyasal gücün yaratılıp işletilmesi döngüsel olarak kendi varlık koşullarını yaratmaktadır. Bu çerçevede Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesinin riyaset ve siyaset kavramları etrafında bir tür *Dâire-i Riyâset* anlayışı geliştirdiği ve idare metafiziği olarak nitelendirilebilecek bir düşüncenin temellerini attığı görülmektedir. Bu görüşü İslam hukukuna aykırı bulan Şehzade Korkud'un eleştirileri ise bu dönemi karakterize eden ikinci bir siyasal düşünce hattının varlığına işaret etmektedir. İkinci olarak dönem eserlerinde derinlemesine kullanım alanı bulan diğer siyasal kavramlar halife, müçtehit ve veli kavramlarıdır. Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesinde halife ve hilafet kavramlarının kullanım biçimi on altıncı yüzyılın ilk çeyreğine değin karmaşık bir bütünlük arz etmektedir. Ele alınan dönem itibarıyla kullanılan hilafet kavramı genel olarak Sünnî hilafet teorisinin karakteristik özelliklerini göstermekte, örneğin hilafet ve saltanat kavramları bir arada kullanıldığı ölçüde bu kavramlar Hz. Muhammed'in devamcısı ve siyasal otoritesini İslam Şeriatı çerçevesinde yürüten bir siyasal otoriteyi nitelemek için

kullanılmaktadır. Kavramın bu türden bir kullanılışı, dini kuralların uygulanmasında ve kişisel özelliklerde peygambere benzemenin veya onu taklit etmenin hilafetin temel gerekliliklerinden birisi olarak kabul edildiği sünnet-merkezli bir anlayışı merkeze almaktadır. Fakat bu kavramlaştırma biçimi Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesinde yer alan yegâne kullanım biçimine tekabül etmemektedir. Özellikle İdrîs-i Bitlisî ve Firdevsî-i Rûmî'nin eserlerinde Osmanlı hükümdarını tanrısal işaretlerin taşıyıcısı, nomolojik ve nümerolojik benzerliklerce üstünlüğü işaret edilen bir kişi olarak betimleyen ve hükümdarın otoritesini dini alanda kurmak için Hurûfî analiz metotlarını kullanan bir başka yaklaşımın varlığı da göz ardı edilemez. Kısmen Şii hilafet teorilerinin etkileri görülen bu ikinci kullanım Osmanlı hükümdarlarının dini yenileyen kişiler (müçtehit) olarak nitelendirildikleri ikincil anlatımlarla da desteklenmektedir. Son olarak özellikle II. Bayezid'in ermiş/veli olarak nitelendirildiği ya da kutb olduğunun iddia edildiği metinlerin dolaşımında olması mistifiye edilmiş bir hilafet teorisinin doğmasına ve siyasal düşüncede yer bulmasına zemin hazırlamaktadır.

On altıncı yüzyılın eşiğinde kaleme alınan siyasal düşünce örneklerinin içerdiği temel söylemsel inşa kategorilerinden sonuncusu etnisite, tarih ve kimlik sorunları etrafında yoğunlaşan bir seri gösterge kümesine tekabül etmektedir. İlk olarak dönemin eserlerinde Osmanlı hakimiyeti altında bulunan ve/veya hakimiyeti altına girmeye direnen insan gruplarının etnik özellikleri üzerine geniş bir etnografik yazın oluştuğu görülmektedir. Bu yazın içerisinde Rum, Arap, İranlı, Çerkes, Tatar, Kürt, Arnavut ve Türkmen grupların etnik özellikleri siyasal bir bağlamda değerlendirilmekte ve sınıflandırılmaktadır. Genel olarak işaret edilen sınıflandırma biçimi incelendiğinde sınıflandırılan etnisitelerin medeni-vahşi ikiliği içerisinde ele alındığı ve bu gruplardan Osmanlı siyasal otoritesiyle eklemlenme veya yerel otonomisini koruma eğilimlerine göre olumlu veya olumsuz biçimde bahsedildiği görülmektedir. Osmanlı hanedanına ait soykütük inşalarında Türkmen gruplara atıfta bulunulmasına karşın bu grupların etnik gösterge üretimi içerisinde olumsuz olarak temsil edilmiş olması bir siyasal problem olarak ortaya çıkmakta ve özellikle Safevî Devleti'nin güç kazanması ile birlikte bu türden söylemlerin gücünü arttırdığı anlaşılmaktadır. Özellikle Türkmen grupların dini kurallara uymayan, asi, bozguncu ve şehir kültüründen habersiz kitleler olarak betimlenmesi, Osmanlı kimliğinin inşası bakımında güçlü bir 'öteki' teşkil etmesi bakımından dikkate değerdir. İkinci olarak etnik bağlantıların belirli bir siyasal otoritenin taşıyıcısı ve aktarıcısı olarak kullanıldığı gösterge serileri Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesi içerisinde yer bulmaktadır. On altıncı yüzyılın eşiğinde kaleme alınan siyasal

düşünce örneklerinde bu türden göstergelerin kullanıldığı iki temel anlam bağlamı bulunmaktadır. Bunlardan ilki Osmanlı hanedanının etnik geçmişi ve onun siyasal otoritesi arasındaki ilişkisi Osmanlı-Selçuklu çizgisinde inşa etmekte, ikincisi ise aynı söylemsel inşayı Osmanlı-Bizans sürekliliği içerisinde gerçekleştirmektedir. Bu ikisine ek olarak Osmanlı hükümdarları ve Hz. Muhammed arasında fiziksel benzerlikler kurgulayan ve bu şekilde belirli bir otorite devri söylemi geliştiren üçüncü bir siyasal söylem türünden bahsetmek mümkündür.

Ele alınan dönemde eser veren Osmanlı tarihçileri, tarih anlatılarının kurgulanmasının siyasal anlamı konusunda oldukça açık bir görüşe sahiptirler. Çeşitli versiyonlar ve yorumlar içerisinde yeni renk ve derinlikler kazanmakla birlikte bu görüş tarih bilgisinin bir tür siyaset bilgisi olduğu ve dolaylı olarak hanedanın kendisi hakkında öz bilince sahip olmasının bir yolu olduğu noktasında ortaklaşmaktadır. Bu çerçevede geniş tarih anlatılarının ve yorumlarının ortaya çıktığı on altıncı yüzyılın ilk yılları aynı zamanda Osmanlı kimliğini inşasında ilk taslakları da barındırması bakımından kayda değer bir mecra teşkil etmektedir. Yukarıda işaret edilen etnik göstergelere dayanarak denilebilir ki hâkim kimlik olarak Osmanlı kimliği bu dönemde bir taslak olarak ortaya çıkarken doğrudan doğruya kendi toplumsal varlığını tanımlayarak tarih sahnesinde yer almamış, tam tersine kendi tanımını ‘öteki’ haline getirdiği diğer toplumsal gruplar, inançlar ve örgütlenme biçimleri üzerinden gerçekleştirmiştir. Bu çerçevede Osmanlı hanedanı etrafında örgütlenen hâkim toplumsal sınıf ve siyasal güce eklenen toplumsal kesimler bu yeni kimliğin bir parçası haline gelirken, bu türden bir eklenme imkanına direnen toplumsal kesimler hâkim kimliğin dışında konumlandırılmışlardır. Genel olarak bakıldığında söz konusu kimlik formasyonu kentli, Sünnî ve egemen sınıfın bir parçası olmak ilkelerinin bir bileşimi olarak formüle edilebilirken ve zorunlu olarak kırsal, Sünnî-formasyonun dışında kalan, siyasal olarak otonom veya madun toplumsal kesimlerin kimlik ve kültürünü dışta bırakmaktadır.

Sonuç olarak bu tez çalışması içerisinde barındırdığı sekiz temel bölüm yordamıyla Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesinin erken dönemine dair geniş bir panorama çizme iddiasındadır. Bu panorama Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesinin geliştiği tarihsel ve toplumsal ilişkilerin ve entelektüel bağlamın karmaşık katmanlarının hem teorik hem de karşılaştırmalı analiz yoluyla açılmasına dayanmaktadır. Bu meyanda Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesinin gelişimi erken devlet biçiminin ve buna karşı yönelen toplumsal eleştirinin gelişiminden, imparatorluk rejiminin tesisine değin takip edilmekte, bu genel

gelişim çizgisi içerisinde siyasal düşüncelerin inşası onları inşa eden toplumsal kesimlerin çelişkili bir aradalığına atıfla anlamlandırılmaya çalışılmaktadır. Söz konusu incelemenin varlığı sonuçların başlıcaları şunlardır: (i) Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesi en gelişmiş biçimine on altıncı yüzyılda ulaşmış olsa da erken dönemde de çok boyutlu ve derinlikli bir siyasal düşünce dünyası bulunmakta ve bu dönemdeki tartışmalar kendisini takip eden döneme kaynaklık etmektedir, (ii) Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesi durağan ve kendisini tekrar eden bir düşünce karakteri sergilemekten uzaktır ve birbirini takip eden tarihsel dönemler boyunca yeni konu ve vurgularla zenginleşmektedir, (iii) Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesi uyum içerisinde ve homojen yapıları bir toplumsal yapıyı yansıtmamaktadır, tam tersine onun karakteristik özellikleri toplumsal tabakalaşma ve sınıf mücadeleleri içerisinde ortaya çıkmakta ve farklı toplumsal kesimlerin rant ve statü merkezli mücadeleleri içeride şekillenmektedir, (iv) Osmanlı toplumunu oluşturan unsurlar ne dolaysızca dini söylem ne de devlet otoritesi altında çıkarlar, dünya görüşü veya ortak kimlik kategorileri altında kaynaşmış değillerdir, tam tersine farklı toplumsal kesimler görece otonomilerini veya toplumsal çıkarlarını diğerlerine karşı savunmakta ve bunun yansımaları siyasal düşünceler içerisinde kendisini göstermektedir.

Genel olarak Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesinin erken döneminin akademik literatürde yeterli ilgili görmemiş olması, özel olarak ise bu dönemin yetkin bir teorik analizinin ve detaylı bir incelemesinin Osmanlı tarihi çalışmalarının diğer kısımlarına da olumlu katkı sunma potansiyeline sahip olması bu çalışmanın çıkış noktasını teşkil etmektedir. Bu çerçevede çalışma boyunca Osmanlı siyasal düşüncesinin kökenlerinin, toplumsal ve entelektüel bağlamının ve dönemsel temalarının tespit edilmesi, aynı zamanda bu öğelerin karşılaştırmalı ve eleştirel bir analize tabi tutulması çalışmanın literatüre vaat ettiği katkıyı mütevazı ölçülerde de olsa gerçekleştirebildiğini düşündürmektedir.

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